

THE NEW CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF
ISLAM

★

VOLUME 5

The Islamic World in the Age of
Western Dominance

★

Edited by

FRANCIS ROBINSON



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THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF

ISLAM

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VOLUME 5

The Islamic World in the Age of Western Dominance

Volume 5 of *The New Cambridge History of Islam* examines the history of Muslim societies from 1800 to the present. Francis Robinson, a leading historian of Islam, has brought together a team of scholars with a broad range of expertise to explore how Muslims responded to the challenges of Western conquest and domination across the last two hundred years. As their contributions reveal, the social, economic, political and historical circumstances which influenced these responses have, in many instances and in different parts of the world, empowered Muslim societies and encouraged transformation and religious revival. The volume offers a fascinating glimpse into the local dimensions of that revival and how, by extension, regional connections have been forged. Synthesising the academic research of the past thirty years, as well as offering substantial guidance for further study, this book is the starting point for all those who wish to have a serious understanding of modern Muslim societies.

FRANCIS ROBINSON is Professor of the History of South Asia in the Department of History, Royal Holloway, University of London, and Sultan of Oman Fellow, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and Visiting Professor in the History of the Islamic World, University of Oxford. His previous publications include *The Mughal Emperors and the Islamic Dynasties of Iran and Central Asia 1206–1925* (2007), *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia* (2000) and, as editor, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World* (1996).

THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
ISLAM

The New Cambridge History of Islam offers a comprehensive history of Islamic civilisation, tracing its development from its beginnings in seventh century Arabia to its wide and varied presence in the globalised world of today. Under the leadership of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Muslim community coalesced from a scattered, desert population and, following his death, emerged from Arabia to conquer an empire which, by the early eighth century, stretched from India in the east to Spain in the west. By the eighteenth century, despite political fragmentation, the Muslim world extended from West Africa to South East Asia. Today, Muslims are also found in significant numbers in Europe and the Americas, and make up about one fifth of the world's population.

To reflect this geographical distribution and the cultural, social and religious diversity of the peoples of the Muslim world, *The New Cambridge History of Islam* is divided into six volumes. Four cover historical developments, and two are devoted to themes that cut across geographical and chronological divisions – themes ranging from social, political and economic relations to the arts, literature and learning. Each volume begins with a panoramic introduction setting the scene for the ensuing chapters and examining relationships with adjacent civilisations. Two of the volumes – one historical, the other thematic – are dedicated to the developments of the last two centuries, and show how Muslims, united for so many years in their allegiance to an overarching and distinct tradition, have sought to come to terms with the emergence of Western hegemony and the transition to modernity.

The time is right for this new synthesis reflecting developments in scholarship over the last generation. *The New Cambridge History of Islam* is an ambitious enterprise directed and written by a team combining established authorities and innovative younger scholars. It will be the standard reference for students, scholars and all those with enquiring minds for years to come.

General editor

MICHAEL COOK, CLASS OF 1943 UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR OF
NEAR EASTERN STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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*The Formation of the Islamic world
Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*

EDITED BY CHASE F. ROBINSON

VOLUME 2

*The Western Islamic World
Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries*

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EDITED BY ROBERT IRWIN

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The Islamic World in the Age of Western Dominance

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VOLUME 6

*Muslims and Modernity
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EDITED BY ROBERT W. HEFNER

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Note on transliteration

Since many of the languages used by Muslims are written in the Arabic or other non Latin alphabets, these languages appear in transliteration.

The transliteration of Arabic and Persian is based upon the conventions used by *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition, with the following modifications. For the fifth letter of the Arabic alphabet (*jīm*), *j* is used (not *ḍj*), as in *jumla*. For the twenty first letter (*qāf*), *q* is used (not *ḳ*), as in *qadī*. Digraphs such as *th*, *dh*, *gh*, *kh* and *sh* are not underlined.

For Ottoman Turkish, modern Turkish orthography is used.

For terms and names in other languages, the individual chapter contributors employ systems of transliteration that are standard for those languages.

Where there are well accepted Anglicised versions of proper nouns or terms (e.g. Nasser, Baghdad, Sufi), these are used instead of strict transliterations.

Chronology


- 1762 Death of Shah Walī Allah, the founder of the reforming tradition in Indian Islam.
- 1792 Death of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab, inspirer of the reforming tradition in Arabia and ally of the Sa‘ūdī family in their search for power.
- 1798 French invasion of Egypt.
- 1799 British conquest of Mysore, the last major independent Muslim power in India.
- 1803 Beginning of the Padri wars in Sumatra, in which economic issues mingled with Islamic reform until 1837.
- 1804 ‘Usman dan Fodio launches his reforming jihad in West Africa, leading to the formation of the caliphate of Sokoto.
- 1818 Britain becomes the paramount power on the Indian subcontinent.
- 1821 Ḥajjī Shari‘at Allah founds the Fara’idī movement, the first of a continuing process of reform in Bengal.
- 1825 Prince Dipanagara declares jihad in central Java to purify Islam and expel the heathen; the war lasts until 1830.
- 1830 The French invade Algeria.
- 1831 Death at Balakot of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī, who by means of jihad founded a state on India’s North West Frontier. His Ṭarīqa yī Muḥammadi inspired subsequent reforming activity.
- 1834 Imam Shamil begins his thirty year jihad against Russian expansion in the Caucasus.
- 1839 Beginning of the Westernising reform era in the Ottoman Empire, the Tanzimat.
- 1852 Al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal begins a reforming jihad in the Senegambia region of West Africa which leads to the foundation of several Muslim states.

- 1856 Du Wenxiu leads a Muslim rebellion in Yunnan which establishes a Muslim state in half the province until 1873.
- 1857 8 Indian Mutiny Uprising, and the deposition of the last Mughal ruler of India.
- 1862 Muslim rebellion begins against Chinese rule in Gansu and Shaanxi in the context of which Ma Hua long tries to establish a Muslim state.
- 1864 Completion of the Russian occupation of the Caucasus.
- 1867 Foundation of the Deoband *madrasa* in northern India.
- 1867 Ya'qub Beg leads a rising against Chinese rule in East Turkistan and founds a khanate.
- 1869 Opening of the Suez Canal.
- 1873 Jihad against Dutch rule begins in the north Sumatran province of Aceh, which does not end until 1912.
- 1877 Foundation of Muhammadan Anglo Oriental College, Aligarh, the focus of the modernising Aligarh movement among Indian Muslims.
- 1881 France declares Tunisia a protectorate.
- 1882 British occupation of Egypt.
- 1885 Death of Muḥammad Aḥmad al Mahdī, who by means of a reforming jihad founded a Mahdist state in the Sudan.
- 1895 Completion of the Russian conquest of Central Asia, beginning with the conquest of the Kazakh lands in 1854. Protectorates established over the ancient khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.
- 1897 Death of the influential Islamic modernist Jamal al Dīn al Afghani.
- 1898 Death of Sayyid Aḥmad Khan, creator of the Aligarh movement and leading thinker of Islamic modernism, who laid the basis for the separatist strand in Muslim politics, which led to the foundation of the All India Muslim League in 1906 and ultimately to Pakistan.
- 1905 Death of Muḥammad 'Abduḥ, the leader of Islamic modernism in Egypt, and influential in the wider Muslim world.
- 1905 The Iranian constitutional revolution begins, leading to the promulgation of a constitution and the establishment of a parliament. In 1911 the new regime was destroyed by Russian intervention.
- 1912 The French declare Morocco a protectorate.


- 1912 Italy conquers Libya.
- 1912 The reformist Muhammadiya organisation founded in the Dutch East Indies.
- 1917 The Balfour Declaration offers British support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
- 1919 The Anglo Persian Agreement makes Iran virtually a British protectorate.
- 1919 Beginning of the Turkish War of Independence. Nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) by 1922 drive Greek invaders out of Turkey and resist European attempts to dismember the land.
- 1920 The League of Nations gives mandates to France to rule the former Ottoman territories of Syria and the Lebanon and to Britain to rule the former Ottoman territories of Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine.
- 1924 Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) abolishes the caliphate.
- 1925 Reza Khan, after taking control of the army and police and bringing most of the country under his rule, declares himself shah of Iran.
- 1927 Mawlana Muḥammad Ilyas founds the Tablīghī Jama‘at in India, which comes to have a worldwide reach.
- 1928 Foundation of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood by Ḥasan al Banna.
- 1932 Foundation of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia by ‘Abd al ‘Azīz ibn Sa‘ud, the outcome of a campaign to restore Saudi power which he had waged since 1902.
- 1932 Iraq granted independence.
- 1938 Death of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), founder of modern Turkey.
- 1938 Death of the Islamic modernist poet thinker Muḥammad Iqbal, whose ideas provided substance for Muslim separatism and the creation of the state of Pakistan.
- 1941 Foundation of the Islamist Jama‘at i Islāmī by Mawlana Mawdudī.
- 1946 Syria achieves independence.
- 1946 Jordan (formally Transjordan) achieves independence, but remains under pronounced British influence until 1956.
- 1947 Partition of British India and the emergence of the independent states of India and Pakistan.

- 1948 End of the Palestine mandate; the United Nations approves the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel. First Arab Israeli war.
- 1949 Indonesia achieves independence from Dutch rule.
- 1951 Libya achieves independence from British rule.
- 1952 Free Officers coup in Egypt leads to the Arab nationalist regime of Gamal Abd al Nasser from 1954.
- 1953 An Anglo American engineered coup overthrows the National Front government of Mosaddegh in Iran.
- 1956 Sudan achieves independence from British rule.
- 1956 Anglo French invasion of Egypt to secure the Canal Zone fails; second Arab Israeli war.
- 1957 The Malay states achieve independence from British rule, becoming Malaysia in 1963.
- 1958 Morocco achieves independence from France.
- 1958 General Muhammad Ayub Khan declares martial law in Pakistan, beginning a process of regular military intervention in Pakistani politics.
- 1960 The Turkish military intervene in Turkish politics, setting a pattern which was to be repeated in 1971, 1980 and subsequently.
- 1960 Nigeria achieves independence from Britain and Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali and Mauritania from France.
- 1962 Algeria achieves independence from France.
- 1966 General Suharto seizes power from President Sukarno in Indonesia and maintains his 'New Order' regime until he is forced to resign in 1998.
- 1966 Egyptian regime executes Sayyid Qutb, theoretician of the 'second phase' in the development of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- 1967 Third Arab Israeli war leads to Israel's conquest of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan and East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
- 1969 The Organisation of the Islamic Conference founded in reaction to an arson attack on the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. It becomes the second largest international organisation after the United Nations.
- 1970 Death of Nasser.
- 1971 East Pakistan breaks away from Pakistan to become the independent state of Bangladesh.


- 1973 Fourth Arab Israeli war, in which Egypt achieves a 'moral' victory over Israel.
- 1973 The great oil price rise engineered through OPEC (Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries) brings new wealth to Muslim oil producing countries.
- 1979 Revolution in Iran leads to the overthrow of the government of Mohammad Shah Pahlavi and the installation of a religious regime under the leadership of Ayat Allah Khomeini.
- 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan.
- 1979 By the Camp David Accord between Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin Egypt recognises Israel in exchange for the return of the Sinai Peninsula.
- 1981 Assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt by a splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- 1990 The former Muslim Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan achieve independence.
- 1990 Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait, leading to the first Gulf War.
- 1992 Hindu revivalist forces demolish the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya in northern India, leading to fears for the position of Muslims within the Indian republic.
- 1996 Ethnic Pashtun Taliban forces capture power in Afghanistan and impose a strict Islamic regime.
- 2001 On 11 September civilian aeroplanes flown by Muslims affiliated with al Qa'ida crash into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington.
- 2001 US forces destroy the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
- 2002 The Islamist Justice and Development Party wins power in the Turkish elections on a platform of democracy, human rights, good economic management and EU entry. The victory was repeated in the elections of 2007.
- 2003 The second Gulf War, in which the Anglo American invasion of Iraq leads to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.




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3. Islamic reform and resistance movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries



4. Muslim population by percentage of total population c. 2000




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6. The settlement of the Middle East, 1915-21



7. North Africa in the nineteenth century



8. Arabia in the nineteenth century




9. Iran and Afghanistan to the mid twentieth century



10. Central Asia and the Caucasus to 1990




II. South Asia to independence



12. South East Asia to independence



13. The jihad states of sub Saharan Africa



14. East Africa in the nineteenth century



15. China in the twentieth century

Introduction

FRANCIS ROBINSON

Muslim societies since 1800 have been influenced by two developments of the first importance. First, the Islamic world system, which from its emergence had walked hand in hand with power, came to be dominated by forces from the West. This domination, moreover, was not just one of conquest and rule; there came with it economic, social, intellectual and political forces of great transformative power. Second, every Muslim society came to be animated by movements of Islamic revival and reform. These movements took different shapes according to the circumstances of the societies in which they flourished. By the end of the twentieth century the programmes of these movements were distinctive features in the lives of most societies and the defining features of some. From the outset it should be clear that the roots of religious reform lie deep in the pre modern history of Muslim societies, that aspects of the movement were already manifest in the eighteenth century and that their prime purpose was inner renewal. However, the period of Western dominance gave urgency and extra purpose to these movements. From context to context there were different interplays between Western power and manifestations of Islamic revival. As time went by Western understandings of Muslim societies came increasingly to be coloured by their experience of the revival. In the same way movements of revival were both shaped by the contact with the West and energised by their resistance to it.

The onset of Western power in Muslim lands was swift and often brutal. The symbolic beginning was Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in June 1798. In fact, Muslim power had been on the retreat from at least 12 September 1683, when the Ottoman forces besieging Vienna had been ordered to retreat, never to return. Since then there had been a slow erosion of power on the margins of their world: the Dutch had gained a substantial foothold in island South East Asia, the British in India, the Russians in the Crimea, the Habsburgs in the Balkans. But 1798 was the moment when Europe asserted itself in the central Islamic lands for the first time since the Crusades, and

did so with armies bearing the banners of reason, nationalism and state power.

Within three years the British and the Ottomans had driven the French from Egypt. But this did not in any way impair the rapid movement of European power into Muslim lands. In 1800 the Dutch government took over from its East India Company in island South East Asia and spread its authority throughout the Archipelago until the process was completed by the end of the Aceh War in 1912. In India, in 1799, the British defeated the last major independent Muslim power in Mysore. By 1818 they were acknowledged as the paramount power in the subcontinent, keeping the descendants of the Mughal emperors virtual prisoners in Delhi. By 1858, after sacking the old Mughal capital in the suppression of the Mutiny Uprising, they ruled all India, either directly or indirectly.

The strategic demands of British India meant further British expansion into Muslim lands. The Afghans, fortunate in their terrain, their warlike habits and their position as a buffer between British India and tsarist Russia, succeeded in preserving their freedom. In the Gulf, however, British influence steadily grew, as it did in southern Iran and along Arabia's southern shore. The completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 and European competition for power led to British domination of the Nile Valley. In 1882 they occupied Egypt, which led in 1898 to the establishment of a condominium with the Egyptians over the Sudan, in which the British held effective authority. On the western shores of the Indian Ocean they shared out the considerable possessions of the sultans of Zanzibar with Germany and Italy. On the eastern shores they had from the 1870s begun to assert their hegemony over the sultans of the Malay states.

At the same time tsarist Russia spread southwards and eastwards to absorb its Muslim neighbours. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia pressed forward in the Caucasus, conquering the Iranian territory of northern Azerbaijan. By 1864, after a bloody struggle for Daghestan, the whole region was occupied. In Central Asia the lands of the Kazakhs were secured by 1854, the khanate of Kokand by 1873, the lands of the Turkomans by 1885 and those of the Tajiks by 1895; protectorates were established over the ancient khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. After the Russian Revolution all became Soviet republics.

The French advance into North and West Africa was no less dramatic, and was accompanied in some areas, as the Russian one had been, by a great influx of European settlers. In 1830 they invaded Algeria; in 1881 they declared Tunisia a protectorate and in 1912 Morocco. The first two were the main

focus of French settlement. By 1912 they had also expanded from Senegal eastwards across the savannah lands to the borders of the Anglo Egyptian Sudan, subduing a string of Muslim states, several of which owed their origins to the Muslim revival. Only the British, who drew the sultanate of Sokoto into their main West African colony of Nigeria, also ruled large numbers of Muslims in the region. Other European powers picked up what crumbs they could; in 1912, for instance, Spain asserted a protectorate over the northern tip of Morocco, and Italy conquered Libya. By the outbreak of the First World War all the Muslims of Africa, except those in Ethiopia, were under European rule.

The Ottoman Empire was not exempt from the surging tide of European power. Through the nineteenth century European powers steadily put more and more pressure on the empire's Balkan territories as they annexed a piece of land here and competed for influence there. The outcome was that the Christian peoples of the Balkans – Greeks, Serbians, Romanians, Bulgarians, supported by one European power or another – threw off Ottoman rule and brought the sizeable Muslim populations of the region beneath their sway. By the First World War only the rump of Rumelia remained of the empire's European territories. The war itself saw the Arab peoples of the empire also fall under European rule as the British, with Arab help, drove Ottoman forces in the Fertile Crescent back into Anatolia, and divided the spoils with their French allies. By 1920 the Ottomans, whose subjects were now mainly Turks, were fighting to hold on to their Anatolian heartland, which the Europeans proposed to dismember, seizing chunks for themselves and creating a Greek Christian province in the west and an Armenian Christian state in the east.

In a mere 120 years or so almost all the Muslim peoples of the world had fallen under European rule.¹ Only the Muslims of Afghanistan, the Yemen and central Arabia could pretend to real independence; those of Iran had one qualified by the division of their country into Russian and British spheres of influence. Great cities – Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Samarqand, Delhi – all redolent of the changing phases of Muslim glory and achievement, were now subject to European authority. Muslim peoples were in the hands of their European masters. But worse was to come. In 1924 the caliphate was abolished: not an act of European power, but of Mustafa Kemal, as he sought to bring a secular focus and new strength to the fledgling Turkish Republic. In

¹ While the master narrative is one of Western advance, in areas beyond Western control Muslim communities were coming to feel the weight of alien rule, for instance, the Uyghurs of China's Xinjiang and the Muslims of Buddhist Thailand.

one sense this meant little; the office of caliph had long been divorced of any real sense of power and leadership of the Muslim community. But in another sense it symbolised much; its demise meant the breaking of a link that reached back to the time of the Prophet Muḥammad and which spoke of how successful, until recently, the community had been.

The period from the post First World War settlement to the 1960s saw most Muslim societies achieve freedom from European rule. First, the two peoples whose freedom was threatened by the designs of European imperialism, the Turks and the Iranians, succeeded in asserting their independence. The Ottomans under the remarkable leadership of Mustafa Kemal drove all foreign armies out of Anatolia and established a modern Turkish nation state. In Iran the Cossack Brigade officer Reza Shah Pahlavi followed in his wake, enabling Iran to loosen the bonds of imperial control fashioned in the Anglo Persian agreement of 1919. The limitations of his achievement, however, were demonstrated when in the Second World War both Britain and Russia were able to reassert their interests in the country. The two decades following this war saw the bulk of Muslim peoples gain their independence. In 1947 this was the fortune of one quarter of the world's Muslims when, amidst appalling slaughter of Muslims by Hindus and Sikhs, and of Hindus and Sikhs by Muslims, British India achieved independence as the sovereign states of India and Pakistan. In 1949 Indonesia emerged from Dutch rule to become, after Pakistan split into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, the world's most populous Muslim state. In 1957 the Malay states followed suit from British rule, becoming Malaysia in 1963. Between 1946 and 1958 it was the turn of Egypt, Libya, the Sudan and the Arab states of West Asia, which colonial power interacting with local forces had forged from the former Ottoman territories. Only the peoples of Palestine, Christians of course as well as Muslims, failed to share in the new world of infant nation states, as Zionist settlers, whose ambition to found a homeland had been endorsed by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, forced the creation of a Jewish state in 1948. In the late 1950s and 1960s the Muslim peoples of North, West and East Africa gained their freedom, along with those of the southern Arabian shore and the Gulf. This left the Muslim peoples under Soviet rule as the last remaining group of significant numbers without their freedom. This they gained in the early 1990s.

Freedom from European rule, however, did not bring freedom from Western power. As they gained their freedom many Muslim states, particularly in the central Islamic lands, found themselves entangled in the Cold War rivalries of the Great Powers. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan became part of what was known as the 'northern tier' of defence against the expansionism of

the Soviet Union. Pakistan's generals in 1958 would keep Washington closely informed of their intention to launch a coup.² Arab socialist republics, on the other hand Egypt, Syria and Iraq allied themselves with the Soviet Union; for a time it seemed the better way of asserting their independence and gaining some extra strength in confronting Israel. There were significant interventions, or attempted interventions, in the affairs of Muslim societies: the Anglo American overthrow of Mosaddegh's regime in Iran in 1953, which arguably held back the growth of democracy for decades; the inglorious Anglo French invasion of Egypt in 1956 to secure the Canal Zone, which was the last 'hurrah' of the old European imperial powers; in 1958 the USA sent troops to the Lebanon and the British to Jordan with the aim of stemming the onward march of Arab nationalism; in 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, leading to resistance organised by the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, among others, which had a considerable impact on Muslim lives from Central Asia, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Kashmir; from 1982 there was the substantial support which the USA, the USSR and France, in particular, gave to Iraq in its eight year war with Iran; in 1983 and 1984 there was the intervention of the USA in the Lebanon which was supposed to hold back the advance of Syrian, and therefore also Soviet, influence.

From the 1990s the USA was the hegemonic power in the Muslim world. Russia imposed its will in its backyard most notably and with brutal force on the Chechens of the Caucasus. Elsewhere the 'new world order' was decreed by the USA. It forced the Indonesians out of their rule of Christian East Timor. Very belatedly, although here British foot dragging bears a heavy responsibility, it delivered aid to assist the Muslim Bosnians in resisting ethnic cleansing by the Christian Serbs.³ With greater expedition it used massive force to relieve the Kosovan Muslims from Serbian oppression. Various states stood up to the hegemonic ambitions of the USA, among them Libya, the Sudan, Syria and Iran; indeed, the continuing capacity of the Islamic Republic of Iran to resist American pressure has demonstrated the greater strength of the revolutionary regime in the face of outside forces as compared with the Qajar and Pahlavi regimes that preceded it. All have been warned; they have been designated 'states of concern'. In two cases, one an organisation, the other a state, active opposition to the hegemonic will led to awesome displays of American power. From the early 1990s Osama Bin Laden's al Qa'ida

2 Ayesha Jalal, *The state of martial rule: The origins of Pakistan's political economy of defence* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 275.

3 Brendan Simms, *Unfinest hour: Britain and the destruction of Bosnia* (London, 2001).

al Sulbah (The solid base) organisation conducted a series of assaults on symbols of American power, culminating on 11 September 2001 in the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. In the autumn of 2001 the USA responded by destroying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which sheltered Bin Laden. In 1990 Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait. The immediate response was the destruction of Saddam's invading force by Western armies in the first Gulf War, the establishment of a major American military presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, action throughout the 1990s to contain Iraq, which led, when those containment measures appeared to be weakening, to an Anglo American invasion of the country in the spring of 2003 and to the destruction of its Ba'thist regime. A Muslim of historical bent might reflect that, some 205 years after the French entered Cairo, the West was playing the same old game in Baghdad; forcing its way into a major capital city of the Muslim world and claiming that it was bringing freedom and enlightenment to the people.

Nothing has more constantly reminded Muslims of the power of outside forces in their lives than the existence and the policies of the state of Israel. They know that the process of Zionist settlement in Palestine would not have been successful without British support, however qualified. They know that the emergence from the mid 1950s of Israel as a major power in West Asia would not have been possible without the unstinting material and political support of the West. They know that Israelis have only been able to achieve their colonial settlement of Arab lands seized in the war of 1967, and in breach of international law, because of American support. They know, too, that Israel has treated Palestinians with scant justice and much brutal force though no more brutal than that deployed by many Muslim regimes with the assurance of American support. For many Muslims the injustices meted out to the Palestinians symbolise both the injustices many experience in their own lives and their own impotence in the face of overwhelming power. In the twenty first century Muslims know that the power of the West to intervene in their world in pursuit of its ends is greater than ever it was in the nineteenth.

The growing power of the West in the Muslim world meant much more than the capacity to dictate the boundaries of states or the lifespans of regimes. It transformed many of the structures of Muslim societies, as it has those of societies throughout the globe. The economies of Muslim societies came to be integrated into a global economy, driven by the industrial revolutions of the West, with their continuous processes of scientific and technological innovation. Whether it was in the plantations of South East

Asia, the cotton fields of Egypt or the oilfields of the Middle East, whole new worlds of production and exchange were created which overshadowed those of peasant husbandry, handicraft production and the bazaar – the communal solidarities they had bred and the Islamic institutions that had rested upon them for centuries. No new physical presence signalled the changes taking place more dramatically than the new Western style cities, which more often than not grew up alongside the old ones, and which brought a new world of broad streets, glass fronted shops, public clocks for the precise regulation of time and suburban hinterlands of slums, flats and villas.

Forms of the modern state were introduced, either during the period of colonial rule or as part of an attempt to keep the Europeans out. Powered by ever growing bureaucracies, such states were increasingly concerned to reach down to individual citizens, direct them towards their purposes, and make them focus their first loyalty upon the state. Such states were likely to be intolerant of tribal and other competing sources of allegiance. Their relationship with the '*ulama*', and others concerned to focus Muslim energies on godly ends, was likely to be more strained than previously in Islamic history. Western knowledge, which seemed to be a key source of Western power, increasingly came to be used in Muslim societies. It was needed to run the modern economy and modern state; it was particularly needed to enable Muslim societies to strive to keep up with the West and to be strong enough to look after themselves in an age of Western domination. Inevitably, the great traditions of *madrassa* learning came to be pushed to one side, as were the attitudes that pervaded the *madrassa*. No longer was the search for knowledge primarily a process of trying to discover and preserve all that one could learn from an age of past perfection. Now the emphasis was on innovation, the discovery of new ideas, new facts, new processes and the testing of all old knowledge in the light of new understandings.

New elites formed to run the new economic and political structures: bankers, traders, commercial farmers, industrial workers, bureaucrats, soldiers, politicians, intellectuals, journalists. All embraced the new knowledge to the extent that they needed it. Some were educated in the languages of Europe: English, French, Dutch, German, Russian. Many became divorced from their heritage of learning, and sought to understand it primarily through Western sources. Even those who did come to lead the cultural resistance to the West often drew on its wisdom to make their case. Thus, the thought of Muḥammad Iqbal, poet philosopher of the Pakistan movements, owed much to that of Nietzsche, Bergson and Renan, and that of 'Alī Shari'atī, who prepared the Western educated young for the Iranian revolution, to Sartre,

Fanon and Massignon. This was the case, moreover, even for the founding fathers of Islamism for whom the preservation of Islamic cultural authenticity meant so much. Sayyid Quṭb, the leader of the second stage in the development of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwan al Muslimīn), was profoundly influenced by the French fascist thinker and Nobel Prize winning biologist Alexis Carrel; Mawlana Mawdūdī, the creator of the subcontinent's Jama'at i Islāmī, was deeply read in Western thought, from Plato, through Darwin and Marx, to George Bernard Shaw.

Through these new elites, as well as through the education systems of the colonial states and their successors, ideas derived from the European Enlightenment came increasingly to circulate in Muslim societies. There was a growth in the scientific mentality and the idea that knowledge should be tested against the advances of scientific discovery, a process that was likely to disenchant the world and threaten the supremacy which could be claimed for God. There were the outcomes of the great Enlightenment political achievements of the American and French revolutions with their emphasis on the rights of man, the political freedom of individuals and the sovereignty of the people as the source of state power. In the twentieth century there was the considerable influence of socialist thought among secular elites, attracted by its critique of Western capitalism, its apparently 'progressive' nature and its proposal of a secular communitarian ethic instead of the Islamic one. For much of the twentieth century Muslim elites drew on aspects of these ideas as they strove to free themselves from Western dominance. On achieving independence command economies were often adopted to limit the economic impact of the West.

Crucial to the spread of knowledge of Europe – indeed, of all forms of knowledge in Muslim societies – was the sustained adoption from the nineteenth century of print. Muslims had known about the printing press for 300 years, but its adoption had been resisted for a range of reasons, among them a shrewd understanding of its potential impact on the authority of religious and political leadership. From the nineteenth century, however, Muslim elites began to use the press with vigour. Muslim states saw its potential for building up state power; other Muslims saw its potential in supporting either their struggles for power within society or the campaigns to overthrow colonial rule. Lithographic printing became a major new activity for the artisans of towns and cities, and printed matter – books in particular – an important new trade for the Muslim world. The growth of the newspaper industry was of great importance. In part this was because it created a new public space in which ideas could be transmitted and discussed, but in part

too, and especially after the introduction of the telegraph in the second half of the century, because it increasingly integrated Muslims into a global world of shared news and information – though not, of course, of shared perception. From the mid nineteenth century the press led the expansion of the horizon of Muslim minds. If at first they were focused on the doings of their courts or governments, by the early twentieth century they readily embraced the Muslim world, and after the First World War were developing a global reach from Japan and China through Europe to the Americas.⁴

From the second half of the twentieth century, and particularly from the 1970s, the pressures of Western capitalism and Western culture became increasingly intense. The increase in pressure was initiated from within the Islamic world. The great oil price rise of 1973, which was engineered through OPEC (Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries), brought much new wealth to the Muslim oil producing countries, at least some of which spread more widely through the Muslim world as the oil producing economies sought labour and bought influence. Growing numbers of Muslims engaged with Western consumerism. The major change, however, came with the Thatcher/Reagan market revolution in the West, which cut public spending, privatised nationalised industries, freed financial services and deregulated foreign exchange markets. This ‘capitalist revival’, as it has been called, transformed the conditions for economic success so that they no longer lay in manufacturing production but in the financing and marketing of goods and services. This process was boosted first of all by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the removal of both an alternative economic model and a restraint on Western capitalism. It was also boosted by the way in which the major Western powers used the institutions of global economic governance such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, etc., to impose their vision of good practice on the weaker economies of the world. Indebtedness made Muslim economies, along with other weaker ones, susceptible to being restructured on Western terms. Towards the end of the twentieth century Muslim societies were increasingly facing the choice of either liberalising their economies, with the huge risks of economic, social and political instability that such action would involve, or of falling further and further behind the economic development of much of the rest of the world.⁵

4 Francis Robinson, ‘Islam and the impact of print in South Asia’, in Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim history in South Asia* (Delhi, 2000), pp. 66–104.

5 Simon W. Murden, *Islam, the Middle East, and the new global hegemony* (Boulder, 2002).

In the case of Western ideas and culture, in particular its consumerist culture, influences were pouring into Muslim societies in ever increasing quantities. Increased trade, travel and tourism played a role in this, but of major importance were the internet and satellite television. The former provides access to an extraordinary panoply of representations of humanity and human interests in institutional and individual form, while at the same time enabling Muslims to interact with the world of Muslim ideas and organisations as never before. The latter was bound to have an attraction in environments in which the media were often exposed to state control and censorship. Nevertheless, the satellite channels were dominated by news gathered by Western news corporations and edited to suit Western agendas and by entertainment in large part generated in the West and projecting individualism, consumerism, sanitised violence and female liberation. Muslim states, however repressive, have had difficulty in restricting access. Individual Muslims have been enabled to interact with the West as never before.

Western domination set Muslim societies major challenges. At first they did not seem to demand a fundamental transformation of the way in which Muslims thought and lived. Indeed, in the early stages of colonial rule Europeans often adapted themselves to the societies to which they had come, learning their languages, using their systems of law and marrying their women. But as Western power grew, the fundamental nature of its challenges became clearer. There was the challenge of defeat. How was it that the Muslim community, which the Qur'an described as the 'greatest nation raised up for mankind' and which had been throughout its history an expanding and dominant force, had come to be subjected to the power of the West? There were the challenges posed by Western science and philosophy to God, His relationship to nature and to man, and to the life hereafter. There were the challenges from capitalism and Enlightenment values to aspects of the organisation of Muslim society on which the Qur'an had ruled precisely. European capitalism challenged the Qur'anic prohibition on taking interest; the new European commitment to the rights of man challenged the Qur'anic acceptance of slavery; while the new European belief in the equality of all human souls challenged the inferior position that the Qur'an seemed to have designated for women.⁶

The greatest challenge, however, came at the level of the state. The modern state seemed to be the prime source of Western strength. It was aspects of this state that Muslims introduced to make themselves strong enough to keep the

⁶ W. G. Clarence Smith, *Islam and the abolition of slavery* (Oxford, 2006).

Europeans out and which Europeans introduced to exploit the resources of their colonies. The key feature of the modern state was its increasing control of all available material and human resources and compensating involvement of the people, in one way or another, as legitimisers of these purposes. This raised the question: was it possible to continue to fashion a Muslim society if all activities and institutions, educational, legal and political, were devoted to state purposes rather than God's purposes? Was it possible to remain a Muslim society when controlled by state structures that were concerned to fashion the strongest aspirations of the people in terms of their relationship with the state rather than with God? A major theme of Islamic history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the attempt by Muslim peoples to answer these questions, as they sought to acquire the power to resist the West. Thus the history of states is the major organising theme of the volume. This said, by the latter part of the twentieth century the role of the modern state had given rise to a somewhat ironical reflection. On the one hand, its capacity to protect Muslim societies from the economic and cultural forces of globalisation was subject to an increasingly intense and successful siege. On the other, many such states were increasingly being hollowed out from within by the developing organisations of Islamic revivalism.

The challenges of the West were often met in Muslim societies with great creativity. But they also gave rise to feelings ranging from nostalgia at the loss of past glory and mortification at present Western power through to resentment swelling to rage at Western bullying, injustice and aggression. Nostalgia was the theme of one of the greatest works of nineteenth century Indian literature, the *Musaddas*, or elegy, of Aṭāf Ḥusayn Ḥālī. This great set piece poem on the rise and decline of Islam and its causes came to be used as the anthem of India's Muslim separatist movement, leaving audiences in tears:

When Autumn has set in over the garden,
 why speak of the springtime of flowers?
 When shadows of adversity hang over the present,
 why harp on the pomp and glory of the past?
 Yea, these are things to forget:
 but how can you with the dawn forget the scene of the night before?
 The assembly has just dispersed;
 the smoke is still rising from the burnt candle.
 The footprints on the sands of India still say:
 A graceful caravan passed this way.⁷

⁷ Translated by Gail Minault in 'Urdu political poetry during the Khilafat movement', *Modern Asian Studies*, 8, 4 (1974), pp. 459–71.

Mortification came with the realisation of European power. 'So it went on until all had passed leaving our hearts consumed with fire for what we had seen of their overwhelming power and mastery,' declared the secretary to the Moroccan envoy to France after watching a review of French troops in 1846. 'In comparison with the weakness of Islam . . . how confident they are, how impressive their state of readiness, how competent they are in matters of state, how firm their laws, how capable in war.'⁸

But, as Western power enveloped the Muslim world, there was growing protest. 'The British and the European nations do not consider Asians and Africans as human beings, and thus deny them human rights,' declared Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madani, principal of the great Indian reformist school of Deoband, in his autobiography written after his internment in Malta during the First World War. 'The British are the worst enemies of Islam and the Muslims on earth.'⁹ The position of Muḥammad Iqbal, who accepted a knighthood from the British, was not so very different:

Against Europe I protest,
And the attraction of the West.
Woe for Europe and her charm,
Swift to capture and disarm!
Europe's hordes with flame and fire
Desolate the world entire.¹⁰

The rejection of Europe, or by now the West in general, both as a destructive force and as a false model of progress, was a theme of many of the leading ideologues who prepared the way for the Iranian revolution. 'Come friends', said 'Alī Shari'atī in the 1960s, echoing his muse Fanon, 'let us abandon Europe; let us cease this nauseating apish imitation of Europe. Let us leave behind this Europe that always speaks of humanity, but destroys human beings wherever it finds them.'¹¹ As the United States replaced Europe in the demonology of the Muslim world, it became the focus of resentment. Ayat Allah Khomeini's howl of rage when in 1964 the Iranian parliament granted American citizens extra territorial rights in Iran in exchange for a

8 Muḥammad as Ṣaffar, *Disorienting encounters: Travels of a Moroccan scholar in France in 1845 1846*, ed. and trans. S. C. Miller (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 193 4.

9 H. A. Madani, *Safarnamah i Malta* (Deoband, 1920), quoted in R. Malik, 'Mawlana Husayn Ahmad Madani and Jamiyat 'Ulama i Hind 1920 1957: Status of Islam and Muslims in India', Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto (1995), pp. 44 5.

10 Muḥammad Iqbal, *Persian Psalms (Zabur i Ajam)* . . . from the Persian of the late Sir Muḥammad Iqbal, trans. A. J. Arberry (Karachi, 1968), p. 76.

11 Quoted in Hamid Algar's introduction to 'Alī Shari'atī, *On the sociology of Islam: Lectures by Alī Shari'atī*, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, 1979), p. 23.

\$200 million loan spoke for all Muslims who had felt powerless in the face of bullying from the West, from the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 to the continuing plight of the Palestinians since 1948: 'They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog.'¹²

Such feelings were no less strongly held in the Arab world, where as Arabs came to feel the weight of Western colonialism the Crusades were a key reference point. The myth of Saladin as the great leader of resistance to the West and his victory over the Crusaders at Hattin was a central theme of the Palestinian struggle under the British mandate. Indeed, the Israeli state came to be seen as the modern version of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, which was established by what Sayyid Qutb called 'the Crusader spirit which runs in the blood of all Westerners'.¹³ A similar image was conjured up in Arab and Muslim minds when Osama Bin Laden on 20 February 1998 proclaimed the formation of a 'world front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders':

The ruling to kill Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim . . . to liberate the al Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.¹⁴

The long tradition of Muslim resentment and protest at Western power in Muslim lands, and its results, is an unsurprising response, but one that has been too often overlooked.

If the growing domination of the West was one context for Muslim societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the second was the Islamic revival. Throughout the period, to a greater or lesser extent, Muslim societies were animated by the revival from West and North Africa, through the central Islamic lands to China and South East Asia. The revival took many different forms, depending on specific social, economic and political circumstances, and as time went on came increasingly to influence Muslim responses to the West.

At the heart of the Islamic revival was a shift in the balance of Muslim piety from an other worldly to a this worldly Islam. This meant a devaluing of a faith of contemplation of God's mysteries and of belief in His will to intercede for man on earth, and a valuing instead of a faith in which Muslims were

¹² 'The granting of capitulatory rights to the US', speech of 27 October 1964, in Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and revolution: Writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. and annot. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, 1981), p. 182.

¹³ Quoted in C. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic perspectives* (Edinburgh, 1999), p. 602.

¹⁴ Quoted in Y. Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The man who declared war on America* (Roseville, CA, 1999), pp. 226–7.

increasingly aware that it was they, and only they, who could act to create a just society on earth. Throughout the history of Muslim societies there had been tension between other worldly and this worldly piety. The Prophet and his companions had promulgated a this worldly activist socio political ethic, but as the Muslim community expanded to embrace Christian and other mystical traditions, and as Muslims came to reflect on the Qur'an and the religious practice of the Prophet, an other worldly or Sufi strand developed in their piety. The tensions this might involve were well exemplified in the life of that great medieval thinker al Ghazali, as he tells us in his autobiography, *al Munqidh min al dalal* (The deliverance from error), of how he first served this world and then the other world, but finally realised that his duty as a Muslim lay in this worldly action.

From the fourteenth century Muslim piety increasingly came to be dominated by an other worldly emphasis. The dominant influence in this move was the thought of the great Spanish Sufi Ibn 'Arabi, whose doctrine of *wahdat al wujud*, the unity of being, played an enormously important role, as Islam expanded to embrace societies from West Africa to South East Asia, in accommodating a myriad local religious practices within an Islamic umbrella. Moved, more often than not, by political decay and corruption in their worlds, the 'ulama' and Sufis, and later on the lay folk who led the movements of Muslim revival, were concerned to renew the faith of their societies by removing all practices that compromised the sovereignty of God and His guidance for mankind, and by promoting the requirement to act on earth to achieve salvation. The revivalist world was one that stressed the Muslim's personal responsibility to act for the good of the community.

Associated with the shift in piety was a set of processes which worked to shape the new activist Muslim. There was an attack on all ideas of intercession for man with God at, for instance, saints' shrines, which at its extreme meant opposition to any form of structure over a grave. There was for some though not all revivalists an attack on the great legacy of medieval Islamic scholarship so that believers might turn afresh to the Qur'an and Ḥadīth (Tradition, the reported sayings and doings of the Prophet). This was in part so that believers might return to God's guidance to chart an effective course in challenging times, but in part too so that they might focus on the dynamic example of the early community. Increasingly, the example of the Prophet was given new emphasis as a model for Muslim lives, as evinced by the organisations that took His name, for instance, the Ṭariqa yi Muḥammadi (Brotherhood of Muḥammad) of early nineteenth century India, and the numbers of biographies of Him that came to be written. Some of the new

emphasis on the Prophet was as a replacement for Sufi saints as the focus of warm and intensely human devotion, but the prime reason was his role as the model of the ultimate man of action.

This new emphasis on the responsibility of each Muslim to help fashion a Muslim society was accompanied by developments which assisted Muslims in doing so. The leaders of the Islamic revival realised that an Islamically educated community was their best defence against either Western power and cultural domination or Muslim rulers who wished to impose it upon them. Forms of Islamic education, usually operating outside the framework of the state, have been promulgated, such as the *pesantren* of Java, the *madrasas* of South Asia, the educational networks of the followers of Bediüzzaman Nursi in Turkey and the preaching tours of the Tablîghî Jama'at (Preaching society). The printing press was adopted. Right in the forefront were reformist '*ulama*' who, although they worried about their distancing from the transmission of knowledge, nevertheless saw the potential of print for creating an Islamically informed constituency in society. For most leaders of the Islamic revival print has been a crucial means of communication. Further stages in the democratisation of Islamic knowledge came with the translation of the Qur'an, Ḥadīth and other major Islamic texts into the languages of Muslim peoples. For the first time many Muslims were able to read and understand these texts. This development has been accompanied by the adoption of other forms of media technology and mass communication radio, television, film, audio and video cassettes, and recently the internet. This democratisation of Islamic knowledge has been largely empowering of Muslim individuals, organisations and communities. It has made the will of ever larger numbers of Muslims a fact in the life of Muslim societies. It has helped to make a growing reality of the new concept of caliphate – the caliphate of man. The idea of man as God's vice regent on earth seems first to have been promulgated in the modern era by Muḥammad 'Abduh; it was enthusiastically adopted by Muḥammad Iqbal, and has been the watchword of Islamic thinkers from Mawdudī in South Asia to al Banna and Quṭb in Egypt through to Shari'atī and Muṭaharī in Iran. The shift in the balance of piety from an other worldly to a this worldly focus is, arguably, the most important development in Muslim piety of the past thousand years.

The expansion of this worldly piety, and the activism it demands, has released a great surge of energy through Muslim societies. From time to time manifestations of this revivalist spirit have clashed with forces from the West, giving rise to Western understandings of an Islam both fanatical and implacably opposed to it. But, in truth, the Islamic revival has always been

primarily about inner religious renewal. It is a process that bears many similarities to the Protestant Reformation in Christianity: the attack on intercession; the emphasis on personal responsibility; the emphasis on literacy and the study of the sources; the role of print; the empowering of individual believers, etc. Indeed, some leaders of the revival drew specific comparisons. Jamal al Dīn al Afghānī was explicit in his admiration for the determination of the European Protestants to ignore their priests and to make up their own minds after studying the sources; not surprisingly, he cast himself as the Muslim Luther. 'We are today', declared Muḥammad Iqbal in his lectures on the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, 'passing through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution in Europe.'¹⁵

The roots of the Islamic revival were established well before any serious Western presence in the Muslim world. There was a long scholarly preparation. One key figure was the fourteenth century Ḥanbalī scholar of Damascus Ibn Taymiyya, whose critique of Ibn 'Arabī and of other worldly Islam has been an inspiration to supporters of the revival right down to the present. Among manifestations of the preparation was the reaction led by the Ḥadīth scholar 'Abd al Ḥaqq and the Naqshbandī Sufi Aḥmad Sirhindī in the early seventeenth century to the compromises that Mughal rulers made with Hindus, and Indian Muslims with Hinduism; there was the great debate in the court of Aceh in the mid seventeenth century over the interpretation of Ibn 'Arabī's thought, which attracted the attention of leading scholars at Medina; there was the work of 'Abd al Ghānī of Nablus (1641–1731), prolific scholar and Naqshbandī Sufi, in revitalising theology and reforming Sufism; there was the similar work in India of Shah Walī Allāh (1702–62), scholar of Ḥadīth and Naqshbandī Sufi. One important development in spreading reforming thought was the expansion of the Naqshbandī Sufi order deriving from Aḥmad Sirhindī and bearing his purified Sufi message – if somewhat diluted – from India to Mecca, Damascus, Istanbul, Kurdistan and the Balkans. Another development was the work of Muṣṭafā al Bakrī (d. 1749), the chief pupil of 'Abd al Ghānī of Nablus, in reviving the Khalwatī Sufi order, which gained great influence at al Azhar in Cairo, becoming both the main framework for reformist ideas in Egypt and a major vehicle for their transmission to much of Africa. Particularly important in spreading reforming thought was a leading group of teachers of Ḥadīth at Medina. Major figures in

15 Muhammad Iqbal, *The reconstruction of religious thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1975), p. 163; for the shift to this worldly piety see Francis Robinson, 'Other worldly and this worldly Islam and the Islamic Revival', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd series, 14, 1 (April 2004), pp. 47–58.

the group were Ibrahīm al Kurānī, who settled the great debate at Aceh, and Muḥammad Ḥayāt al Sindhī. Their pupils included many leading reformers: ‘Abd al Ra’uf of Singkel, Shah Walī Allah of Delhi, Muṣṭafa al Bakrī of Damascus, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab (1703–92) and Shaykh Muḥammad Samman (1717–75). A good number of the pupils of the Medina school also overlapped with those of the Mizjajī family of the Yemen, including several of the above, as well as Muḥammad Murtaḍa al Zabīdī (d. 1791), an Indian pupil of Shah Walī Allah, who became a great figure in eighteenth century Cairo, and Ma Mingxin (d. 1781), who was to spread the ‘New Sect’ teaching among the Chinese Naqshbandiyya. In the eighteenth century the lifeblood of reform flowed readily along the connections of ‘*ulama*’ and Sufis through much of the Muslim world.

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the major vehicle of the revival was what has come to be known technically as ‘reformism’. It was a movement of ‘*ulama*’ and reformed Sufis which aimed for the most part to hold the central messages of reform within the great tradition of scholarship handed down from the past, although for some that tradition might be pared down to the bare essentials of Qur’an and Ḥadīth on which they would use their independent reasoning power.

Throughout the period Arabia was a major source of reforming ideas and influence. Central to this was the movement of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab, which from 1744 gained political backing from its alliance with the Sa‘ūdī family of the Najd. Twice this alliance gained overall power in Arabia. The first Sa‘ūdī Wahhabī empire, which did great damage to the holy shrines of Iraq and the Ḥijaz, was destroyed by the armies of Muḥammad ‘Alī’s Egypt. The second, which was established with the foundation of the Sa‘ūdī kingdom in the 1920s, has existed down to the present. Throughout the period it has been an engine of Islamic reform; the term Wahhabī in many areas of the Muslim world came to denote a particular reforming style and zeal. When in the second half of the twentieth century oil brought great wealth to the Sa‘ūdī Wahhabī regime, it was able, often with political as well as religious purposes in view, to put considerable resources behind its preferred movements of reform.

From the early nineteenth century the influence of these events in Arabia was felt elsewhere in the Muslim world. In South East Asia, for instance, it exacerbated the tensions between those who supported strict Islamic interpretations and those who wished to accommodate their religious practice to the local milieu. In the Minangkabau region of Sumatra there was the so called Padri movement, notably active from 1803 to 1837, in which a Wahhabī style

reform movement endeavoured to impose its will upon the people. In Java there was the reformist campaign led by Dipanagara from 1825 to 1830 which, in the context of a Europeanising aristocracy and the misery that European rule had brought to the countryside, aimed to purify Islam and improve the conditions of the people. Although there are no certain connections between this movement and the mainstream of reform, the basis existed in the enduring links of Javan trade and scholarship to Arabia. Then from 1873 to 1912 there was the great jihad in the north Sumatran province of Aceh against Dutch rule, which had resonances that reach down to the twenty first century. If the last movement was a war of resistance which was strengthened by reform and support from without, the former were movements of inner renewal which came to collide with the colonial power. In the twentieth century much of the reformist spirit came to be channelled through the reformist Muhammadiyah (often mistakenly seen to be modernist). Founded in 1912, it both internalised reform by fostering the human conscience as the arbiter of rightly guided behaviour and externalised it by action in society, establishing schools, orphanages and hospitals. Related organisations were devoted to preaching. Down to the late twentieth century it was a continuing source of reforming vigour.

South Asia saw similar developments. The first half of the nineteenth century saw two notable movements. There was that of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī which drew for the most part on reforming ideas passed down through the Naqshbandī Sufi lines descended from Sirhindī, but was also stimulated by reformist influences from Mecca. Calling themselves the Ṭarīqa yi Muḥammadi, they fled British controlled India to establish their own Islamic society on the North West Frontier. Sayyid Aḥmad was killed in 1831 but his followers were to spread his message down to the First World War. The second movement was that of the Faraʿīdī in Bengal which, beginning in 1821, was profoundly influenced by reformist ideas brought back by Ḥajjī Sharīʿat Allāh after more than twenty years in Arabia. Initially a movement for purification, after the Ḥajjī's death it became an underground brotherhood opposed to the British. As in South East Asia the reformist current eventually came to be expressed in a form of 'protestant' Islam in which the individual human conscience was fashioned as the guardian of individual Islamic behaviour and thus the guarantor, in the absence of Muslim power, of the existence of an Islamic society. At the heart of this movement was the Deoband *madrassa*, founded in 1867. One hundred years later it claimed over eight thousand *madrasas* worldwide founded in its image. Reformism found South Asia particularly fertile soil, being expressed through several movements, among them the Tablighī Jamaʿat, which is

acknowledged by many as the most widely followed movement in the Islamic world. From the 1970s the numbers of Deobandi *madrasas* in Pakistan began to increase rapidly; those in the North West Frontier Province came to form the base from which the Taliban militias emerged to take power in Afghanistan.

In much of the rest of Asia reformist thought was carried by members of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Some of the drive came from India from the westward expansion of Sirhindi's ideas. Particularly important was Mawlana Khalid Baghdadi (1776–1827) who, after studying in Delhi at the feet of Sirhindi's successors, carried his teachings into West Asia. This said, activity also stemmed from other branches of the order in the Caucasus, Central Asia and China.

In the Caucasus two striking movements of reform came into conflict with expanding Russian power. In the first Imam Manşur preached a pure reformed Naqshbandi message in Daghistan from 1785 to his death in 1794. And in the second Imam Shamil from 1834 continued Manşur's work in Daghistan, resisting mighty Russian invasions for over thirty years, and remaining to this day an inspiration to the continuing resistance of the neighbouring Chechen people. In Kazan in the Volga Basin there was significant activity led by Baha' al Dīn Wa'isī (1821–93), leading to passive resistance against the Russian regime. In Anatolia the Kurd Said Bediüzzaman Nursi sustained the spirit of Naqshbandi reform in the hostile environment of Atatürk's Turkish Republic. In Central Asia, however, the homeland of the Naqshbandis, activity was limited to a three day holy war against the Russians in Andijan.

China, on the other hand, saw remarkable Naqshbandi led activity. In east Turkistan there were six Naqshbandi led uprisings against Manchu rule, the last of which led to the regime of one Ya'qub Beg from 1867 to 1877. Although it is not possible certainly to associate these uprisings with the reformist spirit, we should note that Ya'qub Beg imposed a strict Islamic regime. Elsewhere in China, however, there is striking evidence of Naqshbandi reformist influence. There is the opposition of the 'New Sect' Naqshbandis to the 'Old Sect', which supported forms of acculturation to the Chinese environment in religious practice. In 1781 this broke into open conflict around the great Chinese Muslim centre of Lanzhou. In the nineteenth century New Sect militancy grew as more reforming influences entered the region from West and South Asia, and led to two great rebellions. The first ravaged Gansu and Shaanxi from 1862 to 1877, during which time its leader, Ma Hua long, tried to establish a Muslim state. The second raged across Yunnan from 1856 to 1873; its leader, Du Wenxiu, succeeding in creating a Muslim state in half the province. The first

leader of the Yunnan rebellion was Ma Texin who, like so many in the reforming tradition, was the first scholar to translate the Qur'an into his native language.

In Africa the role of the Naqshbandiyya as the carriers of reformist ideas was taken by the Khalwatiyya and the Idrisiyya and their offshoots. The former, we have noted, was an old order given new life by Muṣṭafa al Bakrī; the latter was a new order founded by a Moroccan, Aḥmad b. Idris (1760–1837), who settled in Mecca and taught a Sufi way with a Wahhabī-like programme. In the nineteenth century reformist movements inspired by these sources surged across Africa.

One significant branch of the Khalwatiyya was the Tijaniyya, founded by the Algerian Aḥmad al Tijanī (1737–1815), who had been taught by Maḥmud al Kurdī, a leading pupil of al Bakrī. His order spread to Algeria and Morocco, to the Nilotic and Central Sudan, and especially to West Africa. At the heart of its success in the last region was al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal (1794–1864), a Fulani from Fuuta Tooro in Senegal. On pilgrimage in the 1820s he adopted reformist teachings after spending three years in Medina as the pupil of a Tijanī shaykh. Returning to West Africa he created a theocratic empire, which stretched from the bend in the Niger to Upper Senegal, and which survived until in 1893 it was conquered by the French. The second significant branch was the Sammaniyya, which was founded by Shaykh Muḥammad Samman and spread in the Nilotic Sudan, Eritrea and south west Ethiopia. This spiritual tradition led to one remarkable manifestation of revival and reform, the Sudanese Mahdiyya. The movement was led by Muḥammad Aḥmad (1844–85) who, under instruction from two Sammaniyya shaykhs, became a strict follower of the *shari'a*, eventually banning Sufism. Declaring himself in 1881 to be the expected Mahdī, he waged war against the Turko-Egyptian regime which was hated for its innovations, and founded in 1885 a theocratic Mahdist state. In 1898 this was readily overcome by the British as they advanced up the Nile, but its example has remained an inspiration in the politics of the Sudan down to the present.

The Idrisiyya also produced two significant branches, both of which stemmed from men who had failed in the competition to succeed Aḥmad ibn Idris as shaykh in Mecca. The first was Muḥammad 'Alī al Sanūsī (1787–1859), who established himself in the 1850s in Jaghbub in the Libyan desert and preached a pure reforming message. Unlike many of his fellow reformers, he set out to create his theocratically organised society by peaceful means, establishing Sufi lodges as cells of reformed Islamic culture. In the latter half of the nineteenth century these spread along the Sahara trade

routes until they reached from Cyrenaica to Timbuktu and the kingdom of the Waday. Of course, they collided with the advancing French and Italians, but survived to become the basis of Libyan resistance to foreign domination. The second man was Ibrahim al Rashid, whose nephew and pupil Muḥammad ibn Ṣaliḥ founded the Ṣaliḥiyya, based in Mecca, whose most notable product was Muḥammad ‘Abd Allah Ḥasan (1864–1920). From 1895 Ḥasan led a major reforming movement in British Somaliland which for twenty years involved a holy war against lax Sufis, the Ethiopians and the British. He died undefeated and remains a symbol of Somali resistance against oppression.

Not all African movements received their stimulus from pulses of reform in the Islamic world at large. In West Africa, the work of al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal apart perhaps, the main reformist drive was locally generated. The leaders were the Fulani from Senegal who intermarried with Berber tribes drifting south across the Sahara. From the fifteenth century they had slowly moved eastwards, where they came to mix uneasily with semi Islamised and pagan communities from the Senegambia to Bornu. They drew on long traditions of Saharan Islamic scholarship and mysticism. The most important leader, ‘Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817), never travelled to Cairo or Mecca, was rooted in the Saharan traditions of scholarship and, unlike many reformers who wished to escape the medieval legacies of Islam, drew on the full range of classical and post classical scholarship from al Ghazālī to al Suyuṭī. In his world, unlike West or South Asia, the full classical tradition remained a dynamic inspiration. ‘Usman’s jihad, which was launched in 1804, followed a century or more of Fulani jihads as they travelled eastwards. It led to the formation of the sultanate of Sokoto in the Hausa lands which grew by the mid nineteenth century to embrace Adamawa in the south east, Nupe in the south and Ilorin to the south west. The work of reform explains the vigour of Islam in the West African hinterland as colonial powers expanded into it in the nineteenth century and the prominent role it has come to play in many states in the twentieth century, not least among them the great state of Nigeria.

It is axiomatic that the spirit of revival and reform was expressed differently in different social, economic, cultural and political environments. We have noted how in areas where state power was strong it might be expressed through educational movements and peaceful proselytisation, while in areas where state power was weak or non-existent it might be expressed through warfare leading to state creation. But, as Western power came in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries to embrace Muslim societies ever more tightly and its threat to Islam as a faith and a way of life came to be

understood more clearly, the basic programme of reform – returning to the Qur'an and Ḥadīth and purifying Sufi practice – was not enough to meet the threat.

One response of the reforming spirit to this heightened awareness of the Western threat was Islamic modernism. This was typically the response of Muslim ruling elites who were concerned to face up to the realities of Western scientific advance and Western dominance. At one level such modernists wanted Muslims to master Western science and technology, which they perceived to be the source of Western strength. Thus they pioneered educational developments, often outside the control of the *'ulama'*, to bring about this change. But at the deepest level they wished to review Islamic knowledge as a whole, including its founding pillars of the Qur'an and Ḥadīth, in the light of Western learning. They were determined that there should be harmony between Western science and Islamic understanding. Among the leading modernists were: Sayyid Aḥmad Khan of India, Namik Kemal of the Ottoman Empire, Muḥammad 'Abduh of Egypt, Jamal al Dīn al Afghānī and the Tatars Shihab al Dīn al Marjānī, Jar Allah Bigı and Ismail Bey Gasprinskii. Some came from reformist backgrounds, but all knew that the reformism of the *'ulama'* was inadequate to meet the challenges of the times. For a time some modernists were attracted to pan Islamic responses to the West, but after the First World War they began to focus their attention on the nation state. For the great Indian modernist Muḥammad Iqbal this was to be a state built on Islamic principles – a Pakistan. Arguably, in its constitution and legislation such as the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) Pakistan in its first two decades was a laboratory of Islamic modernism.

The movement of revival and reform in its modernist garb was too rarefied an Islamic understanding to achieve acceptance in Muslim societies beyond a narrow elite. Moreover, it carried with it the danger for many of endorsing Islam and Islamic institutions as central features of national life and identity. The elites of most societies adopted secular national identities for their peoples based on history, ethnicity, language or the state structure they controlled. Islam and its institutions were given a subordinate role to play, and in some cases virtually no role to play at all. Such was the thinking of Atatürk and Reza Shah Pahlavi and their followers as they built the modern Turkish and Iranian states. So too was the thinking of the great nationalist movements that struggled against colonial power: the Wafd in Egypt, the Ba'th in Syria and Iraq, Sukarno's nationalists in Indonesia, Ben Bella's Front de Liberation Nationale in Algeria. After independence, secular philosophies – nationalist, liberal, socialist – became even more prominent among Muslim

elites. Moreover, such ideas informed their use of state power; as Islam was driven more and more into private space, secular values were given fuller rein in public space, national rather than Islamic values informed education and women were required increasingly to serve the purposes of the state rather than those of family or God's law.

The second response of the reforming spirit was a range of movements which fall under the general term Islamism. For Islamists '*ulama*' led reform was inadequate because it failed to address issues of Western power and dominance; the modernists were inadequate because they permitted Islam to be judged by Western knowledge; and the nationalists were a disaster, in part because they sidelined Islam, permitting secular values to rule in their societies, and in part because their policies simply failed to meet either the material aspirations or the psychological needs of their people. The founders of Islamism, Ḥasan al Banna, who created the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Arab world in 1928, and Sayyid Abu'l A'la' Mawdudī, who created the Jama'at-i Islāmī of the South Asian world in 1941, were typical of the movement's leadership in subsequent decades. The former, a schoolteacher, and the latter, a journalist, both came from reforming backgrounds, but had been educated outside the old *madrasa* system of the '*ulama*' and were well acquainted with Western learning. Islamists started from the principle that all human life must be subordinated to the guidance sent by God to human beings; as Mawdudī said, the *shari'a* offers a complete scheme of life 'where nothing is superfluous and nothing wanting'. It followed that whereas most Islamist movements have been concerned to continue reformist traditions of fashioning an Islamic society from within by bringing about changes in individual and community behaviour, they have also been concerned to influence the workings of the state, if not seize power within it. Thus they would assert the *shari'a* in their societies, bring about the Islamisation of knowledge and economics, promote 'Islamic' values and standards of behaviour, and curb or overthrow elites who seemed to prefer the values of the West to the Islamic system, or *nizam*, they wished to promote. Throughout the Muslim world from the 1950s to the 1970s Islamist organisations sprang up, more often than not providing much needed basic services – schools, hospitals and clinics – but also welfare associations, youth clubs and political and paramilitary organisations. The leadership tended to be highly educated in Western disciplines – doctors, engineers, university teachers; support came from those often excluded from the workings of power – the growing middle and lower middle classes which underpinned the modern state and modern economy, students and the vast numbers who in these years moved from the countryside to the cities of the Muslim world.

From the 1970s the challenge of Islamist movements in the politics of Muslim societies became increasingly evident. In Turkey Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamist National Salvation Party, became deputy prime minister. In Pakistan General Zia ul Haq led the implementation of an Islamic system after the design of Mawlana Mawdudi. In Egypt President Anwar Sadat found himself under increasing pressure from Islamist forces, pressure which was greatly increased after his peace with Israel in 1977, leading to his assassination by a splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1981. Iran, moreover, saw one of the great revolutions of the twentieth century, akin to those of the Russian or the Chinese, when in 1979 Islamists joined forces with *'ulama'* under the leadership of Ayat Allah Khomeini in overthrowing the Pahlavi regime, with its secular orientation and Western alliances. This first full scale Islamist regime, although placed in the special Shi'ī environment of Iran, has been an inspiration to Islamist movements as well as a laboratory in which it has been possible to observe the experimental top down creation of a modern Islamic state and society. In the following decades Islamist movements played a major role in the political discourses of all Muslim societies, and not least those that emerged in the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Some, noting that after the Iranian revolution Islamists have had limited further success, have talked of the failure of political Islam.¹⁶ But such a judgement tends to ignore the shifts of political discourse in an Islamist direction in many societies where their parties are present, and arguably the globalisation of Islam.¹⁷

For most of their existence Islamist movements focused primarily on their own societies. International connections might be made through Cairo, Mecca, London or Paris, or through transnational support for campaigns of resistance against external oppression: for instance, those of the Hizbullah against the Israeli presence in the Lebanon; of the Kashmiris against India's presence; and the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After their success in driving the Russians from Afghanistan in 1989, two leaders of the *mujahidīn*, 'Abd Allah 'Azzam, a Palestinian, and Osama Bin Laden, a Sa'udi citizen, considered how they might refocus the organisation and the forces they had created. They noted that Islamists were unlikely to achieve their objectives in individual Muslim societies because of the support the USA and its allies gave to the elites in power; to bring change in their own countries they must internationalise their activities and target the USA and its allies. Thus al Qa'ida emerged to create a worldwide strategic framework

¹⁶ Olivier Roy, *The failure of political Islam* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

¹⁷ Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The search for a new ummah* (London, 2004).

of Islamist political and military organisations. From the early 1990s it launched a series of attacks on Western interests, of which the most audacious was the air assault on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The increasing global dominance of the West had led some Muslims to organise globally to resist it.

Thus, two great processes have dominated the history of the Muslim world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the growth of Islamic revivalism and the growth of Western power. The origins of the former were rooted deep in the centuries before 1800; its messages were carried along the connections of *'ulama'* and Sufis which reveal the workings of the Islamic world system that preceded that of the West. As time went on the Islamic revival came increasingly to interact with the West, in part being shaped by it and in its turn shaping Western perceptions of the Muslim world. In this context the major theme of this volume is the relationship between the transmitters and interpreters of the central messages of Islam – *'ulama'*, Sufis and, increasingly, lay folk – and the wielders of political power in their societies. From the beginning of the Islamic revival these transmitters have been concerned to renew the faith of their societies, often spreading Islamic knowledge through the population as never before. As time has passed, and as they have come to sense the power of the modern state to shape society as a whole, some have sought to impose their will upon it.

Alongside the grand narrative of the interactions between the transmitters and the wielders of power, there is a series of sub themes. One has been the relative decline of Sufis and *'ulama'* as transmitters of Islam and the rise of lay folk, supported by new social formations. Sufis have suffered: the Islamic revival has targeted many of their practices; the cult of the Prophet has grown to displace that of local saints; secular education has cast an Enlightenment chill over mystical beliefs; and Muslims have become increasingly divorced from the great heritage of medieval learning that enriched the higher Sufi understanding. Nevertheless, wherever there has been oppression, as in Soviet Russia, Sufi orders have been at the heart of the resistance. *'Ulama'* have fared less badly. Print and, subsequently, electronic communication have robbed them of their exclusive hold over Islamic knowledge and its interpretation, while the secular systems of education and law usually adopted by modern Muslim states have pushed them towards the margins of society. Indeed, Muslim elites in the twentieth century tended to see them as symbols of Muslim backwardness. *'Ulama'*, however, have been rather more flexible than their opponents have given them credit for. In some societies, as in South and South East Asia, they have provided significant levels of

education outside the framework of the state; in others, as in the Shi‘i communities of Iran, Iraq and the Lebanon, they have taken the leading role in resisting oppression. Moreover, wherever they are in the Muslim world, they represent the link to the Islamic religious tradition and to the skills needed to interpret it. But, for all that may be said about the continuing vitality of traditional Islamic scholarship, the major development of the twentieth century has been the emergence of Islamic thinkers and leaders from outside the ranks of the ‘*ulama*’: Iqbal and Mawdudī in India and Pakistan; al Banna and Sayyid Quṭb in Egypt; Ḥasan al Turabī, a lawyer from the Sudan; Rashīd al Ghannushī, a teacher from Tunisia; Mahdī Bazargan, an engineer from Iran: and Harun Nasution, an intellectual from Indonesia. The Islamist project has been in the main a lay project, driven forward by the aspirations of a rising bourgeoisie.

A second sub theme has been the growing prominence of women in the political discourse and public lives of Muslim societies. Movements of Islamic revival could make women a major target of their attention. In societies where public space was increasingly occupied by Western or secular values it was women who, by upholding an Islamic rule for themselves and their households, became key pillars of Islamic civilisation. Such was the grave responsibility bestowed upon them by Islamic reformism in India. Indeed, through much of the Muslim world women have been made to bear the brunt of the cultural revolutions foisted upon them by their menfolk, such as the attacks on the veil by secular dictators such as Atatürk and Reza Shah Pahlavi, or the forcing of women back into veiling, as happened in the Iranian revolution and under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there is much evidence to suggest that while the increasingly large scale presence of veiled women in the public spaces of Muslim towns and cities from the 1980s in part reflects patriarchal preference and a desire for cultural authenticity, it also demonstrates the major role women were coming to play in the modern state and economy. It is worth noting that, while fourteen centuries of Muslim history see just two short lived female rulers of major Muslim states, Shajar al Durr in thirteenth century Egypt and Sultana Raḍiyya in thirteenth century Delhi, the years since the 1980s have seen four: Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh, Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Tansu Çiller in Turkey and Sukarnoputri Megawati in Indonesia.

Through Islamic history the leadership of the Muslim world in ideas, in wealth and in power has shifted from region to region. For much of the period from 1800 the Ottoman Empire was the Muslim great power, and arguably some of that mantle fell upon republican Turkey as the state that

seemed to have absorbed more of the Western lessons of progress than most. In the latter part of the twentieth century the Iranian revolution, in the context of the general rise of Islamism, saw the Turkish model grow out of fashion. The Iranian experiment, which horrified some Muslims but excited many with its defiance of the West and its assertion of a distinctively Islamic model of progress, was the first time for some centuries that Iran had had a leading role in Muslim affairs, and the first time in the history of the Muslim community that its Shī‘ī branch had set such a striking example for others to follow.

At a more fundamental level, the period saw a general shift in the centre of gravity of the Muslim world. For the first time more Muslims came to live east of the Hindu Kush than to the West. The Indian subcontinent, which in the early modern period had begun to transmit ideas to the rest of the Muslim world, now through its interactions with the British Empire became a significant exporter of ideas, such as those of Iqbal and Mawdūdī, and organisations such as that of the *Tablighī Jama‘at*. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the shift in economic dynamism to South East and East Asia brought new weight to the Malaysian and Indonesian presence in the Islamic world, and in the latter particular significance to an Islamic leadership given to democratic development.

It is one of the ironies of the period that at a time when the West has come to dominate the Muslim world, Muslims have at last achieved what they failed to win in many centuries of attempted conquest: a significant presence in the West, outside Spain. At the beginning of the twenty first century these communities number around 10 million in Europe and 6 million in North America, with much smaller but also significant communities in Latin America and Australasia. By and large these communities have migrated for economic reasons, but many have fled political upheaval, from Pakistan and Palestine in the mid twentieth century down to Chechnya and Kosovo at the end. For the first time, from a Western point of view, engaging with Muslim communities has not just been an aspect of foreign policy but of domestic policy. For Muslims there have been the perennial problems of integration and assimilation, of how to be both a Muslim and a citizen of a Western society. In the process Western societies and their Muslim communities have learned much from each other, sometimes fruitfully, at other times less so.

The West, after overwhelming the Islamic world system and exposing Muslim societies to an increasingly intense interaction, left it as a world of nation states. This was a world of many different voices: different national voices, different voices within nations, different voices within movements. It

most certainly did not speak as one. Nevertheless, there has continued to be a level at which Muslims identify as Muslims, at which they know, as God told them, that they are 'the best community raised up for mankind'. If for Muslim believers this community is a living fact, for those who are Muslims primarily by culture a shared history and sense of brotherhood still lingers. This sense of community, which is supported by powerful strands running through Islamic history, law and rites, was manifest in Muslim responses to the steady loss of Muslim power in the world, and not least in the extraordinary response of Indian Muslims to the destruction of Ottoman power in general and the caliphate in particular. It was also manifest in the many attempts from the 1880s to build pan Islamic organisations, which achieved realisation of a kind through Sa'udī intervention in the 1960s and the creation of the World Muslim League and the Islamic Conference organisation. The sense of the brotherhood of all Muslims at the level of the ordinary Muslim has been much nourished by the development of global media. The fate of Palestine, Bosnia and other places where Muslims have suffered have been matters of urgent concern. During the last quarter of the twentieth century more and more young Muslims have travelled to take up arms in faraway places to defend their fellow Muslims. This sense of brotherhood is one strand which holds together the al Qa'ida organisation. At the beginning of the twenty first century the community loyalties of Muslims throughout the world remain a fact that still carries political potential.

The interactions of Muslim societies with the West in this period reveal no clash of civilisations. They have shaped each other and their perceptions of each other. Moreover, Muslims have had as many different responses to the West as have Westerners to the world of Islam. Study of the many ways in which Muslims, the heirs to a great civilisation, have striven to draw on its resources to meet the massive challenges of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and be true to themselves is the best way to reduce any sense of clash. Muslim tenacity in respecting the roots of their civilisation, and at times their creativity in finding solutions to the challenges of modernity, are examples from which all can learn and all should respect.

PART I

★

THE ONSET OF WESTERN
DOMINATION *c.* 1800 TO *c.* 1919

The Ottoman lands to the post-First World War settlement

CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY

Among Islamic states, the Ottoman Empire was the longest lived and one of the largest.¹ Surviving into the age of European imperialism, the Ottomans continued elaborating the Islamic and Turkish traditions of statecraft into the twentieth century, even as they underwent the metamorphic pressure of emergent global modernity. Imperialism and separatist nationalism presented the threatening guise of modernity to the Ottomans. They also saw the attractive aspects of modernity that had emerged from Europe's economic and political revolutions. Oppressed like other societies by their sense of backwardness compared to the most advanced nations, Ottomans strove to adopt elements of modernity that could protect the empire from the threats that other aspects of modernity posed to it.

The empire increasingly displayed a doubly imperial character: it was a *multinational empire* threatened by nationalism and European *imperialism*. This duality made late Ottoman history a story of dynamism amid disintegration. Both require recognition. Among constructive developments, Ottoman Muslims' responses to the challenges they faced gradually generated two great currents of change. One of these favoured disruptive change and a rapid advance towards modernity; the other favoured an accommodative, Islamically committed advance. The currents formed and differentiated gradually, creating a dialectic that shaped Turkish history under both empire and republic. This chapter examines the political, social, economic and cultural evidence of four periods: those of sultans Selim III and Mahmud II (1789–1839); the Tanzimat (1839–1870s); Abdülhamid II (1876–1909); and the Young Turk revolution and final crises (1908–22).

¹ This chapter is adapted from Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey: Islam, nationalism, and modernity* (forthcoming).

Return to centralisation: Selim III and Mahmud II

Dual catastrophes of the late eighteenth century precipitated the Ottomans into an era of accelerating, destabilising change, to which they responded with defensive modernisation. Since about 1600 the Ottoman polity had become highly decentralised in practice. Yet power still belonged to the sultan in principle. Selim III (r. 1789–1807) and Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) responded to demands to reassert their power. Their efforts signified a new initiative from the centre and the introduction into Ottoman policy of something like the systematising spirit of the Enlightenment. Selim failed to neutralise vested interests opposed to his programme, the New Order (*Nizam ı Cedid*). He was overthrown and later killed. Mahmud learned from his mistakes and prepared carefully. Once he had abolished the Janissary infantry (1826), he undertook the reforms Selim had envisioned.

The Eastern Question, 1768–1839

While crises continually confronted Ottoman statesmen, some proved truly epoch making. The half century of Selim and Mahmud's reigns began and ended amid such crises: first the dual catastrophes of 1768 and 1798, then the Egyptian crisis of 1839.

The Ottoman Russian War of 1768–74, ending in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, opened the era of European preoccupation with the 'Eastern Question': what would happen to the balance of power as the Ottoman Empire lost territory and collapsed? The war ended the Ottoman monopoly of the Black Sea and positioned Russia to expand at Ottoman expense, annexing the Crimea (1783) and advancing into the Caucasus. The war also showed that Russia did not only threaten the Ottoman borderlands. Catherine II dreamed of recreating a Greek empire, with Constantinople as its capital. The Russian fleet sailed into the Mediterranean, defeated the Ottomans near İzmir (1770) and raised a rebellion in southern Greece. The Ottomans could only cope by mobilising provincial warlords (*ayans*, *derebeys*), whose powers expanded disproportionately, compounding the reasons for a return to centralisation.

Under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), Russia got much of the northern Black Sea coast, as well as freedom of navigation and commerce in the Ottoman Empire. It acquired rights to station consuls throughout the empire, to remonstrate on behalf of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and to build a church in Beyoğlu (the part of Istanbul where embassies were located) a right later expanded into Russian claims to protect all Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule. The Ottomans were to pay a large indemnity to the

Russians and address the Russian sovereign as *padişah*, the title reserved for the Ottoman sultan. The treaty also acknowledged a religious role for the Ottoman sultan as caliph over Muslims, whom the treaty briefly made 'independent' before they passed under Russian rule. Probably Russian drafted, the clause is vague and ahistorical in Islamic terms. To the extent that the caliphal title later gained importance beyond Ottoman borders, this treaty stimulated the process. However, Ottoman loss of the Crimea and the end of the Crimean hanate caused Muslims everywhere to question the sultans' legitimacy as defenders of Islam (*ghazıs*). Ottoman statesmen recognised that the European menace was not isolated on distant frontiers but threatened the 'heart of Islam' and the 'entire Muslim community'.²

Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798) confirmed this perception. Although short lived in effect compared to Russian aggression, the French invasion confronted Egyptians with new techniques and destabilised old relationships. The biggest question left behind was who would rule after the French. The answer emerged, just when Istanbul was about to reassert its power against provincial warlordism, in the biggest warlord of all, Mehmed Ali Paşa (Muḥammad 'Alı, governor of Egypt, 1805–1848).

Through 1839 the gravest crises revolved around Balkan separatism (Serbian autonomy and Greek independence) and Mehmed Ali's Egypt based bid for power at Ottoman expense. As European interest in Ottoman affairs intensified, regional issues' international repercussions increasingly decided their outcomes. Although the Serbs had already won autonomy with Russian help (1815), European philhellenism made the Greek revolution (1821–30) the paradigm of nationalist rebellion against Ottoman rule. In response, Mahmud II had to run the risk of calling in Mehmed Ali. Egyptian troops succeeded where Mahmud's had not, taking Crete (1825) and Athens (1826). Egypt's successes provoked both international intervention to save the Greeks and Mahmud's destruction of his archaic Janissary infantry in order to found a modern army. European intervention left Mehmed Ali in control of Crete. Unhappy at that, he abandoned obedience to the sultan, demanded the governorship of Syria, and took it by force (1831).

Mehmed Ali's defiance of the sultan's authority threatened Ottoman survival more than any event since 1774. His troops advanced into Anatolia twice, defeating the Ottomans at Konya (1832) and Nizib (1839). The Ottoman

2 Şanizade Ataullah, *Tarih i Şanizade* (Istanbul, n.d.), vol. II, pp. 99–100; Ahmed Cevdet, *Tarih i Cevdet, tertib i cedid*, 12 vols. (Istanbul, 1309), vol. X, p. 19, vol. XI, p. 273.

government was so isolated that it could find no ally after Konya but Russia, with which it concluded the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (1833). The perils of Ottoman dependence on Russia did not go unnoticed across Europe. In 1839 the Egyptians again defeated the Ottomans on land, Mahmud died, and the Ottoman fleet defected to Egypt, all within days. This time the Europeans acted, organising a multilateral intervention to save the Ottomans. By 1841 Mehmed Ali had been pushed back to Egypt, where he and his descendants ruled as hereditary, autonomous governors under Ottoman sovereignty.

Reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II

Coming to the throne during a war with Russia and Austria (1787–91), Selim III commissioned reports from his advisers. Once peace was restored, he acted on their recommendations. The first priority was to create a European style infantry, to be called the New Order (*Nizam ı Cedid*), a term that came to designate his reforms overall. Selim also created a new treasury to finance his infantry. He introduced incremental reforms in other military services. Like earlier European reformers, he soon found that improving the military required increasing the efficiency of revenue collection and of government in general. From the moment Selim commissioned his advisers open endedly to submit recommendations for reform, almost any aspect of the imperial system was up for reconsideration. For example, a new agency was created to supply Istanbul with grain (*Zahire nezareti*, 1793). Recognising the bad relations between his subjects and provincial authorities, Selim attempted to separate the judicial and administrative functions of the *kadis* (religious judges) and restrain abuses by local notables (*ayans*). In order to improve Ottoman merchants' competitive position, he created privileged categories of Ottoman merchants, both non Muslim and Muslim (1802). In one of his sharpest breaks with the past, Selim adopted European diplomatic practice and opened permanent embassies in European capitals (1793), instead of sending out temporary embassies as in the past.

Although scholars sometimes question how innovative Selim's reforms were, such debates miss a key point. Some of his reforms broke with the past, as in diplomacy; others made incremental changes. The most significant innovation was the *Nizam ı Cedid* in totality. The Ottoman government, which had previously run on custom, had become the object of rationalisation. In the New Order, the systematising spirit of the Enlightenment (*esprit de système*) first appears in Ottoman policy making. Selim's downfall was not in failing to innovate but in failing to neutralise opposing interests, especially military ones. When they could, they revolted and overthrew him. Post 1789

international instabilities and the Ottomans' monetary and economic difficulties during this period compounded Selim's problems.

Mahmud II could not assert himself either, until the end of the Napoleonic wars made the international situation more predictable. During his first twenty years, Mahmud eliminated provincial warlords in places as far away as Libya, either by military campaigns or by using patronage to separate notables from their provincial power bases. Descendants of the same families might retain local influence; yet law and order under central authority prevailed in many provinces by the 1830s.³ Mahmud also used patronage to promote sympathisers in the capital and dispatch opponents to provincial posts, where the executioner sometimes awaited them. In the 1820s, when Mehmed Ali began conscripting Egyptian peasants, drilling and disciplining them into a force that proved itself against the Greek revolutionaries, the Ottoman Janissaries' indiscipline and unwillingness to campaign turned sentiment against them, giving Mahmud his chance to eliminate them. In 1826 he announced a plan to create and drill two modern companies within the Janissaries. The Janissaries barricaded themselves inside their headquarters in revolt. Declaring war by unfurling the Prophet's banner (*sancak ı şerif*), Mahmud summoned his artillery, who loyally opened fire. After this 'auspicious incident' (*vak'a ı hayriye*), surviving Janissaries were hunted down. Closely associated with the Janissaries, the Bektāşi dervish order was also suppressed. A new army, the Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad (*Muallem Asakir i Mansure i Muhammediye*), was formed and given new uniforms, including the fez. So began a dress revolution that extended to civilians (excepting the *ulema*) in 1829.⁴

From 1826 onwards, Mahmud's reign demonstrated anew that reform meant planning and rationalisation in all fields. All branches of the military were reformed. The remnants of the old provincial cavalry (*sipahis*) were phased out or integrated into new forces, and their revenue collection rights were transformed into tax farms.⁵ Old military academies were upgraded and new ones founded. Conscription was introduced to man the new army. Bearing chiefly

3 Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 167, 170, 173; 4; Meir Litvak, *Shi'i scholars of nineteenth century Iraq: The 'ulama' of Najaf and Karbala'* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 135-49; André Raymond, 'Les provinces arabes (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)', in Robert Mantran (ed.), *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1989), pp. 406-18; Avigdor Levy, 'The military policy of Sultan Mahmud II', Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University (1968), pp. 89-92.

4 Levy, 'Military policy,' p. 314.

5 Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 854; Michael Palairat, *The Balkan economies, c. 1800-1914: Evolution without development* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 38, 40, 87, 132-3; Musa Çadırcı,

on the Muslim peasantry, it created resistances like those noted in Egypt in this period, while also widening the gap in prosperity between Muslims and non Muslims, who were exempt.

Reforms of the 1830s transformed the entire government. The central agencies were reorganised into ministries. Permanent diplomatic missions in Europe, abandoned after Selim's fall, reopened in 1833; and the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (*Bab ı Ali Tercüme odası*, 1821) was expanded, becoming the training ground for the modernist civil elite. Many councils were formed, partly to compensate for still sketchy development of some administrative agencies.

A centralising autocrat needed trained, loyal servants to execute his will. In the 1830s, as the new military developed, the old scribes were also transformed into civil officials (*mülkiye memurları*). Reforms in personnel policy created a hierarchy of civil ranks, defined their correspondences with the military and religious ranks, substituted salaries for the perquisites that had compensated scribes in the past, and introduced new penal codes for government functionaries.⁶ The new civil officials produced their greatest impact *qualitatively* in diplomacy, through which the Ottomans' few qualified diplomats soon achieved disproportional influence, and *quantitatively* in provincial administration. The creation of a modern system of provincial administration, staffed by civilians, began after the provincial warlords were brought to heel.

Financially, the empire endured one of its most difficult periods from the 1770s until the 1840s. Real government expenditure roughly tripled (1790–1830), causing huge deficits and provoking the steepest debasements in Ottoman history. There was no way to respond without serious financial reforms. The Ministry of Finance was created by merging formerly separate treasuries and budgets. A Ministry of Pious Foundations (*evkaf*) was created to use some of the foundation revenues for the reforms; the fact that the largest foundations had been founded by members of the dynasty and supervised *ex officio* by various high officials facilitated this change. Mahmud also introduced new taxes. As in Egypt, state enterprises were developed to support military reform by producing munitions and supplies.⁷

Tanzimat döneminde Anadolu kentleri'nin sosyal ve ekonomik yapıları (Ankara, 1991), p. 318; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1977), vol. II, p. 43.

6 Carter Vaughn Findley, *Ottoman civil officialdom: A social history* (Princeton, 1989), pp. 22–6.

7 Shaw and Shaw, *History*, vol. II, pp. 36–9; Levy, 'Military policy', pp. 490–507, 507, 515–36; Çadırcı, *Tanzimat döneminde Anadolu*, pp. 131–45; Randi Deguilhem, 'Wakf', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4 vols., 2nd edn (Leiden, 1954–2004), vol. XI, p. 90.

Reviving Ottoman diplomacy (1833) helped break the diplomatic isolation signified by the Ottoman Russian alliance of the same year. By the time Mehmed Ali defeated the Ottomans again at Nizib (1839), Ottoman diplomats had managed to mobilise international support to turn back the Egyptians. This effort demonstrated that international support came at the price of major internal reforms. As Mahmud's reign ended, reforms were introduced to bring Ottoman practice into line with British style liberal thinking, both economically and politically.

Economically, the key innovation was the Anglo Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838.⁸ It confirmed existing commercial privileges, introduced free trade with low import and export duties, and allowed British merchants to trade anywhere in the empire. The treaty obligated the Ottomans to abolish all monopolies, and it specified that its terms were binding in all the empire's territories, including Egypt. Inasmuch as 'monopolies' included the state enterprises founded by both the Ottoman and the Egyptian governments in efforts to industrialise, this was no small concession. British and Ottoman negotiators saw this provision as primarily aimed at Mehmed Ali, however; and the specification that the treaty also applied to Egypt is noteworthy for that reason. The old idea that the treaty caused the decline of Ottoman manufactures overlooks the fact that the Ottomans' dependent integration into the world economy had already begun and overrates the treaty's impact on Ottoman manufactures.

Politically, the critical reforms were announced in the Gülhane Decree, drafted by Mustafa Reşid Paşa before Mahmud died but proclaimed shortly afterwards. The Gülhane Decree thus figures as one of the foundational acts of the Tanzimat (the 1839–76 reform period). In the short term the decree sufficed to consolidate support against Mehmed Ali, but its terms gave rise to divergent expectations later in application.

Society and economy under Selim and Mahmud

In want of precise statistics, the Ottoman population in the early nineteenth century has been estimated between 14 and 23 million, figures that probably underestimate the total by 10 to 12 million. The empire was comparatively underpopulated, with estimated 1840 population densities around eighteen per square kilometre in Anatolia and higher in the Balkans.⁹ The empire was

8 İnalçık and Quataert, *Economic and social history*, pp. 764, 825–6; Halil İnalçık, 'İmtiyazat', *EL2*, vol. III, p. 1187.

9 Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman population, 1830–1914: Demographic and social characteristics* (Madison, 1985), p. 23; Palaioret, *Balkan economies*, p. 20.

also ruled and defended by surprisingly small numbers of people. The scribal branch of the ruling elite numbered an estimated 1,500–2,000 people as of 1770–90; in the Ottoman–Russian War of 1828–9, Mahmud II reportedly could field only 15,000 regulars against more than ten times as many Russian troops advancing into both the Balkans and eastern Anatolia.¹⁰ Population does appear to have been growing. The most populous region was the Ottoman Balkans; in provinces located further east and south, population density declined as aridity increased. As of 1830 the largest cities were Istanbul (375,000) and Cairo (260,000), followed by Edirne, Izmir, Aleppo, Damascus, Tunis and Baghdad (perhaps 100,000 apiece).¹¹

Many factors combined to depress population. Disease, war and famine played their historical roles. Bubonic plague recurred into the mid 1800s, and Asiatic cholera entered the empire from Russia in 1821, among other epidemics. Mehmed Ali established quarantines (1830), and the Ottoman regime followed suit later. Inasmuch as the empire was at war for nearly half the years between 1800 and 1918, military service, from which Istanbulites and non-Muslims were exempt, weighed heavily on provincial Muslims and thus on agricultural production. Even in peacetime, agricultural productivity was low and highly vulnerable to climatic variations, diseases of animals and plant pests.

To contemporaries, Ottoman subjects' most salient identifiers were not their numbers but their faiths. Figures from 1844 to 1856 imply that 59 per cent of the total population was Muslim, with the ethnically diverse Greek Orthodox as the largest single non-Muslim religious community. The relatively large non-Muslim population was one factor that Ottoman statesmen had to take into account in shaping reform policy. As the empire lost Balkan territory and Muslim refugees flowed in, the Muslim percentage of the population increased in the later part of the century.

The Ottoman economy still operated on assumptions different from western European ones. In addition to custom, Ottoman economic thought prioritised provisionism and fiscalism.¹² *Provisionism* meant maximising the supply of goods to prevent scarcity. In international trade, it implied preferring imports to exports. *Fiscalism* meant maximising revenue and cutting expenditures, if necessary, to maintain treasury balances. Enforcing these

¹⁰ Findley, *Ottoman civil officialdom*, p. 22; Levy, 'Military policy,' pp. 405–9.

¹¹ İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and social history*, pp. 652–5, 781; Palaioret, *Balkan economies*, pp. 25–33; André Raymond, *Grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane* (Paris, 1985), pp. 62–6.

¹² Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda devlet ve ekonomi* (Istanbul, 2000) pp. 43–96 and *passim*.

principles implied significant state control over the economy. While this was not a command economy overall, there were elements of command, including state purchases (*miri mübaya*) of military or other necessities at below market prices, or the assumption that essential manufactures, such as gunpowder and sailcloth, should be produced by state enterprises, which European free traders denounced as monopolies. Provisionism and fiscalism dated from periods when they had worked to Ottoman advantage. Integration into a world economy that operated on different assumptions made these old policies increasingly costly for Ottomans. The military crises of 1768–98 exposed this problem, turning the improving economic trend of the earlier 1700s into a protracted Ottoman economic crisis (1770–1840). As conditions changed, Ottoman thinking adapted, but slowly. Policy choices were constrained, in any event, by the progressive enlargement of the commercial and legal privileges (*imtiyazat*) historically granted to European states to allow their subjects to trade in the empire. These ‘capitulations’, as Europeans called them, evolved in this period into bilateral treaties that restricted Ottoman sovereignty.

Obtaining their agricultural produce mostly from small peasant households and manufactures mostly from guilds, state enterprises and the rural proto-industrial textile producers of the Bulgarian hill towns or Tokat (Anatolia), the Ottomans faced competition from the emerging European economy of iron and steam. However, the size of the internal markets and adaptability in the face of international competition enabled the Ottomans to perform better than might have been predicted.¹³ Egypt’s Mehmed Ali brought precisely the prevailing Ottoman assumptions and methods to his development projects in Egypt. His accomplishments, far from differentiating him from the Ottomans, show what those methods could produce in a country whose size and ecology facilitated centralisation and command in a way that Mahmud II could only envy.¹⁴

Culture under Selim and Mahmud

The two great currents of change that would interact dialectically to shape Ottoman Muslims’ responses to modernity had only begun to differentiate by 1839. However, the challenges of the times already led some Ottoman Muslims to seek greater knowledge of the outside world and others to re-emphasise the

¹³ Palaioret, *Balkan economies*, pp. 34–57, 66–81, 157–63; İnalçık and Quataert, *Economic and social history*, pp. 843–56, 888–98; Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda*, pp. 237–64, 272–92.

¹⁴ Findley, *Turkey: Islam, nationalism, and modernity*, chap. 1.

fundamental values of their own tradition. Before 1839 the former trend was confined to the central elites; but the latter trend had generated the greatest Islamic awakening of late Ottoman times. This movement quickly found a broad following in both centre and periphery; it still exerts great influence. Consequently, although literary works by elite authors will merit attention in discussing cultural life in later periods, a new religious movement commands attention in this period.

Its founder, Mevlana Khalid (1776–1827) emerged out of Ottoman Kurdistan to found a reform movement known as the Khalidiyya Naqshbandiyya. The Khalidiyya had its origins in the Mujaddidiyya, an earlier reform of the Naqshbandī Sufi order. Two waves of the Mujaddidiyya had already reached Istanbul, but without producing Khalid's impact.¹⁵

Born a Kurd near Shahrazur (Iraq), Khalid was initiated there into the Naqshbandī, Qadiri and other orders.¹⁶ He went to India to study with Shah Ghulam 'Alī (Shaykh 'Abdullah al Dihlawī, d. 1824) of the Mujaddidiyya Naqshbandiyya, founded by the great reformer Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624), whom Muslims revered as the 'renewer' (*mujaddid*) of the second Islamic millennium. Khalid acquired valuable credentials in the religious sciences and mysticism. Shah Ghulam 'Alī both authorised Khalid to teach disciplines such as Ḥadīth and Qur'an commentary and appointed him as deputy (*khalīfa*) to propagate the Mujaddidiyya in Kurdistan. When he returned to Iraq, these credentials enabled Khalid to propagate Sufism and hold his own against strict religious scholars, who opposed many Sufi movements. During his remaining years (1811–27) Shaykh Khalid faced opposition but won followers in Iraq, Syria, Istanbul and Iran. His impact as both scholar and mystic won him acclaim as the *mujaddid* of his century, echoing Sirhindī's honorific. Many of those who responded to him were bazaar merchants. Propertied elements, both merchants and landowners, continued to support the Khalidiyya and gave it a broad social base in addition to its adherents among the learned.

The Khalidiyya Naqshbandiyya owed its success to many factors, starting with the founder's learning and charisma. Strict observance of the *shari'a* and the Sunna, a cardinal Mujaddidī principle, helped Naqshbandīs win support from the *ulema*, who criticised many other orders' laxity. The Naqshbandī principle of 'solitude within society' (*khalvat dar anjuman*) enjoined social engagement and political participation, in contrast to some

15 Butrus Abu Manneh, *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century (1826–1876)* (Istanbul, 2001), p. 41.

16 Sean Ezra Foley, 'Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya Khalidiyya, 1776–2005', Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown University (2005).

orders' other worldliness. Early conflicts with Kurdish *amırs* led Khalid to support the Ottoman state against them. When his fast growing influence aroused Mahmud II's suspicions, Khalid allayed these suspicions, ordering his followers to pray for the Ottoman state. In contrast to other worldly Sufi orders or anti Ottoman movements such as the Wahhabiyya of Arabia, Khalid positioned his movement as a force for religious renewal and political reintegration.

Central to its appeal was the Khalidiyya's spiritual discipline.¹⁷ To other Naqshbandis' insistence on *shari'a* observance and silent recitation of the order's formulas (*dhikr khafi*), the Khalidis added emphases of their own. The practice that did most to differentiate the Khalidiyya was that of *raḥīṭa*, the disciple's meditative concentration on the shaykh's mental image. Khalid insisted that his followers meditate on his image alone, and never on those of his deputies or successors. This requirement both differentiated the order and maintained its centralisation until some later shaykhs breached the rule.

Among other practices contributing to the order's success, Khalid trained many deputies and sent them elsewhere to propagate the order. There in contrast to Qadiri practice the deputy could become a shaykh and send out his own *khalīfas*. This practice facilitated rapid expansion but eventually gave rise to different suborders. Also distinctive was reciting the *dhikr* not only silently but often individually. Consequently, the Khalidiyya did not actually require a dervish lodge (*tekke*) to function, although it might use one as a meeting hall.¹⁸ In time, the Khalidiyya had more *tekkes* in Istanbul than any other order but paradoxically could better dispense with them after the Turkish Republic ordered *tekkes* closed (1925).

Historical circumstances also favoured the order at times. The prior establishment of Mujaddidi Naqshbandis in Istanbul gave it friends in high places, not to speak of sympathetic Kurdish migrants among Istanbul work ers. In the 1820s the suppression of the Janissaries and the heterodox Bektāṣi order benefited the Naqshbandis.¹⁹ With support from leading Mujaddidi officials, Mahmud II demolished some Bektāṣi *tekkes*, turned the others over to Mujaddidi Naqshbandis, and confiscated the Bektāṣi *tekke* endowments for

17 Hamid Algar, 'Devotional practices of the Khalidi Naqshbandis of Ottoman Turkey', in Raymond Lifchez (ed.), *The dervish lodge: Architecture, art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992), pp. 209–27; Abu Manneh, *Studies on Islam*, pp. 31–40.

18 Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, shaykh and state: The social and political structures of Kurdistan* (London, 1992), pp. 224–8; Algar, 'Devotional practices', pp. 222–24.

19 Abu Manneh, *Studies on Islam*, pp. 43–51, 66–71; Algar, 'Devotional practices', pp. 211–12; Foley, 'Shaykh Khalid', pp. 209ff.

the treasury. Wary of a movement that he did not control, Mahmud also harassed the Khalidis, interfering in the succession to Mevlana Khalid and banishing Khalidī shaykhs from Istanbul. However, Khalidis regained prominence in Istanbul from the late 1830s on and made their order virtually synonymous with the Naqshbandiyya in the western Islamic lands.

The Tanzimat (1839–76)

During this period reformism continued and intensified, but the power centre shifted from the palace to the civil bureaucratic headquarters at the Sublime Porte (*Bab ı âli*). From Mahmud's death (1839) until Abdülhamid's accession (1876), no sultan had the force of character to dominate policy consistently. The new elites filled the gap. With defence dependent on diplomacy, preponderant political influence accrued not to the military, but to the civil elite, especially the diplomats. Dominating the posts of foreign minister and grand vezir, Mustafa Reşid (1800–58), Keçecizade Fuad (1815–69), and Mehmed Emin Âli Paşas (1815–71) shaped the period; and their associates filled the other ministries and the provincial governorships. At the same time, elite formation and cultural change slipped further out of government control. If the Khalidiyya had already created a major forum for the Islamically committed, adaptive movement of change, now the rise of the Ottoman print media created a base for a new intelligentsia advocating a more daring, disruptive approach to modernity. By the 1870s a new kind of political opposition had also emerged.

The Eastern Question, 1839–76

This period both began and ended with Ottoman survival more imperilled than at any other time before 1918. Midway through the Tanzimat, the Crimean War might have proven equally threatening had not Britain and France supported the Ottomans against Russia. Continual smaller crises in the provinces showed how the impact of modernity was politicising old differences and disrupting the historical *pax Ottomanica*.

Following the Egyptian crisis of 1839–41, as Crete and Lebanon reverted from Egyptian to Ottoman rule, turmoil erupted in both. As the island's Christians demanded union with independent Greece, Crete's old Christian Muslim symbiosis collapsed. Outright revolt occurred in 1866, and Ottoman sovereignty gradually attenuated, vanishing totally in 1913.²⁰ In Lebanon, Egyptian

20 François Georgeon, *Abdulhamid II, le sultan calife* (Paris, 2003), pp. 335–8.

rule had already shaken old networks that bridged differences of religion and class. After 1840 Ottoman reform policy and increased European activity, especially by missionaries, created new differences and politicised old ones. Sectarian and later class based conflict broke out in Lebanon in the 1840s, followed by sectarian conflict in Damascus in the 1860s. The Ottomans agreed with the major powers to introduce special regulations, giving Mount Lebanon a separate administrative system under a non Lebanese Christian governor and so restoring security at the price of perpetuating the new sectarianism in Lebanese politics.²¹

In the Balkans, nationalism continued to spread. Bulgaria remained under Ottoman rule, flourishing economically but enduring twelve minor insurrections (1835–76).²² Romanian nationalists wanted to unify Moldavia and Wallachia. Europe's 1848 revolutionary wave affected the Ottoman lands when Romanians responded to it, although they only later won unification (1861) and independence (1878). Balkan tensions did not produce a major war until 1877; but the same factors caused a crisis over the Christian Holy Places, and that did lead to war.

The Crimean War (1853–6) grew out of a Catholic Orthodox dispute over the keys to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The growing politicisation of ethno religious difference and European competition to champion different religions among the sultan's subjects turned this question, which could not have produced such crisis in earlier times, into a pretext for war. As protector of Orthodoxy, Russia issued an ultimatum. Britain and France declared war in return for Ottoman promises of further egalitarian reform. The war ended with the Ottoman Reform Decree of 1856 and with the empire admitted on paper to the concert of Europe under the Treaty of Paris. The Ottomans now became the first non Western state to conclude a treaty nominally on equal terms with the European powers; yet the treaty further eroded Ottoman sovereignty by neutralising the Black Sea, internationalising the Danube and installing European controls in Romania and Serbia.

Avoided in 1856, territorial losses occurred in the 1870s, a decade of crisis that also included famine in Anatolia (1873–5) and state bankruptcy

21 Ussama Makdisi, *The culture of sectarianism: Community, history, and violence in nineteenth century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2000); Engin Akarlı, *The long peace, 1861–1920* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993); Philip S. Khoury, *Urban notables and Arab nationalism: the politics of Damascus, 1860–1920* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 8–52; J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in world politics: A documentary record*, 2 vols. (New Haven, 1975), vol. I, pp. 344–9.

22 Palaioret, *Balkan economies*, pp. 129–35, 157–65.

(1875–81). Revolt broke out in Herzegovina (1874) and spread to Bulgaria. Having defaulted on their foreign loans, this time the Ottomans could not get European support. Outcries about massacres of Christians inflamed European opinion, even as counter massacres flooded Istanbul with Muslim refugees, whose plight Europeans ignored. In 1876, as the situation destabilised, two sultans were deposed in Istanbul, and a third came to the throne, Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). The crisis strengthened Ottoman constitutionalists' hands sufficiently that the 1876 Ottoman constitution was adopted, partly to ward off European interference. That did not stop Russia from declaring war. The Russo-Turkish War (1877–8) brought the empire near to extinction, causing major territorial losses in the northern Balkans and eastern Anatolia. The war also enabled Abdülhamid to end both the bureaucratic hegemony of the Tanzimat and the First Constitutional Period (1876–8).

Reformist emphases

Amid the reforms of this period, several themes stand out: legislation; education and elite formation; governmental expansion; intercommunal relations; and new forms of politics. The dependence of reform on planning and regulation makes legislation the place to begin. The period's fundamental acts were the Gülhane Decree of 1839, Reform Decree of 1856 and constitution of 1876; yet they were only the crests on a mounting legislative wave.

The Gülhane Decree merged Europeanising reforms with Ottoman and Islamic emphases.²³ It called for reforms in taxation, recruitment and judicial process. It extended guarantees of life, honour and property to all subjects, and it promised new laws to implement these promises. The rights guaranteed and the denunciation of tax farming and monopolies echo British Liberalism. At the same time, the repeated references to promulgating *kavanin i şer'îye*, laws according to the *shari'a*, evoke the Ottoman tradition of conforming state law (*kanun*) with Islamic law. Although Europeans assumed the contrary, the decree does not say that non-Muslims and Muslims are equal, which they are not under the *shari'a*. The decree does extend its provisions to all subjects of the sultanate, both 'Muslims and members of other communities' (*ehl i İslam ve milel i saire*), as state law (*kanun*) could do. Characteristically Ottoman and Islamic emphases on justice appear in the provisions on due process and on

23 Ahmed Lutfi, *Tarih i Lutfi*, 8 vols. (Istanbul, 1302), vol. VI, pp. 61–5; Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türk anayasa metinleri, senedi ittifaktan günümüze* (Ankara, 1985), pp. 11–13.

reducing taxation by replacing old, exorbitant taxes with one 'appropriate tax' (*bir vergü yi münasib*).

Although the Gülhane Decree had not explicitly stated the equality of non Muslims with Muslims, the Reform Decree (*Islahat fermanı*) of 1856 did.²⁴ Reaffirming historical communal privileges, the decree invited the non Muslim communities to draw up communal regulations (*nizamname*) and form representative bodies. Among other provisions, it forbade language that 'held some communities lower than others'. The decree opened public office to subjects of all religions. It also made military service obligatory for non Muslims but allowed them to purchase exemption by paying a substitution fee (*bedel*), which effectively replaced the *cizye*, the tax required of non Muslims under the *shari'a*.

The 1876 constitution, the third fundamental act of the Tanzimat, responded not only to the international crisis but also to the accumulation of other organic acts. By then, organic statutes had been issued for the non Muslim communities, for Lebanon, Crete, Tunisia and Romania. Organic regulations for parts of the empire implied a fundamental law (*kanun ı esasi*) for the whole. The constitution showed the extent to which rule of law, guaranteed rights and equality had imprinted Ottoman thinking. It also showed that imperial authority preserved its sanctity. The constitution became law only by the sultan's decree. It left the sultan's prerogatives undefined, although it mentioned many: appointing and dismissing ministers, enforcing *shari'a* and *kanun*, vetoing laws passed in parliament. Abdülhamid insisted on including an article that allowed the sultan under martial law to exile anyone whom the police reported as a security risk. The leading constitutionalist Midhat Paşa went into exile in 1876 as a victim of this article, without martial law being in force.

With the acts of 1839, 1856 and 1876 as its crests, the mounting wave of Tanzimat legislation consisted of new regulations, laws and codes. Among these, the penal code of 1858 and the commercial codes of 1850 and 1863 were based on French models. However, the Ottoman land law (*arazi kanunna mesi*) of 1858 systematised the traditional Ottoman principle of state owned agricultural land (*miri*). When the *ulema* resisted a proposal to adopt the French civil code, a commission led by Ahmed Cevdet Paşa produced instead a code based on the *shari'a*, the *Mecelle* (1870–7). New courts were set up to try cases under the new laws. These were known as *nizami* courts, a term that

²⁴ Kili and Gözübüyük, *Türk anayasa*, pp. 14–18; Paul Dumont, 'La période des Tanzimât (1839–1878)', in Mantran (ed.), *Histoire*, pp. 497–500.

derives from *nizam*, 'order', and thus identifies these and other institutions, including the new army, as products of reform.

A prerequisite for successful reforms, elite formation depended on education. The scale of the need for qualified personnel was huge. An entire new army had to be created after 1826. Analogously, civil officials' numbers grew by tens of thousands after they acquired primary responsibility for provincial administration.²⁵ The *ulema*'s vested interest in the elementary Qur'an schools (*mekteb*) and the higher religious schools (*medrese*) forced educational reformers to work around them. After several military academies had been founded (1773–1834), the first new civil schools became the foundation for a broader network of government schools, starting with the *rüşdiyes* (1840s). These were upper elementary schools designed to pick up where the Qur'anic elementary schools left off. The first middle schools (*idadiye*, 1845) and lycées (Galatasaray, 1868) were added later. The 1869 public education regulations (*maarif-i umumiye nizamnamesi*) attempted to systematise education. In time, Galatasaray and the School of Civil Administration (Mülkiye Mektebi, 1859) became to the civil elite what the academies were to the military. As the new education spread beyond the elites, it fostered the Ottoman proto bourgeoisie and a new reading public. Elite education also produced an unintended consequence: elites whose new ideas led them to shift their loyalty from their imperial master to their own ideal of the state.²⁶

The Tanzimat reforms vastly expanded governmental functions and their impacts on Ottoman subjects' lives, as many examples show. Given Istanbulites' exemption from conscription and taxation, provincials bore the tax burden; and provincial Muslim males bore that of conscription. As of 1869, that meant four years in the regular army (*nizami*, 210,000 men), six years in the reserve (*redif*, 190,000) and eight years in the home guard (*mustahfizan*, 300,000).²⁷

The new provincial administrative system formed another great Tanzimat legacy. The Gülhane Decree mandated replacing tax farming with salaried revenue collectors (*muhasşils*). Direct revenue collection would have benefited

25 Carter Vaughn Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton, 1980), pp. 22–3, 212–18.

26 Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the bourgeoisie, demise of empire: Ottoman westernization and social change* (New York, 1996), pp. 45–6.

27 Çadırcı, *Tanzimat döneminde Anadolu*, pp. 254–72, 360–71; İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun en uzun yüzyılı* (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 115–32; Dumont, 'La période des Tanzimât', pp. 481–3; Shaw and Shaw, *History*, vol. II, pp. 91–5.

both the treasury and the taxpayers; but the change was badly prepared, and tax farming resumed within a few years. However, other functions of the *muhasşils* produced lasting results: registering taxpayers and their income sources, creating local councils. Soon, provincial administration assumed a tiered, hierarchical order – the province and its subdivisions – with appointed civil officials and councils that brought together both officials and elective members. Provincial administration laws of 1864 and 1871 standardised this system. The 1871 law called for a four tiered provincial administration. In descending order, the four levels (and their chief administrators) were the *vilayet* (*vali*), *sancak* or *liva* (*mutasarrıf*), *kaza* (*kaymakam*) and *nahiye* (*müdü*r). This system brought the enlarged role of government home to provincial Ottoman subjects and created a new form of politics in the indirect elections for the provincial councils.

Maintaining the empire's integrity also required bridging its peoples' differences, a need that produced contradictory efforts. Notably, the 1856 Reform Decree affirmed religious equality, maintained non Muslims' communal privileges and called for strengthening the 'heartfelt patriotic bonds' (*revabit ı kalbiye i vatandaşî*) among all Ottoman subjects. Achieving all three goals at once would prove impossible. The growing politicisation of identity issues forced Ottoman statesmen to try nonetheless. They had to face the fact that concessions to non Muslims offended conservative Muslims, to whom the *shan'a* assigned a superior position. Some disturbances of the period, as in Syria and Lebanon, expressed such feelings. The reorganisation of the non Muslim communities (*millets*) raised additional complex issues and worked out differently in different communities. The small, new Protestant *millet* created a model constitution. The Armenian community's reformed institutions increasingly responded to nationalist appeals. Vulnerable to nationalism in much the same way as the Ottoman Empire was, the Greek Orthodox faced demands for autocephalism (independently headed, national Orthodox churches) from Bulgarians (1870) and Romanians (1885). Meanwhile, with the 1856 Reform Decree, Tanzimat statesmen attempted to foster the 'heartfelt patriotic bonds' by redefining Ottomanism (*Osmanlılık*) to include rulers and subjects equally, rather than just the ruling elite. A century earlier, Ottoman attempts to reconcile individual, communal and all inclusive rights might have worked as well as the construction of British identity did. In its day it worked as poorly as the effort to create an Austro Hungarian 'imperial nationalism'. To the extent that Ottoman solidarity ever took fire emotionally, the credit went not to Tanzimat bureaucrats but to the new literary intelligentsia who emerged from their midst.

Cultural change made the Tanzimat as important in shaping the Westernising Ottoman intelligentsia as the preceding period was for the conservatives represented by the Khalidiyya. These cultural changes also produced momentous political consequences. In the past, politics had revolved around personalities more than policies. Great men had formed household based factions, competed for the sultan's favour, and intrigued to overthrow their rivals. To advance, talented men who were not born into a great household had to win a patron's favour. The classic way to display one's talent had been by writing verse, preferably a praise poem that would establish a patronage relationship. These patterns persisted into the Tanzimat, but the ground shifted under them. The sultans had traditionally been the greatest patrons, and Selim III was the last sultan to make a name for himself in the old poetical and musical forms. Loss of palace patronage threw the writers into crisis, from which they were only saved by the rise of the Ottoman language print media, particularly newspapers. During this period, the growth in literacy, in the Ottoman Muslim proto bourgeoisie and in bourgeois self consciousness created the reading public for Ottoman language journalism. The literary intelligentsia had new opportunities, at the price of adapting to a new audience, new media and new ideas about language and literary forms. The launching of the first Turkish owned non official newspaper, Yusuf Agah's *Tercüman ı Ahval* (1860), symbolises the takeoff of Ottoman 'print capitalism'. This created a new forum for the modernist intelligentsia, much as the Khalidiyya did for conservatives.

The literary bureaucratic intelligentsia also produced the first modern style political opposition movement, the Young Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlılar, 1865).²⁸ They found a new kind of patron in Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, a rich, alienated member of Egypt's Mehmed Ali dynasty. The Young Ottomans followed him to Paris, where he financed the oppositional newspapers that they published beyond Ottoman censors' reach. The Young Ottomans thus became the first Ottoman intellectuals to go into exile voluntarily rather than compromise their principles. Assessments of the group have varied. Historians have concentrated on their political ideas and neglected their literary artistry; literary scholars have done the opposite. Neither purely literary nor purely political, they sought to create a modern Ottoman Islamic culture. They did, however, produce their greatest political impact by helping to advocate and draft the 1876 constitution.

²⁸ Şerif Mardin, *The genesis of Young Ottoman thought: A study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas* (Princeton, 1962).

Society and economy during the Tanzimat

Amid hardships indicative of the Ottomans' dependent integration into the world economy, the economic life of the period produced some successes. In state finance, the high point was the 1844 coinage reform, which ended the longest period of monetary debasements (1770–1840) in Ottoman history. The 1844 bimetallic standard endured with modifications until 1922. However, government revenues remained inadequate to support the reforms; and expenditures lacked effective controls, especially at the palace.²⁹ Revenue shortages led to the issue of paper money (*kaime*, 1840–62), which depreciated badly, as did later issues. During the Crimean War the government began to contract foreign loans. Mismanagement of those led to state bankruptcy by 1875. Modern banks emerged in this period, among which the Ottoman Imperial Bank (OIB, 1863), although British and French owned, served as a virtual state bank.³⁰

Trade and agriculture expanded, with both exports and imports roughly quintupling in value. Agrarian products and carpets accounted for most exports; industrial and some colonial goods made up most imports. Internal trade, although less well documented than external, also grew, and probably accounted for 75 per cent of all trade during this period.³¹

Agriculture experienced appreciable growth, despite its chronic inefficiencies. Land was abundant, but the supply of capital and labour was inadequate, and the high cost of land transport added another obstacle. With localised exceptions, average landholdings therefore remained small. Factors stimulating agriculture included improved rural security following Mahmud II's attacks on warlordism, the clarification of titles under the 1858 land law and the resettlement of Muslim refugees on vacant land. While total state revenue nearly tripled (1848–76), the tithes on agricultural produce (*öşür*) nearly quadrupled.³²

Ottoman manufactures also adapted and grew. Ottoman guilds could not compete with factory made imports; but outside the major cities, where the guilds were entrenched, other forms of production did adapt. Upland towns in Bulgaria developed a rural industry in textiles for the Ottoman internal market. Bulgarian woollens were so competitive that 'European goods were

29 Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, p. 178.

30 Edhem Eldem, *A history of the Ottoman Imperial Bank* (Istanbul, 1999).

31 Şevket Pamuk, *A monetary history of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 220; Palaioret, *Balkan economies*, pp. 42–3; İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and social history*, pp. 834–41.

32 Tevfik Güran, 19. *Yüzyıl Osmanlı tanımı üzerine araştırmalar* (Istanbul, 1998), p. 58.

largely restricted to the fashion trade'.³³ Nablus (Palestine) combined olive growing with oil and soap making in another example of economic growth. During the Tanzimat the number of Nablus soap factories tripled, and their production quadrupled.³⁴ Particularly successful among manufactured exports, carpet exports increased in value seven or eightfold (1850–1914).³⁵ The evidence on manufactures has to be examined comprehensively, inasmuch as the decline of one sector often led to asset reallocation and the rise of another.

Society changed with the economy. Estimates of 1872 put the population at 23 million for provinces directly ruled from Istanbul, or 40 million including indirectly ruled territories (Egypt, semi-independent Balkan countries). Among the 23 million, 14 million lived in Asia, and 9 million in Europe. Non-Muslims slightly outnumbered Muslims in the European provinces; in the Asian ones, Muslims outnumbered non-Muslims nearly three to one. Overall growth rates were not high, but this population was dynamic in many ways. Urban growth was rapid. Istanbul and Izmir both roughly doubled (1840–90), to 900,000 and 200,000 respectively; Beirut increased tenfold to 100,000. Set in flight by Balkan separatism and Russian expansion into the Caucasus, Muslim refugees also transformed rural populations. In the hundreds of thousands annually from 1854 on, the annual migration peaked at 400,000 in 1864.³⁶

Qualitative social changes affected both individual subjectivity and class formation. Ottoman Muslim society combined ethical egalitarianism and a communal spirit with pronounced hierarchies of gender and age. In such a context, cultural change and new possibilities for self-expression quickly produced significant consequences. With the appearance of the first state schools for girls and women teachers (1859, 1870) and the first magazines for women (1868), Ottoman Muslim women's lives also changed. Although Muslims rightly feared being outdistanced by non-Muslims in forming an entrepreneurial middle class, elements of an Ottoman Muslim proto bourgeoisie were emerging. The kinds of capital that distinguished its segments might be either intellectual (ruling elites, writers) or economic (merchants, landowners).

33 Palaioret, *Balkan economies*, p. 72.

34 Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995), pp. 182–232; Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the state in the late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 28–9, 37.

35 Donald Quataert, *Ottoman manufacturing in the age of the industrial revolution* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 134–60.

36 Dumont, 'La période des Tanzîmât', p. 487; Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *Merchants and migrants in nineteenth century Beirut* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 2, 28–60; Justin McCarthy, *Death and exile: The ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, 1995), pp. 23–58.

Different endowments meant different interests and stood in the way of common class consciousness, as the chronic clashes between provincial administrators and local landed interests illustrated.³⁷ However, both segments of the Muslim proto bourgeoisie had acquired their own cultural fora with the religious awakening that the Khalidiyya sparked for the conservatives and the advent of 'print capitalism' for the modernists. Most Ottoman Muslims identified with both segments, until forced to choose.

Tanzimat culture

With the new print media and reading public, the literary forms that expressed bourgeois consciousness in Europe came into vogue. Ottoman plays and novels drew on Ottoman prototypes in various ways. Yet to the extent that these were borrowed genres, Ottoman authors borrowed not only forms, but also elements of content. Works of imagination thereby became tools for transforming Ottoman reality. In particular, Ottoman writers implicitly assumed that a novel or play had to have a hero and a heroine, whose interaction animated the plot. Nothing challenged authorial ingenuity more than writing a 'boy meets girl story' about a society where Islamic gender norms were supposed to prevent encounters between males and females who were not *mahrem* (too closely related for marriage). The contortions that Ottoman writers went through to solve this problem provide significant insights into changing socio cultural expectations. For the Tanzimat, no writer proves the point better than Namık Kemal (1840–88), a leading Young Ottoman, constitutionalist and cultural modernist, whose thought overall is noteworthy for its Islamic content.

His play *Vatan yahud Silistre* ('Fatherland, or Silistria,' 1873) helped launch modern Turkish theatre. Its political content caused demonstrations, which resulted in exile for him and other Young Ottomans.³⁸ Ottoman censors reacted specifically to the play's exposure of a fundamental contradiction in the policy of egalitarian Ottomanism, namely, that Islam was the motivator to fight for the empire. The melodramatic plot combines mistaken identity with the theme of the heroine who disguises herself as a soldier to follow her love into battle. With departure for the front imminent as the play opens, Namık Kemal makes short work of bringing hero and heroine together by having him climb in through her window to declare his love and bid her farewell. She at first has trouble understanding his love of the fatherland;

37 Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*, pp. 48–52, 110–14, 241–3.

38 Namık Kemal, *Vatan yahud Silistre* (n.p., 1307/1891–2).

what she understands is her love for him – an indication of Namık Kemal's limited expectations for women's political awareness. Later, after their daring raid to blow up the enemy's ammunition, the heroine also discovers that their commander is her long lost father. She emerges from disguise, resumes Islamic dress and is reunited with her father and her hero. Patriotism had to overrule Islamic gender norms to get the hero and heroine together in act one. After their victory, those norms are restored, as the characters celebrate their good fortune and wish long life to the sultan. The names of heroine and hero – Zekiye, 'Miss Intelligent', and Islam Bey, 'Mr Islam' – have obvious meanings. The fact that his was not in common use as a personal name makes it stand out more. The play presents the warlike face of nationalism at its most heroic, leaving later generations to learn the costs of fulfilling such expectations in a region where Islam did not motivate everyone to fight for an Ottoman future.

Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)

His reign began with the short lived First Constitutional Period (*Birinci Meşrutiyet*, 1876–8) and ended in the Second, opened by the Young Turk revolution (1908). In between, his autocratic rule made this the Hamidian period.³⁹ The bureaucratic hegemony of the Tanzimat was over; and the sharp zigzags that ensued, from constitutionalism to autocracy and back to constitutionalism, helped differentiate the two great currents of change discernible in late Ottoman history. Abdülhamid left a controversial legacy. A bloodthirsty tyrant to some, to others he was a major reformer and the premier Muslim sovereign of his day. His record provides evidence to support both interpretations.

The Eastern Question, 1876–1908

After 1878 Abdülhamid succeeded in avoiding war with Russia. However, he lost control of Tunisia and Egypt. Then, as internal differences further destabilised the Ottoman polity, European powers' policies shifted more towards competing for concessions inside it.

Atop the 1875 state bankruptcy, Abdülhamid faced the Russo Turkish War and Treaty of Berlin. The treaty deprived the Ottomans of vast territories and much of their most productive population. It obliged them to pay Russia an

³⁹ The discussion of this reign follows Georgeon, *Abdulhamid II*, plus other sources as noted below.

indemnity supposedly amounting to over £300,000 a year for a century. The entire Ottoman budget for 1878–9 did not amount to much over £13 million, about 60 per cent of the pre war total. The 1875 state bankruptcy reached resolution with the organisation of the Public Debt Administration (PDA, 1881), an international agency that took control of six major revenues in order to repay bond holders, returning any remainder to the Ottoman government. This arrangement restored financial order of a semi colonial kind. However, rationalising debt service in this way precluded rationalising the rest of Ottoman finance or meeting the empire's developmental needs. To make matters worse, Abdülhamid's mind combined determination to centralise with a keen business sense. He expanded the palace treasury and crown estates on a scale never before seen, creating another financial empire within the empire. The Ministry of Finance could only control the leavings from the PDA and palace treasury. None of the states against which the Ottomans had to defend their interests faced such economic handicaps.

While many threats the Ottomans faced were localised, other manifestations of imperialism operated systemically, producing effects everywhere. After the PDA, notable examples included the foreign banks and the Régie des tabacs (1884), a largely French company that monopolised purchase and sale of 'Turkish' tobacco. The PDA had thousands of employees; the Régie had more. A boom in European investment also occurred.⁴⁰ French investments grew more than sixfold (1881–1908). Cultural penetration of the empire increased alongside economic. As European missionaries reached a peak of competitiveness, foreign schools inside the empire numbered over 400 by the 1890s. As beneficent as their work was, missionaries created differences that had not been there before (for example, Protestant and Catholic as well as Gregorian Armenians), politicised differences both new and old (Maronites and Druzes in Lebanon) and antagonised local authorities both lay (the Ottoman government) and religious (the Eastern churches). When they ran into difficulty, missionaries sought help from whichever diplomatic mission they could (American missionaries were wont to appeal to the British ambassador). Not without reason did Ottoman concerns about missionaries grow, not least because the latter often acted without requesting official authorisation. When Abdülhamid attempted in 1901 to close unauthorised French institutions, not only did the French respond with force and demand recognition of their institutions, but the other European powers raised

⁴⁰ Eldem, *History of Ottoman Bank*, pp. 233–40.

corresponding demands.⁴¹ The Ottoman government countered European cultural imperialism with efforts to expand the state schools and propagate Sunni Islam. What it could not counter was the centuries old expansion of the legal and commercial 'privileges' (capitulations, *imtiyazat*) that enabled foreigners to do as they pleased inside the empire.

In addition to systemic threats, localised crises also continued. In North Africa, the Ottomans faced European imperialism and Islamic protest movements. Abdülhamid responded by bolstering support from Oman to Zanzibar to Morocco.⁴² The most tangible results came in Libya, where he supported the Sanusiyya order in return for its supporting him as caliph. The French occupation of Tunis (1881) and the British occupation of Egypt (1882) brought European encroachment to a point of crisis. Ottoman responses included protracted campaigning in Yemen, ending in accommodation with the Zaydi imamate only after 1908.

Meanwhile, the Armenian crisis of 1894–6 rocked Anatolia. Eastern Anatolia was historically a site of religious coexistence among both Muslims (Sunni and Alevi) and Christians (Armenian, Nestorian, Syrian Orthodox). Conflicts of interest between Armenian peasants and Kurdish nomads complicated the picture. The Russo Turkish War (1877–8) and loss of Kars, Ardahan and Batum to Russia left bad blood between the region's Christians and Muslims, especially the refugees. The Treaty of Berlin (1878) made the six eastern provinces, where most Ottoman Armenians lived, an international concern by calling for reforms under British supervision, a demand naturally resisted by Abdülhamid. Locally, politics played out among four actors: Ottoman government agents (civil and military); Turkish notables in the towns; *beys* of the nomadic Kurdish tribes; and Armenians. Despite enthusiasts' visions of this region as 'Armenia', the Armenians accounted for under a quarter of the six provinces' populace, and did not constitute a majority in any province.⁴³

Although security and prosperity would probably have satisfied most Ottoman Armenians, radical nationalists in the Caucasus proposed liberating Ottoman Armenians. Abdülhamid's security concerns led him to create the Hamidian cavalry (*Hamidiye alayları*), recruited among the eastern tribesmen

41 Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial classroom: Islam, the state, and education in the late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 77–8; Rogan, *Frontiers*, pp. 122–59, 182–3, 200–1, 218, 244; van Bruinessen, *Agha, shaiikh and state*, pp. 229–33; Fawaz, *Merchants*, pp. 112–20.

42 Kemal Karpat, *The politicization of Islam: Reconstructing identity, state, faith, and community in the late Ottoman state* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 258–75.

43 Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and minorities: The population of Ottoman Anatolia and the end of the empire* (New York, 1983), pp. 23, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 62; Karpat, *Politicization*, pp. 211.

(primarily Kurdish) and commanded by tribal *beys*. The peasants' historical reasons to fear the nomads now reached new heights.⁴⁴ A three crested surge of violence ensued: the Armenian rising, forcibly repressed, at Sasun (1894); an Armenian demonstration that degenerated into violence in Istanbul and triggered widespread violence in Anatolia (1895); and Armenian radicals' seizure of the Ottoman Bank headquarters in Istanbul (1896). The bank attack cooled European armenophilia for a time, and the crises left Armenians weakened by reprisals and emigration.

Diplomatic attention was soon diverted by crises in Macedonia (the Ottoman provinces of Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica). Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonian nationalists all challenged Ottoman rule. In the 1890s, organisations formed to support all these causes. Abdülhamid responded by playing off the divisions among the Balkan nationalists and the outside powers. By 1903 rival Macedonian nationalist groups' attempts to launch general insurrections had created a situation that Ottoman forces could hardly master. The great powers demanded separation along 'national' lines and regional financial control by the Ottoman Bank. Macedonia confronted the Ottomans with crises until its loss in the Balkan wars; its greatest city, Salonica, also became the seedbed for the 1908 Young Turk revolution.

Reform and opposition

Despite the crises, Abdülhamid left a mixed but significant legacy of reform. Key topics for consideration include centralisation, Islam and major fronts of reform policy, as well as the tension between law and autocracy, and the rise of a new opposition.

Abdülhamid made his new palace at Yıldız the centre of government. Assuming the throne after two depositions in 1876, and living in a time when anarchists often assassinated ruling figures, his fearfulness led to his increasing seclusion there. He concentrated political power in the Grand Chancery (*Büyük Mabeyn*), the dreaded nerve centre of palace rule. He made the palace treasury (*Hazine i Hassa*) into a ministerial size agency. He presided at Yıldız over permanent commissions responsible for major issues, including refugees and the Hijaz railway. Diplomacy, too, was conducted from the palace. The Sublime Porte became a backwater.⁴⁵

Unlike the Tanzimat statesmen, who achieved political hegemony *de facto*, Abdülhamid wielded power *de jure*. Earlier sultans had not always exercised

44 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, shaiikh and state*, pp. 185–9.

45 Findley, *Bureaucratic reform*, pp. 227–39, 265–6.

their powers fully, but those powers had never been limited in principle. For Ottoman Muslims at least, the sultanate retained its sacrosanct aura.⁴⁶ A forceful sultan could take these powers back into his hands. Since Küçük Kaynarca, the saliency of the caliphate had continued growing; and modern progress had made the unity of the Islamic world more perceptible. Namık Kemal and others had begun writing about Islamic unity (*ittihad ı İslam*) in the 1870s. Although European powers' apprehensions about pan Islamism far exceeded Abdülhamid's resources or daring in pursuing the policy, he was the caliph of Islam. He was, as well, 'the Servitor of the Two Holy Cities', and Muslim pilgrims from all the world depended on him. Regarding Mecca and Medina as essential for the empire's survival, he devoted one of his most modernistic projects to consolidating that link: the Hıjaz railway (1900–8).

Abdülhamid enacted modernising reforms in many ways. In local administration, much of the implementation of the 1871 law on provincial administration occurred under him, and the municipal administration law (1877) was also extended to the provinces. Ranging from 30,000 to 100,000 square kilometres, Ottoman provinces (*vilayet*) were still much larger than those of most European countries. At least their administrative staffs increased in number and quality, especially as graduates of the School of Civil Administration (*Mülkiye Mektebi*) raised the level of professionalism. As statistical tools came into increased use, the first modern censuses were conducted (1881–93, 1905–6); and yearbooks were published not only for the central government but for individual provinces and ministries.⁴⁷ After the Balkan territorial losses of 1878 shifted the Ottoman centre of gravity southward and eastward, developmental efforts were channelled in that direction. The foundations for the later state of Jordan were laid in this period. Yet this was a major period for the development of administration and public works all over the empire. Abdülhamid was one of the most prolific public builders of Islamic history, leaving a still recognisable stamp on towns across his realm. The difference between his reign and earlier ones was that he built, not magnificent mosques and palaces, but utilitarian administrative offices, garrisons, schools, small mosques, train stations or docks. The telegraph lines more than doubled in length under Abdülhamid. For the most part, the railway reached the empire after 1880, first in the Balkans, then in the Asian provinces.

46 Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in world history* (New York, 2005), pp. 31–2, 47–8, 123–6, 167, 230–2; Karpas, *Politicization*, pp. 121, 176–82, 241–75.

47 Karpas, *Ottoman population*, pp. 33–5, 122–69; Findley, *Bureaucratic reform*, pp. 198, 273, 285–7.

Education, too, expanded significantly. The 1869 education regulations called for a five tiered hierarchy consisting of the elementary (*ibtidai*), upper elementary (*rüşdiye*), middle (*idadiye*), lycée level (*sultani*) and higher professional schools, to be followed by university. By 1908 there were 40,000 students in the *rüşdiyes* and 20,000 in the *idadis*. Istanbul University opened in 1900, and the network of professional schools was expanded and extended into the provinces, with military schools in each regional army headquarters, a medical school in Damascus, and law schools in Salonica, Konya and Baghdad. In expanding the state schools, competition with non Muslim and foreign schools remained a major goal.

Military reform was essential to secure throne and empire. Determined to see his army recover from the Russo Turkish War without becoming a threat to him, Abdülhamid sought expertise from Germany. Military expenditures absorbed half the budget throughout his reign. He could only economise by scrimping on the navy and salary payments, whose irregularity caused mutinies in his later years. However, he equipped the army with up to date weapons, almost all German. Recruitment was rationalised with a new law (1886) and extended to refugees. Officer training was strengthened with the opening of provincial military schools, and the Military Academy (*Harbiye*) curriculum was revised with advice from German General (later Field Marshal) Colmar von der Goltz. In the officer corps, this educational push raised the percentage of 'school men' (*mektepli*, as opposed to 'regimentals,' *alaylı*) from 10 to 25 per cent (1884–99).

Von der Goltz's long service (1883–95, 1908, 1915–16) symbolised the Ottoman German military relationship.⁴⁸ Having long employed foreign advisers, the Ottomans now made the relationship systematic. German officers did not yet command, but were highly paid and taken seriously. Reliance on German armaments encouraged other economic relationships, including the concession to German financiers for the Anatolian railway, which reached Ankara in 1892.⁴⁹ As entrepreneurs dreamed of extending the line to Baghdad, the Anatolian railway made it possible to supply Istanbul for the first time with grain brought overland from Anatolia, rather than by ship from Black Sea ports. Kaiser Wilhelm II (r. 1881–1918) visited the empire in 1882 and 1898.

Abdülhamid's vigour in pursuing his goals as both autocrat and moderniser exposed the tension between the two. Ottoman reform had always depended both on rationalisation and on the sultan's power to legislate by

⁴⁸ Karpas, *Politicization*, p. 264.

⁴⁹ İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and social history*, p. 806.

decree. In that sense, tension between reason and will ran throughout the history of reform. The last decisive reign in Ottoman history brought that tension into the open. The tide of plans, regulations and laws kept rising. Abdülhamid thought a great deal about their implementation, and his officials achieved 'a degree of efficiency for which they are seldom credited'.⁵⁰ Yet this was no ideal rule of law. The 1876 constitution had placed the sultan above the law, and he had suspended the constitution. Planning and regulation thenceforth became tools for him to use instrumentally to extend the range of his control. Modern inventions served the same purpose. His vast photograph collection enabled Abdülhamid to see the empire he feared to visit. The telegraph enabled him to collect information almost instantaneously across vast distances. The railway extended his reach economically, strategically even spiritually, in the case of the Hijaz railway. As Abdülhamid aged, the vices of his regime worsened. Press censorship became severe in the 1890s. The network of palace spies and informers created a climate of fear, eventually producing scandals that discredited the regime.⁵¹

Abdülhamid managed to neutralise the Young Ottoman opposition at the start of his reign. After 1889, however, the Ottoman intelligentsia produced a new opposition, known in English as the Young Turks. Abdülhamid coped fairly well with them for many years; yet they brought about a constitutional revolution in 1908.

An important consequence of the tension between will and reason helped to shape this new opposition. Abdülhamid's efforts to educate new elites to serve his will had produced men more loyal to their own ideas than to their sultan's will. The first nucleus of opposition formed in the Military Medical Academy, where the combination of scientific modernity, military discipline, enforced religious and political conformism and the confinement of a residential college generated radicalising pressures. Student activists were sent into internal exile from 1895 on. Ottoman exiles also grouped in Europe, where Ahmed Rıza assumed the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The name pays tribute to Auguste Comte's positivism but changes his motto, 'Order and Progress', to show that imperial unity outranked order in Ottoman priorities. Abdülhamid's ability to counter the opposition suffered a major blow when his brother in law, Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, fled to Europe with his two sons and joined the opposition.⁵² One son, Sabahaddin, emerged

⁵⁰ Rogan, *Frontiers*, p. 84.

⁵¹ Findley, *Bureaucratic reform*, pp. 232, 285, 411.

⁵² M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in opposition* (New York, 1995).

as an alternative to Ahmed Rıza in both leadership and ideas. Sabahaddin favoured English style decentralisation and free enterprise, whereas Ahmed Rıza represented positivism, centralisation and the developing trend toward Turkish nationalism.

Ideologically, the Young Turks shared much with their Young Ottoman forebears. The different names applied to the two groups reflect others' imprecise language, not their identity concepts. The Young Turks, too, were Ottomanists, not Turkish nationalists, at least not as long as hope of preserving the empire lasted. They differed from their precursors in their immersion in the newly emerging social sciences and in having lost the Young Ottomans' interest in Islamic thought. Many Young Turks were radical materialists, hostile to Islam except as a tool for mass mobilisation.

After 1905, a rising revolutionary tide favoured the Young Turks. The Japanese victory over the Russians thrilled Ottomans and validated Japan's Meiji Restoration (1868) as a model of constitutional modernity. Revolution broke out in Russia (1905) and Iran (1906). The Young Turks tightened their organisation and broadened their efforts at political mobilisation. Tax revolts across Anatolia (1906–7) and widespread military revolts convinced the elitist Young Turks to reappraise prospects for mass action. The tax revolts were the work of local notables, the propertied, conservative wing of the emergent Ottoman middle class. The interests of radicals and conservatives had begun to converge.

Macedonia formed the revolutionary crucible, as local activists, led by Talat Bey, won new followers and merged with the Paris CUP. As rumours circulated that Britain and Russia planned to divide the Ottoman Balkans, Ottoman commanders took to the hills, and insurgents proclaimed the restoration of the constitution in numerous towns. Abdülhamid had no choice but to concede (July 1908). He kept his throne for another year as a constitutional monarch, until an attempted counter coup (April 1909) precipitated his deposition.

Threatened by both ethnic revolt and foreign intervention, the Young Turks were conservative revolutionaries. They aimed to hold the empire together and restore the 1876 constitution, their talisman for a Japanese style resurgence. One of the lessons they drew from other recent revolutions shows how much their constitutionalism differed from the Liberal paradigm. In their view, parliament depended for its survival on an external organisation able to defend it. The 1876 Ottoman parliament had lacked such a shield; the Russian Duma withstood attempted counter revolution thanks to the revolutionary secret organisations, feared even by the tsar. From 1908 until

1913, the CUP assumed the stance of a secret body monitoring constitutional government from offstage.⁵³ The same combination of civil and military elites would govern Turkey until 1950. Later assumed by the military high command, such a guardianship still persists in Turkish politics.

Society and economy

In government finance, bankruptcy and the Public Debt Administration (PDA, 1881) limited the possibilities of this period. In the 1870s, when most European countries abandoned bimetallism for the gold standard, the Ottoman Empire lacked the resources to follow suit. It remained on a 'limping gold standard', allowing the value of silver to slip until 108 silver kuruş in silver, rather than 100, equalled one gold lira.⁵⁴ The government could only maintain silver at that level by manipulating the supply. The impossibility of doing so everywhere caused wide fluctuations, and the value of the silver kuruş dropped as distance from Istanbul increased. The Ottoman Bank remained the most important bank, although foreign owned banks increased greatly in number. The major Ottoman banking initiative was the Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*, 1888). It could not solve all agrarian credit problems; yet it provided a partial alternative to usurious moneylenders, and it opened over 400 branches, more than any other financial institution.

The greatest economic innovation was the railway.⁵⁵ Only a few lines having been built before, the empire acquired 7,500 kilometres of track under Abdülhamid, a quantum improvement, although negligible by international standards. After Salonica and Istanbul had been connected to the European lines, the Anatolian railway joined Istanbul to Ankara and Konya (1890–5). Most railways were built by granting concessions to foreign interests, which demanded a guaranteed revenue per kilometre and preferentially employed foreigners or Ottoman minorities. The railways thus became additional bastions of economic imperialism. The Baghdad railway concession (1903), providing for an extension from Konya to Basra, would have epitomised this approach to railway building, but only 700 kilometres were completed by 1914. Significantly, the Hijaz railway required a different method. It was financed by state initiative and donations from Ottoman and foreign

53 Nader Sohrabi, 'Global waves, local actors: what the Young Turks knew about other revolutions and why it mattered', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44, 1 (2002), pp. 50, 56–9.

54 Pamuk, *Monetary history*, pp. 205–22.

55 İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and social history*, pp. 804–15.

Muslims.⁵⁶ The Ottomans still relied on foreign rolling stock and expertise; however, they were able to employ Muslim engineers by the time the railway entered the Hijaz – necessarily so, given the interdiction of the zone around the Holy Cities to non Muslims. The finished Damascus–Medina line cut travel time from fifty days by caravan to seven by train. By 1910 the Ottoman railways carried 8 million passengers a year and nearly 2 million tons of goods.

In trade, imports and exports grew, despite the downward trend in the world economy through the mid 1890s. Agriculture still dominated exports, and indigenous non Muslims were replacing foreigners in external trade. Yet three quarters of trade was internal, and that remained largely in Muslim hands. In fact, neither internal and external trade, nor Muslim and non Muslim merchants, were segregated from each other. Trade networks between port cities and the interior often had a non Muslim at one end and a Muslim at the other; and Muslim merchants needed to participate in European trade in order to buy imports at wholesale for sale in the interior.⁵⁷

Agriculture developed significantly, and continued to employ 75–85 per cent of the population. Over half the tax revenues came from agriculture; yet under 10 per cent of the land was cultivated. Ottoman agriculture still suffered from historical handicaps, which set a low baseline against which to measure growth. Commercial agriculture expanded along the coasts and into the interior with the railway. The PDA and Régie des tabacs took an interest in improving production of commodities on which their operations depended (silk, tobacco). The Agricultural Bank, agricultural schools and model farms were set up, and students were sent abroad. Abdülhamid's vastly expanded crown estates (*çiftlikat ı hümayun*) also benefited production. Some of his estates became model farms. The peasants on his estates were exempt from military service and certain taxes. Abdülhamid's motives in expanding his estates were strategic as well as economic: to reinforce the Ottoman hold on these territories. Reportedly, he owned 1.25 million hectares in Syria. The net revenue from his estates was estimated at 1.5 million gold liras per year, not counting mineral rights. Among Ottoman crops, grains predominated; yet the variety was great, and cotton expanded markedly.

Having passed the worst phase of the adjustment to free trade, Ottoman manufacturing also grew. Most manufacturing still occurred in small workshops or domestic settings. The machines that made a difference were

⁵⁶ William Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz railroad* (Charlottesville, 1980).

⁵⁷ İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and social history*, pp. 824–41; Fawaz, *Merchants*, pp. 85–120; Rogan, *Frontiers*, pp. 95–121.

therefore simple ones, such as the Singer sewing machines that were widely used around 1900. The state adopted stimulative policies: tax exemptions for entrepreneurs and machinery imports, elimination of internal customs. Among the more industrialised lines of production, silk reeling mills developed from Mount Lebanon to Bursa to Salonica. The silk industry employed some 400,000 people around 1900. Other major exports included lace and carpets. Soaring foreign demand led to the industrialisation of many phases of carpet production and to the formation of large workshops, where ethnically mixed workforces wove 'Turkish' carpets. Outside Istanbul, Salonica was probably the most industrialised Ottoman city. Its factories produced consumer goods and construction materials by the 1880s, metals and machine tools by the early 1900s. Salonica also became the most advanced Ottoman city in working class consciousness.⁵⁸ Muslims, as well as non Muslims, played entrepreneurial roles in this period.

Factors transforming Ottoman society ranged from shrinking borders and refugee inflows to the spread of modern ideas. The Balkan territorial losses (1878) left the empire overwhelmingly Muslim in population and Middle Eastern in geography.⁵⁹ The first two Ottoman censuses (1881 93, 1906 7) yielded totals for regions directly ruled from Istanbul of 20.5 and 20.9 million; expert opinion raises both totals to about 25 million. The seemingly stable numbers implied demographic weakness. Evidence that non Muslims were reproducing more rapidly than Muslims did concern the government. Nonetheless, shrinking borders and Muslim immigration raised the Muslim proportion of total population from 60 per cent (1878) to 74 per cent (1906 7). The Muslim migrants included intellectuals who reinforced the Ottoman intelligentsia, religious activists (many of them Khalidi Naqshbandis from the Caucasus) who reinforced the conservative bourgeoisie, and poor people who came empty handed but received vacant land and helped develop whole regions. These immigrants helped prepare the bases for the coalescence of Turkish national identity under the early republic. Meanwhile, the empire lost about 300,000 emigrants, almost all non Muslim (Armenians, Greeks and Christian Arabs).⁶⁰

Despite Abdülhamid's repression and censorship, individuals and groups blazed their own trails into modernity. Old and new rubbed together,

58 Quataert, *Ottoman manufacturing*, pp. 107 60; Akram Fouad Khater, *Inventing home: Emigration, gender, and the middle class in Lebanon, 1870 1920* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001), pp. 19 63.

59 Karpas, *Ottoman population*, pp. 28 35, 65 77, 122 151; Karpas, *Politicization*, pp. 341 5.

60 Khater, *Inventing home*, pp. 48 70.

creating paradoxes all around. Often machines and gadgets shaped these paradoxes from bustles and starched collars to trains and steamships. New desires and tastes caused change. Male music teachers and physicians admitted into Ottoman harems became anonymous agents of social revolution, as did photographers who photographed unveiled women. Trams, ferries and trains not only changed transport but also created new spaces where Islamic norms of gender segregation proved difficult to maintain. Printed publications created new senses of community and new media for debates on topics of common interest. Photography and print changed gender relations, as Muslim women established that they could get their pictures taken or publish under their own names without losing respectability. The first magazine entirely by Ottoman Muslim women appeared in 1883; the first Ottoman woman novelist, Fatma Aliye, began publishing signed works about 1890.⁶¹

Marriage was the most sensitive point where the individual and the collective met in pursuit of modernity. In this period, revolutionary change was occurring in a domain as yet little affected by modern science: reproductive behaviour. Census data shows that Istanbul household sizes were already small and fertility rates declining by 1885. In 1907, 46 per cent of Istanbul's Muslim households had three or fewer members, and only a minority of those households were either extended (16 per cent) or polygynous (under 3 per cent).⁶² Istanbul Muslim family structures had come to resemble those of Mediterranean cities further west, not those of Anatolia. Factors limiting the birth rate included rising ages of marriage for women and earlier cessation of childbearing. Various means of birth control were in use, chiefly withdrawal (*azil*, Arabic 'azl), used among Muslims in the time of the Prophet and sanctioned by *ḥadīth*. Islamic legists also permitted abortion in the first 120 days of pregnancy. Moreover, while logic might suggest that the conservative wing of the proto bourgeoisie would adopt new patterns more slowly, evidence from Istanbul suggests only slightly higher fertility rates among Muslim tradesmen than among bureaucrats.

Changes for the individual and family stimulated class formation. The secular intelligentsia deepened its mastery of contemporary European thought and laid the organisational bases for revolution.⁶³ Conservative

61 Serpil Çakır, *Osmanlı kadın hareketi* (Istanbul, 1994), pp. 22–6.

62 Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *Istanbul households: Marriage, family and fertility, 1880–1940* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 14–15, 50, 126–31, 149, 176–7.

63 Hanioglu, *Young Turks in opposition*; M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (New York, 2001).

Muslim interests found the Hamidian ethos congenial. Conventional opinions about non Muslims' dominance over the productive sectors of the economy, though not unfounded, appear exaggerated, especially as one moves into the interior. The religious movements most appealing to conservative Muslims displayed continuous dynamism. Abdülhamid's position precluded his patronising one religious movement to the exclusion of others. However, evidence of the continued vigour of the Khalidiyya Naqshbandiyya appears in its many influential shaykhs and *tekkes*, including a major one immediately opposite the grand vezir's headquarters at the Sublime Porte. The founder of Turkey's most influential twentieth century religious movement also emerged in this period, Said Nursi (1877–1960), later known as *Bediüzzaman*, 'the wonder of the age'. Meeting with Abdülhamid, he tried to persuade him to found a university in south eastern Anatolia.⁶⁴ The literature of the period shows, moreover, that conservative modernism was not limited to religious movements.

Conservative cultural modernity

Ottoman fiction articulated the bourgeois expectations implied in the demographic data. As in Namık Kemal's 'Fatherland', bringing hero and heroine together to launch the plot remained a problem without an easy solution. The desire for such plots generated implications for social change even in conservative authors' works. Ahmed Midhat's *Müşahadat* ('Observations', 1890), a work about gender relations and Ottoman social integration, illustrates this point.⁶⁵

Ahmed Midhat (1840–1912) wrote this novel to display his view of naturalism. He thought Emile Zola's naturalism misrepresented reality by seeing only degradation. Believing that a novel depicting only the sordid was not natural, he wrote about sordid realities but transformed them into a utopic vision of Ottoman modernity. He also experimented with literary technique in *Müşahadat*. He included himself among the characters, and made the writing and discussion of the novel part of the story. Literary scholars find these the novel's most significant features. His early readers are more likely to have identified with the book's characters and their stories.

In his works, Ahmed Midhat characteristically solved the boy meets girl problem by bringing non Muslim females together with Muslim males,

64 Algar, 'Devotional practices', pp. 211–13, 222–4; M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic political identity in Turkey* (New York, 2003), pp. 135–9, 151–2.

65 Ahmed Midhat, *Müşahadat* (Istanbul, 1308/1890–1).

which is what he did in *Müşahadat*. The two leading females both have Armenian names (and diverse backgrounds). The heroine is the serious minded Siranuş; her friend is the light hearted Agavni. The leading males, all Muslim, are the hero, Re'fet; the wealthy, old Egyptian merchant, Seyyid Mehmed Numan; and Ahmed Midhat himself. The plot and subplots unfold from a chance encounter between Ahmed Midhat and the Armenian women on the ferry.

Müşahadat is a novel for entrepreneurs. The hero, Re'fet, is a variation on the stereotype of the spendthrift who squanders his inheritance. Already past that stage, he is an up and coming businessman with the firm of Seyyid Mehmed Numan, a patriarchal figure with whom almost all the characters have ties. Siranuş and Agavni both enjoy a degree of education and financial independence that young Muslim women could only envy. However, both are also orphans, whose roots extend into the sordid depths of Beyoğlu, the 'other' Istanbul of minorities and foreigners.

The novel revolves around which female will win the hero. Agavni has known him since his dissolute days, and allusions indicate without disapproval that they are living together. The old fashioned Egyptian merchant also has a daughter, Feride. So secluded that she is only heard about from others, she is sickly, ill favoured and ill educated, thanks to her father's low expectations for her. Deciding that she loves Re'fet, she acts through intermediaries, dramatising her unsuitability and the failure of her father's archaic approach to female upbringing. Feride's actions cause Agavni's death. As the old merchant's model of patriarchal social order fails, Ahmed Midhat steps in as new model patriarch. He helps Siranuş use her talents to support herself as a private teacher of French and music. As Siranuş assumes the high achiever image of a woman who can respectably play a public role, Re'fet takes new interest in her. It is not the love he felt for her dead friend, but love is not the best basis for marriage. Having learned that her father was a Tunisian naval officer, Siranuş converts to Islam. She and Re'fet marry, and they move into his family home, not in Beyoğlu but in Istanbul proper.

Not a religious requirement for a non Muslim woman's marriage to a Muslim, her conversion seems odd in a novel full of easy interaction across religious lines. For the book's female readers, however, her conversion served a purpose by effacing the primary difference between her and most of them. When Siranuş converts and marries Re'fet, new man and new woman unite a victory less for Islam than for modernity. What would it take for a Muslim born woman to accomplish as much?

The Young Turk revolution and the final crisis of empire

The Ottoman Empire's terminal crisis filled the years from the 1908 revolution to the 1922 victory in the National Struggle to found a new Turkey. The Young Turks were conservative in wanting to preserve sultanate and empire. They were radicals in thought and policy. As the terminal crisis of empire unfolded, radical outcomes ensued.

The constitutional revolution

To the extent that the Ottoman Empire ended in revolution, the Young Turk revolution (1908) established the new order's *constitutional* character, and the National Struggle (*Milli Mücadele*, 1919–22) decided its *national* character. In 1908, Ottoman men and women celebrated the restoration of the constitution with intercommunal fraternisation, revelling in their freedom and launching tens of political parties and hundreds of periodicals and magazines.⁶⁶

Initially, the CUP played its guardian role from offstage without assuming power directly. As Abdülhamid adjusted to constitutional monarchy, the palace machine was neutralised. 'Reorganisations' (*tensikat*) purged government payrolls of tens of thousands of bureaucrats and soldiers. Organised opposition also developed. The new regime faced opposition from both Sabahaddin Bey's liberals and the conservative Muhammadan Union (*İttihad i Muhammedî*). In 1909, conservatives and other malcontents attempted a counter revolution. That provided the excuse to depose Abdülhamid and enthrone his brother, Mehmed Reşad (r. 1909–18).

Competitive politics prevailed through 1913. Amendments required the sultan to swear to uphold the constitution and made the ministers responsible to parliament, among other changes. New laws and regulations poured forth for reforms of every kind. For example, the 1913 Provincial Administration Law replaced that of 1871.⁶⁷ Aggressive efforts were made to control the budget and recover Abdülhamid's assets.

An ambitious military reorganisation began, with von der Goltz and an enlarged German military mission in central roles. The reorganisation brought the army abreast of European armies operationally and ahead of them organisationally through the adoption of a 'triangular', three regiment infantry

⁶⁶ Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997), pp. 52–5.

⁶⁷ Findley, *Bureaucratic reform*, pp. 294–300, 310–13.

division with an attached artillery regiment; the Germany army adopted this model only in 1915, as other powers did by 1918.⁶⁸ The Ottoman defeat in the Balkan wars (1912–13) resulted from the incompleteness of the reforms and from strategic challenges specific to that war. Resumed in 1913–14, military reform enabled the Ottomans to perform much better in the First World War.

Politically, relatively junior officers' influence in the CUP created disparities between the military and political hierarchies. As the opposition regrouped after 1909, various parties emerged, most of which formed a common front known as the Entente libérale (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası). When it defeated the CUP in a by election, the CUP asserted itself more forcefully, so much that the 1912 election became the 'big stick' (*sopalı*) election. Defeat in the Balkan wars precipitated more drastic intervention. The CUP coup of January 1913 ended contested elections and installed the dictatorship that controlled the government through 1918. This is commonly described as a triumvirate of Enver, Cemal, and Talat Paşas. In fact, they were only three leaders in a CUP inner circle of fifty or so.⁶⁹

The CUP government took the empire into the First World War on the German side.⁷⁰ This and many other acts proved terribly costly. Particular responsibility accrues to Enver Paşa. As minister of war and acting commanding general (1913–18), he acted impulsively, without regard to disparities between means and ends. Remarkably, Young Turk reformism also continued, producing some radical, secularising reforms that anticipated those of the Turkish Republic. The head of the religious hierarchy (*şeyhülislam*) lost his seat in the cabinet (1916), and the religious courts were reassigned to the Ministry of Justice (1917). The 1917 marriage law required that marriages be concluded before a magistrate and included provisions for Christians and Jews as well as Muslims.⁷¹

Nothing better illustrates the CUP's mixed record than the question of nationalism. Despite their French derived label (*Jön Türk*), their ideological preferences were Ottoman. For some time, their supporters were also: Albanians, Arabs, Jews, Greeks and Armenians, as well as Turks. Most Ottomans' identity concepts still oscillated, until circumstances restricted

68 Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in detail: The Ottoman army in the Balkans, 1912–1913* (Westport, 2003), p. 24–8.

69 Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern history* (London, 2004), pp. 106–10; Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, pp. 3, 195.

70 Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 110–13, 121–32; Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to die: A history of the Ottoman army in the First World War* (Westport, 2001), pp. 11–12, 25–7; Zafer Toprak, *Milli iktisat milli burjuvazi* (Istanbul, 1995), *passim*.

71 Niyazi Berkes, *Development of secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), pp. 411–23.

the choices. The loss of the Ottoman Balkans marked a watershed.⁷² The consequences varied by region. In the Arab provinces, CUP policy had shown no marked Turkish nationalist bias. Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament had divided, supporting or opposing the CUP along lines of policy, not nationalism. After the Balkan losses, the Young Turks reacted by emphasising Islam. In the Arab provinces, Islamic appeals worked well. As governor of Syria (1915–18), Cemal Paşa feared a nationalist revolt and applied repressive policies, paralleling those inflicted on Anatolian Armenians but with vastly smaller human consequences. The Arab revolt that Cemal Paşa feared did occur, but in the Hijaz (1916), a region not fully integrated into the Ottoman provincial administration. In Anatolia, matters worked out quite differently. Loss of the Balkans raised Anatolia's significance for Ottoman Muslims, including the many with Balkan roots. In Anatolia, heightened emphasis on Islam divided more than united. Even before the First World War, many Greeks were forced out of western Anatolia and Ottoman Thrace; many more were after the National Struggle. After 1914, as eastern Anatolia became a theatre of war, armies collided, and so did incompatible nationalisms. More catastrophically than anything ever seen in other provinces, the Armenian massacres and deportations (1915) destroyed centuries of coexistence, leaving desolation.

The Eastern Question, 1908–18

Other powers interpreted the 1908 change of regime in Istanbul as an invitation to take what they wanted.⁷³ In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina; Crete united with Greece; and Bulgaria declared its independence. Insurrection broke out among Albanians (1910); the fact that most of them were Muslim made this painful for the CUP, some of whose leaders were Albanian. The Italians took the Ottomans' last African province, Libya (1911) and also seized the Dodecanese islands.

Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece presented the Ottomans with their final Balkan crisis. In the First Balkan War, the Ottomans faced the challenge of defending two widely separated strategic centres in Thrace and

72 Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, pp. 4, 14–15, 96–143; Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial citizens: Republican rights, paternal privilege, and gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York, 2000), pp. 19–23; Taner Akçam, *From empire to republic: Turkish nationalism and the Armenian genocide* (London, 2004), pp. 115–79.

73 Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 103–7; Shaw and Shaw, *History*, vol. II, pp. 287–98; Paul Dumont and François Georgeon, 'La mort d'un empire (1908–1923)', in Mantran (ed.), *Histoire*, pp. 580–1, 600–11.

Macedonia against four enemies who could attack either centre from more than one direction.⁷⁴ With their military reorganisation still unfinished, the Ottomans met defeat in the First Balkan War (1912–13), losing nearly four million people and 60,000 square miles, briefly including Edirne. The Second Balkan War (1913) then broke out among the victors, enabling the Ottomans to retake Edirne and leaving the frontier in Thrace where that of the Turkish Republic remains.

Resuming their military reorganisation (1913–14), the Ottoman army proved more successful in the First World War. It maintained large forces on four fronts, and at times a fifth – a feat matched by no other belligerent but Great Britain. In November 1918, ‘even after the collapse of Russia, Bulgaria, and Austria Hungary [and] the mutinies in the French Army and the German Navy . . . the Ottoman Army, although battered beyond recognition, was still on its feet and in the field’.⁷⁵

The Ottomans temporised as war opened, but several factors pushed them towards belligerency. One goal was to escape the diplomatic isolation endured during the Balkan wars. In August 1914, the British confiscated two ships that the Ottomans had ordered from a British shipyard. The Ottoman–German alliance was signed that same day, and the fictional sale of two German vessels to the Ottomans repaired the British slight. German willingness to negotiate with Ottomans as equals helped seal the alliance. The Ottomans now also did something they had always resisted: allow foreign military officers (Germans) to command. Enver Paşa ordered general mobilisation in August, and the Ottomans opened hostilities with a naval attack against the Russians in the Black Sea in October. Concentrating forces in Thrace to defend Istanbul, the Ottomans prepared for campaigns against the Russians in the Caucasus and the British in Egypt; British Indian forces invading Iraq opened a third front.

On the Caucasian front, hostilities began in November 1914, with Enver in command. Characteristically overestimating his capabilities, he led his forces to defeat at Sarıkamış (December/January). This defeat left the Ottomans expecting a Russian spring offensive. The religiously mixed populations on both sides of the front complicated the security issues. For the next several years, as the front moved back and forth, both Christians and Muslims could find themselves on the wrong side of the lines at any time. Local residents

⁷⁴ Erickson, *Defeat*, pp. xvii, 1–35, 48–67, 138–46, 328–9, 344.

⁷⁵ Erickson, *Ordered to die*, pp. xvi, 213–16. Except as otherwise noted, discussion of the First World War follows this book.

favoured whichever army shared their religion; some Armenians, including a former member of the Ottoman parliament, fought in Anatolia with the Russians. Warfare interdicted agriculture for three years in succession (1915–17).

As famine, plague and war stalked the land, so did ethnic cleansing. In Russian territory, Muslims were victimised.⁷⁶ Behind Ottoman lines, the Armenians suffered catastrophically from the 1915 Ottoman decision to deport most of them to Syria. No such policy could be carried out humanely, especially in wartime by a resource strapped empire in a region lacking modern transport, where even in peacetime armed tribesmen preyed on the settled population. Scholarly debate continues about the deportations and massacres and whether the CUP government acted with genocidal intent. The policy was applied not just in the east, but across Anatolia. Its historic Armenian minority disappeared, and Armenian fatalities numbered in the hundreds of thousands at least.

The Russian army advanced in 1916, taking Erzurum, Trabzon and Erzincan, before disintegrating in revolution (1917). That turnabout enabled the Ottomans to make deceptive gains as the war ended, retaking the towns lost to Russia in 1878, then continuing into Georgia and Azerbaijan to score final victories (November 1918) after the Istanbul government had accepted an armistice.

Ottoman hostilities with Great Britain began with the Ottoman invasion of Sinai in 1915. The British did not sever the nominal Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt until 1914, when the Ottoman alliance with Germany made the boundary between Egypt and the Ottoman Arab provinces into a potential battle line. Cemal Paşa attempted to invade Egypt from Syria (February 1915) but was repulsed.

The Gallipoli campaign then opened with the British–French attempt to force the Dardanelles. British and imperial forces attempting amphibious landings faced Ottoman troops in superior positions under German and Ottoman commanders, including division commander Mustafa Kemal Paşa. His heroism became the stuff of charismatic legend. The invasion degenerated into trench warfare, and the Entente forces withdrew by January 1916, abandoning vast amounts of supplies.

In Iraq, a British Indian force occupied Basra (1914). Effectively using artillery and aviation, the Ottomans besieged the British at Kut al Amara (1916), forcing an entire division and its general to surrender – another great

⁷⁶ Findley, *Turks in world history*, pp. 146, 169–70; Akçam, *From empire to republic*, pp. 158–79.

achievement. Later, a larger British force invaded. It defeated the Ottomans at the second battle of Kut al Amara (1917), took Baghdad, and left the Ottomans only Mosul. In another of his grand plans, Enver formed the 'Thunderbolt Army Group' (Yıldırım Ordular Grubu) to retake Baghdad; but the British invasion of Palestine forced a change of mission.

The Palestine campaign and the Arab revolt together produced decisive results. Launched in 1916, the Arab revolt took all the major towns in the Hijaz but Medina, the Ottoman base; and Sharif Husayn declared himself king of the Arab lands, a claim not recognised beyond the Hijaz. Having reached Aqaba (July 1917), the rebels advanced northward in the interior, while British Egyptian forces advanced along the coast. The rebels entered Damascus (September 1918), and Amır Fayşal ibn Husayn briefly became king of Syria (1918–20). The British took Jerusalem (December 1917), then Damascus and Aleppo (October 1918).

Threats to Istanbul finally forced the Ottomans to accept an armistice (October 1918). The collapse of Bulgaria (September 1918) had severed over land contact with the Central Powers and brought Entente forces perilously close to Istanbul, without adequate forces available for its defence.

Diplomacy and peacemaking

Scarcely had the Ottoman Empire entered the war before the Entente powers began making plans to partition it at the war's end. Ironically, these plans had lasting consequences for the Arab lands but not for the Turkish Republic. Again ironically, the great powers still unaware of Arabia's oil resources left the peninsula mostly unclaimed but divided the Fertile Crescent among themselves. Ultimately, the Entente powers made more promises than they could keep. The most important are the Husayn McMahon Correspondence (1915–16), the Sykes Picot Agreement (1916), and the Balfour Declaration (1917). Once Greece entered the war (1917), Greek demands for the Aegean coast of Anatolia were added to the list.⁷⁷

The Husayn McMahon Correspondence consisted of ten letters exchanged between Sharif Husayn of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt. Sharif Husayn sought British recognition of independence for 'the Arab countries' and an Arab caliphate. Responding vaguely, McMahon expressed willingness to approve the Arab caliphate with reservations about the districts of Mersin and Adana; 'portions of Syria lying to the

⁷⁷ Hurewitz, *Middle East and North Africa*, vol. II, pp. 16–24, 46–56, 60–4, 94–6, 101–6, 128–30, 219–28; Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (London, 1999), pp. 197, 270, 281.

west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo'; the provinces of Baghdad and Basra; and territories where French interests had to be taken into account. The British attached no importance to these promises except as a means to start the revolt. Sharif Ḥusayn did not know that then, but he did sense that the Ottomans wanted to replace him with a more docile ruler in the Hijaz. He precipitated his revolt to prevent that.

The Sykes Picot Agreement defined British and French interests. It divided Iraq and geographical Syria (including Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan) into five zones. There were two zones of direct control: a British zone encompassing the provinces of Basra and Baghdad, and a French zone along the coast of Syria and Lebanon. Two spheres of interest divided the interior of Syria and Iraq between France (north west) and Britain (south east). The straight line border that still separates Syria from Jordan and Iraq, drawn at this time, originally extended all the way across Iraq. Finally, northern Palestine, including the Christian Holy Places, was to form an international zone. The agreement includes references to an Arab state or states, but was neither coordinated with the Ḥusayn McMahon Correspondence nor revealed to Sharif Ḥusayn at the time.

The Balfour Declaration (November 1917) added an ambiguously worded, public declaration of British support for the aspirations of the Zionist movement to establish 'a national home for the Jewish people' in Palestine.

The Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) resulted from negotiations in which Sykes Picot trumped Ḥusayn McMahon, and Balfour trumped everything else where Palestine was concerned. As for the interior of Syria and Iraq, France traded other claims (Mosul, Palestine) for direct control throughout Syria, with no zone of indirect control.

Intended as a comprehensive death warrant for the Ottoman Empire, the treaty disposed of every territory that had belonged to it. The Hijaz was recognised as an independent kingdom (soon to be swallowed by the Sa'udis). France received a mandate from the League of Nations for Syria (including Lebanon), and Britain received mandates for Iraq and Palestine (initially including Transjordan). As if assuming that the Turkish people were as dead as the empire, Sèvres gave away most of the future Turkish Republic. The Armenians were to have an independent state in north eastern Anatolia. The Kurds were entitled to autonomy or independence in south eastern Anatolia. The straits and Istanbul were to be internationalised. Greece got control of the zone around Izmir in western Anatolia. Another agreement recognised spheres of influence for Italy in south western Anatolia and for France in the south east. By default, part of central Anatolia and the Black Sea

coast remained to the Turks. But the treaty was never ratified. Greece had already occupied Izmir in May 1919, and the Turkish National Struggle had begun. Its success forced the renegotiation of the clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres that applied to what became the Turkish Republic, which the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) recognised. Elsewhere in the Middle East the legacy of Sèvres lingers still. Among the defeated peoples of the First World War, only the Turks successfully forced renegotiation of the peace terms that had been imposed on them.

Economy and society

By 1923 the First World War had ravaged eastern Anatolia, and the National Struggle had ravaged the west; yet these years were not ones of disaster alone. The 'national economy' movement and the Ottoman home front experience are as much a part of the period's history as the demographic disasters.

English style liberal ideas had found a readier audience among Ottomans in politics than in economics. Parliamentary government and guaranteed rights served Ottoman interests; free trade and rugged individualism contradicted their communalist values and served others' interests. Thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) preferred the neo mercantilist 'national economy' school of thought. After 1908, liberal and 'national' economics competed for the last time, and the 'national' triumphed after the Balkan wars.⁷⁸ The loss of Salonica reinforced this trend. As the CUP relocated to Istanbul, its leadership became increasingly Muslim, and forged links with the largely Muslim guilds. The collapse of international trade after war broke out in 1914 left no alternative to 'national' economics.

As other belligerents adopted interventionist, 'war socialist' policies, so did the Ottomans. War enabled the government unilaterally to repudiate the capitulations, adopt protective tariffs, enforce Ottoman law and taxation on foreign businesses, and require use of Turkish in business correspondence. The 1916 monetary law ostensibly eliminated the 'limping gold standard' by abandoning bimetallism in favour of gold.⁷⁹ In fact, the government had already issued paper money (1915). Ostensibly backed by gold or later by German treasury bonds, the paper money lost almost all its value by the war's end, despite supportive measures, including the issue of war bonds (1918) and the creation of a special commission to control foreign currency exchange.

⁷⁸ Except as otherwise noted, this section follows Toprak, *Milli iktisat milli burjuvazi* and Zafer Toprak, *İttihat Terakki ve devletçilik* (Istanbul, 1995).

⁷⁹ Pamuk, *Monetary history*, pp. 222–46.

The greatest challenge of 'national' economics was capital formation. War conditions made it possible for the government to seize many foreign firms and require even allies to form partnerships with local investors. 'National' economics also called attention to the hybrid character of the Ottoman Imperial Bank (OIB), which was the Ottoman bank of issue and yet was responsible to foreign directors and invested much of its capital in France. The CUP chose not to challenge the OIB but encouraged the formation of other banks, including Evkaf Bankası ('Pious foundations', 1914) and İtibar i Milli Bankası ('National credit', 1917). Acting locally, merchants and landowners also formed 'national' banks. Company formation accelerated so much that the number of joint stock companies grew from 9 to 129 (1908–18). Wartime shortages also stimulated the growth of cooperatives, not only among consumers but also among producers, helping to organise and 'nationalise' export markets in commodities such as figs and raisins. As inflation pushed the value of government salaries below subsistence levels, Turks ceased looking down on commerce.

The limited possibilities of capital formation among Muslims made resort to non market mechanisms inevitable. Fought not with a remote enemy such as Russia but with peoples who had been Ottoman subjects until a few decades before, and many of whose members still lived inside the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan wars prompted aggressive measures. Ottoman Greeks, who had materially supported Greece in the Balkan wars, paid the price with the boycott of Greek merchants in 1913–14. The Ottoman Special Organisation (Teşkilat ı Mahsusa), created to carry out covert operations, pressured the Greek and Armenian populations of Ottoman Thrace and western Anatolia; and many were deported in peacetime (1913–14).⁸⁰

After 1914, the Ottoman home front replicated the Euro American experience to a very high degree, even though the war's consequences were far graver for the Ottomans. The cost of living index for 1914–18 rose by a factor of two or three in western Europe, twelve in Austria Hungary, and eighteen in the Ottoman Empire. War disrupted government finance, leading to war taxes, postponement of payments and 50 per cent salary cuts. When the Ottomans floated an internal war loan in 1918, they promoted it by all the means used elsewhere: electric lit signs, posters, press campaigns, promotional films and songs. Goods shortages led to the formation of more and more government agencies to stabilise supply or stimulate production, until finally there was talk of creating an 'economic general staff' over all. The

⁸⁰ Akçam, *From empire to republic*, pp. 139–49; McCarthy, *Muslims and minorities*.

CUP's Istanbul deputy, Kara Kemal, who controlled the city's Guilds Association (Esnaflar Cemiyeti), became extremely powerful. Still, provisioning the cities remained an insoluble problem. The widening gap between the 'war rich' and the 'war poor' forced the same government that wanted to stimulate capital formation to crack down on its abuse.

The Ottoman home front experience also emulated that of other belligerents in its effects on women. In agriculture, women had always worked, and now had to take over from conscripted males. Non Muslim women had filled places in urban workforces before 1914. Thereafter, Muslim women increasingly entered the workforce. A society was formed to promote Muslim women's employment (1916), as was a women merchants' bazaar. Women volunteered for the army, serving in labour battalions and in rear areas. Government offices employed women for the first time. Ottoman women's experiences naturally heightened their political consciousness. By the time of the post war occupation of Istanbul, prominent women were speaking publicly at protest meetings. Drawn into the National Struggle, Turkish women of the 1920s demanded the vote.

While some socio economic consequences of war were constructive, the overall human costs of war and imperial collapse could not fail to be catastrophic. Among the belligerents in the First World War, the Ottomans suffered the severest population losses.⁸¹ Anatolian population losses (1914–23) have been calculated at 20 per cent lost to death, another 10 per cent to emigration, and up to half the survivors displaced as refugees. Atop the losses of the Armenian and Greek populations, the impact of war, famine and disease on Muslims was so great that some provinces lost a third of their Muslim populations. Syrian mortality has been placed at 18 per cent (1914–18). Compared to that in Anatolia, Syrian mortality resulted more from famine, and the famine more from natural causes, although repressive government policy and intercommunal conflict also contributed. Syrian and Anatolian death rates approaching 20 per cent compare starkly with French and German war losses of under 5 per cent. In lands where Jews, Christians and Muslims had coexisted for centuries, the collapse of multinational empire and the winner takes all struggles provoked by rival nationalists' attempts to create their imagined communities had produced mortality rates not seen since the Black Death of the 1340s.

⁸¹ McCarthy, *Muslims and minorities*, pp. 117–44; Thompson, *Colonial citizens*, pp. 19–30.

Culture, gender, modernity

Exemplifying Turkish women's widened horizons, Halide Edib (1882–1964) defines this period among writers. Immersed in childhood in Ottoman Muslim lifeways, she studied at the American Girls' College in Istanbul and published in English as well as Turkish. Her education and experiences enabled her to solve the gender related problems that confronted earlier writers, foregrounding her heroines with new realism. Based partly on her own experiences, *Ateşten Gömlek* ('Shirt of Flame') the first and to many the best novel of the National Struggle made its heroine a victim of the 1919 occupation of Izmir and the embodiment of the struggle to retake it. Published in English as *The Clown and his Daughter*, in Turkish as *Sinekli Bakkal*, her other best loved novel returns to the eve of the Young Turk revolution to depict a girl named Rabia.

In the unpromising surroundings of *Sinekli Bakkal* (literally, 'The Fly Plagued Grocery,' the name of the neighbourhood where the action occurs), Rabia's empowerment depends on all the circumstances that could invert the normal hierarchies of age and gender.⁸² Her grandfather is the neighbourhood's puritanical *imam*, whose daughter has married badly. Her husband, Tevfik, heir to the neighbourhood grocery shop, is at heart an actor—one who plays female roles. When Rabia is still quite small, Tevfik's impersonations land him in exile. After that, her life with her unloving mother and grandfather has but one compensation. Her good voice and memory give him the idea of training her as a *hafız* (Qur'an reciter), practically the only prestigious traditional public role for Muslim women. As the young girl's fame spreads, the neighbourhood's wealthiest residents, Selim Paşa, the minister of security, and his wife take an interest in her education. Rabia finds herself studying music with Vehbi Efendi, an elderly Mevlevi dervish, and Peregrini, a former monk turned music master. The two men embody East–West cultural choices, but their philosophical natures make the choices complementary.

After her father's return from exile, Rabia goes to live with him and run the grocery shop. Another marginal male, the dwarf Rakim, also a performer, shares in the household and Tevfik's theatrical ventures. Addressing her father by his given name, Rabia soon runs this bizarre household, while continuing her musical studies and public performances in Istanbul's greatest

82 Halide Edib [Adivar], *The clown and his daughter* (London, 1935); Halide Edib Adivar, *Sinekli Bakkal* (Istanbul, 1996 [1935]).

mosques. When her age requires it, she adopts the poor working women's outer dress: a loose black cape, white headcloth and black veil, always thrown back by working women. Rabia is approaching the age when she must restrict her contacts with non kin males of marriageable age. As a non Muslim, Peregrini could not marry a Muslim woman. Still, the thought of no longer seeing him troubles her especially.

The tensions of impending revolution swirl around the characters. Selim Paşa and his wife are the neighbourhood's greatest benefactors. Yet their son is a Young Turk conspirator. Rabia's father Tevfik, in female disguise, has been caught carrying incriminating documents for him. Both men are exiled to Damascus; if Selim Paşa were not the minister of security, their fates might have been worse. Those left behind worry about Rabia, none more than Peregrini. When he confides in the old dervish, Vehbi Efendi says that Peregrini should marry her. However, to do so he would have to convert, not something to do lightly. As Rabia's musical opportunities expand, she begins performing the much loved Turkish Ode on the Prophet's Nativity (*Mevlud i Şerif*), introducing a modulation from minor to major. The change of tonality expresses her feelings for Peregrini. After much soul searching, he proposes. She accepts on condition that he convert and they remain in Istanbul. He converts, taking the name Osman, and they marry. Later, when she realises she is pregnant, they refurbish and move into her late grandfather's house. Forced by complications of her pregnancy to choose between abortion and caesarean section, she insists on the latter. The operation occurs in late winter before the Young Turk revolution in July. Amnestied, Tevfik returns to learn he has a grandson.

Ahmed Midhat brought non Muslim women together with Muslim men in his novels, but Halide Edib found an irreproachably authentic way to do the opposite. Once again, the hero and heroine's happiness does not suffice without the greater social good; and their son's difficult birth foreshadows the advent of the revolutionary utopia of freedom and modernity.

Conclusion

As accelerating change and a deteriorating geopolitical environment filled late Ottoman history with paradoxes of dynamism amid disintegration, the struggle to ward off imperial collapse created institutions, laws and elites that would endure into the post imperial era. Launched by governmental efforts at centralisation and defensive modernisation, processes of change among Ottoman Muslims soon extended beyond governmental control, as illustrated by the

rise of the conservative current represented by the Khalidiyya Naqshbandiyya and the more radical current identified with the Ottoman language print media. The social changes of the era, including both the Muslim refugee influx and the growth of bourgeois strata, enlarged the social bases for these changes. Despite the Ottomans' dependent integration into the world economy, economic development supported these changes through the relative importance of internal trade and the growth of the propertied proto bourgeoisie. In contrast to the economic constraints, the imaginative realm opened by the new literary forms permitted Ottoman imaginations to soar, exploring new alternatives in individual subjectivity, gender relations, class formation and societal reintegration.

Egypt to c. 1919

KENNETH M. CUNO

The era of Muḥammad ‘Alī

The French occupation of Egypt (1798–1801) was the first military incursion by an industrialising and aggressively expansionist Europe in the central Middle East, and it ushered in the modern era of Western hegemony. Napoleon’s view of Egypt as a stepping stone to India underlined its strategic position. Since then a succession of powers has sought influence if not dominance in Egypt and the greater Middle East, considering it too important to be left alone. Anglo-French competition was superseded by a British invasion and occupation in 1882. After the last of Britain’s garrison withdrew in 1956, two decades of Soviet–American rivalry ended in the present American hegemony. Foreign dominance demarcates the political history of modern Egypt from previous eras.

The ‘Mamluk’ households that had ruled for most of the previous century were too weak and divided to regain supremacy after the French withdrew, enabling Muḥammad ‘Alī to manoeuvre himself into the viceroyalty. Muḥammad ‘Alī (in Turkish, Mehmed Ali) came to Egypt in 1801 with an Ottoman expedition sent against the French. A native of Kavalla, in what is now Greece, he was an officer in the Albanian unit, becoming their commander when his superior was killed, and waging war against the Mamluk factions while ingratiating himself with Cairo’s notables. In an unusual move the ‘*ulama*’ of Cairo requested his appointment as viceroy, and thus he was appointed and awarded the title of *pasha* by Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) in June 1805. During his long reign Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha (r. 1805–48) established his family as hereditary rulers in Egypt. In 1905 he was retroactively declared ‘the founder of modern Egypt’ during the official centenary of his appointment as viceroy. His descendants, Kings Fu‘ad (r. 1917–36) and Faruq (r. 1936–52), staged additional commemorations and patronised a school of historians in order to place Muḥammad ‘Alī and the ‘Muḥammadī’ dynasty he founded at

the centre of the modern national narrative.¹ Regardless of whether his nickname is deserved, his policies contributed in important ways to the making of the modern state and society.

Household government

Muḥammad ‘Alī’s Albanian origin was less significant than his formation in and adherence to Ottoman ruling class culture and norms. He spoke Ottoman Turkish, not Arabic. He introduced an architectural style emulating that of the imperial capital, known as ‘Rumi’,² and portraits show him adopting the new dress required by Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) in the 1830s, including replacement of the turban by the *ṭarbush*. Once appointed viceroy, he assembled a household commensurate with his office and rank, with numerous male and female slaves, and adopted the imperial style of reproducing through multiple concubines. Large households were integral to the reproduction of the Ottoman ruling class. Male slaves were trained to become members of the military administrative apparatus, and their strategic placement and advancement in it enhanced the influence of their master’s network. Harem slaves were trained to become the wives of ruling class men and mistresses of their own harems. Strategic out marriage of harem women enhanced the loyalty of clients and cemented alliances with other households. Muḥammad ‘Alī’s leading officers and administrators were his kin, in laws and *mamluks*, while others were linked to him through marriage to women from his harem.³

Reforms

Muḥammad ‘Alī’s reforms in the military, administration and education drew inspiration from earlier Ottoman reforms along French lines that had culminated in the Nizam ı Cedid of Sultan Selim III, who was overthrown in 1807. While similar reforms were begun some twenty years later by Sultan Mahmud II they were revived earlier by Muḥammad ‘Alī in Egypt. The Pasha

1 Kenneth M. Cuno, ‘Muhammad Ali and the decline and revival thesis in modern Egyptian history’, in Ra’uf ‘Abbas (ed.), *Islah am taḥdith? Miṣr fī ‘aṣr Muḥammad ‘Alī* (Cairo, 2000), pp. 107–13.

2 Ehud R. Toledano, *State and society in mid nineteenth century Egypt* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 55.

3 Kenneth M. Cuno, ‘Ambiguous modernization: The transition to monogamy in the khedival house of Egypt’, in Beshara Doumani (ed.), *Family history in the Middle East: Household, property, and gender* (Albany, 2003), pp. 254–5; Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s men: Mehmed ‘Alī, his army and the making of modern Egypt* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 176; F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives, 1805–1879: From household government to modern bureaucracy* (Pittsburgh, 1984), pp. 20–32.

used old style troops in the Arabian campaign (1811–18), freeing the Holy Cities from Wahhabī Saʿūdī control, and penetrating Najd to destroy Saʿūdī power. This was done at the sultan's request, to restore his sovereignty in the Hijaz and his prestige as servant of the Holy Cities, but the Pasha now controlled this province, appointing his own men as governors. Later he extended his control to Yemen. The old style troops also conquered what is now northern Sudan (1820–2) in search of gold and slaves. The Pasha tried to form military units of African slaves, but their high mortality made this impractical. Instead, in 1822 he began to form a new army of peasant conscripts trained and organised on the French model, still the most advanced of its time. Like Sultan Selim he named his new army *nizām i jedid*. The *nizām* army and a nascent navy performed well in Greece (1824–8). Refurbished and rebuilt, they easily seized the Syrian provinces and southern Turkey in 1831–2.

Sweeping fiscal reform preceded formation of the *nizām* army. A cadastral survey in 1813–14 spelled the end of the tax farm (*iltizam*) system. Direct collection of the land tax increased the Pasha's resources, strengthening his hand, and deprived the old elite of a source of income.⁴ Another military related reform was the introduction of 'modern' (European) educational subjects and methods. Traditionally, the religious elite monopolised formal education, the purpose of which was to reproduce the religious culture and train the next generation of clerics. Muslim boys who showed an aptitude for learning in a Qur'an school (*kuttab*) would enter a mosque college (*madrasa*), where the curriculum emphasised the religious sciences such as theology and jurisprudence, and related areas such as grammar and rhetoric. Other forms of education were less formal. The ruling and upper classes employed tutors, and the sons of the urban middle and artisanal classes learned from their fathers and uncles or as apprentices. No firm distinction existed between 'training' and 'education', and girls might receive either depending upon their social status.

The first of the new schools was created in 1815 to train officers in military engineering. Other schools were either military related, such as the medical school and the veterinary school, or related to what nowadays would be called economic and social development, such as a school for midwives, an agricultural school and the School of Languages. The Pasha sent a small number of officers and administrators to train in Europe before 1826, but in

4 Kenneth M. Cuno, *The Pasha's peasants: Land, society, and economy in Lower Egypt 1740–1858* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 106–11.

that year the first of several large student ‘missions’ was dispatched to Paris. Like the new schools, the student missions emphasised practical knowledge: civil, military and naval administration; diplomacy; hydraulics; mechanics; military engineering; artillery; metal founding and arms making; printing; lithography and engraving; chemistry; medicine; surgery; anatomy; physiology and hygiene; agriculture; natural history and mining; and shipbuilding.⁵ The students were in their teens to thirties, already literate in Ottoman and/or Arabic, and some had religious educations. The Pasha’s goal was to produce a cadre of technically competent officers and officials, rather than mass education.

State, religious institutions and the intelligentsia

The present relationship between religion and the Egyptian state developed in the nineteenth century, as the Pasha and his successors asserted the prerogative of appointing (or approving) the chief religious officials, and defining (and thus limiting) their authority. By the end of the century their reforms impinged on and regulated the operation of al Azhar and the *shari‘a* courts. In 1812 Muḥammad ‘Alī seized the opportunity presented by the death, in consecutive months, of the Shaykh al Azhar (rector of al Azhar) and the Shaykh al Bakrī (head of the Bakriyya *ṭarīqa* or mystical order), to assert his authority over these offices. He intervened to secure the nomination of Muḥammad al Shanawani (d. 1817) as Shaykh al Azhar and, weeks later, invested Muḥammad al Bakrī (d. 1855) as Shaykh al Sajjada al Bakriyya, making explicit al Bakrī’s authority over all the Sufi orders. Four years later he added to al Bakrī’s influence by naming him *naqīb al ashraf* (chief of the descendants of the Prophet). In 1835 the Pasha raised the standing of a third religious dignitary when appointing the Ḥanafī *muftī*, Shaykh Aḥmad al Tamīmī al Khālī (c. 1801–52), by making him the state *muftī*, whose rulings alone would have official standing. The title of al Tamīmī’s long serving successor, Muḥammad al ‘Abbāsī al Mahdī (1828 or 1829–96), *muftī al diyar al miṣriyya* (loosely, Grand Muftī of Egypt), indicates the supremacy this office acquired in juridical affairs.⁶

5 James Heyworth Dunne, *An introduction to the history of education in modern Egypt* (London, 1938), pp. 159–63.

6 Chris Eccel, *Egypt, Islam and social change: Al Azhar in conflict and accommodation* (Berlin, 1984), pp. 134–5; Fred de Jong, *Turuq and turuq linked institutions in nineteenth century Egypt* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 19–20, 31; Juan R. I. Cole, *Colonialism and revolution in the Middle East: Social and cultural origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi movement* (Princeton, 1993), p. 37.

Clerical activism had played a role in Muḥammad ‘Alī’s rise, and, two years later, in Sultan Selim’s fall. The pious and self effacing al Shanawani fitted the Pasha’s desire for a shaykh al Azhar without political ambitions. By giving Shaykh al Bakrī formal authority over the mystical orders and, later, the *ashraf*, and with the creation of the post of Grand Muftī, he divided religious authority among three chief clerics, each owing his office to the ruler and none likely to challenge him. The ‘*ulama*’ lost an independent source of income with the abolition of tax farming and the taxation of most *waqf* and *rizqa* endowments of agricultural land. The Pasha blocked new endowments of land, a policy reversed by ‘Abbas (r. 1849–54), who however created a bureau to supervise them, which later became a ministry. Government supervision of *waqfs* meant control of their income. The ‘*ulama*’, paid out of these funds, became in effect civil servants.⁷

Despite some grumbling about the treatment of *waqfs*, certain key ‘*ulama*’ supported reform and cooperated with the new regime. Shaykh Ḥasan al ‘Aṭṭar (1766–1835), a prolific writer with wide scholarly interests, supported Muḥammad ‘Alī’s educational reforms, especially the schools of medicine and veterinary science. The Pasha appointed him editor of the new official gazette, *al Waqa’i’al Miṣriyya* and, later, Shaykh al Azhar. Al ‘Aṭṭar’s most famous pupil was Shaykh Rifa’a Rafi‘ al Ṭaḥṭawī (1801–73), who accompanied the first student mission to Paris as its *imam*, learning French and reading widely. He later served as head of the new School of Languages, edited *al Waqa’i’al Miṣriyya* and directed the translation bureau. Purged by ‘Abbas along with other protégés of Muḥammad ‘Alī and Ibrāhīm (r. 1848), he returned to Cairo under Sa‘īd (1854–63). He again directed the translation bureau under Isma‘īl (r. 1863–79) and was a proponent of mass education for girls as well as boys.⁸

Al ‘Aṭṭar, al Ṭaḥṭawī and others shared a perception of Ottoman weakness and the necessity of reform in order to overcome it. Their views on education contained two themes characteristic of reformist ‘*ulama*’ in Egypt and elsewhere. One was that the Muslims had lost the study of philosophy and the natural sciences, in which they had once excelled, and in which Europe was now advanced. They believed that Muslims could overcome their present

7 Doris Behrens Abuseif, ‘Wakf’, *El2*, vol. XI, pp. 66b–67b; Gabriel Baer, *Studies in the social history of modern Egypt* (Chicago, 1969), p. 83.

8 Albert Hourani, *Arabic thought in the liberal age 1798–1939* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 69–72; Daniel Newman, ‘Life of al Ṭaḥṭawī’, in Rifa’a Rafi‘ al Ṭaḥṭawī, *An imam in Paris: Account of a stay in France by an Egyptian cleric (1826–1831)*, intro. and trans. Daniel Newman (London, 2004) pp. 29–68.

state of backwardness by reintroducing these subjects in the curriculum. The other theme was that traditional educational institutions such as al Azhar were incapable of meeting this challenge.⁹

Conservative 'ulama', faced with the challenge posed by reformers such as al 'Aṭṭar and al Ṭaḥṭawī as well as the revivalist Wahhabī and Sanūsī movements, may have responded by putting greater emphasis on the immutability of the *shari'a* and the inadmissibility of independent *ijtihād* (original interpretation outside *madhhab* boundaries) in *shari'a* studies. The doctrine of 'the closure of the door of *ijtihād*' had appeared earlier, but it was not a consensual view, and limited forms of *ijtihād* continued to be practised and discussed by prominent 'ulama'. According to Indira Gesink the conservatives' insistence on the limits of *ijtihād* served 'their desire [to uphold] . . . a consistent body of law in the face of external challenges and internal divisions'. The views of the reformers were more in line with the aims of the Muḥammadī dynasty. Frustration with the conservatism of the religious establishment led them to support the new schools.¹⁰

Economic policies

Muḥammad 'Alī oversaw the improvement of the irrigation system and an extension and intensification of agriculture. Summer canals were cut throughout Lower Egypt, permitting perennial irrigation. The Pasha ordered the cultivation of a newly discovered, long staple variety of cotton, which was prized in international markets. Perennial irrigation made possible an increase in production of cotton and other cash crops grown in the summer, such as indigo and rice. Much of that was destined for international markets, and in a good year agricultural exports accounted for about one fifth of the Pasha's revenues. The Pasha created a 'command economy' in pursuing these and other, less successful, policies. State control of agricultural and industrial production and distribution expanded steadily from 1809 through the 1820s. An elaborate system was created whereby decisions about what crops to plant and where to plant them were passed down through the provincial bureaucracy to village officials. The harvests were taken to

⁹ Peter Gran, *Islamic roots of capitalism: Egypt, 1760–1840* (Austin, 1979), pp. 104–5, 123, 126, 160–1; Heyworth Dunne, *Introduction*, pp. 154, 265; Albert Hourani, *Arabic thought*, pp. 75–6; Cole, *Colonialism*, pp. 36–9.

¹⁰ Wael B. Hallaq, 'Was the gate of *ijtihād* closed?', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 16 (1984), pp. 3–41; Indira Falk Gesink, "'Chaos on the Earth': Subjective truths versus communal unity in Islamic law and the rise of militant Islam', *American Historical Review*, 108 (2003), pp. 711–17 (p. 712).

government warehouses whence they were distributed internally or exported. The peasants were credited against the tax they owed and paid for the remainder of their harvest, though they often received promissory notes that were discounted. The major, traditional industries as well as new ones were controlled in a similar fashion. Foundries and arsenals were established to supply the military and navy, and an ambitious effort was made to launch a large scale textile industry. Although textile production was traditionally widespread in the villages and towns, the Pasha was persuaded to create a factory system based on the contemporary European model. By the early 1830s there were about two dozen cotton spinning manufactories in the Nile Valley, plus weaving and printing establishments, into which skilled workers were drafted. Egyptian artisans were able to copy human powered mule jennies, while most weaving was still done by hand. Imported steam driven jennies and looms could neither be copied nor adequately maintained, and this technological gap might have doomed the factories in the long run if political events had not intervened.¹¹

The command economy impoverished a significant portion of the peasantry. Much attention in the 1820s and 1830s was devoted to the reassignment of land that had fallen into tax arrears or was deserted. There was growing concern with illegal (that is, unauthorised) peasant migration as villagers fled tax arrears and conscription. Village shaykhs were instructed to report strangers, and dragnets were launched to return absconders. A decline in state revenues from their peak in the late 1820s reflected the deteriorating situation in the countryside. Moreover, the occupation of Syria was a net drain on the treasury. Due to the command economy's failure, only summer crops were controlled in the later 1830s.¹²

Controversy over Muḥammad 'Alī's policies intensified in Europe during the occupation of Syria (1831–9). The rebellious Pasha's victories caused Sultan Mahmud II to turn to Russia for support. The advance of Russian influence in Istanbul and Russian warships into the Sea of Marmara was a setback for British strategy, one of the pillars of which was to block Russian movement southward towards the Straits, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Thus Britain reaffirmed its support for Ottoman territorial integrity in Asia, and upheld the reform party in Istanbul in the hope of preserving the empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion. British intervention in

11 Pascale Ghazaleh, *Masters of the trade: Crafts and craftspeople in Cairo, 1750–1850*. Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. XX, no. 3 (Cairo, 1999), pp. 114–24; Moustafa Fahmy, *La Révolution de l'industrie en Egypte et ses conséquences sociales* (Leiden, 1954).

12 Cuno, *Pasha's peasants*, pp. 117–20, 123–4, 144; Fahmy, *Pasha's men*, pp. 45, 100–1, 107–8.

Turco Egyptian hostilities during 1839–40 forced the Pasha to withdraw from Syria and Arabia, ending this threat to the Ottoman Empire. British hostility towards the Pasha's controls on production and commerce – what they called his 'monopoly system' – intensified after the invasion of Syria. In addition to the strategic threat posed by Egyptian expansion, British views reflected their adoption of an aggressive policy of 'free trade imperialism'. The Anglo-Ottoman commercial convention of 1838 established a free trade regime with *ad valorem* duties and a ban on 'monopolies' that would be applied in Egypt after 1841.¹³

The middle decades

Muḥammad 'Alī's policies had mixed results for the lives of ordinary people. Security improved. Before 1800 villages were enclosed in walls and stout gates guarded Cairo's residential quarters. The gates of the quarters were removed by the French and never replaced, and mid-century villages were no longer walled. Nutrition improved with the expansion and intensification of agriculture. Famine had occurred often in the eighteenth century, but was rare in the nineteenth. Smallpox vaccination and the quarantine system lowered mortality further. The population grew slowly despite wars and conscription.¹⁴

On the other hand, Muḥammad 'Alī's policies accentuated inequalities. Land in arrears or abandoned by impoverished peasants was transferred to wealthier villagers, including the rural notables, and to members of the Pasha's family, his officers and officials. Most land was state revenue (*miri* or *kharaj*) land and would not be recognised as privately owned until the 1890s. The Pasha granted additional cultivated and reclaimable land to himself and his family, officers and officials after 1840 to ensure their loyalty. Later called 'ushr land, it was privately owned and untaxed until 1854, when Sa'īd imposed a low rate on it. Thus in the countryside the smallhold and landless strata grew while some villagers – especially the notables – accumulated more land. A privileged class of large landowners, mostly the families of Ottoman officers and officials in the Pasha's service – Ottoman Egyptians and headed by the viceregal family, was created. Two terms, 'izba and *muraba'a*, were emblematic of the new situation. Large landholdings were

13 Fahmy, *Pasha's men*, pp. 289–305; Afaf Lutfi al Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 232–46.

14 Justin A. McCarthy, 'Nineteenth century Egyptian population', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 12, 3 (Oct. 1976), pp. 1–39; Daniel Panzac, 'The population of Egypt in the nineteenth century', *Asian and African Studies*, 21 (1987), pp. 11–32.

often farmed by sharecroppers for a one fourth share of the crop, a system known as *muraba'a*. On the large estates agricultural workers began to be housed by mid century in small settlements called *'izbas*. Named after their owners, *'izbas* are easy to spot on early twentieth century survey maps, and the names reflect the origins of the large landowning class: Ottoman Egyptians, rural notables, provincial merchants and the occasional foreigner.¹⁵

Muḥammad 'Alī's policies appear not to have weakened Egypt's large scale merchant class as much as shifts in international trade. Muḥammad Bey Shinnawī, a descendant of prominent merchant notables in eighteenth and nineteenth century al Mansura, was a mill owner and cotton merchant on the eve of the First World War.¹⁶ Yet continual operation of a merchant family firm such as his was more the exception than the norm. With the liberalisation of trade in the 1840s, European firms based in Alexandria and employing Greek agents came to dominate large scale commerce in the countryside. Facing stiff competition from firms backed by European capital, many merchants invested in land. Despite a lack of *de jure* ownership, land tenure was stabilised by new laws, and rising agricultural prices made it an attractive investment.¹⁷

The traditional craft, service and merchant guilds remained intact, becoming obsolete towards the end of the century once they ceased either to serve the needs of the state or to protect the interests of the workers. Urban manufacturing and service workers increased in number. Some older industries restructured in the face of European competition and adjusted to new tastes, so that in the second half of the century construction workers, furniture makers, tailors and shoemakers learned to produce in European styles. Some entirely new services arose, such as cab driving, made possible by the construction of straight, paved streets.¹⁸

The political regime

In accordance with the London Convention and the *fermans* of 1840 the Muḥammad 'Alī family were granted the hereditary *paşalık* of Egypt and Sudan. The Pasha was required to reduce his army to 18,000. All Ottoman

15 Thomas Fowler, *Report on the cultivation of cotton in Egypt* (Manchester, 1861), p. 17; Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the world economy, 1800–1914* (London and New York, 1981), pp. 146–8.

16 *The Egyptian directory 1914* (Cairo, 1913), p. 1087; Cuno, *Pasha's peasants*, pp. 154, 251 n. 33.

17 Cuno, *Pasha's peasants*, pp. 186–97.

18 Ghazaleh, *Masters*, pp. 87–114; John Chalcraft, *The striking cabbies of Cairo and other stories: Crafts and guilds in Egypt, 1863–1914* (Albany, 2004), pp. 37–66.

laws and treaties were to be applied in Egypt, including the commercial convention of 1838. The last seven years of the Pasha's rule were devoted to political and economic retrenchment. He had once said that he ensured the loyalty of his men by paying them well and giving them gifts, but not land, which might enable them to develop an independent influence. Now he distributed land grants to solidify the position of his family and retain the loyalty of the elite. The marriage of harem women to officers and officials further assured their loyalty to the viceregal household.¹⁹ Though Muḥammad 'Alī, his sons and his leading officials had retinues of *mamluks* who were placed in the military and administration,²⁰ by mid century the men entering the officer corps and civil service were trained in government schools rather than elite households, and *mamluk* retinues had become obsolete. Large harems were still maintained, as the practice of marrying harem women to officials and officers continued through the reign of Isma'īl. Isma'īl, and other princes and princesses, gave harem women in marriage along with houses and grants of land of anywhere from 50 to 1,000 *faddans* (1 *faddan* = approximately 1 acre).²¹ Although, in keeping with Ottoman reform, the Egyptian government formed executive ministries in the 1830s and a consultative assembly in the 1860s, the political regime remained autocratic. To rise 'up' in state service meant moving closer to the viceroy, who controlled finances and was the sole dispenser of patronage.

The Ottoman system of succession of the oldest male fostered rivalry between Muḥammad 'Alī's descendants. The Pasha was succeeded by his son Ibrahim as regent, followed by his grandson 'Abbas Ḥilmī I, his younger son Sa'īd, and then another grandson, Isma'īl. There was bad blood between Ibrahim and 'Abbas. Once in power 'Abbas purged many officials favoured by Muḥammad 'Alī and Ibrahim, earning an undeserved reputation as a 'reactionary'. 'Abbas' loyalists attempted to install his son Ilhamī as viceroy in place of Sa'īd, the legitimate successor. Isma'īl put an end to these rivalries by securing a *ferman* changing the system of succession to primogeniture. His oldest son Tawfiq now became crown prince. Isma'īl conciliated other, collateral lines of the viceregal family by marrying his sons and daughters into them, thereby inaugurating a pattern of royal endogamy and monogamy

19 Imad Aḥmad Hilal, *al Raḥīq fī Miṣr fī al qarn al tasi' 'ashar* (Cairo, 1999), pp. 412–13.

20 Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives*, pp. 100–1.

21 Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of experts: Egypt, techno politics, modernity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002), p. 54; Daniel Crecelius, *The roots of modern Egypt: A study of the regimes of 'Alī Bey al Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al Dhahab, 1760–1775* (Minneapolis, 1981), p. 115; Hilal, *al Raḥīq*, pp. 93–4.

in place of concubinage and polygyny. Tawfiq (r. 1879–92) was married to Amina Ilhami (1858–1931), granddaughter of ‘Abbas, and would become Egypt’s first monogamous ruler.²² In spite of their rivalries Muḥammad ‘Alī’s successors consistently asserted Egypt’s autonomy and the position of their dynasty. Ottoman laws were applied, but often in a localised version. ‘Abbas insisted on issuing his own penal code, rather than the one drawn up in the imperial capital. The Egyptian land code of 1858 was distinct in many respects from its Ottoman counterpart.²³ In addition to changing the rule of succession, Isma‘il persuaded the sultan to grant him and his successors the official title khedive, and to allow him to contract foreign loans without imperial approval.

A changing elite

The elite that emerged in the middle decades had a larger proportion of Egyptians, men such as the engineer ‘Alī Mubarak (1823–93). Mubarak was appointed director of government schools by ‘Abbas, and would have a long career directing public works and education under Isma‘il and Tawfiq. His earliest education was in a *kuttab*, then in government schools and in France. Ottoman state servants of this generation were equally likely to be the product of government schools and foreign training. Muḥammad Sharif (1826–87), an Ottoman educated in Muḥammad ‘Alī’s schools and in France, served in the army under ‘Abbas, later heading several ministries and serving as prime minister more than once. Mubarak and Sharif were vastly different in background and outlook. Mubarak came from a family of provincial ‘*ulama*’ in Lower Egypt and was proud of his Egyptian heritage. The son of an Ottoman chief judge, Sharif harboured a belief in the Ottomans’ inherent right to rule and a contempt for native Egyptians. Mubarak was dedicated to reform, especially in education, following a European model. Sharif was profoundly conservative and mistrustful of introducing elements of European culture.²⁴ Both men represent the first generation of officials trained in Muḥammad ‘Alī’s schools and abroad, who started their careers in government service soon after the Pasha’s death. The men in this generation differed from their predecessors in having a European style education, advanced training and knowledge of a European language,

22 Cuno, ‘Ambiguous modernization’, pp. 248, 259–60.

23 Gabriel Baer, ‘The development of private ownership of land’ and ‘Tanzimat in Egypt: The penal code’, in Baer, *Studies*, pp. 67–70, 109–32; Cuno, *Pasha’s peasants*, pp. 193–7.

24 Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives*, pp. 123–38, 151–8; Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., *Biographical dictionary of modern Egypt* (Boulder, 2000), pp. 131–2, 191.

usually French. This was also true of the rulers, beginning with Saʿīd, who had European tutors. The growth of education and the expansion of the bureaucracy and officer corps under Ismaʿīl offered new opportunities to Egyptians, who by the 1870s predominated in the civil service just below the highest offices, and in the lower ranks of the officer corps. However, the contraction of the state after the bankruptcy of 1876 blocked social mobility. ʿAlī Mubarak was the sole Egyptian cabinet minister before 1882, and no Egyptian officer was promoted beyond the rank of colonel. The frustration of Egyptians in the officer corps contributed to the ʿUrabi Revolution.

Egypt's rural notables also emerged as a force in politics. Typically large landholders, their wealth and influence increased during the mid century agricultural boom. Some emulated the ruling elite, building houses in the Rumī style with whitewashed walls and glazed windows, and sending their sons to government schools. Railway and telegraph lines built in the 1860s facilitated communication and travel between their villages and the urban centres. In 1866 Ismaʿīl created a Consultative Assembly of Delegates (*majlis shura al nawwab*). The assembly was predominantly provincial, its members coming from the most prominent families. It reflected the khedive's recognition of the importance of the notables and the need to consult them, especially in matters of taxation,²⁵ but it lacked real power. Assemblies were convened at the pleasure of the khedive, who neglected to do so in some years. Nevertheless, deputies took their work seriously, delving into issues such as tax reform, public works, irrigation and the corvée. They asserted a voice in state finances, debating the government's reliance on foreign credit to finance the deficit and demanding the right to examine annual accounts of receipts and expenditures.²⁶ Unlike the officer corps and civil service, the notables were not a dependent elite. They might receive honours, titles and gifts from the khedive, but they had independent local bases of wealth and influence.

Informal imperialism

From an estimated 14 per cent before 1800, Europe's share of Egypt's growing foreign trade rose to about half by mid century. This was encouraged by the

25 ʿAbd al Raḥman al Rafīʿī, *ʿAṣr Ismaʿīl*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1947), vol. II, pp. 82 ff.; Raʿuf ʿAbbas Ḥamid, *al Niẓam al ijtimāʿī fī Miṣr fī ḡill al milkiyyat al ziraʿiyya al kabīra 1837–1914* (Cairo, 1973), p. 194.

26 Ḥamid, *al Niẓam al ijtimāʿī*, pp. 194–5; Georges Douin, *Histoire du regne du khédive Ismaïl*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1933), vol. I, pp. 304–13, vol. II, pp. 66–9; Yacoub Artin, *La Propriété foncière en Égypte* (Bulaq, 1883), p. 151.

khedives' promotion of export oriented agriculture, their infrastructural projects, the commercial convention of 1838 and the development of steam navigation. The port of Alexandria boomed, its population rising from around 15,000 in the 1820s to over 200,000 in the 1870s.²⁷ In addition to European diplomats, bankers and businessmen, Egypt's growing economy offered opportunity to skilled craftsmen and tradesmen from Greece and Italy, who settled in Alexandria, Cairo and other towns. Their foods and languages have left an imprint on Egyptian culture. Migrants from other Ottoman provinces Muslims, Christians and Jews also found opportunities in the trades or professions. Whether tourists or residents, foreign nationals enjoyed extraterritorial legal privileges due to their nations' aggressive interpretation of ancient agreements known as the capitulations. They could neither be sued nor tried in a local court, but only under their own law as administered by their consular representatives. Nor were they subject to taxation. The Mixed Law Code of 1876 provided a venue for adjudication of property and commercial cases involving Egyptians and foreigners, with an international judiciary and French based law. This reflected the balance of power with Europe.²⁸

Though rivals, Britain and France shared an interest in preserving Egypt's autonomy that is, in limiting imperial authority so as to enhance their own influence and in its stability. The two powers contested influence in part by supporting their subjects' pursuit of concessions for major projects. Britain backed construction of Africa's first railway by Robert Stevenson, connecting Alexandria with Cairo and Suez and facilitating the passage to India. Sa'id gave an incredibly generous concession to the Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps for the construction and operation of the Suez Canal. The canal was begun despite British and Ottoman opposition, and opened in 1869 amid extravagant festivities attended by foreign dignitaries, including Empress Eugénie of France. The Gezira palace (now a Marriott hotel in the Zamalek district of Cairo) was built to accommodate her, and a carriage road (now Pyramid Road) was constructed through the fields of Giza for her visit to the pyramids. These projects fitted with the planning and construction of a new, European style quarter in the floodplain between Ottoman Cairo and the Nile. One can easily distinguish the Paris like visage of the nineteenth century city, with its straight streets and roundabouts, from the old city with its narrower, winding lanes. Haussmann's remaking of Paris inspired the plan

27 Michael J. Reimer, *Colonial bridgehead: Government and society in Alexandria 1807 1882* (Boulder, 1997), pp. 90, 110.

28 Jasper Yeates Brinton, *The mixed courts of Egypt* (New Haven, 1968).

of the new city. Isma‘īl, who wished to be accepted on equal standing with the princes of Europe, understood such a planned capital to be an accoutrement of a modern state – along with the library, museum and learned societies he patronised.²⁹

Emergence of a public sphere

The reign of Isma‘īl saw advances in intellectual life and the emergence of a ‘public’ that took an interest in and discussed issues affecting the political community. A sense of political community was nurtured by the spread of literacy, the state school curriculum, railways and telegraphs, the khedive’s encouragement of intellectual life and his use of public rituals and symbols to foster loyalty to the khedival and imperial dynasties. A crucial role was played by publishing and the press. Muḥammad ‘Alī established a press in the 1820s to print books in Arabic, Ottoman Turkish and Persian for administrators and the schools. By the end of the decade it also printed *al Waqa’i‘ al Miṣriyya* (‘Egyptian events’) in Arabic and Ottoman, which was distributed to officers, officials, prominent ‘*ulama*’ and notables and teachers and students in the government schools. The production of Arabic books grew slowly but steadily from over a hundred in the 1820s to more than four hundred in the 1850s, when privately owned Arabic presses began to be established. More than three times as many Arabic books were printed in the 1860s and 1870s as in the previous two decades. Isma‘īl encouraged the development of a periodical press, albeit a tame one, patronising some newspapers and shutting down others after brief runs, including the satirical *Abu Naḍḍara al Zarqa’* (‘The Man with the blue glasses,’ 1877–8), edited by Ya‘qub Sanu‘ (1839–1912). *Abu Naḍḍara* broke new ground with its use of colloquial Arabic and political cartoons, and Sanu‘ continued to publish it in Paris after his deportation. The Taqla brothers of Beirut founded *al Ahram* (‘The Pyramids’, 1876), now Egypt’s leading newspaper. From the 1860s to 1880 some 23 non government Arabic periodicals appeared in Cairo and Alexandria, though many did not last very long.³⁰

Although some newspapers such as *al Ahram* were circumspect in local politics they were free to cover events outside Egypt, and the presence of a Reuters bureau in Alexandria from 1866 made that task easier. This was an era of momentous events that directly affected the extended political community

29 Janet Abu Lughod, *Cairo: 1001 years of the City Victorious* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 103–13.

30 Ami Ayalon, *The press in the Arab Middle East: A history* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 15, 41–5, 50; ‘A‘ida Ibrahīm Nuṣayr, *al Kutub al ‘Arabiyya allatī nushirat fī Miṣr fī al qarn al tasi‘ ‘ashar* (Cairo, 1990), pp. k–m.

of Ottoman subjects and fellow Muslims. In 1876, *al Ahram*'s first year, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire declared bankruptcy, an Ottoman constitution was issued – the first in the Middle East – and Bulgaria rose in bloody rebellion, leading to war with Russia and the intervention of the other powers. While the Congress of Berlin (1878) was deciding the empire's fate, the debt settlement in Egypt subjected it to Anglo French control (as described below). Albert Hourani observed that while al Ṭaḥṭawī's generation of reformers saw Europe as a model to emulate, in the course of the century Europe revealed a predatory side.³¹

Egypt and India were centres of the movement in Islam called 'modernism' by Western scholars. Towards the end of the century modernists advocated a cluster of reforms aiming to reconcile the way in which the faith was understood with 'modern values such as constitutionalism, . . . cultural revival, nationalism, freedom of religious interpretation, scientific investigation, modern style education, [and] women's rights'. Conservatives and some Western observers were sceptical about the compatibility of these values with Islam, but the modernists 'saw the tension between Islamic faith and modern values as a historical accident, not an inherent feature of Islam'.³² Reformist '*ulama*' preferred the label Salafī, the term referring to the earliest generations of Muslims, *al salaf al ṣāliḥun* or 'the pious forebears', whose understanding and practice of the faith were idealised as closer to the Prophet's Islam than that of succeeding generations. In the Salafī (re)construction of history, the present state of backwardness was the result of inner decay. Centuries of accretion of un-Islamic custom and layers of archaic scholarship had to be scraped away to permit a return to the true or original Islam. Thus they pitted themselves against the mystical orders, which they saw as obscurantist, and against the conservative curricula and methods of the *madrasas*, which they saw as ossified. Additionally and increasingly toward the end of the century, colonialist discourse forced the reformers into defending Islam itself: Islam, they insisted, was not a cause of backwardness and oppression.³³

The Iranian scholar and activist al Sayyid Jamal al Dīn (1838/9–97), who called himself 'al Afghani', spent the years 1871–9 in Cairo. Though often credited with beginning the Salafī movement in Egypt, his perception of the need for and means to reform paralleled the concerns of al 'Aṭṭar and

³¹ Hourani, *Arabic thought*, pp. 103–4.

³² Charles Kurzman, *Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A sourcebook* (Oxford, 2002), p. 4.

³³ A. Merad, 'Islah', *El2*, vol. IV, pp. 142b–144a.

al Ṭaḥṭawī, especially with regard to education. Al Afghani was invited to Egypt and granted a stipend by Ismaʿīl's prime minister, Riyaḍ Pasha (1834–1911), a sign of the compatibility of Salafī reformism and the Muḥammadi dynasty's progressive vision. Al Afghani's charisma and learning attracted a following including Muḥammad ʿAbduḥ (1849–1905) and Saʿd Zaghlul (1857–1927). He taught mainly Islamic philosophy, which was studied in Iran but had not been part of the Sunni curriculum for centuries. Nikki Keddie observed that al Afghani's teaching offered 'a path to rationalism, science, and fresh interpretations of Islam', providing a culturally 'indigenous' alternative to 'accepting . . . the superiority of the aggressive and threatening foreigner'.³⁴ Despite his association with Islamic reform and, later, pan Islam, al Afghani's Egyptian circle included several Syrian Christian writers and the Jewish Sanuʿ. He encouraged all to promote the cause of reform and resistance to European domination through journalism.³⁵ Shaykh Muḥammad ʿIllaysh (1802–82), the Maliki *mufti* and a teacher at al Azhar, championed the use of *taqlid* in *shariʿa* studies, with its reliance on the scholarship of previous generations, and opposed independent *ijtihād*. Al Afghani and later reformers redefined *taqlid* and *ijtihād* in epistemological terms, claiming that 'the closure of the door of *ijtihād*' and the practice of *taqlid* were causes of stagnation and backwardness.³⁶

Bankruptcy, revolution and invasion

Foreign loans were Ismaʿīl's undoing. He inherited a foreign debt from Saʿīd, and had to borrow to pay an indemnity to de Lesseps to revise the terms of the Suez Canal concession more in Egypt's favour. Additional loans financed infrastructural projects. The khedive may have counted on export earnings from cotton to pay off the loans. The American civil war created a cotton shortage in world markets and a 'cotton boom' in Egypt that was in full swing when Ismaʿīl's rule began. Cotton, grown mainly in the eastern Delta since the 1820s, was now planted wherever land could be irrigated. Prices remained high until 1864, and then plunged. The khedive's ability to raise revenues in other areas was limited. On the eve of bankruptcy, debt service consumed the majority of revenues. The Ottoman and Egyptian bankruptcies occurred nearly simultaneously, and European creditor nations intervened to protect the bondholders' interests. The debts were consolidated and rescheduled,

34 Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad Din 'al Afghani': A political biography* (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1972), pp. 86–7.

35 Ayalon, *The press*, pp. 44–5; Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad Din*, pp. 83–4.

36 Gesink, "'Chaos on the Earth'", pp. 717–27.

special funds controlled by the creditors were created to pay off the debts, and revenues were assigned to the funds. In Egypt about half of all state revenues were assigned to the Caisse de la dette publique. In 1878 a French minister of public works and a British minister of finance were placed in the khedival cabinet, taking control of revenues and expenditures. Ismaʿil had personally secured some loans, and as a consequence his estates were turned over to a commission to be sold off. The British government purchased his shares in the Suez Canal Company, inherited from Saʿid. From then until its nationalisation in 1956, the Suez Canal Company and its revenues were in Anglo French hands.³⁷

The financial settlement transformed Egyptian politics. Ismaʿil took draconian measures to raise taxes, causing widespread distress and anger. In Upper Egypt in 1878 the unremitting demands and a poor Nile resulted in famine. Second, the khedive's authority was undercut. Deprived of control of the budget, he no longer had the means to induce and enforce the loyalty of the governing elite. Moreover, the European takeover displaced the Ottoman Egyptian and native elite. Last, the European Ministry's budget cutting caused the dismissal of thousands of civil servants and officers and reduced salaries for others. Ismaʿil tried to mobilise opposition in April 1879, dismissing the European Ministry and appointing a new ministry ostensibly to carry out a National Manifesto issued earlier that month and signed by more than three hundred officials, military officers, members of the Assembly, religious leaders, merchants and notables. The manifesto offered a revised financial plan to pay off the debt, and called for giving the Assembly more power. Two months later Ismaʿil was deposed by the sultan, acting under Anglo French pressure.³⁸

His son and successor, Khedive Tawfiq, restored the European Ministry and its financial programme. The announcement of further cuts in the military coincided with a policy of restricting the higher ranks to Ottomans. In January 1881, when three Egyptian colonels including Aḥmad ʿUrabi (1841–1911) were court martialled for petitioning for the dismissal of the war minister, they were rescued by their regiments. The war minister was replaced by Maḥmud Sami al Barudi (1839–1904), a Circassian Egyptian sympathetic to the Egyptian officers. The khedive's dismissal of al Barudi led to another showdown in September when ʿUrabi, backed by the army, presented a set of demands to Tawfiq. In the intervening months what had begun as a mutiny became a

37 Owen, *World economy*, pp. 122–35.

38 Cole, *Colonialism*, pp. 101–7; Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives*, pp. 179–226; Alexander Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians! The socio political crisis in Egypt 1878–1882* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 43–134.

broadly based revolutionary movement. Now the officers were backed by the same elements that had supported the 1879 manifesto, Ottoman Egyptian and Egyptian officials, rural notables, prominent 'ulama' and intellectuals, including a number of writers from al Afghani's circle. 'Urabi's demands reflected the interests of this coalition: dismissal of the European Ministry; election of a new Assembly; and raising the army's strength to 18,000 (less than a third its size in 1878). Again Tawfiq capitulated. In January 1882 a joint Anglo French note declaring support for the khedive backfired, undermining his government. A new ministry was formed with al Barudi as prime minister and a majority of Egyptians for the first time, including 'Urabi as war minister. The Assembly now gave itself the authority to vote on bills and to discuss the portion of the budget not encumbered by the debt or the imperial tribute. Spurred by alarmist reports from their men on the spot, Britain and France dispatched warships to Alexandria in May, demanding the resignation of the nationalist cabinet. A month later the tense city exploded in rioting, and the khedive fled to the protection of the British fleet. In July the British bombarded the city on a false pretext. In September they invaded, defeated 'Urabi, and restored Tawfiq. 'Urabi and numerous supporters were placed on trial. His sentence of death was commuted to exile in the Seychelles.³⁹

Anglo American historians have begun to accept the 'Urabist movement as revolutionary due to its 'extensive civilian involvement and social depth', but there is disagreement over the extent of its popular support and radicalism. In Egypt the Free Officers rehabilitated it as a national revolution and a precursor to their own, and recent studies have focused on its popular bases. In comparative perspective it was one of several movements in Asia and Africa that were driven by opposition to autocratic rulers allied with foreign domination and inspired by constitutionalist ideas during the pre First World War era.⁴⁰

The veiled protectorate

The British restored Tawfiq but not khedival autocracy. Egypt became a 'veiled protectorate', in the apt words of its main architect, the British consul

39 Donald M. Reid, 'The 'Urabi revolution and the British conquest, 1879 1882', in M. W. Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge history of Egypt*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1998), vol. II, *Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century*, pp. 217 38; Cole, *Colonialism*, pp. 234 72; Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians*, pp. 135 305; John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al Sayyid Marsot, 'The British occupation of Egypt: Another view', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 9 (1978), pp. 471 88.

40 Cole, *Colonialism*, pp. 3 22; Reid, 'The 'Urabi revolution' (p. 217).

general, Lord Cromer (1883–1907). Legally Egypt remained an Ottoman province ruled by the khedive, but the British ruled in all but name. British officers trained and led a new army and police force. Cromer, with advisers appointed to each ministry, made important decisions. The Army of Occupation was conspicuously present in the Qaṣr al Niḷ barracks in Cairo (the site of today's Nile Hilton). At first the British insisted that they would depart as soon as political and financial order were restored, though a British garrison remained for seventy five years. The occupation gained a certain legal standing in Anglo Ottoman negotiations, though London and Istanbul failed to agree on the terms of an evacuation. The various international agreements to which Egypt was subject – especially in finances – hindered the British until they were able to reschedule the debt and make timely payments on it, winning 'the race against insolvency'. French opposition to British control disappeared with the entente of 1904.

Imperial strategy was the decisive factor in the longevity of the occupation. Control of Egypt and the Suez Canal was deemed vital to guarantee communication with India, especially now that the Ottomans were turning to Germany for financial and technical assistance. Zealous officials such as Cromer, convinced of their civilising mission, drove Britain's deepening involvement in the Egyptian administration. The Sudan crisis afforded Cromer an opportunity to clarify the relationship between the British and Egyptian governments. After the fall of Khartoum to the Mahdist rebellion in 1884, Cromer opposed another military expedition, his priority being to meet the scheduled debt payments. At Cromer's suggestion the foreign secretary, Lord Granville, sent him a message stating 'that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those [Egyptian] Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices'.⁴¹

Although British interests in Egypt were primarily strategic, Cromer's policies had certain economic, social and political aims informed by the 'lessons' learned in India. In order to raise agricultural output and increase exports, special attention was devoted to the improvement of irrigation and drainage, one of the few areas of significant public expenditure. The Aswan Dam, built in 1902 and heightened in 1907 and 1912, brought perennial

⁴¹ Afaf Lutfi al Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer: A study in Anglo Egyptian relations* (London, 1968), pp. 54–67 (quote p. 57); see also Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British colonial rule in Egypt 1882–1914* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 48–145.

irrigation to Middle Egypt. The emphasis on agriculture was also calculated to win the support of the propertied classes, whom British administrators viewed as natural allies. Agricultural prosperity, it was believed, would keep the peasantry content and secure the acquiescence of the large landowners in continued colonial rule. In the 1890s a new cadastral survey was begun, full private ownership rights were recognised in agricultural land and tax rates were lowered. This period saw economic growth though the distribution of income was highly skewed. In a mainly agrarian economy land ownership data is a good indicator of inequality. In 1913 less than 1 per cent of all properties were larger than 50 *faddans*, but they accounted for 44.2 per cent of the land. In Roger Owen's vivid analysis, about 70 per cent of rural families owned less than the 5 *faddans* deemed necessary for their subsistence, and another 21 per cent owned no land at all.⁴² Most 'peasant' households survived by renting or sharecropping the land of others and wage labour. Women contributed income by tending livestock and poultry and taking on manufacturing piecework.

Urbanisation, industrialisation and education were discouraged. When local entrepreneurs established spinning and weaving factories, Cromer imposed an excise tax sufficient to make them unprofitable. Funding for education was reduced. The number of government schools was cut and students were required to pay for tuition.⁴³

Modernism

Muḥammad 'Abduh joined al Afghānī in Paris, where for eight months in 1884 they published *al 'Urwa al Wuthqa* ('The indissoluble bond'), which was smuggled into Egypt and throughout the Middle East. In its pages al Afghānī's rationalist approach to Islam was joined with a stronger emphasis on the need for pan Islamic unity in the face of European domination. If Muslims understood their faith correctly, strength and unity would result.⁴⁴ Al Afghānī sketched a modernist agenda in broad strokes, but it was 'Abduh who tried to achieve it in concrete form. Permitted to return to Egypt in 1888, he served as a judge in the civil courts and later as Grand Mufti (1899–1905). Like al Afghānī 'Abduh believed that the principles of original Islam offered the soundest basis for modern life, and their recovery would serve to close the gap between secular Westernisation and the ossified Islam of the

42 Owen, *World economy*, p. 218.

43 Ibid., p. 225; Donald M. Reid, *Cairo University and the making of modern Egypt* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 18.

44 Hourani, *Arabic thought*, p. 113; Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad Din*, p. 224.

conservative clerics. Original Islam, in his Salafī method, was to be found in the sources of the faith – Qur'an and Sunna – as well as in the religious scholarship of the first few Islamic centuries. That period was characterised by *ijtihād*, informed original interpretation. Stagnation had set in about the fourth century, and was reproduced through *taqlīd*, which he saw as blind imitation.⁴⁵

‘Abduh confined his activism to the spheres of education and law. In that respect, at least, he was a traditional cleric, acting as a teacher and guide, and pursuing reform through scholarship. The very different career of his disciple Shaykh Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa (1865–1935) mirrored changes occurring in the discursive field of Islam. Though trained like ‘Abduh as a religious scholar, for most of his life Riḍa edited the influential modernist journal *al Manar* (‘The Beacon’, 1898–1935). Turn of the twentieth century discussions and debates over Islam were no longer confined within the *madrasas* but had spilled out into the public sphere. Modernists contributed to this development by asserting that *ijtihād* was something that could be practised even by lay persons, so long as they were educated in Arabic.⁴⁶ Yet it was also a consequence of the development of print culture. The difference can be put this way: intellectuals of al Afghani and ‘Abduh’s generations sought influence for their ideas by gathering circles of students around themselves and getting the ear of the ruler, a prince or a minister. Riḍa’s generation competed for a share of public opinion.

The continued growth of the periodical press suggests the expansion of the public sphere and the growing importance of public opinion. In Cairo and Alexandria alone, between 1880 and 1908 over 500 newspapers and more than a hundred journals were published, though many were short lived. Book publishing developed exponentially. Three fifths of all Arabic books published in the nineteenth century were printed in the 1880s and 1890s, and the number published in the first quarter of the new century surpassed what had been published up to 1900. Islamic books were the most numerous, being well over a fourth of what was published between 1822 and 1925. Works of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) were published far more often than anything else in this category, followed by the bases of religion (*uṣūl al dīn*); *ḥadīth* and *Ḥadīth* studies; the Qur’an, Qur’anic studies and exegesis (*tafsīr*); and the biography of the Prophet.⁴⁷ The thriving market for religious books seems to

45 Hourani, *Arabic thought*, pp. 149–51. 46 Gesink, “‘Chaos on the Earth’”, p. 729.

47 Ayalon, *The press*, p. 50; Nuṣayr, *al Kutub al ‘Arabiyya . . . fī al qarn al taṣī‘ ‘ashar*; ‘Aḍa Ibrahīm Nuṣayr, *al Kutub al ‘Arabiyya allatī nushirat fī Miṣr bayn ‘amay 1900–1925* (Cairo, 1983).

reflect an interest generated by the controversies between modernists and conservatives. It also illustrates how print technology would in the long run undermine clerical authority in interpreting the *shari'a*. Religious questions could no longer be monopolised by the shaykhs or confined within the academies. Books, including religious books, could be bought, read and discussed by anyone.

Second-wave nationalism

Unlike Tawfiq, who owed his position to the British, his son 'Abbas Ḥilmī II (r. 1892–1914) chafed under the veiled protectorate, and his relations with Cromer were strained. In his first year as khedive Cromer confronted him over the appointment of a prime minister, extracting a promise to follow British advice in important matters. The following year he was forced to back down from disparaging remarks he made about the British officers in his employ. More quietly, the palace under Tawfiq and 'Abbas cultivated the charisma of the Muḥammadī dynasty. The khedives toured the provinces and staged public celebrations of their birthdays and the anniversaries of their accessions, replete with processions, cannon fire and illuminations, while Ottoman imperial celebrations were correctly observed as well. The press reported on the activities and movements of members of the khedival family in a manner similar to the coverage of European royal families. Towards the turn of the century a number of books and articles appeared extolling the life of Muḥammad 'Alī. These efforts to identify the reigning dynasty with the modern nation, including the centennial of the Pasha's accession in 1905, were in response to the emergence of a sense of national community, and the contested nature of that identity.⁴⁸

Thus second wave nationalism included a pro palace orientation, the leader of which was Shaykh 'Alī Yusuf (1863–1913), founder and editor of the newspaper *al Mu'ayyad* ('The Confirmed [as truth]', 1889–1915). 'Alī Yusuf came from a humble family in Upper Egypt and had an Azhar education. *Al Mu'ayyad* had early support from Tawfiq's prime minister, Riyaḍ Paşa, and became a palace mouthpiece under 'Abbas. It supported the khedive and struck an anti British and pan Islamic stance. Its pages carried articles by nationalists who later would espouse competing views, such as Muṣṭafa Kamil, Muḥammad Fard, Aḥmad Luṭfī al Sayyid and Sa'd Zaghlul. By the turn of the century it had the largest circulation of any Egyptian news paper, having overtaken the popular pro French *al Ahram* and pro British

⁴⁸ Cuno, 'Muhammad Ali and the decline and revival thesis'.

al Muqattam.⁴⁹ In 1907 ‘Alī Yusuf formed the pro khedival Constitutional Reform Party.

Two other trends were represented by their very different leaders, Muṣṭafa Kamil and Aḥmad Luṭfī al Sayyid. Muṣṭafa Kamil (1874–1908), the son of an army officer, was born in Cairo. Unlike many intellectuals of the time he was educated entirely in the new schools and had no exposure to religious education. He attended the Khedival Law School, and earned a law degree from the University of Toulouse. He belonged to the professional class that in the next century would be called the *effendiyya*, and who, along with students in the government schools, formed his popular following. The *effendiyya* were disadvantaged by the favouritism shown Britons and other foreigners in civil service appointments. As literate urbanites they were sensitive to an accelerating pace of social and cultural change that seemed to threaten to run out of control. The problem was especially acute under colonial rule, for one was not master of one’s own house. Muṣṭafa Kamil’s anti imperialism and cultural conservatism appealed to this constituency, and it was also compatible with the agenda of the khedive, who patronised him throughout the 1890s. He was an Egyptian nationalist but also an exponent of Ottoman and pan Islamic solidarity, calling in *The Eastern Question* (1898)⁵⁰ for support of the ‘sacred [Ottoman] Islamic Caliphate’ against European aggression, and supporting Ottoman claims to the eastern Sinai in the Taba dispute of 1906. The extended political community in which many Egyptians saw themselves was reflected in his appeal to multiple loyalties – Egyptian, Ottoman and pan Islamic. Anti imperialism was a consistent element in his thought. His book *The Rising Sun* (1904), published nearly a year before Japan’s decisive naval victory over Russia in the Tsushima Strait, upheld Japan as a model of successful modernisation while resisting Western control.⁵¹ After breaking with ‘Abbas, Kamil founded the daily *al Liwa* (‘The Banner’ and successors of various names, 1900–14), which became the mouthpiece of the Nationalist (Waṭanī) Party, which he formed in 1907. Under Kamil and his successor Muḥammad Farīd (1868–1919) the Nationalist Party called for an immediate and unconditional end to the British occupation, and for constitutional government.⁵²

49 Ayalon, *The press*, p. 57. 50 Muṣṭafa Kamil, *al Mas’ala al sharqiyya* (Cairo, 1898).

51 Muṣṭafa Kamil, *al Shams al mushriqa* (Cairo, 1904). I am grateful to Arthur Goldshmidt for information on this book.

52 Hourani, *Arabic thought*, pp. 199–201, 205; James Jankowski, ‘Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860–1914’, *The Muslim World*, 70 (1980), pp. 235–7.

Aḥmad Luṭfī al Sayyid (1872–1963) was the scion of a wealthy rural notable family. He began his education in a *kuttab* before attending government schools, including the Khedival Law School. Along with Muṣṭafa Kamil he joined the secret Society for the Revival of the Nation, which was patronised by the khedive and would evolve into the Nationalist Party. Later he distanced himself from Kamil and the khedive. In 1907 he became editor of *al Jarida* ('The Newspaper', 1907–14), the mouthpiece of the Umma ('Nation') Party established in the same year. The Umma Party identified the interests of the nation with the notables, 'those who have a real interest in the country', who considered themselves qualified and entitled to lead it. Its supporters were mainly from the large landholding families. As men of property they were mistrustful of radical change. Though desiring an end to the occupation they were gradualists, believing that Egypt needed a period of preparation for self rule. Influenced by European liberalism, the Umma Party distrusted the khedive's autocratic leanings and championed a constitutional order in which his power would be constrained by a parliament. It articulated a specifically Egyptian identity devoid of Ottomanism or pan Islamism.⁵³

These three nationalist orientations emerged before 1907, when events dictated the establishment of formal parties. Coming on the heels of the Taba dispute in 1906, the execution of four peasants and the flogging of several others in the village of Dinshaway aroused nationalist passions as never before. This exercise in exemplary colonial violence, decreed by an extraordinary tribunal, resulted from an incident provoked by British officers hunting pigeons, who accidentally set fire to the village and then shot at the villagers in panic, wounding a woman. A fleeing officer died of heat stroke, but it was assumed that the peasants killed him. The angry public response to these events led Luṭfī al Sayyid's group to found *al Jarida* and the Umma Party to act as a moderating voice. Their move led to the formation of the other two parties.⁵⁴

The national leadership that emerged after the First World War was formed in the pre war Nationalist and Umma parties. Despite differences they shared a concept of 'Egyptianness' that was not strictly ethnic. Egyptians were those whose families had lived in the Nile Valley for some time, and

53 Hourani, *Arabic thought*, pp. 179–83; Walid Kazziha, 'The Jaridah Ummah group and Egyptian politics', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 13 (1977), pp. 373–85 (quote from Ahmad Luṭfī al Sayyid, p. 378); Jankowski, 'Ottomanism and Arabism', p. 241.

54 Luṭfī al Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, pp. 166–75; Kazziha, 'Jarida Ummah group', 379; Tignor, *Modernization*, pp. 278–86.

who 'felt' Egyptian. No distinction was made between Ottoman Egyptians and native Egyptians, who in any event had begun to intermarry by then. The Nationalist Party's pan Islamism intensified after Kamil's death, alienating many Copts, but neither party defined the Copts nor Egypt's Jews as outsiders.⁵⁵ Another concern shared by all nationalists was the state of education and Egypt's linguistic identity. The British reduced spending on education to less than 1 per cent of the budget in 1902, and it never exceeded 4 per cent. By 1900 English was the principal language of instruction in the primary and secondary schools, something opposed by even the Umma Party. Cromer opposed the establishment of a modern university. The privately funded Egyptian University (now Cairo University) opened after his departure in 1908, with support from the khedival family and across the political spectrum.⁵⁶

Cromer cultivated the notables, seeing them and the Umma Party as a counter to the khedive and anti British nationalists. His successor, Sir John Eldon Gorst (1907–11), drew close to the khedive in order to isolate the nationalists. He revived the Press Law of 1881 to suppress Nationalist Party publications and jailed or drove into exile the party's leaders, including Muḥammad Farid. However, in 1910 the notable dominated Legislative Assembly rejected a proposed extension of the Suez Canal concession beyond its terminus date of 1968. Boutros Ghali (1846 or 1849–1910), the prime minister and a prominent Coptic leader, was associated with this proposal, the press law and other unpopular policies. His assassination by a nationalist in February 1910, amidst vitriolic exchanges between *al Liwa'* and the Coptic press, brought Muslim Coptic relations to a nadir. A Coptic Congress vented grievances in March 1911 in Asyut. Muslims responded by convening an Egyptian Congress in Heliopolis in April, which condemned separatism and asserted national unity. Tensions abated under Gorst's successor, Viscount Kitchener (1911–14), who revived Cromer's policy of cultivating the Umma Party.⁵⁷

Martial law was imposed during the First World War, political activities were suppressed, and the nationalist newspapers ceased publication. Britain declared Egypt a protectorate, severing it from the Ottoman Empire, and deposed 'Abbas II in favour of his uncle, Ḥusayn Kamil (r. 1914–17), who was

55 Hourani, *Arabic thought*, pp. 177, 106–7.

56 Denis Walker, 'British colonial rule in Egypt (the cultural and political formation of Mustafa Kamil's independence movement)', *Hamdard Islamicus*, 16 (1993), pp. 99, 92–5; Tignor, *Modernization*, pp. 336–8; Reid, *Cairo University*, pp. 9–43.

57 Walid Kazziha, 'The political and social bases for the development of self governing institutions in Egypt, 1883–1914', *L'Égypte Contemporaine*, 64 (1973), pp. 479–91.

given the title sultan to emphasise Egypt's separation from the Ottoman Empire. His successor, Aḥmad Fu'ad, would take the title king in 1922.

Egypt in the early twentieth century

During the 'long' nineteenth century Egypt's population grew from perhaps 4.5 million to over twelve million by 1917. Four fifths of Egyptians still lived in villages and most earned a living from agriculture, but only a wealthy minority possessed enough land to live from it alone. Most of the benefits of a century of improved irrigation and transport went to them. In spite of reduced mortality, perhaps one in three persons lived to the age of twenty. Most women married in their late teens or early twenties, while men delayed marriage longer. Divorce, and remarriage due to divorce or death, was frequent. Counting slave concubines, polygyny probably was most widespread in the 1860s and 1870s, due to increased slave ownership made possible by the cotton boom and aggressive slave raiding in Sudan. The slave trade ended in 1877. In the early twentieth century possibly 6 per cent of married Muslim men had multiple wives. Wealthy rural notables practised polygyny and maintained large multiple family households even while modernist reformers endorsed monogamy and the khedival family appeared to uphold it. Family life was in flux, and with it the position of women, with multiple and sometimes contradictory trends in different strata.⁵⁸

Since both the traditional and new schools were devoted nearly exclusively to educating men, gains in literacy produced a chasm between the sexes (15 per cent male and 2 per cent female literacy in 1917)⁵⁹ that alarmed reformers and conservatives alike, for by then the idea of the conjugal family as the basic unit in society had taken hold. While some early feminists saw education as a means of improving women's status, most advocates of women's education believed it was necessary to prepare them for a domestic role as housewives and mothers.⁶⁰ *The Liberation of Women*

58 Daniel Panzac, 'La population de l'Égypte à l'époque contemporaine', in Robert Mantran (ed.), *L'Égypte d'aujourd'hui. Permanence et changements 1805 1976* (Paris, 1977), pp. 158–64; Owen, *World economy*, p. 25; Cuno, 'Ambiguous modernization'; Kenneth M. Cuno, 'Demography, household formation, and marriage in three Egyptian villages during the mid nineteenth century', in Mohammad Afifi et al. (eds.), *Sociétés rurales ottomanes* (Cairo, 2005), pp. 105–17.

59 Panzac, 'La population de l'Égypte', p. 173.

60 Margo Badran, *Feminists, Islam and nation: Gender and the making of modern Egypt* (Princeton, 1995), pp. 62–5; Beth Baron, *The women's awakening in Egypt: Culture, society, and the press* (New Haven, 1994), pp. 155–8; Marilyn Booth, *May her likes be multiplied: Biography and gender politics in Egypt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001), pp. 43–4, 65–6.

(1899)⁶¹ by Qasim Amin (1863–1908) aroused a storm of controversy with its call for the reform of the family through the education of women and an improvement in their legal status, and for its assertion that Islam did not require women to cover their faces or hands in public. The book signalled the spread in educated circles of a European bourgeois family ideal, in which ‘the family’ consists of a monogamous couple and their children in an independent household, and the home is a site for the raising and disciplining of children, the nation’s future.⁶² Several years of women’s writing and advocacy in the press preceded Amin’s book, though no female author produced the reaction that he did, perhaps because he took on several issues at once and went further than female writers in criticising the face veil. The pioneer feminist Malak Hifnı Naşif (1886–1918, who published under the pen name ‘Bahithat al Badiya’) was more concerned with the evils of polygyny, marriage at an early age and the ease with which men divorced their wives. Though convention prevented her from attending in person, she submitted a list of demands to the Egyptian Congress in 1911 that included women’s access to all types and levels of education, the opening of the professions to them and their admission to mosques for congregational prayers.⁶³

The development of education produced another division in society, namely between ‘turban and *ṭarbus*’. Generations earlier the *madrasa* system and a career as a turbaned ‘*alim*’ was the sole path of social mobility available to men of humble origin. Now the surest path of advancement was open to *ṭarbus* wearing government school graduates in the civil service and professions. At mid century there were some twenty *madrasas* in Cairo and thirty two in the provinces, but by the beginning of the twentieth century there were only six.⁶⁴ On the other, hand khedival decrees in 1908 and 1911 centralised the *madrasa* system under the direction of the Shaykh al Azhar. His authority was further enhanced with the chairmanship of administrative councils, including the Council of Great Scholars (Hay’at Kibar al ‘Ulama’), which was authorised to discipline students and defrock ‘*ulama*’ for unseemly acts or unorthodox views.⁶⁵ Thus institutionally strengthened, al Azhar

61 Qasim Amin, *Tahrir al Mar’a* (Cairo, 1899).

62 Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 111–13.

63 Badran, *Feminists, Islam and nation*, p. 69; Leila Ahmed, *Women and gender in Islam* (New Haven, 1992), pp. 182–4.

64 Eccel, *Egypt, Islam and social change*, p. 140.

65 Daniel Crecelius, ‘Nonideological responses of the Egyptian ulama to modernization’, in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), *Scholars, saints and sufis: Muslim religious institutions since 1500* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), p. 194.

would act in the future as a guardian of conservative orthodoxy. A corresponding decline in the prestige of the heads of the Sufi orders, Shaykh al Bakrī and Shaykh al Sadat, was due to the disapproval of mysticism by both the conservative ‘*ulama*’ and the reformers. Yet the numerous Sufi orders remained popular. In Cairo alone in 1900, one source listed more than eighty *mawlid*s or saints’ days.⁶⁶

The autobiography of Ṭaha Ḥusayn (1889–1973) offers a perspective on the contrasts that Egyptians experienced in this era. He presents his life as a series of transitions: village to city, Islamic Cairo to modern Cairo, the culture of al Azhar to that of Luṭfī al Sayyid’s *al Jarīda* and the Egyptian University, and finally Egypt to Europe. His is not an objective account but an affirmation of modernism. He recalls his village *kuttab* teacher as corrupt and rural religious mendicants as spongers. A lack of modern medical knowledge caused the death of two siblings. By his third year at al Azhar he had given up on learning. In the Egyptian University, however, he found the European style lectures ‘strange and new . . . exciting my mind and revolutionising my whole way of thinking.’⁶⁷ Perhaps he saw in his life a metaphor for Egypt, or a prescription to be followed.

66 Daniel Crecelius, ‘The emergence of the Shaykh al Azhar as the pre eminent religious leader in Egypt’, in *Colloque international sur l’histoire du Caire* (Cairo, 1972), pp. 109–23; Roland L. N. Mitchell, *An Egyptian calendar* (London, 1900), pp. 60–5.

67 Ṭaha Hussein, *The days. His autobiography in three parts* (Cairo, 1997), p. 248.

Sudan, Somalia and the Maghreb to the end of the First World War

KNUT S. VIKØR

Two trends dominate the history of North and north eastern Africa in the nineteenth century. One is the growing interference of European powers in the internal workings of the Muslim states. The other is the development of Islamic reform, in part as a reaction to the challenges of the European presence, in part indigenous and often pre dating any European influence. Some of these reformist trends paved the way for the integration of Muslim societies into the colonial 'modernity', while others, intentionally or not, became vehicles for intellectual or political resistance to pressures from outside.

Some historians have seen these indigenous reform movements as local emanations of the Wahhabi movement of Arabia. However, most of them had little or no connection to the Wahhabiyya. It would rather seem that a less radical but profound milieu for intellectual reform in Morocco in the later eighteenth century played an important role, as many of these movements, as far away as in Somalia, had their intellectual roots in this milieu. Less inclined than the Wahhabis to call other Muslims infidels and often linked to Sufi movements, these reformists called for a renewal in legal development (*ijtihad*) and rejected the absolute authority of the established opinions in the schools of law (*madhhabs*). Although not initially concerned with politics, many of them became focuses for militant mobilisation when the historical moment called for it.

The nineteenth century also changed the nature of those established state authorities that did survive by adapting to the changed relations of power. North Africa was in 1800 no stranger to European interventions. Christian powers in particular Spain had invaded and occupied port cities and coastal regions for longer or shorter periods many times before. What changed in the course of the century was that the Europeans started to intervene in the internal workings of Muslim states. The rulers, for their part, saw the European powers initially as a resource they could

manipulate for their own regional ends, and not least as a source of finance. But this thirst for European loans and finance allowed the foreigners to translate their economic power into political influence, partly to ensure that the Maghrebi economies could repay what they owed, but even more to allow European economic interests a free hand in 'developing' the Maghreb.

Many rulers saw the necessity for reform and modernisation of their societies to counter this development. But often they focused primarily on the aspects that could cement their own rule: a better and bigger army, and more efficient taxation to pay for it and for the loans. Reforms were also closely linked to the personality of the ruler; a change of sultan or *bey* often led to reforms being reversed or abandoned, each time giving the stable element, the foreign powers, greater influence, before these eventually took full control of affairs, in the form of protectorates or by more direct means.

In many parts of the region, however, the nineteenth century was still one of state building. There was no Libya, Sudan or Somalia in 1800, while all these entities existed, after a fashion, in 1920. All of these (and partly Algeria as well) were creations of either foreign colonisers, Muslim movements that resisted them, or both. By the 1920s they were all subject to European rule, but the religious movements in both Libya and the Sudan laid the basis for political structures that were to dominate these countries after independence, albeit in a 'modernised' form. The jihad leaders of the nineteenth century became in all cases symbols for a national identity they themselves would not have recognised.

The Maghreb

Morocco: Mawlay Sulayman and Islamic reform

The 'Alawī sultans of Morocco had by 1800 consolidated their rule.¹ Sultan Mawlay Sulayman, who came to power after a short civil war in 1792, had primarily a scholarly background, and maintained his father Sīdī Muḥammad's keen interest in religious matters. Sīdī Muḥammad had wanted to promote unity between the *madhhabs*, rejected Ash'arī theology, and

1 Jamil M. Abun Nasr, *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 241–7; Mohamed El Mansour, *Morocco in the reign of Mawlay Sulayman* (Wisbech, 1990); and Knut S. Vikør, *Sufi and scholar on the desert edge: Muḥammad b. 'Alī al Sanūsī and his brotherhood* (London, 1995), pp. 33–41.

proclaimed himself to be a 'Malikī in *madhhab*, and Ḥanbalī in doctrine'.² Sulayman shared his father's concern for reform. He was, however, less radical and reversed some of his policies: thus, Ash'arism was restored and Ḥanbalism rejected.³

The sultan's intervention in religious matters was only possible because there was already a close relationship between him and a class of 'ulama' in Fez who shared his and his father's desire for reform. Although this trend developed at about the same time as the Wahhabī movement did in Arabia, and with some of the same ideas, the latter movement was unknown to the Moroccans until around 1806, when the new rulers in Mecca sent out a universal call to join their cause.⁴

The response in Morocco was mixed. Many scholars reacted with outright revulsion, while the reformist group in Fez took a more balanced view. They could support some of the Wahhabīs' grievances, such as their attack on the practice of visiting graves, but rejected their militant and exclusionist strategies. This more moderate and parallel brand of reformist thought appeared clearly also to be that of the sultan, who sent a letter with this content to the Sa'udis in 1811.

After 1810 many of the great reformist scholars passed away, and the sultan lost some of his links to the Fez 'ulama'. When some Berber tribes rose in revolt shortly afterwards, they were supported by part of the Fez population. In 1822, however, Sulayman died of natural causes and was succeeded by his nephew Mawlay 'Abd al Raḥman. The new sultan restored order, but reversed most of the religious policies that Mawlay Sulayman had favoured.

Sulayman's reign was thus marked by religious concerns and troubles with Berber rebels. In both of these, some Sufi brotherhoods played important roles. Many important *ṭariqas* were favourable to the sultan, but among those that joined the political opposition were the Wazzaniyya and the new Darqawiyya orders. The Wazzaniyya was primarily a local and *sharifi* order, and supported the Fez rising primarily because the sultan had started to meddle in their internal affairs. The Darqawīs, a slightly

2 Rachid Abdalla El Nasser, 'Morocco: From Kharijism to Wahhabism: The quest for religious purity', Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan (1983), p. 326; and Vikør, *Sufi and scholar*, p. 38. This has sometimes been misquoted as 'Wahhabī in doctrine'.

3 Mansour, *Morocco*, pp. 132–7.

4 A. Green, 'A Tunisian reply to a Wahhabī proclamation: Texts and contexts', in A. H. Green (ed.), *In quest of an Islamic humanism: Arabic and Islamic studies in memory of Mohamed al Nowaihi* (Cairo, 1984), pp. 155–77.

non conformist order, linked up to and urged on the Berber revolts of 1811, while they on other occasions cooperated with the sultan.⁵

The regencies before the French invasion of Algiers

East of Morocco, the Ottomans' hold on power was mostly nominal in the 'regencies' of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. In Algiers, the real power had fallen to soldiers under the leadership of a *dey*, and based largely on the once profitable *jihad al baḥr*, piracy of European ships.⁶ In Tunisia, the Ḥusaynid dynasty of *beys* had ruled virtually independently from Istanbul since 1705, as had the Qaramanlis in Tripoli since 1711. By the end of the century, only the Ḥusaynids were still in place.

The Ottomans had made the region between Tunisia and Morocco into one province under Algiers, but its various parts were so socially and culturally diverse that it can hardly be called one 'country'. The western parts, with the centres of Oran, Mascara and Tlemcen, were influenced by Fez and Morocco, while the east with Constantine looked towards Tunis. The *dey's* government, mainly concerned with the sea, did not have all that much interest in the countryside anyway. They delegated to some tribes, known as *makhzan* ('state') tribes, the task of collecting the taxes and representing the rulers. But as the revenues from the 'sea jihad' dwindled in the course of the eighteenth century, the *dey* increased the tax burden on the interior, leading to unrest in several regions.

Several of these were organised or supported by new and activist Sufi orders based in Morocco. The most prominent was the Darqawiyya order, which led a revolt from Tlemcen in 1803.⁷ With the city besieged by the *dey's* army, the Darqawis suggested that the Tlemcen notables proclaim their allegiance to the Moroccan sultan. The sultan appeared to accept this, thus claiming Tlemcen as a part of Morocco. But not wanting to commit any forces to the claim, he settled with the *dey* and threw the Darqawī leader in

5 Bradford G. Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods in nineteenth century Africa* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 43–5; Vikør, *Sufi and scholar*, pp. 53–8; and Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and its interpretations in pre colonial Morocco: State society relations during the French conquest of Algeria* (London, 2002), pp. 44.

6 Raphael Danziger, *Abd al Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and internal consolidation* (New York, 1977), pp. 15–25; and Abun Nasr, *History*, pp. 164–8.

7 Ahmad b. Khalid al Naṣirī, *Kitab al Istiṣṣa li akhbar duwal al Maghrib al aqsa* (Casablanca, 1954–6), pp. 109–11; Mehdi Bouabdelli, 'Documents inédits sur la révolte des Derqâwa en Oranie', in J. Berque and D. Chevallier (eds.), *Les Arabes par leurs archives* (Paris, 1976), pp. 93–100.

prison for his role in the revolt. These revolts showed, however, how the *dey* system of rule was in an accelerating state of collapse.

The turn of the century thus saw the *dey* of Algiers in a weakened state. Neighbouring Tunis had at the same time regained its strength under Ḥammuda Bey (r. 1782–1814).⁸ He was able to throw off the subservience to Algiers that Tunisia had fallen under half a century earlier. However, the *dey* tried to reassert his power in 1807–8, invading Tunisia again, and the conflictual relations between the two regencies, at war with each other while formally both provinces under Istanbul, must be seen as one cause of Tunisia's reaction to the events in Algiers in 1830.

Ḥammuda Bey also put efforts into developing agriculture and a balanced economy, while expanding his army. However, after his death in 1814 the policies of internal development and restraint on expenditure were replaced with increased spending, heavier taxation and ensuing economic decline. At the same time, European powers began to seek a foothold in Tunisian affairs. Their primary concern was to combat the piracy business, which had, in any case, become less and less profitable for all Maghrebi states. The European consuls also strove to open Tunisian markets for European traders, getting rid of state monopolies. The *beys* that followed Ḥammuda accepted this in return for French support against their regional rivals.

In Tripolitania, the Qaramanlı dynasty was from 1793 led by Yusuf Qaramanlı, who was a strong and efficient leader.⁹ However, like their neighbours, the Qaramanlıs' control was not effective in the peripheral areas of their supposed territory. The eastern region of Cyrenaica was unsafe after a war between the great tribal confederations of the 'Awaqir and Maghariba in 1832. In the south, Fezzan on the edge of the Sahara had been independent under the Awlad Muḥammad dynasty for 300 years.¹⁰ But Yusuf Qaramanlı, wanting to extend his control over the trans-Saharan trade, supported a coup in 1812 that put one of his agents in power and brought Fezzan under his control.

There were also tribal risings in Tripolitania itself, led by the Awlad Sulayman tribe.¹¹ He defeated them in 1818, but they rose again in 1831 and

8 Abun Nasr, *History*, pp. 180–7.

9 Ettore Rossi, *Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania: Dalla conquista araba al 1911* (Rome, 1968), pp. 259–94; and Abun Nasr, *History*, pp. 196–205.

10 Rossi, *Storia*, pp. 267–8; Jean Claude Zeltner, *Tripoli: Carrefour de l'Europe et des pays du Tchad: 1500–1795* (Paris, 1992), pp. 126; and Knut S. Vikør, *The oasis of salt* (Bergen, 1999), pp. 217–19.

11 Dennis D. Cordell, 'The Awlad Sulayman of Libya and Chad: Power and adaptation in the Sahara and the Sahel', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 2 (1985), pp. 324–9.

moved into Fezzan, again wresting this region out of Tripoli's reach. These and other revolts in Tripolitania weakened the Qaramanlis' rule, while the British and other consuls gained influence. Istanbul finally decided that it was time to reassert its power. The Ottomans therefore mounted an attack on Tripoli in 1835, deposed the Qaramanlis and reintroduced direct control over Tripolitania.

In Cyrenaica, the Ottomans were also restricted to controlling the coastal towns, while the Awlad Sulayman remained a source of trouble in the south. The Ottomans therefore mounted an expedition to Fezzan in 1842 and expelled the tribe. They settled in the Kanem region on the southern edge of the Sahara, continuing to cause troubles for the trade.

‘Abd al-Qadir

The French invasion of Algiers in 1830 is most often seen as the beginning of the European quest for direct control over the Middle East and Africa, but it is probably better to view it as a punitive raid that went wrong.¹² It started as a quarrel over money, in which the *dey* slapped the French consul of Algiers and refused to apologise. Partly due to domestic politics, the French government mounted an expedition to show its strength, to which the *dey*'s forces made little resistance.

The French did not intend, however, to remain there longer than necessary, and approached various parties to whom they could hand over the rule. But none were willing to get involved, except for Algiers's traditional rivals in Tunis. The *bey* accepted the French overtures, and designated his son Muṣṭafa to become ruler of Constantine and the eastern parts of Algeria, and his grandson Aḥmad to take over Oran in the west.¹³ However, they soon discovered that the French had no authority in these areas and withdrew, leaving the *beys* of the previous regime in place.

In the west, there was another power that wanted to seize the moment. The border between Morocco and the Ottoman province had always been fluid, and the sultans had kept their eye on the border city of Tlemcen, as seen in the events of 1803–5 mentioned above. Now, in the chaos after the *dey*'s fall, they renewed the invitation, and Mawlay ‘Abd al Raḥman sent a force to take

12 Danziger, *Abd al Qadir*, pp. 36–50; Abun Nasr, *History*, pp. 248–63; Charles André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1979), vol. I, pp. 68–82; and Charles Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A history from 1830 to the present* (London 1991), pp. 5–12.

13 This is the same Aḥmad Bey who ruled Tunisia 1837–55, after his father Muṣṭafa Bey (1835–7) (see below).

possession.¹⁴ He was, however, unable to secure the town and withdrew after a short period. As they left, the Moroccans approached a local religious leader, Muḥyī 'l Dīn al Qadiri, and asked him to continue the struggle in their name. He accepted, and called on local tribes to raise a jihad. However, because of his age, he asked them to confer their *bay'a* (allegiance) on his son, 'Abd al Qadir (1807–83).

'Abd al Qadir was at twenty five still a young man. The basis for his claim to leadership was primarily his father's standing as the leader of the Qadiri Sufi order, which he had built in the region. However, the Qadiriyya did not have any strict organisation that could lead the jihad. It was only by transforming the legitimacy of piety into a political legitimacy based on their personal spiritual power that the two leaders could build a temporal challenge to the invaders.

Thus, 'Abd al Qadir could not base his organisation directly on any Sufi model; it was clearly a temporal political structure that he built. His main strength was always in the western regions of Algeria, of which he had been the recognised leader for fifteen years. But he was not a 'national' leader in a modern sense. As long as there was a Muslim *bey* in command in Constantine, he showed no ambition to rule 'Algeria'. Similarly, when he later moved into Morocco, both his supporters and opponents saw him as a credible candidate for its sultanate. His relations with the sultan were in fact ambiguous: he often accepted, as his father had done, that he was only the local agent of the Moroccan ruler, but could at the same time use the caliphal title *amir al mu'minin* to his local followers.

'Abd al Qadir's war alternated between periods of active conflict and interludes of peace with the French.¹⁵ This was in part due to his success on the battlefield, but it was primarily the result of French vacillation and uncertainty over what they were going to do with this new African possession. During the first decade the French applied a 'restrained occupation'. They were, like their Spanish predecessors, mainly interested in the coastal towns, primarily Algiers and Oran, and their immediate surroundings. The rest of the country was only of concern in so far as it could pose a threat to those areas. However, there were disagreements over this on the French side; some generals promoted a more aggressive policy, sometimes with and more often without approval from Paris.

¹⁴ Bennison, *Jihad*, pp. 48–58.

¹⁵ Danziger, *Abd al Qadir*, pp. 71–179; and Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, pp. 13–22.

After accepting the *bay'a* in 1832, 'Abd al Qadir quickly moved to take Mascara, which became his capital, and Tlemcen. He could then impose his authority over all the tribes of western Algeria. However, some previous *makhzan* tribes, such as the Dawa'ir, only accepted it grudgingly and took the first opportunity to throw it off.

The French commander accepted that he did not have enough men to face this new force, and instead signed a peace treaty with 'Abd al Qadir in 1834. The treaty was ambivalent, and parts of it were kept secret from Paris, but it in effect recognised 'Abd al Qadir's authority over the western half of Algeria. The east was still under control of the *bey* who claimed Ottoman suzerainty. 'Abd al Qadir recognised him as a fellow Muslim ruler, but could for this reason not accept the advances the French started to make towards Constantine. When the French commander at Oran also gave protection to the Dawa'ir and other previous *makhzan* tribes, hostilities were reopened in 1835.

'Abd al Qadir had used the peace to start building state structures in his area, including a new conventional army based on the Ottoman *nizami* model. However, it was soon apparent that this was no serious match for the French forces, which took both 'Abd al Qadir's capital of Mascara and Tlemcen. But their policy of 'restraint' was still in force, and they left almost immediately, allowing 'Abd al Qadir to return to his previous position. Rather than committing large forces to a permanent occupation, the French signed a new peace treaty with 'Abd al Qadir at Tafna in 1837, accepting his authority over an even greater expanse of western and central Algeria.

'Abd al Qadir clearly saw, however, that this was a temporary situation and that renewed conflict was inevitable. He used the time to consolidate his state and prepare for the coming war. He built an administration, based on regional divisions while maintaining the *makhzan* tribe system that was later taken over by the French. In 1839 the conflict with France erupted again. The French had taken Constantine in 1837, and 'Abd al Qadir gave notice that he considered any attempt to connect Constantine with Algiers as an act of war. When the French ignored him and sent a column to open the way between the two sectors, 'Abd al Qadir resumed the war. However, the French policy of restrained occupation had now ended. The same General Bugeaud who had signed the Tafna treaty now hit 'Abd al Qadir's regions hard, and occupied Mascara and Tlemcen in 1841–2, this time permanently. 'Abd al Qadir was forced into guerrilla warfare, and created a 'mobile capital' of tents, the *zmala*. The guerrilla war was effective, and the French were still not able to deal a final blow. But 'Abd al Qadir was forced on the defensive and in 1843 had to retreat across the border to Morocco, suddenly becoming an issue for the Moroccan sultan.

The relations between them had been ambivalent all the time since Muḥyī 'l Dīn had been invested by the sultan as his representative, while he and his son had at the same time in effect established an independent state in western Algeria. The sultan had supported 'Abd al Qadir's jihad, thus boosting his own popularity and legitimacy in Morocco. But the French started to put pressure on the sultan to end his material and moral support, and he soon found himself in a difficult dilemma: if he continued supporting 'Abd al Qadir he faced the danger of a French invasion, and if he made peace with France he risked popular insurrection.¹⁶

The sultan could postpone facing up to the dilemma as long as the jihad took place on the other side of the border. Once 'Abd al Qadir crossed into Morocco, however, it became pressing. 'Abd al Qadir's only hope at this point was to try to provoke the Moroccan army into action on his side. As he had considerable support in Morocco, in particular in the border areas, he succeeded in this, and skirmishes developed between Moroccan and French forces along the border.

The matter did not end well for Morocco. The French responded by bombing the ports of Tangier and Mogador, and sent an expeditionary force to occupy the border town of Oujda. In spite of inferior numbers, in 1844 they dealt the Moroccans a crushing defeat at the battle of Isly. This turned the tide for the sultan in several ways, one of which was that the alliance with 'Abd al Qadir, who moved back and forth across the border, was clearly becoming dangerous both for Morocco's independence and for the sultan's own rule.

The sultan therefore, after a period of mouthing passive sympathy, declared 'Abd al Qadir a rebel and started to put pressure on him to leave Morocco. But the situation in Algeria had become more and more precarious, and 'Abd al Qadir eventually had nowhere to go. Finally, the Moroccan army faced 'Abd al Qadir in battle. In spite of some victories, 'Abd al Qadir could not in the long run prevail against both the Moroccans and the French. Thus, in December 1847, caught between the two, he chose to surrender to France. After a period in a French prison, he settled in Damascus, where he lived out his life as a poet and religious scholar, in which he was equally proficient.

16 C. R. Pennel, *Morocco since 1830: A history* (London, 2000), pp. 41–3, 48–9; and Bennison, *Jihad*, pp. 99–131.

Algeria after the war: the two nations

Although the French only ‘stumbled into Algeria’¹⁷ and it took them a decade or more to establish a policy for the territory, the invasion came to set Algeria’s history apart from that of its neighbours for the rest of the century. While some Europeans later settled in all of these countries, only Algeria saw a large scale colonisation from Europe. While never amounting to more than perhaps one ninth of the total population of Algeria, the immigrant *colons* had by the end of the century become so numerous that they began to consider themselves almost a nation apart, a French Algeria that ferociously fought any attempt from Paris to undermine their interests. This primarily meant opposing any possible compromise with or improved status for the Muslim majority in the country.

After the policy of ‘restricted occupation’ was abolished at the end of the war with ‘Abd al Qadir, the French moved to take effective control of the country. In doing so, they had to face a number of revolts, some in the form of *mahdīs*, others by local secular or religious leaders.¹⁸ By this time, however, the French had built up sufficient military power that they did not pose serious threats. The unrest did, however, make necessary military control over these areas. Thus, until 1871 Algeria was divided into two parts: one was a ‘civilian’ zone, dominated by the *colons*, and in theory to be administered as a part of France (although Algeria did always have some separation in rules and taxation); the other, ‘military’, area was where the Muslims were in majority, and was for a long time administered through new institutions called the *bureaux arabes*. Although their main mission was to maintain security and keep the Muslims under control, these were in fact much more knowledgeable and sometimes even sympathetic, or at least aware, of Muslim concerns than were the *colons*. Thus, the military often came to be seen as protectors of Muslim judicial and social structures, albeit under European ultimate control.

This led to continuous conflicts between the military leaders and the *colons*, who distrusted and sabotaged their efforts. The central authorities in Paris tried to steer a middle course, and were therefore equally distrusted by the *colons*, in particular after Napoleon III’s unfortunate statement that Algeria was ‘after all, an Arab kingdom’. They did also initiate some political

17 Julia A. Clancy Smith, *Rebel and saint: Muslim notables, populist protest, colonial encounters (Algeria and Tunisia 1800–1904)* (Berkeley, 1994), p. 70.

18 Clancy Smith, *Rebel and saint*.

reforms, supported by the *bureaux arabes*, to help 'modernise' Muslim society and give Muslims status as French subjects (*senatus consultus* of 1863 and 1865).

In the end, however, after the French army's inglorious defeat by Germany in 1871, the *colons* prevailed. They used the occasion to have the division between civilian and military areas abolished and united the country under their control. This led to the rapid abolition of what remained of Muslim and pre colonial administrative structures. Giving the Muslims political rights in this unified Algeria was of course out of the question. Instead, new special laws for the 'natives' (*indigénat*) were introduced, largely depriving the Muslim inhabitants, under the pretence of rather vague security concerns, of any legal rights.

At the same time, the number of *colons* grew steadily, passing half a million in the 1890s. This went hand in hand with what can only be called a land grab of Muslim property. By the end of the century, the *colons* had acquired one and a half million hectares of Arab and Berber land, most of it after 1870.¹⁹ However, the majority of the European population was not rural, but urban. Algiers and Oran, in particular, developed into European towns. Arab urban culture largely disappeared, as did much of the social structure of the country side. The families of notables and *qa'ids* (local strongmen) melted away, local manufacture and urban trade dwindled to nothing. Both the legal structure and the traditional system of education were suppressed, while the few efforts Paris made to establish a new and modernised education for the Muslims were effectively sabotaged by the *colons*.

By the end of the century the old indigenous society was by and large reduced to nothing. The last major Muslim revolt took place in 1871, when the Kabyle Berber leader Muḥammad al Muqrani, formerly an ally of the French, tried to take advantage of the army's weakness after the Franco Prussian War to rebel.²⁰ This last effort also proved fruitless, but showed that the French attempts to drive a wedge between the Arab and Berber populations, considering the latter 'less Islamised' and more sympathetic to the Europeans, had failed. After this revolt, there were only small and marginal outbursts of resistance from the Muslims. Rather, it was the *colons* who created problems. They rose in an anti Semitic revolt in 1898, protesting against the naturalisation of the Jewish population and hinting at the need for an 'independent French Algeria'. Their greatest concern, however, was to block the social and political advance of the *évolués*, those Muslims who had managed to acquire education or held state jobs. But, as Muslims took part in the defence of France on the battlefields of the First

¹⁹ Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, pp. 59 and *passim*.

²⁰ Julien, *Histoire*, vol. I, pp. 475–93.

World War, their claims for extended rights became more difficult to ignore, however hard the *colons* tried to do just that.

Morocco: attempted reforms and European interference

The battle of Isly was a sharp reminder for Morocco that it had to face up to the European challenge. The sultan started to build a new *nizami* army, more than ten years after ‘Abd al Qadir had tried to do the same thing.²¹ However, the process went slowly. Although Morocco pursued internal reforms similar to those of Tunisia and Egypt, it did so later and with less vigour. Only after 1860 did it follow what the others had begun a generation earlier, and Morocco never really had anything comparable to the Ottoman Tanzimat programme before 1900.²²

The second decisive warning came in 1859–60. Domestic politics caused the Spanish government to make a raid on its traditional enemy, occupying the port city of Tetuan. The Moroccans were unable to stop them, but the British helped broker a deal in which Spain withdrew from Tetuan in return for a crippling indemnity and cession of an area in southern Morocco (later defined to be Sidi Ifni). This short war showed that Morocco could not stand up even to Spain, and that it had to rely on inter-European diplomacy to secure its interests. From this moment on, the European powers could and did regularly intervene in Morocco’s internal affairs. They supported the reform programme which the sultan eventually initiated, focusing on the army, taxation and administration. European instructors were imported to help train the army, but the reforms turned out to be too costly, and many of them were abandoned before they could have much effect. The Europeans were, however, particularly interested in opening up Morocco to its own traders. Earlier restrictions that limited Europeans to the towns of Tangier and Mogador were lifted, and European loans gave them increased influence over the sultan and his state.

An important consequence of the European presence was the rise of the *protégés*. These local partners of European traders were given special privileges under pressure from the European powers, and turned into an often untouchable upper class. Many of them played positive roles in promoting trade and economic activity, but the system was clearly also open to abuse, as

21 Abun Nasr, *History*, pp. 297–314; Abdallah Laroui, *Esquisses historiques* (Casablanca, 1992), pp. 50–62; and Pennel, *Morocco*, pp. 40–174.

22 Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial protest and resistance, 1860–1912* (Chicago, 1976), p. 50.

the Europeans were more interested in protecting the position of their local contacts than with checking any corruption they may have been party to.

After the 'Abd al Qadir crises, the positions of Mawlay 'Abd al Raḥman and his two successors Muḥammad (r. 1859–73) and Ḥasan (r. 1873–94) were not seriously endangered. The sultans developed links to local strongmen (*qa'ids*), who were given authority in the peripheral regions, particularly in the south, in return for loyalty to the state. Giving such power to tribal leaders, who often had a background of rebellion, had the potential to result in instability. However, the sultans, and in particular Mawlay Ḥasan, were able to play these *qa'ids* off against each other so that they did not constitute a threat. There were a number of smaller revolts in the north in the last decades of the century, but nothing that seriously threatened the regime.

After Mawlay Sulayman's time, the earlier tradition of internal Islamic reform died away in Morocco itself, while it was still to have an impact further east. But a different impulse of reform came from Egypt in the 1870s, inspired by Muḥammad 'Abduh and al Afghani. Scholars such as 'Abd Allah al Sanusi worked for their Salafi ideas, but met opposition as they were considered anti Sufi.²³ Sufi leaders were also active on their own. While the influential Wazzani *sharif* became a *protégé* of France, a new order, the Kattaniyya of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al Kabir al Kattani, started mobilising against the European reforms and for a stricter adhesion to the *shari'a*.²⁴

The attempts made by the state to promote internal reform came to a crisis point when sultan Mawlay Ḥasan died in 1894. His son 'Abd al 'Aziz (r. 1894–1908) was only a child, and for the first few years Morocco was ruled by Ḥasan's vizier, Ba Aḥmad. But after he died in 1900, the young sultan, although undoubtedly a serious reformer, came under increasing criticism for ostentation. Moreover, as he did not have his father's skill in handling the *qa'ids*, their rivalry and ambition started to have an effect. At the same time, Morocco was not able to meet its financial obligations to the European creditors, who demanded and were allowed greater influence over Morocco's economic life. Thus, Spanish and later French officials took control over Morocco's customs, and the economic decisions of the country were increasingly made by European powers.

23 Ibid., p. 37, Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830–1912)* (Casablanca 1993), p. 208; and Vikør, *Sufi and scholar*, p. 48n. Al Sanusi, no relation to either the Tunisian or the Cyrenaican of the same name, was forced to leave Morocco and only returned in 1900.

24 Burke, *Prelude*, pp. 77–80; Laroui, *Origines*, p. 102; and Pennel, *Morocco*, p. 131.

The main reason Morocco was still able to retain its independence throughout the century, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, was inter European rivalry. Both France and Britain had ambitions to control Morocco, and neither would let the other take over. However, after the signing of the *entente cordiale* in 1904, this rivalry was over. Britain 'ceded' Morocco to France, in return for getting a free hand in Egypt. From then on, it was only a matter of time and opportunity before European control was imposed.

Thus, Sultan 'Abd al 'Aziz was surrounded by European ambition, by increasingly unruly *qa'ids* in the south, and by popular protests against the financial problems and European high handedness. He had nowhere to go, and in 1907 a two pronged revolt against him broke out. On the one hand, anti French and anti reform forces were spurred on by al Kattani and supported by the 'ulama' of Fez, the perennial kingmakers. On the other, he was challenged by his brother Mawlay 'Abd al Ḥafiz in Marrakesh, supported by the local *qa'ids* in the region. After attacks on Europeans in the Casablanca area, French forces intervened and took direct control over the region, sparking general resistance. With support both from Marrakesh and Fez, the revolt of 'Abd al Ḥafiz gained ground, and the French were not able to prop up the reigning sultan. After losing several battles, 'Abd al 'Aziz abdicated, and 'Abd al Ḥafiz (r. 1908–12) entered the capital in triumph.

The new sultan soon found himself in the same situation as his predecessor. His power base was unstable, and he quickly dashed the hopes of any revolution against the reforms. Al Kattani was killed, and the *qa'id* families were soon at loggerheads. The French still controlled the state's finances, and in order to gain their recognition, the sultan had to accept the treaties that granted the Europeans their power. French forces remained in the Casablanca area and also at Oujda. So unrest continued and, although a new revolt in 1911 was easily defeated, in 1912 the French made the sultan sign a treaty granting them a protectorate. A few weeks later, they forced 'Abd al Ḥafiz to abdicate in favour of his brother Mawlay Yusuf (r. 1912–27).

The French thus allowed the sultan to continue as the formal head of state, but took direct control of the administration and economy. Their rule of Morocco turned out to be more direct than the protectorate of Tunisia, although it still took them some time to establish effective control over the territory. In particular the south was unruly. All sultans since Mawlay Hasan had supported the religio political role of the Faḍīlī Sufi shaykh Ma' al 'Aynayn (d. 1910), who was the sultan's *khalīfa* at his centre in Smara (today's

Western Sahara) and led the resistance against the French in Mauritania from 1903.²⁵ His son Hiba (Aḥmad Haybat Allah) raised a revolt against the protectorate from a basis in Marrakesh. The French were able to expel him from there, but the rebellion lasted in the far south until 1934.

While the French were taking control, another power moved in from the north. Spain had always considered the northern coast of Morocco as their area of interest. Mimicking the French, they declared a protectorate of their own over a strip of northern Morocco from the Atlantic coast to the Algerian border, with Tetuan, Ceuta and Melilla as the largest towns.

From reform to protectorate in Tunisia

For the *beys* in Tunis, the French arrival in Algeria at first provided a useful counterbalance to their formal masters in Istanbul, before they came to realise that the Europeans might be a greater nuisance than the Ottomans.²⁶ Thus, the policy of the *bey*, of always trying to balance the external powers against each other, went through two stages: first they allied with France against the Ottomans, and then later used their Ottoman connection as an attempt to stem the French advance.

Fear of the Ottomans grew in particular after the Turkish forces had retaken Tripoli and deposed the Qaramanlı dynasty in 1835. The *bey* was greatly concerned that he would be next. Thus, he made a point of supporting the Ottomans in their venture. When his son Aḥmad was to be invested as *bey* two years later, the Ottoman sultan requested that he pay an annual tribute to him. Aḥmad Bey politely refused this symbol of subservience, while professing his allegiance to the sultanate and the sultan. He also refused to introduce the new Tanzimat reforms in his domain, thus emphasising that Tunisia was as far as possible independent from Istanbul.²⁷ He was, however, very interested in modernisation that could give Tunisia its place among the powers of the day. So he started his own reform programme, focusing on building a *niẓamī* army. He spent large sums on it, inviting French instructors and equipping a considerable force. However, the amounts spent exceeded what he could afford, and after amassing debts and imposing crippling taxes to pay for them, he was forced to cut back and disband much of the army.

25 Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*, pp. 125–51; Laroui, *Esquisses historiques*, pp. 99–106; and Rahal Boubrik, *Saints et société en islam: La confrérie ouest saharienne Fāḍiliyya* (Paris, 1999), pp. 129–61.

26 Abun Nasr, *History*, pp. 272–97; and Lisa Anderson, *The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980* (Princeton 1986), pp. 66–104.

27 L. Carl Brown, *The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey* (Princeton, 1974), pp. 209–334.

Aḥmad's cousin and successor Muḥammad Bey (r. 1855–9) halted most of the reforms, but maintained the heavy taxes and was known mostly for his oppressive rule. The result was an increased pressure for reforms, not least from the European powers. In 1857 the sultan agreed to what was in effect a Tunisian version of the Tanzimat called the 'Security Pact', which among other things granted all residents equal rights to property, irrespective of religion. In 1861 his brother Muḥammad Ṣādiq Bey (r. 1859–82) signed what was the first constitution in any Muslim state.²⁸ This established an elected council which could, in theory, depose the *bey*, declare a separation of state from religion, and propose the creation of a secular criminal code. Due mainly to the *bey*'s lack of interest in politics, the real power came to be handed to the prime minister, the *mamluk* Muṣṭafa Khaznadar. This reform movement was short lived. In order to pay the growing debts, rural taxes were doubled, leading to a revolt which almost brought the *bey*'s government down. The revolt was used as an excuse to abolish the reforms; in 1864 the constitution itself was repealed on the demand of the French.

This development illustrates recurring themes in Tunisian history during the century. On the one hand, attempts at Westernising reforms, which were often short lived because they almost completely relied on the personal will of the *bey*. On the other, the strength of European influence, sometimes favouring certain reforms, but just as often blocking or sabotaging social and economic changes which could further Tunisian independence from the Europeans.

The major concern on both sides was the disastrous state of Tunisia's finances, always verging on the edge of bankruptcy due to the enormous debts owed to European creditors. Subject to French pressure, the *bey* established a commission that was granted wide powers to try to put the economy back on its feet. Khayr al Dīn Pasha (c. 1823–90), a former minister, was appointed to head the commission. The following period of Tunisian history has a clear hero and a dark villain. The villain was the prime minister, Muṣṭafa Khaznadar, the epitome of corruption. With the compliance of the *bey*, he almost wilfully destroyed the country's economy by contracting impossible foreign loans at exorbitant rates, raking in huge commissions for himself and apparently being concerned only with lining his own pockets. This was neither a new practice nor restricted to him; indeed, there was a class of corrupt politician businessmen which worked on the same principle: the *bey* allowed it and the European powers were willing agents in this

28 G. S. van Krieken, *Khayr al Dīn et la Tunisie (1850–1881)* (Leiden, 1976), p. 122.

destruction of Tunisia's finances. The hero was Khayr al Dīn, a true reformer. He had outlined his programme for emulating European successes within a Muslim framework in his book *Aqwam al masalik* (1869).²⁹ A *mamluk* himself, he was a man of the established system, promoted by Khaznadar and married to his daughter. It was only when Khayr al Dīn's commission sought to remove the prime minister's monopoly on finances that the two became enemies. Although the *bey* supported his prime minister, he could not resist the French pressure to sack him, and in 1873 Khaznadar was replaced by his son in law.

Khayr al Dīn's period as prime minister was short, only four years, but he set out to promote reforms in a number of areas. He strongly favoured education, reformed the Zaytuna University and created the new *Ṣādiqī* College, which came to provide Tunisia with its new modernising elite. He reorganised the *waqf* (here called *ḥubus*) institution, and started a reform of the provincial administration that did not, however, get very far. In the economic area, the main object was clearly to get rid of the country's crippling debts. Finances did not allow any policy of industrialisation, so the main efforts were to promote agriculture, not least by reducing the excessive taxes that hampered farmers, and to protect traditional manufacture.

France, which had initially supported Khayr al Dīn's modernising efforts, began to feel that some proposals were against its interest, such as abolishing consular privileges and introducing mixed courts on the Egyptian model. So, as bad harvests again put financial pressure on the government, they intrigued with Khayr al Dīn's enemies at court to have him removed, and *Ṣādiq* Bey, never an active reformer, sacked him in 1877, returning the country to the corrupt practices that had prevailed before. Thus, the chance for independent reform passed away. The French concluded that they must have direct control. In 1881 they used a minor tribal border skirmish as an excuse to send an army in from Algeria and marched on to Tunis, forcing the *bey* to accept their supremacy. This was formalised two years later as a protectorate. The south rebelled, but was fairly quickly defeated. The *Ḥusaynid* *beys* were maintained as formal rulers, but the French took over actual administration and continued a reform programme not unlike Khayr al Dīn's, including education, agriculture and economy, with the help of imported French technocrats.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 106–45.

The intellectual life of Tunisia was dominated by the Zaytuna ‘*ulama*’, who were with some exceptions opposed to the reforms.³⁰ A smaller group of scholars, such as Muḥammad al Sanūsī (d. 1900)³¹ and others, did, however, try to introduce the ideas of al Afghāmī and ‘Abduh into Tunisia, and played some role in the 1880s. They were mostly linked to the Ṣādiqī College Khayr al Dīn had established, and to the later Khalduniyya school movement, which became, in contrast to the Zaytuna, the focus of a modern Muslim education system in Tunisia. From an initial anti French attitude, al Sanūsī and many of the others came to cooperate with the new masters, who in turn favoured and supported the Khalduniyya and other modernising efforts.

Islamic resistance

From Morocco to Tunisia, Europe and in particular France were able to impose their will on the Muslim societies, either by military intervention followed by social transformation, as in Algeria, or by economic penetration followed by political control, as in Tunisia and Morocco. The established rulers were unable to check this advance, and the many locally based rebellions made little headway against the Europeans. But some forces of resistance did make an impact, and it is striking how many of these were in one way or another founded in religious traditions.

There was, however, no single Islamic pattern for the mobilisation. We can see different ‘models’ of Islamic political organisation in this period. Some times a political actor can use his own or his family’s renown for piety without drawing on a particular religious organisation or model. The prime example is ‘Abd al Qadir, who used his Sufi background to gain support, but not in his actual state building. Another model is where the religious and eschatological ideas are themselves militant and revolutionary, and the object of the pretender is simply to tap into them by convincing people that he plays the established role, that is as the *mahdī*. The power of Mahdism is explosive, but the risk of failure also overwhelming. There were scores of *mahdis* in North Africa during this century, but only one was successful; the rest disappeared without trace once their claims of invincibility were exposed as false.

30 Arnold H. Green, *The Tunisian ulama, 1873–1915: Social structure and response to ideological current* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 103–25.

31 Not to be confused with Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al Sanūsī, below, who was no relation.

In contrast to models which were inherently political, some movements that were initially pious and apolitical came to play a political role, sometimes long after they were established, and perhaps even against their own will. This we can find in a number of Sufi brotherhoods, many connected to Morocco, such as the Darqawiyya, the Wazzaniyya and even the quietist Tijaniyya. Another tradition which grew out of the reformist milieu in Fez in Sidi Muḥammad and Mawlay Sulayman's time but only became politically relevant much later and much further east, was that of the Moroccan Sufi Aḥmad b. Idris (1759–1837).³² This teacher had no interest in politics himself, and did not even form a proper order; instead, he taught students in Mecca and in the Yemen. He was, however, strongly concerned with religious and legal reform, like his colleagues in Fez eschewing '*madhhab* fanaticism' and promoting *ijtihād*. His importance is mainly displayed in the activities of his students. Three of them each formed a *ṭarīqa* of their own. In the Sudan, Muḥammad 'Uthman al Mīrghani founded the Khatmiyya, which soon became a major intellectual force. The brotherhood initially stayed clear of political activity, as Ibn Idris had done, but it was to take on a more political role in the twentieth century.³³

Nor did the order created by Muḥammad b. 'Alī al Sanūsī (1787–1859) have a political agenda.³⁴ Al Sanūsī was himself a scholar of Fez and deeply marked by the reformist ideas there, and he worked for *ijtihād* and the breaking down of *madhhab* borders. He settled among the Bedouins in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), and his order spread across the desert to Wadai and the Lake Chad regions. The Sanusis remained on good terms with the Ottomans, the formal masters of the region, and did not challenge the authority of the tribal leaders. Yet they provided a trans tribal identity which was used to spread learning and piety, but also to promote a very lucrative trans Saharan trade. However, the French, ill informed about the brotherhood, saw them as a militant threat and attacked their lodges in Kanem when in 1901 they invaded that area from the south.³⁵ This made the local tribes take up arms in the name of the order. The brotherhood itself was quite unprepared, but had thus in spite of itself become a focus of anti colonial resistance.

32 R. S. O'Fahey, *Enigmatic saint: Ahmad Ibn Idris and the Idrisi tradition* (London, 1990).

33 Ali Salih Karrar, *The Sufi brotherhoods in the Sudan* (London, 1992), pp. 49–72.

34 E. E. Evans Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 1–28; and Vikør, *Sufi and scholar*.

35 Jean Louis Triaud, *La légende noire de la Sanūsīyya: Une confrérie musulmane saharienne sous le regard français (1840–1930)* (Paris 1995), pp. 597–669.

The third and youngest of the leading students of Ibn Idris, Ibrahim al Rashid, stayed with al Sanusi for a while, but then moved on to the Sudan, where he established his own order, the Rashidiyya.³⁶ One offshoot became important in Somalia. This was the Shalihiyya order, which started organising from the 1880s in the north and centre of the country. It was to play a significant role at the onset of colonialism.

Why did these religious traditions play a political role in some cases, and not in others? It would seem that the Islamic models would most often arise when there was a political vacuum, either because the established states collapsed or were swept away by foreign invasions. Religious leaders or organisations that were independent of the fallen state could then provide a framework or a pole for uniting society, or could be pressed into this role by force of circumstance. The role of the apolitical brotherhoods of the Idrisi tradition is striking here. Clearly, their reformist religious ideas emphasised their independence from the established order. But it was probably even more important that these new orders were far better organised and structured than many of the older ones, and thus more apt to play such a politicised role, at least in a period of transition.

From Tripolitania to Libya

While the Sanusiyya was thus the closest thing to a unifying force in Cyrenaica, Ottoman power was dominant in Tripolitania. Here, they strove to introduce the Tanzimat reforms, but the main wealth of the region was in the trans Saharan trade, which in the course of the century came to move from the Awlad Sulayman infested regions of central Sahara to the east, where the Sanusi could guarantee peaceful trade.

Italy was the last European power to establish itself in North Africa, but it had several times during the century indicated its interest in both Tunisia and Tripolitania. When the Italians finally decided to act towards the latter region, it was in part from of a sense of national honour, not to fall behind their European partners, but also because of increasing fears of German interests in the Mediterranean.³⁷ In October 1911, then, they landed forces in Tripoli. The Ottomans under Enver Paşa resisted, but the pressures of the Balkan wars forced them to withdraw from the province the following year. They did, however, leave behind instructors and try to aid the local resistance

36 O'Fahey, *Enigmatic saint*, pp. 154–69; and Mark Sedgwick, *Saints and sons: The making and remaking of the Rashidi Ahmadi Sufi order, 1799–2000* (Leiden, 2005).

37 Anderson, *State and social transformation*, pp. 87–95; and Abun Nasr, *History*, pp. 318–23.

to Italy. In Tripolitania, the resistance was led in particular by Sulayman al Baruni, an Ibadī notable,³⁸ but was unable to defeat the Italian forces. It was, instead, the eastern province of Cyrenaica, united with Tripolitania in the Italian mind into 'Libya', that put up the strongest resistance.

The Sanusīs were not prepared for a struggle, but the example of the war in southern Sahara ten years earlier made local leaders approach the Sanusī leader Aḥmad al Sharīf, a noted scholar, and ask him to take up the resistance. The order's council argued against it, but al Sharīf made the decision to take on the jihad. With the aid of the Turkish officers who had been left behind, training camps were set up to create an effective guerrilla force from the Cyrenaican tribes. The Italians, while they held on to Tripolitania, were not able to subdue this desert side resistance led by the Sanusīs. In 1914 they were forced out of the Fezzan by a Sanusī force, and Cyrenaica became impene- trable to them. However, as the First World War developed, al Sharīf made the strategic mistake of following Ottoman and German advice to attack western Egypt in 1916. This brought the British into the conflict, and they easily defeated the Sanusī force. But they did not wish to involve themselves in Libya, and settled for the deposition of al Sharīf. Leadership of the order went to his cousin, Muḥammad Idrīs, who came to terms with Britain. After the war ended, Italy also accepted that it could not defeat the Sanusīs, and a British brokered truce, which recognised Sanusī temporal power in Cyrenaica, was settled in Acroma in 1917. The following year, a short lived republic – the first in an Arab country – was proclaimed in Tripolitania. Only when the Fascists took power did they take up the war again in 1923, and finally defeat the Sanusīs in 1931.

The Sudan

The Turkiyya

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the regions upstream of Egypt along the Nile had for some centuries been under the control of the Funj kingdom. As Muḥammad 'Alī took power in Egypt, however, some of his *mamluk* enemies had settled in regions which the Funj no longer had the strength to control. To remove this danger, Muḥammad 'Alī invaded the

³⁸ Anderson, *State and social transformation*, pp. 125–31, 203–21; and Ali A. Ahmida, *The making of modern Libya: State formation, colonization and resistance, 1830–1932* (Albany, 1994), pp. 117–32.

south and in 1820 it occupied the Funj kingdom.³⁹ This started a period of foreign control known locally as the 'Turkiyya' period. Although it was one Muslim state occupying another, the process and effect was not much different from the colonialism of the Europeans. Besides political aims, Muḥammad 'Alī primarily wanted to extract as much revenue as possible from the conquered domains: slaves, gold, ivory and other goods as well as heavy taxes.⁴⁰ He also wanted to find a source of soldiers for his new army. The Egyptian Ottoman rule was felt and carried out as a military occupation by a foreign power, but as in the later European occupation, it also entailed the introduction of new social structures that heralded modernisation, although not all of them were consistent or successful.

It was in this period that the regions we now know as 'the Sudan' first came under one rule. But the unification was not easily achieved. The Egyptian forces could in the early period only control the northern parts of the Nile Valley which had belonged to the Funj. The south was beyond their reach. They were able to conquer Kordofan to the west, but the Darfur kingdom further west was untouched, and attempts to move into the eastern districts controlled by the Beja met with little success.⁴¹

The sixty years of 'Turkish' rule fall primarily into two. After the initial period of occupation, the country saw the imposition of new administrative structures in a fairly competent manner by the two governors 'Alī Khurshid (1826–38) and Aḥmad Abu Widhan (1838–43). Then Cairo intervened directly, and there followed a period of ambitious but less efficient administration, which caused increasing dissatisfaction among the people. The social and economic model for the new rule was that of the Tanzimat which was being implemented in Egypt. Khartoum was founded in the 1820s and made the capital. New legal systems were introduced, and the *shari'a* courts, previously mainly urban in scope, were to be extended to the countryside. Economically, the Egyptian period was also one of early modernisation. Agricultural reforms were tried, but with limited success.⁴² Transport was improved particularly along the Nile, and the European presence grew in the country. One point of conflict here was the continuity of the slave trade. European anti slavery campaigners faced local elites that had based their

39 P. M. Holt, *A modern history of the Sudan: From the Funj sultanate to the present day* (London, 1977), pp. 35–76.

40 Neil McHugh, *Holyman of the Blue Nile* (Evanston, 1994), pp. 147–66.

41 R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan* (London, 1974), pp. 171–9.

42 Anders Bjørkelo, *Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and traders in the Shendi region, 1821–1885* (Cambridge 1989), pp. 53–81.

wealth on the trade, which had been one motive for the Egyptian occupation, but which they now tried to combat.

This growing prosperity in the middle of the century also allowed an expansion of rule geographically. The Egyptian forces moved southwards beyond the Muslim area and in the 1860s and 1870s gained control over much of what today is known as southern Sudan. In 1874, Zubayr Pasha, a northern slave trader who had created a statelet of his own in Baḥr al Ghazzal in the south west led a force northwards into Darfur, and was able to topple the kingdom there. These regions then also fell under the formal control of Khartoum. At the same time, 'Turkish' that is, Ottoman Egyptian rule started to take on a more European flavour. In parallel with increasing European influence in Cairo, more and more British were employed by the Egyptians for service in the Sudan, both in administration and to lead the army. Thus, an Englishman, Charles Gordon, was appointed 'Egyptian' governor of the Sudan from 1877 until 1880.

The Mahdiyya

Much of the population resented what they felt to be an occupation of foreigners, be they 'Turks' or Europeans. There were, however, few established structures which could take on the burden of organised revolt. The traditional elites were divided locally, and there was no 'national' identity. The answer had to be found in what all the various regions had in common: Islam. But, again, the '*ulama*' were not organised for revolt, and the Sufi orders mostly too integrated with local religious and social elites to be able to present a country wide appeal. Instead, it had to come from a new religio political force which was free from the restraints of the established order: This was Muḥammad Aḥmad (1844–85) who in 1881, from a base on Aba Island on the White Nile, proclaimed himself to be the expected *mahdī* and raised the banner of revolt.⁴³

He did not come out of nowhere, however. Muḥammad Aḥmad had a background in one of the smaller Sufi orders in the Sudan, the Sammaniyya, which he had left when he came out of his contemplative withdrawal to claim *mahdī* hood. As an incarnation of this semi divine figure, he had an authority far beyond that of a Sufi shaykh. He was in direct communication with God, and could and did proclaim laws and make decisions contrary to the *shari'a*,

43 P. M. Holt, *The Mahdist state in the Sudan, 1881–1898: A study of its origins, development and overthrow* (Oxford, 1958); and Holt, *Modern history*, pp. 77–91.

because his status was only surpassed by that of the Prophet himself. Those who followed him had divine protection, and he was assured of victory.

A *mahdī* must prove himself by winning in battle. Muḥammad Aḥmad was able to do this. He acquired the support of the western Baqqara and northern Ja'aliyīn tribes, and with the help of these *anṣār* (helpers) defeated Khartoum's attempts to stop him. He moved on to the province of Kordofan, accompanied by many local revolts which stretched Khartoum's forces. The regional capital, al Ubayyid, was taken after a long siege in early 1883, and later in the same year, the *anṣār* won a huge victory over an army led by the English general Hicks at Shaykhan.

This was the final proof of Muḥammad Aḥmad's claim to *mahdī* hood, and revolts broke out everywhere. The following year, he was therefore able to advance on Khartoum and lay siege to it. It was defended by General Gordon, who had returned to the Sudan, but the attempt to relieve the besieged town came too late, and in January 1885 Khartoum fell and the Mahdī was master of the Sudan. However, he could not savour the victory for long. Soon afterwards, in June that year, after moving the capital to nearby Omdurman, he died of natural causes.

The task of consolidating the Mahdist victory fell to his oldest and closest lieutenant, the Khalīfa, 'Abd Allāhi. During his revolt, the Mahdī had already started the construction of a new state, based on his own exalted religious status. It used some religious models, so he appointed four *khalfas* to help him ('Abd Allāhi being the foremost of these). But it was also 'modern', shown not least in the enormous amount of written documentation that it left behind.⁴⁴ The Khalīfa could not claim the Mahdī's religious status, but continued the construction of a temporal state. He developed an administrative and financial structure, including a ministry of finance.⁴⁵ He did, however, also have to protect himself from external and internal enemies. The Mahdī's relatives, the *ashraf*, wanted one of their own to succeed the Mahdī, and revolted in 1891. Several risings in Darfur were quelled, but the Khalīfa's use of his own tribe, the Ṭa'aisha, in the running of the northern Sudan caused unrest. While the northern front against the British of Egypt was for a while quiet, there was an open conflict with Ethiopia from 1887.

44 The documents made in the Mahdī's lifetime alone have been collected in seven volumes by M. I. Abu Salīm: *al Athar al kamila li'l imam al Mahdī* (Khartoum, 1990–4).

45 Ahmad Ibrahim Abu Shouk and Anders Bjørkelo, *The public treasury of the Muslims: Monthly budgets of the Mahdist state in the Sudan* (Leiden, 1996).

The stalemate with British controlled Egypt was not to last. In the final years of the century, the British started to advance, and took the northern towns of Dongola and Berber in 1897. After their continued progress, the final battle was fought at Kararı the following year, and ended in a British victory. Still, the Mahdist state lasted for thirteen years, and while the 'Sudan' as we know it was largely a creation of the Turkiyya period, the Mahdists helped give at least the Muslim parts of it a sense of unity. The conquest was not yet complete, however. In the west a local ruler called 'Alī Dīnār had used the Mahdist collapse to set himself up as a local sultan, and stayed in power for almost two decades; only when he was deposed in 1916 could the British Egyptian forces claim to control all of the Mahdī's domains.⁴⁶

As Egypt was under British control, a new structure called 'shared power', or Anglo Egyptian condominium, was created for the Sudan. However, it was in effect ruled as a British colony, with only minimal input from the Egyptian side. The continuity from the pre colonial period was, however, clear in the political forces that grew up under the British. Of the two major political parties, one was based on the former supporters of the Mahdī, the *anṣār*, and led by his descendants; the other on the Khatmīyya brotherhood, which had been suppressed under the Mahdī, but grew to new prosperity under the new rulers.

Somalia

At the same time as they occupied the Sudan, the Egyptians also expanded, on behalf of the Ottomans, their interests in some of the trading posts which were dotted along the Red Sea coast, down to the Horn of Africa. Among them were the important and traditional ports of Berbera and Zeila. The British, well established across the strait in Aden, also had a keen interest in what took place in these towns, and raised a protest when in 1869 Egypt made a formal claim to Berbera, Zeila and other towns in this region.⁴⁷ However, an agreement was reached that allowed the Egyptians to take control. Neither the British nor the Egyptians had much interest, however, in the inland areas, as long as they did not affect the activities in the ports. The northern regions of today's Somalia were by the middle of the nineteenth century dominated by an alliance of the Darod and Galla peoples. To their

⁴⁶ R. S. O'Fahey, *State and society in Dar Fur* (London, 1980), pp. 12–13.

⁴⁷ I. M. Lewis, *A modern history of Somalia* (London, 1980), pp. 40–2.

south and east, at the tip of the Horn, the Majerteen sultanate was the dominant force.

The southern parts of the Somali region were dotted with various trading towns known collectively as the Benadir ports. The most important of these were Mogadishu and Brava.⁴⁸ They were also nominally subject to external powers, in this case Oman, which extended its East African interest to control the Benadir towns. A British intervention had 'freed' the towns from Omani control in the 1820, but later the suzerainty of the Omani sultan at Zanzibar over them was recognised, until he 'rented' them out to Italy in 1892 and they took full control in 1905.

As in the north, the inland regions of the south mostly maintained their traditional political structures. The nineteenth century also saw an Islamic mobilisation, and particularly prominent were the establishment and extension of religiously based agricultural communities. Some of these were formed by Sufi brotherhoods, such as the Qadiriyya, Aḥmadiyya and others. In the 1830s, a community known as the Berdera (Baardhere) also raised a jihad in the regions north west of Brava. This struggle to purify Islam was directed against local practices, but also against outside, non Muslim powers, such as the non Muslim rulers of Ethiopia, always neighbours to be reckoned with for Somalis. Sufism also established a solid foothold in the coastal towns, in particular Brava, where Uways al Barawī (1847–1909) became a dominant figure in the spread of his own branch of the Qadiriyya all over East Africa.⁴⁹ Brava was for a long time an important intellectual centre for East African Islam.

Muḥammad 'Abd Allah Ḥasan and the British

The last of the nineteenth century Sufi resistance leaders, the *sayyid* Muḥammad 'Abd Allah Ḥasan (1864–1920), was initiated into the Ṣaliḥiyya order in 1895.⁵⁰ This order belonged to the Idrīsī tradition of structured but apolitical orders. The *sayyid* started, however, agitating against non *shar'ī* behaviour, including

48 Lee V. Cassanelli, *The shaping of Somali society: Reconstructing the history of a pastoral people, 1600–1900* (Philadelphia, 1982), pp. 147–83; and Scott S. Reese, *Renewers of the age: Holy men and social discourse in colonial Benaadir* (Leiden, 2008).

49 Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*, pp. 152–76; and Said S. Samatar, 'Sheikh Uways Muhammad of Baraawe, 1847–1909: Mystic and reformer in East Africa', in Said S. Samatar (ed.), *In the shadow of conquest: Islam in colonial Northeast Africa* (Trenton, NJ, 1992), pp. 48–74.

50 Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*, pp. 177–201; Enrico Cerulli, *Somalia: Scritti vari editi ed inediti*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1957), pp. 189–90; Lewis, *Modern history*, pp. 65–85; and I. M. Lewis, *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a clan based society* (Lawrenceville, NJ, 1998), pp. 35–8.

the use of tobacco, as well as grave worship, once he returned to Somalia. He also started expanding the order, which soon became the largest challenger to the predominance of the Qadiriyya. The two became bitter rivals, as were the *sayyid* and the Qadiri leader Uways al Barawi.

‘Abd Allah Ḥasan formed a mosque community in northern Somalia. He soon showed defiance against the British, and in 1899 proclaimed a jihad against the infidels, both the British and the Ethiopians, but also attacked rival Muslim leaders, including those of the Aḥmadiyya and Qadiriyya orders. The following year he had his first clash with Ethiopian forces in Ogaden. When the British responded to the threats in 1901, guerrilla warfare started that lasted until 1904. The British were more concerned with protecting Aden than with the Somali interior, so the *sayyid* was able to hold his own, but he was increasingly weakened by the battles. Thus, both sides had an interest in a settlement, and a peace agreement was reached at Illig in 1905. This allowed ‘Abd Allah Ḥasan to withdraw to a region inside a sector that Italy claimed, but did not control, on the borders of the Majerteen sultanate. In reality, the powers thus acknowledged that the *sayyid* could establish his own statelet there.

The *sayyid*’s main area of activity was in the north and centre of Somalia, but he also had supporters in the south, although the Benadir ports, where the Qadiriyya rivals were dominant, largely remained closed to him.⁵¹ What role the Sufi background really played in his jihad, may be discussed. He was never the sole leader of the Ṣāliḥiyya in Somalia, and many brethren opposed his war; they even made Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ in Mecca disown him in 1908. But at the same time it is evident that he saw his activity as a way to extend the Ṣāliḥiyya, and his attacks on rival orders and on visiting graves shows that his jihad had both Sufi and political aims. It should also be added that he was an accomplished poet, in particular in the Somali language.

The peace with Britain and Italy held for four years, until 1908. However, although the *sayyid* had now lost the support of some followers, the British were still not able to strike a decisive blow against him, and the guerrilla war dragged on for several years. Some local tribes also came to see the *sayyid* as a rival to their position and turned against him. He was forced to flee and his position was weakened over time, but he kept the jihad going until December 1920, when he finally died of natural causes, and resistance to British and Italian rule died with him.

⁵¹ Cassanelli, *Shaping*, pp. 240–51.

Arabia to the end of the First World War

PAUL DRESCH

Arabia is important to many literatures. Through the nineteenth century, however, its spatial divisions faced mainly outwards: the Hijaz towards both Egypt and the Ottoman centre; Najd towards Iraq; Oman and Hadramawt towards Indian Ocean worlds. There was little immediate feeling of shared experience. Nor did foreign empires, which elsewhere provoked such feelings, usually show interest in direct control. Hadramawt's graves and genealogies, meanwhile, were the moral centre of connections reaching India and Java; East African Muslims looked also to Oman. Across much of Eurasia were names from the Hijaz and Yemen dating to the age of conquest. As the world came increasingly under Western dominance Arabia seemed the great exception, and by the late nineteenth century printed forms in Mecca allowed pilgrims to take Arabian names that attached them to the cradle of Islam.¹

The general setting

Yemen, thanks to a few of its specific regions, possessed agriculture sufficient for its needs. Oman had both African and Indian trading spheres. Najd and al Qaşım shunned outsiders, yet the *Lam' al shihab* (1817) depicts the men as living decades abroad while the women showed an appetite for imported textiles.² The great pilgrim caravans traversed north and central Arabia: rulers taxed these, as they did traders, and the Bedouin robbed them or extorted protection money, encouraging authors to write as if all Arabia were nomads. In central Arabia, as in Yemen or Oman, most people (including many tribes folk) were farmers, not mobile pastoralists. But Arabia was poor, and chronicles often mention famine.

1 C. S. Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter part of the 19th century* (Leiden and London, 1931), pp. 236–7.

2 A. M. Abu Ḥakima (ed.), *Lam' al shihab fī sirat Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al Wahhab* (Beirut, 1967), pp. 175, 180, 183–4.

A significant Jewish population lived in Yemen, paying *jizya* to tribal protectors or to government; a few *banyan*, or non Muslim Indian traders, were tolerated in Yemen and Oman; and 'Christian' (European) travellers occasionally passed through the hinterland. Life was felt to be Islamic not least because non Muslims were absent or controlled. Themes of more localised identity recur also. In Mecca, wherever husbands went, Meccan born women claimed a right to remain in the Holy City, and Guarmani's account of Jabal Shammar (near Ḥa'il) reveals the same logic:

The inhabitants of the Gabal willingly give their daughters in marriage to strangers (even though these may be the simplest of travellers), taking them back when their 'husbands' leave, on the condition that should the latter not return within a given period they must consider themselves divorced.³

Although exceptions are found empirically, the moral rule was that males engaged with abroad (where they might be inhabitants of several places) and females were identified with home. Descent and marriage express what Ho calls 'a resolute localism'.⁴ Cultural expression is everywhere a mass of names, stories and forms of dress; political expression is a plethora of emirates, which makes Arabia's usual history a list of 'petty wars and intestine broils'.⁵

Tribes (*qaba'il* or '*asha'ir*') were important in most regions. Much analysis has been incautious, but the crux of tribalism is a simple assumption that people are related of their nature; divisions among them are God given, and relatedness implies responsibility. The implication may be rejected: tribes are not solidary groups. Appeals to tribalism, however, had often a distinctive flavour. The 'Ujman of Najd, in 1860, were thus urged on by maidens in embellished camel litters; an Omani tribe, around 1870 (very much the age of firearms), said archaically, 'Our judge is the sword blades of India and straight lances'.⁶ In Yemen urban centres of learning were supplemented by *hijras*, enclaves under tribal protection, identified with learned families. In

3 C. Guarmani, *Northern Najd: A journey from Jerusalem to Anaiza in Qasim*, trans. Lady Capel Cure (London, 1938), p. 57; cf. Hurgonje, *Mekka*, p. 88.

4 E. Ho, *The graves of Tarim: Genealogy and mobility across the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley, 2006), pp. 63 ff.

5 Badger's introduction to Ibn Ruzayq, *History of the imâms and sayyids of Omân*, ed. and trans. G. P. Badger (London, 1871); for local identities, A. al Fahad, 'The 'imama vs. the 'iqal: Hadari Bedouin conflict and the formation of the Saudi state', in M. Al Rasheed and R. Vitalis (eds.), *Counter narratives: History, contemporary society and politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen* (New York, 2004), pp. 39–40.

6 A. Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia* (London, 2000), p. 181; A. H. al Salimi, *Tuhfat al a'yan bi sirat ahl 'uman*, ed. Ibrahim Atfayyish, 2 vols. in 1 (Cairo, 1961), vol. I, p. 253.

Hadramawt, similarly, there were protected *hawṭas*. Tribal law existed, which in Yemen was condemned by the learned as *ṭaghut* (un Islamic).

In Oman there was a conspicuous division between the Hinawī and Ghafirī tribes, and failure to unify under learned persons was condemned as clan nishness (*‘aṣabiyya*). Most Omani *‘ulama’* themselves claimed tribal genealogies, however. In the settlements of Najd the leading families shared tribal identities with the nomads around them, and dominant groups along the Gulf littoral claimed descent from tribes inland.⁷ Even where tribes and towns stood conceptually opposed, in the Hijaz, some townsmen would dress as Bedouin on a saint’s day, and princely families had their sons raised by desert tribes.⁸ A Basran author in 1869 claimed his town showed tribal and ‘Arab’ virtue, for ‘the stranger is honoured among them, and the guest respected’.⁹ It is important to note who was excluded from such moral systems.

A striking feature of Najd and the Hijaz is the detestation shown Ithna ‘Asharī Shī‘ites. Cursing them from the pulpit at Mecca dates from the mid eighteenth century Ottoman Persian wars, and suspicions that *al rafīḍa* (those ‘refusing’ the early caliphs) cursed among themselves companions of the Prophet gave an edge to prejudice. Yet there were (Shī‘ī) Zaydis who, favouring ‘Alī, cursed even Abu Bakr, and Zaydis did not suffer systematic loathing; as great a doctrinal difference existed with Ibaḍīs, who discounted both ‘Alī and ‘Uthman, but at Mecca Ibaḍī visitors passed unremarked.¹⁰ Often, unhistorically, Ithna ‘Asharis were associated with the *‘ajam* (Persians), distinguished by dress and language. Africans, meanwhile, were called *zunuj* or *‘abid* on account of skin colour; ‘Christians’ (i.e. Europeans) and Turks were viewed with distaste ‘because their skins are fair, and their beards long, and because their customs seem extraordinary’.¹¹

The British, the ‘Christians’ immediately at issue, bombarded Ra’s al Khayma in 1809 and 1819. In 1820 they imposed a maritime truce on the

7 Al Fahad, ‘The *‘imama’*’, p. 39; M. al Nabhami, *al Tuhfa al nabhaniyya fī tarikh al jazira al ‘arabiyya* (Beirut and Bahrain, 1986), p. 81.

8 Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 43; I. Rif‘at Pasha, *Mir‘at al Ḥaramayn*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1925), vol. I, p. 203.

9 I. F. al Ḥaydarī, *‘Unwan al majd fī bayan aḥwal Baghdad wa ‘l Baṣra wa Najd* (Baghdad, 1962), p. 162.

10 B. Haykel, *Revival and reform in Islam: The legacy of Muhammad al Shawkani* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 148–9, 160, 167–9; A. Z. Daḥlān, [*Khulāṣat al kalam fī bayan*] *Umara’ al balad al ḥaram mundhu awwalihim fī ‘ahd al rasul ḥatta ‘l sharīf al Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī* (Beirut, n.d.), p. 299 (henceforth *Khulāṣa*).

11 J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys*, 2 vols. (London, 1930), vol. I, p. 283, cf. Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 39.

Gulf, which fixed in place ruling families; in 1839 they seized Aden.¹² They receive little attention in local sources, however. They controlled certain ports, and otherwise aimed to limit influence by other powers. Through the eighteenth century (Turkish) Ottoman concerns with the Hijaz had been similar. Ottoman suzerainty extended to Jiddah, while beyond this, despite the importance of the Holy Places, the *amir* of Mecca was autonomous. At the turn of the new century, however, the Wahhabis of Najd appeared in Iraq, Oman, Yemen and the Hijaz. Their pillage of Karbala' and massacre of its people in 1802 was a shock to the Muslim world (an Ottoman massacre in 1843 receives less notice); in 1803 they took Mecca and in 1807 rejected the state sponsored pilgrim caravans from Egypt and Syria. The Ottomans dispatched their then vassal Muḥammad 'Alī of Egypt, whose troops retook Medina and Mecca in 1812–13, and in 1818 destroyed the Sa'udī/Wahhabi capital of al Dir'iyya. Egypt retained the Hijaz until 1840.

Confessional groups and dynasties

The Ottomans, re-established from 1841, maintained an ecumenical regime in the Holy Cities.¹³ Each Sunnī *madhhab* was allotted a face of the Ka'ba for its prayers; there would ideally be four *muftis* in both Medina and Mecca; there were multiple judges, *imams* and preachers; and the '*ulama*' of each Holy City had their shaykh. From about 1869 the position at Mecca was held by Aḥmad Zaynī Daḥlān (1817–86), the Shafī'ī *muftī*, whose contacts with Muslims abroad were numerous. At Mecca and Medina the four schools interacted freely. Elsewhere Ḥanafīs were identified with Ottoman officialdom and with parts of India, but in Arabia were not much localised (the Shammar near Ḥa'il and the Ḥarb are exceptions); Ḥanbalīs were associated with Najd, Shafī'īs dominated western and southern Arabia, and Malikīs were conspicuous in the east. In Bahrain Shaykh Muḥammad Khalīfa (r. 1843–68) had around him famous Malikī '*ulama*', but also Ḥanbalīs and a few Shafī'īs, of whom one became chief *qaḍī*.¹⁴ Sunnī political divisions obscure a world of Shī'ī learning

12 R. J. Gavin, *Aden under British rule 1839–1967* (London, 1975) provides a good account of British strategic concerns throughout the period.

13 W. Ochsenwald, *Religion, society and the state in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman control 1840–1908* (Columbus, 1984); A. M. Abu 'l Khayr, *al Mukhtaṣar min kitāb nashr al nawr wa 'l zahr fī tarajim afaḍil Makka*, ed. Muḥammad al 'Amūdī and Aḥmad 'Alī, 2 vols. (al Ṭa'if, 1978).

14 Al Nabhanī, *Tuhfa*, p. 112; cf. *ibid.*, p. 143 for the pattern under 'Isa 'Alī (r. 1869–1923).

that covered eastern Arabia.¹⁵ Beyond the 'four schools' and the Ithna 'Asharis, meanwhile, were three important *madhhabs*.

Zaydis dominated Yemen, and rule was reserved to *sayyids*, the Prophet's kin. Interaction with (Sunni) Shafi'is had changed the Zaydi imamate, and a movement of 'renewal' associated with Muḥammad al Shawkanī (d. 1834) affected both *fiqh* and governance; the imamate itself had survived since the ninth century, however, and would later fascinate reformers elsewhere. Ibaḍis in Oman claimed a still longer presence, tracing themselves to the aftermath of the Kharijī schism.¹⁶ Al Kharuṣī claimed (misleadingly) in the 1840s that all of Oman was once Ibaḍī except for people in the sea ports; when Wahhabism came, it attracted 'many ignorant "Arabs" living in the wilderness'.¹⁷ The Wahhabis, according to him, are 'a recent *madhhab*, not from old times'. The Wahhabī/Sa'udī domain, the third main grouping, often included al Aḥsa' (with a large Shī'ī population, plus Sunnis of many schools) and usually al Qaṣīm (mainly Ḥanbalī), which demand separate histories.¹⁸ Though Wahhabī activity provides a unifying thread among Arabian events, its core remained the area near Riyadh and al Dir'iyya.¹⁹

Learned Ḥanbalis fled central Arabia for Basra, al Zubayr, Baghdad and Syria.²⁰ The area from Basra into southern Iraq was predominantly Sunni until perhaps mid century: conversion to Shī'ism accompanied Indian funded canals to Najaf and extensive new settlement, the camel herding tribes remaining Sunni. But many confessions were stable geographically. A common form is thus 'the Najdī' or 'the Yemeni'. And events can look different according to where they are viewed from. When Sa'ud and 'Abd Allah fought for leadership of the Wahhabī state in the 1860s, the former went to Najran and sought help from al Makramī, which from Najd appears simply the man's name; in Yemeni sources, however, the Makarima are conspicuous as Isma'īlis, in Najran and to the west of Ṣan'a', and it is hard to imagine what

15 A. H. al Baḥranī, *Anwar al badrayn fī tarajim 'ulama' al Qaṭīf wa 'l Aḥsa' wa 'l Baḥrayn* (Najaf, 1960).

16 J. C. Wilkinson, *The Imamate tradition in Oman* (Cambridge, 1987).

17 N. al Kharuṣī, 'Sira fī masa'il shatta', in J. K. al Sa'dī (ed.), *Qamus al shan'a* (Muscat, 1983), vol. VII, pp. 278–9.

18 M. 'U. Nakhla, *Tarikh al Aḥsa' al siyāsī 1818–1913* (Kuwait 1980); M. A. al Salman, *al Aḥwal al siyāsīyya fī 'l Qaṣīm fī 'ahd al dawla al Sa'udiyya al thanīyya 1823–1891* ('Unayza, 1988).

19 W. G. Palgrave, *Narrative of a year's journey through central and eastern Arabia, 1862–63*, 2 vols. (London and Cambridge, 1865), vol. II, p. 75; A. al Bassam, 'Ulama' Najd khilal thamaniyya qurun, 2nd edn, 6 vols. (Riyadh, 1419).

20 Al Ḥaydarī, 'Unwan, pp. 91, 162, 166–7; al Bassam, 'Ulama'; M. Ibn Ḥumayd al Suḥub al wabīla 'ala ḍara'iḥ al ḥanabīla, ed. Baḥrī Abu Zayd and 'Abd al Raḥman al 'Uthaymī, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1996).

doctrinal accommodation was possible.²¹ Political events provide at most a time line.

Briefly, the Al Bu Sa‘īdī sultans in Oman inherited the Ya‘ariba seaborne empire, and Aḥmad Sa‘īd (d. 1783) held the titles sultan and Ibaḍī imam. From about 1805, his grandson Sa‘īd (d. 1856) dominated Muscat, and hence oceanic politics; Sa‘īd’s paternal uncle Qays bin Aḥmad retained loyalties inland. Sa‘īd’s own interests shifted towards Zanzibar as early as 1830, and in 1861 the realm was divided under British auspices, with one of Sa‘īd’s sons taking Zanzibar, the other Muscat.²² Barghash Sa‘īd of Zanzibar (r. 1870–88) was important in an Ibaḍī intellectual ‘renaissance’ linking North Africa with Oman. Meanwhile, in Oman, the rulers (called sultans) at Muscat faced the possibility of fresh imams claiming greater legitimacy than theirs. Ḥamud ‘Azzan was approached to be imam in 1846, but the venture foundered; his nephew ‘Azzan Qays ruled briefly, 1868–71. Both were descended from Qays bin Aḥmad. The term *sayyid*, elsewhere reserved to the Prophet’s kin as a synonym of *sharif*, in Oman means descendants of Aḥmad Sa‘īd ‘Al Bu Sa‘īdī’.

Central Arabia was dominated by Wahhabism. Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab’s descendants, the Al al Shaykh, continued providing key ‘*ulama*’, and their imams were the Al Sa‘ūd. The first Sa‘ūdī state (1745–1818) had expanded from Najd through the richer area of al Aḥsa’. In the early nineteenth century they took clothes, food and even cooks from there; the great historian of Wahhabī Najd, Ibn Ghannam (d. 1811), was brought from al Aḥsa’ to al Dir‘iyya.²³ The second Sa‘ūdī state (c. 1824–91), based on Riyadh, repeated the process. It flourished under Imam Fayṣal (r. 1834–37, 1843–65) whose sons, Sa‘ūd and ‘Abd Allah, soon afterwards disputed power. Their civil war, while showing certain ‘*ulama*’ at their best, lost al Aḥsa’ to the Turks (1871),²⁴ and eventually Riyadh was lost to the Al Rashīd of Ḥa’il (1891). The spread of literacy in Najd was impressive; the name of Wahhabism itself spread widely. But, except for ‘Asīr, few outsiders came to Najd for study.

21 Vassiliev, *Saudi Arabia*, p. 193; A. M. al Ḥibshī (ed.), *Ḥawliyyat Yamaniyya 1224–1316 hijrī* (Ṣan‘a’, 1980), pp. 17, 105–6, 187, 208, 295.

22 Wilkinson, *Imamate*; H. Fattah, *The politics of regional trade: Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf, 1745–1900* (Albany, 1997).

23 Abu Ḥakīma (ed.), *Lam‘*, p. 176; A. al Ḥamid, *al Shi‘r fi ‘l jazīra al ‘arabiyya: Najd wa ‘l Ḥijaz wa ‘l Aḥsa’ wa ‘l Qatīf 1150–1350* (Riyadh, 1986), p. 58.

24 Vassiliev, *Saudi Arabia*; M. J. Crawford, ‘Civil war, foreign intervention, and the question of political legitimacy: A nineteenth century Saudi qadi’s dilemma’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14 (1982), pp. 227–48.

The early Wahhabis prospered in ‘Asīr,²⁵ and *sharīfs* from there took the coast further south when Egypt withdrew. Yemen lost the Red Sea ports. Al Mutawakkil Aḥmad (r. 1809–16) was succeeded by his son al Mahdī ‘Abd Allah (r. 1816–35), but his grandson al Maṣṣūr ‘Alī (d. 1871) established no effective control. In 1849 the Ottomans made an attempt on Ṣan‘a’. There were multiple claimants to the Zaydī imamate, coastal *sharīfs* were as powerful as highland imams (both were descendants of the Prophet), and Yemeni historians call the mid nineteenth century ‘the time of corruption’.²⁶ Literary tradition survived. Ṣan‘a’ struggled to defend itself, however, and tribesmen from the north moved south. While early in the century one finds learned visitors to Ṣan‘a’ and (lowland) Zabīd from throughout the Islamic world, by 1860 Yemen was largely abandoned to its troubles.

By contrast the Holy Cities, and the port town of Jiddah, made the Ḥijaz cosmopolitan. Mecca was one of the few places where (Muslim) strangers were easily assimilated; here also many ‘*ulama*’ did not journey abroad in search of knowledge, and a lifetime in the Holy City was common. Local power was held by *sharīfs*, one of whom would be recognised as *amīr* by Ottoman *ferman*. Among intrigues at Istanbul and local rivalries, the position was disputed between two lines, the Dhawī ‘Awn (‘Abadila) and Dhawī Zayd. ‘Abd al Muṭṭalib Ghalib of the Dhawī Zayd was thus twice *amīr* (1851–5, 1880–2), and Muḥammad ‘Abd al Mu‘īn (Muḥammad ‘Awn) of the other line also ruled more than once: roughly 1827–36, 1840–51, 1856–8.

Autonomy, rank, status

Non Islamic empires beyond Arabia could be aligned with *al dunya*, or worldly things. Aḥmad ‘Alī al Junayd (1783–1858) of Hadramawt was famous for scholarship and generosity, and distrustful of foreign commerce, but his piety rested in part on payments from a brother in (British controlled) Singapore.²⁷ Ḥaḍramī politics from the 1840s was dominated by *condottieri* returned from Hyderabad; Ḥaḍramīs as far afield as Java lived beneath the shadow of Dutch and British power. Aḥmad al Muḥdar (d. 1887) continued denouncing a corrupt outer world, and Aḥmad Bin Sumayṭ (d. 1925), born in the Comoros and famous in Zanzibar, depicted Hadramawt as a sacred

25 H. A. al Ḍamadī, *al Dībaj al khusrawanī fī akhbar a‘yan al Mikhlaḍ al Sulaymanī*, ed. Isma‘īl Muḥammad al Bashārī (Riyadh, 1424).

26 P. Dresch, *Tribes, government, and history in Yemen* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 212–24.

27 Ho, Graves, pp. 69–70, 77, 78; U. Freitag, *Indian Ocean migrants and state formation in Hadramaut: Reforming the homeland* (Leiden and Boston, 2003), pp. 97–9, 106–7.

homeland,²⁸ yet Hadramawt's moral autonomy depended throughout on foreign income. Such patterns do much to define Arabia's meaning in this period.

Rulers in Oman, without Zanzibar, were pressed for funds and, from Thuwaynī Sa'īd (r. 1856–66) to Fayṣāl Turķī (r. 1888–1913), faced claims that Islam was ruined. Sultans at Muscat leaned increasingly on British support. In Ibaḍī accounts one finds towns such as al Rustaq described as *amṣar* (defended places, on the model of early Islamic garrisons) and Nizwa as 'the kernel [*bayḍa*, the precious centre] of Islam and the seat of the kingdom of the Arabs';²⁹ but equating the imamate with inland Oman and sultans with the coast, or Hinawī tribes with Ibaḍism and Ghafirī with imported belief, misleads. The tribes of the interior were as much involved with Zanzibar as those near sea ports.

Inland, the tendency of men in al Qaṣīm and Najd to travel abroad (not only to trade in Iraq or India, but as labourers on the Suez Canal)³⁰ was matched by their determination that outsiders should not reverse the process. Egyptian invasions in 1818 and the 1830s, then Ottoman threats in the 1870s, provoked arguments from Najd that Muslims should retreat beyond their influence (that is, make *hijra*) and sever commerce with them; the issue recurred in 1896–7, and perhaps again in 1904–5, when al Qaṣīm was disputed between the Al Rashīd of Ḥa'il and the Al Sa'ūd.³¹ Like the oceanic regions of Arabia, the land locked centre, while deeply engaged with a larger world, claimed moral autonomy.

The extreme case was the Hijaz, where donations from elsewhere allowed the pursuit of an 'Islamic' life without regard to non Muslim power. The pilgrim caravans from Syria and Egypt each carried to Mecca not only the *maḥmal* (a camel borne palanquin denoting royal honours) but also the *khizana*, 'treasure'. The scale of subsidies was huge.³² Pilgrims often emphasised 'visiting' the Prophet over the *hajj* itself; morals in Mecca were widely thought dubious; large non Arab populations existed, and Mecca itself saw Medina as less compromised by imported customs; yet as part of Arabia the region stood ideally apart from a corrupting world. In 1903 the *begum* of Bhopal rationalised buying

28 Ho, *Graves*, pp. 229, 230; A. Bang, *Sufis and scholars of the sea: Family networks in East Africa 1860–1925* (London, 2003).

29 Al Salīmī *Tuhfā*, p. 264; V. Hoffman, 'The articulation of Ibaḍī identity in modern Oman and Zanzibar', *Muslim World* 94 (2004), p. 202.

30 C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. (London, 1964), vol. II, pp. 450–1.

31 Al Bassām 'Ulama', vol. I, p. 279, vol. II, p. 451, vol. IV, p. 327, vol. VI, p. 157; al Salīmān, *Aḥwāl*, pp. 375–6.

32 Ochsenswald, *Religion*; Rif'at Pasha, *Mir'at*, vol. II, pp. 309 ff.; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 173–4.

off armed Bedouin with the thought that 'these people were dwellers in Arabia and as such deserving of alms'.³³ Such concepts of privilege were also at play internally.

In the early days of Islam, Arabia paid the tithe (*'ushr*) while conquered areas paid land tax as *kharaj*; and in the nineteenth century, as Ottoman reforms in the north unfolded, it mattered where Arabia ended and Iraq began.³⁴ Elsewhere the form of tax may have mattered as greatly as its net sum. Shafi'is in Lower Yemen objected to paying *kharaj* to Zaydī conquerors; and Ibaḍīs in Oman identified *kharaj* they paid Wahhabīs with earlier Persian tyranny. The Wahhabīs themselves had in central Arabia inverted the payments between settled *ḥaḍār* and nomadic *a'rban* or 'Arabs', making towns dominant, and apart from the importance to the treasury of *ghanima* (booty), which was great, payments denoted moral order.

Everywhere people other than rulers and '*ulama*' were often called *ra'iyya* (subjects). Quite apart from tax, they were not all equal. Few were free of debt, many paid wealthier neighbours what less scrupulous minds would consider interest, and most lacked the noble genealogy that, from India to Africa, coloured Muslim views of Arabia. The lower most strata intermarried with ex slaves. At the other pole of status, the *sayyids* of Yemen and Hadramawt refused to give wives to non *sayyids*.

Slaves drew foreign intervention. The British in 1822 forbade sales in Zanzibar to Christians; in 1847 they banned shipping slaves from there to Arabia; in 1861 they imposed on Bahrain a treaty banning seaborne slaving. Under pressure, the Ottoman government in 1855 outlawed importing slaves, provoking riots in Mecca.³⁵ Two ranked worlds existed: that beyond Islamic borders, where no rules applied; and that within Arabia, where slaves were made subordinate kin and by many accounts despised their un-Islamic origins.³⁶ Abolitionism compromised Arabia's status and Islam's autonomy as surely as changing the laws of marriage would have done. Slaving was disputed in Bahrain as late as 1911; when an imamate was again launched in Oman, in 1913, the British were accused of permitting the forbidden (tobacco and alcohol) while forbidding licit transactions in slaves and arms.³⁷

33 Sultan Jahan Begam, *The story of a pilgrimage to Hijaz* (Calcutta, 1909), p. 256.

34 Al Haydarī, '*Unwan*', pp. 241 ff.

35 Dahlan, *Khulaṣa*, p. 362; al Hibshī, *Hawliyyat*, pp. 251, 351.

36 Burckhardt *Notes*, vol. I, pp. 181 2, 356 7; Doughty, *Arabia*, vol. I, pp. 604 5; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 18, 19.

37 Al Nabhanī, *Tuhfa*, p. 156; M. al Salīmī, *Nahḍat al a'yan bi ḥurriyyat 'Uman* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 142 3, 150, 213 14.

A second intrusion derived from British dominated commerce.³⁸ The vigour of local trade is often understated; but long distance shipping fell into non Arab hands, and in the age of steam local ship building everywhere decayed. Indian merchants were already important in oceanic trade and finance. Muslim Indians (*khoja*) were more numerous; non Muslims (*banyan*) are said to have mobilised capital more efficiently. Both often now claimed British protection. In a treaty with Oman (1873) Indian extraterritoriality and restrictions on slavery both mark British intervention. In 1858 a dispute over ships, debt and nationality had led to riots at Jiddah, where 'Christians' (*naṣara*) and their protégés were lynched; murder was provoked by quarantine arrangements in 1895. Such incidents were few, however. People lamented, the more distantly the more intensely, a 'growing despotism in the world of the perilous *Naṣara*',³⁹ and at home little happened. Everywhere through the nineteenth century, however, Europeans found Arabian connections, which particularly in British and Dutch eyes were (mis)identified often as Wahhabi.

Wahhabism and 'reform'

The term 'Wahhabī' was used by Arabian authors of a movement centred specifically on Najd, which sometimes they call a *madhhab*, sometimes a *dīn*, a new religion. Scathing dismissals of Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab's *Kitab al tawḥīd* and *Kashf al shubuḥat* are notorious.⁴⁰ More interesting is that in Yemen Ibn al Amīr (d. 1769) had praised the Wahhabīs then finally opposed them, and Muḥammad al Shawkanī (d. 1834), who knew Ibn al Amīr's work intimately and taught one of Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab's grandsons, did the same two generations later, as if there was a gap between principles and practice. The practice of early Wahhabism was not forgotten. Daḥlān in the 1880s thus tells how in 1803 at al Ṭa'if 'they went killing the infant who fed at its mother's breast':⁴¹ everything was carried off as loot, he writes, except books, which were ripped apart.

38 Fattah, *Regional trade*; Ochsenwald, *Religion*, pp. 95 6, 99 100, 106 ff.; Wilkinson, *Imamate*, pp. 63 8, 233 5; Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 103, 184 8.

39 Doughty, *Arabia*, vol. I, p. 133; cf. al Hibshī, *Ḥawliyyat*, pp. 251, 263; S. M. al Kindī *Tarīkh Ḥadramawt al musamma bi 'l 'udda al mufīda*, ed. 'Abd Allah al Hibshī, 2 vols. (Ṣan'a', 1991), vol. II, pp. 72, 163, 183.

40 Daḥlān, *Khulasa*, p. 303; Ibn Ruzayq, *History*, pp. 229 30; al Ḥaydarī 'Unwan, p. 228.

41 Daḥlān, *Khulasa*, pp. 297 8; *al Futuḥat al islamiyya ba'd muḍī 'l futuḥat al nabawiyya*, 2 vols. (Damascus and Beirut, 1997), vol. II, pp. 239 40.

The second Sa‘udī state (c. 1850) was less intemperate than the first, yet dismay persisted at Wahhabī *takfīr* (‘declaring infidel’ people who thought themselves Muslims). Ibaḍīs distinguished *kufr nifaq*, whose practitioners were hypocrites, from the *kufr juḥūd* of polytheists; much Yemeni theory was more severe; late Wahhabī thought on *takfīr* was itself detailed.⁴² What distinguished Wahhabīs nonetheless was their willingness to denounce as polytheists (*mushrikīn*) all who differed from them. On the other hand, their imams often recognised borders with other powers, ignoring absolutist logic.

Though Mecca was told to copy (*qallada*) Sunnī tradition rather than risk Shi‘ism,⁴³ Wahhabīs are often said to have vilified all dependence (*taqlīd*) on schools of law. Rejecting sectarian labels, not least ‘Wahhabī’, they claimed to follow simply the prescriptions of Islam. Their particular profession of *tawḥīd* (the unicity of God) implied political obedience, however, and a letter of appointment, dated 1855, sets out a *qaḍī*’s duties towards his people: ‘you must pray with them as a congregation on Friday, instruct them in the mighty *tawḥīd*, and judge among them as God prescribes’.⁴⁴ Congregational prayers were obligatory, and the male population would be heard on their catechism, making of ‘*aqīda* very much a ‘creed’. Coherent doctrine begins emerging as later generations unpacked Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab’s statements. His grandson Sulayman ‘Abd Allah (d. 1818) wrote *Taysīr al ‘azīz al ḥamūd fī tafsīr kitāb al tawḥīd*; ‘Abd al Raḥman Ḥasan (d. 1869) wrote *Fath al majīd*. The rulings of ‘Abd al Latīf ‘Abd al Raḥman (d. 1876) show scholarly confidence, and arguments around Bin Jirjis, an Iraqi Ḥanbalī who twice in mid century stopped at ‘Unayza, match the texture of learned controversy in Oman or Yemen.⁴⁵ But dissenters contended that where argument was offered Wahhabīs were simply Ḥanbalīs; in so far as ‘*aqīda* was enforced without argument they were innovators like the savage Kharijīs.

Practical effects are hard to judge. The founder of Oman’s Bu Sa‘idī dynasty had been given a domed tomb at al Rustaq: this was still a place of pilgrimage (*mazar*) in the 1850s despite waves of Wahhabī enthusiasm. In Yemen certain tombs were demolished in the early 1800s, but one later finds people returning to interest in the dead, and imams themselves visiting

42 Al Kharuṣī, ‘Masa’il shatta’, p. 294; Hoffman, ‘Ibaḍī identity’, p. 204; Haykel, *Revival*; A L. Al al Shaykh ‘*Uyūn al rasa’il wa ajwiba ‘ala ’l masa’il*’, ed. Ḥusayn Muḥammad Bawa, 2 vols. (Riyadh, 2000), *rasa’il* nos. 1, 2, 16, 19, also pp. 957 ff.

43 A R. Al al Shaykh, *Mashahīr ‘ulama’ Najd wa ghayrihim*, 2nd edn (Riyadh, 1974), p. 55.

44 Al Bassam, ‘*Ulama*’, vol. V, p. 293; cf. al Ḥaydarī, ‘*Unwan*’, pp. 213–21; al Salman, *Aḥwal*, p. 319.

45 Al al Shaykh, ‘*Uyun*’; D. Commins, *The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia* (London, 2006), pp. 58–9; al Bassam, ‘*Ulama*’, vol. IV, pp. 230–1, vol. V, pp. 89–93, vol. VI, pp. 482–3.

ancestral graves. On the other hand, Aḥmad ibn 'Isa of Najd, in the 1880s, when Sa'udī/Wahhabī power had disappeared, prevailed on the *amir* of Mecca to demolish domes in the Ḥijaz, those of Khadija and of Eve being left for fear of public reaction.⁴⁶ Such issues as 'approaching' God (*tawassul*), and its relation to venerating the dead, were everywhere more prominent at the century's end than at its start. Yet often debates precede Wahhabī influence, or what seems to have been influence is actually parallel development, and Wahhabism figures in a far broader discourse of renewal (*tajdid*) and reform (*iṣlah*).

Reform can mean many things. In Hadramawt, local dynasts returning from Hyderabad, of whom the Qa'ayṭis and Kathiris were greatest, were taken up in mid century by *sayyids* wishing 'Islamic' order.⁴⁷ This *sayyid* history turns on what to Wahhabis was anathema: descent based holiness, the visiting of tombs and Sufi practice organised around the 'Alawiyya order, whose influence extended far abroad. In the course of the nineteenth century every power in reach, whether local or imperial, was approached for Ḥaḍramī purposes. What 'reform' meant will have changed between Ṭahir Ḥusayn (d. 1826), whose efforts began before Hadramawt suffered Wahhabī raids, and 'Abd al Raḥman al Mashhur (d. 1902), in whose own time (1882) an 'advisory treaty' was signed between the Qa'ayṭis and the British.

A very different history is elaborated by Daḥlān for Mecca. A succession of 'raids' provides challenges to hierarchical order, and even when in 1803 the Meccans are summoned to hear their Wahhabī conqueror they assemble 'according to their ranks': the *amir* and the *sayyids*; the *qaḍīs*, the *muftīs* and '*ulama*'; then the common people. A sense of elaborate status is apparent in accounts by visitors. And Daḥlān's own last entry in *Khulaṣat al kalam* relates ceremoniously how in 1882 'Awn al Rafiq was named *amir*, at the Valley of Mina on 11 Dhu 'l Ḥijja, 'for every year on that day the [Ottoman] *firman* is read out confirming the Amīr of Mecca'.⁴⁸

Worlds of learning

In Daḥlān's time, it is said, there were only six copies of *al Khulaṣa*. Printing appeared in Ṣan'a' with the Turks in the 1870s, a press was established in

46 Al Bassam, '*Ulama*', vol. I, p. 440; Rif'at Pasha, *Mir'at*, vol. I, pp. 31, 480 1; Ibn Ruzayq, *History*, p. 188; al Hibshu, *Hawliyyat*, pp. 7, 32, 148, 345; M. Zabara *Nayl al waṭar min tarajim rijal al yaman fī 'l qarn al thalith 'ashar*, 2 vols. (Beirut and Ṣan'a', n.d.), vol. I, pp. 158, 391.

47 Freitag, *Indian Ocean*; al Kindi, *Ta'rīkh*; Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 156 73.

48 Daḥlān, *Khulaṣa*, p. 379; cf. Rif'at Pasha, *Mir'at*, vol. I, pp. 49 51.

Mecca in 1883, but what general publishing there was developed in Egypt, or even Zanzibar. Before this, merchants in al Qaṣīm read newspapers from Istanbul; afterwards, certain Ḥaḍramīs suspected journals as distractions from scholarship, and Arabia long after print appeared was chiefly a manuscript culture. 'Modern' schools appeared late: in the Ḥijāz (from 1874) they owed much to Indians, and in Hadramawt (from 1887) to expatriate reformers.

Nor was prose the only important medium. The Al Thānī of Qatar, for example, were patrons of poetry. Western presentations obscure how even general history is laced with verse, and much other poetry is preserved orally.⁴⁹ 'Abd al Latīf Al al Shaykh (d. 1876), an outstanding figure among late Wahhabī 'ulama', pursued legal controversies in didactic verse, while among the Ithnā 'Asharīs such figures as Ḥasan al Dimastanī (d. 1864) and 'Alī 'Abd al Jabbar (d. 1870) were as famous. Early in the twentieth century (Sunni) Malikī law was arranged by 'Abd al 'Azīz al 'Alajī in some 4,000 couplets; Muḥammad al 'Amrī, an Algerian of Medina, commemorated the Ḥijāz railway. Importantly, people memorised polemic verse that emerged from disputes among 'ulama'.

The self presentation of 'ulama' obscures much. Faṭīma bint Aḥmad 'al Fuḍayliyya' (d. 1832) and the Indian scholar Khadija bint Iṣḥāq (d. 1892) of Mecca are among the few women mentioned. The role of women in bequeathing *waqf* is sometimes apparent; ordinary people, whether male or female, appear only in generalities. Accounts may instead stress textual derivations, as when al Ḍamadī, reporting heads being severed in battle (1817), digresses on the precise legality of 'transporting heads from one place to another place distant'.⁵⁰ A certain unworldliness is evident. Sulayman 'Abd Allah (d. 1818) thus confessed he knew the men in books of tradition better than he did those around him in al Dir'iyya;⁵¹ biographical collections praise 'ulama' who refused political appointments, and accounts of pious indigence are common. Nor do all accounts depict successful mastery of knowledge. Al Ḥusayn al Sharafī of Ṣan'a', who knew legal systematics ('ilm al furū'), 'became muddled in his mind' and thought he was the Mahdī, hoarding sea shells for alchemical researches.⁵²

Scholars harassed by Wahhabīs claimed that questions were posed to which there was no brief answer; 'Abd Allah Abu Buṭayn (1780 1865) in al Qaṣīm

49 Al Ḥamid, *Shi'r*; S. A. Sowayyan, *Nabati poetry: The oral poetry of Arabia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1985); Al al Shaykh, 'Uyun, pp. 567 73, 673 4, 909 14; al Baḥrānī, *Anwar*, pp. 217, 319 and *passim*.

50 Al Ḍamadī, *Dibaj khusruwani*, pp. 162 3.

51 Al Bassam, 'Ulama', vol. II, p. 432. 52 Zabara, *Nayl*, vol I, p. 398.

preferred following a local *qaḍī*'s decision though he thought it faulty, for difference (*khilaf*) as such was evil.⁵³ 'The rivalries of learned people draw some to speak wickedly of others, which then spreads and circulates,' says al Ḥaydarī; 'God the exalted forgive [both] them and us'.⁵⁴ Much may be lost, however. The Al Sulaym of 'Unayza, for instance, won virtual independence of the Al Sa'ud in 1861. By Guarmani's account, in the backwash of Wahhabi power 'Islamism was to give way to pure Deism':

O Believers! there is no other divinity but God . . .

Deny the existence of angels, djinn, afrit, and devil; for the Creator has no need of intermediary spirits . . .

Deny the divine origin of all writings, the Koran, the Bible and the Gospels; for the Book of God is read in His works . . .⁵⁵

It is hard to guess whether the traveller simply misunderstood. We know still less about 'millenarian' ideas in Yemen, some of which involved Jewish prophecy; and the Faqīh Sa'īd, who in 1840 declared himself the Mahdī, is only the most famous of many supposed heretics dismissed as 'Sufis'.⁵⁶

Sufi orders (*ṭuruq*) drew attention from Western powers. Le Chatelier, alarmed for French colonialism, writes of them threatening 'the progress of civilisation' and lists many orders in the Ḥijaz.⁵⁷ In the Ḥijaz, however, unlike the 'Alawiyya of Hadramawt, they were not explicitly reformist, and in much of Arabia to seek 'brotherhoods' is to overconcretise a discipline of mind. Though Zaydism had long distrusted Sufi orders, Sufism was current among Zaydī scholars; even in (Wahhabī) al Qaṣīm one finds followers of Qadīrī and Naqshbandī thought.⁵⁸ Nor did ecstatic rituals enjoy uncritical acceptance elsewhere. When Ibrāhīm Bin Jasir of Burayda broke up such a meeting at Mecca, Sharīf 'Awn (r. 1882–1905) agreed he was right to do so.⁵⁹

Jurisprudence and Sufism alike bordered other domains of knowledge. *Ḥisab al jumal*, for instance, gave numerical values to the alphabet, filling life with chronograms. Sharīf Ghalīb, asking when Wahhabi power might end, was told: '*quṭī'a dabiru 'l khawarij*' (the Kharijis will be wiped out), which spelled AH 1227 (1812), the year Egypt's army reached Medina; many Yemenis

53 Ibn Ruzayq, *History*, p. 248; al Bassam, 'Ulama', vol. II, p. 376.

54 Al Ḥaydarī, 'Unwan, p. 227. 55 Guarmani, *Northern Najd*, p. 120.

56 Zabara, *Nayl*, vol. II, pp. 226–7; al Ḥibshī, *Ḥawliyyat*, pp. 90–9, cf. also pp. 41, 500.

57 A. Le Chatelier, *Les confréries musulmanes du hedjaz* (Paris, 1887). For a sober account, Ochsenswald, *Religion*, pp. 42–7, 53–4.

58 Zabara, *Nayl*, vol. I, pp. 20, 116, 316, vol. II, pp. 80–1, 351; al Ḥibshī, *Ḥawliyyat*, p. 243; al Bassam, 'Ulama', vol. V, p. 159.

59 Al Bassam, 'Ulama', vol. I, p. 280.

expected the Mahdī in 1849, when the Turks briefly took Ṣan‘a’, for the Islamic year 1265 spelled *gharsa*.⁶⁰ The *imam* of the Filayhī Mosque in Ṣan‘a’, who once paralysed al Mahdī ‘Abd Allāh (r. 1816–35), had a powerful command of ‘the science of names and letters and a strong grip on devils and the jinn’; in Oman, Naṣir Abī Nabhan al Kharuṣī (d. 1847) knew ‘the science of the secret’.⁶¹ In the shadow of modernist reformers there is a tendency to leave occult knowledge unexplored.

Temporal power and Arabian Islam

In much of Islam, the eighteenth century saw interest in ‘reform’. Reading later concerns into earlier ones is problematic, and some historians too easily invoke a period’s ‘mood’.⁶² Nineteenth century Arabia perhaps shows such a mood, however. A rhetoric emerged whereby strong rulers, not themselves men of learning, would follow the advice of scholars. This was the basis of the alliance between the Al al Shaykh and the Al Sa‘ūd that made Wahhabism; al Shawkanī’s reformist view of the Zaydī imamate was similar; Shafī‘ī *‘ulama’* in Hadramawt formed councils to instruct their rulers.⁶³ In Oman, though in classical Ibaḍī theory a *shari* imam, ‘selling’ himself to God, would as ruler invalidate dispute, Sa‘īd al Khālī lī said, ‘the learned are rulers of the kings, and the kings are rulers of the subjects’.⁶⁴ Even among Ibaḍīs and Zaydīs the ideal of a single person combining piety, learning and the power to right wrong was under pressure.

In 1869 *‘ulama’* in Oman wrote to North African Ibaḍīs: ‘Your brothers the Omanis in this age have risen for God the exalted, waging jihad in His cause.’ But ‘Azzan Qays (r. 1868–71) was technically a ‘weak’ imam: *‘ulama’* claimed his authority in confiscating opponents’ property, yet that authority depended on their own consensus.⁶⁵ The Zaydīs recognised *muhtasib* imams, though such would be rulers as al Hadī Ghalīb (d. 1885) or al Mutawakkil Muḥsin (d. 1878) did not claim the status. Several Yemenis attempted restoring the older (Hadaḥī) ideal of a ‘complete’ imam whose virtue would be

60 Daḥlān, *Khulaṣa*, p. 329; al Hibshī, *Ḥawliyyat*, pp. 188–9; cf. al Salīmī *Tuḥfa*, pp. 204–5.

61 Zabara, *Nayl*, vol. I, pp. 134–5; Hoffmann, ‘Ibaḍī identity’, pp. 209, 210; cf. Doughty, *Arabia*, vol. I, p. 301, vol. II, pp. 17, 121.

62 A. Dallal, ‘The origins and objectives of Islamic revivalist thought 1750–1850’, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 113 (1993), pp. 341–59; A. Dallal, ‘Appropriating the past: Twentieth century reconstruction of pre modern Islamic thought’, *Islamic Law and Society*, 7 (2000), pp. 325–58.

63 Al Kindī, *Tarikh*, vol. II, pp. 67, 321. 64 Al Salīmī, *Nahḍa*, p. 332.

65 Al Salīmī, *Tuḥfa*, pp. 247–9, 252, 256–8; cf. Wilkinson, *Imamate*, pp. 154–62.

self evident: Aḥmad ‘Alī al Sirajī made a ‘summons’ in 1831, Muḥammad al Wazīr in 1854, al Hadī Sharaf al Dīn in 1897. By the time imams who were truly scholars established influence, however, Turkish administration was supplementing ideals of order, and in the period after 1918 imamat of many kinds in Arabia turned, where imperialist space allowed, into ‘kingdoms’.

Much earlier, learned persons faced the Sunnī dilemma that the best of rulers are close to the ‘*ulama*’ and the best ‘*ulama*’ shun rulers. ‘Abd al Razzaq al Tamīmī (d. 1838/9) of al Zubayr was a brilliant intellect, yet Ibn Ḥumayd regrets his taste for ‘princes and events’; Abu Buṭayn (d. 1865), respected yet also well liked as *qaḍī* in ‘Unayza, is described as exceptional.⁶⁶ Worldly ‘*ulama*’ nonetheless have their place in history. Aḥmad al Kibīsī (1824–99), who once left a corrupted Ṣan‘a’ (that is, made *hijra*), was later judge and statesman under Turks and imams alike; Zayn al ‘Abidin ‘Abd al Shukur of Mecca (d. 1871) was a favourite of Sharif ‘Abd Allah and managed his political correspondence. Rulers reciprocated. Salim Sulṭān (d. 1821) was thus remembered as an admirable governor of Muscat who conscientiously observed the times of prayer and debated poetry: he was ‘bountiful towards Muslims of merit’, and kept around him men of letters. Or again Daḥlān at Mecca on Muḥammad ‘Awn (d. 1858): ‘the *majlis* of our lord Sharif Muḥammad was always replete with learned persons, men of letters, and seekers after knowledge . . . he conducted many raids . . . and in all of them had victory and triumph’.⁶⁷ The image is of Muslim gentlemen who might have adorned any age.

The pan-Islamic period through the First World War

‘Abbas of Egypt (d. 1854) spent freely for support in Arabia; his successors were interested in the Red Sea, and the Ottomans remained alert to either Persian or Egyptian influence in the Gulf.⁶⁸ In 1858–9 the Porte pressured Shaykh Muḥammad of Bahrain, who flew Ottoman and Persian flags from opposite corners of his fort. In 1861, however, facing new Wahhabī threats, he succumbed to Britain. In 1862 the Ottoman governor of Massawa‘, in Sudan, spoke of controlling the Aden straits; Egypt’s assumption of control over Massawa‘ in 1866 only complicated rivalries in western Arabia, and the

⁶⁶ Ibn Ḥumayd *Suḥub*, p. 532, also pp. 627–33; al Bassam, ‘*Ulama*’, vol. IV, pp. 225–41.

⁶⁷ Daḥlān, *Khulaṣa*, p. 348; cf. Ibn Ruzayq, *History*, pp. 241–2; al Nabhanī, *Tuhfa*, p. 136.

⁶⁸ Palgrave, *Narrative*, pp. 189, 196; Ochsenswald, *Religion*, pp. 162–4.

Ottomans in the following year briefly claimed sovereignty over Hadramawt. The Suez Canal (1869) gave them the means to intervene in Arabia directly.

In 1871 the empire deployed 4,000 regulars to conquer al Ḥṣa' and 9,000 to suppress a rising in 'Asir, which they feared had Egyptian backing. The latter force took Ṣan'a' in 1872. This forward policy brought to power in Istanbul reformers favouring pan Islamic projects; the accession of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876 1909) confirmed their ascendancy, and even Z̤ufar featured in pan Islamic diplomacy in the 1870s when (the Indian born) Sayyid Faḍl of Hadramawt, who had earlier fought the British in Kerala, sought help there.⁶⁹

While Britain maintained its peripheral control, parts of Arabia experienced an Ottoman *risorgimento*. The military venture in al Ḥṣa' foundered, though the Turks kept possession until 1913. By the early 1900s, however, they had 30,000 troops in Yemen, and with them came obsessions often written of as specific to European imperialism: statistical order, straight roads and public drainage, uniforms, schools, and a doctrine of progress.⁷⁰ In Yemeni accounts the Turks appear now as '*ajam*, definitively non Arab foreigners, as the Persians had long seemed elsewhere.

Ottoman attempts to force Turkish clothes and the red *ṭarbus̤h* on Yemenis drew the response that Yemeni dress was 'Islamic'.⁷¹ Photographs of the Holy Cities show *ṭarbus̤h* and 'modern' uniform beside robes and turbans, and the *begum* of Bhopal describes the Syrian *maḥmal* arriving at Medina in 1903:

Full royal honours were paid to it in its progress; a guard of honour composed partly of local troops and partly of the troops that accompanied it formed an escort and the whole procession marched to the music of a brass band.⁷²

Brass bands gave offence in non Ottoman Oman. The modernist Islam of the empire and expectations of Arabia by reformers elsewhere were oftentimes at odds. But Mecca, as the 'sounding board' of Islam, usually returned a muffled note. 'Abd al Qadir of Algeria made the *ḥajj* in the 1860s; Jamal al Dīn al Afghani (1839 97) may have done so many times; and Raḥmat Allah Khali ('Kayranawi'), who fled India after 1857 and whose anti Christian tract *Iẓhar al ḥaqq* (c. 1863 4) is famous, lived in Mecca until his death in 1890/1. One would not know their world importance from local sources.

69 Al Kindi, *Tarikh*, vol. II, pp. 18, 334; Freitag, *Indian Ocean*, pp. 79 80.

70 T. Kuhn, 'Ordering the past of Ottoman Yemen, 1872 1914', *Turcica*, 34 (2002), pp. 189 200.

71 M. Zabara, *A'immat al Yaman fi 'l qarn al rabi' 'ashar*, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1956), vol. I (ii), pp. 178, 181, 372.

72 Sultan Jahan Begam, *Pilgrimage*, p. 316; cf. Rif'at Pasha, *Mir'at*, vol. I, p. 369.

Dahlan's 'Islamic conquests' (*al Futuḥat al islamiyya* c. 1885 6), unlike *al Khulaṣa*, saw print and was widely spoken of; he himself gave *fatwas* to correspondents as far afield as Daghistan and Java. But a postscript to his Meccan history says of the penultimate year of the Islamic century: 'among the strange events (*ḥawadith ghariba*) in the year '99 [1881 2] was that a man called Muḥammad Aḥmad appeared in Sudan . . . and many people thought he was the Mahdī'.⁷³ The impression is of events in a faraway country of which Ḥijazī 'ulama' knew little. The people of al Qaṣīm, by contrast, sent somebody to check.⁷⁴ When he returned he said the Sudanese themselves expected salvation from a descendant of Qaḥṭan, that is, from the 'original' Arabs of Arabia.

The millennial year AH 1300 (1882 3) passed quietly. In 1900, however, al Kawakibi's *Umm al qura* depicted an imagined meeting at Mecca of Muslim notables, and the Ottoman government treated the account as all but real. As early as 1879 'Abd al Qadir had been rumoured to be thinking of an 'Arab' kingdom; al Afghām floated a tale in 1883 that Britain planned an Arab caliphate; the Ottomans' own language of empire included ideas of Arab 'revival'.⁷⁵ Arabia by the century's end was filled with the imaginings of others.

As Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa would argue post 1918, Muslims were being brought together by European technologies of empire. The telegraph had been expensive, the mail remained slow; but steam ships, although pilgrimage figures did not rise dramatically, were moving ordinary people in large numbers; and from the 1880s, though few in Arabia read it, Arabia's affairs were played out in a trans regional Islamic press. Thus the Turks in Yemen provoked massive Zaydī resistance, and such complaints as the following, from al Maṣṣūr Muḥammad (r. 1884 1904) later gained coverage in *al Manar*:

We have seen how officials do not administer God's laws, do not respect what God has forbidden . . . and do nothing of God's book or the *sunna* of God's Prophet . . . they flaunt before God their wine drinking and carnality between males . . . the word of the Jews and Christians is raised high.⁷⁶

Yemen became a focus of Muslim concerns about the empire's nature. The coup of the Young Turks in 1908 was refracted through the same lens; and when Imam Yaḥya (r. 1904 48) won a truce in 1911, the contrast of not only Arab and Turk but Islamic and governmental law was highlighted.

⁷³ Dahlan, *Khulaṣa*, pp. 381 2; Dahlan, *Futuḥat*, pp. 300 12.

⁷⁴ Al Bassam, 'Ulama', vol. V, p. 307.

⁷⁵ Kuhn, 'Ottoman Yemen', pp. 193 4; Ochsenswald, *Religion*, pp. 82 3, 201 2.

⁷⁶ Zabara, *A'imma*, vol. I (ii), p. 56; H. A. al 'Amrī, *al Manar wa 'l Yaman* (1315 1354 H/1898 1935 M) (Damascus and Beirut, 1987), pp. 241 7 and *passim*.

The Idrisī state in 'Asir (1906 34),⁷⁷ established by a collateral relative of North Africa's Sanūsīs, was another matter for leading articles: the Ottoman Italian War of 1911 12 saw the Idrisīs and Imam Yahya take opposite sides. And in 1905 and 1915 the press was filled with an issue still more distinctive of the age, a Ḥaḍramī controversy over marriage between *sayyids*' daughters and non *sayyid* men.⁷⁸ This struck at a traditional moral order. Symptomatically it began among Ḥaḍramīs abroad (in Java and Singapore), engrossed scholars throughout Islam, and focused on Arabia.

During the First World War the Idrisīs gained support from Britain. Imam Yahya in Yemen and Ibn al Rashīd at Ḥa'il did so from the Turks. In 1902 'Abd al 'Azīz Al Sa'ūd had taken Riyadh from the Rashīdīs, and in 1913 he seized al Aḥsa' as his ancestors had done before: he too gained limited support from Britain. But 1914 18 was not climactic for Arabia, either in Islamic or imperialist terms. Britain feared a dry wind blowing through the East; the Turks themselves must have had some hope when they called for jihad against the Triple Entente. The initiative fell instead to Ḥusayn 'Alī, *amir* of Mecca (r. 1908 24). Installed by the Young Turks, he had later opposed them but by 1914 had been denounced as a tool of secularists; launching his revolt in June 1916, with British support, he now became an Arab nationalist hope, but his own propaganda was primarily that the Ottomans had fallen under secular influence. In the post war years Arabia would see a string of visitors, some pan Islamist and some pan Arabist, pursuing visions of a broader unity. The reality they faced was a half dozen major principalities. In 1919, on the other hand, there was fear in Yemen that 'the Franks' (the British) would seize all that the Ottomans had claimed; but Arabia was judged, in Lloyd George's words, 'too arid a country to make it worth the while of any ravenous Power to occupy'.⁷⁹

Conclusion

Grand narratives of Muslim anti imperialism must be treated cautiously. Ibaḍī 'ulama' in East Africa, says Wilkinson, had sought common ground with other Islamic groupings to confront colonialism, 'but it is very much to be questioned whether the main line of ulema there, or in Oman, really had much pan Arab, pan Islamic or for that matter pan anything vision'.⁸⁰ Their

77 A. Bang, *The Idrisī state in 'Asir 1906 1934* (Bergen, 1996); al 'Amrī, *al Manar*, pp. 342 50.

78 Gavin, *Aden*, pp. 266 8; Ho, *Graves*, pp. 173 81; Freitag, *Indian Ocean*, pp. 245 9.

79 Zabara, *A'imma*, vol. III, pp. 3 4; Vassiliev, *Saudi Arabia*, p. 250.

80 Wilkinson, *Imamate*, p. 245.

problems were more immediate. So too were those of Zaydis in Yemen, Shafi'is in the Ḥijaz or even Hadramawt, and Wahhabis in Najd.

Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa's ideal of the caliphate as a grand imamate (c. 1922) found its focus by elimination. There was simply nowhere plausible left beyond 'Christian' control but parts of Arabia, and Riḍa suggested as an interim caliphal candidate Imam Yaḥya of Yemen, thus capturing an imagined complex of independence from imperialism, descent from the Prophet and Arabia as the cradle of Islam.⁸¹ The quieter continuities of learning received less attention. The lives of Arabians, attempting as best they could to be good Muslims, received even less, and most of the history of this real Arabia remains still to be recovered.

81 M. R. Riḍa, *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rašīd Riḍa*, ed. and trans. Henri Laoust (Beirut, 1938), pp. 89–90, 118–19, 191.

Iran to 1919

ALI M. ANSARI

Iran entered the nineteenth century heaving from nearly a century of war and political turmoil.¹ In 1722, the Safavid dynasty succumbed to an ignominious end at the hands of its Afghan vassals, inaugurating a prolonged period of political turmoil which witnessed the dramatic rise and fall of Nadir Shah (r. 1736–47) and the comparative stability of Karīm Khan Zand (r. 1751–79), to be followed in turn by another bout of tribal and political conflict until Aqa Muḥammad Khan (r. 1796–7), a scion of the Qajar tribe and lead contender to succeed the throne vacated by the Safavids, finally established himself as patriarch of a new dynasty in 1796. Like his predecessors, Aqa Muḥammad Khan was forced to conquer the country from within and to fight to maintain the territorial integrity of the state he wished to inherit. But unlike his immediate predecessors, his hegemony proved sufficiently complete that he was able to ensure a peaceful succession, an achievement all the more remarkable given that he had no direct heirs of his own. The Qajar dynasty continued to reign (if not rule) over the 'Guarded Domains of Iran' until 1925, a period of comparative stability which nonetheless witnessed profound changes in the character and nature of the Iranian state, especially with respect to its international status. Indeed, the nineteenth century in Iranian history has not unfairly been characterised as a period of steady decadence and decline, as successive monarchs and their ministers sought to manage and, in some cases, reverse this process by attempting to implement, with varying degrees of sincerity, a series of structural reforms. Ultimately, the failure to reform was to lead to a revolution, which at first sought to limit the powers of the monarch but eventually led to the political emasculation and overthrow of the dynasty.

¹ Sir John Malcolm, *A history of Persia*, 2 vols. (London, 1829), vol. II, p. 182.

1. Fath 'Alī Shah and the extension of patriarchal monarchy

If Aqa Muḥammad Shah was a peripatetic monarch who chose to govern from the saddle, his successor had a preference for the sedentary lifestyle, settling his court in the Qajar capital, Tehran. Historians have tended to be unsympathetic to this change in monarchical vigour and direction, lamenting the dissipation of military rigour to the decadence of the harem. But if Aqa Muḥammad had sought to define the boundaries of the Iranian state, he left it to his successor to consolidate the dynasty's grip on power. The exercise of power in its most brutal form could not be extended indefinitely. Nadir Shah's short lived legacy was evidence enough of the shortcomings of coercion and had to be complemented by the extension of authority. This was to be achieved through the continued cultivation of the elites, especially the 'ulama', the development of particularly Persian symbols and rituals of kingship. Fath 'Alī Shah (r. 1797–1834) was to adopt the titles *shahanshah* (king of kings) along with Turko-Mongolian *kakhan* (khan of khans) and the dramatic extension of kinship ties binding both the Qajar tribe to itself and the wider elite. Aqa Muḥammad Shah had reportedly been anxious that the tribal rivalries that had destroyed other dynastic aspirants should not be repeated with the Qajars, and had laid down strict instructions that the Quyunlu and Develu branches be intimately bound together in successive marriages. In this respect at least, Fath 'Alī Shah was to prove able, willing and highly successful. This was not so much the extension of the household as its procreation, and, according to some sources, 'he left behind some sixty sons and more than forty daughters'.²

The consequence of this in the short term was to be a singular consolidation of the state in the Qajar extended family, which ensured the identification of the state with the dynasty to an unprecedented level. In the long term, the proliferation of princes and the transformation of royal governorships into what amounted to feudal appanages would exhaust the central government, decentralise power and ensure that Fath 'Alī Shah's chosen title *shahanshah* reflected less an imperial authority, and more of a first among increasingly avaricious equals. By the end of Fath 'Alī Shah's reign in 1834, the inflation in royal princes was being matched by a dramatic increase in honorific titles, most of which had to be paid for in annual rituals with the

2 Abbas Amanat, *Pivot of the universe: Nasir al Din Shah and the Iranian monarchy 1831–1896* (London, 1997), pp 19–20.

shah, thereby affirming the Napoleonic dictum that it was with baubles that men were led. In the Qajar case, however, the central treasury became increasingly dependent on the monies such annual sales generated, thus altering the balance of power between the king and his wealthiest subjects. This eventual weakening of the power of central government was, ironically, to be assisted by the development of the principle of primogeniture, a development which had been encouraged by Aqa Muḥammad Shah to avoid the fratricidal struggle that characterised successions, but which in retrospect allowed a succession of mediocre monarchs to ascend the throne when vigour was needed. (Fath 'Alī Shah's eldest son, Muḥammad 'Alī Mirza, whose ruthlessness may have been a match for his great uncle, was barred from the succession on account of his mother being a Georgian concubine). Ironically, this search for stability and the mediocrity it produced was to be legally guaranteed by European powers, to their immense benefit.

Apart from the extension of the royal family, Fath 'Alī Shah's reign was to be defined by his relations with European powers and the ultimate imposition of two treaties which were to signify Iran's growing impotence in an international system increasingly dominated by Europe. Aqa Muḥammad Shah had never encountered the Russians in battle, though he was preparing to do so before he was murdered. A period of respite had been assured by the opportune death of Catherine the Great in 1796 and the continued preoccupation with the French revolutionary wars in Europe. However, by 1799 Russian forces were pressing on Iran's north western frontiers, keen to make amends for the sack of Tiflis. Unlike his predecessor, Fath 'Alī Shah does not appear to have taken the Russian threat seriously, considering Russian incursions to be a continuation of the border raids that had plagued the two states for decades. It may have been that the withdrawal of Russian forces in 1796 following the death of Catherine II had given the Iranians a false sense of their own power. Tsar Paul, despite his intense dislike for his predecessor and her policies, could not ignore pleas for help from Georgia, and dispatched a small force southwards, acceding to Georgian demands to be made a protectorate, which soon transformed into outright annexation. Fath 'Alī Shah continued to insist on Iran's sovereign rights over the territory, and soon found himself the focus of European attention and rivalries as both France and Britain sought to negotiate treaties. None of these diplomatic manoeuvres yielded much, and with the assassination of Tsar Paul in 1801, Iran's predicament was rapidly to become worse. Tsar Alexander continued the policies of Catherine, and determined that the natural frontier between Iran and Russia should be the Aras River. He appointed a new commander in

the Caucasus in 1802, Prince Tsitsianov, a Georgian by origin and a convert to the cause of Russian imperialism whose distaste for 'Asiatics' was proverbial, to implement these policies. Tsitsianov moved his forces southwards, occupying most of the Caucasus, and actively agitated for a seizure of Iran's Caspian provinces including Gilan, an ambition which mirrored the initial expansion of Peter the Great southwards prior to the rise of Nadir Shah. The seizure and sack of Ganjā, ostensibly in revenge for the sack of Tiflis, eventually alerted Tehran to the reality of the threat and the need for action. This was no longer a tributary state which was being contested, but Iranian Shi'ī territory which had been violated.

The crown prince, 'Abbas Mirza, whose seat was in Tabriz, was dispatched to deal with the threat, and the first battle of the Russo Persian War was fought on 1 July 1804 near Erivan. It proved an indecisive engagement, partially successful for the Persians because of Russian overconfidence and contempt, but an early indication nonetheless that the military and technological revolution had passed Iran by. While 'Abbas Mirza, at the sharp end of the struggle, was soon made aware of the changes and reforms that would need to be made, his father and the court factions that surrounded him, were to prove less than energetic in this regard. If the war was to prove protracted, this had to do with it becoming a sideshow to the wider Napoleonic contest in Europe. Indeed, the failure to secure a decisive victory, much to Tsitsianov's irritation, hampered Russian strategy, and as Alexander himself led his forces to defeat at Austerlitz, a peace party was emerging in St Petersburg, urging a settlement of outstanding and peripheral issues. For Iran, Napoleon's ascent provided some interesting opportunities, and on 4 May 1807 Fath 'Alī Shah, frustrated at British duplicity (Britain and Russia were now allies), signed the Treaty of Finkenstein with the French emperor.³ This short if comprehensive treaty was to see military assistance afforded to Iran, including training and the supply of equipment, along with a recognition of Iran's sovereign rights over Georgia, in return for a complete break in relations with Britain, safe passage for French troops, and an attack on British India. General Gardane was sent to Tehran to begin the implementation of the treaty, much to the consternation of the British. Unfortunately for Fath 'Alī Shah, his diplomatic efforts, as previously with Britain, were to fall victim to changing fortunes of war in Europe. Before Gardane's arrival in Tehran, Napoleon decisively defeated the Russians at Friedland, leading to the Treaty of Tilsit, and

3 For details of the treaty, see Gholamreza Tabatabai Majd, *Moadat va gharar dadhaye tarikhi dar doreh Qajariye* (Tehran, 1372), 'Treaty of Finkenstein', pp. 42–7.

friendship between France and Russia. Fath 'Alī Shah found himself surplus to requirements. British anxiety with the defence of India however ensured that a new treaty was not long in coming, although in stark contrast with the Treaty of Finkenstein, the two treaties signed with Britain in 1809 and 1812 were to prove long on caveats though equally short on delivery. For example, although Britain agreed to assist against European incursions, the treaties included a lengthy discussion on the specific circumstances in which Britain would assist Iran (an inability to provide material assistance would be compensated with an annual subsidy). While with respect to Afghanistan an extraordinary arrangement was reached by which Iran promised to assist Britain in the face of an Afghan attack on India, while Britain simply agreed not to interfere if Afghanistan should invade Iran.⁴ The nature of the treaties already indicated a change in the balance of power between Iran and its European interlocutors. But if British treaties were to prove conveniently verbose, their attitude paled in comparison with the humiliation to be imposed by the Russians.

The first Russo Persian War was not to go well for Iran. With the failure of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, Alexander was able to turn his attention and more forces once again to the Caucasus. At the battle of Aslanduz 'Abbas Mirza was defeated by a vastly inferior Russian force, bringing the war to an ignominious end, and confirming in no uncertain terms the military superiority of the West. The Treaty of Gulistan was finally signed on 4 October 1813. The treaty not only redrew the international boundary (albeit imprecisely) and confirmed the loss of much of Iran's Caucasian territories, it acknowledged that only Russia could deploy naval warships in the Caspian, and significantly, ensured that Russia would not only recognise but support, if necessary, the legitimate heir to the throne.⁵ This provision facilitated Russian interference in the domestic affairs of the Iranian state and as such mirrored the Ottoman Russian Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774). Such a concession could not be ignored by Britain, which soon ensured the signing of a new treaty in 1814, in which a clause was included which outlined, in somewhat more circumspect terms, the means by which Britain could interfere in Iran's domestic affairs. The 1814 treaty also reiterated the agreement reached in 1812, that in the absence of military assistance from British India, Britain would provide an annual subsidy of 200,000 tomans; although once again this appeared to be conditional on a number of factors to be

4 Majd, *Moadat*, pp. 49–72.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 72–7.

assessed by Britain.⁶ Nevertheless, the apparent promise of British assistance appears to have stiffened Iranian resolve in the face of continued Russian condescension, and there was some hope that the adoption of new military techniques and discipline (*nizam jadid*) would bear fruit. In truth, neither side perceived the Treaty of Gulistan as final, and both appeared be ready and willing to continue the contest. However, as Malcolm has argued:

An army cannot be maintained in a state of discipline and efficiency for any length of time, unless its pay be regular, and its equipments complete: and this can never be the case, except in a state where the succession to the throne is settled, where the majority of the population are of peaceable habits, and administered, and not liable to be altered at the will of the sovereign, and of his delegates. That a regular army, by influence of its example, and habits of order, may be instrumental in promoting civilisation, there can be no doubt; but this change must coincide, with many other reforms, or every effort to render it effectual to the great end of national defence will prove abortive, and terminate in disappointment . . . The means this nation possesses for resisting [such] an attack are far from inconsiderable; but they would not be improved by the partial introduction of a new military system.⁷

The dispatch of the commander in chief of the Caucasus, General Ermolov, to Tehran in 1817 to resolve outstanding territorial issues proved disastrous, as Ermolov determined to offend every Iranian sensibility. The death of Alexander and the accession of Tsar Nicholas in 1825 witnessed a temporary thaw in Russian policy, but Menshikov's embassy was greeted with a wave of anti Russian sentiment, encouraged by the '*ulama*', who were becoming increasingly outraged at the ruthless behaviour of Ermolov in the Caucasus. Refugees flowed into Iran, fanning the flames of indignation such that *fatwas* were soon being issued for a jihad against Russia. To what extent the '*ulama*' forced Fath 'Alī Shah's hand remains unclear, though the decision to finally react to Russian provocations was to prove a fatal mis calculation (the more so because the British could claim that Iran was the aggressor and withhold assistance). This time, facing veterans of the

6 The 1814 'treaty' was less a legal document than a discussion and explanation of the 1812 treaty – the Iranians in fact called it an 'argumentation document' (*ehťaj name*). It was, in short, less than clear: see Majd, *Moadat*, pp. 99–105. According to the records of the East India Company no subsidy was paid until 1828–9: see 'Affairs of the East India Company: Appendix C No. 21', *Journal of the House of Lords: volume 62: 1830*, pp. 1368–71. The sum that was finally paid went towards paying the Russian indemnity, and was paid at the cost of waiving the other obligations of the 1812/14 treaty.

7 Malcolm, *Persia*, vol. II, pp. 360–1.

Napoleonic wars, 'Abbas Mirza found himself outgunned and out disciplined. The fighting was short lived, and resulted in the Treaty of Turkmenchai, signed in 1828. Gulistan had been an injury to be avenged; Turkmenchai now heaped insult upon this injury, which served notice in no uncertain terms that Iran was no longer an equal of the Great Powers. The promise of Aqa Muḥammad Shah had not been realised. Not only were extra Caucasian territories conceded, but Iran was forced to pay an indemnity of 20,000,000 roubles. It also confirmed, in much clearer terms, that Russia would support the legitimate succession of 'Abbas Mirza and his heirs. A supplementary commercial treaty provided rights to Russian merchants which essentially signified the start of the system of 'capitulations' in Iran.⁸ If the state had been humiliated, society was to prove less forgiving. When the new Russian minister to Tehran, Griboedov, determined to continue the policy of condescension, he found himself the target of hostile popular sentiment, such that in 1829 a crowd assaulted the Russian legation and killed all but one of its members. Fath 'Alī Shah, anxious not to incur the wrath of the tsar, immediately sent a legation to apologise, but found the tsar preoccupied with the Ottoman Empire, and more sympathetic to the Iranians than his own minister. The Caucasian frontier had been settled, Russia had other problems, while the Treaty of Turkmenchai ensured a very favourable relationship with Iran. 'Abbas Mirza, with a vested interest in Russian friendship, turned his attention east, to subdue Khurasan and the Afghans, a venture fully endorsed by the Russians and calculated to incite concern among the British.

For all his failures with the Russians, 'Abbas Mirza was considered by many, including those foreign emissaries whose portrayal of the court of Fath 'Alī Shah was less than flattering, to be the great hope of the Qajar dynasty and the Iranian state. Based in Tabriz and confronted with both the Ottomans and the Russians, he had greater access to those political and scientific changes that were transforming the West, and he was by no means ignorant of the value and importance of reform. There is little doubt that his willingness to engage with Europeans ensured that they drew a favourable impression of the heir apparent; but more important for his historical legacy was the fact that he died before he was able to make good any of his intentions. Viewed through the prism of his lamentable descendants, 'Abbas Mirza's premature death in 1833 has come to be seen as one of many opportunities lost. Fath 'Alī Shah himself died a year later. An anxious court kept his death secret until the preparations for the succession of Muḥammad Shah

⁸ Majd, *Moadat*, pp. 122–57.

(r. 1834–48, the son of ‘Abbas Mirza) could be completed, and the threat of internecine conflict averted. Not that rival contenders did not appear, but by and large, Muḥammad Shah’s succession proved smooth, supported as he was by both the British and the Russians.

Fath ‘Alī Shah had reigned for thirty six years and overseen the consolidation of Qajar government and the imposition of internal peace and stability at the cost of the retraction of the country’s traditional borders. Taken in isolation, Fath ‘Alī Shah’s reign may be regarded as having achieved a measure of success. The state treasury was relatively buoyant, and indeed, in comparative terms, Iran was richer than the Ottoman Empire, whose population at this time was considered to be twice as large. Internal administration was coherent and on the whole well managed, coordinated and linked as it was by an intricate network of marriages which bound the elite to the Qajar royal family. The three pillars of the traditional Iranian state – landowners, merchants and ‘*ulama*’ – were cultivated and protected, with the shah carefully managing and manipulating the various factions and social groups that contested Iranian political culture. This was a highly personalised political culture, in which the application of the law reflected the popular conception of custom and the personal affectations of the arbiter. It was also highly decentralised, in so far as there were no formal ministries, and aside from the modest developments encouraged by ‘Abbas Mirza, no genuine standing army in the European sense. Indeed, for all the patrimonial pretensions of Fath ‘Alī Shah’s court, the Qajar state remained essentially patriarchal in character, governed through the kinship ties of a very extended family, and dependent on the personal qualities and charisma of the ruler. The shah existed to manage and balance society, not to change it, but his ability to successfully achieve this depended less on the existence of means to exercise power than on the careful cultivation of authority.⁹ The proliferation of titles reflected the concentric extension of this authority away from the shah towards those to whom he had delegated responsibility, since society was to be awed into compliance rather than forced. No one had to cultivate this charisma more than the shah, and while Aqa Muḥammad Shah’s charisma of kingship was apparent through his *de facto* success on the battlefield, his nephew had increasingly to compensate for military failure by emphasising the majesty of kingship; and few traditions of kingship are as well endowed with reserves of majesty as that of Iran. Aqa Muḥammad Shah may have exhorted his troops to action by reciting passages from the *Shahnameh*, and

9 Malcolm, *Persia*, vol. II, pp. 303–4.

constructed a Kayanid crown, but his nephew plundered it for ritual and metaphors of majesty. Not only was the Peacock Throne reconstructed, but Fath 'Alī Shah aspired to emulate his Sasanian predecessors by having rock carvings made of his majesty at Rey. The consensual nature of Qajar 'despotism' not only imposed limitations on the activities of the shah and accentuated the importance of charismatic authority, but also ensured that without that crucial element of charisma, little change could be effected on society. Moreover, in the absence of charisma, any social impetus for change was likely to be constrained by the inactivity of the one element of the system on which the rest depended. The consequence was to be a further decentralisation of power, a dilution of authority and a lapse into fatalistic complacency.

Social revolution and the failure of reform

No one better epitomised this complacency than Muḥammad Shah, 'Abbas Mīrza's son and Fath 'Alī Shah's successor. His legitimacy and succession guaranteed by international treaty, Muḥammad Shah enjoyed a comparatively smooth transition to power, and continued through his lackadaisical attitude to government to dissipate what was left of central government power and royal authority.¹⁰ Although his fourteen year reign witnessed attempts to establish control over Herat – a predilection for the eastern frontier the Russians encouraged – it was chiefly characterised by indolence and complacency which had not been seen since the days of Shah Sulṭān Ḥusayn (r. 1694–1722), the last of the Safavid monarchs to actually rule. Indeed, far from managing, and refining where necessary, the system he had inherited, Muḥammad Shah proceeded to squander it. His repeated attempts to seize Herat resulted in protracted sieges which exhausted the treasury, and turned a surplus into deficit, while his affectation for the Sufi life offended the 'ulama', on whom his religious legitimacy depended. The offence was extended to other members of the elite when Muḥammad Shah appointed his Sufi mentor Ḥajjī Mīrza Aqasī as prime minister (*sadr i azam*). Aqasī soon became renowned for his venality and nepotism, maintaining and protecting his position by ensuring that his master only heard what was necessary and what was good. According to the shah's brother, 'the

¹⁰ See, for example, *Nameh ye Ḥajjī Mīrza Aqasī beh Muḥammad Shah: dar shekayat az shoghli sadarat 1259* (A letter from Ḥajjī Mīrza Aqasī to Muḥammad Shah complaining about his position as minister 1843), in Ebrahim Safai (ed.), *Yek sad sanad tarikhi: doran e Qajar* (Tehran, n.d.), p. 39.

Ḥajjī [Aqasī] had entirely conquered the temperaments of the late shah [Muḥammad Shah]. By means of mysticism, piety and asceticism he convinced the late shah that he was a saint.¹¹ In 1848 he reportedly told the dying shah that the tranquillity of kingdom compared favourably with the revolutions that were now engulfing Europe.¹²

Within two months of the accession of the new shah, revolts were erupting throughout the country, the most serious ultimately being that of the Bab. The emergence of the Babi revolt reflected changes that had occurred in the structure of the Shī'ī 'ulama' since the end of the eighteenth century, and the dynamic fluidity of Iranian society as well as its relation to the state. As a result of the political turmoil of the eighteenth century the Shī'ī 'ulama' had developed structures independent of the state, such that far from being servants of the state as they had been under the Safavids, by the time of the accession of Aqa Muḥammad Shah, they were increasingly negotiating the terms of their relationship with the temporal power, granting religious legitimacy in return for protection. Moreover, their position with respect to society at large had been considerably enhanced by their ability and willingness to deliver justice and social welfare where the state had been absent, and to mediate where the state was proving exacting.¹³

The ability of the 'ulama' to provide for the populace was also facilitated by an important theological development which had begun to take root at the turn of the nineteenth century. This involved a debate between two epistemological schools of thought, known as the Akhbari Usulī dispute. The Akhbaris, who had been dominant, argued against the principles of *ijtihād* and *taqlīd*, the notion that a religious scholar of sufficient learning could interpret and pronounce on aspects of the law and, by the process of *taqlīd*, be a source of emulation and imitation by his followers. The practical consequences of this debate was that the Akhbaris tended towards a much more philosophical approach to everyday problems, refusing to adjudicate without reference to one of the twelve Imams, and as such appeared to be divorced from the real world. Usulis, on the other hand, were more than willing to practise *ijtihād* and to solve problems. This tendency was given a boost by the great Usulī scholar Aqa Muḥammad Baqir Bihbihānī (d. 1791). The triumph of the Usulī doctrine effectively expanded the possibilities for interpretation, provided the justification for a division of Shī'as into the sources of emulation and their

11 Azud al Dawla, *Tarikh i Azudi*, pp. 61–2, quoted in Amanat, *Pivot*, p. 29.

12 Amanat, *Pivot*, p. 103.

13 Malcolm, *Persia*, p. 304; the respect which the common people retained should nonetheless be juxtaposed with the irreverence of the elites: see *ibid.*, pp. 457, 462.

followers, and crucially provided *mujtahids* with the chance of access to esoteric knowledge their Akhbari colleagues would not have presumed to acquire. It also redefined the relationship between the senior '*ulama*' and the shah inasmuch as it facilitated access to a distinctly religious (and, some would argue, superior) charismatic authority. Indeed, Mulla Aḥmad Naraqī, in propounding and developing the hitherto marginal concept of *vilayat i faqih* (government by the jurist), was quite explicit about the superior authority enjoyed by the religious jurists.

This was never a possibility with the Safavids, since they had claimed descent from the imams, and Naraqī's views were in many ways exceptional. Indeed, even he was anxious not to provoke the temporal authorities, and tended to frame his discussion within the parameters of theological discussion devoid of political implication. Nonetheless, if the doctrine of *vilayat* was not being widely adopted, the concept of *marja'iyat*, where Shi'is were being encouraged to tie themselves to the particular teachings of a *mujtahid*, was becoming entrenched. Naraqī never claimed the title of *marja'*. This was left to another senior *mujtahid*, Shaykh Murtaḍa Anṣarī (d. 1864), whose acclamation as the only *marja'* of his age ensured that he defined, by his practice and behaviour, the meaning of the concept. These changes in Shi'i theology and practice were to have profound consequences in the decentralised power structure that characterised Qajar Iran. Given the fluidity of social relations and the absence of an overbearing centralised state and discontent with the capabilities of that state, the ground was fertile for the growth of particular religious movements centred upon charismatic authorities who could claim esoteric knowledge.

Among the earlier movements to emerge was the Shaykhi movement founded by Shaykh Aḥmad al Aḥsa'i, who was reportedly born in a small village in the eastern Arabian Peninsula. A Shi'i, the Shaykh moved to Iraq for his education and then to Iran in 1806, where he stayed till 1822. He gained a considerable reputation in southern Iran as a scholar, and benefited from the patronage of the governor of Kirmanshah and the sympathies of the shah himself. His popularity and following attracted the envy of other members of the '*ulama*', who sought to define him out of orthodoxy by labelling him and his followers Shaykhis, who had diverted from the true path of orthodox Shi'ism. Nevertheless, despite these mounting pressures, the Shaykh's popularity and political support afforded him the protection he needed. His successor, Sayyid Kazim Rashti (d. 1843/4), was to prove more vulnerable, and although he emphasised the Shaykh's teachings as part of mainstream Shi'i thought, he nonetheless thought it wise to move to Iraq, where he

continued to vigorously defend the esoteric basis of the Shaykh's ideas. Essentially Shaykhī doctrine argued that Shī'ism had to be purified of its innovations and return to the infallible sources of guidance (the Qur'an, Ḥadīth and the Imams). Where interpretation was required this would be achieved through the exercise of reason and esoteric, in this case that of the Shaykh. Indeed, Shaykhīs argued that in the absence of the Hidden Imam, other intermediaries were needed to provide guidance, in this case the Shaykh and his successors. The Shaykh himself attracted controversy by defining God in terms of the 'Primal Will', claiming an intimate relationship with the Imams whom he tended to deify and alluding to practices which to many members of the '*ulama*' approached those of Sufism. These ideas, along with the notion that resurrection did not mean a physical but rather a spiritual return, drew scorn and criticism from the orthodox '*ulama*'.

In the absence of a clear successor to Rashtī following his death in 1843/4, the Shaykhī community was thrown into disarray. A number decided to transfer their allegiance to a hitherto unpretentious former pupil of Rashtī, by the name of Sayyid 'Alī Muḥammad Shīrāzī. Much to the distress of his family, 'Alī Muḥammad had grown tired of mercantile life and gone to Iraq to study under Rashtī who, according to Bābī tradition, was suitably impressed with the boy's piety and learning. In 1840 he returned to Shīrāz, much to the satisfaction and relief of his family. However, four years later it was reported that he was having dreamlike revelations, resulting in a visit from senior members of the Shaykhī movement, who, suitably impressed, accepted him as Rashtī's legitimate successor, and he soon became known as the Bab, the gate to the Hidden Imam. His claims, however ambiguous they were initially, soon excited Shī'ites in both Iraq and Iran, with the prospect of a millenarian movement. Not surprisingly, this caused considerable anxiety among the orthodox '*ulama*', who drew attention to his 'heretical' claims to be the Hidden Imam's representative on earth, and to enjoy an intimate relationship with him. Eventually the frustration boiled over, and in 1845 members of the '*ulama*' issued a *fatwa* condemning the Bab to death. Significantly, at this stage Muḥammad Shah did little to see the *fatwa* implemented, curious as he was about the Bab's claims; but he nonetheless invited the Bab for an audience, only to have him suddenly arrested and imprisoned in a fortress in north western Iran. An otherwise sympathetic relationship not surprisingly now became fraught, as the Bab issued condemnations of the shah, and his followers grew more militant. In 1847, the first casualty occurred when a prominent notable in Qazvin was murdered, the blame immediately being attached to the followers of the Bab. The latter compounded matters

when in 1848 he announced that, contrary to previous assertions, he could now confirm that he was indeed the Hidden Imam, returned at the end of time. This was an extraordinary claim to make, since the return of the Imam effectively nullified *shari'a* law, and confirmed the illegitimacy of the Qajar state. Far from being a religious curiosity, the Bab had transformed himself and his followers into a revolutionary movement, with profound political consequences. Just at this time, Muḥammad Shah died.

His death sparked further revolts, in Khurasan and in Tehran, as regiments mutinied for lack of pay. Combined with the Babi revolt, the Qajar state appeared to be crumbling under the weight of its own inefficiencies. Yet just as the country's notables breathed a sigh of relief at the imminent demise of Aqasi, the young king, Nasir al Dīn Shah (r. 1848–96), brought with him a new first minister from Tabriz. Mirza Taqī Khan, known to history by his most common title, 'Amir Kabir', was the son of a cook.¹⁴ He had risen through the ranks as much on personal proximity to the future monarch as on his talents which were to prove extensive, and certainly more constructive than those of Aqasi. As with Aqa Muḥammad Shah, Amir Kabir understood that the shah was the linchpin of the state, and that his majesty must be restored and, if possible, extended if anything was to be achieved. Acutely aware of the failings of the Qajar state, Amir Kabir was a keen admirer of Muḥammad 'Alī in Egypt, and was determined to develop a strongly centralised and bureaucratic state to transform Iran's decentralised patriarchal structure into a powerful patrimonial one. In this respect, Amir Kabir was not the harbinger of *modern* Iran as some nationalist historians would contend, but an advocate of a strong centralised state modelled on traditional Iranian norms – his main source was the *Siyasat nama* of Nizam al Mulk (d. 1092) – with the shah firmly ensconced at the centre of an efficient bureaucratic machinery. Central to his project was the establishment of order, and this in turn depended on the majesty of the monarch.¹⁵

The young king's self confidence was to be enhanced by the reading of history. Amir Kabir reportedly prevented him reading a translation of Malcolm's *History of Persia*, and instead encouraged him to read the *Shahnama* and a biography of Napoleon.¹⁶ Such models of government were intended to instil a sense of purpose and action in the young monarch, and Nasir al Dīn was regularly berated for his complacent attitude towards

14 George N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question* (London, 1892), vol. I, p. 444. Curzon concludes from the fact that since people of menial descent can achieve high office, 'from one point of view, Persia is the most democratic country in the world'.

15 Quoted in Amanat, *Pivot*, p. 94. 16 *Ibid.*, p. 130.

government: 'With these excuses and postponements and escaping from duties it is absolutely impossible to rule over such an unruly [country] as Iran', adding for good measure that 'if your Majesty would be willing to set your mind for two months on your duties, all the corrupt assumptions would depart from people's minds. The affairs would be in such order as to make the entire world envious.'¹⁷ If the monarch had inherited some of the lethargy of his father, Amīr Kabīr proved more than able and willing to compensate. His enthusiasm for the monarchy and determination to restore order involved the implementation of a programme of austerity, since perpetual insolvency was the root cause of the monarchy's immediate problems. The absence of money not only resulted in mutinous troops – without which no order could be imposed – but also ensured that the shah was dependent upon his vassals and, more significantly, the foreign legations. Nasir al Dīn Shah however found frugality to be contrary to his vision of majesty, as of course did those notables who depended on a steady stream of pensions and grants for their material well being. Amīr Kabīr's determination to rein in excessive expenditure only compounded the sin of his ignoble birth in the eyes of the Qajar elite. Nonetheless, to begin with he enjoyed the unconditional support of his shah, much to the chagrin of his opponents.

Among the many problems facing the state, the Bābī revolt was to prove one of the most serious, although initially the official response to the Bāb's claims was that he was mad. This declaration of insanity, confirmed by European physicians, prevented the imposition of a death penalty, and instead the Bāb was ridiculed and bastinadoed. For his supporters, however, the claims were very serious, and as the Bāb ascended the scales of charismatic authority, so his followers acquired the residual charisma that could now be delegated. In ascribing the Bāb near divine qualities and status, his disciples in turn acquired the characteristics and authority of 'companions' and Shī'ī saints. Moreover, the Bāb's increasingly virulent and extreme statements only confirmed their conviction that Judgement Day had in fact arrived. Some decided to mount a last stand at the fortress at Tabarsi, the siege of which lasted some seven months, in part because of the financial support the Bābīs had mustered from wealthy sympathisers – including the future leader of the movement, Bāhā'Allāh (1817–92), a point noted by Amīr Kabīr. The siege nonetheless came to a successful conclusion, and Amīr Kabīr, determined to put an end to insurrection once and for all, had the Bāb executed in 1850. This of course, was not the end of the movement. In

¹⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 119, p. 120.

1852, following an assassination attempt on the shah, a wholesale pogrom of Babis took place throughout the country. Baha'Allah was himself sentenced to life imprisonment, and was subsequently released early and sent into exile. From 1866 he relocated to Baghdad, where he consolidated his leadership over the Babis and initiated the transformation of the militant millenarian movement into the Baha'i faith.

If the Babi movement was to witness renovation and renewal under the leadership of Baha'Allah, the state that spawned the movement was to be less fortuitous. Amir Kabir was determined to renovate the kingdom. Like other reformers, he began with a wholesale reform of the armed forces, rationalising recruitment, rebuilding fortifications and forbidding the practice of billeting. This was to be a modern army on the lines envisaged by 'Abbas Mirza in Azerbaijan. Although the paper strength of the army was always exaggerated, its practical strength was by 1852 estimated to be around 70,000, not a negligible force for a state that was struggling to define a centralised and solvent bureaucracy. He also founded the first institute of higher education in the country, the Dar al Funun, with the intention of acquiring technical expertise in the sciences and military arts, and moved to centralise the judiciary and bring the religious courts under state control.¹⁸ He also inaugurated the first Persian language newspaper (significantly, under an English editor)¹⁹ and furthermore, in a bid to control finances, cut court pensions, and reassessed land taxes, ensuring that all overdue taxes were collected. Not surprisingly, such an austerity package played badly with the Qajar elite, including, significantly, members of the shah's harem, and Nasir al Din's mother in particular, who resented the control Amir Kabir had over her son.²⁰ The growing resentment and opposition of the elite was compounded by anger among the British and Russian legations with Amir Kabir's ruthless determination to reassert Iranian independence. With respect to the revolt in Khurasan he is reported to have said, 'It would be better for Iran that the inhabitants of Mashhad should be brought back to their duty through the loss of twenty thousand men, than the city should be won for the Shah through foreign interference', adding, 'We will not allow Khorasan to turn into a second Egypt.'²¹ These combined pressures were ultimately to be the undoing of the shah's *atabak*. By the end of 1851, with the country pacified but the reforms barely rooted, Nasir al Din grew tired of his mentor and had

¹⁸ Curzon, *Persian Question*, vol. I, p. 454.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 468.

²⁰ *Amanat, Pivot*, pp. 134–6.

²¹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 116.

him dismissed. Amīr Kabīr retired into internal exile in his home in Kashan, where, with royal encouragement, he was persuaded to take his own life in 1852. Amīr Kabīr of all people, with his knowledge of the history of Iranian kings, must have realised that he too might one day become expendable, and that the practice of viziericide was not uncommon, particularly when a young king decided it was time to establish his personal authority. Yet this was a particularly brutal and wasteful exercise, because, more than the death of an individual, it came to signify the death of a process and a crucial opportunity lost in the political history of Iran. For all the satisfaction the foreign legations gained from Amīr Kabīr's dismissal, they were equally shocked at his murder.²² Nasir al Dīn Shah was likewise to express regrets later in life.²³ Amīr Kabīr's legacy was to be a profoundly mixed one. He had succeeded in crushing revolts, both social and political; but while he had restored order, he had been unable to build constructively upon it, leaving it instead to a monarch whose feckless incompetence would squander any advantages Amīr Kabīr had gained.²⁴ Nothing in Iran succeeds so much as tragedy, however, and Amīr Kabīr's limited practical impact belied the enormous influence he was to have on the popular consciousness. He was to transcend history and become myth.²⁵

Social change and revolt

For the next two decades Nasir al Dīn Shah managed the modest successes that Amīr Kabīr had been able to achieve in his short premiership, but failed to show the energy and drive that his *atabak* had hoped. Rather than become the master of his kingdom, as Amīr Kabīr had hoped, the shah succumbed to the vagaries of court politics and the manipulations of the foreign legations. His only real attempt to make his mark was an abortive attempt to reincorporate Herat within the Iranian state. In 1856 Iranian troops did finally take the city, to general jubilation in Tehran, only to find that its capture brought with it a declaration of war from Britain. British troops landed at Bushire and Kharg, and began the march inland, encountering Iranian forces at Khushab in 1857. Before any serious engagements could take place, a treaty was signed

22 Curzon, *Persian Question*, vol. I, p. 402; see also Amanat, *Pivot*, pp. 163–4.

23 Amanat, *Pivot*, pp. 166–8.

24 Amanat offers an interesting interpretation of the consequences of this for the development of the orthodox '*ulama*': *ibid.*, p. 168.

25 For early examples of popular nostalgia see *ibid.*, p. 390.

bringing the whole unfortunate exercise to a tolerable end. Nasir al Dīn Shah was fortunate that this particular imperial war was not popular in Britain: few Britons knew or cared about Herat, and Palmerston was under considerable pressure for having pursued it. He was therefore eager to bring matters to a swift conclusion, and the terms of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of Paris (1857) were not unduly harsh. Iran had to forfeit its right to Herat and to promise not to interfere in Afghanistan, but there was no indemnity to be paid, and a clause was included which allowed Iran to intervene if its borders had been infringed.²⁶ For Nasir al Dīn Shah and the Qajar state, this rather fortunate escape nonetheless represented another defeat, and emphasised again, if such evidence were needed, that Iran was not capable of sustaining a military campaign against a European power. Her statesmen therefore resorted to diplomatic means by seeking engagement with a wider range of European and Western powers (a trade agreement was signed with the United States in 1856), in order to balance the increasingly suffocating pressures of Britain and Russia. Perhaps the only significant development in this period, although this had little to do with royal foresight, was the construction and development of the telegraph system, which the British government had decided to pursue following the Indian Mutiny (1857). Traversing Iran, this new network allowed the shah, and later his opponents, to better communicate and coordinate their activities throughout the country.

The first concessions for the construction of the telegraph were to be offered in the 1860s. As a project it was both a positive development and lucrative for the government, which suddenly acquired a taste for the wholesale privatisation of Iranian assets. Trading agreements that may have had value in integrating Iran within a broader international diplomatic framework, and afforded the state some political leverage in its negotiations, took a pernicious turn with the awarding of concessions. If favourable trading agreements had irritated the local merchant elite, the awarding of what amounted to monopoly control over key state assets was to translate this into anger and ignite the spark of nascent Iranian nationalism. The catalyst for this development was an extraordinary concession to the British entrepreneur Baron Julius de Reuter. In 1872 Nasir al Dīn Shah was encouraged to award an extensive concession to Reuter, by his new prime minister (the first in fact to carry the title since Amīr Kabīr), Mīrza Ḥusayn Khan. Mīrza Ḥusayn Khan was a keen advocate of the reforms espoused by Amīr Kabīr, barring one significant difference: he argued that modernisation would be best

²⁶ Majd, *Moadat*, pp. 277–91.

achieved with British assistance; or, as Rawlinson noted, 'the regeneration of Persia through the identification of her interests with those of Great Britain'.²⁷ The concession awarded, however, was so extensive in its largesse that the astonishment of the international community was matched by that of the Foreign Office in London. In Curzon's opinion the concession, which cost £40,000, amounted to 'the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished in history'.²⁸

The international outcry, along with the discomfort in the Foreign Office at someone of 'Jewish extraction' having so much control over Iranian resources, ensured that the agreement, much to Reuter's justifiable chagrin, was never honoured.²⁹ Concession fever and national indignation, particularly among elements of the elites, for whom Qajar economic mismanagement was beginning to bite, re-emerged over a decade later, when Reuter was eventually compensated for his loss by the award of another concession, that of establishing and operating the British Imperial Bank of Persia. The concession, signed in 1889, not only granted Reuter some limited mineral rights, but significantly provided his new bank with the exclusive rights to issue bank notes, thereby depriving many of the country's exchange merchants of a ready source of revenue in an instant. The rising anger among the country's elite was nonetheless probably better exemplified by the abrogation, following protests from the 'ulama', of another concession, on this occasion the right to conduct a lottery, granted to the Armenian Iranian notable, Malkom Khan (1833–1908). Malkom Khan speedily sold his concession before the abrogation took effect, much to the irritation of the court, which stripped him of his titles and posts. He struck back from Istanbul with the publication of the highly influential Persian newspaper, *Qanun*.³⁰

Malkom Khan represented a generation of Iranians who had begun to absorb the cultural and intellectual influence of the West. Increasingly frustrated with the inability of the shah to take decisive action and restore a modicum of dignity to the Iranian state, they began to argue for the implementation of more radical European style reforms. As with the Young Ottomans, this was not a case of strengthening the central state through the person of the monarch; it was a recognition that the problem lay with the

27 Quoted in Curzon, *Persian Question*, vol. I, p. 480. 28 Ibid.

29 Geoffrey Jones, *Banking and empire in Iran: The history of the British Bank of the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1986), vol I, p. 13.

30 For details see Edward G. Browne, *The Persian revolution 1905–1909* (Washington, 1995) pp. 35–8.

monarch himself. Edward Browne caught the mood when he eloquently pointed out that, contrary to the diplomatic view, Nasir al Dīn Shah was far from the enlightened monarch generally presented. On the contrary, he was 'a selfish despot, devoid of public spirit, careful of his own public comfort and advantage, and most averse to the introduction of liberal ideas amongst a people whose natural quickness, intelligence and aptitude to learn cause him nothing but anxiety'. He added that 'his supposed admiration for civilisation amounts to little more than the languid amusement which he derives from the contemplation and possession of mechanical playthings and ingenious toys'.³¹

Complementing this legal approach were two more revolutionary and highly emotive ideas, both of which, again, related to European influence. The first, secular nationalism, with increasingly racial connotations, was epitomised by Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, for whom the ills of the country could be laid at the door of foreign invaders, especially the Arabs.³² The other equally vituperative approach was epitomised by the Islamic modernist Jamal al Dīn al Afghānī (1838–97), whose polemic, when he sought to rouse the masses from their slumber, could be equally colourful. Afghānī is widely regarded as the father of modern pan Islamism and, unlike his co agitators, Islam was at the core of his thinking and a necessary means for the awakening of the Islamic world. At the same time, his approach and understanding of Islam was a much more nuanced and critical one than some of his disciples would have us believe. Certainly his legacy in the Arab and Iranian world remain distinct. Afghānī, despite his adopted name, and desire to disguise his Shī'ī roots, was a product of the fluid religious environment that had given birth to the Bābī movement. He was a keen advocate of the use of reason and interpretation in order to modernise the faith and ensure its compatibility with developments in contemporary science. He was particularly scathing of the tendency towards uncritical faith: 'Yoked, like an ox to the plow, to the dogma whose slave he is, he must walk eternally in the furrow that has been traced for him in advance by the interpreters of the law. Convinced, besides, that his religion contains in itself all morality and all sciences, he attaches himself resolutely to it and makes no effort to go beyond.'³³ He was in essence an Islamic *philosophe* who would have found much in common with the

³¹ See Edward G. Browne, *A year among the Persians* (Cambridge, 1893), p. 99.

³² Shaul Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, bureaucracy and reform under the Qajars: 1858–1896* (London, 1978), p. 345.

³³ Answer of Jamal ad Dīn to Renan, quoted in Nikkie Keddie, *An Islamic response to Imperialism: Political and religious writings of Sayyid Jamal ad Dīn 'Al Afghānī'* (Berkeley, 1983), p. 183.

French thinkers of the Enlightenment, and while by no means an atheist, his views were undoubtedly heterodox.³⁴ Above all, he was an activist, and recognised that popular political agitation could only be achieved through the medium of Islam. Distrusted by the orthodox ‘*ulama*’ (in whichever Muslim country he happened to settle in), Afghani’s thought, eclectic as it may be at times, was to have a profound influence on generations of succeeding activists, though as with all founding fathers, his views have often been selectively used.

If Afghani was critical of the more secular trends within the Muslim world, and Iran in particular, he nonetheless shared with them an intense dislike of the shah, describing him as a ‘viper’ and a ‘man of sin’, adding: ‘Naught will content me save that the Shah shall be killed, and his belly ripped open, and his body consigned to the tomb.’³⁵ Such views gained political expression in 1891–2, when it became apparent that the shah had granted yet another concession, this time for the sale of tobacco products. Like the concession to the British Imperial Bank, this directly affected the commercial interests of merchants, while in this case adding to the list of the aggrieved those landlords who cultivated and grew tobacco. Moreover, growth in the Iranian economy had begun to slow, adding to the widespread sense of economic injustice. Afghani protested against the concession and was expelled, but discontent began to filter through the country’s newspapers, and a move to boycott tobacco products gathered steam. Finally the leading *mujtahid*, Ḥajjī Mirza Ḥasan Shirazi, intervened to back the emerging boycott, thereby blessing the nation wide protest, which on occasion took on a distinctly revolutionary flavour, and ensuring that the government would ultimately be forced to concede defeat and annul the concession. This misjudged concession saddled the government with its first significant debt of some £500,000 as it was forced to pay compensation to the concessionaire. In Browne’s view:

Only one great and good thing came out of all this wretched business. The Persian people led by their spiritual guides, and led, moreover, on the whole with wonderful wisdom and self restraint, had shown that there was limit to what they would endure, that they were not the spiritless creatures which they had been supposed to be, and that henceforth they would have to be reckoned with. From that time especially, as I believe, dates the national awakening of which we are still watching the development.³⁶

34 For an alternative view see Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and Abduh: An essay on religious unbelief and political activism in modern Islam* (London, 1997).

35 Browne, *Persian revolution*, p. 24. 36 *Ibid.*, p. 57.

The constitutional revolution

Nasir al Dīn Shah finally succumbed to an assassin in 1896, thus transforming himself overnight from a monarch of mediocre achievements into a martyr. His successor, Muẓaffar al Dīn Shah (r. 1896–1907), ruled a state that had barely altered in its social and political fabric since the accession of Fath ‘Alī Shah a century earlier. The country was still overwhelmingly rural, its population illiterate and largely poor, and its economy agricultural and traditional. The consequences of another concession, awarded in 1901 to William Knox D’Arcy for the exploitation of oil, was yet to be felt. Trade was the dominant activity of its commercial classes, while an increasingly independent ‘*ulama*’ vied with landlords in contesting the political landscape with the extensive Qajar royal family.³⁷ The promise of the Qajar state had of course evaporated, while the impact of Europe was everywhere to be felt. Military pressures had given way to commercial intervention and political manipulation. Far more profound than these interventions was to be the intellectual and cultural impact of Europe. In the decades leading to 1905, an increasing number of the Iranian political and commercial elite were becoming familiar with Europe, initially through contact with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, but gradually through travel to Western Europe. The educated Iranian elite was in many ways remarkably cosmopolitan and adaptable. Its most educated members both travelled extensively and acquired the languages of Europe. It was not only Malkom Khan who might spend time in Europe; Afghani, for instance, spent time in both Paris and London, and was conversant with many members of the liberal elite, most notably Ernest Renan, who said of him: ‘The liberty of his thought, his noble and loyal character, made me believe while I was talking with him, that I had before me, restored to life, one of my old acquaintances – Avicenna, Averroes, or another of those great infidels who represented for five centuries the tradition of the human mind.’³⁸ The intellectual vitality of the political elite, when allied with the authority of the senior ‘*ulama*’, and the simmering discontent of the mercantile classes, was to have momentous consequences for the political transformation of the Qajar state.

As with all revolutions of consequence, the immediate trigger was set by an economic crisis. In late 1905 the government decided to take action against

37 On the power of the ‘*ulama*’ see Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey, dated 23 December 1905, in R. M. Burrell, *Iran: Political diaries 1881–1905*, ed. R. L. Jarman, 14 vols. (Melksham, 1997), vol. II, pp. 485–506.

38 Quoted in Keddie, *An Islamic response*, p. 92.

inflation by making an example of a number of Tehran merchants. One of these merchants proved to be highly popular, and respected *sayyids* within the bazaar and a number of '*ulama*' decided to take their protest at his treatment to the Masjid i Shah. Turned away, they then headed for another shrine, the Shah 'Abd al Azim. There, they demanded redress for their grievances, including in particular the dismissal of a Belgian customs official by the name of Joseph Naus whose attempts to extract more revenue for the state had made him deeply unpopular and, more innovatively, the establishment of a 'house of justice' (*adalatkhana*). Much to their surprise, on 12 January 1906 the shah acceded to their requests, although it appears that this was a tactical concession with a view to dispersing the crowds, since no one seemed to have a clear idea what a house of justice might entail. Unsurprisingly, the shah did not dismiss Naus, although the Belgian thought it wise to leave the country until the dust had settled. When the issue was finally discussed, in April 1906, it became clear that what was envisaged was a parliament with legislative powers and the ability to check the power of the shah and his ministers. This was rejected out of hand, but the government discovered that the senior *mujtahids*, Ṭabaṭaba'ī and Bihbihani, in actual fact supported the protest and that Ṭabaṭaba'ī in particular voiced support for the idea of a parliament (*majlis*). Nonetheless, a standoff continued until July, when the government arrested a preacher for a particularly virulent denunciation of the state of affairs. The arrest resulted in further clashes during which a young cleric, who happened also to be a *sayyid*, was shot. Further clashes ensued as protestors 'surrounded a pole bearing the blood stained shirt of the murdered Seyed [*sic*] and paraded it through the bazaars. The soldiers tried to stop the procession and finally fired, killing and wounding many.'³⁹

Outraged at the turn of events, the '*ulama*' collectively migrated to Qum and effectively went on strike until the shah fulfilled the promises he had made. At the same time, the merchants of Tehran staged a sit in at the British embassy, which was known at the time to be sympathetic to the idea of a constitution. Faced with an effective shut down of the capital, the shah relented. On 18 August the '*ulama*' returned to Tehran. These new revolutionaries immediately set about defining a constitution, and almost as quickly the differences became apparent. Secularists clashed with the religious nationalists, while local grievances contended with the broader vision

39 Sir C. Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, *General Report on Persia for the year 1906*, 29 January 1907, in Burrell, *Iran*, vol. III, pp. 73–87.

harboured by the architects of the movement. The truth was, of course, that this was a small scale, urban and elitist movement; and while Tehran and Tabriz provided the intellectual depth, other parts of the country were less attached to the idea of a constitution. Nonetheless, a preliminary law was enacted to enable elections, and then a detailed Fundamental Law was signed by Muẓaffar al Dīn Shah. The shah had the good sense to die before he could change his mind, thereby enshrining his singular contribution to the political history of Iran.

His successor, Muḥammad ‘Alī Shah (r. 1907–9), was less than enamoured with his inheritance. The electoral laws, and the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 1907, offered a limited franchise, inasmuch as women were not allowed the vote and suffrage was limited to those with property or a profession. It also included a provision by which all laws would be vetted by a council of the leading *mujtahids*. In its tone and tenor, however, this was a liberal document, offering Iranians civil rights and curtailing the power of the monarchy. More controversially, article 26 of the Supplementary Laws decreed that ‘the powers of the realm are all derived from the people’.⁴⁰ Language of this nature was to provoke disputes with more conservative clerics, such as Shaykh Faḡl Allāh Nūrī, who began to see the constitution as yet another Western innovation. His protestations were, however, initially ignored as elections were set and the political climate in the centres of constitutionalism became increasingly competitive. The six newspapers that were in circulation prior to the revolution leapt to over one hundred in the ten months after the formation of the *majlis*. Political excitement aside, religious agitation was not the only problem with the initial constitution. Of the 156 constituencies defined, a full sixty were allocated to Tehran while the relatively populous Azerbaijan received a mere twelve. The first *majlis* therefore had a preponderance of deputies from Tehran, and of these a majority of secular nationalists. As such it was neither representative of the country as a whole nor indeed of the elite. Almost immediately it set itself ambitious plans, and made no secret of its antagonism to the government. It demanded the formation of a national army, a national bank and the implementation of state wide education. Unfortunately, in their enthusiasm, the delegates failed to appreciate the cost of such plans, and instead argued that the government should economise. Unsurprisingly the government refused. Deadlocked ensued.

Meanwhile the international situation was changing. Britain, having been in favour of the constitution, had supported it, and had not been unduly

⁴⁰ Browne, *Persian revolution*, p. 375.

concerned at Russian discomfort. In 1907, however, Britain and Russia agreed to bury their differences in an agreement which witnessed their division of Iran into spheres of influence. Tehran and Tabriz sat squarely within the Russian sphere of influence, and Muḥammad 'Alī Shah was aware both of Russian displeasure at the granting of the constitution and his own subjects' growing fatigue with the unfulfilled pleasures of politics. In 1908 he decided to move by using the newly strengthened Cossack Brigade to close the *majlis* and suspend the constitution. The stalemate continued, as the shah now discovered that he had little means to achieve much on his own either and, worse still, he enjoyed none of the popular sympathy of the revolutionaries. Popular discontent resulted in an uprising in Gilan in the north and among the Bakhtiari tribesmen in the south, both groups leading armed men to Tehran where in 1909 they deposed the shah and replaced him with his nine year old son Aḥmad Shah. The constitution was restored and a new *majlis* elected. This time the secular nationalists were in control, Faḡl Allah Nūrī, the firebrand cleric, was hanged and the influence of the 'ulama' as a whole declined. With a more radical platform the second *majlis* was more eager to raise the funds necessary for its plans. However, at this stage the international situation took a turn for the worse. While the Anglo Russian agreement had divided Iran into spheres of influence, it had nonetheless implied consultation between the Russians and the British; and the latter had been sympathetic to the constitutional movement. Tsar Nicholas II had also toyed with the idea of greater liberalism, but with the assassination of his liberally minded prime minister, Stolypin, Russian attitudes began to harden. With Russian troops occupying Tabriz, the government was anxious not to antagonise the Russians further. Nonetheless, the *majlis* decided that salvation had to be sought from a third power, and attention was directed towards the United States. The US government was unwilling to become involved but allowed a banker, Morgan Shuster, to lead a team of officials to Iran, at the invitation of the *majlis*, to reform the country's finances.⁴¹ Shuster energetically set to task with an ambitious programme of reform including the formation of a 15,000 strong Treasury Gendarmerie. His brusque manner, somewhat ironically, offended the Russians, who demanded his dismissal – a demand the *majlis* refused. The government however, anxious not to provoke the Russians further than necessary, suppressed the *majlis* on 24 December 1911 and dismissed Shuster the following day. The Russian domination of

41 Shuster's assessment of the situation, and European exploitation, was damning: see W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York, 1912), pp. 37–8.

northern Iran was confirmed not only with the brutal repression of the constitutionalists in Tabriz, but with the subsequent notorious bombardment of the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad on 30 March 1912.⁴² For all intents and purposes, central government ceased to exist.

In the run up to the First World War, probably the most important development to affect Iran occurred in Britain with the transfer of the Royal Navy to oil and the subsequent decision by the British government to purchase a 'golden share' in the newly formed Anglo Persian Oil Company. These moves transformed Britain's relationship with Iran, ensuring that in British eyes at least, Iran was no longer simply part of the Great Game, but in effect had become the strategic prize itself. Iran was no longer simply important for the defence of India, but for the defence of Britain herself. In Iran herself, while central government disintegrated, the regency was concluded and the young king, Aḥmad Shah, was finally crowned in 1914. Of marginally more significance, the third *majlis* was also convened by the end of that year. But Iranian affairs from August 1914 were not to be determined by its own political woes, but by the catastrophe to befall Europe. With Russian troops in occupation of the north of the country and the widespread opposition they engendered, there was some concern that popular sympathies might encourage the government to nominally throw in its lot with the Central Powers, especially with the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war. However, with the Ottoman decision to invade Iran, itself a consequence of Russian attacks from Iranian territory, there was little to choose between the combatants, and Iran eventually decided that neutrality would be the best option.⁴³ Not that this legal neutrality served her particularly well. The Russians and Ottomans continued to use Iran as an extended battlefield, while the British in the south recruited a new military force (the South Persia Rifles) in order to protect her own interests, and of course the oilfields. By the end of 1917 the situation had been transformed by the Russian Revolution, along with the slow retreat of the Ottomans, which effectively ensured that Britain, by default, became the undisputed hegemon within Iran. As British forces moved northwards they discovered a country in the throes of a serious social and economic dislocation made worse by a government without money and the onset of a poor harvest. Moreover, widespread grievance coupled with the growth of nationalist sentiment had led to the emergence of

42 Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey, *Persia Annual Report* [15876], dated 18 March 1913, in Burrell, *Iran*, vol. V, pp 461–95.

43 Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey, *The War* [50145], dated 24 March 1915, in Burrell, *Iran*, vol. V, pp. 669–72.

a political rebellion in Gilan – the Jangali movement, under the leadership of Mirza Kuchik Khan. While no accurate figures remain as to the extent of the losses incurred by Iran in the First World War as a consequence of fighting, government mismanagement and poor harvests, some estimates suggest that the population may have decreased by as much as 25 per cent. What is certain is that Britain, herself bankrupt from the war, found herself in inadvertent control of an entire country for which she had no immediate plan, and which, by the beginning of 1918, could not be considered an imperial priority.⁴⁴ It was to be left to the succeeding foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, to redefine Britain's role in Iran.

44 Sir C. Marling to Mr Balfour, *The War* [92798], dated 7 February 1918, in Burrell, *Iran*, vol. V, pp. 801–6.

Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus to 1917

ADEEB KHALID

When the empires of Europe marched off to war in 1914, Nicholas II, Tsar of All the Russias, ruled over more Muslims than any Muslim sovereign. 'Russian Muslims' numbered over twenty million at the end of the imperial era, and could claim to be the second largest confessional community in the empire, yielding only to Orthodox Christians in number. This was a bit deceptive, for this 'community' consisted of a vast array of societies with very different historical experiences of Russian rule and different relationships to the Russian state. Although many spoke of a 'Muslim question' in late imperial Russia, it is difficult to discern a single 'Muslim policy' followed by imperial authorities that would have encompassed all the Muslims of the empire. A survey of Muslim interaction with the Russian state of this breadth and scope therefore has to focus on diversity as its main theme.

Muslims and the Russian state

From the very inception of statehood in what is now Russia, Eastern Slavs have interacted with Muslims, as neighbours, rulers and subjects. Long distance trade in silver from Muslim lands provided the impetus for the establishment of the first Rus' principalities, and Islam arrived in the lands of Rus' before Christianity. The rulers of the Volga Bulghar state converted to Islam at the turn of the tenth century, several decades before Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev converted his subjects to Christianity in 988. The Bulghar state was destroyed in 1236–7 by the Mongols, who then went on to subjugate Rus' as well. The conversion to Islam in 1327 of Özbek Khan, the ruler of the Golden Horde, meant that political overlordship of the lands of Rus' was in the hands of Muslims for over a century. As the power relationship between Muscovy and the Golden Horde began to shift, Muscovite princes found themselves actively involved in its succession struggles. The khans of Kasymov, a dynasty that lost out in the succession struggles of the Golden

Horde, came under Muscovite protection in the mid fifteenth century, and became a privileged service elite. Muscovy had acquired its first Muslim subjects as early as 1392, when the so called Mishar Tatars, who inhabited what is now Nizhnii Novgorod province, entered the service of Muscovite princes. But it was the conquest in 1552 of Kazan that irreversibly altered the balance of power between Muscovy and its neighbours to the east and south east, opening up the steppe to gradual Muscovite expansion. It also brought a large Muslim population under Muscovite rule for the first time. Over the next two centuries, the lands of the khanate of Kazan were gradually absorbed into the administrative structures of the empire.

Muscovy sat astride the frontier between the agrarian and nomadic worlds. The absence of any physical barrier made it an open frontier, while the military imbalance, which swung increasingly in Muscovy's favour, ensured that conquest of the steppe remained on the agenda of Muscovy's rulers.¹ The main obstacle was distance. The vast stretches of steppe land were brought under control through the establishment of lines of fortifications that served both to 'pacify' territory behind them and to prepare the ground for further advances. Over the next two centuries, Muscovy (which became the Russian empire in 1721) acquired numerous Muslim subjects as it asserted suzerainty over the Bashkir and Kazakh steppes. The Bashkir steppe was brought under military control by 1740, and then, over the next several decades, integrated into the civilian administrative system of the empire.² The assertion of Russian control over the Kazakh steppe proved more difficult, and civilian structures of administration began to be established only in the 1860s.

Muscovy's southern frontier also remained fluid. The khans of Crimea, another of the successor states of the Golden Horde, had become vassals of the Ottomans while retaining substantial autonomy. They continued to struggle with Muscovy for control of the so called 'Wild Field' (*dikoe pole*) that lay in between the two states. The balance of power finally tilted in favour of the north only in the eighteenth century. At Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, Catherine the Great forced the Ottomans to recognise the independence of the Crimea, which she then annexed in 1783. Expansion in the late eighteenth century also brought Russia to the Caucasus. While the annexation of the Transcaucasian principalities (including present day Azerbaijan) was accomplished with relative ease, the conquest of the Caucasus consumed Russian

1 Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's steppe frontier: The making of a colonial empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington, 2002).

2 Charles R. Steinwedel, 'Invisible threads of empire: State, religion, and ethnicity in Tsarist Bashkiria, 1773–1917', Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University (1999), pp. 40–7.

energies for the first half of the nineteenth century. Russian armies experienced the tenacious resistance of the mountain peoples of the region, and the region was not finally subjugated until the 1860s.³

Finally, in the last major territorial expansion of its history, Russia subjugated the Central Asian khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand in a series of military campaigns between 1864 and 1876. Tashkent was taken in 1865, and became the capital of the Russian province of Turkestan two years later. Turkistan continued to grow as Russian conquests in the region continued until 1889. As a result, Kokand was abolished entirely, and large parts of the territories of Khiva and Bukhara were also annexed. The remaining portions of Khiva and Bukhara were turned into Russian protectorates. The final acts of Russian conquest in the region were the subjugation of the Turkmen desert and the extension of military control over the Pamirs. The conquest of Central Asia dramatically increased the size of the empire's Muslim population, which stood at more than fourteen million when the first empire wide census was taken in 1897.

The different circumstances in which various Muslim populations were incorporated into the empire produced markedly different administrative arrangements. Such difference was the norm in the Russian empire where, down to the end, the state based its relations with various groups in particularistic legislation specific to them. Service to the state was the ultimate measure of loyalty and the source of privilege. While there always remained a gap between the state's ascription of categories and its subjects' understanding of their own identities, the state's legal categories and its administrative structures nevertheless were very significant in determining the social dynamics within each community. The Tatars were, on the whole, well integrated into the empire. In the nineteenth century, a small Tatar nobility existed and enjoyed all the privileges that came with the rank, except that of owning Orthodox Christian serfs. Tatar peasants owed obligations to the state (such as taxation and conscription) that were little different from those owed by their Russian neighbours. Tatar functionaries played an important role in the administration of Bashkiria and western Siberia, while Tatar merchants controlled substantial trade with Siberia and inner Asia.⁴

At the other extreme was Central Asia. In Turkestan, local elites were not incorporated into the Russian nobility in the aftermath of conquest, and the

3 For the military history of the Caucasian wars, see Moshe Gammer, *Muslim resistance to the tsar: Shamil and the conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan* (London, 1994).

4 Allen J. Frank, *Muslim religious institutions in imperial Russia: The Islamic world of Novouzensk district and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910* (Leiden, 2001).

vast majority of the population continued to be defined solely as *inorodtsy*, 'aliens', a category that denoted difference from the otherwise unmarked core population of the empire. Turkestan was ruled by a governor general possessing wide ranging powers and answerable directly to the tsar. The native population of the region was exempted from conscription. This belied a general thinness of Russian rule in the region that prevented any attempts at incorporating the province more closely into the empire's administrative structure. Bukhara was a different matter again, for the Russian state did not even pretend to rule it directly. Indeed, the installation of the protectorate made the emirs more secure in their power domestically, since they could now count on Russian support against domestic challenges. The consolidation of the emirs' power had a traditionalising influence on society, for the emirs grounded much of their legitimacy in being the last Muslim sovereigns in Central Asia, and used claims of devotion to an immutable tradition to fight off all demands for change. Although Bukhara was occupied by Russian troops in 1910 in the aftermath of bloody sectarian riots that could only be quelled by outside intervention, the Russian state remained reluctant to annex the protectorate, and the emirs retained their autonomy until forces of social revolution overthrew them in 1920.

The emphasis on accommodation to Russian rule should not obscure the fact that conquest was often brutal and resistance took many forms. No aspect of Russian expansion was more tenaciously opposed than the conquest of the northern Caucasus, which lasted two generations. Revolts on the steppe punctuated the advance of Russian rule, all the way down to the bloody uprising of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in 1916 to protest against a wartime decree that conscripted the *inorodtsy* of Turkestan for work at the rear. The Russian conquest also transformed Muslim societies in numerous ways, as they were incorporated into new economic and administrative networks. In many cases, Russian conquest precipitated demographic change. The Turkic population of the Volga Basin was diluted by the arrival of large numbers of Slavic peasants; at the turn of the twentieth century, the Kazakh steppe saw sustained (and officially sanctioned) resettlement of Slavic peasants, which shifted the balance between nomadic and sedentary ways of life on the steppe. In Crimea, the Russian conquest was followed by large scale flight of the Muslim population to lands still under Ottoman rule. A second wave of emigration from the Crimea took place in the aftermath of the Crimean War, as tens of thousands of Nogay Tatars from the peninsula migrated, with the tacit support of the Russian state, to Dobrudja in

present day Romania.⁵ This second wave of Crimean emigration coincided with mass expulsions of Muslim mountaineers from the north Caucasus. Russian authorities decided that the only real solution to the prolonged resistance they had met in their conquest was to 'cleanse' the region of its mountaineers, who were deemed irreconcilable to Russian rule. Although estimates of the numbers involved vary greatly, Russian army archives confirm a minimum figure of 418,000 mountaineers expelled between 1861 and 1864.⁶ In Transcaucasia, Russian conquest transformed the sectarian composition of the region's Muslim population, which had a Sunni majority on the eve of the conquest. The decades following the conquest witnessed a slow but steady exodus of the Sunni population to Ottoman lands, accompanied by an influx of Shi'is from Iranian Azerbaijan. As a result, Russian Azerbaijan acquired a Shi'i majority.⁷

Islam under Russian rule

The practice of Islam, its reproduction, and its transmission to future generations took place in largely autonomous local communities. Each community was centred around a mosque and (especially in Central Asia) a shrine. The servants of the mosques were selected by the community, and the funding provided by local notables or through *waqf* property. Each community also maintained a *maktab*, an elementary school in which children acquired basic knowledge of Islamic ritual and belief. Higher religious education took place in *madrasas*, both locally and in neighbouring Muslim countries. Entry into the ranks of the '*ulama*' was contingent upon education and insertion in the chains of discipleship. Islamic religious practice required neither the institutional framework nor the property of a church. This loose structure meant that the fortunes of Islam and its carriers were not directly tied to the vicissitudes of Muslim states.

This is not to say that Russian rule did not matter. In the immediate aftermath of the conquest of Kazan, the state followed a policy of harsh repression. In Kazan itself, mosques were destroyed and the Muslim population expelled from the city, which was to be an outpost of Christianity on the

5 Bryan G. Williams, *The Crimean Tatars: The diaspora experience and the forging of a nation* (Leiden, 2001), chap. 5.

6 Austin Jersild, *Orientalism and empire: North Caucasus mountain peoples and the Georgian frontier, 1845–1917* (Montreal, 2002), p. 26.

7 Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan: A borderland in transition* (New York, 1995), p. 10.

steppe. There followed a period of considerable missionary activity that led to the conversion of some Tatars to Christianity. Repression was renewed in the early eighteenth century, when Peter the Great and his successors began to see religious uniformity as a desirable goal. In 1730 the church opened its Office of New Converts, and initiated a campaign of conversion in the Volga region. While its primary targets were the animists inhabiting the region, the office also destroyed many mosques. As many as 7,000 Tatars may have converted to Orthodoxy, thus laying the foundation of the Kräshen community of Christian Tatars. The Office of New Converts was closed in 1764, and official policies towards Islam underwent a major change under Catherine II (see below), but the Volga Basin remained a religious frontier down to the end of the imperial period. From the late eighteenth century, however, the pressure from the Orthodox Church coexisted with considerable spread of Islam among the region's animist populations, to the extent that the church came to see Islam as a rival in the region.⁸

The reign of Catherine II (1762–96) marks a turning point in the state's relationship with its Muslim subjects. She made religious tolerance an official policy, and set about creating a basis for loyalty to the Russian state in the Tatar lands. She affirmed the rights of Muslim nobles, and even sought to induct the *'ulama'* in this endeavour. Toleration remained official policy down to 1917, but for much of the rest of the imperial period, the state's attitude is best characterised as one of 'pragmatic flexibility'.⁹

Tolerance went hand in hand with bureaucratic control. In 1788, Catherine established a bureaucratic structure through which Islam could be brought under state supervision and thus be put to use. This was the 'Muslim Spiritual Assembly' in Orenburg. To a certain extent, it was modelled on the Orthodox Church. Headed by a *mufti* appointed by the state, the assembly was responsible for appointing and licensing *imams* as teachers throughout the territory under its purview, and to oversee the operation of mosques.¹⁰ It was also supposed to help Russia's relationships with the nomads on the steppe (hence

8 Paul Werth, *At the margins of orthodoxy: Mission, governance, and confessional politics in Russia's Volga Kama region, 1827–1905* (Ithaca, 2002).

9 Andreas Kappeler, 'Czarist policy toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire', in Andreas Kappeler et al. (eds.), *Muslim communities reemerge: Historical perspectives on nationality, politics, and opposition in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC, 1992), p. 143.

10 D. Iu. Arapov, *Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia islama v Rossiiskoi imperii: Posledniaia tret' XVIII nachalo XX vv.* (Moscow, 2004); D. D. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII XIX vv.* (Ufa, 1999).

the choice of Orenburg as the seat of the assembly), and the first two *muftis* were quite active in Russian diplomacy with the Kazakhs.

At that time, such an institution was unique in the Muslim world, and the first *mufti* had to struggle to have his authority acknowledged. But gradually, the Spiritual Assembly came to be an integral part of the religious landscape of the Volga Urals region and beyond. Indeed, during Russia's brief experiment with constitutional revolution of 1905, the Spiritual Assembly emerged as a major site of Tatar public activity. Similar bodies were set up in the Crimea in 1831 and Transcaucasia in 1872, and enjoyed considerable success in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. Nevertheless, much religious activity remained beyond the purview of the assemblies. They had little connection to Sufi activity or the running of *maktabs* or shrines. Older patterns of learning and travel continued, and connections with Bukhara, Afghanistan and beyond were not ruptured.

In many parts of the steppe, indeed, Islamisation accompanied the consolidation of Russian rule, and was at times even supported by the Russian state.¹¹ For Catherine, Islam was a higher form of religion than shamanism, and she hoped that the Kazakhs would gradually be brought into the fold of Islam through the efforts of the Tatars. This would help bring the Kazakh steppe under closer Russian control. The state settled Muslim peasants in the trans Volga region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the main agent of the Islamisation of the steppe was the Tatar mercantile diaspora. As communities of Tatar merchants appeared throughout the steppe beginning in the late eighteenth century, Tobol'sk, Orenburg and Troitsk became major centres of Islamic learning. Tatar merchants began sending their sons to study in Central Asia, and Sufi linkages with Central Asia and the lands beyond were strengthened. To the nomadic population of the steppe, these connections brought challenges to customary understandings of Islam. A group of '*ulama*' trained in the learned tradition of Islam had emerged among the Kazakhs at the beginning of the twentieth century.

While the policies enacted by Catherine survived until 1917 in their broad outline, her enthusiasm for Islam did not. The Enlightenment had also brought to Russia the concept of 'fanaticism', and it tended to dominate Russian thinking about Islam in the nineteenth century. Islam was now deemed to be inherently 'fanatical', and the question became one of curbing or containing this 'fanaticism'. If Catherine had hoped for the Islamisation of the Kazakhs as a mode of progress, nineteenth century administrators sought to protect the

¹¹ Frank, *Muslim religious institutions*, *passim*.

‘natural’ religion of the Kazakhs from the ‘fanatical’ Islam of the Tatars or the Central Asians.

In Turkestan, Russian policies towards Islam bore the imprint of the first governor general, Konstantin Petrovich Kaufman (in office 1867–81). For Kaufman, Islam was irredeemably connected with ‘fanaticism’, which could be provoked by thoughtless policies. Such ‘fanaticism’ could be lessened by ignoring Islam and depriving it of all state support, while the long term goal of assimilating the region into the Russian empire was to be achieved through a policy of encouraging trade and enlightenment. This led Kaufman to forbid both the Orthodox Church from proselytising in his domain, and the Orenburg Muslim Assembly from extending its jurisdiction into Turkestan. Official disregard (*ignorirovanie*) did not spell the end of Islam in the region, of course. Kaufman was wrong in assuming that the transmission of Islam depended on state support. Traditional patterns of learning continued: the shrines that marked the region as Islamic survived, as did the *maktabs* and *madrasas*. Indeed, by all accounts there was a blossoming of *madrasas* in the Ferghana Valley, as the introduction of cotton transformed the region’s economy and increased the amount of cash available. New *madrasas* were built, and the number of students increased substantially. The ‘*ulama*’ accommodated themselves to the new political realities, and while there were debates over the status of Russian rule in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, the consensus seems to have been that as long as the new rulers did not interfere in the observance of the basic tenets of the faith, their rule was legitimate. Many ‘*ulama*’ accepted honours from the Russian state and worked in its courts as *qadis* and *muftis*.

The policy of ignoring Islam was modified after Kaufman’s death, but its basic outline was never abandoned. Russian authorities in Turkistan had neither the personnel nor the financial resources to alter this policy radically. Over the following decades, the state made efforts to regulate *waqfs* and *madrasas*, but the Russian presence remained lighter in Turkistan than in other Muslim areas of the empire, with the exception of Bukhara.¹²

Muslim reform

The last half century of imperial rule in Russia was a time of massive change in the various Muslim societies of the empire. A renewal of Islamic learning had begun in the Tatar lands in the late eighteenth century, and led to new

12 P. P. Litvinov, *Gosudarstvo i Islam v russkom Turkestane (1865–1917)* (Elets, 1998).

theological stances as well as a reform of Sufi practices. The nineteenth century saw the establishment of new *madrasas* in the Tatar communities of the Volga Basin and beyond. By the end of the century, almost all Muslim communities of the Russian empire had vocal groups of reformers active in them, and the agenda of reform had broadened to include a thoroughgoing critique of existing cultural practices, the articulation of new public identities, and a questioning of the political status quo in the empire.

Conventionally, this process is rendered into a single narrative of the rise of reform or modernity among the Muslims of Russia that culminated in a single national movement in the early twentieth century under the leadership of the Tatars. Religious debates of the nineteenth century thus become simply the precursors to later movements for cultural or political reform. The influence of nationalist historiography, whether in its émigré or its Soviet form, is crucial in this teleological formulation of the issue. We should resist the urge to see in this process of reform a singularity of vision or purpose. The diversity of the Muslim communities of the Russian empire, not to mention their geographical dispersion, make such an explanation implausible. Rather, several different currents of reform can be discerned, of various origins and inspiration, that existed now in parallel, now overlapping or intertwined and achieved vastly different degrees of success in the many different Muslim societies involved.

The earliest currents of reform were articulated entirely within the Islamic tradition and concerned issues of belief (*‘aqa’id*) and ritual (*‘ibadat*). These theological debates bear no direct genealogical link to other modernist reform movements that arose late in the nineteenth century. The former revolved around dissatisfaction with the tradition of interpretation of texts as it had been practised in Central Asia and in the Tatar lands since Mongol times, and a turn, under the influence of revivalist movements in the broader Islamic world, to the Qur’an and the Ḥadīth as the only authoritative sources of authority. The first proponents of this theological reform were Tatars, and their espousal of reform also entailed a revolt against the authority of Bukharan traditions.

The reformist position was first articulated by Abdunnasir Kursavi (‘Abd al Naṣīr al Qurṣawī) (1776–1812), who followed generations of Tatar *‘ulama’* to Bukhara to further his studies. The influence of the Mujaddidiyya branch of the Naqshbandī Sufi order had begun to be felt in Bukhara by the turn of the nineteenth century. Its most influential figures were Fayḏ Khan b. Khizr Khan al Kabuḏī (d. 1802) and Niyazquli b. Shahnīyaz al Turkmanī (d. 1820–1), with whom Kursavi studied in Bukhara. Kursavi created a scandal in Bukhara by

arguing against the consensus among Bukharan *'ulama'* on the question of divine attributes (*ṣifat*). Bukharan *'ulama'* had accepted both the Maturidī and the Ash'arī positions on this question to be equally authoritative. Kursavi took issue with not just the Bukharan view, but with both the Maturidī and the Ash'arī positions, arguing instead that fixing the number of divine attributes contradicted the higher principle of divine transcendence. The only authority lay in the text of the Qur'an itself, where Kursavi found sanction for neither position. Kursavi applied the same logic to another question that had long been important among the Tatars. Ḥanafī *fiqh* requires the evening prayer (*'isha'*) to be performed when the sky is completely dark. In the northern latitudes of the Tatar lands, complete darkness does not descend for several weeks in the summer. Did this mean that the evening prayer could be dispensed with, or did it have to be performed in conjunction with the sunset prayer? Kursavi argued that the Qur'anic injunction for five daily prayers overrode the niceties of *fiqh*, and the fifth prayer had to be said at all times.¹³ The principle of creative reinterpretation through the examination of the original scriptural sources of Islam at the expense of the consensus of *'ulama'* was to be central to the project of theological reform that developed over the course of the nineteenth century, primarily in Tatar lands.

This did not come without opposition, of course. Kursavi's intervention in Bukhara unleashed a storm of condemnation, with a meeting of Bukharan *'ulama'* declaring Kursavi an apostate and condemning him to death. He escaped the death sentence, but not controversy, which continued to hound him when he returned to the Tatar lands. Nevertheless, Kursavi's followers continued to develop his teachings, and found fertile ground for their ideas in Tatar society as it developed over the course of the nineteenth century. Kursavi's fame was far exceeded by that of one of his followers, Shihabeddin Märjani (Shihab al Dīn al Marjānī) (1818–89). Märjani too studied in Bukhara, where he received his *ijāza* (authorisation to teach or transmit *ḥadīths*) into the Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidiyya from 'Ubayd Allah b. Niyazqulī (d. 1852), the son of Kursavi's mentor. But his studies in Bukhara left Märjani disenchanting with the intellectual milieu. Much of his time in the city was spent reading on his own. A visit to a certain *qaḍī*, Abu Sa'īd in Samarqand, in whose library Märjani found many manuscripts of interest, was a significant event in his intellectual trajectory. Märjani returned to the Tatar lands and

13 Michael Kemper, 'Entre Boukhara et la Moyennne Volga: 'Abd an Naṣīr al Qûrṣawī (1776–1812) en conflit avec les oulémas traditionalistes', *Cahiers du monde russe*, 37 (1996), pp. 41–52.

was appointed *imam* at a mosque in Kazan. He also embarked on a career as a teacher and a prolific writer. Following Kursavi, Märjani also criticised the influence of philosophers and ‘philosophisers’ (*mutafalsifā*) on theology (*kalam*), who had mired, so he argued, the Islamic tradition in imitation (*taqlid*). In short, his was an argument for the permissibility of interpretation (*ijtihad*), through direct recourse to the Qur’an and Ḥadīth.¹⁴

Kursavi and Märjani represent a break in an intellectual link, several centuries long, between the Tatar lands and Central Asia. The break with Bukhara did not prove final, for Tatar students continued to travel thither down to the revolution, but it did lead to a shift in the orientation of Tatar ‘*ulama*’, who from the mid nineteenth century began to travel to India, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt for their education. (On the eve of the First World War, associations of ‘Russian’ students existed in Cairo, Istanbul, Beirut, Mecca and Deoband.)¹⁵ This reorientation brought them to a deeper engagement with the study of Ḥadīth and an intimate knowledge of reform currents in the broader Muslim world. By the turn of the twentieth century, Tatar scholars such as Musa Jarullah Bigiyev (Musa Jar Allah Bigi), Zaynullah Rasulev (Zayn Allah b. Ḥabīb Allah b. Rasul), Galimjan Barudi (‘Alimjan al Barudi) and Rizaetdin Fakhretdin (Riḏa al Dīn Fakhr al Dīn) could write in Arabic and were prominent well beyond the boundaries of the Russian empire.¹⁶ Bukhara, on the other hand, had come to symbolise backwardness and stagnation for Tatar intellectuals of all stripes.

A different pietistic movement within Sufism influenced developments in north Caucasus. The Mujaddidiyya Khalidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi order appeared at the beginning of the nineteenth century from neighbouring provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In the context of Russian expansion, this doctrine provided a compelling vision of solidarity in the face of Russian encroachment. Reformist Sufism thus provided an impetus for the creation of a common identity and modern forms of statehood in the region, and provided the authority and legitimacy for a series of imams (culminating in

14 The best work on the Tatar religious milieu is Michael Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte in Tatarien und Baschkirien, 1789 1889: Der islamische Diskurs unter russische Herrschaft* (Berlin, 1998).

15 Zavdat S. Minullin, ‘Fraternal and benevolent associations of Tatar students in Muslim countries at the beginning of the 20th century’, in Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper and Allen J. Frank (eds.), *Muslim culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the early 20th centuries*, vol. II (Berlin, 1998), pp. 271–80.

16 Hamid Algar, ‘Shaykh Zaynullah Rasulev: The last great Naqshbandi shaykh of the Volga Urals region’, in Jo Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of identity and change* (Durham, NC, 1992), pp. 112–33.

the redoubtable Shamil (1797–1871) who fought the Russian armies for the first half of the nineteenth century.¹⁷

The religious history of nineteenth century Central Asia remains little studied. The Mujaddidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi order maintained a presence in the region,¹⁸ but the turn of the twentieth century saw the appearance of a new current of reform emphasising the centrality of the Ḥadīth. This found fertile ground among a circle of ‘*ulama*’ in Tashkent, who launched the journal *al Iṣlah* (Reform) in 1915. The main inspiration for this came not from the Tatar debates described above, but from revivalism in India, which had developed an Ahl i Ḥadīth movement.

Jadidisms

Such currents of reform need to be distinguished from Jadidism, the unabashedly modernist vision of cultural change that began in the late nineteenth century with a critique of traditional Muslim education and culminated in a far ranging transformation of many aspects of communal life. While Jadidism shared with other currents of reform a concern with the renewal of the Muslim community, its intellectual inspiration, its social basis and its modalities of operation were quite distinct. The key concepts in Jadidism were ‘civilisation’ (*medeniyet/madaniyyat*) and ‘progress’ (*terakki/taraqqi*), which give evidence of the appropriation of Enlightenment notions of history and historical change. These concepts were in turn assimilated by the Jadids (as the proponents of Jadidism are customarily called) into their understanding of Islam to produce a vigorously modernist interpretation of Islam, in which the achievement of ‘civilisation’ (always in the singular) came to be seen as the religious obligation of all Muslims.¹⁹

The ideas of Jadidism were first articulated by the Crimean Tatar activist Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (1851–1914).²⁰ Gasprinskii was a *murza*, a member of the

17 Anna Zelkina, *In quest for God and freedom: The Sufi response to the Russian advance in the North Caucasus* (London, 2000). The direct connection between Sufi networks and the jihad in North Caucasus has been questioned by Michael Kemper, *Herrschaft, Recht und Islam in Daghestan: Von den Khanaten und Gemeindebünden zum ḡihad Staat* (Wiesbaden, 2005).

18 Baxtiyor Babadʒanov, ‘On the history of the Naqshbandiya muḡaddidiya in Central Mawaraʼannahr in the late 18th and early 19th centuries’, in von Kügelgen et al. (eds.), *Muslim culture*, vol. I (Berlin, 1996), pp. 385–413.

19 Adeb Khalid, *The politics of Muslim cultural reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley, 1998).

20 The best work on Gasprinskii remains Edward J. Lazzerini, ‘Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim modernism in Russia, 1878–1917’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington (1973).

Crimean aristocracy that Catherine had inducted into the Russian nobility. As a noble, Gasprinskii inhabited a world quite different from that of Kursavi or Märjani. He received a traditional Islamic education at home, but had been educated at military academies in Voronezh' and Moscow. In his youth, he had travelled in Europe and, according to one biographer, had served as the secretary for the writer Ivan Turgenev during a two year stay in Paris.²¹ As a man with feet in both worlds, Gasprinskii was the ideal person to articulate the message of Jadidism. Muslims, he felt, lacked many skills important to full participation in the mainstream of imperial life. The fault lay with the *maktab*, which not only did not inculcate useful knowledge, such as arithmetic, geography or Russian, but failed, moreover, in the task of equipping students with basic literacy or even a proper understanding of Islam itself. Gasprinskii elaborated a modernist critique of the *maktab*, emanating from a new understanding of the purposes of elementary education. The solution was a new method (*usul i jadid*) of education, in which children were taught the Arabic alphabet using the phonetic method of instruction and the elementary school was to have a standardised curriculum encompassing composition, arithmetic, history, hygiene and Russian. The new method school was to be the flagship of reform and, indeed, to give the movement its name but the reform soon extended far beyond the modest goals of teaching functional literacy to children. Jadidism became a thoroughgoing critique of Muslim society as it was. As a Turkistani Jadid wrote in 1906, 'all aspects of our existence are in need of reform'.²² This included the reform of customary religious practices, the inculcation of new forms of sociability through the establishment of benevolent societies, the cultivation of new literary genres and of theatre. The Jadids also argued for change in the position of women, who should receive education to allow them to become better mothers and better members of the community.²³ Reform was an imperative that could

21 Cafer Seydahmet, *Gaspralı İsmail Bey* (Istanbul, 1934), p. 19. In works published in Turkey and the West, Gasprinskii is often referred to as Gaspralı, which is seen as the more authentic version of his name. Muslims in the Russian empire routinely used 'Russian' forms of their names (regardless of which language they used) without considering them a sign of russification. In three decades of public life, Gasprinskii never once called himself Gaspralı; that name was coined for him by those of his followers who became émigrés after the revolution and sought to 'nationalise' his legacy.

22 Munawwar Qari 'Abdurrahshid Khan oghli, 'İşlah ne demakdadur', *Khurshid* (Tashkent), 28 September 1906.

23 Marianne Kamp, 'Unveiling Uzbek women: Liberation, representation, and discourse, 1906–1929', Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago (1998), chap. 1; Şengül Hablemitoğlu and Necip Hablemitoğlu, *Şefika Gaspralı ve Rusya'da Türk Kadın Hareketi (1893–1920)* (Ankara, 1998).

not wait. 'If we do not quickly make an effort to reform our affairs in order to safeguard ourselves, our nation, and our children, our future will be extremely difficult.'²⁴

Gasprinskii campaigned tirelessly to raise money and win support for his efforts. The main channel for his reform was the bilingual newspaper *Terjüman/Perevodchik* (The Interpreter), which he began publishing, almost single handedly, in 1883. Barring a few short lived experiments, *Terjüman* was the first private newspaper to be published by a Muslim in the Russian empire. Gasprinskii received permission to publish it by tying it to the celebration of the centenary of the Russian annexation of the Crimea. This move was typical of Gasprinskii's political stance. He assumed loyalist stances and worked towards the inclusion of Muslims into the economic and political life of the empire. A later generation of Jadids was to take more radical political positions, but the desire to acquire 'civilisation' remained the single most important feature of the movement.

Jadidism was a discourse of cultural reform directed at Muslim society itself. It was up to society to lift itself up by its bootstraps through education and disciplined effort. Jadid rhetoric was usually sharply critical of the present state of Muslim society, which the Jadids contrasted unfavourably with a glorious past of their own society and the present of the 'civilised' countries of Europe. For the Jadids, progress and civilisation were universal phenomena accessible to all societies on the sole condition of disciplined effort and enlightenment. There was nothing in Islam that prevented Muslims from joining the modern world; indeed, the Jadids argued that only a modern person equipped with knowledge 'according to the needs of the age' could be a good Muslim. This argument was made repeatedly in editorials, plays and belles lettres.

On the eve of the revolution, modernist reform had appeared in almost all Muslim societies of the Russian empire. While it shared a great deal in common, it varied in its success as well as its trajectory. The view, articulated by émigré Tatar historians, that Jadidism was a single movement headed by Gasprinskii and carried to all Muslim regions of the Russian empire by Tatars does not stand up to scrutiny. Rather, there were many versions of Jadidism, each situated in the dynamics of a particular Muslim society. The main constituency for Gasprinskii was the urban population of the Crimea and the Volga Basin, with a vigorous mercantile class able, and indeed eager, to support new method schools and a print based public space.

²⁴ Munawwar Qarî, 'İşlah ne demakdadur'.

Azerbaijani modernism had its own lineage, but peculiar to Azerbaijan's location on the crossroads of three empires. The first efforts to reform Muslim schools in Transcaucasia appeared as early as the 1830s, and the first vernacular newspaper, *Äkinji*, appeared in 1875. Mirza Fath 'Alı Akhundzadeh took positions far more radical than Gasprinskii a generation before *Terjüman* began publishing. Baku, of course, experienced the first oil boom in history, which produced a strong, self-confident Muslim bourgeoisie. It was they who supported the reform of Muslim education and the creation of an Azerbaijani press and theatre. The term 'Jadidism' was seldom used locally.

In Turkestan, where Russian rule was more recent and less intrusive, traditionalist '*ulama*' retained considerable influence, and the carriers of reform found themselves fighting an uphill battle as they staked out a position for themselves in society. In Bukhara, the calculus of reform was different still. After capitulating to the Russians, the emirs staked their legitimacy on the claim to be the last surviving Muslim sovereigns in the region, and consequently the last safeguards for 'orthodoxy'. The emirs had little interest in implementing significant reform. Yet a constituency for reform emerged, as Bukharan merchants newly integrated into the global economy sought a modern education for their sons. The emirs' refusal to open modern schools led local merchants to organise a benevolent society for 'the education of children' (*Tarbiya yi Atfal*) to send students to Istanbul for education. Bukharan reform thus owed a great deal to Ottoman debates.

In contrast to Jadidism elsewhere in the Russian empire, Bukharan reform was predicated on the reform of (and by) the state. Bukharan Jadids hoped that the emir would do his duty as a Muslim sovereign and lead his country to reform and progress. Education remained central to Bukharan reform, but it was to be implemented by the state.²⁵ This vision was best articulated by 'Abd al Ra'uf Fitrat (1886–1938), who spent four years (1909–13) in Istanbul on a scholarship from *Tarbiya yi Atfal*. In 1911, Fitrat used a fictional Indian Muslim traveller as a sympathetic but stern outside critic to list the desiderata of Bukharan reformers. As the Indian travels through Bukhara, he notes the chaos and disorder in the streets, the lack of any measures regarding hygiene and public health, the complete lack of economic planning or public education, and the corruption of morals and improper religious practices. Government officials (*umara*) have no care for the good of the state; the '*ulama*' 'drink the blood of the people', and ordinary people are victims of

25 Adeeb Khalid, 'Society and politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920', *Central Asian Survey*, 19 (2000), pp. 367–96; Sadriiddin Ainî, *Ta'rikhi inqilobi Bukhoro* (Dushanbe, 1987).

ignorance. Fıtrat took care to spare the emir from criticism by the traveller through the rather weak stratagem of blaming all the corruption of Bukhara on the officials and the ‘*ulama*’, but the severe indictment of the current order of things is unmistakable.²⁶

The diversity of reform

The Jadids saw their project as one of the reform of Islam. They too grounded religious authority in the ‘original’ texts of Islam and tended to be dismissive of the authority of interpretation. But the centrality of ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’ and their fascination with reason and science distinguished the Jadids from religious reformers such as Kursavi and Märjani, whose vision of reform was informed much more directly by classical sources of authority, and less by the kind of audacious reading of the Islamic tradition that the Jadids made their staple. True, many Tatar ‘*ulama*’ did assimilate the notions of civilisation and progress into their theological reform, so that by the turn of the twentieth century Musa Jarullah Bigiyev could take a position indistinguishable from that of a Jadid. Bigiyev couched his criticism of *kalam* in terms of progress and the triumph of reason. Muslim ‘*ulama*’, he argued, became ‘imprisoned’ in the useless scholasticism of *kalam* at about the same time that ‘Luther’s revolution’ freed European minds to free inquiry. ‘That is, while the civilised world progressed because of the freedom of reason, the captivity of reason caused the Muslim world to decline.’²⁷ But it was the ‘*ulama*’ who published journals such as *Din vā magishāt* in Orenburg or *al Iṣlah* in Tashkent who best represented religious reform. ‘Progress’ and ‘civilisation’ seldom showed up in those pages, even though they were filled with criticisms of the present state of the Muslim community and arguments for the need to change. And there was no shortage of contention between them and the Jadids.

The various currents of reform remained incomplete projects that faced opposition from a number of sources. All projects of reform entail a criticism of the present state and a challenge to the status quo. They evoke opposition from those whose position they threaten. The criticism of customary practices, of Sufi shaykhs and of traditional education, common to all currents of reform, provoked a great deal of opposition from those invested in them. The ‘needs of the age’ did not appear equally compelling to all sections of society, nor did

26 ‘Abd al Ra’uf [Fıtrat], *Bayanat i sayyah i hindı* (Istanbul, 1331).

27 Musa Carullah, ‘Medeniyet Dünyası Terraki etmiş iken İslâmiyet Âlemi Niçin İndi?’, *İslâm Dünyası*, 2 March 1912, pp. 4–6.

they lead everyone to the same conclusions. The emergence of reform projects therefore led to heated debate in the Muslim societies of the Russian empire in the last half century of imperial rule, as questions of leadership and communal identity divided communities. The parameters of this debate have seldom been understood properly. The Jadids often tended to label all their opponents as *qadimchilar*, 'proponents of the old ways'. For the historian, this is a singularly unhelpful label, for it hides enormous differences among those who opposed Jadid reform, or their reasons for doing so.

The opposition to reform took many forms. It came from those, such as Sufi shaykhs and traditional '*ulama*', who were directly challenged by reformers. In addition, large numbers of people, especially in Central Asia, the Kazakh steppe, and northern Caucasus, remained beyond the reach of reform, for the carriers of reform were less numerous there, and the socio economic context quite different. For their own reasons, many Russian officials were suspicious of reform, preferring instead to deal with traditional elites whose motives were deemed apolitical. Thus Nikolai Il'minskii, lay missionary, orientalist and pedagogue, wrote in 1883 that a 'fanatic without Russian education and language is better than a Russian civilized Tatar; even worse is an aristocrat, and still worse is a man with a university education'.²⁸ In 1900 the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a circular to governors of all parts of the empire with Muslim populations, expressing concern at the rise among Tatars of a 'progressive movement' and its implications for the stability of the empire's Muslim population.²⁹ By 1913, the same ministry had come to see traditionalist '*ulama*' as its allies against the forces of nationalism and separatism represented by the Jadids.

The battle for reform had largely been won in the Crimea and the Tatar lands by the eve of the revolution. Modern elementary schooling became widespread (including Tatar schools run by branches of local self government (*zemstvo*) in Kazan and Ufa provinces), while the old method *maktab* had largely disappeared. Kazan, Ufa and Orenburg also boasted several new method *madrasas*. Other aspects of reform, such as a periodical press, a vibrant publishing industry, a vernacular tradition of belles lettres and a Tatar theatre, had all become realities. In Transcaucasia, a vibrant and self confident Muslim bourgeoisie had created a similar intellectual landscape in the cities of Ganjä, Baku and Tiflis (Tbilisi). The situation was rather

28 Quoted by Robert Geraci, *Window on the East: National and imperial identities in late Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, 2001), p. 150.

29 Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan, f. I 1, op. 31, d. 123, ll. 2 3ob.

different elsewhere. The Kazakh steppe witnessed two trends in parallel: a steady Islamisation of the population and the rise of a class of '*ulama*' learned in the scholarly tradition of Central Asian Islam, with mild reformist tendencies; and the rise of a largely secular intelligentsia, whose world view was shaped primarily by Russian discourses.³⁰ In Turkestan and Bukhara, reform remained largely an urban phenomenon, and the Jadids faced resolute opposition from within their own society. This was to come out into the open during the mass politics of 1917 and had much to do in shaping the evolution of Central Asian Jadidism after the revolution.

New public identities

The last half century of imperial rule saw the articulation of new public identities and new forms of community in the Muslim societies of the empire. The roots of contemporary ethnic and national identities are to be found in this period.

Two things must be stated at the outset. First, there was no clear cut movement towards a single predefined goal, but rather a state of flux, in which new forms of community were imagined along different lines. The main trend was towards imagining community in broader, more abstract terms, so that identities based on lineage or locality were replaced by those based on confessional, ethnic and regional principles. These various principles intermingled, however. Second, there was a great deal of contention among and between Muslim groups. New identities were articulated by small groups of intellectuals, and the degree to which these new identities had any meaning for the people at large was a different matter. We need to make a clear distinction, therefore, between what certain leaders (or putative leaders) aspired to and what they were able to achieve. In general, one can say that, as with religious reform, the new identities did not always become widely accepted, and the majority of the Muslims of the empire continued to give meaning to their world in customary terms. Nevertheless, the new ways of imagining community wreaked havoc with these customary understandings of the world and underpinned a great deal of the political activity of Muslim elites in the late imperial and early Soviet periods.

30 A. Bukeikhanov, 'Kirgizy', in A. I. Kastelianskii (ed.), *Formy natsional'nogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh: Avstro Vengriia, Rossiia, Germaniia* (St Petersburg, 1910), pp. 597–8.

The advent of new identities was connected to modernist discourses described above. The Russian state's practices of ethnographic classification played their part, as did the rise of nationalist ideologies among other groups in the Russian empire (and in the nineteenth century world at large). For many Muslim intellectuals in late imperial Russia, the 'nation' was an integral part of modernity, and a guarantor of progress in its own right. The nation, however, could be defined along any of several different axes of solidarity. For some, all Muslims of the Russian empire constituted a single national community. Gasprinskii argued that the Muslims needed 'unity in language, thought, and deeds', and his newspaper sought to show this through example. After 1905, when a number of Tatar and Azerbaijani activists organised the first of four all Russian conferences of Muslim representatives to work out a common plan of action, this concept of the nation acquired a certain reality.

Planning for what came to be called the first All Russian Muslim Congress had begun in 1904, but was overtaken by the revolution of 1905. It finally met, without full permission from the government, in Nizhnii Novgorod during the town's annual trade fair in 1905. Attended by modernist reformers from the Volga region, the Crimea and Transcaucasia, the conference decided in principle to organise a Union of Muslims (*Ittifaq al Müslimîn*) as a quasi political organisation. Delegates resolved to work for greater political, religious and cultural rights for their constituency. Two more conferences met in 1906, of which the latter, held in August, was by far the best attended. More than 500 delegates formalised the creation of *Ittifaq* as a political party, voted on its programme and elected a central committee.³¹ The central committee, like the congress that produced it, was dominated by reformist figures from the Volga, the Crimea and Transcaucasia; Turkestan was practically unrepresented.³²

This was a heady era of political liberalisation in the wake of the revolution of 1905. The tsar had been forced to issue a set of Fundamental Laws and to concede the establishment of a parliament, the Duma. The short lived first Duma, elected in 1906, had twenty five Muslim members, who formed a 'Muslim faction'. The number swelled to thirty seven in the second Duma, elected in early 1907, but it did not last. In June 1907 the prime minister, Petr Stolypin, abrogated the second Duma, rewrote electoral laws and began a backlash against the liberal reforms conceded during the revolution. The

³¹ Musa Jarullah Bigi, *Islahat äsasları* (Petrograd, 1915).

³² *Umum Rusya müsülmanlarıning 3 unchi räsmi nädväläri* (Kazan, 1906), pp. 168–9.

representation of Muslims in the Duma was reduced and the Ittifaq was denied permission to register as a political party. The third Duma, the only one to serve out its five year term (1907–12), had ten Muslims, and the fourth only seven.³³ The fourth All Russian Muslim Congress met only in 1914, and was a closely monitored affair, closed to the public.

This political activity raised the hackles of many Russians, both inside and outside officialdom, who tended to gloss it as ‘pan Islamism’, and to see in it a recrudescence of the ‘fanaticism’ deemed to inhere in Islam itself, but now combined with Ottoman machinations against the Russian state. Such a characterisation of ‘pan Islamism’ has all too often been repeated by historians since then. In fact, the all Russian Muslim movement was headed by modernists convinced of the necessity of achieving progress and civilisation, who sought to reform Islam itself along those lines. Their agenda called for autonomy for Muslim institutions (most notably, the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly), but also for their reform. The politics pursued by the Ittifaq was part of the Russian liberal movement committed to the expansion of local self government and to gradual reforms leading to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. The Muslim faction voted with the Kadets, the party of classical liberalism, and sought the entrenchment and protection of freedom of conscience that had grudgingly been conceded by the tsar in 1905. Finally, the all Russian Muslim movement remained the work of Tatars, with some Azerbaijanis prominent in it. Central Asians, who accounted for half the empire’s Muslim population, were virtually absent from the Muslim congresses or from the Ittifaq, which in turn had little impact on Turkestan. Ultimately, ‘pan Islamism’ was rooted not in any primordial religious impulse, but in the transformations of the political imagination of the modern era. It was a new way of imagining the Muslim community, made possible by new means of communication, articulated by new groups in society, and concerned primarily with issues of politics and society.

The Ittifaq never could establish the kind of grassroots organisation that had been envisaged during the heady days of 1905. Official hostility was only partly to blame. There were too many centrifugal forces tearing apart the façade of Muslim unity the organisation had put up. A central plank of Gasprinskii’s agenda was ‘unity in language’. He published *Terjüman* in a form of Turkic (based on Ottoman, but with simplified syntax and vocabulary) that he hoped would be understood by ‘the porters and boatmen of

33 Diliara Usmanova, *Musul'manskaia fraktsiia i problemy 'svobody sovesti' v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii (1906–1917)* (Kazan, 1999).

Istanbul . . . [as well as] the Turkic camel drivers and shepherds of the interior of China'.³⁴ This implied that the community of the 'Muslims of Russia' had an ethnic dimension to it, and that the 'Muslims of Russia' were connected to the community of 'the Turks of the world'. This was glossed as 'pan Turkism' by contemporary observers, who also endowed it with sinister implications in this case, of racism and foreign machinations. This again is a generalisation in need of correction.

'Pan Turkism', the argument for the political unity of all Turkic peoples of the world, remained a marginal view, expressed usually by émigrés radicalised by exile. It should be distinguished from 'Turkism', a romantic discourse that foregrounded the Turkic ethnic origins of the different Muslim populations of the Russian and Ottoman empires. Turkism proved irresistible to Muslim intellectuals throughout the Russian empire. The triumph of Turkism was not simply the recovery of something lost or making obvious certain ethnic facts that had always been there, but a creative act of imagination, in which older ways of imagining one's place in the world were displaced by new ones. Several important examples can be noted.

Since the eighteenth century, Muslims of the Volga Basin had conceived of their community as 'Bulghar', descended from the kingdom of that name that had first accepted Islam. It was the act of conversion, not ethnolinguistic affiliation, that defined the origins of the community.³⁵ The term 'Tatar' was seldom used by local Muslims themselves, while memories of descent from inner Asian nomads played no part in this identity. All this changed in the last decades of the nineteenth century. New conceptions of history and the nation put ethnicity and language at the centre, and the Bulghar identity was displaced by a new Tatar (or Turco Tatar) one. Along with this came pride in one's language and ethnic origins: the Golden Horde, not the Bulghar state, was acknowledged as the forerunner of the Muslim community of the Volga Basin.

In Transcaucasia and Bukhara, the appeal of Turkism also helped redefine the cultural orientation of modernist intellectuals. The Muslims of Transcaucasia had long existed in the cultural orbit of Iran, their Turkic speech notwithstanding. In the late nineteenth century, the situation changed dramatically, as a number of intellectuals, Hüseyinzade Ali and Ahmed Agaev (Ağaoğlu) among them, came to emphasise their ethnic identity foremost.³⁶ In

34 Quoted in Lazzarini, 'Ismail Bey Gasprinskii', p. 209.

35 Allen J. Frank, *Islamic historiography and 'Bulghar' identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia* (Leiden, 1998).

36 Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 30–5.

Bukhara, where Persian (Tajik) had long been the language of learning and the chancery and was spoken by the majority of the urban population (many of whom were bilingual), the shift to a Turkic identity was more complicated. Bukhara's relations with Safavid Iran were complicated by sectarian differences, although cultural links were maintained and people continued to travel.³⁷ After the installation of the protectorate, however, the Ottoman Empire, as much the more powerful state, appeared to Bukharan intellectuals as the most relevant model to follow. It was no coincidence that the benevolent society *Tarbiya yi Aṭfal* sent students to Istanbul and not Tehran. In Istanbul, Bukharan students picked up a fascination for their Turkic origins. For many of them, Turkism was a more 'progressive' identity than anything Iran might have offered. Fīṭrat was perhaps a typical example of this shift. He published two tracts and a collection of poetry in Istanbul; all three were in Persian. But he returned convinced that Bukharans were 'really' of Turkic stock, but had adopted Persian under Iranian cultural influence.³⁸

Turkism, however, did not automatically lead to pan Turkism. The discovery of romantic notions of identity by the Jadids led them to articulate the identity of their community along ethno national lines. In doing this, they were only appropriating for their own use the common sense of the age, that humanity is divided into discrete, ethnically defined nations. But did the Turks of Russia belong to a single nation, or a number of different ones? Here too, visions of a broad Turkic unity coexisted in a state of considerable tension with narrower forms of identity, such as Tatar or Kazakh. The narrower definition of the nation tended to win out. Gasprinskii's dream of unity in language never materialised because it conflicted with the goal of providing functional literacy in the vernacular. The various Turkic languages differed enormously, and the goal of making the written language accord with speech ensured that a common Turkic language was not a viable option. The upsurge in Tatar publishing from the 1860s did much to turn Tatar into a self consciously separate language. Kazakh intellectuals, for their part, revolted against the hegemony of Tatar as a written language on the steppe, and had embarked upon a project of creating a literary language of their own. By the 1910s, a Kazakh language press was an accomplished fact. In Turkestan, the question of unity in language barely caused a ripple. In about the only opinion published on the subject in Turkestan, Ḥajjī Mu'īn (1883–1942), a

37 R. D. McChesney, 'The Central Asian hajj pilgrimage in the time of the early modern empires', in Michel Mazzaoui (ed.), *Safavid Iran and her neighbors* (Salt Lake City, 2003).

38 Sohīb Tabarov, *Munzim* (Dushanbe, 1992), p. 40.

playwright and publicist from Samarqand, provided a list of words that Tatar authors might replace with their Chaghatay equivalents.³⁹ The problem would be solved if the Tatars deferred to Central Asians.

Nor was it simply a matter of the ideological appeal. Broader Islamic or Turkic identities were also unable to bridge the vast gaps between the political and social dynamics of the different Muslim societies of the empire. Speaking in the name of all 'Russian Muslims' allowed Tatar leaders to claim a constituency considerably larger and more diverse than merely the Tatars, who did not even form a majority of the population of the Volga Basin. For public figures in other parts of the empire, the political concerns were different, and Tatar leadership irrelevant. This was clearly the case in 1917, when the all Russian Muslim movement was briefly resurrected and Tatar leaders organised a conference in Moscow to discuss a common political strategy for Muslims. Divisions between representatives from different regions quickly appeared, and the various groups of Muslims went their separate ways.

39 Ḥajjī Muʿīn ibn Shukrullāh, 'Til birlashdurmaq haqqinda', *Ayina*, 4 January 1914, pp. 259–60.

Afghanistan to 1919

NAZIF M. SHAHRANI

The place and people

The earliest known reference to 'Afghanistan' as a political entity is in the pact signed by Britain and Qajar Iran in 1801. This alliance was formed against military threats in the region from France or attacks on British India by the Afghan (Durrani Pashtun) rulers of the kingdom of Kabul.¹ Afghanistan as a territorially defined buffer state between British India and tsarist Russia, with its current boundaries, however, took shape during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

This overwhelmingly Muslim (over 99 per cent), landlocked country covers an area of 647,500 square kilometers (251,773 square miles), primarily of rugged mountains, steep valleys, deserts and arid plateaus. The Hindu Kush dominate the country's geography, topography, ecology and economy. Communications and road systems are poor, although a few difficult passes connect them with Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Located in the 'Heart of Asia', this ancient land has been an important crossroads for diverse peoples and their cultural and religious traditions.

In 1815 Elphinstone offered the following demographic estimates of the peoples ('races') inhabiting the Durrani empire at the time: 'Afghauns [i.e. all Pashtun from Herat to the Sind River] 4.3 million, Beloches [all the Baluch] one million, Tartars of all description [Uzbeks and Turkmen] 1.2 million, Persians (including Taujiks) 1.5 million, Indians (Cashmeerees, Juts, &c.) 5.7 million, and miscellaneous tribes 0.3 million'.² In 1871 MacGregor remarked that 'it is impossible to do more than form an approximate estimate of the

1 For the Persian text of the treaty see Mir Muhammad Siddiq Farhang, *Afghanistan dar panj qarni akhir* (Afghanistan during the last five centuries), (Herndon, VA, 1988), pp. 131–2. Also see Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An account of the kingdom of Caubul*, 2 vols. (London, 1972 [1815]), vol. I, pp. x–xi; 112–14.

2 Elphinstone, *Account of the kingdom of Caubul*, vol. I, p. 114.

population of a country like Afghanistan, yet from such data as I possess I will attempt'. Reviewing a number of disparate population figures based on region, clan/tribe or ethnicity, provided by various British authors including Elphinstone, he suggested a total population of 4.9 million souls for the country i.e. about 2.5 million Afghans (Pashtun), 1.7 million Parsivans etc. (Farsi/Tajik speakers) and 0.65 million for the northern areas which were not under the control of Kabul at the time.³

The rise of the Durrani empire

The last empire to emerge in the old mould, that of Aḥmad Shah Durrani (1747–73), stretched from Khurasan to Kashmir and Punjab, and from the Oxus to the Indian Ocean. It was, however, more of a confederation of Pashtun and non-Pashtun tribes and khanates than a centralised kingdom. Aḥmad Shah Durrani's Islamic zeal as a pious leader waging jihad proved attractive to followers, as did the booty procured during his raids in India. However, the strategy of conquest used so effectively by Aḥmad Shah to break through the limitations of tribal politics ultimately proved to be transient.

Aḥmad Shah's son and heir designate, Timur Shah (r. 1773–93), was confronted by the instability of the kin-based system of political patrimonialism he had inherited. His measures to ensure the continuity of his power (which included moving the capital from Qandahar to Kabul and relying on Qizilbash troops and officials) led to growing resentment among some Pashtun tribal leaders and attempts at revolts. Conditions for centralisation of power, however, grew worse upon the death of Timur Shah, who left twenty-six sons from his ten wives of diverse tribal and ethnic origins without designating a successor. The feverish efforts of his eventual successor, Zaman Shah (r. 1793–1801), to secure tax tributes from the eastern provinces by means of centralisation were unsuccessful. The conflicts among Timur Shah's sons for the throne, already aggravated by declining resources (both money and allies), reached a breaking point in 1800 when Zaman Shah executed the Barakzay leader Sardar Payinda Khan, thus shattering the alliance between the two powerful Sadozay and Barakzay clans of the Durrani tribes.

³ Lieutenant Colonel C. M. MacGregor (comp.), *Central Asia, Part II: A contribution towards the better knowledge of the topography, ethnology, resources, & history of Afghanistan* (Calcutta, 1871), pp. 28, 32.

From Durrani empire to Barakzay kingdom

The murder of Sardar Payinda Khan, who left twenty one sons from at least nine wives, all eager for revenge, offered ample opportunity for British Indian officials to end Zaman Shah's infatuation with the idea of invading India for plunder. British agents encouraged the fratricidal squabble for succession among the Sadozay princes and their embittered Barakzay clansmen.⁴ Bloody wars and chaos lasted for nearly four decades, culminating in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42). One of the most significant legacies of the turmoil surrounding dynastic succession was the politicisation of Islam in the form of Shi'ī–Sunnī conflicts in national politics. Sunnī–Shi'ī antagonism in response to Safavid policies existed only in the western regions. Sectarian tensions in Kabul, however, emerged because of the competition over the support of sizeable Qizilbash Shi'ī troops and their community among the contenders. In June 1803 a minor incident in Kabul was used by the opponent of the reigning monarch, Shah Mahmud, to instigate a devastating riot against the Shi'ī Qizilbash communities. This unprecedented sectarian conflict not only ended Shah Mahmud's first reign but inaugurated a new role for Islam and the 'ulama' in Afghanistan's national politics.⁵ By the 1820s and 1830s the role of the 'ulama' and *ruḥāniyyun* (Sufi leaders) in national politics expanded, not only in the service of Afghan leaders vying for political ascendancy, but also in the service of foreign colonial powers.

Another significant legacy of the succession wars of the early nineteenth century was the loss of the major revenue producing provinces of Punjab, Kashmir and Sind. Afghan Turkistan, Badakhshan and Hazarajat also fell to the many independent local chieftains. The Qajars had already claimed most of Khurasan and were attacking Herat. The Sikhs had taken most of the eastern provinces and were fighting for control of Peshawar and its environs. The Russians and the British were aiding and encouraging such attacks against the Afghans. Eventually, in the face of overwhelming non-Muslim colonial threats, the crises of dynastic wars were overcome by the universalising power of jihad.

An Indian jihadist, Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī, who had been fighting the British in northern India, came to Afghanistan in 1827 to encourage the

4 See Christine Noelle, *State and tribe in nineteenth century Afghanistan: The reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–1863)* (Richmond, 1997).

5 See Elphinstone, *Account of the kingdom of Caubul*, vol. II, pp. 335–7; Mir Ghulam Muḥammad Ghubar, *Afghanistan dar masīr-i tanḳh* (Qum, 1981 [1968]), p. 393; Fayz Muḥammad Kateb, *Siraj al-tawāriḳh* (Kabul, 1331), pp. 66–7.

Barakzay *sardars* (commanders) to wage a jihad against the Sikhs. But it was not until 1834, when the Sikhs attacked Peshawar, that Sardar Dost Muḥammad, who had held Kabul since 1826, was willing to confront them. Upon the declaration of his intentions, the Kabul *'ulama'* conferred on him the title of *amir al mu'minin* (commander of the faithful) and leader of the jihad against the Sikhs. This marked the foundation of the Barakzay dynasty by making Dost Muḥammad the *amir* (not king) of Afghanistan (r. 1834–9 and 1842–63). After declaring jihad in 1835, Amir Dost Muḥammad garnered considerable popular support, thus establishing the mobilising potency of jihad for defending the country and consolidating the power of his dynasty.⁶

In their first military incursion (1839–42) the British, in response to Russian activities in Central Asia and in Kabul, intended to install a Sadozay prince, Shah Shuja', as a puppet to replace at the time the less desirable Barakzay Amir Dost Muḥammad. The fierce resistance of the popular jihad movement proved disastrous for the retreating British forces. Shah Shuja' was killed and Amir Dost Muḥammad restored to the throne (1842).

Banishment (or self imposed exile) and official visits to British India, together with the Anglo Afghan wars, exposed some courtiers to new Western technology, institutions and values. Through a limited modernisation of the army, weaponry and government sponsored industry, the Barakzay *amirs* tried to strengthen their own power and promote political centralisation. Lacking financial resources and modern weapons, they became increasingly dependent on the British, who influenced the subsequent wars of succession after Amir Dost Muḥammad's demise and the installation of his son, Amir Shir 'Ali (r. 1863–6, 1868–79). British financial and military subsidies to both rulers played important roles in reuniting the country. However, as the 'Great Game' intensified in Central Asia, the very survival of the Barakzay kingdom and the country became contingent on British goals and intentions in the region.

The creation and consolidation of a 'buffer nation-state'

Russian military advances in Turkistan (1860s–1870s) prompted the Second Anglo Afghan War (1878–80). After encountering a stiff jihad resistance, Britain withdrew, but retained control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs and

6 This development radically shifts the political use of Islam from mobilising for conquest of new territory to resistance against foreign invaders. See John William Kaye, *History of the war in Afghanistan*, 3 vols. (London, 1851–7), vol. I, pp. 129–30; Kateb, *Siraj al tawarikh*, pp. 127–8; and Ghubar, *Afghanistan*, pp. 517–18.

enthroned Amīr ‘Abd al Raḥman (r. 1880–1901), a grandson of Amīr Dost Muḥammad. For the next two decades Britain, unilaterally or in consultation with Iran and Russia (but not the Afghan *amīr*), marked the boundaries of a buffer state which came to be known, officially, as the kingdom of Afghanistan.

‘Abd al Raḥman, defeated in the wars of succession, had withdrawn to Mashhad, Khiva, Bukhara and eventually Russian controlled Samarqand (1868–80), where he astutely observed the ‘Great Game’ unfold.⁷ The new *amīr*’s priority, and that of his British sponsors, was to reunite his diminished domains and establish a strong centralised government. He was given considerable military, financial and technical support to embark on a project of nation building. During his two decade reign of terror, he orchestrated some of the bloodiest military incursions, similar to the rampages of his Taliban successors a century later, against non Pashtun territories with the aim of imposing his sovereignty. He created his desired centralised state by the use of sword, fire and blood, and earned himself the title of the ‘Iron Amīr’ from his British masters. Lord Curzon, who visited him in 1894, described him as ‘at once a patriot and a monster’.⁸

The political ideals and practices of Amīr ‘Abd al Raḥman Khan, the acknowledged founder of the modern Afghan (Pashtun) nation state, its governance rules and practices, and its hegemonic discourses, have been preserved in a two volume autobiography allegedly dictated to his scribe, Sulṭān Muḥammad Khan. This ‘Mirror for the Afghan Prince’ is profoundly informative about the political culture of the evolving Afghan state and society.⁹ In this ‘Mirror’, he uses the metaphor of ‘building a house’ to justify his brutal methods, stating: ‘It was necessary to clear that house of all the injurious scorpions existing in it . . . all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers, and cutthroats, who were the cause of everlasting trouble in Afghanistan.’¹⁰

Unlike his predecessors, he believed that the power of the ruler does not derive from the support of the people or tribal khans; rather, he was convinced that his power as *amīr* emanated directly from Allah. Assuming the title or *laqab* of *ẓiya’ al millat i wa’l dīn* (the light of nation and the faith), he claimed that the purpose of Allah in honouring him with His ‘vice regency’ or *khalīfa* was to avert the threat of foreign aggression against

7 See Mir Munshī Sulṭān Maḥomed Khan, *The life of Abdur Rahman, amir of Afghanistan*, 2 vols. (London, 1980 [1900]), vol. I, pp. 131–84. Issued in Persian as *Tajut tawarikh* (The crown of histories).

8 Peter King (ed.), *A viceroy’s India: Leaves from Lord Curzon’s note book* (London, 1984), p. 102.

9 Khan, *The life of Abdur Rahman*. 10 Ibid., vol. II, p. 176.

Afghanistan and to safeguard it from further internal disturbances. Suspected enemies were killed, forced to exile in British India or the Ottoman lands, detained in the capital or had their young sons held hostage as *ghulam bachagan* (court pageboys).

The *amir's* policies favoured the Sunni over the Shi'1 and the Pashtun (the real Afghans) over the non Pashtun. Among the Pashtun he relied on his own clan of the Barakzay / Muhammadzay and the *Şafis* of Tagaw. He used his sword mercilessly against *mullas* whom he called 'false leaders of religion', and 'the cause of downfall of all Islamic nations in every country'. The Iron *Amir* made them submit to his rule or leave the country, 'either by being exiled or by departing into the next world'.¹¹ He confiscated the *awqaf*, took charge of religious schools and established salaries for those *mullas* who agreed to preach what he wished to propagate. His central concerns were the payment 'of *Zakat* (taxes), taking part in *Jehad* service at the borders of the Islamic state, and *obedience to the ruler*' (emphasis added).¹² As head of an Islamic state, the *amir* claimed to be the sole interpreter of religious doctrine and asserted that *jihad* or *ghazawat* (holy war) 'could not be fought except under the order and instructions of the ruler of the country'.¹³ As the defender of the Hanaf1 Sunni doctrine of Islam, he waged a devastating *jihad* against the *Ĥazara* Shi'1 (1890 3),¹⁴ and in 1896 forcibly converted the only non Muslim community in Kafiristan (Land of non believers), which he then renamed Nuristan (Land of light). Large numbers of *Ĥazaras* were forced to exile or were taken as slaves. He employed clerics who published religious tracts supporting his self image of sagacity and ostentatious piety, appointed many compliant *qaḍis* (judges) with expanded powers to enforce his policies of centralisation and unification of *dīn* (religion) and *dawlat* (the state). The signal achievement of his religious policies was establishing the guardianship of Islam and Muslim territory as the fundamental responsibility of the state and the basis for its legitimacy. His disingenuous use of Islam was not without precedent. What set him apart, however, was the rigorous articulation, public affirmation and effective integration of the ideals of kingship, kinship

11 Senzil Nawid, *Religious response to social change in Afghanistan 1919 1929: King Aman Allah and the Afghan ulama* (Costa Mesa, 1999), pp. 25, 28.

12 Ashraf Ghani, 'Islam and state building in a tribal society, Afghanistan: 1880 1901', *Modern Asian Studies*, 12, 2 (1978), pp. 269 84.

13 See Vartan Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan: Politics of reform and modernization 1880 1946* (Stanford, 1969) p. 135.

14 See Sayed Askar Mousavi, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An historical, cultural, economic and political study* (New York, 1997), pp. 131 8.

and Islam, reaffirmed by patron–client ties and the politics of fear and favour (*zur wa zar*).¹⁵

An important but problematic aspect of his centralisation drive was the settlement of Pashtun nomads (*kuchū/maldar*) and resettlement of Pashtun peasants in Hazarajat and Turkistan, designed to secure the trust and support of his own tribesmen. Few Pashtun nomads settled, but most of them benefited from new grazing grounds opened up for them in the central highlands of Hazarajat, the northern plains of Turkistan and in Badakhshan. The Iron *Amir*'s policy of demographic aggression in these regions dramatically affected the non Pashtuns, who lost much of their most productive lands to the state or to the resettled Pashtuns.¹⁶ Thus, his nation state building policies in multi ethnic Afghanistan firmly established problematic practices which have become the core elements of the nation's political culture: person centred sovereignty based rule from Kabul, by the Barakzay clans of the Durrani on behalf of Pashtun tribes, justified by the discourses of a conservative, even reactionary, Islam and a mantra of national unity.¹⁷

By the time of *Amir* 'Abd al Rahman's death in 1901, Afghanistan was politically unified and had been transformed from a system of indirect rule to a centralised administration based on superior professional military force. His political and military achievements were not, however, accompanied by socio economic reforms affecting the structure of the rural economy. He did not encourage modern education or improve the communication infrastructure, and because of his extreme fear of colonialist threats, he adopted a policy of isolationism, avoiding extensive foreign contact, trade and communication.¹⁸ His minimal reform efforts suffered from lack of resources and skilled personnel. The meagre revenues collected through heavy taxation were spent on the upkeep of his standing army (some 50,000–60,000 strong) and the royal court. Preservation of the Barakzay monarchy established by

15 Nazif M. Shahrani, 'State building and social fragmentation in Afghanistan: A historical perspective', in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds.), *The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan* (Syracuse, 1986), pp. 36–40.

16 See Hasan Kawun Kakar, *Government and society in Afghanistan: The reign of Amir 'Abd al Rahman Khan* (Austin and London, 1979) pp. 113–45; also see Nancy Tapper, 'Abd al Rahman's north west frontier: The Pashtun colonisation of Afghan Turkistan', in Richard Tapper (ed.), *The conflict of tribe and state in Iran and Afghanistan* (New York, 1983) pp. 233–61; and Klaus Ferdinand, 'Nomad expansion and commerce in central Afghanistan', *Folk*, 4 (1962), pp. 123–59.

17 See Nazif Shahrani, 'Resisting the Taliban and Talibanism in Afghanistan: Legacies of a century of internal colonialism and Cold War politics in a buffer state', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 4 (2000), pp. 121–40.

18 Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan*, pp. 124–8, 160.

the use 'of the sharp blade of the sword', and maintained 'with the sharp blade of the pen by communicating with the neighboring powers', mainly the British Indian patrons, remained the supreme goal of the subsequent rulers of Afghanistan.¹⁹

Amir 'Abd al Raḥman took unprecedented measures to ensure a smooth transition after his own demise.²⁰ He did not name a successor, but groomed his eldest son, Ḥabīb Allah, the first monarch to accede without violence. Amir Ḥabīb Allah (r. 1901–19), began as a relatively progressive ruler. By opening the Ḥabībīyya School in 1903, he laid the foundation for modern education in Afghanistan. He also opened a printing press and a bureau of translation. Unlike his father, he revered 'ulama' and *pirs* (spiritual teachers), offered them royal patronage, and he and many of his courtiers became disciples. He was given the title *siraj al millat i wa'l dīn* (The lamp of the nation and of the faith) by a group of conservative 'ulama' for his services to Islam.²¹ However, over time he too became autocratic and like his father began to claim 'divine rights', ordering the publication of books and tracts which advocated sovereignty of the ruler over his subjects, and claiming that in fulfilling his duties, 'the ruler was answerable only to God'.²²

Feeling secure on his throne, he left many of the administrative tasks to his brother Naṣr Allah, and eldest son, 'Inayat Allah. Ḥabīb Allah became preoccupied with organising his opulent court on the Western model and indulged in sports, hunting and other leisure activities. The court introduced new taxes to cover its large expenditures. Tax collection provided an ideal pretext for bribery, extortion and fraud. Armed uprisings against local officials, who were frequently Barakzay *sardars*, occurred in the well armed frontier area of Paktia (1912–13) and in Qandahar (1912). Both incidents were resolved without major military confrontations, but abuse and exploitation of rural people by officials continued.

Ḥabīb Allah offered all adult members of his own clan cash allowances, issued amnesty to families his father had exiled, and appointed many of those who returned to critical government posts. Among them, Maḥmud Ṭarzi, who had spent many years in Damascus and Istanbul, became the editor of *Siraj al Akhbar*, which promoted ideas of Afghan nationalism, Islamic patriotism and pan Islamism. Ṭarzi became a powerful advocate for Afghan independence and for the Islamic reformist ideals of Jamal al Dīn al Afghānī and

19 Khan, *The life of Abdur Rahman*, vol. II, p. 177.

20 See *ibid.*, pp. 1–13.

21 See Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan*, pp. 182–3, and Ghubar, *Afghanistan*, p. 700.

22 Nawid, *Religious response* pp. 31, 36.

others. Consequently, entirely new sets of political ideals – such as constitutionalism, nationalism, liberal secularism, reformism and Islamic modernism – entered Afghan political culture, both complementing and competing with the traditional ideals of kingship, kinship and Islam. They found adherents among the nascent intelligentsia, members of the royal family, the court page boys and some ‘*ulama*’, thus encouraging anti British sentiment.

When Amir Ḥabīb Allah visited India (1907) at the invitation of the British government, some clerics openly opposed his trip, an act of defiance which resulted in the execution of four *mullas*.²³ The Ḥizb i Sirri yi Millī (Secret national party), commonly known as *mashruta khawhan* (the constitutionalists), was formed to oppose the *amir*’s growing autocratic rule. All later democratic movements have been inspired by the activities of this group, which marked the beginnings of political awakening in the country. The young Prince Aman Allah, who later succeeded his father to the throne, and some court officials, including the court scribe/historian Fayz Muḥammad Kateb,²⁴ were among its members. Because of an alleged plot by the party (1909) on the *amir*’s life, the head of the party, Mawlawī M. Sarwar Asif Qandahari, and several of its members were executed. Prince Aman Allah and his mother fell from favour, and many others suffered incarceration.²⁵

Opposition to Amir Ḥabīb Allah’s First World War policies grew steadily towards the end of his rule. Some influential ‘*ulama*’ and nationalists were supportive of the Ottoman caliph’s call for jihad. However, Great Britain, which controlled Afghanistan’s foreign affairs, insisted on a policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, some members of the royal court – including Crown Prince Naṣr Allah, an avowed Muslim patriot – were secretly encouraging jihad against Britain in the eastern tribal zone and were regarded by the British officials as ‘the central wire puller of all trans border priestly fanaticism’.²⁶ A region where the establishment of Deobandī *madrasas* was on the rise was a source of concern for the British officials. Ultimately, frustration over Amir Ḥabīb Allah’s war policies among nationalists, constitutionalists and reformist ‘*ulama*’ may have led to his assassination, on 20 February 1919, while on a hunting trip.

23 Ibid., p. 35.

24 Robert D. McChesney, *Kabul under siege: Fayz Muhammad’s account of the 1929 uprising* (Princeton, 1999), p. 17.

25 See Ghubar, *Afghanistan*; Abdul Ḥay Ḥabībī, *Junbushis mashrutiyyat dar Afghanistan* (Constitutional movement in Afghanistan) (Kabul, 1364); Said S. Hashimi, *Constitutional movement in Afghanistan*, vol. I (Stockholm, 2001).

26 Nawīd, *Religious response*, p. 33–4.

South Asia to 1919

FRANCIS ROBINSON

The period 1800–1920 saw the roughly one quarter of the world's Muslims who lived in the Indian subcontinent enter the modern world. They moved from a time when the Mughal emperor, in theory at least, still guaranteed the existence of the Muslim community to one in which increasing numbers of Muslims were coming to regard it as their personal responsibility to sustain the Muslim community on earth. This period marked the final assertion of British power in the region and the increasing engagement of Muslims with the possibilities of Western ideas, forms of organisation and technology. Muslims offered a great variety of responses to the new situation, most of which have had ramifications that reach down to the present. The development of mass communications made possible an increasingly intense discourse amongst Muslims within regions, across India and increasingly across the world. Communities of Muslims emerged which could in their interactions with the colonial state be presented as one Muslim community. There developed alongside this the idea among some Muslims that they had separate interests from those of other Indians, and the formation of organisations to support these interests.

The imposition of British rule and the movements of Islamic reform, 1800–57

In 1803 the British defeated the Marathas outside Delhi and made the Mughal emperor a British pensioner. Soon afterwards Shah 'Abd al 'Aziz, head of Delhi's Walī Allāhī family of 'ulama', issued a *fatwa* declaring India *dar al ḥarb*. In Delhi, he said, the *imam al Muslimīn* has no authority while Christian leaders run everything from the administration and taxation through to law and punishment. Indeed, 'from here to Calcutta the Christians are in complete control'.¹ There was no endorsement for *hijrat* or *jihad* in the *fatwa*,

¹ Muhammad Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims* (London, 1967), p. 390.

while in other declarations on the same subject he made permissible the acceptance of interest, the learning of English and the taking of jobs under the British, providing that they involved no harm to Muslims.² The prime purpose of the *fatwa* was to announce that after six hundred years India was no longer a *dar al Islam* supported by a Muslim ruler. The community would have to find some new way of sustaining itself. To this problem Muslims now gave their full attention.

In the eighteenth century Muslim power swiftly evaporated, leaving the emperor, the blind Shah 'Alam, a pathetic remnant of Mughal grandeur. Successor states emerged under leaders, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh, to compete with the British East India Company for power. These states, along with the British, maintained Mughal systems and traditions, and were often centres of cultural and economic vitality. In the two decades before 1803 the major Muslim successor states Mysore, Hyderabad, Awadh had all been brought under forms of British control. The tide of conquest, moreover, did not stop at Delhi. By 1818, after the final defeat of the Marathas, the British were the paramount power. Subsequently, the disastrous British intervention in Afghanistan between 1839 and 1842, which was stimulated by fear of Russia, led in 1843 to the annexation of Sind and in 1849 to that of the Sikh kingdom of the Punjab. Now, British power reached from the Pashtun tribes of the Hindu Kush in the north west to the hill tribes of Assam in the north east, and from the Himalayan mountains in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south. The final annexation, of Awadh in 1856, rounded off the process. The British now ruled roughly 50 million Muslims, about 20 per cent of the population of India.

These Muslims were unevenly distributed. About half, mostly cultivators, lived in Bengal to the north east, where they had become Muslims as the frontier of rice cultivation had expanded eastwards under Muslim rule. Roughly one fifth landlords, cultivators and tribesmen lived in the Punjab to the north west, where Muslim power had been present since the eleventh century. The remainder were divided between communities fashioned to a greater or less extent by interactions with Arab influences from the sea and those formed primarily by the settlement of Persians, Turks, Afghans and Arabs who had come to serve at Muslim courts. The former were to be found around the coasts in Sind, Gujarat, Malabar and the Carnatic. The latter were found in the great cities of former Mughal rule in the north, and in *qasbas*, small towns of

2 Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Shah 'Abd al 'Aziz: Puritanism, sectarian polemics and jihad* (Canberra, 1982), pp. 225–44.

Muslim settlement, scattered across the north Indian plain from Panipat to Benares, which we will give its twentieth century name, the United Provinces (UP). Here Muslims had established a distinctive gentry class, and from here they travelled throughout India to serve as administrators, scholars, poets and soldiers. In the north east and north west Muslims formed roughly half of the population; in Sind they were a substantial majority. Elsewhere they tended to be a small minority; in the UP the first census found them to number about 13 per cent. At this stage elite Muslims remained profoundly conscious of their traditions of rule; there was no sense that lack of numbers might be a problem. But, as the colonial transformation progressed, they became increasingly worried about being a minority at the mercy of others.

As might be deduced from their differing origins, these Muslims were much divided. They spoke India's many regional languages Bengali, Punjabi, Gujarati, Malayali, Tamil, and so on. They expressed their faith through a host of regional cultures, on occasion maintaining idioms and practices from the Hindu world around them and giving them new meaning. They were powerfully divided, too, by status, the biggest difference being between those who had migrated to India from outside, or alternatively had acquired the genealogy or the resources to claim to have done so, and those who were descendants of 'converts' to Islam. The former had a distinct concept of themselves as a nobility, a *sharif* class. Even amongst this nobility there were divisions, most certainly of status, with the *sayyids*, descendants of the Prophet, holding the highest rank. There were also growing tensions between Sunni and Shi'ī, which were exacerbated by the decline of Sunni power in northern India and the rise of the Shi'ī kingdom of Awadh. This said, it should be noted that the *sharif* class shared a common culture in which Persian and Urdu played a major part.

British rule brought a general dismantling of the system and the values that had supported the agrarian military states of the Mughal era, and their replacement by policies designed to open up India to British industry. As Emily Eden, the governor general's daughter, declared on seeing the tawdry remnant of the Mughal court in the 1830s, the English have just 'gone and done it, merchandised it, revenueed it, and spoiled it all'.³ The process was accompanied by a series of changes which hit Muslims hard, although not always as hard as they claimed. Among them were the demilitarisation of society; new approaches to landholding and taxation; the abolition of Persian

³ Emily Eden, *Up the country: Letters written to her sister from the upper provinces of India* (London, 1983), p. 98.

as the language of government; the supersession of the old knowledge and skills needed for success by new ones from the West; and a steady undermining of the symbols of Mughal authority. Their impact, however, varied according to time and place. In Bengal there is some truth in W. W. Hunter's statement that the Muslims were 'in all respects . . . a race ruined under British rule'.⁴ The permanent settlement of 1793, by ignoring Indian systems of multiple rights in land, made those who collected the revenue, most of whom were Hindus, into the landowners. At a stroke the cultivators, most of whom were Muslims, were cut out of the landlord class. Their situation was worsened by the resumption, where no documentary proof could be found, of revenue free grants which supported the work of '*ulama*' and Sufis: traditional Muslim education suffered badly. In the judicial and revenue services from the 1770s to the 1850s Muslims had a steadily declining proportion of positions. The handloom weavers of East Bengal had their livelihoods destroyed as they failed to compete with the output of British machines.

In northern India Muslims survived British attempts to create a market in land. There was no permanent settlement. Instead, a record of rights was established alongside settlements at regular intervals. There is no evidence that Muslims did any worse than other groups, and some did rather well. In the judicial and revenue services by the 1850s Muslims still held nearly three quarters of the positions, plus a majority of those in the police. Many, therefore, maintained their livelihoods, but not all. Between 1828 and 1840 1,750,000 acres of land held as revenue free grants were resumed. '*Ulama*' and Sufis suffered in particular; *madrasas* had to close.⁵ To the Muslim gentry of the *qasbas* it was clear that the old courtly culture was on the way out. While still, in principle, drawing their authority from the Mughal emperor, the British steadily reduced the forms of respect he was shown. The changing world was encapsulated in the experience of the poet and Mughal courtier Ghalib, when he sought a teaching post at Delhi College. Ghalib expected the British official, as was customary, to come from his office to greet him in his palanquin. Instead, he was told that as he was seeking a job he must go inside and wait attendance on the official.⁶

4 W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (London, 1871), p. 149.

5 Farhan Ahmad Nizami, 'Masrasahs, scholars and saints: Muslim response to the British presence in Delhi and the Upper Doab 1803–1857', D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University (1983), pp. 42–57.

6 Mushirul Hasan, *A moral reckoning: Muslim intellectuals in nineteenth century Delhi* (New Delhi, 2005), pp. 60–1.

In Sind and the Punjab the impact of British rule was very different. By the 1840s in the north west the British were less interested in generating a market in land and more concerned to establish a secure system of political control in a region of growing strategic importance. In Sind the landed elites, entirely Muslim and many of whom were Sufi *pirs*, were transformed from being the holders of various rights into landlords. The issue of revenue free lands was treated more leniently than elsewhere.⁷ In the Punjab British policy took a similar conservative path, following Dalhousie's annexation dispatch which called for upholding 'native institutions and practices as far as they are consistent with the distribution of justice'.⁸ This led to the creation of a powerful landlord class in which the Muslims, particularly in the west, played a substantial part and in which landholding Sufi *pirs* became closely connected to British interests.⁹

These developments formed the background to Muslim responses to the British presence. Some involved forms of religious resistance, others forms of constructive engagement. Arguably, the most striking of the former was the jihad movement of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī (1786–1831). Born into a family of learning and piety in the *qasba* of Rae Bareli, Sayyid Aḥmad set out in 1804 to find a job, but without success. From 1806 he studied with members of Shah 'Abd al 'Aziz's family in Delhi, and was admitted to the Chishtī, Qadiri and Naqshbandi Sufi orders. From 1811 to 1818 he fought with the irregular cavalry of Amir Khan, later *Nawab* of Tonk, his job coming to an end with the establishment of British power. He returned to Delhi having developed considerable spiritual charisma; Muḥammad Isma'īl, the grandson of Shah 'Abd al 'Aziz, and 'Abd al Ḥayy his son in law, both became his disciples. From this moment down to 1826 the *sayyid* preached a message of Islamic reform through northern India, interspersed in 1821–3 with a pilgrimage to Mecca.

The *sayyid's* message was stimulated by his belief that Muslims had lost power because they had failed to fulfil the requirements of the *shari'a*. In preaching it he both continued the reforming mission of Shah 'Abd al 'Aziz and his father Shah Walī Allah, and went beyond it in his concern to achieve purity. His teachings are to be found in his *Sirat al mustaqim* (The straight path), which was compiled by Shah Isma'īl in 1819, and in his *Taqwiyat al iman*

7 Sarah F. D. Ansari, *Sufi saints and state power: The pirs of Sind, 1843–1947* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 9–56.

8 David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the making of Pakistan* (Berkeley, 1988), p. 14.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 11–72.

(The polishing of the faith). Both quickly appeared in Urdu to reach a wider audience, and were among the earliest books to be printed on the lithographic press. In these works he proclaimed the centrality of *tawḥīd* (the unity of God), and condemned all those practices that compromised it: Sufi customs which suggested that there might be intercession for man with God; Shī‘ī customs such as keeping and parading *ta‘ziyas* (representations of the tombs of the martyrs of Karbala’); and expensive ceremonies and popular practices, in particular the prohibition, following Hindu custom, of the remarriage of widows.

After winning substantial support for his message across northern India, and admitting thousands to his Sufi order, the Ṭarīqa yi Muḥammadi, in 1826 he performed *hijrat* to the tribal areas of the north west, north of Peshawar, where with the support of some Pashtun tribes he established a small state, adopting the classic title of the Muslim ruler, *amir al mu‘minin*. In 1827 he launched a jihad against the Sikhs, defeating an army sent by Ranjit Singh. But he had difficulty in sustaining his Pashtun alliances. In 1831 he, Shah Isma‘īl, and roughly 600 *mujahidin* were killed by the Sikhs at the battle of Balakot.

Sayyid Aḥmad left a network of supporters through the cities and *qasbas* of northern India, some of whom continued to raise funds to support the *mujahidin* on the frontier, while others carried his message into Bengal, Hyderabad and Madras. He set an example of reforming activism which was admired and remembered, although in future reform was to be driven forward by a jihad of the pen and the voice rather than the sword. Some have described it as a manifestation of Wahhabism in India, but its origins were indigenous and its Sufi form anathema to the Wahhabis.¹⁰

Revivalism in Bengal deserves particular attention. Leadership came from two directions. The first was from followers of Sayyid Aḥmad Bareilwī. His two Patna *khalīfas*, Wilayat ‘Alī (1791 1835) and ‘Inayat ‘Alī (1794 1858), preached his reforming message in West Bengal. Another follower, Titu Mīr (1782 1831), preached his message in the same region from 1827, instructing his followers to grow their beards. When Hindu landlords began to fine Mīr’s followers for wearing beards, open warfare broke out between the Muslims and their landlords, which was only brought to an end in 1831 when British troops destroyed Mīr’s headquarters and killed him. Yet another follower, Karamat ‘Alī Jawnpurī (1800 73), preached a peaceful reforming message to such good effect that he was said to have followers in every

10 P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 50–5.

Bengali village. They were known as Ta'aiyunis, those who identify themselves with the schools of law.

The more significant revivalist movement in Bengal, and one intimately linked to the structural economic disadvantages that most Muslims suffered, was that of the Fara'idīs (from *fara'id*, meaning obligatory duty, derived from the Arabic *farḍ*). The movement's founder was Ḥajjī Shari'at Allah (1781–1840), who performed the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1799 and stayed until 1818, gaining among other things a good sense of the doctrines and impact of the Wahhabī movement. After a second pilgrimage in 1821 he began preaching that Muslims must observe the obligatory duties enjoined by the Qur'an and the Prophet's example, strictly maintaining the unity of God, and avoid all forms of innovation or unbelief, for instance, Hindu ceremonies or worshipping at Sufi shrines. The opposition to most forms of Sufism differentiated the Fara'idīs from the followers of Sayyid Aḥmad, but so too did their insistence that, while the British ruled, mosque attendance on Fridays and 'Id celebrations were suspended. The movement did not consider jihad, focusing on peaceful proselytisation.

The Fara'idīs were Muslim cultivators and landless labourers who felt oppressed both by their mainly Hindu landlords and by the new class of British indigo planters. Shari'at Allah's son, Dudu Miyan (1819–62), created a hierarchical organisation within the British district structure headed by *khalīfas*. Fara'idīs paid subscriptions which enabled the organisation on their behalf to fund legal battles against landlords and planters. *Khalīfas* settled disputes within their district and Fara'idīs could only go to the British courts with the *khalīfa*'s permission. They ran a state within a state.¹¹

Much Muslim engagement with the British did not take a specifically religious form. Rather, the Muslim elite of the *qasbas* and cities of north India displayed a wary pragmatism. In Delhi Shah 'Abd al 'Azīz set the tone, establishing good relations with the British and not preventing his followers from engaging with them, providing nothing forbidden was involved. Thus many of the Muslim elite worked for the British, though not all found they could do so and retain their self respect. Nevertheless, there were relationships of personal warmth and mutual respect, as evinced by Ghalib's sorrow at the murder of his friend, William Fraser, the Delhi resident, and Sayyid Aḥmad Khan's (1817–98) recording, with the encouragement of European friends in the Delhi Archaeological Society, of the ruins of Delhi in his

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 55–60; Rafiuddin Ahmed, *The Bengal Muslims 1871–1906: A quest for identity*, 2nd edn (Delhi, 1988), pp. 39–71.

Athar al Şanadūd, which was one of the achievements to win him a fellowship of the Royal Asiatic Society.¹²

In this context there developed in Delhi what has been called a 'renaissance'. At its heart was Delhi College, which was founded in 1825 and taught English and Oriental (Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit) programmes. Roughly 35 per cent of its 350 pupils in the 1840s were Muslim. Several leading '*ulama*' taught there, and the renaissance sparkle was generated in the interaction between its students and Western knowledge. The excitement grew from the early 1840s when the college began to teach Western sciences under the leadership of a gifted Hindu, Ram Chander, who translated key works into Urdu. Years later pupils would recall the thrilling nature of the time. Printed books, magazines and newspapers began to circulate; in the 1840s Delhi had seven printing presses.¹³

The mood of excitement, however, turned to one of concern. On the one hand, Christian missionaries, based in particular in Agra, began to adopt an increasingly aggressive approach towards Islam. On the other hand, some of the implications of Western science were found alarming, which led Sayyid Aḥmad Khan in 1848, for instance, to write a tract rebutting Copernican cosmology. Matters came to a head in 1852 when Ram Chander, who had recently challenged Muslims over Muḥammad's miracle of splitting the moon in two, became a Christian, to the evident delight of British officials. Alarm coursed through the city; Muslim enrolments at the college sank. Two Muslims, Raḥmat Allah Kayranawī and Dr Wazīr Khan, set out to scotch the missionary threat by taking on their leading proponent, Dr Pfander, in a public debate in Agra on key differences between the faiths, for instance, corruption of the scriptures, the doctrine of the Trinity and the prophethood of Muḥammad. The outcome in 1854 was inconclusive, although the Muslims claimed a victory. This did nothing, however, to allay their sense of unease.¹⁴

Further east in Lucknow, the capital of what was from 1819 the kingdom of Awadh, matters were less strained, perhaps because its Muslims had known the British for longer, perhaps because they had greater independence, and perhaps because of the greater flexibility open to Shī'ī *mujtahids*. After early reservations, the Shī'ī gentry came to work for the British without obvious difficulty and with the support of their *mujtahids*. One, Mir Ḥasan 'Alī, even taught Urdu to East India Company staff at Addiscombe, returning with an

12 Hasan, *Moral Reckoning*, pp. 41–83. 13 *ibid.*, pp. 85–131.

14 Avril Ann Powell, *Muslims and missionaries in pre Mutiny India* (Richmond, 1993), pp. 158–262.

English wife. In the early decades of the nineteenth century the Shi'ī elite became increasingly involved with British capitalism. Ten million rupees were loaned to the company to help it fight in Nepal; ten families received between them 600,000 rupees per annum interest. There were further loans of this kind. Moreover, the leading 'ulama' were also investing in East India Company stock. By the 1830s the *mujtahids* had declared that it was permissible to take interest not only from polytheists, but also from Sufis, Jews and Christians. Regarding Western science the *mujtahids* were less accommodating. While lay Shi'ī intellectuals relished their encounters with Copernican, and even Newtonian, science, the 'ulama' refuted it. From 1842 the attitude of the 'ulama' towards the British became less relaxed, in part because they supported the king as the British weighed more and more heavily on the region, and in part because they felt that the British were not even handed in adjudicating between Hindu and Muslim over a temple placed in a mosque at Ayodhya. The 'ulama', nevertheless, maintained their investments in the East India Company.¹⁵

The half century that followed the *dar al ḥarb fatwa* of Shah 'Abd al 'Aziz saw the 'ulama' take the initiative as Muslims set out to answer the question of how to be Muslim without power. The period saw a widespread growth of Islamic reform, which was less a matter for scholarly study than for urgent social action. The outcome was processes that made Muslims increasingly self conscious as Muslims, that drew careful distinctions between Muslim and non Muslim, and which in their jihādī forms had a long term impact on British policy by reinforcing the idea that Muslims were fanatical. Side by side with this there were real attempts on the part of the Muslim elite, which of course included 'ulama', to engage with British rule and Western civilisation, but by mid century some of these attempts were beginning to run into problems.

Muslims and the colonial state 1857–1900

The Mutiny uprising of 1857–8 was a defining moment both for the British and for the Muslims of north India. The uprising began with a military mutiny in May 1857, which was followed by a general breakdown of order in the vast tract of land from the Punjab to Bihar. In 1857 Delhi and Lucknow, the two formal centres of Muslim power, were focal points in the action, but

15 J. R. I. Cole, *Roots of North Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and state in Awadh, 1722–1859* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 251–82.

it was not until 1858 that the British fully reasserted their authority over the countryside. One source of the conflagration was the rapidly increasing pressure placed on Indian society under Dalhousie's governor generalship (1848–56). His regime absorbed seven Indian states in as many years, including the rich kingdom of Awadh, and pressed forward new technologies, for instance, the railways, telegraph and postal service, as well as older ones such as canal irrigation. A second source, acutely analysed by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in his *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, was the style and content of British rule: the aggressive preaching of Christian missionaries had led Indians to fear that their religions and their customs were in danger; the passing of laws resuming revenue free grants or creating a market in land, which had brought ruin to many; the passing of laws regarding employment or pensions in complete ignorance of their impact on society; the British failure to show Indians proper respect either personally in day to day relations or collectively as a society; and the British failure effectively to manage their Indian troops. His first step towards ameliorating matters was for an Indian to become a member of the governor general's council.¹⁶

There was a strong British view, in particular among younger administrators caught up in the uprising, that it was the outcome of a Muslim conspiracy; Muslims had been prominent in the action. But so had Hindus in Awadh, the Central Provinces and Bihar. Moreover, leading Muslims supported the British, among them Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who rescued the British population of Bijnor district; there was no support for the uprising from the Muslims of Bengal, who had suffered most, or from those of Malabar with their distinctive jihādī traditions; while Muslims from the Punjab formed part of the reinforcements for the British troops besieging Delhi. It was less a Muslim revolt against the British than one primarily of those in India who felt they had suffered at British hands.¹⁷

The immediate British treatment of Delhi and Lucknow was savage. As many as 30,000 citizens were said to have been killed in the sack of Delhi. Mughal princes were slaughtered out of hand and the old Mughal emperor exiled. The remaining citizens were driven out, and for a moment the British considered razing the city. But then in June 1858 Hindus were permitted to return on payment of 10 per cent of the value of their property, and in August 1859 Muslims on payment of 25 per cent. Relics of the Mughal era were treated with contempt: Shah Jahan's Friday mosque became a barrack for

¹⁶ Syed Ahmed Khan, *The causes of the Indian Revolt*, new edn (Karachi, 2000).

¹⁷ Hardy, *Muslims*, pp. 62–70.

Sikh soldiers, the Fatehpuri Mosque was sold to a Hindu, and the area within a 500 yard radius of the Red Fort, where the old Mughal aristocracy had lived, was flattened to provide a field of fire. Two fifths of Lucknow, the largest pre colonial city in South Asia, whose buildings were admired by Indian and Briton alike, was demolished. Subsequent British treatment of the Muslims, as British officers dispensed post Mutiny retribution in the countryside, was, under the firm guidance of Governor General Canning, more even handed. Nevertheless, through the 1860s Muslims remained under suspicion; there was the feeling that their religion made them instinctively opposed to the British.¹⁸

The impact of the Mutiny and its aftermath was formative for Muslims, and these included several who were to be leaders in the latter half of the century. For one, who saw major figures of the Delhi renaissance murdered before his eyes, 'the shock of those last Mutiny days was beyond all bearing'.¹⁹ Sayyid Aḥmad Khan, who saw an uncle and a cousin murdered, his property ransacked and his mother die from the privations experienced, thought of leaving for Arabia, as several notable figures did. 'For some time', he declared in 1889, 'I wrestled with my grief and, believe me, it made an old man of me. My hair turned white.'²⁰ Muslims realised that their old world was utterly destroyed and that they must, one way or another, actively come to terms with British rule. 'Hearken to me', the poet Ḥālī (1837–1914) told a symposium in 1874, 'do not go into the ruins of Delhi. At every step priceless pearls lie buried beneath the dust . . . times have changed as they can never change again.'²¹

Sayyid Aḥmad Khan led the process of constructive engagement with British rule. The *sayyid* was born to lead. On his father's side he was descended from high ranking Mughal courtiers; on his mother's side his grandfather had been the principal of the Calcutta Madrasa, East India Company envoy to Iran and Burma, and prime minister of the penultimate Mughal emperor. He was profoundly conscious of the achievements of Muslim power in India, as his historical writings attest. An East India Company civil servant since 1837, he had friends and admirers among the British but was never afraid to speak his mind. From the early 1860s he set out

18 Ibid., pp. 70–91. 19 C. F. Andrews, *Zaka Ullah of Delhi* (Lahore, 1976), p. 75.

20 Altaf Husain Hālī, *Hayat i Javed*, trans. K. H. Qadiri and David J. Matthews (Delhi, 1979), p. 56.

21 From a *marsiya* quoted in Naryani Gupta, *Delhi between two empires 1803–1931: Society, government and urban growth* (Delhi, 1981), pp. xviii–xix.

to build bridges between his Mughal elite world and the British in both ideas and action.

Sayyid Ahmad's first concern was to demonstrate that British policy had a substantial responsibility for the Mutiny uprising and that numbers of Muslims had behaved loyally in it. He then addressed the issue of religious ideas. It should be clear that he was a man of deep faith, brought up in the traditions of the family of Shah Wali Allah, and in devotion to the Sufi guidance of Shah Ghulam 'Alī Naqshband. His early religious writings were religiously conservative. But, after the Mutiny uprising, he moved onto a totally different plane, engaging both with modern biblical criticism and with Western science. He produced a substantial commentary on the Bible with the aim of showing how much Muslims and Christians shared. He set out to demonstrate in a Qur'an commentary, and in a magazine, *Tahzīb al Akhlaq*, that Islam was compatible with progress. An important step in moving beyond the old thinking of the '*ulama*' was his rejection of the law schools and his use of the Qur'an and Hadith as his basic source of guidance. He argued that *tawhīd* meant that the word of God and the work of God must be in harmony. Therefore, if Western science and Muslim understanding were in disagreement, it was because of a failure of rational effort. Again he argued that there was a distinction to be made between those injunctions in the Qur'an related to the faith and those related to social practice. The former were for all time; the latter were of their time, and should change with the times. Thus, he strove to build bridges, and in doing so established some of the trajectories and techniques of Islamic modernism. As was to be expected, though few doubted his sincerity, such views attracted much opprobrium indeed, a *fatwa* of *kufṛ* from Mecca.²²

When it came to practical action Sayyid Ahmad's prime focus was education. Wherever he was stationed as a judge in the 1860s, he set up schools and learned societies; indeed, the establishment of such societies was a major feature of the life of the Urdu speaking elite across northern India. The most prominent of these was Sayyid Ahmad's Aligarh Institute, founded in 1866, which translated works from English into the vernacular and published a weekly newspaper, the *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, in Urdu and English. The Aligarh Institute was a true organisation of the Urdu speaking elite with rather more Hindu than Muslim members, and so was the organisation

22 Christian W. Troll, *Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A reinterpretation of Muslim theology* (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 58–222.

which it spawned, the British India Association, with the aim of making representations to government.

Sayyid Aḥmad's concern that education should be effective meant that he wrestled with the issue of which medium at the higher level was appropriate, English or the vernacular. By 1867 he had decided that it should be the latter, and the British India Association petitioned for the establishment of a vernacular university in north India. This immediately raised the question of which vernacular, Urdu or Hindi, and which script, Persian or Nagri. For Sayyid Aḥmad this was not an issue: Urdu in the Persian script was the court language of north India, and its pleasures were widely shared by Hindus and Muslims of the Urdu speaking elite. But for many Hindus, who now lived in an atmosphere of incipient Hindu revivalism, it had become difficult to defend a language and a script associated with Islam against one associated with their faith. Learned societies divided on the issue. Hindu members of the Aligarh Institute began to demand that its proceedings and translations should be published in Nagri. In discussion with the commissioner of Benares in 1869 Sayyid Aḥmad talked for the first time of working not for the people of India but for Muslims alone. 'I was convinced that the two communities were incapable of putting their heart and soul into anything requiring mutual effort.'²³

From now on Sayyid Aḥmad focused on higher education primarily for Muslims. In 1869–70 he visited England and decided that his aim should be a foundation after the model of Oxford and Cambridge. In 1877 the foundation stone of his Muhammadan Anglo Oriental College was laid by Viceroy Lytton at Aligarh. To begin with it had English, Urdu/Persian and Arabic departments, but by the early 1880s only English remained. The market had forced Sayyid Aḥmad to change his views: the Urdu speaking elite wanted an education that would get them jobs under the new dispensation. The students lived in rooms arranged around courtyards and were taught by both Indians and able and idealistic young Englishmen. They were encouraged to acquire the skills and tastes of the English and to consider themselves leaders of the future. By 1895 there were 595 students, and the college educated over three fifths of the Muslim graduates of the North West Provinces and Awadh (later UP) and a quarter of those of India. It should be noted, moreover, that at this time it attracted financial support from the Hindu aristocracy, and 20 per cent of its students were Hindu.

²³ Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860–1923* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 84–98; Hali, *Hayat-i-Javed*, p. 100.

Sayyid Aḥmad's achievement was more than just the fashioning of Islamic modernism and creating the key institution of Muslim higher education; he inspired innovation across a broad front designed to help Muslims embrace 'modernity', which came to be called the Aligarh movement. Among its leading figures were: the poet Aṭṭaf Ḥusayn Ḥalī, who created the anthem of the movement in his *Musaddas*, an elegy which told of the glories of the Islamic past, the decay of the present, and the need to embrace Western knowledge to progress; the writer Naẓır Aḥmad (1830–1912), whose novels in the workmanlike prose favoured by the movement over the old florid, courtly style set out the bourgeois self discipline required for success under British rule; the mathematician and educationist Zaka' Allah (1832–1914), who translated large numbers of textbooks into Urdu; and the thinker Chiragh 'Alī (1844–1905), who strove to build on Sayyid Aḥmad's modernist Islam. These, and many others, worked under the auspices of the All India Muslim Educational Conference, which Sayyid Aḥmad founded in 1886, to carry the message of Aligarh across India.²⁴

Sayyid Aḥmad was a giant in his time, but he was not alone in trying to build bridges with the British. In Bengal Nawab 'Abd al Latīf (1828–93), a government servant steeped in English culture, founded the Muhammadan Literary and Scientific Society in 1863, which focused on bringing useful knowledge to the elite and by the 1870s had 500 members. There was also Sayyid Amīr 'Alī (1849–1928), who had a modern education, went to England where he was called to the Bar, and returned to Calcutta to practise, eventually becoming a high court judge. But his writings on Islam, of which *The Spirit of Islam* (1891) was the most influential, were designed more to defuse European concerns by presenting it as a faith of reason and progress than to build bridges to the West on which most Muslims would be willing to place their feet. In Bombay the Sulaymānī Bohra leader, Badr al Dīn Tyabjī (1844–1906) set up the Anjuman i Islam in 1876 to provide schools for the city's Muslims. In Lahore, the Anjuman Himayat i Islam was founded for the same purpose in 1884.²⁵

As with all Indian faiths under colonial rule, towards the end of the nineteenth century attention was paid to women's education as a means of strengthening the community. Women's journals played a role. Amongst the more important were *Tahzīb un Niswan*, edited from Lahore by Sayyid Mumṭaẓ 'Alī (d. 1935) and the women of his family; *Khaṭun*, edited from

²⁴ Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 98–126.

²⁵ Hardy, *Muslims*, pp. 104–7.

Aligarh by Shaykh ‘Abd Allah (1874–1965) and his wife Wahid Jahan Begam (1886–1939); and *‘Ismat* edited from Delhi by Rashid al Khayri (1863–1939). The requirements of purdah were a major issue for Muslim elite families. A series of remarkable women, along with male pioneers, set up schools to show that this barrier could be overcome without shame. Among them were: Tayyiba Begam (1873–1921) in Hyderabad, Rukhaya Sakhawat Husayn (1880–1932) in Calcutta and Sultan Jahan, the *Begum* of Bhopal (1858–1930). Within the Aligarh movement women’s education had a slight check because Sayyid Ahmad thought that all effort should be prioritised for men. Nevertheless, from 1888 the All India Muslim Educational Conference began to pass resolutions in favour of women’s education. After Shaykh ‘Abd Allah became its secretary in 1902 a women’s section was established. In 1906 a girls’ school was begun at Aligarh, which from 1915 had a hostel accommodating girls from all over India. It was to become the Women’s College of Aligarh Muslim University.²⁶

The Westernising thrust of British rule and British education policy had the effect of destroying the virtual monopoly of the ‘*ulama*’ over knowledge and its transmission, as well as cutting back their influence over the administration of the *shari‘a*. The ‘*ulama*’ redoubled their efforts to find ways of sustaining the Muslim community in a world where it did not have power. They showed no little creativity. Arguably the most important responses were led by ‘*ulama*’ who were in the tradition of Shah Wali Allah and strongly influenced by Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi’s jihad legacy. The failure of the Mutiny uprising, however, and the brutal assertion of British power that followed, had made it clear that their jihad should be of a different kind. In the reformist tradition of Barelwi, these ‘*ulama*’ closely adhered to the *shari‘a* and emphasised the study of the revealed as opposed to the rational sciences. They avoided all forms of behaviour that might suggest the influence of the Shi‘i, Hindu or British worlds, and tolerated only a restrained Sufi practice with a complete prohibition on ideas of intercession at saints’ tombs. Their focal point was the Deoband *madrasa*, founded in 1867 by Muhammad Qasim Nanawtawi (1833–77) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829–1905). Their particular emphasis was on scriptural religion. Knowledge of God’s word and God’s law, and therefore of how to behave as a Muslim, was the first step in preserving Muslim society under British rule. The second was, in the absence

26 Gail Minault, *Secluded scholars: Women’s education and Muslim social reform in colonial India* (Delhi, 1998), pp. 58–266.

of state power to support God's guidance, to bring the individual human conscience more into play as the sanction of the law. Followers were reminded, for instance, of the horrors of the Day of Judgement, and encouraged to reflect on their actions daily. Thus a 'protestant' or willed form of Islam came to be developed.²⁷

There were some who felt that the Deobandis did not go nearly far enough. These were the Ahl i Ḥadīth. They came from the same background of revival and reform as the Deobandis, but were more extreme in their religious ideas, more intense in their commitment to them, more elitist in their social background, and more consciously sectarian. Like the Deobandis they were committed to purifying Muslim behaviour of all practices not in accordance with the *shari'a*. But in doing so they went much further. Whereas the Deobandis, adopting a position of *taqlid*, accepted the achievement of Islamic scholarship as it had been handed down to them, the Ahl i Ḥadīth rejected this scholarship and made direct use of the Qur'an and Ḥadīth. They argued that the best way to be a true Muslim was to go back to these textual sources and use the jurisprudential techniques that the founders of the law schools had done themselves. It was an approach that meant immense personal responsibility for the believer. In reinforcing this responsibility they condemned all aspects of Sufism. They lived in dread of judgement. Thus the writings of a leading figure, Nawab Ṣiddiq Ḥasan of Bhopal (1832–90), were imbued with 'a pervasive pessimism, a fear of the end of the world'.²⁸ Towards the end of the century a group broke away, saying that only the Qur'an could be used for contemporary guidance. They were called the Ahl i Qur'an.²⁹

The Ahl i Ḥadīth and the Ahl i Qur'an were puritanical sects, whose positions by and large were extreme versions of those of Deoband. What was particularly significant, however, was the step the Ahl i Ḥadīth made beyond Deoband in rejecting all forms of *taqlid*. They showed a positive direction to the Ahl i Qur'an and the Aḥmadiyya (see below). But much more important, their break with past scholarship, and their concomitant fresh examination of the sources of Islam, offered a crucial way forward both to Islamic modernism in the Aligarh tradition and to the Islamism of

27 Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Princeton, 1982), pp. 46–260.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 269. 29 *Ibid.*, pp. 264–96.

Mawlana Mawdudī (1903–79), two strands of thought of great influence both in the subcontinent and in the wider Muslim world.³⁰

Not all creativity flowed from the reforming traditions of Walī Allāh and his followers; there were also new ideas and emphases rooted in pre-reformed Islamic understandings. Indeed, they were stimulated in the process of resisting reform. In the late nineteenth century they crystallised around the scholar and polymath Aḥmad Raḍa Khan of Bareilly (1856–1921). He used his Ḥanafī legal scholarship to justify Islam as it had been handed down – a custom-laden Islam which was closely tied to the world of the shrines where believers sought the help of saints to intercede for them with God. If the Deobandīs wished to conserve Islam as they found it in the Ḥanafī law books, the Barelwīs wished to conserve it as they found it in nineteenth-century India. They proselytised their position with vigour; their relations with the Deobandīs and Ahl i Ḥadīth, in particular, were marked by polemic and, on occasion, by rioting.

The new emphasis Aḥmad Raḍa Khan brought to traditional Muslim piety was to elevate yet higher the position of the Prophet. He stressed the Sufi concept of the light of Muhammad, which derived from God's own light and which had existed, like the Word in Christian theology, from the beginning of creation. It had played a part in the very process of creation; it was omnipresent; it meant that the Prophet, though human, was also more than human. He had, moreover, unique knowledge of the unknown, and therefore could be called upon to intercede for man with God. In his endorsement of an Islam of the Sufi shrines Aḥmad Raḍa Khan offered an answer to the needs primarily of the illiterate in the villages. In his emphasis on the Prophet, though not in his specific doctrine, he was at one with many religious thinkers of his day who sought to emphasise the Prophet's life as a model for contemporary action. There was much interest in writing His biography.³¹

The 'ulama' of Farangī Maḥall in Lucknow, who had consolidated the rationalist traditions of persianate scholarship on Indian soil, in the process creating the Dars i Nizāmī curriculum, were also in large part resistant to reform. The one notable exception was their great *muftī*, 'Abd al-Ḥayy (d. 1886–7), who developed a jurisprudential technique which enabled Muslims in good conscience to respond flexibly to change and innovation.³²

³⁰ Ibid., p. 295. Metcalf does not include Mawdudī in this assessment.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 296–314.

³² Francis Robinson, *The 'ulama of Farangī Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia*, (New Delhi, 2001), pp. 121–3.

Rather more creative was the work of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan (1859–1908), who founded the Ahmadiyya in the Punjab. The province was a cauldron of change, with Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Sikhs all competing against a background of rapid economic flux. A prominent champion of Islam, Ghulam Ahmad strove to best all the rival faiths, declaring himself a symbolic representative of Krishna and Jesus as well as an Islamic *mahdī*. But, when he appeared to deny the finality of Muhammad's prophethood, he created a sharp divide between his followers and the wider Muslim community.³³

As well as being creative in developing new Islamic understandings, 'ulama' were also creative in sending down roots into Indo Muslim society, as they had never done before. A catalyst for this was British removal of the revenue free grants which had supported them under the Mughals and their successors. This said, for many – and particularly those of the reforming tendency – there was great merit in being free of any dependence on, or even association with, the colonial state. The outcome was that 'ulama' either had to have a private income, or pursue a trade, or they had to provide a service which society valued enough to pay for it. Addressing this last requirement with success was the key to a major strengthening of their position.

'Ulama' in the Walī Allah tradition took the lead in this process. They sought to broaden their constituency, as well as to sustain Muslim society under colonial rule, by making knowledge of how to behave as a Muslim as widely available as possible. One way of doing so was to cut down their writing in Arabic and Persian, which automatically confined their readership to a small elite, in favour of writing in Urdu and other Indian languages. Early in the century Muhammad Isma'īl had set the tone in his introduction to *Taqwiyat al imān* when he declared that he had written his reforming messages 'in simple and easy Urdu so that they would be comprehensible to all who read or heard'.³⁴ This emphasis on communication was a strong feature of writing amongst the 'ulama' as they cultivated their new public. Then, as the growth of the newspaper press created a new forum in which Islamic interests could be advanced, they became journalists.

The natural concomitant of writing in Indian languages was to make the classical works of Islam available in them too. This had been an early feature of the Walī Allah tradition, the *shah* himself translating the Qur'an into Persian, while one son produced a literal version in Urdu and another an

33 Yohanan Friedmann, *Prophecy continuous: aspects of Ahmadi religious thought and its medieval background* (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 1–46.

34 Muhammad Ismail, 'Taqwiyat ul imān', trans. Shahamat Ali, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 13 (1852), p. 317.

idiomatic one. As the nineteenth century progressed, more translations were produced, spurred by rivalry among 'ulama'. These were joined by translations of the great collections of Ḥadīth, collections of *fatwas*, the writings of al Ghazālī and Ibn Khaldūn, many of the texts taught in *madrasas* and much of the supporting corpus of medieval Islamic scholarship.³⁵

A key aid in building a constituency for the 'ulama' was the printing press. Muslims had known about the printing press since the late fifteenth century but had resisted its introduction – in large part, so it is assumed, because widespread and unsupervised availability of books would undermine oral, person to person transmission of knowledge, which was regarded as crucial to achieving the transmission of true meaning. But in the early nineteenth century 'ulama' took the lead in adopting print, in the form of lithographic printing, because they had come to see it less as a potential source of weakness than as an important means of strengthening their position and that of their community under colonial rule. Faced by the threats both of Western secular knowledge, supported by colonial power, and by Christian missionaries, who attacked Islam on the streets and in the press, 'ulama' quickly came to use print to broadcast knowledge of Islam.³⁶

Central to the rooting of reformist 'ulama' in Indo Muslim society was the foundation of *madrasas*, which were to train young men in their precepts. Deoband's Dar al 'Ulum was the classical example of this development. It taught the Dars-i-Nizāmī curriculum with an emphasis on the transmitted subjects, Qur'an and Ḥadīth; its pupils were to be beacons of reformed Islam. Some vocational skills were taught to enable former students to live independently of government patronage. Unlike other *madrasas* of the time, it was bureaucratically organised on the model of government and mission schools, with classrooms, professional staff, examinations, prizes and annual reports on performance; it had an institutional existence which was greater than any individual or family involved in it. Most important, it was totally dependent on popular subscriptions; it would only survive as long as Indian Muslims believed it served a useful function.

The Deoband *madrasa* was most effective in spreading the influence of reform. In its first hundred years it taught over seven thousand students and founded, or affiliated, nearly nine thousand *madrasas*, of which thirty had been founded or affiliated by 1900. Its scholars issued *fatwas* in support of their

³⁵ Metcalf, *Islamic revival*, pp. 198–234.

³⁶ Francis Robinson, 'Islam and the impact of print in South Asia', in Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim history in South Asia* (New Delhi, 2000), pp. 66–104.

reforming beliefs. By the 1890s the burden of issuing *fatwas* to questions from all over India, which they aimed to do on the day the question came, had become so great that they founded a *fatwa* office. The existence of these *fatwas* gave Muslims both an opportunity to avoid the Anglo Muhammadan law as administered through the British courts and more generally comfort to those who wished to be in good conscience as Muslims under colonial rule. They have been described as the most important single means of spreading reforming beliefs.³⁷

Deobandis, like the Aligarh modernists, also spread their influence in the world of women, but with rather more purpose. The means was *Bihishti zewar*, by Ashraf ‘Alī Thanawī (d. 1943), which was published at the beginning of the twentieth century, first in part form and then as a book, and which would form part of the trousseau of many Muslim women. The purpose was nothing less than revolutionary. Whereas traditionally the home, the woman’s world, had been the place where custom reigned, where there were practices that might undermine belief, now, because the man’s world in public space was compromised by the presence of Christian colonial rule, the home was to become the bastion of Islamic values. Women were to be empowered to drive custom from the home and to ensure that the highest standards of Islamic conformity reigned. They were to be key exemplars and key transmitters of the reforming message. *Bihishti zewar* was designed to be read aloud and orally transmitted. It is said to be the most widely read book after the Qur’an.³⁸

These multifaceted responses to British rule have been rightly depicted as an Islamic revival. Both of the main strands of this revival, the Aligarh movement and the Deoband movement, were concerned to fashion two very different types of Muslim. Aligarh aimed to fashion Muslims who were able to operate with success in the world of Western knowledge and British power. Indeed, it went a long way towards creating the ideal envisaged in Macaulay’s education minute of 1835, that is, Indians who were ‘English in taste and in opinions, in morals and in intellect’. The aim was to make sure that the old Mughal elite continued to have its hands on the levers of state power. They had no interest in the Muslim masses. Deoband aimed to create Muslims who knew the scriptures and felt personally responsible for making God’s message work in the world. That message, moreover, was to be spread

³⁷ Metcalf, *Islamic revival*, pp. 87–137, 146–57.

³⁸ Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Perfecting women: Maulana Ashraf ‘Alī Thanawī’s Bihishti Zewar: A partial translation with commentary* (Berkeley, 1990).

as widely through Muslim society as possible. There was no possibility of intercession at saints' shrines or through the Prophet; they would learn on the Day of Judgement, which they greatly feared, whether they had discharged their responsibility effectively or not. Overall this meant a transformation of the focus of Muslim piety from the next world to this. The knowledge that man must act on earth to achieve salvation became a source of great energy in Muslim society. It is important to note, however, that this new emphasis on a this worldly faith of social action from the inner dynamics of Islam in the context of colonial rule was not unique. Similar developments were also taking place among Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists.

The emergence of Muslim separatist politics, late nineteenth century to 1918

A key feature of nineteenth century India was the growth and changing shape of the public arena. In pre colonial India this had existed in the courts of rulers, the salons of notables, and in mosques and bazaars. This arena was transformed by technological innovations which came with the British: by the railway, which grew from the 1840s to be the fifth largest system in the world by 1900; by the telegraph, which both linked all the major centres of India with each other and also linked India to Europe and the wider world; and by a cheap postal system, which was central to the workings of India's burgeoning numbers of social and political associations. These developments all contributed to the effectiveness of print media, books and especially newspapers, which Indians embraced with vigour. At the same time Indians came together more and more in associations, conferences and public meetings, and government opened up formal political space in municipal and district boards, and in the provincial and all India legislative councils, which in time came to be elected.³⁹

It was in this newly fashioned public arena that the politics of Muslim separatism began. Our main focus will be on the UP; it was from here, from the Muslim members of the Urdu speaking elite, that most of the early political leadership came. At the heart of this process were developments which led Muslims to think of themselves less as part of an Urdu speaking

39 For the emerging public arena see: C. A. Bayly, *Empire and information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 180-376; Ayesha Jalal, *Self and sovereignty: Individual and community in South Asian Islam since 1850* (London, 2000), pp. 1-186; and Sandria B. Freitag, *Collective action and community: Public arenas and the emergence of communalism in North India* (Delhi, 1990).

elite of Hindus and Muslims and more as a community of Muslims. We have noted the divisive impact both of Muslim revival and reform and of Hindu revivalism as it asserted Hindu preferences. To these should be added changes introduced by government which made Muslim members of the Urdu speaking elite increasingly concerned that they would lose their hold on the levers of power. The widespread introduction of Western education left Muslims at a disadvantage; associating it with Christianity, they were slow to embrace it. The imposition of increasingly high levels of achievement in Western education as requirements for government jobs, along with government determination to reduce the Muslim presence in them, led to their proportion of posts in the judicial and revenue services falling from 64 per cent in 1857 to 35 per cent by 1913. The introduction of elections to municipal and district boards on the basis of a property franchise enabled Hindus, who were the major beneficiaries of the new commercial wealth of the province, particularly in the west, to impose their religious preferences on the environment.⁴⁰

In the late nineteenth century these pressures might have driven the UP Muslims into the politics of protest. But they were kept docile by the influence of Sayyid Aḥmad Khan and signs of favour from government. Sayyid Aḥmad resisted all attempts by the Indian National Congress, founded 1885, to draw the Muslims of northern India into its fold. The main planks of the Congress platform, examinations held simultaneously for the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in Britain and India and elections to the legislative councils, were inimical to the interests of Muslims who were less well advanced than the Hindus of the maritime provinces. Once the issue of elections was lost in the Council Act of 1892, Sayyid Aḥmad founded the Muhammadan Anglo Oriental Defence Association of Upper India, which met alongside the Educational Conference; it aimed to put memorials to government opposing Congress demands and discouraging popular agitation amongst Muslims. In 1896 the association submitted an ominous memorial to government demanding separate electorates, with Muslims voting only for Muslims, on all elected bodies, plus extra seats 'on account of their past historical role'.⁴¹ At this stage government was not in a position to accept such demands, but made very clear its support for Sayyid Aḥmad and all his works. Muslims were still feared, and government regarded it as crucial to keep them on its

⁴⁰ Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 33–83.

⁴¹ MAO College magazine, December 1896, quoted in M. S. Jain, *The Aligarh movement: Its origin and development, 1858–1906* (Agra, 1965), pp. 128–9.

side. Sayyid Aḥmad was knighted, while his Muhammadan Anglo Oriental College received financial and other aid from the provincial government, without which it would not have survived. Almost every viceroy visited the college.⁴²

The death of Sayyid Aḥmad in 1898 and the appointment of a lieutenant governor of the UP, who was determined to shift the basis of government more towards the Hindus, put an end to Muslim docility. After a series of measures designed to reduce their presence in the bureaucracy, Muslims launched into open protest. Such was the danger of the younger Muslims getting out of hand that Sayyid Aḥmad's successors, Muhsin al Mulk (1837–1907) and Viqar al Mulk (1841–1917), took the lead in organising meetings and forming organisations. Matters came to a head in 1906 around two events, the government's dismissal of a pro Muslim lieutenant governor of East Bengal and Assam, which was followed by the secretary of state for India's announcement that he intended to increase the size and power of the legislative councils. Muhsin al Mulk immediately asked if he could submit a memorial to the viceroy, Lord Minto. This memorial, which was presented by a deputation of leading Muslims at Simla on 1 October 1906, was a charter of UP Muslim concerns. It reminded Minto that they had once been the governing class, emphasising their 'political importance'; it also reminded him of their special relationship with government, which had been imperilled by recent events, stirring up the younger generation of Muslims. It referred to the need for separate electorates for Muslims so that their interests could be secured. Minto replied in general terms, promising to safeguard the political rights and interests of the Muslims. What was intended as a gesture of sympathy, however, Muslims came to regard as a promise specific to their demands.⁴³

In all likelihood the Aligarh leadership would have left matters with the memorial, but their hand was forced when the Bengal leader, Nawab Salim Allah, smarting after Bengal concerns had been excluded from the memorial, declared that he would found an all India political association when the Educational Conference met in December at Dhaka. The nineteenth century had seen the development of a strong Muslim identity in Bengal. This happened, in part as the message of Muslim revival and reform was received in the abrasive context of Hindu landlord Muslim tenant relations, and in part as Amir 'Alī through his National Muhammadan Association (founded 1878) tried to work with government in seeking protection for Muslim

⁴² Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 111–32.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 133–47.

interests, especially in government service. The National Muhammadan Association set up branches throughout India, but of particular importance were the district associations in Bengal that came to be affiliated to it. In the context of these associations the Muslim elite came to work with the rural 'ulama'. Hindu revivalism sharpened their sense of Muslim identity, first in the context of the anti cow killing agitation that swept through the region in the 1880s and 1890s, and then in the profoundly Hindu tone of the opposition to the partition of Bengal. Muslims saw the new state of East Bengal and Assam creating a focus of Muslim opportunity. Nawab Salim Allah's aim in 1906 was to protect this gain. In December the UP Muslim elite travelled to Dhaka in large numbers, dominated the meeting, in which the All India Muslim League was established, and carried the management of the organisation back to the UP, where it was to remain.⁴⁴

From 1906 to 1909 the League played the key role in advancing the Muslim cause as what came to be known as the Morley Minto council reforms went through Parliament. The League's prime concern was that separate electorates, with extra seats above Muslim proportions of the population, should be achieved. In India the League developed local branches which agitated loudly at appropriate moments. In London its branch, led by Amir 'Ali, played a crucial role in lobbying press and Parliament. Throughout the UP Muslims were the major force in driving matters forward; British fears of antagonising the Muslims, and the desire of the Liberal Party to avoid yet another defeat in the House of Lords, also played their part. The outcome was that the League achieved its aim of separate electorates and acknowledgement of Muslim political importance, and a Muslim identity was established in the electoral system of British India.⁴⁵

By this time the UP Muslim elite had divided into two political groups. One, of established professional men and landlords, was known as the 'Old Party'; the second, of younger and generally poorer men, many of whom were Aligarh graduates and desperate to develop careers as lawyers, journalists or government servants, was known as the 'Young Party'. The two leading figures of the latter were a journalist of Aligarh and Delhi, Mahomed Ali (1878 1931), and a lawyer of Lucknow, Wazir Hasan (1874 1947). The years 1909 14 saw the 'young' make a strong bid to take control of politics from the 'old'. They were helped by three blows to their confidence in government favour: the annulment of the partition of Bengal;

44 Ahmed, *Bengal Muslims*, pp. 160 90; Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 147 9.

45 Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 149 74.

the rejection of plans to make Aligarh into a Muslim university with rights to affiliate Muslim institutions; and their growing awareness that the British were unwilling to intervene to prevent European powers tearing pieces out of the Ottoman Empire. They rallied young Muslims to their cause in three notable campaigns: the Red Crescent medical mission, which left in 1912 to assist the wounded of Ottoman armies; the Anjuman i Khuddam i Ka'ba, in which from 1913 Mahomed Ali worked with 'ulama' to raise funds to protect the Holy Places of Islam; and the Cawnpore Mosque affair of 1913, in which the 'young' stimulated Muslim concern at government insensitivity all over India. But the 'Young Party' attempt to seize control was baulked at almost every point; they succeeded in just one area, but that was the most important. In 1912, Wazir Hasan became secretary of the All India Muslim League and transformed its constitution to make it a 'Young Party' organisation. In 1913 it pledged to work with other political organisations for a system of self government suitable to India.⁴⁶

Wazir Hasan spent his early months as secretary trying to build an alliance on political progress with the Congress, on the understanding that the League's requirement for separate electorates was accepted. He failed. All was transformed in 1914, however, by the outbreak of the First World War. By 1915 the League and the Congress realised that there was an opportunity to achieve further devolution of power, provided they showed a united front. By December 1916 they had agreed a joint scheme of council reforms. In it Congress accepted the League's demand for separate electorates and, as a result of the Lucknow Pact, brokered by Jinnah (1876–1948) extra seats in each province for minorities. The pact, which was essentially a deal between the 'Young Party' Muslims of the UP and the Congress, sacrificed the interests of Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces to those in the minority provinces, the UP in particular. The essence of the deal was carried into the Government of India Act of 1919. Thus the Congress need to keep a united front enabled the League to embed the principles of separate electorates, and Muslim political importance in the UP, yet further in the developing politics of British India.⁴⁷

Given the enormous impact of Muslim separatism on the lives of the peoples of South Asia in the twentieth century, it is appropriate to reflect on how it was that Muslims, divided across India by culture, religious understanding and material circumstance, should espouse Muslim separatism. Numerous arguments have been put forward. The discussion above suggests

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 175–229.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 229–46.

that any explanation should take into account the following: the impact of Muslim revival and reform; the impact of Hindu revivalism; the impact of British policies on the material circumstances of all communities; the significance of the British construction of Indian society in terms of religious groupings which supported a British fear of Muslims; and the desire of a powerful group of Muslims from the old ruling class, mainly in the UP, to protect their interests. At different times the elements carried different weight, but all worked together to fashion for many, but certainly not all, Muslims a sense of their separateness.

There were other important developments which accompanied the emergence of Muslim separatism. One was the growing power of the '*ulama*' as a group. The destruction of Muslim political authority by the British gave the '*ulama*' an opportunity to assert themselves as leaders. Indeed, the wide ranging authority the '*ulama*' claimed over the life of the community was a point forced home by Shibli Nu'manī (1857–1914) at an early meeting of the Nadwat al 'Ulama' in 1894: 'A very large part of the national life is in the *ulama*'s right of ownership', he declared, 'and they have or can have absolute sway over it.'⁴⁸ The subsequent decades saw increasing attempts by the '*ulama*' to organise to impose their will on politics. It was for this reason that in 1919 'Abd al Bari of Farangī Maḥall (1878–1926) with the Deobandis founded the Jam'iyat al 'Ulama' i Hind. At the same time '*ulama*' came to work closely with the secular leadership, announcing their arrival by sitting on the platform at the Muslim League annual session in 1918, working closely with the Khilafat organisation from 1919, and from 1920 to 1923 being the driving force behind the non cooperation movement. In these years the '*ulama*' gave a foretaste of the ambitions they were more fully to reveal in the politics of Pakistan.⁴⁹

A second development was the growing presence of women in public space. From 1901 Muslim women's clubs began to form in the major cities. In 1914, in the context of the inauguration of the girls' hostel at Aligarh, the All India Muslim Ladies' Conference was founded. Although always dominated by women from Aligarh, it met annually in cities from Lahore to Calcutta to Hyderabad. Its main focus was on education and social reform. Its temper can be judged by its anti polygamy resolution, passed unanimously by 500 women from all over India at Lahore in 1918: 'The kind of polygamy which

48 S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the birth of Pakistan*, 2nd edn (Lahore, 1965), pp. 139–40.

49 Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 257–344.

is practiced by certain sections of the Muslims', it declared, 'is against the spirit of the Quran and of Islam.'⁵⁰ Several women became active in the work of the Anjuman i Khuddam Ka'ba, and more toured the country to speak at Khilafat meetings, Bī Amman, the mother of Mahomed Ali, doing so without a veil.⁵¹

A further development was the sense of a crisis of authority which grew throughout the period. The idea of *khilafat*, of succession, of authority handed down from the past, was intrinsic to Indo Muslim society. It was there in the Qur'an and Ḥadīth, the work of scholars, the understandings of Sufis, the skills of craftsmen, all handed down in the making of society. But the nineteenth century saw a fracturing of the lines of succession, a breaking with the authority of the past. At one level this was represented by those 'ulama' and modernists who abandoned *taqlid* and circumvented medieval scholarship to find a way forward. At a deeper, more painful, level it was experienced in the battle between theology and Western science, between Unani Tibb and Western bio medicine, between Islamic literary forms and those influenced by the West, between Muslim craftsmen and Western manufactured goods, and between the remnants of Muslim power and the might of the West. Arguably all was brought to a head in the outpouring of emotion that accompanied the ending of the Turkish *khilafat* between 1919 and 1923, an event that resonated at a deep psychological level with what Muslims were experiencing through much of their existence. All was summed up by the poet Akbar Ilahabadi:

The minstrel, and the music, and the melody have all changed.
Our very sleep has changed; the tale we used to hear is no longer told.
Spring comes with new adornments; the nightingales in the garden sing a different song.
Nature's every effect has undergone revolution.
Another kind of rain falls from the sky; another kind of grain grows in the fields.⁵²

At the very moment that the authority of the past was being undermined, a new source was emerging – the caliphate of man. The idea of the caliphate of man reached back to the Qur'an, but gained new force in the nineteenth century as Muslim reformers, confronted with the problem of sustaining

⁵⁰ Minault, *Secluded scholars*, p. 289.

⁵¹ Gail Minault, 'Purdah politics: The role of Muslim women in Indian nationalism 1911–1925', in Hanna Papanek and Gail Minault (eds.), *Separate worlds: Studies of purdah in South Asia* (Columbia, MS, 1982) pp. 245–61.

⁵² Ralph Russell and Khurshidul Islam, 'The satirical verse of Akbar Ilahabadi (1861–1921)', *Modern Asian Studies*, 8, 1 (1974), p. 9.

Muslim society without power, created a willed Islam. The idea of man as the prime mover on earth, as God's vice regent, his *khalfā*, was powerfully present in the thought of Muḥammad Iqbal (1878–1938) and Mawlana Mawdudī (1903–79), as it also was elsewhere in the Muslim world. It remains to be seen how its potential will be realised in Islamic thought and practice.⁵³

⁵³ Francis Robinson, 'Other worldly and this worldly Islam and the Islamic revival', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 14, 1 (2004), pp. 47–58.

South-East Asia and China to 1910

WILLIAM GERVASE CLARENCE-SMITH

Heterodoxy and reform

Reforming syncretic Islam was a central issue for nineteenth century South East Asia and China, often leading to violent conflict. No great overarching empire had ever arisen to impose a version of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, even if individual monarchs had spread Islamic rule by the sword. Some small and scattered Muslim communities had lived for centuries under infidel dominion, and their elites had come under great pressure from competing religions. Obtaining wives and slaves from surrounding infidels subtly reinforced syncretic tendencies, even when outsiders formally converted to Islam.

Muslims were unevenly distributed. While they only accounted for about 2 per cent of the 426 million people in the whole Chinese empire around 1910, they accounted for nearly all those in Xinjiang (East Turkistan), nearly 30 per cent in Gansu, and a little over 5 per cent in Shaanxi and Yunnan.¹ Approaching half of South East Asia's population was Muslim, with Java alone accounting for nearly three quarters of them. The rest were mainly scattered along coastal plains from Sumatra to Mindanao.²

Maritime South East Asia's believers generally lived under Muslim rulers around 1800, but 'Javanism' remained powerful, and other faiths were prominent. A syncretic amalgam of Sufi Islam with past Hindu, Buddhist and Animist civilisations, Javanism had seemingly enjoyed a renaissance in the

¹ Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China: A neglected problem* (London, 1910), pp. 197–217.

² Constance M. Wilson, *Thailand: A handbook of historical statistics* (Boston, 1983), p. 34; Étienne Aymonier, *Les Tchames et leurs religions* (Paris, 1891), p. 26; C. Morgan Webb, *Census of Burma 1911* (Delhi, 1986); C. A. Vlieland, *British Malaya: A report on the 1931 census and on certain problems of vital statistics* (London, 1932); United States of America Bureau of Printing, *Census of the Philippine Islands 1918* (Manila, 1921), vol. II; Peter Boomgaard and A. J. Gooszen, *Changing economy in Indonesia, volume 11, population trends, 1795–1942* (Amsterdam, 1991).

eighteenth century. Lively aspects of this type of syncretism could also be discerned beyond Java, notably among the Sasak of Lombok, and the Cham of Vietnam and Cambodia. The densely populated island of Bali remained ardently Hindu, providing a repository for the dazzling culture of ancient Javanese empires. In the eastern archipelago, Catholics and Protestants were substantial contenders with tenacious Animism, which also persisted in islands off western Sumatra and in upland Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo, Sulawesi and Mindanao. Indeed, a powerful Animist substratum existed everywhere, manifest in the propitiation of spirits of ancestors and nature.

The southern Philippines epitomised what outsiders described as 'superficial Islam'. In 1814, a European observer noted of Sulu that 'it is astonishing how little they know and how much less they follow the doctrines of their faith'.³ Sultan and nobles (*datu*) administered law codes dominated by custom (*adat*), assisted by enslaved Catholic Filipino scribes. Village mosques were humble edifices of bamboo and palm thatch, and the *imam* boasted the Hindu appellation of *pandita*. There were neither Sufi mystical orders nor associated rural boarding schools. Believers were lax in daily prayer, but assiduous in appeasing spirits. Men consumed alcohol and opium, and gambled over cock fights, while unveiled women adorned their hair with flowers. Nevertheless, Sulu Muslims abstained from pork, circumcised boys, followed Islamic norms for calendar, marriages and funerals, attended Friday prayers, kept the Ramadan fast and celebrated the Prophet's birthday. Much the same picture was presented for coastal Sarawak in the 1840s.⁴

Some factors worked to unify Muslims politically and culturally in Maritime South East Asia. Densely populated Java harboured aspirations for a single sultan, and had an ancient legal system. Although there were significant numbers of speakers of Sundanese, in the west of the island, and Madurese, on their own small island, Javanese was typically used for Islamic purposes, alongside Arabic. In the more sparsely peopled and politically fragmented 'Malay world', stretching from North Sumatra to the fringes of New Guinea and Mindanao, Malay enjoyed similar religious prestige. The mother tongue of lands bordering the Straits of Melaka, Malay was related to other Austronesian languages, including those of Java. The laws of Melaka, written in Malay, served as a model throughout the area.

3 J. H. Moor (ed.), *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and adjacent countries* (London, 1968; repr. of 1837 edn), appendix, p. 37.

4 Hugh Low, *Sarawak: Its inhabitants and products*, (London, 1968; repr. of 1848 edn), pp. 123–44.

Times seemed propitious for Muslim rulers in Maritime South East Asia around 1800, as Western seaborne empires were weakened. The Dutch East India Company, staving off bankruptcy from the 1750s, finally collapsed in 1800. Spain was fatally undermined by European wars and American rebel lions from 1796, and the Portuguese presence in and around Timor was insignificant. Even the British East India Company, entangled in costly wars in India, repeatedly considered abandoning its unprofitable footholds.

In contrast, the scattered communities of mainland South East Asia and China were vulnerable to resurgent Asian powers. Muslims, without their own rulers, rarely had recognised *shari'a* courts, and faced forceful rival cultures. In China and Vietnam, they had to conform to official Confucian norms, while coming to terms with popular Daoism, Mahayana or Tibetan Buddhism, and Catholicism. In Cambodia, Laos, Thailand (Siam) and Burma, Theravada Buddhism predominated. Animism remained potent in the tangled mountain chains that protruded from Tibet.

Across all of eastern Asia, notables were prominent in Islamic life. *Hajjis*, returning from the hazardous and expensive trip to the distant Hijaz, were rare and revered. Equally prized and uncommon were *sayyid* or *sharif* descendants of the Prophet. Sufi shaykhs of the mystical 'orders' were cherished. Rural religious teachers (*kiai* in Java) were assisted by pious women (*niiai*). Prestigious rural boarding schools in Java, known as *pesantren*, enjoyed exemption from taxes and labour services. Peasants selected the officials of village mosques. There was little conflict between rural notables, due to overlapping statuses and polygynous marriage alliances, but there was some tension with the urban '*ulama*' of Java, the *pangulu*, close to the *priyayi* (noble) elite. Relations were cordial between the Shafi'i school of law, prevalent in Maritime South East Asia and the southern mainland, and the Hanafi school, dominant further north. A few foreign traders were adepts of Ibadī, Shi'i, and Isma'īlī doctrines, but sects failed to take root among the indigenous population.

Nineteenth century reform diffused through hubs of piety, linked to the wider Islamic world. The sultanate of Aceh, North Sumatra, was the 'veranda of Mecca', because of its role in shipping pilgrims. Ulakan, in the coastal strip of West Sumatra, was a focus of Shattari Sufi piety, with roots in South Asia. The sultan of Palembang, in southern Sumatra, patronised *sayyid* scholars from Hadramawt in southern Arabia. Patani was the Malayan peninsula's chief seat of Islamic learning, while Banten played the same role for Java. The kingdoms of South Sulawesi were late but enthusiastic converts. There were several 'little Meccas' in western China, notably Hezhou (Linxia) in Gansu, and Dali and Kunming in Yunnan.

Despite growing reformist opposition to 'mixed Islam', traditional binary divisions are scarcely satisfactory. It is usual to contrast the Malay world's Kaum Muda ('New Group') and Kaum Tua ('Old Group'), Java's *santri* (orthodox) and *abangan* (heterodox), Indo China's *trimeu* (reformist) and *kobuol* (reactionary), or China's 'new teachings' and 'old teachings'. In reality, reformers embraced widely differing programmes, and were repeatedly forced to compromise with beliefs and habits that were deeply entrenched and highly diverse.

An unprecedented upsurge in infidel power, both Asian and European, contributed to violent strategies of reform, but Muslims failed to unite against the threat. Many judged resistance to technologically superior outsiders to be hopeless, and Western conquerors occasionally saved Muslim minorities threatened by Asian rulers. Moreover, imperialism increasingly came under the banner of religious toleration, giving a new twist to the problem of Islam's relations with the state.

'Association' lay at one end of the spectrum of colonial policies. Residents 'advised' Muslim rulers, but the latter retained control over Islamic institutions. Muslim rulers headed an Islamic judicial structure, enforced the pillars of the faith, banned missionaries of other faiths (including sectarian Muslims), censored publications and vetted teachers. This was no simple preservation in aspic of 'traditional Islam', however, for enlightened colonialists hoped that 'progress' would diffuse through structures that retained legitimacy in the eyes of believers.

'Assimilation' lay at the opposite end of the spectrum. As forced conversion contradicted freedom of worship, Muslims were free to practise their faith privately in households and mosques. However, all social and political institutions were secular, and often staffed by infidels. Colonialists might accept local legal norms for civil cases, but frequently preferred customary law to the *shari'a*, while abolishing 'repugnant' practices. Proselytisation by other faiths was permitted.

Holy wars in China

The Muslims of China proper, known as Hui or Dungan, faced many restrictions. Many mosques had no minarets, and the call to prayer was usually made discreetly from within the building. By law, a tablet venerating the emperor was located inside every mosque, obliging congregations to find subtle ways of avoiding idolatry. The Hui had no *qadi* courts, and the *shari'a* was treated as mere local custom. Not until after the proclamation of the

Chinese Republic in 1911 were Hui able to develop their own associations, journals and schools.

However, there were elements of association in the policies of the Qing or Manchu dynasty. Imperial edicts of 1691 and 1730 stressed that Hui enjoyed the same rights as the Han majority. Indeed, Hui could make the pilgrimage to the Hijaz and study abroad, significant concessions for a regime that was deeply suspicious of foreign travel. The Qing rewarded Muslims who supported their cause, even when they repented after rebelling. Some Muslims thus enjoyed distinguished military careers, typically in cavalry units, while others passed exams and became officials. Harmony was further bolstered by modest prosperity, cultural adaptation and minority status. Hui were prominent across China as stock raisers and traders, transport riders, inn keepers and miners. They nearly all spoke Mandarin, and their way of life mostly conformed to Chinese norms. A 'gentry class', strongly influenced by Confucianism and Daoism, accepted the inevitability of Manchu rule.

Beijing's deteriorating relations with the Hui of western China was thus somewhat unexpected. It resulted in part from a demographic upsurge in the imperial heartlands, which propelled Han Chinese settlers into these areas, provoking disputes with Hui over issues such as land, water, stock theft, transport riding, mines, trade, sales of pork and the conversion of brides. Adepts of Mahayana Buddhism and Daoism, Han settlers formed secret societies to promote their interests. This coincided with the penetration of Islamic 'new teachings' from the west, challenging established compromises with Chinese culture and state. Violence broke out during religious processions and rituals, giving rise to local massacres and Islamic calls to holy war. Local officials favoured Han settlers, despite Beijing's pleas for impartiality.

Muslim risings, some of them jihads, rocked western China from the 1780s to the 1890s, but they were all crushed. They were most threatening to Beijing when even greater rebellions menaced the empire's heartlands in the 1850s and 1860s, notably those of the Taiping (1850–64) and the Nien (1851–68). At other times, Qing commanders disposed of vast armies equipped with superior imported Western firearms, notably rifles and German siege guns. Moreover, successful generals were experts at exploiting divisions between Hui factions.

Violence broke out in the north west in 1781 and 1784, arising out of conflicts between Muslims. Officials turned minor incidents into serious revolts by arresting the alleged propagators of 'new teachings'. Although these risings were not backed by all Muslims, and were soon suppressed, Chinese reprisals stored up trouble for the future. The authorities banned the

hajj, the entry of foreign Islamic specialists, the adoption of purchased Han children, the conversion of non Muslims, the construction of new mosques and changes of abode without permission.

Officials spread problems to the south west, by deporting 'undesirables' to work in mines and border defence. In Yunnan, disturbances between Hui and Han were reported from the 1810s, with mining rights as the flashpoints. The authorities intervened repeatedly, and began to retaliate against entire Hui communities. A major rebellion exploded in Yunnan in 1856, after Han workers had attacked their Hui rivals in a silver mine in 1855, engendering an official massacre of several thousand Muslims around Kunming. Risings spread across Yunnan, and moved into Guizhou in 1858.

At this point, Du Wenxiu declared himself 'sultan of believers', with his capital in Dali. Adopting the name Sultan Sulayman, he entrusted key posts to Muslims, sought support from believers in Sichuan and Tibet, and dreamed of creating a state extending over south western China and northern South East Asia. However, Du's commitment to Islam was not exempt from contradictions. Possibly a Han child adopted into a Hui household, he had passed several official examinations with brio. In his Chinese documents, he was 'Generalissimo Du', ruling over the 'Pacified South'. Confucian symbols occurred alongside Islamic ones, and no jihad seems to have been officially declared. Seeking to rally disaffected Han to his cause, he employed pro Ming slogans and dress codes, and appointed non Muslim officials. He recruited Animist soldiers, few of whom converted to Islam, and sought firearms and recognition from Buddhist Burma.

Divisions between Muslims fatally undermined the sultanate. Those in north eastern Yunnan and Sichuan held aloof. Ma Rulong, leader in south eastern Yunnan, chafed under Du's authority, and defected to the Qing in 1862. Unity was undermined by claims of different ethnic origins in inner Asia, with varying degrees of Islamic fervour and involvement in distinct economies. As Qing forces completed their reconquest of Yunnan in 1873, Du committed suicide, but was nevertheless ritually beheaded. An estimated 300,000 Hui perished in the war and in the retribution that followed.⁵

The peace of the grave fell on Yunnan until the Republican Revolution of 1911, even though the French, seeking to extend their influence, posed as 'protectors' of Yunnanese Muslims. Chinese officials banned all 'new teachings', and watched the Hui like hawks. Refugees fanned out over a wide area, typically settling along established caravan routes. Some went to Sichuan and

5 G. Cordier, *Les musulmans du Yunnan* (Hanoi, 1927), p. 22, citing Émile René Pourias.

Tibet, while others strengthened Hanafi Islam in Burma, Thailand and Laos. They settled in both rural and urban areas, exercising specialised occupations such as mule breeding. A few turned to banditry, clashing with Burmese, Thai and French forces.

North west China rose again in 1862, partly as a protest against the forced resettlement of Shaanxi Muslims. Lan Dashun, a Shaanxi man returning from exile in a Yunnan mine, led one movement, reinforced by volunteers from the south west. No sultanate was proclaimed, but Ma Shenghua, imam in north eastern Gansu, adopted the title 'King who pacifies the south and restores the Ming'. The Muslim population was riven with complex internal quarrels, and the four main centres of resistance failed to cooperate. Moreover, many Hui fought on the Qing side, helping a veteran of the Taiping wars to reconquer the region piecemeal by 1878.

The last Hui rising in the north west occurred in 1895–6, when Chinese garrisons were withdrawn to meet the Japanese menace. A jihad was called following official mishandling of a dispute over rituals between Hui, but fighting was restricted to parts of eastern Qinghai, a mainly Tibetan speaking province, and bordering areas of Gansu. With vastly superior firearms, and staunch Muslim and Tibetan allies, Chinese forces repressed the uprising quickly.

Beyond the limits of China proper, the Qing experimented with indirect rule in East Turkistan, conquered in 1759. The inhabitants of the Tarim oases, today known as Uyghur, then simply called themselves 'Muslims', a term that included a substantial Hui minority. The Qing generally worked through local Muslim rulers, and retained *shari'a* courts under a *shaykh al Islam*. In Zungharia, however, with a mixed population of Turks, Hui, Mongols and Han exiles, they imposed direct military rule. Outside the valleys and oases, there roamed turbulent Kyrgyz and Kazakh nomads, wearing their Islam lightly and ignoring the frontier with Russia.

Rebellions in East Turkistan were fanned by exiles in the neighbouring Kokand khanate, which itself sent forces from 1826 to 1832, proclaiming the struggle to be a holy war. An uneasy peace after 1832 was strained by rising Chinese taxation, and fighting resumed in 1847. The great rebellion of 1864 was set off by local Hui, fearing Chinese retaliation for the 1862 rising in north western China, but Turkic leaders soon moved to the fore. They declared the struggle to be a jihad, burned Buddhist temples or turned them into mosques, and slaughtered, enslaved or forcibly converted unbelievers. Ya'qub Beg, bringing reinforcements from Kokand, seized the chance to set up his own khanate from 1865, through a mixture of persuasion, force and

guile. Initially a vassal of Kokand, he transferred his allegiance to Istanbul, and played Russia off against Britain. He set up a strict Islamic state, complete with a religious police imposing the *shari'a*.

Qing forces exploited Muslim disunity to reconquer East Turkistan by 1878, and then tightened Beijing's grip. Ya'qub Beg's sudden death removed his iron hand in 1877, and violence flared up between Hui and Turks, oasis dwellers and nomads, rival cities along the old silk roads, and diverse Sufis. The Qing abandoned indirect rule in the new province of Xinjiang, set up in 1884, where neither Muslim *beg* nor *shari'a* court had any place. At best, Muslim assessors advised on points of Islamic law in Chinese courts.

Infidel Asian rule in South-East Asia

Among non Muslim rulers of South East Asia, the Vietnamese emperor Minh Mang (r. 1820–41) stood out as the fiercest enemy of Islam. Famous for rebuking China for being insufficiently Confucian, he decided to impose uniformity on his subjects, not only in Vietnam, but also in newly conquered Cambodia. His Muslim victims were Cham, speaking an Austronesian language and former masters of a great Hindu empire. Some two thirds of them remained Hindu in southern Annam, but the more populous refugees in Cambodia and Cochinchina were all Muslims, intermarrying freely with 'Malays'.

Minh Mang sought the complete eradication of Islam, whereas his father, on unifying Vietnam in 1802, had restored autonomy to Panduranga, the last remnant of the Cham empire. Minh Mang initially called for the strict observance of Confucian rites, provoking small Cham revolts in 1822 and 1826. In 1832 he turned Panduranga into a regular province, ordering its inhabitants to comply with every minute detail of Vietnamese life, including eating pork and worshipping the emperor. Cham rebellions in 1833–5 were crushed, and land was confiscated for Vietnamese settlers. Minh Mang applied the same policies to Cambodia from 1835, but his accidental death in 1841 resulted in a general uprising, in which Vietnamese forces were expelled with Thai assistance.

Even after Minh Mang's death, the Cham position remained precarious. Tu Duc (r. 1848–83) resumed assimilation in Vietnam, and his persecution of Christians sparked off Franco-Spanish intervention in 1858. Even in more tolerant Cambodia, where Theravada Buddhist kings had long welcomed Muslims as traders, soldiers and officials, some Cham fought a jihad against corrupt officials in the eastern province of Thbaung Khmum from 1858 to 1861. Some of the rebels redeemed themselves by helping Norodom to defeat

a challenge from his younger brother and gain the throne in 1860. Norodom was then confirmed as king under a loose French protectorate from 1863.

Burmese kings went from persecuting to courting their Muslim subjects. King Bodawhpaya (r. 1782–1819), a zealous Buddhist aspiring to become ‘universal ruler’, annexed Arakan in 1784. He deported many Muslims as serfs to the central plain, notably around Shwebo, and allegedly ordered Muslims to eat pork or die, causing pilgrimage centres to spring up at the tombs of martyrs. In 1824 his successor, Bagyidaw (r. 1819–38), sought to profit from the decay of the Muslim Mughal empire, but the British East India Company defeated his invading forces, annexing Arakan and Tenasserim in 1826. This humiliating defeat provoked a volte face. The reforming King Mindon (r. 1853–78) funded the construction of mosques, encouraged Muslims to make the pilgrimage, and even built a hostel for Burmese pilgrims in Mecca.

Thailand’s kings had long claimed the entire Malayan peninsula, and some Malay sultans had recognised Thai suzerainty by paying a triennial tribute, the *bunga mas*, a tree of silver and gold. Rama I (r. 1782–1809), founder of the Chakri dynasty, placed the Patani sultanate under direct rule in 1784, and demanded that the rulers of Kedah, Trengganu and Kelantan make personal obeisance to him in Bangkok. Rama II (r. 1809–24) divided Patani into seven small states in 1816, and subjected the Kedah sultanate to similar pressures from 1819.

Malay sultans turned for help to the British East India Company, which had obtained Penang from Kedah in 1785, Singapore from Johor in 1819, and Melaka from the Dutch in 1824. Reluctant to become involved, the company negotiated the Burney Treaty of 1826, recognising Thai rights in Patani, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, but not in Perak and Selangor, with their rich tin deposits. The treaty implicitly denied Thai claims to Pahang, though this was not confirmed till 1863.

Thailand’s ‘forward policy’ faced strong Muslim resistance. Patani rebelled repeatedly from 1789, and the struggle was declared a holy war. The ‘*ulama*’ of Kedah did likewise in 1821, attracting Malay and Arab volunteers. Muslim forces scored notable victories in 1831–2, and again in 1838–9. They freed Kedah and Patani, and marched on Songkhla (Singora), burning Buddhist pagodas as they went. Although Bangkok soon won back lost ground, the authorities decided to restore indirect rule through sultans from 1839, contenting themselves with extracting the ancient tribute.

Tensions built up again from 1892, as King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910) sought to end administrative anomalies. Autonomous rajas, ruling mixed

Malay and Thai populations in the Phuket area, were integrated into regular provincial structures. In 1902 Bangkok pensioned off the Patani sultan and his seven subordinate rajas, abolished tribute payments and placed the area under Thai Buddhist officials. Accusations that Muslims were being forced to worship idols, statues of the Buddha and photographs of the king caused yet another rebellion.

The Malay sultans once more appealed to Britain, and a deal was struck in 1909. Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis became British protectorates. In return, Britain waived extraterritorial privileges in Thailand, provided a rail way loan, and took responsibility for the debts of Kedah's sultan. Sir John Anderson, the British governor, failed to persuade Whitehall that Patani and Satun, the latter formerly part of Kedah, should also be transferred to Britain. Angry at being left in Thai hands, these two states rose in fruitless rebellion in 1910 II.

In Indonesia, the Hindu raja of Karangasem, in eastern Bali, consolidated his grip over the Muslim Sasak majority of the neighbouring island of Lombok. The island became increasingly restive during the nineteenth century, as privileges, status and wealth accrued to the Hindu minority. When conscription was introduced in 1891, for a war in Bali, the Sasak rebelled and declared a jihad. The war went badly for the Muslims, but the Dutch annexed the island in 1894, freezing relations between the Hindu raja and his Muslim subjects.

Minor Western empires

For Muslims in Indo China, acquired piecemeal by France between 1858 and 1893, conquest entailed passing from an Asian master to a European one. Some Cham participated in anti colonial risings in Vietnam in the 1860s, while others lamented the loss of military and administrative prominence in Cambodia. However, the Cham generally prospered under French rule, specialising in livestock, fishing and trade. They were also allowed freely to buy and rent land in Cambodia and Cochinchina.

The French allowed some immigration into Indo China, but there were only about 2,000 foreign Muslims by the 1930s, mainly Tamils from South India.⁶ Enterprising traders from France's Indian enclaves were French subjects, and could become citizens by 'renouncing' their civil law. British Indians, as foreigners, formed *congrégations musulmanes* with internal autonomy, but

6 Marcel Ner, 'Les musulmans de l'Indochine Française', *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*, 41, 2 (1941), pp. 152-3.

only if there were at least 100 Muslims in a locality after 1890, leading to protests at being arbitrarily placed in Chinese *congrégations*.⁷ North and West African soldiers and clerks were subjects or citizens, whereas 'Malays', specialising as urban cab drivers, were foreigners, as were Yemeni and Afghan stevedores and guards, unless Yemenis registered as French subjects in Djibouti (Jibuti) in East Africa.

The British conquest of Burma, in three stages between 1826 and 1886, allowed for a more substantial influx of foreign Muslims, as lowland Burma became a province of India till 1937. About half the South Asians entering Burma were Muslims, many of them seasonal labour migrants. Most Muslims in Burma by 1911 were of Indian origin, including some non Sunni. There were also mixed race or converted speakers of Burmese and Arakanese, as well as about 15,000 Chinese Hui, some Malay fishermen in Tenasserim, and a few Persian and Arab traders. Buddhists complained about the prevalence of South Asian languages and customs, pressure on non Muslim wives to convert, and the negative consequences of divorce and concubinage. In the indirectly ruled Shan states, the desire of the Hui of Panglong for full autonomy engendered clashes with their Wa overlords.

British direct rule in Malaya's Straits Settlements had paradoxical consequences. Settlers, mainly Chinese, poured into these enclaves, which were detached from India in 1867 to become Crown colonies. Muslims rapidly became a minority in their own land. Appointed Muslim advisory boards had few powers, the court system was secular, and Christian missions were freely admitted. Nevertheless, vibrant Islamic communities developed in these cosmopolitan ports, as foreign Muslims also settled, escaping controls at home. Arabs, Indians and assorted Indonesians found that preaching, teaching and publishing were virtually unsupervised in the Straits Settlements, as long as there was no threat to public order. The British also facilitated the *hajj*, subject to health checks, turning Singapore into the 'pilgrim capital' of South East Asia.

In contrast, Malay sultans kept real control over Islam and custom, together with the trappings of sovereignty. They accepted British protection in stages after 1874, to ward off challenges by rival sultans, Chinese immigrants and European concession hunters. Significant armed resistance was limited to Pahang from 1891 to 1895, sparked off by British insistence on the registration of slaves. The rebel leader, Wan Ali, reputed to be invulnerable,

⁷ Natasha Pairaudeau, personal communication.

pronounced his struggle a jihad. He obtained some support from sultanates to the north, under Thai suzerainty.⁸

Sultans formed religious committees, which controlled the legal system. Although these committees had a nominal majority of nobles, increasingly educated in British schools that taught little on Islam, two ex officio members actually dominated proceedings, the chief *mufti*, or *shaykh al Islam*, and the chief *kathi* (*qaḍi*). They appointed salaried judges, no longer dependent on fees and gifts, and oversaw Islamic religious trusts. Malay law codes prevailed, mixing the *shariʿa* with customary and statute law, but judges increasingly tended to privilege Shafiʿi elements. Criminal law followed India's Anglo Muhammadan model, and appeals rested with the 'sultan in council'.

These committees also had religious and educational functions. They appointed village *imams*, and directed public works departments, flush with rubber and tin revenues, to build new mosques and prayer houses. The authorities enforced the five pillars of the faith, as well as prohibitions on adultery, alcohol, Christian missions and unlicensed Muslim preachers. They vetted teachers and textbooks, but their attempts to integrate Islamic teaching into publicly funded vernacular schools proved unpopular, leaving a space for traditional rural *pondok*.

British Borneo, where Muslims were a minority among Animists, added eccentric twists to this basic pattern. The sultan of Brunei, who claimed the whole area, accepted a British protectorate in 1888, followed by a resident from 1906. However, between 1841 and 1905, Brunei sultans had gradually ceded or sold almost the entire area to the south of the capital to the 'White Rajas' of the Brooke family. Themselves under informal British protection, the Brookes ruled Sarawak indirectly, through Muslim and Animist chiefs. As for Sabah (North Borneo), it was disputed between the sultans of Brunei and Sulu, claimed by Spain, the Netherlands and Britain, and coveted by Germany. A British firm obtained a vast concession from both sultans, and became the British North Borneo Chartered Company in 1881. The company's attempts to copy the Sarawak administrative model were poorly executed, leading to the Islamic Mat Salleh rebellion of 1895, which persisted for a decade.

In the neighbouring Philippines, naval raids on Spanish territory scarcely warranted the appellation of jihads. Among the thirteen or so Moro ethnic groups, the chief corsairs were Iranun and Samal Laut (Bajau), reputed to be the least observant Muslims of the region. Indeed, the latter were widely

8 W. Linehan, *A history of Pahang* (Kuala Lumpur, 1973), pp. 118–68.

believed to have been 'cursed by Allah'. A *pandita* usually accompanied a raiding fleet, but only to lead prayers and arbitrate over booty. As forays spread from Sumatra to New Guinea from the late eighteenth century, free Muslims were enslaved, unless they could demonstrate *hajji*, *sayyid* or *sharif* status. Captives were sold in the two main sultanates, Sulu and Magindanao, where they collected marine and forest produce, exchanged for firearms and luxury goods with Chinese traders.

Although the Spanish rhetoric of 'crusades against the Moors' persisted into the 1870s, this spirit was on the wane. In return for submission, Manila offered sultans religious toleration and indirect rule. With shallow draft steamers, stone forts and artillery, the Spaniards contained naval raids from the 1840s, and slowly garrisoned key points in Moro territory. By 1890 they had conquered the Pulangi valley in Mindanao, and held all the main cities and sea routes. They allowed sultans to rule, and tolerated raids against the Animists of upland Mindanao.

A sore point was Spanish support for Catholic missions. The Jesuits, expelled from the Spanish empire in 1767, were allowed back into Mindanao from 1859, and received official subsidies. Divided about encouraging Spanish attacks on Muslims, they showed no qualms about buying Muslim children, whether captives or sold by distressed parents, to raise as Catholics. A few Muslim adults converted to Christianity in the sparsely settled south eastern fringes of Mindanao, where even a *sharif* was reputed to have accepted baptism in 1894.⁹ After the Spaniards had crushed a rising in 1876–8, missionaries gained access to the Sulu sultanate as well.

Islamic reform and holy war grew as Spanish power expanded. Arab and inner Asian scholars, together with *hajjis*, were recruited to reform the judicial system. Raids were targeted on mission stations in Mindanao, while *juramentados*, those sworn to a cause, launched suicide attacks on Europeans. 'Martyrs' were spiritually prepared by a *pandita* for *sabilullah*, war on the path of God, through fasting, prayers, sermons and promises of immediate entry into paradise. To discourage *juramentados*, the Spaniards buried their corpses with dead pigs, and punished their families and *pandita*. During the Philippines Revolution of 1896–8, Moro sultans and chiefs refused to cooperate with Catholic Filipinos, achieving de facto independence as Spanish troops withdrew in 1898.

⁹ Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Magindanao 1860–1888: The career of Datu Uto of Buayan* (Ithaca, 1971), p. 41.

The Americans, new masters of the Philippines, initially favoured indirect rule in Muslim areas. By the Bates Agreement of 1899, the sultan of Sulu remained in charge of internal affairs, with American courts dealing only with Christians. However, the agreement was abrogated in 1904, following a vitriolic campaign in Washington against monarchy and the enslavement of Christians. At best, the sultan remained the 'religious head' of his domains. The Moro Province kept special laws, and judges appointed 'Islamic spiritual guides' to help with inheritance and family cases.

Nevertheless, a steady erosion of Muslim rights occurred under military rule up to 1913. Most jobs in the public sector went to Chinese or to Christian Filipinos. Public schools, nominally secular, were staffed with Christian teachers, and lessons were mainly in English, so that most Moros only sent slave children for education. Catholic and Protestant missionaries could proselytise freely, whereas entrance permits were often refused to foreign Muslim scholars. The pilgrimage was restricted, notably by the need to prove sufficient funds for the journey and for dependants left behind. Most ominous was the rising tide of non Muslim settlement, especially Christian Filipinos from the densely populated western Visayas. American forces brutally crushed a series of holy wars, and copied Spanish methods of retaliating against suicide attacks.

Dutch Islamic policy

A marked break with the policies of the Dutch East India Company occurred in 1808. King Louis Bonaparte, French ruler of the Netherlands, dispatched Marshal Herman Daendels to reform Java, at the time blockaded by Britain. Surakarta and Yogyakarta, two autonomous principalities formed in 1755, became vassals rather than allies, and lost some territory. In zones of direct administration, Daendels replaced nobles with salaried officials, sold land to Europeans, ignored *shari'a* courts, discouraged performance of the *hajj*, and imposed strict controls on movements of 'Mohammedan priests'. Recent European immigrants, imbued with revolutionary anti clericalism, openly ridiculed Islam and its 'priests'.

Thomas Stamford Raffles, Daendels's successor in Java during the British interregnum of 1811–16, went further. He created a unified and secular legal system for all inhabitants, and allowed Christian missionary societies full freedom of action. Arabs, especially those of *sayyid* status, were both mocked and feared. He sacked and looted Yogyakarta's palace in 1812, an unprecedented humiliation for a Javanese monarch, and imposed a subordinate and

rival ruler in the principality. Finally, Raffles turned to unpopular Chinese tax farmers to recoup his costs.

Arriving in 1816 to restore Dutch rule, G. van der Capellen was the envoy of a monarch striving to restore the *ancien régime* in Europe. He reinstated Javanese *priyayi* in some of their ancient privileges, and expelled all but one of the Christian missionaries. However, his 1823 cancellation of European land leases in Yogyakarta, consequent on manifold abuses, backfired. Planters demanded the return of advances that Javanese nobles had long since spent. Van der Capellen made the further mistake of arresting several revered *kiai*.

A great rebellion broke out in central Java in 1825, led by Prince Dipanagara of Yogyakarta. As the son of a concubine, he had been passed over for the throne in 1822, in contravention of the *shari'a*. Brought up in rural semi exile by a devoutly Islamic great grandmother, he was inspired by stories of the nine converters of Java and his glorious forebear, Sultan Agung. In 1825, Dipanagara declared a jihad to purify Islam and expel the infidel and their 'heathen apostate' allies. He assumed Islamic titles, such as 'caliph of the Prophet' and 'first among believers'. *Santri* youths staffed his bodyguard units, took Islamic personal names and titles, wore white, shaved their heads, fought chanting Sufi *dhikr*, and sought to convert prisoners. Among his followers were *kiai*, *niai*, *hajjis*, *pangulu* and Arab *sayyids*. His chief religious adviser was Kiai Maja, neither a *hajji* nor trained in Mecca, but a renowned Islamic scholar. Indeed, Dipanagara was accused of abandoning the honour of the Satria (Kshatriya) for that of *santri* Islam.

The rebellion was confined to the centre of the island, and many Javanese stayed on the sidelines or fought for the Dutch, who slowly turned the tide with reinforcements and improved tactics. Kiai Maja and many '*ulama*' made a separate peace in 1828, seemingly alienated by Dipanagara's growing syncretism and claims to be the 'regulator of religion'. Dipanagara was captured and exiled in 1830, and both Yogyakarta and Surakarta were greatly reduced in size, despite the latter's neutrality in the war. Over 200,000 Javanese are estimated to have perished in the conflict.

In West Sumatra, the Dutch became embroiled in the Padri wars of 1803–41. Some scholars explain this bitter civil conflict in economic terms. A boom in exports of cassia from the 1740s, and coffee from the 1790s, benefited hill settlements, encouraging them to challenge the old dominance of plains villages, growing mainly rice. Nouveaux riches evaded matrilineal Minangkabau custom by claiming that the *shari'a* allowed them to transmit private land to their sons. Islamic justice served to combat banditry, spreading

rapidly as the power of the three 'joint rajas' declined in tandem with gold exports. Other scholars, however, stress the primacy of Islamic reform, transmitted from the heartlands of the faith.

Europeans intervened from 1818 on the side of the rajas, who assigned sovereignty over their lands to the Netherlands in 1821. Temporarily distracted by the Java War, Dutch forces rapidly conquered West Sumatra in 1831.² However, they antagonised the rajas by imposing direct rule, and alienated many by imposing trade monopolies, taxes, forced labour, forced coffee cultivation and the abolition of slavery. A rebellion erupted in 1833, and although the Dutch soon regained overall control, violence persisted in outlying areas till the 1840s.

After these two ruinously expensive colonial wars, coinciding with futile attempts to reconquer Belgium after 1830, a virtually bankrupt Netherlands returned to the tried and tested policies of the East India Company. Nobles and chiefs, restored to their dignities, policed the forced cultivation of export crops, notably coffee. Java's *pangulu* regained status as part of these reforms. From 1835 they once again presided over *shari'a* courts in mosque forecourts, adjudicating on marriage, divorce, inheritance, and Islamic taxes and charitable trusts. However, *qaḍis* received no official training or funding, depending on court fees and *zakat* taxes collected through mosques. They lacked powers of enforcement, and were supervised by the local regent (*bupati*). From 1882 the single *qaḍi* was replaced by a 'council' of three to eight members, known as *Priesterraden* or *Raden Agama*, but this was a cosmetic change. Plaintiffs could still choose to take their cases to 'native courts' (*landraden*), where judges operated mainly on the basis of *adat*, albeit employing a *pangulu* as paid adviser on *shari'a* matters.

Outside Java and Madura, the Dutch did not regulate *shari'a* courts, which only existed in south eastern Borneo, South Sulawesi and parts of Sumatra. Elsewhere, Muslim rulers acted in a judicial capacity. It was only late in the nineteenth century that the administration hesitatingly began to standardise a patchwork quilt of treaties, which left Muslims as nominal rulers of about half the area of the Outer Islands. Sultans had less room for manoeuvre than their colleagues in British Malaya, although their Islamic policies have been surprisingly little studied.

Accommodation with *hajjis* was difficult, as the Dutch despised them as 'leeches', and feared them as 'fanatics'. Government employees were regularly discouraged from going on pilgrimage. From 1825 Javanese and Madurese had to obtain costly passports, on pain of a large fine. The fine was reduced in 1831 and rescinded in 1852, but passports were extended to the whole colony in 1859.

To obtain passports after that date, prospective pilgrims had to furnish certificates that they possessed sufficient funds for the journey. On return, they had to pass an 'examination' to gain the right to the title and dress of a *hajji*.

The shock of the Java War led the Dutch to reduce their dependence on Muslim troops, while clamping down on Christian missions in Muslim areas. They only licensed missions in Animist zones, hoping to create Christian 'buffer zones' and 'military reservoirs', with restrictions gradually eased in Java from the late 1840s. Protestants from the Moluccas (Maluku) partially replaced Javanese soldiers, and were later joined by Protestants from Minahasa in North Sulawesi, and from the Batak highlands of North Sumatra.

A long and ruinous conflict, the Aceh War, once again shattered Dutch complacency and finances from 1873. Coastal nobles soon surrendered, but a group of '*ulama*' from the Pidie region, notably Teungku Cik di Tiro (1836–91), led a holy war of attrition. As the Dutch gradually tightened their grip over North Sumatra, suicide attacks (*atjehmoord*) multiplied, persisting long after 1912, when the war is conventionally seen as having ended.

Banten provided another wake up call in 1888, for the Cilegon rising, erupting uncomfortably close to the colonial capital, resulted in the death of eight Europeans. The Javanese speaking coastal strip was fervently Islamic, sending large numbers of pilgrims and scholars to the Hijaz, and the countryside was rife with 'social bandits'. The Dutch exiled the last sultan of Banten in 1832, destroyed his palace, moved the capital to a new location, and took over the appointment of *pangulu*. The Wachia rebellion of 1850 ensued, spreading to the Lampung Districts of South Sumatra. *Kiai*, *hajjis* and Sufi shaykhs steadily extended their religious influence, and a capitation tax, introduced in 1882, added to the anti Dutch sentiments that exploded in 1888.

Chastened by this uprising, the Dutch appointed Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) to advise them on Islamic matters. A talented scholar, he had visited Mecca in disguise in 1884–5. In post from 1889 to 1906, and continuing to provide advice from the Netherlands till 1933, he argued forcefully that Muslims should be granted absolute freedom of worship, including the right to go on pilgrimage. Custom had a place in Islamic law, which varied geographically and needed to be better understood. He opposed codifying the *shari'a* on British Indian lines, so as to hasten socially progressive legal evolution. Islam should be firmly excluded from the political sphere, and millenarianism and pan Islam especially should be combated. At the same time, a Muslim elite should be trained in Dutch secular schools, to lead an Indonesia 'associated' with the Netherlands in a kind of commonwealth.

Snouck Hurgronje's recommendations are often equated with Dutch policy, but they were only partially implemented. The Dutch abolished exams for returning *hajjis* in 1902, and dispensed with certificates of funding in 1905, while maintaining the requirement for passports. Controls over the movement, residence and dress of Arabs were relaxed, in return for introducing immigration controls. A rising star, Cornelis van Vollenhoven, exploited Snouck Hurgronje's ambivalence towards *adat* by promoting customary law at the expense of the *shari'a*. Many Javanese *priyayi* collaborated in this programme, criticising *qadīs* as poorly educated and traditionalist, although the ruler of Surakarta founded a *madrasa* for *pangulu* in 1905.

Education and missions were other contentious issues. Reflecting the rise of Christian political parties in the Netherlands from the 1880s, the authorities openly flouted Snouck Hurgronje's advice by supporting Christian missions, especially after the adoption of the 'ethical policy' in 1901. Subsidies increased sharply, especially for mission schools and hospitals, and Protestant and Catholic zones of influence were demarcated. Java was increasingly 'opened' as a mission field, on the grounds that Javanists were not really Muslims. From 1905, the unpopular *goeroe ordonnantie* obliged regents to license teachers in 'wild' (independent) Islamic schools in Java and Madura.

Contacts with the wider Islamic world

The 'colonial peace' contributed to a growing flow of pilgrims to the Hijaz, especially measures taken against banditry, piracy and epidemics. The advent of steamers from the 1860s further stimulated the process. From around 800 a year leaving Singapore in the 1820s, figures reached 2,000 in the 1850s.¹⁰ Dutch consular officials in Jiddah noted over 10,000 arriving from Indonesia alone in 1909–10, one of the largest contingents from the Islamic world.¹¹ However, Muslims from remote inland areas, such as western China, were much fewer in number, as they still found it difficult and costly to reach ports such as Rangoon, Canton or Haiphong.¹²

Returning *hajjis* benefited from great prestige. They wore special clothes, often a white turban, and were the object of considerable respect. Many became teachers, and some sought to reform aspects of local Islamic practice. Officials criticised them for preying on popular credulity, and suspected them

10 Anthony Milner, *The invention of politics in colonial Malaya* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 158–9.

11 Jacob Vredenburg, 'The haddj: Some of its features and functions in Indonesia', *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land, en Volkenkunde*, 118, 1 (1962), pp. 148–9.

12 Cordier, *Les musulmans*, pp. 62–3.

of being ferocious opponents of foreign rule. *Hajjis* were certainly prominent in anti colonial risings, although distinguishing cause and effect is not easy.

Numbers of students in the Holy Cities, and in the wider Middle East, also rose. Religious scholars might stay away from home for decades, and quite a few settled and died in the Holy Places. The Jawi (South East Asian) community in the Hijaz was one of the largest expatriate groups in the nineteenth century, with established scholars teaching transient visitors in Malay or Javanese. Al Azhar in Cairo increasingly attracted Arabic speaking South East Asian pupils towards the end of the century, while the more secular minded went to the *lycée* in Istanbul.

Coming the other way were influential scholars and mystics, settling as teachers and religious functionaries. In South East Asia, Arabs were to the fore, overwhelmingly from Hadramawt and mainly *sayyid* in status until the 1870s. Other Arabs came from North Africa, the Nile valley, the Hijaz and Iraq. Some learned inner Asians, notably from Bukhara and Afghanistan, also arrived in South East Asia, going as far afield as the Philippines. Scholars entering China were mainly from inner Asia or India, while Bengali *imams* served in Burma and Thailand.

The religious impact of foreign Muslims was reinforced by their economic, political and social prominence. Men typically came alone and married locally, often taking several wives and creating complex webs of kinship. Some made substantial fortunes, notably in transport, trade and real estate. Many a *sayyid* married into a local noble family. They were appointed *qaḍī*, *muftī* or *shaykh al Islam*, and thus contributed to Islamic reform. Ḥaḍramī *sayyids* even came to rule autonomous states, notably Pontianak in West Borneo, Siak in East Sumatra and Perlis in Malaya.

The spread of printing introduced a slow and subtle shift in foreign religious influence, away from the Hijaz and towards Cairo, Beirut and Istanbul. Jawi Peranakan, of mixed South Indian and Malay origins, set up a Singapore printing press in 1876. This produced a steady flow of pamphlets and journals, following Egyptian models.¹³ Java was another early centre of printing, precocious in the use of Latin rather than Arabic script.¹⁴ *Al Manar*, published in Egypt from 1898, particularly impressed South East Asian Muslims, and was much translated and copied by the region's burgeoning religious press.

13 William R. Roff, *Bibliography of Malay and Arabic periodicals published in the Straits Settlements and peninsular Malay States, 1876–1941* (London, 1972).

14 Ahmat Adam, *The vernacular press and the emergence of modern Indonesian consciousness, 1855–1913* (Ithaca, 1995).

Millenarianism and Javanism

Local forms of millenarianism were boosted by widely held Islamic beliefs that the *imam mahdī* was coming to fill the earth with justice, prior to the last judgement. These longings reached a crescendo between 1785 and 1883, the thirteenth Islamic century, believed by many to be the last. Immense volcanic explosions in South East Asia, notably those of Mount Tambora in 1815 and Mount Krakatau in 1883, seemed to be the harbingers of the end times. Such expectations were most pronounced on Java, where the *mahdī* blended into Javanist figures such as Ratu Adil, the just king, and Eruchakra, the cosmic restorer. Many hopes associated with the millennium were highly unorthodox, notably the reinstatement of three semi legendary pre Islamic kingdoms.

Javanese peasants quickly hailed Prince Dipanagara as a millennial figure when he rebelled in 1825, and many of the underpinnings of his movement were Javanist. He appeared as an avatar of the Hindu god Vishnu, maintained ancient court rituals and Javanese law, and employed a Sanskrit term for God. Meditating in remote rural areas, he had visions of Arjuna, the hero of the *Bhagavad Gita*, and Lara Kidul, 'queen of the southern sea', the protector of his dynasty. Indeed, Javanist elements in his ideology seem to have moved to the fore as the war progressed.

Millenarian and Javanist strands of contestation outlived Dipanagara's defeat. In central Java, an illiterate peasant, Surantika Samin (d. 1914), developed the 'Science of the Prophet Adam'. Animist in inspiration, with an emphasis on sexuality and agriculture, the movement exploited hostility to Dutch forestry regulations. Samin was exiled to Palembang in 1907, but his movement persisted.¹⁵ Belief in the *mahdī* was current in Banten, where credence was also given to the 'Last admonition of the Prophet', a text purporting to be an eschatological revelation to the *sharif* of Mecca. Millenarian hopes were whipped up by the tsunami that followed the explosion of Mount Krakatau in 1883. However, the Bantenese longed for the restoration of their sultanate, rather than the preceding Hindu state of Pajajaran.

Clifford Geertz postulated two types of Javanism, one influenced by Hinduism among the *priyayi*, and another deriving from Animism in peasant circles. This distinction is too stark, but peasant Javanism was marked by the propitiation of the spirits, and magical, divining and healing techniques, using

¹⁵ Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, 'The Samin movement', in *Continuity and change in Southeast Asia: Collected articles of Harry J. Benda* (New Haven, 1972), pp. 269–301 (no editor indicated).

water, salt and oil. In contrast, the elite stressed the Satria (Kshatriya) ethos of the Hindu warrior, and the cultivation of the inner self through yoga and meditation. Beliefs in reincarnation and the monist fusion of the human essence with the divine denied basic Islamic tenets of the last judgement and paradise. More generally, however, all Javanists shocked devout Muslims by their attachment to painting, *gamelan* music, *wayang* puppet theatre, Hindu myths, the religious prominence of women and a fascination with sexuality.

Dutch policies encouraged the evolution of Javanism as a self consciously separate religious sensibility, even if this was not a deliberate attempt to divide and rule. An institute for the Javanese language was established in Surakarta in 1830, and the town's dialect and Indic script were adopted as standard. Bibliophiles painstakingly collected and preserved old manuscripts, while archaeologists opened up vistas of a glorious pre Islamic past. The study of the island's ancient culture developed in the Netherlands, originally in Delft and later in Leiden.

The Dutch also sought to minimise relations between *priyayi* officials and *santri* Muslims after 1830. It is sometimes claimed that this worked to the latter's advantage, by allowing the *santri* to claim anti colonial credentials. However, requiring Javanese regents to appoint *pangulu* to legal and religious offices worked against the grain. Moreover, intermarriage between *priyayi* and *kiai* or *pangulu* families persisted, and some nobles remained patrons of *santri* Islam.

Whether Javanism was gradually becoming a 'separate religion' therefore remains hotly contested. Javanists certainly called themselves Muslims, revered the Qur'an and the prophets, and joyfully celebrated Muḥammad's birthday. They shunned pork, circumcised boys, prayed, fasted and dispensed charity, albeit with some laxity and idiosyncrasies. By the late nineteenth century, however, a more critical stance appeared, notably in the *Serat Dermagandhul*, which mocked the 'cultural paraphernalia of the ridiculous, untrustworthy, covetous, grasping and taboo ridden Arabs from their hot arid desert'.¹⁶ Local pilgrimages, especially those to Demak, seemed better than the *hajj*, which drained the island of capital. Writers scoffed at the narrow legalism of the '*ulama*', and disparaged Islamic obscurantism, said to have deprived Java of access to science and technology, leaving the island

¹⁶ Ann Kumar, *The diary of a Javanese Muslim: Religion, politics and the pesantren, 1883–1886* (Canberra, 1985), pp. 11–12.

defenceless against the West. Nevertheless, these polemics were directed more against Middle Eastern Islam than against the religion itself.

Wahhabī doctrines

Pilgrims and scholars studying in the Ḥijaz brought back Wahhabī ideas to eastern Asia. They witnessed the followers of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab, who sought to purify Islam through holy war, taking Mecca and Medina in 1802–4. Although they were expelled by an Egyptian army in 1812–13, Wahhabī forces regrouped in central Arabia, retaining a certain prestige. Their literal reading of the Qur’an and Ḥadīth led them to attack schools of law, sects and Sufism as movements that divided and betrayed Islam. They were also noted for their austere and puritanical lifestyle.

The most celebrated ‘Wahhabīs’ of South East Asia were the Padris of West Sumatra. Three returning pilgrims launched the holy war of 1803, and sought to establish strict Islamic norms. Led by Shaykh Jalal al Dīn Aḥmad, they prohibited the wearing of jewels or silk, cock fighting, tooth filing and gambling. They also banned the consumption of alcohol, opium, tobacco and betel. Men wore white and grew beards, while women wore dark clothes and veils. The Padris restricted the application of Minangkabau matrilineal *adat*, and wished to rely on the Qur’an alone in legal terms. They built large new wooden mosques, with associated *qaḍī* courts, and strictly enforced religious duties. ‘False Muslims’ were killed or enslaved, as were conquered and raided Animist Batak to the north.

However, Padris deviated in some respects from the Arabian model. They sought to reform and purify Sufism, rather than rejecting it altogether, and did not destroy the tombs of Sufi ‘saints’. Padris continued to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday, failed to adopt Ḥanbalī law, and seemed uninterested in the Ḥadīth. Moreover, their political preferences were anti monarchical. Overtly Wahhabī ideas faded after the Dutch victory in the 1840s, but the Minangkabau retained a reputation for Islamic fervour, influencing later South East Asian movements out of all proportion to their limited numbers.

There were other alleged examples of the penetration of Wahhabī ideas. From 1821 to 1825, returning *hajjīs* obtained backing from the ruler of the Bugis state of Wajo, in South Sulawesi, to destroy ‘sacred places’, prohibit transvestite shamans and veil women in public. Some Wahhabī influence may also have been present in Malay jihads against the Thai in the 1820s and 1830s, and in the Bengali Fara’īdī movement, which spilled over the frontier into northern Arakan. In contrast, Wahhabī ideas found little or no echo in

Java. Indeed, Arab refugees from the occupation of the Hijaz gave an anti Wahhabī and pro Ottoman flavour to the Java War of 1825–30.

A possible Wahhabī background may be detected to the Budiah movement of Muḥammad Rifangi, which developed in central Java in the 1850s. As a *ḥajjī* and religious teacher, he preached a focus on the Qur'an and obedience to an unspecified caliph. He anathematised music, *wayang* puppet theatre, unveiled women, social relations between unrelated men and women, and similar innovations stemming from local custom. Once the Dutch had exiled him to Ambon in 1859, his followers became a small quietist sect, interpreting jihad as the struggle against the base self.¹⁷

A more overtly Wahhabī movement emerged in China, which some officials called the 'new new teachings'. The initial name Ahailisunnai (*ahl al sunna* or people of the tradition), was later changed to Yihewani (*ikhwan* or brotherhood), the term used by Wahhabī supporters in Arabia. The founder, Ma Wanfu (1849–1934), returned to north western China from *ḥajj* in 1888, resigned from all Sufi orders, and preached the primacy of Qur'an, Ḥadīth and Sunna. In 1895 he supported a jihad against the authorities, but soon surrendered, and was thus able to develop the movement again from 1897. His central message, attacking Sufism and saint worship, resulted in sporadic violence. He also taught a threefold raising of hands in prayer, long hair for men, and absolute abstention from opium. The Yihewani gradually spread across China, with main mosques linked to minor ones.

The rise and fall of neo-Sufism

Neo Sufism, understood in a wide sense, originated on the western peripheries of Islam. These mystics reserved esoteric study for a small elite, for their focus was on making the *shari'a* triumph. They pruned mysticism of monism, pantheism and extravagant practices, while building up ever more exclusive and tightly knit brotherhoods, transcending family and tribe. Pitting their energies against backsliding Muslims and resurgent infidels, revivalists frequently turned to jihads of the sword, promising invulnerability to their followers through amulets and similar techniques.

The Jahriyya (Zheherenye), an inner Asian Naqshbandī offshoot, played a controversial role in China's holy wars. The order cannot simply be equated with the 'new teachings' denounced by Chinese officials, and yet its approach

¹⁷ Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest movements in rural Java: A study of agrarian unrest in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries* (Singapore, 1973), pp. 118–27.

was clearly conducive to challenging Chinese authority. More hierarchical and exclusive than the old networks, its support for the voiced *dhikr* set it apart from other Naqshbandi groups. The Chinese identified Ma Hua long, the Jahri leader, as their main north western enemy during the 1862–78 rebellion. The Khufiyya (Hufuye), another Naqshbandi offshoot, was less hostile to Chinese rule. The Qing exploited deep divisions between Qadiri, Kubrawi, and different varieties of Naqshbandi to reconquer East Turkistan after 1864.

Muhammad al Samman, founder of the Sammaniyya, was the Meccan teacher of an influential South East Asian theoretician of holy war, ‘Abd al Šamad al Palimbani (c. 1704–89). Probably of Ḥaḍrami origins, and living much of his life in the Holy Places, al Palimbani combated monism and spread the Sammani order widely in South East Asia. His book on jihad, *Nāsiḥat al Muslimin*, circulated well into the twentieth century. In it, he presented jihad of the sword as a duty, promised paradise to martyrs and provided prayers for invulnerability. His call on the Javanese to drive out the Dutch may have contributed to the outbreak of the Java War of 1825–30.

The Sammaniyya played a part in various radical movements. The long lived Muhammad Arshad al Banjari (1710–1812) spread the order in his native south eastern Borneo. The rural Muslim leaders, who coordinated resistance to the Dutch during the Banjarmasin War of 1859–63, were probably Sammani. The rise of the Sammaniyya in South Sulawesi accompanied the religious purification of the 1820s, also attributed to Wahhabi ideas. In this case, the Sammaniyya gained adepts over the long term, at the expense of the Yusufi branch of the Khalwatiyya.

The Padri wars of 1803–41 may have owed more to generational and ideological splits in the Shaṭṭari order than to Wahhabi stimulus. While older Shaṭṭari leaders, notably Tuanku Nan Tua, censured violence, youthful adepts justified holy war, and rejected the mystical ‘excesses’ of their elders. The rebels took over many *surau*, rural schools that were Sufi strongholds, gaining an excellent organisational framework, together with revenues from export crops to acquire weapons. Moreover, the Shaṭṭariyya was centrally involved in small anti Dutch risings in West Sumatra in 1897 and 1908.¹⁸

Standard accounts of the Aceh War of 1873–1912 simply stress the role of the ‘*ulama*’, but the Dutch authorities specifically blamed Sufis, who were predominantly Sammani and Shaṭṭari in this region. Al Palimbani’s book on

¹⁸ Ken Young, *Islamic peasants and the state: The 1908 anti tax rebellion in West Sumatra* (New Haven, 1994).

jihad circulated widely, inspiring a local epic poem calling for holy war. Reformers enforced the *shari'a* strictly, repressing gambling, animal fights, opium and homosexuality, and ensuring that religious obligations were carried out and *zakat* was paid. They looked askance at visits to saints' graves, magic and ritual feasts, and probably tried to modify matrilineal aspects of local *adat*. New mosques were built, as well as forts, bridges and roads.

The development of the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya, exceptionally of South East Asian origins, was another clear neo Sufi challenge to Europeans. Despite its name, associating two ancient brotherhoods, this was a new order, founded in Mecca some time after 1850 by Aḥmad bin 'Abd al Ghaffar al Khaṭīb (d. 1878), from Sambas in West Borneo. The order, which popularised a loud and ecstatic *dhikr*, provided the organisational framework for the Banten rebellion of 1888, although its principal leaders were in Mecca at the time. The order also became powerful in Brunei. The shaykh who justified the Lombok holy war of 1891–4, against Hindu Balinese rule, was probably from this order. As a last gasp, a Qadiri wa Naqshbandi teacher led a small rebellion in the Surabaya area of East Java in 1903.

Many brotherhoods split over the issue of holy war, and repeated military defeats strengthened the hand of those who preached peaceful reform. From around the middle of the century, two Naqshbandi branches grew particularly fast in South East Asia, the Khalidiyya and the Maḥhariyya. The Khalidi branch drew adherents away from the Shaṭṭariyya in West Sumatra, where one third of the people may have belonged to a Sufi order by the 1880s. Sultans in Malaya also favoured this brand of Sufism. Elitist and austere, Naqshbandi reformists rejected monism, practised the silent *dhikr*, opposed superstition and forms of *adat* contrary to the *shari'a*, and gained many recruits among *hajjis*. In China, the Khufi branch of the Naqshbandiyya rivalled the Jahri one, and the Shadhiliyya drew adherents away from both from the 1880s. Many *sayyid* Arabs were members of the exclusive 'Alawiyya brotherhood, or of its clan based subdivisions, which also sought peaceful reform.

Reformist 'ulama'

Sufi shaykhs and 'ulama' were almost indistinguishable around 1800, but divergences began to emerge half a century later. Initially there was a preoccupation with reconciling the holy law with moderate Sufism, harking back to the great figure of Abu Ḥamid al Ghazālī (1058–1111). Muḥammad al Nawawī (1813–97) was typical. From Banten, but living in the Ḥijaz from 1855, he broke with custom by failing to encourage his numerous South East Asian

disciples to join Sufi orders. His loyalty to the Shafi'ī school of law was unbending. He opposed the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), a model for the Wahhabī, drawing instead on the rationalism of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210). He attacked colonial 'collaborators' in his homeland, and favoured the restoration of the sultanate of Banten.

Over time, South East Asian scholars began to express frank exasperation with Sufi orders, although not with mysticism per se. Aḥmad Khaṭīb (1852–1916) was a Minangkabau from West Sumatra, whose father had been a *qaḍī* in Padri times. Teaching in Mecca from 1876, Aḥmad Khaṭīb anathematised Sufi orders, especially the rising Naqshbandiyya, and denounced the matrilineal *adat* of his homeland. Faithful to Shafi'ī legalism, he called for a renewal of *ijtihād* (interpretation). Together with his stress on improved and modern education, this made him a significant precursor of later reformism. Many of his pupils in the Ḥijaz went on to study with Muḥammad 'Abduh and his followers in Cairo, and then propagated modernism in South East Asia.

The most controversial scholar was Sayyid 'Uthman bin 'Aqīl bin Yaḥya (1822–1931), of mixed Ḥaḍramī and Egyptian origins. Choosing to reside in Batavia rather than the Ḥijaz, and friendly with Snouck Hurgronje, he was known to the Dutch as chief *muftī* of the Netherlands Indies. The numerous *fatwas* and pamphlets that flowed from his lithographic press stressed strict adherence to Shafi'ī law, and opposition to Javanist and Sufi 'innovations', such as men and women chanting together in dark mosques. He virulently and repeatedly attacked the ignorance and venality of Naqshbandī shaykhs. Sayyid 'Uthman raised the greatest protest by opposing holy war against the Dutch, as they guaranteed freedom of religion. However, he accepted Sarekat Islam in the 1910s, because the movement stayed within the framework of colonial legality to contest Dutch power.

The growing rift between '*ulama*' and Sufi shaykhs took longer to penetrate into the countryside, where religious boarding schools were expanding rapidly. Java remained famous for its *pesantren*, but they mushroomed elsewhere under different names, *surau* in West Sumatra, *dayah* in North Sumatra and *pondok* in the Malay peninsula. A *kiai* was almost invariably a Sufi shaykh around 1800, but this equivalence slowly eroded. Among Madura's *kiai* in the 1880s there was a clear differentiation between 'teachers of the book' and 'teachers of the way'.¹⁹

¹⁹ Kumar, *The diary*, p. 76.

Pan-Islam

Viewing the Ottoman sultan as caliph, and thus 'suzerain' of all Sunni Muslims, went back at least to the late eighteenth century. This was when Abdülhamid I (r. 1774–89) countered Russian pretensions to protect Christians by claiming to be the defender of all believers. News of the Ottoman Empire's plight at this time galvanised fighters in the Java War of 1825–30. Similar surges of sympathy occurred during the Crimean War of 1853–6, and the First Balkan War of 1912–13. The Dutch were even wont to refer to the Naqshbandiyya as the 'Turkish order', because of its supposed sympathy for the Ottoman caliph.

South East Asian indigenous rulers at times turned to the Sublime Porte to retain their independence, although Western diplomats intervened to prevent Ottoman 'interference'. In Sumatra, the sultan of Jambi declared his lands to be Turkish territory in 1855. The sultan of Aceh renewed his ancient vassalage to Istanbul in 1850, sent help for the Crimean War, and presented his domains to the Ottomans in 1868. Similarly, Ya'qub Beg placed his state in East Turkistan under Istanbul's protection from 1872. Calls for Ottoman help were noted in the Banten rising of 1888, the Pahang War of 1891–5, and in Jambi and Riau in 1904–5. The Bugis ruler of Bone was said to be employing Turkish military instructors in 1904, and the sultans of Siak and Kutei made private visits to Istanbul in 1898 and 1908 respectively. The Americans asked the Porte to order the sultan of Sulu to submit to their forces in 1898.

The term 'pan Islam' itself emerged in the late 1870s, partly as a function of colonial angst, but also reflecting the enthusiasm of Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) for recognition as universal Muslim leader. Books of South Asian sermons reached Java in the 1880s, designating the caliph as the legitimate ruler of all Muslims. Arabs, chafing under discriminatory Dutch legislation, asked for Ottoman assistance. In return, they helped to raise money for Ottoman causes, such as the Hijaz Railway, and sent some of their children for education in Istanbul. They also provided copy for Middle Eastern press campaigns, denouncing the oppression of South East Asian Muslims in 1898–1901, and again in 1908–9.

The colonial response was to accept the caliph as the religious head of Sunni Islam, while confining the sultan's political role to that of Turkish sovereign. Although Ottoman consuls were appointed from 1864 in Singapore, and from 1883 in Batavia, their diplomatic status remained unclear, especially as they tended to be locally resident Ḥaḍramīs. The Dutch summarily dismissed claims that Hadramawt was part of Yemen, and thus of the Ottoman Empire. Colonial regimes staunchly resisted Ottoman pretensions to protect all

Muslims, and Snouck Hurgronje opposed mentioning the caliph in Friday prayers.

Although the conspiratorial plots of Jamal al Dīn al Afghānī (1838/9–97) are not known to have extended as far as this, pan Islam was associated with occasional small outbursts of anti colonial violence, often with millenarian overtones. It was widely believed that the ‘Raja Rum’ in Istanbul would one day send his fleet to bring justice to believers. However, when the caliph called on Muslim colonial subjects to join his holy war against the Allies in 1914, designating the neutral Netherlands as a hostile power, there was no initial reaction. Only in 1916 did the leaders of a small revolt in South Sumatra claim to be responding to his call. By this time, the Sublime Porte had acknowledged furious protests from The Hague, and had officially withdrawn its appeal to Indonesians.

Conclusion: the dawn of modernism

The shift towards legal associations and media campaigns, clearly discernible after 1910, had its roots in growing disillusion with holy war. Violence gradually ceased to be so prominent from the 1880s, as the futility and divisiveness of jihads of the sword became manifest, although some conflicts persisted into the 1910s. A new generation of reformers sought to heal the bitterness and distrust generated by civil strife. They also tried to come to terms with seemingly irresistible infidel enemies, championing educational reform above all else.

Ḥaḍramī Arabs played a pioneering role in South East Asia, stimulated not only by their contacts in the Middle East, but also by the emulation of progressive Chinese organisations in South East Asia. Wealthy Ḥaḍramīs of Batavia founded the Jam‘iyyat al Khayr (Benevolent society) in 1901. They gave priority to modern Arabic medium education for all Muslims, and planned a wide raft of charitable projects. Well funded and well run, this organisation became a model for later associations. Another sign of the times was the publication of *al Imam* in Singapore from 1906 to 1908, edited by men of Ḥaḍramī and Minangkabau origins. Much influenced by *al Manar* in Cairo, the paper attacked Malay sultans, called for modern science and education, and put forward Japan as an economic model.

The subsequent flowering of Islamic organisations and newspapers was strongly influenced by Egyptian modernism, but it also drew strength from the legacy of earlier reform. Critiques of legal scholasticism and Sufi ‘excesses’ were rooted in the Naqshbandiyya and the teachings of great Jawi scholars in the Ḥijaz, with faint Wahhabī overtones. Internal missions to ‘nominal’

Muslims also owed much to Sufi predecessors. The choice of peaceful and legal methods to contest colonial rule, as long as Muslims could practise their faith, echoed the *fatwas* and pamphlets of Sayyid 'Uthman's prolific pen.

More heterodox forms of modernism also built on earlier foundations. China's Xidaotang movement, deeply influenced by Confucian rationalism and flourishing after the Republican Revolution of 1911, looked back to the Hui scholars who had deemed the Chinese classics not to conflict with Islam. Javanism took an institutional form when a 'native doctor' set up Budi Utomo (High reason) in 1908, allowing youths trained in Dutch schools to fuse secular Western science with the glories of Javanese culture. Novel notions of *waṭāniyya* (Islamic nationalism) were stimulated by the translation of the Egyptian Muṣṭafa Kamil's book into Malay in 1906, but the stress on the 'political kingdom' was prefigured in some of the preoccupations of pan Islam.²⁰

²⁰ Michael F. Laffan, 'Watan and Negeri: Mustafa Kamil's "Rising Sun" in the Malay world', *Indonesia Circle*, 69 (1996), pp. 156–75.

Africa south of the Sahara to the First World War

ROMAN LOIMEIER

Introduction

In the long perspective of historical development, as well as the nineteenth century, which is the prime focus of this chapter, sub Saharan Muslim societies have developed different expressions of 'Islamic religious culture'.¹ In the spectrum of possible realisations of Islam, the movements of jihad in sub Saharan West Africa could be seen to represent one extreme, while the Muslim citizens' rights movements in Cape Town/South Africa or in the Quatre Communes of Senegal formed another expression of Muslim society. In between these extremes we find a number of other translations of Islamic religious culture into different historical experiences as well as different geographical and cultural settings such as Ethiopia, the Nilotic Sudan, tropical West Africa or the East African coast.

Muslims in sub-Saharan West Africa: crisis and jihad

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sub Saharan West Africa experienced a series of wars which led to the establishment of new states and empires that were ruled, for the first time in the history of West African societies, by Muslim religious scholars. The wars that ended with the victory of these religious scholars were legitimised in religious terms and came to be regarded as jihads, while the new 'Islamicate'² states that arose from these movements of jihad were legitimised in religious terms as imamates or emirates. The jihads of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought to an end, in major parts of sub Saharan West Africa, the rule of non Muslim rulers and of those Muslim rulers who had tolerated the coexistence of Islam

1 L. Brenner, 'Histories of religion in Africa', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 30, 2 (2000), p. 143.

2 M. G. S. Hodgson, *The venture of Islam: Conscience and history in a world civilization*, vol. I: *Classical age of Islam* (Chicago, 1974), p. 59.

and local cults. In addition, they set the stage for the European conquests of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which encountered, from the Atlantic to Lake Chad, a series of imamates and Muslim empires. When looking at the development of each of these West African imamates and emirates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we see, however, that there never was a single model of jihad, but a spectrum of expressions of jihad and, consequently, not a single political model of political rule but a spectrum of expressions of Muslim rule: as each jihad movement developed its own character, each imamate developed its own style and structure of governance, from the almost ideal type of an Islamicate state, Masina, to the empire of Samori Touré, which became 'Muslim' only after the jihad. In between were again different models of Islamicate states, such as the caliphates of Sokoto and Bornu, or the 'Tukuloor' empire of al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal. These caliphates and empires could be seen, from a chronological perspective, as being the result of an early series of 'greater jihads' which developed before the age of European conquest and sometimes even came to an end, as in the case of Masina, before European conquest. In addition, there was a late series of 'lesser jihads' which led to the formation of a number of short lived imamates such as that of Ma Ba Jaxu (d. 1867), Cheikhou Amadou Ba (d. 1875), al Ḥajj Mamadu Lamin Dramé (d. 1887), or Fode Kaba (d. 1901).³ Only these late jihad movements were directly linked with the dynamics of European colonial conquest, yet in geographical terms essentially confined to the Senegambia.

Most leaders of the early jihad movements, with the exception of al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal, were affiliated with the Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhood (*ṭanqa*), while most leaders of the late jihads, with the exception of Samori Touré, who was supported by a network of Qadiri scholars, were linked with the Tijaniyya. Yet, although *ṭanqa* affiliation came to form an important marker of religious identity for the scholarly elites of the jihad movements, and even came to be seen as a major element of their 'corporate identity',⁴ *ṭanqa* affiliation remained a characteristic feature of a scholarly elite, and did not become, as in late nineteenth century East Africa, a feature of popular adherence or of mass conversion to Islam. And despite the impression that the different jihads seem to have evolved in a linear historical sequence, from Naṣir al Dīn's rebellion in the Senegal River Valley in 1673/4, to Bundu from the 1680s, the jihads in Fuuta Jalon from 1725, in

3 See M. Klein, *Islam and imperialism in Senegal: Sine Saloum 1847 1914* (Edinburgh, 1968); and C. A. Quinn, *Mandingo kingdoms of the Senegambia* (London, 1972).

4 L. Brenner, 'Concepts of *ṭanqa* in West Africa: The case of the Qadiriyya', in D. B. Cruise O'Brien and C. Coulon (eds.), *Charisma and brotherhood in African Islam* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 47–50.

Fuuta Tooro from 1775, in Hausaland from 1804, in Masina in 1818, to al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's wars and jihads from the 1850s, the Senegambian jihads from the 1860s, and, finally, Samori Touré's policies of 'top down' Islamisation from 1875, there is no proof that these jihads represent an interrelated chain of events.⁵ From a general perspective, the development of jihad movements can rather be seen as evolving from the specific processes and dialectics of social, economical and political change that characterised West Africa's history from the sixteenth century. Yet not all jihads were successful: some failed, such as the very first jihad led by Naṣir al Dīn in the late seventeenth century or the jihad in Bornu in the early nineteenth century. Other jihad movements changed their character to become movements of conquest, such as the jihad of al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal. As a consequence, the jihad movements were interpreted in different ways by local scholars, colonial historians and Western academia. The jihad of al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal, for instance, was seen by some as a jihad of the Tijaniyya, while others regarded it as a movement of Tukuloor colonisation. And in colonial as well as post colonial Senegal and Mali respectively, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal was seen as a national hero and a conqueror.⁶ Similar variations of interpretation can be observed with respect to the imamate of Fuuta Jalon in Guinea and the Sokoto caliphate in northern Nigeria, which not only had to fight constant wars against a multitude of enemies, but also had to come to terms with slave rebellions, which were again legitimised in Islamic terms as movements of resistance against oppressive (Muslim) rule. As a consequence, each jihad movement developed its own myths and cultivated its own historiographic and hagiographic legacies, and these myths and legacies were again subject to interpretation. As David Robinson commented with respect to al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal and the Tukuloor empire, his empire was neither an empire nor Tukuloor, even if respective Tukuloor, French or post colonial Senegalo Malian constructions of history seem to support this idea.⁷

5 P. D. Curtin, *Africa north of the forest (1500–1880)*, in P. D. Curtin, S. Feierman, L. Thompson and J. Vansina (eds.), *African history from earliest times to independence*, 2nd edn (London, 1995), p. 179; and D. Robinson, 'Revolutions in the Western Sudan', in N. Levtzion and R. Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa* (London, 2000), pp. 133–4.

6 See A. F. Clark, 'Imperialism, independence and Islam in Senegal and Mali', *Africa Today*, 46, 3–4 (1999), pp. 149–68; J. Hanson, *Migration, jihad and Muslim authority in West Africa: The Futaanke colonies in Kaarta* (Bloomington, 1996); and D. Robinson, 'D'empire en empire: l'empire toucouleur dans la stratégie et la mémoire de l'empire français', *Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara*, 16 (2002), pp. 107–20.

7 See Hanson, *Migration, jihad and Muslim authority*, pp. 8ff.; B. G. Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods in nineteenth century Africa* (Cambridge, 1976), p. 68; Robinson, 'Revolutions in the Western Sudan', p. 131; Robinson, 'D'empire en empire'; for the myths of the Sokoto jihad see Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*; and Y. B. Usman, *Studies in the history of the Sokoto caliphate* (New York, 1995).

In the literature, opposition to slave raiding has often been presented as the major explanation for the jihad movements in sub saharan West Africa. In 1673 a religious scholar from southern Mauretania, Naṣir al Dīn (d. 1674), indeed started a rebellion against the political overlords of the region, the emirs of Brakna and Tagant as well as the kings of Waalo and Jolof, and legitimised his movement by saying that 'God did not grant rulers the right to enslave, to rob or to kill their own populations. He rather commanded them, by contrast, to protect them, as rulers have been created to serve their peoples and not the other way round.'⁸ In fact, since the late sixteenth century, the historical development of Sudanese West Africa was characterised by the disintegration of the great Sudanic empires, the emergence of numerous principalities fighting each other for resources and domination over trade routes and the gradual integration of the Sudanic states into the economic sphere of the transatlantic slave trade, which added to existing trans Saharan slave trading activities. These political and economic developments brought about additional pressures on sub Saharan populations when slave traders, in response to increasing prices for slaves on the West African coasts, started increasingly to penetrate the Sudanic interior. In some areas, such as the Senegambia, the shift to the Sudanic belt of sub Saharan West Africa came as early as the seventeenth century, while most parts of the Sudanic belt were only affected by the transatlantic slave trade from the eighteenth century.⁹ This convincing, yet with hindsight, explanation of the West African jihads as movements of protest against the trade in slaves should not eclipse other, equally important motivations for jihad which portray the jihads as movements of protest against a large spectrum of social and economic grievances, of unjust rule and exploitation, that were reflected in a number of Sudanic chronicles such as the Kano chronicle or the chronicle of Aḥmad b. Furṭu in Bornu.¹⁰ These chronicles show that conditions of crisis were rampant in sub Saharan West Africa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, thus, conducive to jihad in major parts of the

8 B. Barry, *La Sénégambie du XVème au XIXème siècle. Traité négrière, Islam et conquête coloniale* (Paris, 1988), p. 116; for the links between jihad movements and the Atlantic slave trade see P. D. Curtin, *The Atlantic slave trade* (Madison, 1969); P. D. Curtin, 'Jihad in West Africa: Early phases and inter relations in Mauritania and Senegal', *Journal of African History*, 12, 1 (1971), pp. 11–24.

9 P. D. Curtin, 'The West African coast in the era of the Slave trade', in Curtin et al. (eds.), *African history*, p. 191.

10 For the Kano chronicle see H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs* (London, 1967), pp. 92–141; for Aḥmad b. Furṭu see D. Lange, *A Sudanic chronicle: The Bornu expeditions of Idris Alauma (1564–1576)* (Wiesbaden, 1987).

Sudanic subcontinent. Generally, we could say that the history of the jihad in eighteenth and nineteenth century sub Saharan West Africa should be understood as resulting from a long historical evolution of Muslim societies in that region and their interaction with specific local social and political contexts. At the same time, external Islamic influences on the West African movements of jihad can be largely ignored. Thus, only three jihad leaders, Muḥammad al Kanimi, al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal and Mamadu Lamin Dramé, had visited the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina, and ‘Usman dan Fodio, the leader of the jihad in Hausaland, who had studied with a prominent Muslim scholar in Air, al Ḥajj Jibril b. ‘Umar, came to reject the radical teachings of his mentor. Ideological links with movements of reform outside Africa, such as the Wahhabiyya, have to be seen as historical constructions linked with French and British colonial policies which cultivated ‘Wahhabi’ or ‘Mahdist’ scenarios of revolt for legitimacy purposes.

A major feature of the West African movements of jihad was that virtually all jihad leaders were affiliated with traditions of Islamic learning that had developed outside the royal courts. The leaders of the jihads could thus be characterised, in a terminology derived from the Senegambian context, as *sëriŋ fakk taal*,¹¹ ‘religious scholars who [personally] make [their own] fire wood’, in order to be able to teach Qur’anic classes in the evenings by the light of their own fires, thus depending on their own resources. At the same time, these independent scholars opposed those scholars who were called, again in the Senegambian context, *sëriŋ làmb*, ‘scholars of the drum’, as they were willing to sing the praises of and beat drums for the rulers, and to provide legitimisation for those in power. From the late seventeenth century Muslim religious scholars outside the courts became the spokesmen of the oppressed, as in the case of Naṣir al Dīn, as well as ‘Usman dan Fodio, Muḥammad al Kanimi and Aḥmad Lobbo in Hausaland, Bornu and Masina respectively. And even if Naṣir al Dīn’s jihad was eventually suppressed by a coalition of local rulers and French slave trading companies, in 1677/8, his movement established another pattern which was to appear again in subsequent jihad movements of jihad: the adoption by Muslim religious scholars, in their protest against arbitrary rule, a ‘prophetic model’¹² of *da‘wa*, *hijra* and jihad. A Muslim religious scholar and his community (*jama‘a*) would interpret pre jihad social contexts as being analogous to the community of the Prophet

11 See A. Samb, *Essai sur la contribution du Sénégal à la littérature d’expression arabe* (Dakar, 1972), p. 25.

12 D. Robinson, *Muslim societies in African history: New approaches to African history* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 199, 209.

while living in *jahili* (heathen) Mecca; when appeals (*da'wa*) to rulers to change their policies failed, the community of the faithful would be forced to migrate, like the Prophet in His *hijra* to Medina, to a safe place from where a jihad could be started. Such a jihad would often start, as in the Prophet's victory over the Meccans in the battle of Badr in 624, with an initial victory of a small *jama'a* of 'true believers' against an overwhelming force of 'unbelievers', and eventually lead to the overthrow of the unjust ruler and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic government of the faithful.

From the late eighteenth century, Muslim religious scholars thus became leaders of movements of social and political reform which were legitimised, for the first time in West African history, in the name of Islam. In their movements of reform, protest and jihad, religious legitimisation turned out to be a major element of dispute, as established pre jihad rulers, despite the polemics of the jihad leaders, also regarded themselves as Muslim rulers. If pre jihad rulers were not willing to implement Islamic law, they did this not because they rejected *shari'a* as such, but because they were aware that they had to keep a precarious balance between old (pre Islamic) and new (Islamic) foundations of religio political legitimacy. Consequently, the leaders of the jihads not only had to develop strategies of legitimisation for their jihads but also for delegitimising Muslim rulers in power. Patterns of religious argumentation thus became another major feature of the jihads, particularly when the religious scholars who had come to power in the context of such movements of jihad started to fight each other, as in the case of Sokoto against Bornu or al-Hajj 'Umar Taal against Masina. Discourses of legitimisation and delegitimation consequently dominated nineteenth century Muslim historiography in sub Saharan West Africa, and Islam became both the most important foundation of political legitimacy and a major ideological source in a dialectic chain of events which led from rebellion against unjust rule, to jihad, to the establishment of the rule of the faithful, to fresh resistance against the new Muslim rulers: Islam was translated into local contexts as an ideology of liberation, of governance and of protest. In these different jihad movements, different models of legitimisation and delegitimation, as well as a large spectrum of realisations of Islamic governance, were developed. In the following, I will focus on four cases only: the Sokoto jihad and the Bornu response; the jihad of al-Hajj 'Umar Taal; and Masina.

Islam had been established in Hausaland since at least the fourteenth century as a religion of the courts as well as among traders and parts of the population. By the late eighteenth century, Islam 'was accepted by all, even by those who never practiced it, in the sense that they believed in its power

and sought its blessing in such forms as amulets and charms'.¹³ Jihad in Hausaland, as in other parts of sub Saharan West Africa, was thus not so much a jihad against unbelievers as 'a reform movement reforming lax Muslims, not converting pagans. It was ideologically probably less concerned with the *kufir* (unbelief) of pagans than with the *kufir* of those Muslims who opposed the jihad.'¹⁴ From 1804 the jihad in Hausaland led to the establishment of the largest Islamicate state in sub Saharan West Africa, reaching from present day eastern Mali to northern Cameroon, from the fringes of the Sahara to the tropical forests of Yorubaland in the south. This empire came to be called a caliphate, as the leader of the jihad and his successors assumed the title of the caliph, *amir al mu'minin* (commander of the faithful). In addition, the Sokoto caliphate became a major point of reference for other movements of protest in sub Saharan West Africa, particularly neighbouring Bornu, Masina and the empire of al Hajj 'Umar Taal, while the leader of the jihad, 'Usman dan Fodio, came to be regarded as the most important cultural hero of northern Nigerian Muslim hagiographies.

'Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817) was born in Maratta in the kingdom of Gobir, the paramount Hausa state of the region. Early in his life, he moved with his family to Degel, a hamlet to the east of the Rima River, where he studied, first under his father, then, in the established tradition of *ṭalab al 'ilm* (quest for knowledge), by moving from teacher to teacher. From approximately 1774/5 'Usman dan Fodio taught his own classes, but also visited, from 1774 to 1791, most parts of Hausaland, such as Gobir, Zamfara and Kebbi, as well as adjacent lands such as Air. From about 1794 he became the leader of a small but growing *jama'a* in Degel/Gobir. Religious argumentation was now an important issue for the preparation of the jihad as well as the legitimisation of political rule after jihad, as the rulers of Hausaland regarded themselves as Muslims and could not simply be discarded as unbelievers. A major precondition was thus to assess existing religious and social practices in Hausaland in Islamic dogmatic terms, and to find a way religiously to define practices that could be considered to violate the prescriptions of the faith and therefore be regarded as a basis for *takfir*, the declaration of unbelief. In a number of texts, mostly inspired by the writings of a sixteenth century Muslim scholar from Tlemcen (Algeria), Muḥammad b. 'Abd al Karīm al Maghīlī, 'Usman dan Fodio described the 'un-Islamic innovations'

13 J. E. Philipps, 'The Islamization of Kano before the jihad', *Kano Studies (New Series)*, 2, 3 (1985), p. 44.

14 M. Last, *The Sokoto caliphate* (London, 1967), p. 273.

(*bida'*, sg. *bid'a*) as practised in Hausaland, and came to the important conclusion that most of these practices did not constitute, as such, a basis for *takfir*. Muslims who would practise these forms of *bida'* could still be regarded as 'sinners'. *Takfir* would be legitimate only if a Muslim intentionally violated prescriptions of the faith and defended these practices in public. On the basis of such an inclusive definition of faith and unbelief (*iman* and *kufi*), 'Usman dan Fodio was able to define the majority of Muslims in Hausaland as Muslim, and, thus, exempt from *takfir*. Only those rulers who tolerated the *bida'* of their populations and perpetrated acts of unbelief had to be regarded as unbelievers against whom jihad was not only a legal but a religious obligation.¹⁵

After a war of four years (1804–8), 'Usman dan Fodio and his *jama'a* were able to defeat the Hausa kingdoms and to incorporate them into a new empire, administered from a new capital city, Sokoto, and organised in a series of semi independent emirates. Although many of 'Usman dan Fodio's companions had died in the jihad, the Sokoto empire turned out to be a federation of emirates ruled by religious scholars who now became political rulers, and who continued to legitimise their rule in religious terms. Also, in the 1810s, Adamawa in the south east was conquered, while in the 1820s the emirate of Ilorin in the south joined the caliphate. In the east, however, the jihad met with major difficulties, and eventually failed: when jihad troops attacked Bornu, in 1805, and even managed, in 1808, to conquer Bornu's capital city, Birnin Gazargamu, the ruling king handed over power to his son, Mai Dunama, who turned for help to a well known religious scholar, al Ḥajj Muḥammad al Amin b. Muḥammad al Kanimi (1775/6–1837/8). With the support of his *jama'a*, Muḥammad al Kanimi was able to defeat the attackers and to retake Birnin Gazargamu. In 1809 he defeated Sokoto forces again, and in 1813 even imposed his own rule over Bornu. Bornu thus escaped conquest, but also came to be ruled by religious scholars, who legitimised their rule, as in Sokoto, in Islamic terms.¹⁶ Al Kanimi could now, in his argumentation against the jihad, count on the fact that Bornu had in 1805 been not just another Hausa kingdom, but an old and independent empire which had been ruled by a Muslim dynasty since the eleventh century and could thus claim an undoubtedly Islamic legacy. The religious dogmatic defence of Bornu was even more effective as it was organised by a famous religious scholar who had established an independent *jama'a* in Ngala (Bornu), south of Lake Chad, far

15 See L. Brenner, 'The jihad debate between Sokoto and Bornu: An historical analysis of Islamic political discourse in Nigeria', in J. F. A. Ajayi and J. D. Y. Peel (eds.), *Peoples and empires in African history: Essays in memory of Michael Crowder* (London, 1992).

16 See L. Brenner, *The shehus of Kukawa* (Oxford, 1973).

from the court of the rulers of Bornu. In addition, Muḥammad al Kanīmī had been raised and educated in Fezzan and Tripolitania, he had gone on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina in 1790 and had been living in the Ḥijāz for a couple of years.

Muḥammad al Kanīmī's role in the conflict between Bornu and Sokoto is of particular interest for the development of jihad movements in sub-Saharan West Africa, as this religious scholar not only managed to defeat Sokoto in military terms but was also able to delegitimise the jihad against Bornu in religious terms. Muḥammad al Kanīmī's major argument was that the mere occurrence of un-Islamic innovations did not automatically turn the rulers of Bornu into unbelievers. The only violation of Islam that would justify *taḳfīr* would be if a Muslim publicly declared things to be legal and acceptable that were prohibited by Qur'an, Sunna and *shari'a*. Rulers, such as the rulers of Bornu, who unintentionally violated prescriptions of the faith but who did not command unbelief as such, would have to be regarded as 'sinning Muslims'. Jihad against them would be illegal. In his argumentation, Muḥammad al Kanīmī therefore adopted 'Usman dan Fodio's argument for jihad in Hausaland and his definition of *kufr*, but turned it against Sokoto. Muḥammad Bello, 'Usman dan Fodio's son, who ruled the Sokoto empire from 1817 to 1837, was not able to refute this argument, and consequently cultivated another one to justify jihad, namely that Bornu had, in the context of the jihad in Hausaland, supported unbelievers against Muslims and as a consequence had to be regarded as belonging to the party of unbelievers through association with unbelief. Although this argument was based on wrong assumptions, as Sokoto and not Bornu had started the war, and as pre-jihad Hausa rulers could be seen as Muslims as well, the strategy of delegitimising a Muslim ruler on account of his alleged association with unbelief was to serve, in later jihad movements, as a major justification for jihad among Muslims.

While the jihad in Hausaland and the war between Sokoto and Bornu had led to the emergence of two different models of an Islamic empire, the jihad of al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal al-Futī (1796–1864) may be seen as to represent a third model of jihad and the subsequent evolution of a Muslim empire.¹⁷ In comparison to Sokoto, Bornu and Masina, the jihad movement led by al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal differed in two major respects: while the scholars in Sokoto, Bornu and Masina and most other parts of sub-Saharan West Africa were

¹⁷ For al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal see Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*; and D. Robinson, *La guerre sainte d'al-Hajj 'Umar: Le Soudan occidental au milieu de XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1988).

affiliated with the Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhood, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal came to stress his affiliation with the Tijaniyya, a *ṭariqa*, which claimed spiritual supremacy over all other Sufi brotherhoods. Second, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's movement turned into a movement of conquest which was increasingly dominated by a single group, the Tukuloor, a group of Fulfulde ('Pulaar') speaking peoples from Fuuta Tooro in Senegal. The jihads in Hausaland and Bornu, as well as those in Masina and Fuuta Jalon, and the Islamicate states resulting from them, even if originally dominated by scholars of Halpulaaren origin, had a more inclusive character and could rely on the active or passive support of non Halpulaaren groups, such as the Hausa in Sokoto, the Jakhanke in Fuuta Jalon or the Marka in Masina.¹⁸ It is therefore possible to present the jihad of al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal as a series of religiously legitimised wars of conquest of the 'Muslim' Foutanke (Halpulaaren) of Fuuta Tooro against the allegedly pagan Bambara, Malinké and Soninké populations of the Upper Niger River, though considerable parts of these populations could point to old traditions of Islamic learning.

Like other jihad leaders, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal, after his return from an extended pilgrimage and journey, from 1825 to 1840, to the Holy Places of Islam as well as most of the Sudanic imams and Muslim empires, established a *jama'a* in Jegunko/Fuuta Jalon which attracted followers from all over Senegambia and Guinea, especially from the imams of Fuuta Tooro and Fuuta Jalon. His followers and students were initiated into the Tijaniyya and came to form the core of a Tijani warrior scholar elite. Affiliation with the Tijaniyya came to be the defining feature of this *jama'a*, particularly when al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's efforts to gain support among the scholars of the Jakhanke group of scholars in Fuuta Jalon and the Senegambia failed. These scholars were mostly affiliated with the Qadiriyya and, as such, not willing to accept Tijani claims of spiritual

¹⁸ For the non Halpulaaren groups in the West African jihads see Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*; Last, *The Sokoto caliphate*; R. Launay, *Beyond the stream: Islam and society in a West African town* (Berkeley, 1992); Robinson, *Muslim societies in African history*; L. Sanneh, *The Jakhanke: The history of an Islamic clerical people of the Senegambia* (London, 1979); and I. Wilks, 'The transmission of Islamic learning in the Western Sudan', in J. Goody (ed.), *Literacy in Traditional Societies* (Cambridge, 1975). For the terms 'Halpulaaren' and 'Tukuloor', see Brenner, 'Histories of Religion in Africa'; M. A. Gomez, *Pragmatism in the age of jihad: The precolonial state of Bundu* (Cambridge, 1992); C. Hilliard, 'al Majmu' an-Nafis: Perspectives on the origins of the Muslim TorodBe of Senegal from the writings of Shaykh Musa Kamara', *Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara*, 11 (1997), pp. 175–88; Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*; Robinson, *La guerre sainte d'al Ḥajj 'Umar*; and J. R. Willis, *Studies in West African Islamic history I: The cultivators of Islam* (London, 1979). For the Halpulaaren Tukuloor Fulbe ethnogenesis see Curtin, 'Africa north of the forest'.

superiority or to submit to al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal’s political authority. Bending to pressure to leave Fuuta Jalon, al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal in 1849 organised a *hijra* to Dingiray in the neighbouring principality of Tamba. In 1852 he deposed the ruler of Tamba and started to prepare a jihad against the kingdom of Kaarta, one of the two Bambara states on the Upper Senegal and Niger River Valleys which controlled the trade between the French colony of Senegal and the Niger River Valley. Kaarta had, in 1807/8, 1816 18, 1831 and 1846, repeatedly attacked and devastated Fuuta Tooro, al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal’s homeland.¹⁹ In order to improve his strategic position against Kaarta, al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal conquered a number of smaller dominions on the Upper Senegal such as Bundu, which had been established, in the 1680s and 1690s, as the first imamate in the greater Senegambian region,²⁰ and in 1855 attacked Nioro, the capital of Kaarta. In the three subsequent years, al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal reorganised Kaarta, while Nioro became the new centre of his *jama‘a*. In 1856, the harsh rule of his army triggered a series of rebellions among the Bambara populations of Kaarta, which led to the devastation of the region. These rebellions also handicapped al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal’s forces at a time when another war, this time with France, was impending: Kaarta and the Upper Senegal region were seen by France as being part of French spheres of interest in Senegambia, and al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal’s expansion was regarded as a direct threat to French commercial and political interests. After a war of three years against French forces on the Upper Senegal, al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal was forced to accept defeat and to give up hope of gaining direct control over Fuuta Tooro. As a consequence, in 1858/9 he appealed to the population of Fuuta Tooro to leave home and move east to settle in Kaarta. This call for *hijra* (Fulfulde, *fergo*) led to the emigration of initially 40,000 50,000 people from Fuuta Tooro to the territories of al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal. The *fergo* continued until the late 1880s, and brought tens of thousands of Fuutanke settlers, mostly young men, to the Fuutanke colonies in the east.²¹

The end of war with France also enabled al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal to start another jihad, which was directed against Segu, the second Bambara state on the River Niger, which was conquered in a military campaign from 1859 to

19 For Fuuta Tooro see D. Robinson, *Chiefs and clerics. Abdul Bokar Kane and Fuuta Tooro 1853 1891* (Oxford, 1975).

20 For Bundu see Gomez, *Pragmatism in the age of jihad*.

21 For the *fergo* and the confrontation with France see Clark, ‘Imperialism, independence and Islam’; and Hanson, *Migration, jihad and Muslim authority*.

1861. Facing defeat, the ruler of Segu, Bina 'Alī, applied to the neighbouring imamate of Masina for help, and proclaimed Segu a protectorate of Masina. Masina accepted Segu's submission and sent religious scholars to destroy the icons of the local cults and to establish mosques, while Bina 'Alī converted to Islam. The alliance between Segu and Masina came too late, however, to stop al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's advance. An appeal from Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu, the imam of Masina, to stop the jihad, as Segu had become 'Muslim' on account of the conversion of its king to Islam, was rejected by al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal. In February 1861, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's army defeated the united forces of Segu and Masina and marched into Segu, the capital city. The subsequent confrontation with Masina posed a serious problem for al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal, as Masina was beyond doubt an Islamic state. In a legitimacy text titled *Bayan ma waq' bayni wa bayna Aḥmadu* (Elucidation of the differences between me and Aḥmadu), al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal adopted Muḥammad Bello's argument against Bornu, claiming that a Muslim who joined forces with a non Muslim in order to wage war against another Muslim became a legitimate target for a jihad, as such a Muslim would have pronounced a public rejection of Islam (*irtidad*) by associating with a non Muslim ruler. When Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu was not able convincingly to refute this argument, as al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's troops had found evidence of pre Islamic religious practices at the court of Segu even after Bina 'Alī's conversion to Islam, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal was free to continue the war against Masina. In 1862 he conquered Masina and, in 1863, attacked Timbuktu, the major centre of Qadiri traditions of learning on the River Niger. This attack overstretched the forces of his army. The humiliating treatment of Masina's ruling elite triggered a rebellion which forced him to retreat to Hamdallahi, Masina's capital, where he was trapped by the insurgents. In 1864, before an army of rescue under the command of his son Aḥmad al Kabir could reach Hamdallahi, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal was killed in an effort to escape.²² In the end, al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's jihad has to be seen not as a single jihad movement, but as a series of jihads and wars, both against non Muslim polities, such as Tamba, Kaarta, Nioro, Segu and the French, and Muslim states such as Bundu, Goy, Kamera, Gidimaxa, Masina and even Timbuktu. These different enterprises were not connected in legitimacy ways, and enhanced the imperial character of al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's conquests.

22 For the confrontation between al Ḥajj 'Umar Taal and Masina see Hanson, *Migration, jihad and Muslim authority*; J. Hanson and D. Robinson, *After the jihad: The reign of Ahmad al Kabir in the western Sudan* (East Lansing, 1991); Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*; and Robinson, *La guerre sainte d'al Hajj 'Umar*.

The different stages in the development of jihad movements, and the evolution of an Islamicate state based on a jihad ideology in sub Saharan West Africa, may also be shown in the case of Masina, although Masina's life span was rather short, from 1818 to 1864. In the beginning, the jihad in Masina had all the characteristics of a rebellion of the Masinanke Halpulaaren groups against their Bambara overlords in Segu, yet, the Masinanke rebellion soon acquired the features of a jihad.²³ In 1818, the *jama'a* of Aḥmad Lobbo (1773–1845), the future leader of the jihad in Masina, was able, after a *hijra* from Djenné to Rundé Siru, to defeat the vastly superior forces of the Bambara overlords of Masina. This victory was immediately interpreted as another 'Badr', and brought about a movement of political realignment within Masina which ended Bambara rule and confirmed Aḥmad Lobbo and his *jama'a* as the new rulers in Masina. Within a few weeks the *jama'a* of Aḥmad Lobbo grew from some 1,000 fighters to more than 40,000, and gave Aḥmad Lobbo the military power to establish an independent imamate. In 1819 Aḥmad Lobbo was able to extend Masina's sovereignty to neighbouring Djenné, and, in 1825, to push the northern boundaries of the imamate as far as Timbuktu. In addition, in the following years the allied forces of Masina succeeded in defeating the Kel Tadamakkat Tuareg, subduing the Dogon of Bandiagara and, in 1843/4, invading Kaarta.

After the consolidation of his victory, Aḥmad Lobbo concentrated on the organisation of the new state, the *laamu diina* (the 'state of religion'), which he ruled as the *amir al mu'minin*. In a short period of time, the *diina* became the most centralised imamate in sub Saharan West Africa, and the one where Islamic concepts of governance were implemented in the most consistent manner. This development of the *diina* was not based, however, on general consensus. The traders in the two major centres of trade and commerce, Djenné and Timbuktu, were rather opposed to the strict regulations of commerce in Masina, for instance, with respect to the control of the long distance trade, and protested especially against the prohibition of the trade in tobacco which had come to form a major part of their activities. In addition, internal disputes became increasingly disruptive in Masina after the demise of the first imam, Aḥmad Lobbo, and that of his immediate successor, Imam Aḥmadu Seku (r. 1845–53). When Aḥmadu Seku's twenty year old son,

23 For Masina see A. H. Ba and J. Daget, *L'empire peul du Macina (1818–1853)* (Paris, 1984 [1955]); W. A. Brown, 'The caliphate of Hamdullahi, ca. 1816–1864: A study in African history and tradition', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison (1972); and B. Sanankoua, *Un empire peul au XIX^{ème} siècle: La Diina du Maasina* Paris, 1990).

Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu, claimed the position of imam, his claim was rejected by the military commanders as well as a number of religious scholars in the 'great council', the major political body of the *diina*. As these groups were unable, however, to coordinate their opposition on account of their own competing claims for leadership, Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu was able to prevail. The crisis of leadership was not resolved, however, as Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu started to revise the religio dogmatic foundations of the state: Thus, the age group ceremonies of the Halpulaaren pastoralists – a central social tradition of Masina, yet condemned as un-Islamic by Aḥmad Lobbo – were tolerated again; Muslim holidays lost their status as state holidays and were regarded as simple family festivities, often connected with features of conspicuous consumption, and consequently condemned by the religious scholars as an un-Islamic innovation. In addition, Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu tried to break the political influence of the religious scholars by accusing them of collaborating with his enemies, and stopped discussing his decisions with the 'great council' of the *diina*. Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu's isolation was increased by the fact that a number of religious scholars fought disputes over claims of spiritual superiority within the Qadiriyya, and even started to join the competing Tijaniyya. The corporate identity of the *diina*, as based on the affiliation of its scholars with the Qadiriyya, thus disintegrated as well.

When al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal attacked the Diina, in 1862, Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu was unable to organise an efficient resistance. Also, Ba Lobbo, Masina's most important military commander, joined al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal at the very beginning of the war, and after defeat at the battle of Cayawal, the Masinanke forces disintegrated, enabling al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal to occupy Masina's capital, Hamdallahi, while Aḥmadu b. Aḥmadu and his family were taken prisoner and executed. The subsequent rebellions of some local commanders against the occupying forces were not aimed at a restoration of the *diina*, but opposed al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's regime and the loss of local autonomy. These rebellions were supported by the Kunta scholars in Timbuktu, the major representatives of Qadiri traditions of learning in sub-Saharan West Africa, who saw al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's conquest of Masina as a dangerous expansion of his Tijani empire. Its independence lost, Masina became an object of rival forces within the greater region, and finally, until French occupation in 1893, a province of the empire of al-Ḥajj 'Umar Taal's successors. The empire was in fact divided, after his death, into a number of semi-independent states ruled by his sons: Segou, under Aḥmad al Kabir; Masina Bandiagara, under Aḥmad at Tijani; Konyakari, under Mukhtar; Nioro, under Muṣṭafa; and Dingiray, under Habibu. These dominions continued to function, in more or less open

rivalry, until 1890–3, when they were conquered and incorporated into the French colonial empire.²⁴ Tens of thousands of Fuutaanke, who since 1858 had left the Senegal River Valley, had to return to Fuuta Tooro after 1893, while the family of al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal cultivated ‘paths of accommodation’²⁵ with the new regime of the French, in both Mali and Senegal. In 1893, Agibu, a brother of Aḥmad al Kabir, was, for instance, nominated *roi du Macina* by the French.

The caliphates, emirates and imamates of Sudanic West Africa tended to develop along two major lines of political organisation. Some, such as Masina and the empire of Samori Touré, developed rather centralised political structures. Samori Touré had, in fact, introduced Islam as a state ideology only after a formative period of state development from about 1875, abandoning it as a paramount source of political legitimisation after a devastating popular rebellion in 1888.²⁶ Other imamates, such as Fuuta Tooro, Fuuta Jalon, Sokoto and the empire of al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal, were characterised by a history of fragmentation and disintegration. This tendency to disintegrate was contained, in the Sokoto empire, in a loose federation of emirates which acknowledged the supreme political and spiritual authority of the sultan of Sokoto until the British conquest in 1903. The empire of al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal, by contrast, was torn in fratricidal rivalries until French conquest in 1890–3. As these political developments were again dominated by religious scholars who had turned into military and political leaders, text production, for the sake of the legitimisation and delegitimisation of political agency, became a major feature of Islamic scholarship. In fact, it can be said that the jihads led to an explosion in text production in sub-Saharan West Africa.²⁷ The new imamates, however, eventually developed new and equally unjust structures of governance such as slave based economies. These may have been marginal in Masina, but acquired considerable size in al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal’s realm, and were of major importance in Sokoto as well as Fuuta Jalon, where, in the second half of the nineteenth century, slaves came to form more than half of the population. In both Sokoto and Fuuta Jalon annual raids constituted a major pattern of political rule, and came decisively to influence the history of

24 For the history of the empire of al Ḥajj ‘Umar Taal from 1864 see Hanson, *Migration, jihad and Muslim authority*; Hanson and Robinson, *After the jihad*; and Robinson, ‘Revolutions in the Western Sudan’.

25 D. Robinson, *Paths of accommodation. Muslim societies and French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Oxford, 2000).

26 For Samori see Y. Person, ‘Samori and Islam’, in Willis (ed.), *The cultivators of Islam*.

27 As shown in J. Hunwick (ed.), *Arabic literature of Africa II: The writings of Central Sudanic Africa* (Leiden, 1995).

the peripheral regions of each imamate, in particular the so called 'middle belt' areas of northern Nigeria, vast stretches of land on the Niger and Benue Rivers, as well as the Jos Plateau. The slaves caught in these raids were not now fed into the transatlantic or trans Saharan slave trades, but mostly set to work on state plantations.²⁸ The residential slave populations in Sokoto and Fuuta Jalon consequently became foci for new movements of protest against oppressive rule and enslavement. Fuuta Jalon, in particular, was destabilised by a series of slave rebellions, the 'Hubbu' movement,²⁹ to such an extent that the imamate was unable to oppose French conquest in 1890. Of particular importance was the fact that many slave rebellions in both Fuuta Jalon and Sokoto³⁰ were led by Muslim religious scholars, such as Modi Mamadu Jahe in Fuuta Jalon, and these religious scholars again legitimised their opposition to oppressive rule in Islamic terms.

The evolution and development of jihad movements, the emergence of imamates and the subsequent development of movements of opposition to the rule of religious scholars was a dialectical development which from the late eighteenth century came to form a structural feature of the history of sub Saharan Muslim societies. Traditions of coexistence of Islam and pre Islamic communal cults became, at the same time, increasingly obsolete, and pre Islamic religious traditions were marginalised. Non Muslim populations, while still representing a majority of sub Saharan populations in the eighteenth century, became a minority in most parts of Sudanic West Africa in the nineteenth century. At the same time, the Muslim populations of these areas experienced a new phase in the development of Islam which could be characterised as a 'second Islamization'³¹ of their societies, as norms of Islamic law, for instance, became an accepted pattern for the organisation of every day life. Non Muslim populations, by contrast, were able to achieve integration into the imamates only by converting to Islam. As a result of these political, religious and social changes, conversion to Islam intensified in the Sudanic belt of sub Saharan West Africa, and this development continued in

28 For the sub Saharan slave economies see Barry, *La Sénégambie*; and P. Lovejoy, *Transformations in slavery: A history of slavery in Africa* (Cambridge, 1983).

29 For the Hubbu movement see Barry, *La Sénégambie*; and P. D. Curtin, 'The commercial and religious revolutions in West Africa', in Curtin et al. (eds.), *African history*.

30 In particular the Ningi rebellion. See A. Patton, 'An Islamic frontier polity: The Ningi Mountains of Northern Nigeria, 1846 1902', in I. Kopytoff (ed.), *The African frontier* (Bloomington, 1987).

31 See R. Loimeier, 'Is there something like "Protestant Islam"?' *Die Welt des Islams*, 45, 2 (2005), pp. 216 54; Fisher has pointed out that the jihad movements have led to a 'second conversion' of Muslim societies in West Africa: see H. J. Fisher, 'The juggernaut's apologia: Conversion to Islam in Black Africa', *Africa*, 55, 2 (1985), p. 166.

colonial times, when Islam once more came to be seen as an ideology of resistance to colonial rule. The dialectics of legitimisation and delegitimisation continued to structure the religious and political development of Muslim societies in sub Saharan West Africa well into the twentieth century, and increasing public awareness of patterns of Islamic argumentation in political contexts can be regarded as one of the most important legacies of the jihad movements of the period. Yet, while jihad movements had transformed the Sudanic belt of sub Saharan West Africa, the mostly non Muslim societies of the tropical belt on the Guinea coast, which had from the early nineteenth century been drawn into European spheres of influence and colonial conquest, were largely untouched by these structural changes in Sudanese Muslim societies. In the context of the creation of the French, British and German colonial empires, from the late nineteenth century, both Muslim minority areas in the forest belt and Muslim majority areas with an experience of jihad movements in Sudanic West Africa were brought together in colonial polities, such as Nigeria and Ivory Coast. Conflicts over political domination expressed in religious terms were consequently inscribed into the colonial and post colonial histories of these West African states and continue to contribute to their destabilisation.

Muslims in East Africa: crisis and reform

Whereas seas of sand connect the northern and southern reaches of the Sahara, the Indian Ocean and the monsoons connect the East African coast with the shores of India and Arabia. The regional orientation towards India and southern Arabia also characterised the development of East Africa's Muslim societies, probably from the eighth century. The Shafi'i school of law thus came to predominate in East Africa, whereas the Muslims in sub Saharan West Africa joined the Maliki school. In contrast to sub Saharan West Africa, however, Islam in East Africa remained confined, for almost a thousand years, to the littoral zones, the *sawahil*, where, by the nineteenth century, an Islamicate culture had developed, characterised by a common language (Kiswahili) and a culture of seafaring and long distance trade. The trading centres and towns of the East African coast never came to form Muslim empires in Sudanic style. In the East African interior, Islam only started to spread, via Muslim traders, in the nineteenth century, and the possible emergence of Muslim states, as in Buganda, was stopped by encroaching colonial rule. We therefore have to understand the historical development of Muslim East Africa as two separate histories: the 'long

history' of the Muslim societies on the coast which were oriented towards the Indian Ocean; and the 'short history' of the Muslim populations of the East African interior 'up country' Kenya, Uganda and 'mainland' Tanzania, as well as Eastern Congo, where small Muslim communities started to develop from the mid nineteenth century. While the history of Islam in the East African hinterland has to be seen as a comparatively recent development, Muslim societies on the coast could in the nineteenth century look back to a history of more than a thousand years. At the same time, Muslim coastal societies have been characterised, despite their linguistic, cultural, religious and economic homogeneity, by a history of competition (Sw. *mashindano*) between different coastal towns such as Brava, Lamu, Pate, Malindi, Mombasa or Kilwa. They did not experience periods of political unity, except in the time of Portuguese domination over the East African coast from 1502 to 1698, and the nineteenth century, when Oman managed to unite major parts of the coast, under sultans Sa'īd b. Sulṭān (1806–56), Majid (1856–70) and Barghash (1870–88).

In the nineteenth century, the societies of the East African coast came to experience a series of crises which were linked, in political terms, with the rise and demise of the sultanate of Zanzibar. Oman and the subsequent colonial partition of East Africa between Great Britain and Germany, as symbolised by the bombardment of Zanzibar by British naval forces in 1896, which sealed Zanzibar's transformation into a British protectorate. In economic terms, these transformations were linked with the development of a plantation economy based on slave work on an unprecedented scale in East Africa, while in religious terms East Africa saw the emergence of a number of movements of reform dominated by Sufi brotherhoods, in particular, the Qadiriyya, the 'Alawiyya and the Shadhiliyya.³² Sufism in *ṭarīqa* form thus came to be established, in East Africa as in West Africa, only in the nineteenth century. Yet, by contrast to Sudanic West Africa, religious scholars linked with Sufi brotherhoods did not rise to become leaders of jihad movements; rather, they supported reform movements in the spheres of ritual practice

32 For the history of the East African coast see R. L. Pouwels, *Horn and crescent: Cultural change and traditional Islam on the East African coast, 800–1900* (Cambridge, 1987). For economic developments see A. M. H. Sheriff, *Slaves, spices and ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African commercial empire into the world economy, 1770–1873* (London, 1987). For the 'Alawiyya see A. K. Bang, *Sufis and scholars of the sea: Family networks in East Africa 1860–1925* (London, 2003). For the Qadiriyya see Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*; and A. H. Nimtz, *Islam and Politics in East Africa* (Minneapolis, 1980). For the Shadhiliyya see A. C. Ahmed, *Islam et Politique aux Comores* (Paris, 1999); and Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*.

and education. These movements could be interpreted as a response to popular dissatisfaction with the economic, political and social development of the East African coast in the nineteenth century.

This dissatisfaction had many causes. First, the imposition of Omani rule produced increasing pressure on the established families on the coast, as they were marginalised, in political and economic terms, by the new Omani elites and their Indian partners in commerce and finance. In order to differentiate themselves from the new political elites, the prominent families of Mombasa and Lamu, of Malindi and Pangani stressed their cultural identity as well established families of 'Shirazi' origin.³³ The prominent families of the coastal towns were, however, not the only ones to be excluded from political affairs and economic development: the common people were also affected because the rapid growth in size and number of clove and sugar cane plantations on the coast led to considerable migration from the East African interior to the coast. On the coast, these non Muslim migrants competed with the local population for employment and income. Threatened from more than one side, the communities on the coast reacted by emphasising their unique social position as Shirazi citizens of Lamu or Mombasa, and refused to accept the social and religious integration of hundreds of thousands of non Muslim migrants and slaves, even if these newcomers to the coast often converted to Islam. The blocking of conversion and exclusion of converts from existing social and religious structures were connected with claims to cultural superiority: while the coastal populations regarded themselves as the harbingers of civilisation, as Waungwana, they saw outsiders, particularly those from the East African hinterlands, as Washenzi (barbarians) or, indiscriminately, as 'coastals' (Waswahili), devoid of proper cultural and religious roots. Washenzi and Waswahili were perceived as an additional threat to the established social order when they started to convert to Islam which was regarded, by the Waungwana, as a major feature of their own culture.

Yet, from the second half of the nineteenth century, the Shirazi elites came to experience pressure in the sphere of religion as well, when another series of migrants started to question their role as a religious elite. This time the migrants came not from the African interior or from Oman, but from the Hadramawt, the Benadir coast of present day southern Somalia and the Comoro islands. Many migrants from Hadramawt and the Comoros were connected

33 For the Shirazi myths see J. de V. Allen, *Swahili Origins*, London, 1993.

with the 'Alawiyya or Shadhiliyya Sufi brotherhoods and could even claim descent from the family of the Prophet, while the migrants from Benadir coastal towns were often connected with the Qadiriyya. On the coast, the immigrant scholars from Hadramawt, the Benadir coast and the Comoros started to compete with local scholars for influence and social positions and, suffering from similar strategies of exclusion, cultivated support among the marginalised groups there. Thus, a coalition of the marginalised and excluded formed, which promised slaves and migrants social emancipation through conversion, while it provided the new scholars with a social basis. Islam consequently became an important arena of negotiation where matters of inclusion and exclusion were decided. These processes of religious reorientation brought about a number of problems, as African slaves and migrant converts adopted not only features of local and allegedly authentic Islam, but continued to practise pre Islamic rituals such as *ngoma* dances, and mixed pre Islamic ritual with local Islamic custom. The development of Islamic ritual was expressed in the dichotomy between established and newly introduced forms of the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet, the *mawlid al nabi*, or the different forms of Sufi rituals, particularly the *dhikr* of the Qadiriyya. From the late nineteenth century the Qadiri *dhikr*, in particular, saw important ritual innovations such as the *zikri ya dufu*, a *dhikr* employing the playing of *dufu* (*bandiri*) drums, and the *zikri ya kukohoa*, a *dhikr* implying respiratory exercises of rhythmic inhaling and exhaling (*anfas*; lit., breath). With respect to *mawlid* celebrations, the coastal elites tended to cultivate the *mawlid Barzanji*, recited in Arabic, whereas converts tended to follow the *mawlid* *ya Kiswahili* as introduced, for instance, by Ḥabīb Ṣaliḥ Jamal al Layl (1853–1935) from Lamu, a form of the *mawlid* characterised by performance in Kiswahili and ecstatic ritual. While the new rituals, in particular the different new forms of the *dhikr* and the *mawlid* *ya Kiswahili*, were perceived by converts as being part of their new Islamic identity, the Shirazī elites resented these processes of innovation and reinterpretation of coastal Islamic culture, as well as their transformation into 'convert' concepts of Islam. Consequently, they attacked the new customs as un-Islamic innovations, and condemned the egalitarianism of the new rituals. The new scholars from Hadramawt and the Benadir coast were willing, by contrast, to defend convert practices of Islam and to provide a certain degree of religious legitimacy. For both the marginal groups of the coastal areas and the migrant populations, affiliation with the new scholars and participation in their religious and social activities came to constitute an important avenue for social mobility, as these ritual practices were legitimised in Islamic terms by

the new scholars against the critique of the local establishment. In these local disputes over the Islamic character of ritual innovations, legitimacy references to external centres of spiritual authority in the Hadramawt, in Iraq, the Hijaz and Egypt were activated in order to gain external support for conflicting claims of religious authority. This was done even though actual contact with other parts of the Muslim oecumene such as Egypt and the Hijaz remained confined to a minority of religious scholars and became more widely spread, as in Sudanic West Africa, only in the context of colonial rule and the subsequent intensification of long distance transport, trade and state organised pilgrimages, as well as the introduction of new media and new means of transport from the 1920s.

The critique of the established scholars was particularly directed against the new *dhikr* ceremonies of the Qadiriyya, as propagated by scholars such as Uways b. Muḥammad al Barawī (1847–1909).³⁴ Shaykh Uways was, in fact, one of the few East African Muslim scholars who had actually studied in Baghdad, the spiritual centre of the Qadiriyya, for a fairly long period of time (the 1870s and 1880s), until returning to Brava in 1883. On account of his scholarship and his direct connections with the centre of the Qadiriyya, he claimed, after his return, to be entitled to lead the local scholarly establishment. His claim, while rejected in Brava, found considerable recognition in other parts of East Africa, in particular Zanzibar, which became, after 1884, a major centre of his activities. In addition, Shaykh Uways managed to cultivate good contacts with a number of sultans of Zanzibar, particularly Barghash, Khalifa b. Saʿīd (r. 1888–90) and Ḥamid b. Thuwaynī b. Saʿīd (r. 1893–6), and was able to transform his branch of the Qadiriyya into a religious mass movement. From the late 1880s his interpretation of the teachings of the Qadiriyya, as connected with a number of new and distinctive religious practices – especially the *zikri ya kukohoa* – became extremely popular among converts to Islam. The new *zikri* practices were attacked, however, as an un-Islamic innovation and as a ‘*dhikr* of coughing’ by other scholars, even scholars of the Qadiriyya who had managed to become part of the local religious establishment, such as Shaykh ‘Abd al ‘Azīz b. ‘Abd al Ghani

³⁴ For Shaykh Uways see I. M. Lewis, ‘Saints in North East African Islam’, in B. S. Amoretti (ed.), *Islam in East Africa: New sources* (Rome, 2001); Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*; S. S. Reese, ‘Urban woes and pious remedies: Sufism in nineteenth century Benaadir (Somalia)’, *Africa Today*, 46, 3–4 (1999), pp. 169–94; and S. S. Samatar, ‘Sheikh Uways Muhammad of Baraawe, 1847–1909: Mystic and reformer in East Africa’, in S. S. Samatar (ed.), *In the shadow of conquest: Islam in colonial northeast Africa* (Trenton, 1992).

b. Ṭahir b. Nur al Amawī al Quraishī (1838–96).³⁵ Shaykh al Amawī had in fact, since the 1860s, propagated another form of the *zikri*, namely the *zikri ya dufu*, and probably felt threatened in his position as paramount scholar of the Qadiriyya in Zanzibar and East Africa, by the rapid spread of the new *zikri* movement of Shaykh Uways. The perception of the *zikri ya kukohoa* as an un-Islamic innovation must thus be seen as a function of local disputes. While the established Amawī branch of the Qadiriyya depicted the *zikri ya kukohoa* in the context of their competition with Shaykh Uways as a *bid'a*, it was perceived by the scholars of the Uways branch of the Qadiriyya as a religious practice that could be regarded as even more authentic than the local practices of the Qadiriyya, as it was practised at the very centre of the Qadiriyya, in Baghdad. The new form of the *dhikr*, as defended and propagated by Shaykh Uways, eventually became a major feature of convert practices of Islam as many converts sought affiliation with the Uways branch of the Qadiriyya which was, in contrast to Shaykh al Amawī's branch, not associated with established Islam. The rapid spread of the *zikri* movement was not confined, however, to Zanzibar and the East African coast, but also seems to have been a major force in the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam in the East African hinterlands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both Glassman and Nimtz correlate the movement of conversion to Islam in Tanganyika, from the late nineteenth century, with the activities of Qadiri missionaries and the ritual attraction of the *dhikr*.³⁶ The expansion of the Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhood and its ritual practices led to a massive spread of new Muslim rituals, particularly the different forms of the *dhikr*. On the basis of these new rituals, new concepts of community came to be cultivated. These concepts were no longer characterised by competition, but by the communal *dhikr*. At the same time, the new Sufi scholars became foci for social and religious reorientation, and were able to challenge existing social and religious structures which had been characterised by their exclusivity.³⁷

While the reform efforts of the Qadiriyya had focused on ritual, a second reform movement on the East African coast concentrated on the propagation

35 For his biography see A. K. Bang, 'Intellectuals and civil servants: Early 20th century 'ulama' and the colonial state', in Amoretti (ed.), *Islam in East Africa*; and A. S. al Farsi, *Baadhi ya wanavyuoni wa kishafi wa mashariki ya afrika* (Mombasa, 1972 [1944]).

36 See J. Glassman, *Feasts and riots: Revelry, rebellion and popular consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888* (Portsmouth, 1995), p. 140, and Nimtz, *Islam and politics*, p. 66. For the competition between Amawī and Uways families see Pouwels, *Horn and crescent*, p. 143.

37 See Bang, *Sufis and scholars of the sea*; and Glassman, *Feasts and Riots*.

of the *mawlid al nabī* and the reform of Islamic education. This movement was represented by scholars of the 'Alawiyya, a religious group which recruited its followers among families of Sharifian descent from the Hadramawt. For many years 'Alawī families had formed networks of scholarship and trade all over the Indian Ocean. In East Africa, in Lamu and the Comoros, 'Alawī families such as the Jamal al Layl and Abu Bakr b. Salim had been established since the early sixteenth century, while other 'Alawī families settled in Zanzibar, where they were represented, in the mid nineteenth century, by the families of Aḥmad b. Sumayṭ (1861–1925) and Abd Allah Ba Kathīr al Kindī (1860–1925).³⁸ As a religious movement, the 'Alawiyya, like the related Shadhiliyya, traced its origin to the Andalusian scholar and saint Shu'ayb Abu Madyan (d. 1198), and, like the Shadhiliyya, stressed the importance of Islamic law and the veneration of the Prophet as the major foundation of knowledge and inspiration (*ma'rifa*). The veneration of the Prophet was emphasised through the celebration of His birthday, *mawlid al nabī*, which also came to be known, in East Africa, as the major 'Alawī ritual. At the same time, the scholars of the 'Alawiyya adopted a critical position not only towards the religious and political establishment on the East African coast, but also towards the scholars of the Qadiriyya and their concepts of the Islamic ritual which allowed for ecstatic practices, and tried to marginalise the growing social influence of Qadiri scholars by advancing new approaches to Islamic education. These efforts at education were expressed in the foundation of new schools, such as the Ribāṭ ar Riyadha in Lamu, established by Ḥabīb Ṣāliḥ Jamal al Layl, or the Madrasat Ba Kathīr in Zanzibar, established by Abd Allah Ba Kathīr. These new schools not only taught Qur'an and *fiqh*, but a larger spectrum of the Islamic canon of disciplines. At the same time, the scholars of the 'Alawiyya started to open access to Islamic education for all Muslims, even slaves. The popularisation of the ritual as brought about by the scholars of the Qadiriyya was thus repeated in structural terms with respect to the reform of Islamic education by 'Alawī scholars. From the late nineteenth century the Qadiriyya, and, to a certain extent, the Shadhiliyya under the influence of Muḥammad Ma'ruf (1853–1905), became religious mass movements in major parts of East Africa, while the reform efforts of the 'Alawiyya remained largely confined to a comparatively small group of educated Muslims in the coastal areas.

³⁸ For both scholars see Bang, *Sufis and scholars of the sea*; and al Farsi, *Baadhi ya wanavyuoni*.

While Islam had been established on the East African coast for a long period of time, it started to expand into the interior fairly late, in the mid nineteenth century, in the context of the establishment of the Omani Zanzibar trading empire. This expansion of Islam continued under colonial rule. In the context of these developments, Muslim scholars acquired social and political influence in societies that had only recently come into contact with Islam, through Muslim traders. The growing religious political influence of religious scholars, in particular those linked with the Sufi brotherhoods, was manifested in early colonial times in the context of the so called Bushiri rising of 1888–9, in the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905–7 and the 'Mecca letters' affair of 1908.³⁹ In the context of these resistance movements against German colonial rule, the trader and scholar networks of the Sufi brotherhoods, particularly the Qadiriyya, provided major links of communication among rebel groups. After the repression of the Maji Maji rising, the movement to convert Africans to Islam intensified in the areas affected by Maji Maji, *mawlid* celebrations spread, and African religious rituals were replaced by the *dhikr* of the Qadiriyya. This led to a change in the religious make up of Tanganyika's population, which was accelerated by the massive disruptions of the First World War: while 3 per cent of the population had been Muslim in 1914, by 1924 the Muslim population had reached 25 per cent.⁴⁰

Muslims in South Africa: the Cape Muslim community

South Africa, and Cape Town in particular, may be seen as another example of an Islamic religious culture, again different from other contextualisations of Islam in sub Saharan Africa.⁴¹ While most Muslim societies of sub Saharan West and East Africa came under European control in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Muslims in South Africa lived under European domination from the time of their arrival at the Cape. In 1658, only six years after the establishment of the first Dutch settlement in

³⁹ For the Bushiri rising see Glassman, *Feasts and Riots*. For Maji Maji see J. Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905–12* (Cambridge, 1969). For the Mecca letters affair see Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods*.

⁴⁰ See Nimtz, *Islam and politics*, pp. 14, 66.

⁴¹ The development of the Indian Muslim communities in Natal will not be discussed here. For these see S. Bhana and J. Brain, *Setting down roots: Indian migrants in South Africa, 1860–1911* (Johannesburg, 1990).

Cape Town, the first Muslims, political prisoners as well as free (*mardyker*) employees of Dutch traders, arrived in Cape Town from India and Indonesia on board Dutch ships. Due to the repressive religious policies of the Dutch East India Company and the Dutch Reformed Church, the Cape Muslims developed as an underground community until they were granted religious freedom in 1804, two years before the British occupation of the Cape.⁴² In the nineteenth century the Cape Muslim community reached considerable strength due to the conversion to Islam of African slaves as well as of poor European immigrants. In 1850 about 40 per cent of Cape Town's population was Muslim, and in 1855 about 8,000 Muslims were living in Cape Town. By 1891 their number had risen to 11,300.⁴³ However, the growing strength of the Cape Muslim community brought about numerous communal disputes, often connected with questions of communal leadership. As a result, the Cape Muslim community was never able to achieve the kind of political unity that would have been necessary to consistently influence Cape Town's political development, although qualifications granting access to the vote at the Cape had been relaxed, in 1839 and 1853, giving an increasing number of Muslims the right to vote in municipal elections and for the Constituent Assembly of the Cape Colony.

In the context of the social development of the Cape Muslim community in the nineteenth century, the *imams* of the Cape mosques turned out to be the major religious political force, and competition among religious scholars regarding control over the influential position of *imam* left its mark on the development of the community. Being an *imam* was thought to be a constituent part of the status associated with the role of a respected notable and, thus, 'a much sought after title'.⁴⁴ Even men who only occasionally led the prayers in one of the Cape Town mosques and prayer rooms, or who taught children in Islamic sciences, claimed the title of *imam*. Their efforts to win

42 For the early history of the Cape Muslim community see F. R. Bradlow and M. Cairns, *The early Cape Muslims. A study of their mosques, genealogy and origins* (Cape Town, 1978); Y. da Costa and A. Davids, *Pages from Cape Muslim History* (Pietermaritzburg, 1994); and A. Tayob, *Islamic resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement* (Cape Town, 1995).

43 For the history of the Cape Muslims in the nineteenth century see Bradlow and Cairns, *The early Cape Muslims*; A. Davids, 'My religion is superior to the law: The survival of Islam at the Cape of Good Hope', *Kronos*, 12 (1987), pp. 57–71; S. Jeppie, 'Leadership and loyalties: The imams of 19th century colonial Cape Town, South Africa', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 26, 2 (1996), pp. 139–62; and R. Shell, 'Rites and rebellion: Islamic conversion at the Cape, 1808 to 1915', *Studies in the History of Cape Town*, 5 (1983), pp. 1–45.

44 Jeppie, 'Leadership and loyalties', p. 150.

communal backing for these claims, as well as their legal and religious disputes, were a decisive feature of the development of the Cape Muslim community, and mosques consequently became sites for the negotiation of conflict, particularly after the death of an *imam*. The mosque was the institution where acquired power could be displayed.⁴⁵ Apart from the position of *imam*, a hierarchy of religious offices connected with the mosques developed as well, and these were as hotly contested as the position of *imam*. Thus, each mosque community had an 'assistant *imam*' (*imam moot*), a 'senior preacher' (*khaṭīb*; Afrikaans, *gatiep*), an 'assistant *gatiep*' and a *billal* (Afrikaans; Arab., *mu'adhdhin*).⁴⁶ The conflicts on questions of leadership and guidance of the Cape Muslim community contributed to an increase in the number of *imams*, from three in 1811 to seven in 1825 and thirty in 1834. By 1860 their number had been reduced to fifteen again, but at least twenty disputes concerning the succession to the imamate and other mosque offices turned into legal disputes and were brought, between 1866 and 1900, to the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony. Often these conflicts could not be solved, and further friction within mosque communities arose, which led to the constitution of new mosque communities, as shown in the career of Abubakar Effendi, an Ottoman *qaḍī* who came to Cape Town in 1862, in order to mediate in local disputes, but who created even more disputes when he insisted on enforcing Ḥanafī legal concepts on the Shafī'ī Muslim communities of Cape Town.⁴⁷

Mosques were, however, not the only places of importance for the development of the Cape Muslim community. The *madrasas*, the Islamic schools of the Cape, also played a significant role in this regard. The first *madrasa* had been established in 1793 by the religious scholar Tuan Guru (1712–1807), in Dorp Street. Initially, only the Qur'an and its correct recitation (*tajwīd*) were taught in this school, but another *madrasa* was established in the early nineteenth century, and by 1832 the number of Cape Town *madrasas* had grown to twelve schools of varying size. In addition to these schools, private teachers

45 Tayob, *Islamic resurgence in South Africa*, p. 47.

46 See Bradlow and Cairns, *The early Cape Muslims*, pp. 36–7; da Costa and Davids, *Pages from Cape Muslim history*, p. 51; and S. Dangor, 'The expression of Islam in South Africa', *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 17, 1 (1997), pp. 141–51, at p. 144.

47 For Abubakar Effendi see Bradlow and Cairns, *The Early Cape Muslims*; da Costa and Davids, *Pages from Cape Muslim history*; H. Kähler, 'Die Kultur der Kapmalaien', in H. Gottschalk, B. Spuler and H. Kähler (eds.), *Die Kultur des Islams* (Frankfurt, 1971); and Tayob, *Islamic resurgence in South Africa*. For the development of the Cape Town mosque communities see Tayob, *Islamic resurgence in South Africa*; and Jeppie, 'Leadership and loyalties'.

were giving classes to children in their homes. A uniform curriculum in Afrikaans with an Arabic script had been developed by 1854, as supervised by the assistant *imam* of Cape Town. At the same time, the assistant *imam* controlled the *madrasas* that had been established by European converts to Islam in the nineteenth century. Their *madrasas* were very popular, as they offered classes in English, Dutch and accountancy.⁴⁸

The increasing integration of the Cape Colony into the capitalist world system during the nineteenth century went along with the integration of the Cape Muslim community into other parts of the Islamic oecumene, especially the Holy Places of the Arabian Peninsula, but also Cairo and Istanbul. Before 1854 only four Cape Muslims were known to have gone on *hajj*, while the numbers of Cape Muslim pilgrims, the *ahl kaf*, as they were called in Mecca, increased steadily in the second half of the nineteenth century. The pilgrim age was regarded not only as a religious obligation but also as a 'grand tour' to the Islamic Holy Places, as well as Cairo, Jerusalem and Damascus. In addition, the *hajj* was seen as a way of acquiring further education and prestige.⁴⁹ The pilgrims returning from the Holy Places contributed to the improvement of local teaching methods and the expansion of traditions of teaching. At the same time, they were responsible for the intensification of disputes in Cape Town, as many pilgrims tried to start new mosques and schools. In addition, the pilgrims or *sjegs* (Afrikaans for *shuyukh*), as they came to be called at the Cape, introduced textbook standards, often new conventions of teaching and religious practice inspired by the traditions of Islamic learning as seen and experienced in the Holy Places. At first, these reform initiatives rarely led to the transformation of existing religious practices at the Cape, and from the 1850s only some Sufi rites, particularly those of the Rifa'iyya, were modified or even abandoned under reformist pressure. With time, however, the *sjegs* came to constitute a second pillar of religious authority in Cape Town, with the term *sjeg* coming to signify a person who had acquired education abroad, whereas the term *imam* remained reserved for local religious scholars.⁵⁰

48 For the development of the Cape Town *madrasas* see da Costa and Davids, *Pages from Cape Muslim history*; J. S. Mayson, *The Malays of Capetown* (Manchester, 1861), p. 24; and Shell, 'Rites and rebellion'.

49 S. Rochlin, 'Aspects of Islam in nineteenth century South Africa', *Bulletin of the SOAS*, 10 (1939), pp. 213–21, at p. 213.

50 See Jeppie, 'Leadership and loyalties', p. 144; Shell, 'Rites and rebellion', p. 19; and Tayob, *Islamic resurgence in South Africa*.

Thus, disputes over questions of ritual and legal procedure dominated the development of the Cape Muslim community and defined the social position of the religious scholars. Although a public council, a *bechara* (from Ar. *shura*), was occasionally summoned, in one of the mosques, to find solutions for specific disputes, these councils seldom achieved satisfactory results. The establishment of a Ḥanafī community in the Nur al Islam Mosque in 1870 under the influence of Abubakar Effendi, the quarrels concerning access to this mosque and a dispute among the *imams*, in particular Achmat Sadiek Achmat and Abdol Rakiep, on the issue of Friday prayers, finally led to a general debate among the religious scholars of Cape Town on the question of which Friday mosque would be recognised as paramount. In 1911, after a series of efforts at mediation, the mosque communities agreed to send a petition to the Ḥanafī *mufti* in Mecca. This initiative led to a mission of religious scholars from Zanzibar to Cape Town, in early 1914. Under the leadership of ‘Abd Allah Ba Kathīr al Kindī, the Zanzibari scholars suggested a compromise, namely that Friday prayers should be held in a single Friday mosque, the Queen Victoria Mosque, and that all *imams* were to deliver the *khutba* alternately in this mosque. This solution found widespread acceptance, and remained in force until 1957.⁵¹

The missions of Abubakar Effendi in 1862 and ‘Abd Allah Ba Kathīr al Kindī in 1914, as well as the numerous efforts of Cape Muslims to obtain legal opinions in Mecca and Istanbul, show how far the integration of the Cape Muslim community into a translocal network of Islamic learning had progressed by the early twentieth century. At the same time, the development of the Cape Town Muslim community in the nineteenth century showed that although Muslims had acquired a considerable degree of integration into communal structures, they remained unable to influence the political process in Cape Town, on account of their internal disputes. Nevertheless, the development of the Cape Town Muslim community provided a model of development of an Islamic religious culture which appears to be strikingly similar to the development of the Muslim *citoyens* in the Quatre Communes of Senegal (Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque and St Louis) where Muslims had started, from 1832, to demand participation in communal affairs as French citizens and to ask for the establishment of a *tribunal musulman* for Muslim civic affairs. In contrast to Cape Town, where Muslim political initiatives largely failed, the

51 See Bradlow and Cairns, *The early Cape Muslims*, p. 23; da Costa and Davids, *Pages from Cape Muslim history*, p. 110; Kähler, ‘Die Kultur der Kapmalaien’, p. 446; and Tayob, *Islamic resurgence in South Africa*.

Muslim citizens of the Quatre Communes, under the leadership of the *qaḍīs* of the *tribunal musulman*, especially Aḥmad Ndiaye Hann (*qaḍī* 1843–1879) and Ndiaye Sarr (*qaḍī* 1880–1903), were able to develop a certain degree of unity and were willing to enter a system of exchange of services with the French colonial administration that came to form a decisive basis for Senegal's political development in the twentieth century, particularly with respect to the development of a working relationship with the leaders of both the Tijaniyya and Muridiyya Sufi brotherhoods. The election in 1914 of Blaise Diagne (1872–1934) as the first African deputy of the Quatre Communes into the French National Assembly, as a result of these policies of negotiation of communal services and obligations,⁵² opened a new chapter in the development of Muslim societies in sub-Saharan Africa within the framework of colonial rule in the early twentieth century.

Conclusion

While Muslim experiences in Cape Town and the Quatre Communes of Senegal evolved from a background of long historical experiences with Europeans, the jihad movements in sub-Saharan West Africa, which resulted from the social and political dialectics of Sudanic history, started well before European colonial conquest and brought about significantly different historical experiences. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the caliphates, imamates and emirates that had restructured Sudanic West Africa came to form a major force of opposition against colonial rule. In a short period of time, Islam acquired the role of a political ideology twice: it served as an ideology of liberation against the oppressive rule of Sudanic kings in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and it became an ideology of resistance against European conquest and colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a consequence of this historical legacy, Islam and the political models developed in the jihad movements came to form focal points of orientation for Muslims in colonial and post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of Sokoto, this perception was enhanced by the fact that the jihad had started dynamics of social and economic reform which could be seen, in hindsight, to have pre-dated colonial and post-colonial processes of modernisation. Muslim experiences of reform were therefore instrumental in legitimising contemporary endeavours of reform by establishing references to

⁵² See G. W. Johnson, *Naissance du Sénégal contemporain: Aux origines de la vie politique moderne (1900–1920)* (Paris, 1991), pp. 211–14.

Islamic models of modernisation, namely, the legacies of the jihad. As the British did not impose a system of direct rule after their conquest of the Sokoto caliphate in 1903, but rather conserved the political apparatus of the empire and its emirates, under the umbrella of indirect rule, the legacies of the jihad could survive into colonial as well as post colonial times. Yet, while jihad oriented legacies of political development came to form one cluster of models of accommodation with modernity, the experiences of the Muslim communities in the Quatre Communes and in Cape Town formed an important second cluster of experiences of accommodation with modernity which were not characterised by legacies of victory and defeat in jihad movements, but by legacies of participation in political processes which granted Muslims a considerable say in colonial politics, even if these processes were not yet defined by Muslims. The different historical experiences and the corresponding expressions of Islamic religious cultures were subject to constant negotiation, however, and the resulting paths of accommodation of Muslims with politics could consequently range over time in Africa's different Islamic religious cultures from being in power, to being close to power, to traditions of withdrawal from political power, to, finally, resistance to political power and jihad.

PART II

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INDEPENDENCE AND REVIVAL
c. 1919 TO THE PRESENT

Turkey from the rise of Atatürk¹

REŞAT KASABA

Introduction

On 17 December 2004, after several days of meetings in Brussels, when the representatives of the current and future members of the European Union (EU) lined up for their customary photograph to mark the conclusion of a successful convention, the group included a representative from Turkey. In those two days the EU had agreed to start negotiations with Turkey that could result in her full membership. It is well known that European public opinion has been strongly opposed to Turkey's accession to candidate status. Many believe that inclusion of a country whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim and poor will undermine the coherence of the EU.

In Turkey too, however, there are people who find the inclusion of Turkey's prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, in the EU's group photograph somewhat unsettling. This relatively small but highly influential group includes some members of the civilian and military elite and intellectuals. Even though Westernisation has been the central ambition of the modern Turkish Republic since its foundation in 1923, and even though Turkey is closer than ever to these ideals today, this elite is unhappy that the country has been brought to this stage by a party and a politician with deep roots in Islamist politics. Since the 1920s it has been the Turkish government's official line that Turkey's Western and secular turn under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) was devised specifically to cut Turkey's ties with its Islamic past and traditions because these were seen as constituting insurmountable barriers in the country's modernisation. This group is uncomfortable also because, after pursuing nationalist and modernist agendas together

¹ I am grateful to Senem Aslan, Brook Adams, Sibel Bozdoğan, Frederic Shorter, Michael Meeker and the Turkish Studies Group at the University of Washington for their comments.

for more than eighty years, it now seems that they will have to make a choice between these two paths. In today's world it is becoming less and less easy for states to insist on maintaining exclusive control over their internal and external affairs if they want to remain part of ever expanding global relationships.

Turkey's accession to her new status and the 'family photo' that marks this event can be disturbing only if we accept a formalistic definition of modernity. According to this, a nation cannot be modern unless the people who constitute it uniformly subscribe to the same set of rigidly defined ideals that are derived from European history. There is, however, another, more substantive, understanding of modernisation that approaches it as a world historical phenomenon. It includes the expansion of capitalist relations, industrialisation, urbanisation and individuation as well as the formation of nation states and the notions of civil, human and economic rights. These can manifest themselves and combine with each other under different contexts and in different forms. Ignoring this potential for diversity, and insisting on formal unity and uniformity around a narrow set of modern ideals, deprives modernity of its dynamic essence and reduces it to an oppressive project, as has happened in numerous instances in other parts of the world – and, for long periods, in Turkey.

Indeed, for long stretches of time in Turkey's modern history, its relatively small political elite has appropriated the right to determine the pace and the shape of its modernisation. The path they drew for Turkey was modelled after Western European experience and required a very heavy dose of state intervention to mould the nation's broader social transformation so that it could fit into this new riverbed. In many ways this has been a successful project. It is the culmination of the policies of the past century that have transformed a land which was fragmented and under occupation, and a people whose identity and purpose were at best uncertain, into today's robust nation, which is a candidate for membership in the EU. Yet the modernisation project of the past century has also created a disjuncture between the Turkish state and society. Under this model, social forces in Turkey have largely been relegated to a relationship of dependency on the directives and imperatives that originate from the state and the elite who wield state power. Even the presence of multi party democracy during most of this time did not change this situation. In fact, there have been only two intervals when this relationship was reversed and Turkish society appeared to be genuinely empowered. The first of these was the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, henceforth DP) years in the 1950s, and the second is the current period of

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, henceforth JDP) government. While the first of these ended in the coup of 1960 which brought the military and bureaucratic elite back into power, the JDP government is stronger than ever after introducing institutional reforms and making significant gains in linking Turkey to the EU. Today it may have become all but impossible for social forces in Turkey to be made subordinate again. Examined in broader terms, the new picture of Europe that includes Turkey, far from being incongruous, may very well represent the melding of two genuinely modern currents, one in Turkey, the other in Europe, mutually reinforcing and strengthening each other's emancipatory promise.

This chapter starts with the rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the national leader, and the formation of the republic in the early twentieth century and explains the bifurcation of Turkey's modern history into two paths: one of these is state centred and formal; the other is society based and substantive. In addition to recounting the separate development of these paths, the chapter also considers what led to their convergence in the 1950s and, more recently, at the turn of the twenty first century.

Building a nation

In the aftermath of the First World War, most territories of the Ottoman Empire were either colonised or fell under the occupation of French, British, Italian or Greek forces. Only central Anatolia was left free of foreign presence, and severe restrictions were placed on the political, military and economic powers of the Ottoman state.

Mustafa Kemal Paşa (henceforth referred to as Atatürk, the surname he was given in 1934) emerged as a national leader under these circumstances. Atatürk had already established a name for himself during the war as an able commander. Shortly after the signing of the armistice between Turkey and the Allied powers in October 1918, he secured an appointment as a military inspector in Anatolia. He left Istanbul, ostensibly to assume his new position; his real intention, however, was to organise a resistance movement. He quit the Ottoman army in 1919 and convened a series of congresses in various parts of Anatolia, to garner support for the resistance and to build a national consensus as to what the boundaries of a Turkish state should be, and how to secure these boundaries. The participants in these congresses issued the National Pact (*Misak ı Milli*) in September 1919, which stated that the lands that were to be liberated had to be limited to Asia Minor and a small part of the eastern Balkans: the area that had formed the basis of the armistice at the

end of the First World War. Setting these limited goals for the nationalist movement reflected Atatürk's pragmatism and his determination to distinguish the nationalist movement from the Ottoman Empire.

Once the ultimate goal of the nationalist struggle was decided upon, Atatürk and his fellow nationalists regrouped the remnants of the Ottoman army and combined them with the irregular forces which were already mobilising against the occupation. In 1920 this new force was placed under the authority of a newly created national assembly inaugurated in Ankara. With these moves, the nationalist initiative was seeking to ground itself in Anatolia, specifically among the Muslim population. So sensitive were the nationalists to the religious sensibilities of the Anatolian population that when the *şeyhülislam*, the chief Islamic authority in the empire, issued a *fatwa* in Istanbul decreeing that it was a religious duty to kill the nationalists, the nationalists obtained a counter ruling from a sympathetic cleric to justify their uprising.² Local notables, peasants, tribesmen, Muslims of all sects, members of religious orders, Kurds, Balkan and Caucasian immigrants were all represented in the national and local assemblies convened by the nationalists, and they participated in the resistance movement.

The fighting force that emerged from this disparate alliance turned out to be surprisingly effective. In 1920 the nationalists secured the eastern borders by beating the Armenians and, in 1921, signing a treaty of friendship with the new Bolshevik regime in Russia. They then persuaded the French and the Italians to withdraw from the southern and south eastern parts of Anatolia, thereby leaving Britain alone in its support for the Greek occupation of western Anatolia. In 1922 the Greek army was roundly defeated and forced to evacuate the areas it had invaded from 1919. A final confrontation with Britain was avoided and, by the end of 1922, the nationalist regime had secured almost all the borders that it had identified as non negotiable in the National Pact of 1919. The two main exceptions were the Mosul province in northern Iraq and the area around Antakya in southern Turkey. Turkey relinquished its claims on Mosul in favour of Great Britain in 1926. Antakya, on the other hand, would be incorporated into the new republic in 1939.

In November 1922 the nationalists abolished the sultanate. The Ankara government and their territorial gains were recognised by the international community in the Lausanne peace conference in 1922 and 1923. The treaty

2 Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish experiment in democracy* (Boulder, 1977), p. 363.

that was signed in Lausanne on 24 July 1923 ended the state of war that had been a constant since 1911 and signalled the beginning of a new era in Turkey.

While the war of liberation and the diplomatic victories that followed it were significant accomplishments, the territory the new state inherited was in ruins. During the war years, two and a half million Muslims, as many as 800,000 Armenians and 300,000 Greeks had lost their lives.³ There were millions of widows, orphans, refugees and internally displaced people in the country. It was by no means clear how this broken people would be united in a meaningful entity.

Since most of the Armenian population of Anatolia had been eliminated during the war and many Ottoman Greeks had emigrated, Muslims constituted the overwhelming majority of the population in the territories of the new state. Accordingly, from the beginning of the nationalist struggle there was a growing emphasis on Islam as a common denominator that could become the rallying point for the disparate communities in Anatolia. This was partly due to the fact that in Anatolia there were many refugees who had been expelled over the past quarter of a century from Russia and the Balkan states because of their religious identity. It is estimated that between 1877 and 1914 more than half a million Muslims were forced to leave Russia for the Ottoman Empire, and between 1912 and 1920 about 400,000 Muslims from the Balkans sought refuge in Anatolia.⁴ The experience of expulsion and the fear of renewed oppression helped strengthen Muslim identity among the refugees and provided a convenient means of mobilisation to nationalists.

In contrast, the scars of the conflicts that had divided the indigenous peoples of Anatolia were so deep that it was impossible to contemplate the inclusion of non Muslims, especially the Armenian and Greek communities, in the construction of the new nation. Accordingly, Turkish negotiators insisted that the Treaty of Lausanne include a provision that barred the return of the refugees who had left Anatolia during the war and required the exchange of Turkey's remaining Greek Orthodox residents for the Muslims of Macedonia and Greece.⁵

The Lausanne Treaty represents the end of a period of population shuffling that had affected the Ottoman territories since at least the Russo Turkish War

3 Erik Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern history* (London, 1993), p. 171; Frederic Shorter, 'The population of Turkey after the War of Independence', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 17 (1985), pp. 419–21.

4 Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman population* (Madison, 1985), p. 70; Justin McCarthy, *Death and exile* (Princeton, 1995), p. 161.

5 Stephen Ladas, *The exchange of minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey* (New York, 1932).

of 1877–8. After 1923 little was left of the non Muslim communities, which had been a prominent component of Ottoman society. The Greek population declined from its pre war levels of almost 2 million to 120,000; Armenians from 1.3 million to 65,000. The Anatolian population, no more than 80 per cent Muslim before the Balkan wars, had become 98 per cent Muslim at the end of the War of Independence.⁶

After the purging of most Christians, the Turkish population was still divided in different ways. Although they were Muslims, recent immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus came with their own specific interests and distinct cultures, and sought to maintain separate communities. The indigenous population of Anatolia was also divided along regional and class lines. The largest concentration of Kurdish communities in the world was in Anatolia. They were predominantly Sunni but were also marked by linguistic and tribal divisions. Also indigenous to Anatolia were several communities of Alevis and Nuşayrîs which were related to Shi‘î Islam. Finally, and most significantly, a very large number of both the Sunnis and Alevis were organised in religious orders, called *ṭarîqas*, the most important of which were the Naqshbandî, Qadîrî, Khalidî, Mevlevî and Bektâşî orders.⁷ Islam had mobilised the Anatolian population against the invading Christian armies of Europe but, given these diverse interests and orientations, it was not clear that it would be an effective means of nation building in the post Lausanne era. Indeed, the very societal organisation in Anatolia appeared to be pulling the country not towards strengthening state and nation, but towards local foci of power and decentralisation.

Under the leadership of Atatürk, who became the first president of the new republic in 1923 and served in that capacity until his death in 1938, the nationalist regime countered these centrifugal forces by building central state institutions and using these to restrict the place of religion in Turkish politics. The nationalists hoped that they could, through institutional reform, mould the disparate and religious population of Turkey into a uniform national community.

Following the declaration of the republic in 1923, the new state took a series of steps radically to limit the role of Islam in the public sector. In 1924 the caliphate and the office of *şeyhülislam* were abolished and all members of the Ottoman dynasty were exiled. Religious affairs, including the *ulema* and the administration of religiously endowed properties, were placed under the

6 Başvekâlet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, *1927 Umumî Nüfus Tahriri* (Ankara, 1929).

7 Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve slogan* (İstanbul, 1990), pp. 17–77.

control of the central government's offices of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations Administration respectively. Also in 1924, education was secularised under the Law of Unification of Education. In 1925 religious shrines were closed down, and wearing the fez and other religious attire was banned. 1926 witnessed the adoption of a new Civil Code and Penal Code from European sources, as well as the calendar used in Europe. And in 1928, Ottoman numerals and the Arabic alphabet were replaced by their Western and Roman counterparts. These reforms were designed to change Turkish society fundamentally and irreversibly by breaking its ties with the Ottoman and Islamic past and by legislating how people should live, act, dress, write, talk, and even pray.⁸ This top down policy of reform and reorganisation has recently been described as 'high modernism' which involved a sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied, usually through the state, in every field of human activity.⁹ When these measures were passed and implemented, more than 80 per cent of Turkey's population was living in rural areas and literacy was less than 10 per cent. Most had never been fully integrated with the imperial regime. Therefore they were not likely to be affected immediately by the new government's reformed institutions. To overcome this barrier, the central government relied on a dedicated generation of teachers and bureaucrats who spread across the country and served as the bearers and implementers of modern ideals and reforms.

To implement their sweeping programme of modernisation, the Turkish delegation at Lausanne was keen also to acquire the means to rebuild the country's economy. Accordingly, the new Turkish state was released from its obligations under the commercial capitulations and free trade treaties that had been signed between the Ottoman Empire and foreign powers. In return, Turkey agreed to maintain existing low tariff rates until 1929, and to pay about 65 per cent of the total debt of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰

In the 1920s, despite these restrictions, the government was able to take steps to protect and promote the Turkish economy. New railways were built and state monopolies were established in alcohol, tobacco, matches and fuel

8 Soner Çağaptay, 'Crafting the Turkish nation, Kemalism and the Turkish nation in the 1930s', Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, (2003); Senem Aslan, 'Citizen, speak Turkish! A nation in the making', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 13 (2007), pp. 245–72.

9 James Scott, *Seeing like a state* (New Haven, 1998); Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and nation building* (Seattle, 2001).

10 Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet döneminin iktisat tarihi* (Ankara, 1982), p. 140.

importation. In 1927 the Law for the Encouragement of Industry introduced incentives for newly established enterprises; the aim was to promote the rise of a new Muslim Turkish class of merchants and industrialists that could take the place of the Greeks and Armenians. Concerning agriculture, the new government's most important policy was the abolition of the tithe and the animal tax in 1925. In part this rewarded landlords and notables for supporting of the nationalist cause. But more significantly, as these taxes were not replaced by new ones large numbers of peasants were freed from their obligations either to the state or to tax farmers.¹¹ Between 1923 and 1929 Turkey's gross national product grew by 10.3 per cent on an annual basis, agricultural output by 13.6 per cent and industrial output, including construction, by 10.2 per cent.¹² However, robust as it was, most of this growth was making up for the losses of the war years; as late as 1928 agricultural production had still not reached pre First World War levels.¹³

The restrictions of the Lausanne Treaty on Turkey's foreign trade policy expired in 1929. This year also marked the beginning of a major crisis in the world economy, forcing most countries to retreat from international markets. These conditions gave Turkey's government an opportunity to reorder its economic priorities. The result was the creation of a protectionist economic policy that brought high tariffs (they increased from 13 to 46 per cent on average) and restrictions on imports; state control over key industries, public utilities, foreign trade and infrastructure; and a pricing policy which favoured the urban industrial sector. For the Turkish economy then, the move from the 1920s to the 1930s entailed a transition from an open to a closed economy, which resulted from both government policies and the collapse of external markets for Turkey's agricultural exports. For the long term history of Turkey, another important outcome of this period was the growth in the power of the bureaucracy. In addition to the uncontested status of its political power, the bureaucracy now acquired a key position in the country's economic decision making. Accordingly, the period between the early 1930s and the Second World War is described as 'étatisme', which in Turkish economic history refers to the privileged position of the state in Turkey's economy.

In the 1930s some Muslim entrepreneurs benefited from their proximity to political power centres, and expanded their operations. As the state protected

11 Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A history of Middle East economies in the twentieth century* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 14–15.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 244. 13 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

industrial sectors and regions started to grow, the agricultural sector as a whole – and especially the formerly important export oriented agricultural regions such as western Anatolia – fell behind. In addition to the divide between the secular state and the religious masses, this urban industrial bias of the state deepened the gulf that separated the governing elite of the country from the approximately 80 per cent of the population that was living in the rural areas.

Towards the end of the decade, growing inequalities in the distribution of economic and political power notwithstanding, the Turkish economy was recovering. But this trend ended with the outbreak of the Second World War. Although Turkey managed to stay out of the fighting itself, it could not escape the economic consequences of the war. Consumer prices increased four and a half times during the war years, which pushed the already impoverished rural classes into further hardship. The size of the Turkish army was also increased by over ten times in this period, from 120,000 to 1.5 million, the burden falling disproportionately on peasants.¹⁴

Apart from the successful diplomacy that kept Turkey outside the war, the government's policies during the war amounted to little more than ad hoc measures which tried to address the ever growing shortages and price increases. One of these policies was the Wealth Tax which was levied in 1942, ostensibly to tax the excess profits the merchants were making by exploiting the wartime black market. According to this law, such merchants and industrialists were to pay 50–70 per cent of their wealth as a one time lump sum to government. If they could not produce the money in fifteen days, they would be drafted into work brigades and sent to eastern Turkey. This tax was supposed to apply to all merchants who had made such illegal gains. In practice, however, 87 per cent of those who were identified as being liable were non Muslims, most of whom were forced to sell their businesses at far below market value and leave the country.¹⁵ Some Muslim businessmen took advantage of this situation and acquired significant amounts of property at low prices.¹⁶

First under the leadership of Atatürk and, after his death in 1938, under the single party regime of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (the Republican People's Party, henceforth RPP), reform and reorganisation of the Turkish state were carried out in an authoritarian way. The Law on the Maintenance of

¹⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 207.

¹⁵ Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık vergisi ve Türkleştirme politikaları* (Istanbul, 2000), pp. 135–243.

¹⁶ Ayşe Buğra, *State and business in modern Turkey* (Albany, 1994), p. 83.

Order (*Takrir i Sükûn Kanunu*) that was passed in 1925 gave the government the power to ban any organisation or publication deemed dangerous to social order. Although the law was designed ostensibly to deal with the Kurdish revolt that had started in 1925, its existence helped the governing elite to silence all opposition, including some of Atatürk's closest friends from the war, who now disagreed with him about his methods. In 1926 the discovery of a plot against Atatürk's life gave the government an excuse to eliminate not only those who were involved in this particular conspiracy but also many others suspected of harbouring unfavourable views regarding the regime. Seventeen people were hanged in Izmir and Ankara immediately following the discovery of the conspiracy; thirteen were sentenced in Izmir, and their sentences were carried out in public.¹⁷ In the two years during which this law and the special tribunals were active, a total of 7,500 were arrested and 660 were executed.¹⁸

In two instances, in 1924 and in 1930, Atatürk allowed the establishment of opposition parties, partly to mollify the discontent among the elite. Despite being intended as loyal opposition parties, these quickly became the centres of popular discontent with the RPP and its policies. They were both closed down within a year of their inauguration. Thus, from 1931 Turkey was a one party state where the barrier between the party and the state had become blurred. The RPP ruled the country, and until 1945 there was no space for independent opposition, civil society organisations or a free press.

Despite the restrictive conditions, several groups tried to support paths of social change which were different from the government's authoritarian high modernism. The first of these consisted of individuals who had supported the nationalist movement, but disagreed with Atatürk on the direction the new regime was taking. Some opposed the secular reforms; others were uncomfortable with Atatürk's dictatorial powers. Ultimately, many either made their peace with the regime or left the country to write critical accounts of Turkey's transformation from exile.

The second group chafing under the weight of the new order comprised the wealthy families in Anatolia. Many of these families had reached a *modus vivendi* with the Ottoman state whereby they were permitted to wield power locally and accumulate wealth as long as they did not question the overall directives of the Ottoman state.¹⁹ A stronger and more centralised state

¹⁷ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (London, 1999), pp. 448–52. ¹⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 181.

¹⁹ Michael Meeker, *A nation of empire: The Ottoman legacy of Turkish modernity* (Berkeley, 2002).

threatened to undermine the status of these families. Also, especially in the south and the south east, local families had gained some of their wealth and power by dominating the local economic networks which had expanded in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²⁰ With the new borders and the imposition of a closed economy, these families found themselves confined to a smaller space, having to reorient their activities internally without the necessary resources or support to do this. They were also unhappy with the state's eagerness to cultivate a new Anatolian elite, selected largely from the newly settled immigrants. These provincial families became the core supporters of the opposition parties which were formed in 1924, 1930 and after 1945.

Third, the secular direction taken by the new state met forceful and almost immediate resistance from religious orders. One of the earliest and largest of these uprisings started as soon as the intentions of the new regime became clear. In 1925, Şeyh Said, a Kurd and the spiritual leader of a Naqshbandi order in eastern Turkey, gathered several thousand followers and started an armed resistance against the nationalist government in Kurdish areas. Şeyh Said and his followers declared their goal as the creation of an independent Kurdistan and the restoration of the caliphate. In the ensuing conflict, the Turkish government mobilized 52,000 troops, half the peacetime strength of its new army. The suppression of this revolt and the government reprisals that followed were brutal. Said and forty six others were hanged, and as many as 20,000 tribal leaders and their families were resettled in western Anatolia, including many not directly linked to the uprising. Government forces razed Kurdish villages, confiscated animals and placed the Kurdish areas of the country under martial law. As mentioned above, the special tribunals established to prosecute the participants in this rebellion remained active for two years and became an organ for suppressing not only Kurdish but all opposition in the country.²¹ The sweeping nature of Şeyh Said's defeat put a temporary halt to Kurdish resistance, but soon new Kurdish activism developed and the Kurds became a permanent source of problems for the government's vision of a centralised and homogenised state and society.

A second religious leader who opposed the new regime and its policies was Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1877–1960), another Kurd who was also the founder of the Nur movement rooted in the Naqshbandi and Khalidi orders. Said

20 Eberhard Wolfram, 'Nomads and farmers in southeastern Turkey', *Oriens*, 6 (1953), pp. 46–9.

21 David McDowall, *A modern history of the Kurds* (London, 1997), pp. 194–202.

Nursi and the Nur movement that gathered around him espoused not a universalist Islam but one that was specific to the experiences of the people of Anatolia. Said Nursi had had good relations with the Young Turks, supported the nationalist movement, and opposed Şeyh Said's emphasis on Kurdish identity. His world view, however, was starkly different from that advocated by the new state. Rather than believing in the power of a strong central state to shape people's sensibilities as the nationalists did, Nursi and his followers focused their attention on the individual's relationship to God. They advocated a return to pure Muslim thought, and argued that once everybody followed this path a just order and an appropriate political arrangement would emerge naturally. With its emphasis on spiritual purity and inter personal relations, the Nur movement quickly became a potent alternative to the high modernist focus on the state.²² During the 1930s and the 1940s, Said Nursi was arrested repeatedly by the authorities, for defying the laws of the republic and for advocating a return to a religiously based society.

A final source of opposition was in rural areas, where the vast majority of the population had been bearing the brunt of the deteriorating economic conditions through the war years. Although political conditions in the country did not allow grassroots politics to develop, these impoverished masses provided fodder for the plans of the main opposition groups mentioned above.

Democrat Party years: integrating the nation

By the end of the Second World War RPP rule was identified with the restriction of civil liberties and the deterioration of economic conditions in the country. It is therefore curious that the RPP leader İnönü (1884–1973) decided to open up the country's political system. The reasons for this apparently suicidal move had to do with international conditions in the post war years. In 1945 Turkey's leaders were convinced that only a close alliance with the United States and the western European powers could protect the country, especially since Stalin had refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and started to make belligerent comments concerning the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.²³ In an effort to prove their democratic credentials and to benefit from the institutional protection and

22 Şerif Mardin, *Religion and social change in modern Turkey: The case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, 1989).

23 Ahmad, *The Turkish experiment*, p. 389.

financial help that the USA was providing to its allies in Europe, the RPP leaders decided to allow the formation of opposition parties in 1945, and to hold the first general election in 1946. The first major new party to be formed, in 1946, was the DP, but the elections of that year were far from democratic. Sensing that the result would not be to its liking, the government withheld official results of the vote and simply announced that the DP had won 67 seats, as opposed to RPP's 361.

The background of the DP's founders shows that this party grew out of the intra elite disagreements that had been going on in the RPP. Among the principal founders were Celal Bayar (1883–1986), who had been involved in the nationalist struggle since the late nineteenth century and had served as prime minister under Atatürk; Refik Koraltan (1889–1974), a lawyer who had been active in generating local support for the nationalist cause in the Black Sea region; Fuad Köprülü (1890–1966), a celebrated historian linked to an illustrious Ottoman family; and finally Adnan Menderes (1889–1961), a wealthy landlord from western Anatolia.

Regardless of the background of its founders, however, the DP quickly became a magnet for those alienated by RPP and its policies. In the first truly democratic elections, held in 1950, the DP swept into power, winning 53.4 per cent of the votes and 408 seats, as opposed to RPP's 39.8 per cent and 69 seats. In the elections held in 1954 the DP increased its share of votes to 57.6 per cent.²⁴ Although they originated from within the ruling elite, the DP leaders strove to broaden the party's appeal. For example, in a move that was diametrically opposed to the RPP's centralised procedures, the DP's local organisations directly nominated 80 per cent of the candidates for seats in 1950.²⁵ Adnan Menderes, who would serve as prime minister between 1950 and 1960, was particularly effective in addressing the concerns of marginalised segments of the society.

In order to reinforce their ties to the discontented elements in Turkish society the Democrats designed economic policies, which favoured provincial and rural areas, such as the distribution of state lands and introducing price subsidies that favoured farmers. In the early 1950s, while the benefits of the favourable market were passed on to the rural sector, this same sector was shielded from adverse conditions after 1955. Agriculture also benefited from the significant increase in the importation of machinery, especially tractors, into Turkey, within the context of the US Marshall Aid Programme.

²⁴ See www.tbmm.gov.tr.

²⁵ Ahmad, *The Turkish experiment*, pp. 81–2.

The area under cultivation expanded from 8.2 million hectares in 1950 to 12.9 million in 1960. During the first half of the 1950s the Turkish economy, its agricultural and manufacturing sectors and its per capita income grew annually between 4 and 11 per cent.²⁶ These rates were somewhat lower in the second half of the decade, mostly because of worsening conditions in external markets.

In word and deed, the Democrats' more tolerant approach towards religion became another important way in which, in the 1950s, the marginalised majority of Turkish society was reintegrated into the political life of the country. Within months of their victory in 1950 the DP relaxed some of the unpopular prohibitions of the 1930s and 1940s. Prohibition against the reading of the call to prayer in any language other than Turkish was lifted; government owned radio stations started religious broadcasts; and mandatory religion courses were introduced in schools. The Democrats released Said Nursi from prison and some of his followers were elected into parliament on the DP ticket.²⁷ After the 1950s, partly as a result of the Democrats' relaxation of some of the harsh restrictions that had been imposed on the public expression of Islam, and partly as a result of the population's response to this new approach, Turkey never again lived through a period where Islam was vilified as in the early years of the republic. On the contrary, Islam became the object of particular attention and careful cultivation for all politicians and political parties.

While important changes were taking place in the governing elite and in its links with the population, Turkey's social and economic transformation continued in the 1950s.²⁸ In the ten years that the DP was in power, rural communities became better linked to the nation's economy and politics, not only through their votes and the cultural policies of the ruling party, but also by taking advantage of the new means of transport and moving closer to the centres of economic and political power. By 1960 32 per cent of Turkey's population was living in cities large and small.²⁹ The entry of millions of new immigrants into the expanding circles of settlement around the big cities (*gecekondu*) also had the effect of bringing into the city the deep strains of religious sentiment that had remained distant and submerged in rural areas

²⁶ Owen and Pamuk, *A history*, p. 250.

²⁷ 'Tartışmalı mütefekkir: Ölümünden 35 yıl sonra Said i Nursi', *Nokta* (22 28 October 1995), p. 10.

²⁸ Çağlar Keyder, *State and class in Turkey* (London, 1987), pp. 117 40.

²⁹ Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2000 *Genel nüfus sayımı: Nüfusun sosyal ve ekonomik nitelikleri* (Ankara, 2003), p. 46.

during much of the 1930s and 1940s. Various religious orders became centred in these areas, giving a new sense of identity and cohesion to the communities of the newly urbanised immigrants. Beyond the *gecekondus*, Istanbul's overall appearance also changed in this decade. To improve Istanbul's spatial integration, the DP controlled municipal government planned and built wide boulevards and roads, some of which cut through the city's historic core. Also, apartment houses became the preferred mode of living for the rapidly growing population of the city, leaving an indelible mark in not only Istanbul but all of the country's urban centres.³⁰

Although the Democrats redefined some of the priorities of the Turkish state, they remained, on the whole, despite their apparent equivocation on some fundamental principles of the early nationalist order, loyal to the overall goals of Kemalist modernisation. This is not surprising since some of the DP leaders had been among the closest friends and allies of Atatürk through the last days of the Ottoman Empire and into the republic. As such they could be as firm as their RPP predecessors in restricting some aspects of political Islam, prosecuting some of the more visible Islamist leaders and protecting the symbols of secular order in Turkey. Hence, they suppressed the particularly militant Tijani order while writing a special Atatürk Bill that made it a crime to desecrate the memory of the nationalist leader.

The Democrats also supported policies and actions that aimed further to homogenise the people of Turkey. One of the most important of these developments was the anti Greek riots of 6–7 September 1955 for which the Democrats became partly responsible, by not reining them in on time – if not by provoking them. What started as street demonstrations to protest against an explosion at Atatürk's family house in Salonica quickly turned into a full scale riot in Istanbul. In the two days of rioting thousands of homes, shops, factories, other businesses and even cemeteries that belonged to Greeks and other non Muslim communities were destroyed.³¹ These riots spread a sense of fear and insecurity among the already small non Muslim population of Istanbul, and caused many of them to emigrate.

In the international arena, too, the Democrats continued a staunchly pro Western policy. Turkey became firmly allied with the USA and its European allies. In 1952 they even succeeded in getting Turkey accepted as a member of NATO, although the country had no coastline on the Atlantic and had not

30 İpek Akpınar, 'The rebuilding of Istanbul after the plan of Henri Prost, 1937–1960', Ph.D. thesis, Bartlett School (2003).

31 Tuna Kuyucu, 'Ethno religious unmixing of Turkey: 6–7 September riots as a case in Turkish nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, 11, 3 (2005), pp. 361–80.

fought in the Second World War. In no small measure, Turkey's admission to NATO was facilitated by her dispatch of 25,000 troops to fight in the Korean War alongside the United States. In addition to being included in the Marshall Plan and the Truman Pact, Turkey became a member of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, which would expand into the OECD in 1960. In 1955 Turkey took the lead in organising the Baghdad Pact, which formed an alliance among the US allies Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, and in 1958 US Marines used their bases in Turkey in carrying out their landing in Lebanon. Incidentally, these policies became important factors in pushing states such as Egypt and Syria away from the USA and Turkey and towards the USSR.

After 1954, as the effects of worsening world economic conditions started to be felt, DP governments tried to protect their main supporters with generous price subsidies, import restrictions and an overvaluation of the currency.³² At the same time, deteriorating conditions made the DP leaders fearful of opposition and increasingly intolerant of criticism. It became common for DP governments in the late 1950s to close down newspapers, persecute journalists and punish not only specific groups, but also cities and even whole regions for supporting the opposition. Although the DP moved away from inclusiveness and became less open to ideas that originated from local branches, the party leaders continued to cast themselves in the role of fighting urban/intellectual privilege, on behalf of the provincial and rural classes. Consequently, the late 1950s became years of growing discontent in big cities among intellectuals and junior military officers. The latter group was particularly unhappy about the economic and political power of the new civilian elites and its own deteriorating economic situation. Ultimately, these forces of opposition would coalesce behind the military coup of 1960. But the Democrats, and in particular Menderes, continued to be widely popular across the country until the military takeover on 27 May 1960.

Re-dividing the nation: 1960–80

On 27 May 1960 a group of junior officers, who had conspired secretly during the late 1950s, overthrew the government. They closed down parliament, suspended the constitution and arrested all active members of the DP, including members of parliament. Shortly thereafter, 588 DP leaders, parliamentarians and party activists were put on trial on charges of high treason, abuse of power and other offences against the state and the nation. The 1960

³² Owen and Pamuk, *A history*, p. 108.

coup was a major interruption of the ongoing transformation of Turkey, especially for the integration of the popular classes into the country's political life. It was an attempt by the representatives of Turkey's bureaucratic and military elite to reclaim the mantle of modernisation and reassert their control over the Turkey's political evolution. Hence, except in the centres of major cities, there was no celebration or public expression of excitement in Turkey in the days that followed the coup.

The officers who seized power on 27 May formed an alliance with some university professors and together they designed a constitution that tried to prevent the recurrence of a power monopoly by a single political party. The new constitution included a bicameral system with checks and balances, an independent constitutional court, guarantees for an autonomous press and universities, and a bill of civil liberties. Although these reforms were supposed to be progressive, they were conceived by an illegal and authoritarian regime with little input from society. Furthermore, most people were focused on the way in which the DP and its leaders were sacked and on the humiliations to which they were subjected in show trials. When the constitution was presented in a referendum on 9 July 1961 it received far less support than was expected, with less than two thirds of the voters endorsing it. The large 'no' vote was interpreted as a sign of continuing support for the DP.³³

The outcome of the referendum made the coup leaders even more determined to confront Menderes and his legacy. Of the fourteen death sentences that were handed down by the military tribunal, his was one of three that were carried out on 16–17 September 1961. By hanging the popular prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs and finance, the coup leaders were trying to provide some legitimacy for their actions. After all, if the DP's offences could not be shown to be treasonous, it would be hard to justify overthrowing the entire constitutional order. The military leaders also thought that by killing him, they would put an end to the rumours of Menderes' invincibility and immortality, which continued to spread in the country. Not surprisingly, however, these executions made the military regime even less popular.

After the coup, some of the officers wanted to hold on to power, perhaps indefinitely. The top military leadership, however, was unsympathetic to this. The DP leaders had cultivated good relations with them and they, in turn, felt loyal to the government. Some had been included in the coup plans only at the very last moment. While some joined the conspirators somewhat

³³ Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 258.

reluctantly, many were forced into retirement. Following the coup, the remaining senior officers created a number of mechanisms which made it all but impossible for their junior colleagues to engage in another conspiracy. At the same time, they made sure that the military would retain a privileged position in the country even after the end of the military regime. One of the tools of this influence would be the National Security Council (NSC), which was formed in 1962. Staffed by senior commanders, the president, prime minister and several cabinet members, this body was to have wide powers in shaping the country's foreign and domestic policy. Furthermore, through the creation of the army's Mutual Assistance Association, a military investment fund, the armed forces gained a stake in the capitalist order. Consequently, the military became both a thoroughly integrated component of the political and social order in Turkey and, compared to the 1950s, a more unified and effective defender of that order. As a result, during subsequent interventions in 1971, 1980 and 1997, the military would act within its chain of command, with the most senior officers taking the lead.

The unpopularity of the coup became evident in the first elections on 15 October 1961, when political parties linked to the defunct DP gained a strong plurality (34.8 per cent for Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, henceforth JP) and 13.7 per cent for Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party), which was widely interpreted as a posthumous victory for Menderes. This trend continued through the 1960s with the JP, as the main heir to the DP tradition, winning a landslide in 1965 with 52.9 per cent of the votes, as opposed to RPP's 28.7 per cent.

Especially after Süleyman Demirel (b. 1924) became its chairman in 1964, the JP set out to pursue an all inclusive populist programme along the lines of the DP. Its platforms promised something for everybody, including the industrialists, workers, small traders and artisans, peasants, large landlords, religious constituencies and Western oriented liberal intellectuals. Like Menderes, Demirel tried to employ a populist rhetoric to bond with the rural population. Unlike Menderes, however, Demirel moved quickly and more clearly to the side of the big industrialists in major cities, thereby alienating the smaller manufacturers in provincial towns. Also, the JP was determined to prevent another coup at all costs. Demirel therefore abandoned all pretence of being critical of the state and the military bureaucratic elite, and identified himself closely with the established order. He also tried to hold onto the DP's constituency by doling out subsidies, protecting domestic markets and employing a staunchly anti communist and religiously laden rhetoric. However, towards the end of the 1960s, as the country continued to go through the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, it became difficult to maintain such a big tent in Turkish politics.

In the 1960s and the 1970s the coalition that had coalesced around the DP splintered to form several different political parties with more specific ideologies and programmes. Turkey's first explicitly Islamist political party, Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, henceforth NOP) was one of these. It was founded by Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1926) in 1970, both to introduce Islamist opposition into Turkish politics and to address the needs of the newly urbanised residents of shanty towns, the Anatolian merchants and small producers, all of whom were being squeezed by the government's policy of supporting big capital. Another party on the right seeking support from the same constituency was the ultra nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Action Party, henceforth NAP). The NAP was headed by Alapslan Türkeş, who, as a junior officer, had played a leading role in the 27 May coup. The NAP and the other parties on the right exploited the feelings of resentment and fear that were increasingly palpable among migrants as they faced a new life in the fast changing urban environment.

Initially, the only leftist alternative to these conservative parties was Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Workers' Party, henceforth TWP). But after a brief period of electoral success in 1965, the TWP was pushed out of the formal political arena and splintered into several groups. In the late 1960s and 1970s the RPP revised its platform and adopted a social democratic position on social issues. This would become the basis for its revival in the 1970s.

Outside the formal political parties, many professional, labour, student and civil organisations were formed in the 1960s. These became increasingly vocal in articulating either the interests of their constituencies, or, more typically, their utopian visions of what these interests should be and how Turkish society and state should change to serve those interests. There was, however, little in the way of formal ties between these organisations and political parties. Even the RPP, which would turn around its electoral fortunes significantly with its new social democratic rhetoric, limited its ties with civil society organisations lest they taint it with socialism or communism. Hence, what was common to both the formal and informal parts of political society was the growing gap between what they were arguing, debating and, increasingly, fighting about, and the modern transformation and mobilisation that Turkish society was experiencing. One indication of this separation was the steady decline in the rate of participation in the general elections during the 1960s, from a high of 81 per cent in 1961 to 64.3 per cent in 1969.³⁴

³⁴ Ahmad, *The Turkish experiment*, p. 192.

The economic policy Turkish governments pursued in these years was a typical application of import substituting industrialisation. The government's fiscal, monetary and tariff policies were all geared towards protecting and supporting domestic industries and industrialists producing for the internal market. In the short term these policies bore fruit and generated a noticeable shift towards urban industrial sectors in the economy. While the Turkish economy grew by about 6 per cent on an annual basis during the 1960s, the rate of growth in the manufacturing industry was around 10 per cent between 1963 and 1977. In agriculture, growth remained steady around 3.4 per cent. In these years real wages almost doubled, which was key for creating and sustaining a domestic market for the products of the protected industries.³⁵ By 1970 38.45 per cent of Turkey's population was classified as urban.³⁶ Istanbul's population grew from 1.8 million in 1960 to over 3 million in 1970, and its rate of growth was over twice as fast as the growth of Turkey's population.³⁷ In the 1960s the area around Istanbul became both the centre of Turkey's industrialisation and the main magnet for rural urban migration. A report published in the late 1960s stated that the Istanbul region was home to 45 per cent of all manufacturing plants in Turkey, and was producing 48 per cent of the net value added.³⁸

The growing population of Istanbul brought a huge expansion of the *gecekondu* districts that surrounded the city. According to one study there were approximately 240,000 *gecekondu* dwellings in 1960; by 1970 this number had increased to over 600,000. It is estimated that between one third and a half of Istanbul's population have lived in *gecekondu* districts at some point in their lives.³⁹ Compared with their counterparts in other parts of the world, *gecekondu* districts in Turkey grew in a relatively organised fashion. Rather than being reservoirs of individuals caught between rural and urban life, each *gecekondu* area was a well structured enclave, containing concentrations of people coming from the same region or even town in Anatolia. Some of these districts acquired distinct ethnic or religious identities, so that Kurdish or Alevi districts became well known.⁴⁰ While the overall patriarchal system continued to dominate the lives of the immigrants, those who arrived first were definitely more privileged. Similarly, connections to local government and the knowledge of how one could manipulate and gain access to it were

35 Owen and Pamuk, *A history*, p. 250.

36 Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *2000 Genel nüfus sayımı*, p. 46.

37 Mustafa Sönmez, *İstanbul'un iki yüzü* (Ankara, 1996) p. 121.

38 Ahmad, *The Turkish experiment*, p. 287. 39 Sönmez, *İstanbul'un*, p. 87.

40 Karpat, Kemal, *The gecekondu: Rural migration and urbanization* (Cambridge, 1976).

important assets. Religious orders facilitated some of the migration by providing support, protection and employment to people. With the help of the *tarikas* and other networks, these settlements fostered the development of powerful mechanisms for the integration of the millions of migrants into an urban life.⁴¹ Among the parties that emerged out of the political transformations of the 1960s, the NOP and the other Islamist parties that followed it were most successful in integrating themselves into these communities. More than anything else, it was their ability to organise support and provide services on a micro level that determined the long term success of Islamist politics in Turkey.

During this period of economic and political transformation, Turkey also became somewhat isolated from the outside world. The share of both imports and exports in the Gross National Product declined, and Turkey could find no diplomatic support during the Cyprus crisis of 1964. The only important exceptions to this trend were the new links that were developing between Turkey and Europe. These included the first waves of guest workers about a million Turkish workers moved to Germany and other European countries in the 1960s and the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 that started a process that was supposed to end with Turkey's full membership in the European Economic Community, the EU's predecessor.

By the end of the 1960s the major political parties in Turkey had become involved in an insular and increasingly acrimonious struggle among themselves. At the same time, student groups and other extra parliamentary organisations were fighting among themselves. The second half of the 1960s was marked by violent confrontations between left and right wing student organisations, urban guerrilla activities which attacked symbols of authority, wealth and 'American imperialism', and an increasingly militant labour activism. As demonstrations, bombings, robberies, kidnappings and assassinations spread, it seemed that the government was losing its ability to withstand these attacks and to protect the life and property of its citizens.

On 12 March 1971 the high command of the Turkish army issued an ultimatum demanding that a strong and credible government be formed to deal with 'anarchy' and to carry out 'Kemalist reforms'. Following this ultimatum, Demirel resigned as prime minister and a government of technocrats was formed to carry out the mandate of the generals. The military and its civilian allies tried to tighten their control over the government by eliminating some liberal clauses from the constitution, expanding the power of the NSC,

⁴¹ Jenny White, *Money makes us relatives* (Austin, 1994).

instituting special tribunals to deal with offences against the security of the state and imposing martial law in much of the country. Within two years, as many as 5,000 people had been arrested, tortured or tried and sentenced to various terms in prison or, in some cases, to death.⁴² Among those who fell victim to the regime were student and labour leaders, prominent authors, academics and artists.

In the elections that were held in 1973 and 1977, history repeated itself. Just as the JP had become Turkey's largest party following the 1960 coup because it was seen as the main anti junta party, the RPP, as the only party that had been consistent in its opposition to the 12 March intervention, received the highest percentage of votes in both elections. Having wrested control of the RPP from Atatürk's close friend and comrade İsmet İnönü in 1972, Bülent Ecevit (1925–2006) quickly gained in popularity through his leftist and populist rhetoric and his principled opposition to the military regime. Even more important for the RPP's 1977 victory, however, was Ecevit's 1974 decision to order the Turkish military to occupy 33 per cent of the island of Cyprus in response to a Greek Cypriot coup which had threatened to bring about the annexation of the island by Greece.

The other important political development was the emergence of the Islamist Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, henceforth NSP) in 1972 to take the place of the NOP, which was closed down by the military. Like its predecessor, the NSP presented itself as the defender of traditional (read Islamic) values and interests in Turkey. As a result of the continuing migration of large numbers of people to Istanbul and other big cities, the bearers of these values were no longer concentrated in provincial or rural areas but had become visible and active in Turkey's largest metropolises. As such, they had become integral parts of Turkey's modern transformation although they were still left on the margins of public life. The NSP appealed directly to the discontent of these groups.⁴³ In 1973, much to the surprise of many observers, it became the third largest party in Turkey and the junior partner in a coalition government with the RPP. Although this partnership did not last long, it was an important step in legitimising political Islam in Turkey's formal politics.

The 12 March intervention did little to address the problems that the military had cited in forcing the government out of power. During the 1970s formal politics became even more dysfunctional and further removed from society. Turkey had eleven different governments between 1971 and

⁴² Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 272.

⁴³ Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and political development in Turkey* (Leiden, 1981).

1980, some led by people who were not even members of parliament. Also in these years, two 'Nationalist Front' governments were formed, consisting of all the major parties on the right. The main purpose of these coalitions was to limit the influence of civil society organisations and the left in Turkey's politics.

Outside parliament, urban guerrilla organisations such as Devrimci Gençlik (Revolutionary youth) and Türk Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish people's liberation army) (on the left) and Ülkü Ocakları (Idealist hearths) (on the right) became increasingly violent during the second half of the 1970s. The number of people who were killed in clashes among these organisations and between them and the security forces increased from 230 in 1977 to almost 1300 in 1979.⁴⁴ Some of these attacks involved targeted assassinations of prominent politicians, intellectuals and leaders of civil society organisations. Even more ominously, Alevis and Kurds became special targets for ultra nationalist groups, partly because of their outsider status vis à vis the original definition of Turkish identity, and partly because of their left leaning politics. On 23–24 December 1978 111 people were killed, and 210 homes and over 70 businesses and offices belonging to Alevis were destroyed in the south eastern province of Kahramanmaraş. Nevertheless, Alevi identity never became the basis for a distinct political movement in Turkey, even in response to this violence. Some of the Kurds, on the other hand, chose a different route when they formed the new Kurdistan Workers' Party (known by its Kurdish acronym, PKK) in 1978, with the goal of creating an independent Kurdistan.

In the second half of the 1970s Turkey was deeply affected by the global economic crisis induced in part by the oil boycott and OPEC price increases. As a country that imported most of its energy supplies, the tenfold increase in the price of oil was disastrous for Turkey. Current account deficits became a permanent feature of the economy during this period. Furthermore, in response to the oil crisis, European countries halted their importation of labour from Turkey, thereby curbing a major source of foreign exchange.⁴⁵ The weak and short lived governments of this era tried to deal with the economic crisis by continuing existing economic restrictions and introducing even more economic controls. For example, the value of the Turkish currency was kept artificially high in a losing battle to protect domestic markets and industries. The result was a period of acute shortages and a jump in the rate of inflation, from 6.5 per cent in the early 1970s to over 105.3 per cent in

⁴⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 276.

⁴⁵ Keyder, *State and class*, pp. 165–96.

1980.⁴⁶ In the late 1970s Turkey started a new series of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but the radical restructuring of the Turkish economy that was required was all but impossible to implement in a country that had such an ineffectual state.

Reconfiguring the nation: 1980–2000

On 12 September 1980 Turkey's military made one more effort to re establish control over social change, launching a new coup. Of the military interventions Turkey experienced in its history, this did most to widen the gap between formal politics and society. While previous military interventions had been selective in their persecution of politicians, the leaders of the 12 September coup were thorough in completely suppressing the democratic process in Turkey. The government was deposed, parliament was dissolved, political parties were closed down and their leaders were arrested, all political activity was banned, all mayors and municipal councils were fired and all labour unions and civil society organisations were outlawed. The constitutional protections for free speech, freedom of press and for the autonomy of universities were suspended. To say, write or even imply anything that was critical of the coup or the coup leaders was banned. The leader of the coup, Kenan Evren, and the commanders of the land, sea, air and gendarme forces concentrated all the legislative, executive and judiciary powers in their hands. They described their overthrow of the government as a last resort to save the country. Yet all indications are that this coup was a long time in the making. Within the first six weeks of the intervention, 11,500 people were arrested; by the end of the year this number had gone up to 30,000. Within a year over 120,000 people were imprisoned for activities that were criminalised by the military regime.⁴⁷ Without a previously prepared list of enemies, it would have been impossible for the military regime to move so swiftly after 12 September.

In addition to suppressing democracy, the coup established a plethora of new laws, regulations and institutions designed to give enduring power to the military bureaucratic elite and its ideological supporters, even after the formal end of the military regime. Among these were a new constitution that restricted individual freedoms, political activity and civil society organisations. It also established a unicameral assembly and a strengthened National Security Council, with a veto over all civilian government decisions

⁴⁶ See www.belgenet.com/eko/enflasyon_or.html.

⁴⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 294.

deemed relevant to national unity, security and foreign policy. The empowerment of the NSC led to the bifurcation of the Turkish state; where substantial power moved to branches dominated by the military, security services and other organisations operating in secrecy. Throughout the 1990s the minutes of the NSC's meetings were not made public; nor were the military budgets ever disclosed in full.

In the 1980s, however, Turkey changed in ways far different from those the military leaders envisaged. Though the military was keen on legislating an organised society, Turkey's social transformation undermined them. The rural urban migration accelerated significantly and the country passed a milestone in the mid 1980s when, for the first time, more than half of its population was classified as urban.⁴⁸ Rather than assimilating quickly, as had been predicted by an earlier generation of social scientists, the residents of the multiplying settlements in and around Istanbul and other big cities melded elements of their past with their new urban experience. Consequently, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of a society that combined rural and urban, religious and secular, liberal and conservative and old and new in its culture, politics and economy.

By 1990, Istanbul, with its population of over 7 million, had come to epitomise this peculiar amalgam which Turkey was becoming. In 1990 only 37 per cent of the people living in Istanbul were born in the city; the rest were immigrants.⁴⁹ With its mosques, crowded streets, abject poverty, *arabesk* music and shanty towns, Istanbul was still like what some writers would describe an 'oriental city'. Yet at the same time it was becoming a city of office towers, fast food chains, expressways, shopping malls, five star hotels and international festivals and conventions. In effect, by the 1990s the separation between state and society, which had corresponded very closely to an urban rural separation in the earlier years of the republic, had lost this geographical anchor. Through their labour, the spread of their culture and their presence in urbanised centres, the formerly marginalised rural, poor and immigrant groups had become a central part of Turkey's modern society. It was by no means the case, however, that they were all integrated and included in modern society on an equal basis. In the 1980s a large segment of the new migrants could only find unregulated, temporary and low paying jobs.

48 State Institute of Statistics, *The population of Turkey 1923 1994: Demographic structure and development* (Ankara, 1995).

49 Sönmez, *İstanbul'un*, p. 125.

The transformation of Turkish society in the 1980s also found a clear political expression in the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, henceforth WP).⁵⁰ Within ten years of the end of the military regime in 1983 this party would become the largest political party in Turkey, increasing its share of the vote from 7.1 per cent in 1987 to 21.4 per cent in 1995. By the mid 1990s the WP was controlling several local governments and the mayor's office in some of Turkey's most important cities, including the capital city, Ankara, and the largest city, Istanbul. For a little over a year, in 1996–7, the WP would also serve as the primary party in a coalition government.

An important factor that thwarted the military's social and political projects in the 1980s was the country's growing openness to the outside world, which occurred partly through the agreements between Turkey and international agencies, and partly as a result of steps the government took in response to demands from big business. Key among international agreements was the programme of economic stabilisation and liberalisation that had been put into effect in January 1980. The goal of this plan was a radical reorientation of the Turkish economy towards privatisation, and towards liberalisation of foreign trade and capital markets. The Turkish lira was devalued, price controls and import quotas were eliminated, government subsidies were reduced and Turkey's banking system was made more compatible with its foreign counterparts. Steps were also taken to reduce the size of the state bureaucracy and to start selling some of the government owned industries.

The conditions became particularly favourable for the full implementation of this programme after the military coup, when all dissent, including strikes and lockouts, was banned. These measures generated a significant increase in exports, from \$2.3 billion or 2.6 per cent of GNP in 1979 to \$8 billion in 1985, and to \$13.0 billion or 8.6 per cent of GNP in 1990. Eighty per cent of this increase came from manufacture exports, demonstrating a new leap in Turkey's industrialisation.⁵¹ These policies also unleashed the creative potential of the Turkish economy which, in previous decades, had been inhibited by some onerous barriers. One result was the development of a strong network of middle sized industrial establishments in Anatolian cities, which not only became major players in cultivating new export markets for Turkey, but also, in the 1990s, a formidable political force.⁵²

⁵⁰ Jenny White, *Islamist mobilization in Turkey* (Seattle, 2002).

⁵¹ Owen and Pamuk, *A history*, p. 119.

⁵² Ayşe Buğra, 'The claws of the tigers', *Privateview*, 1 (1997), pp. 50–5.

The second factor contributing to the liberalisation of Turkey's economy and foreign trade regime was the personality and policy preferences of Turgut Özal (1927–93), who dominated politics throughout this decade. Özal was a high ranking bureaucrat responsible for the economy in the last government before the coup, when Turkey signed the stabilisation agreement with the IMF. After the coup he was promoted to deputy prime minister with expanded powers over the economy. In 1983, in the first post coup elections, he formed a new political party, the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, henceforth MP), and ran against the military's hand picked candidates. In yet another repetition of history, the Turkish electorate skipped the two parties supported by the military and flocked to Özal's MP, which gained 45 per cent of the vote, and won a clear majority in the new parliament. Özal served first as prime minister, and then as president, until his death 1993.

A large part of Özal's appeal came from his background, which in some ways was close to being a microcosm of Turkey's modern experience. He had started in the state bureaucracy, had moved on to work for the World Bank, and then for the private sector. He was born in a provincial town and had connections with the Naqshbandi religious order. He also spoke freely of his partial Kurdish heritage. Intellectually, Özal was close to a group of intellectuals who sought to achieve a synthesis between Turkish history and Islam by trying to demonstrate that Turkish Islam was historically distinct, unique, and particularly strong. In the early 1980s the military rulers supported this line of thinking as part of their struggle against communism.⁵³ Ironically, the military's support would become an important factor that helped political Islam gain strength in Turkish politics in these crucial years. Özal's broad appeal was evident in his entourage, where one could find leftists, ultra nationalists and hardcore secularists, as well as devout followers of religious orders. With such support, Özal was able to use state institutions to push through economic liberalisation measures in the 1980s, and extend these into other areas of Turkish society, multiplying the country's ties to external sources of capital, commodities, information and services.

These changes in Turkey's economic and political outlook coincided with favourable global conditions in the 1980s and the 1990s. First, in the heightened Cold War atmosphere of the early Reagan years, Turkey, once again, was able to take advantage of its strategic importance and obtain aid from the West. Later, the end of the Cold War diminished the importance of Turkey's

53 Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic political identity in Turkey* (New York, 2003), pp. 69–75.

status as a frontline state in the war against communism. At the same time, however, new possibilities for economic activity, political cooperation and cultural influence in the former Soviet Union emerged, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This was an important factor that contributed to the success of both the policy of export promotion and the new Anatolian industrialists who pursued business opportunities in these places. The steady rise and expansion of the EU and the strengthening of pan European institutions were also to have a profound impact on Turkey. Turkey had been a party to initial negotiations, agreements and institutions which laid the foundations for today's EU. In the intervening period, Turkey's economic and political troubles had put her membership well beyond the realm of any probability. But in the fast changing environment of the late 1980s Özal decided to push the issue, and formally applied for membership in 1987. This set into motion a process which reached a decisive point only in December 2004 when the EU agreed to start the negotiations that should end in Turkey's integration into the union. Throughout these years, but especially since 1987, the possibility of accession to candidate status and eventual membership has given the EU and the other European organisations tremendous power to influence Turkey's economic and political path. More than any other factor, this has played a key part in undermining the legacy of the 12 September coup in Turkey.

Although he was responsible for liberalising significant parts of Turkey's economy and society, Özal's style of government also contributed to the development of widespread corruption. First under the military regime, then with the majority he commanded in the parliament, Özal pushed through many of the new laws without any real deliberation or input from any part of society, and without creating the necessary legal or institutional framework for them. This made the political process open to abuse and cronyism. Also, decisions imposed thus could be reversed just as easily when power shifted. Indeed, in the 1990s political parties diluted the pace of liberalisation and export promotion by reintroducing the populist price subsidies of previous decades. After the death of Özal in 1993, Turkey's government was once again dominated by a series of weak coalitions led by figures who had been in Turkish politics for close to half a century. Under these conditions the part of the state dominated by the military expanded its influence, and also became linked to the network of corrupt relations that was permeating the civilian government and bureaucracy.

A key factor that perpetuated the power of the security apparatus, and especially that of the military, was the Kurdish nationalist insurgency, which

continued through most of the 1980s and the 1990s. It was part of a broader Kurdish rights movement, not all parts of which necessarily agreed with the extreme demands of the PKK led armed struggle. Within this Kurdish rights movement there was a succession of political parties which took part in elections and won representation in the parliament and in local administration.⁵⁴ Furthermore, a substantial part of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey had moved out of their traditional homeland in eastern Turkey and were living assimilated lives in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, the military pursued scorched earth tactics in dealing with the insurgency and the Kurdish rights movement in general. In clashes between the Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish military over 30,000 people, mostly Kurds, were killed. More than a million Kurds were resettled far from their homes in eastern Turkey, and tens of thousands of villages and pastures were destroyed.⁵⁵ The military and bureaucratic elite's hostility towards the Kurdish rights movement was not confined to armed insurgency: in the 1990s three successive Kurdish political parties were closed down. In one instance in 1994, seven Kurdish parliamentarians were ejected from the National Assembly, arrested, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms for their nationalist views.

In the 1990s the military and the police resorted to outright force, against not only Kurds but also other perceived threats as well. In March 1995 police confronted rioting Alevis in two particularly congested and poor shanty towns of Istanbul, killing as many as twenty demonstrators. In 1997 the military staged another intervention into the political process to force the Islamist dominated coalition government out of office. Several times in the 1990s, and especially in December 2000, police and gendarme forces attacked several of their own prisons, using heavy machinery, bombs and weapons to confront inmates who were holding hunger strikes in protest against their conditions. More than thirty inmates were killed and several hundred wounded in the ensuing clashes.⁵⁶

In addition to these confrontations the Turkish state and bureaucracy also became engaged in fighting to reverse the growing prominence of Islam in the public sphere and to undermine the popularity of Islamist parties.⁵⁷ In

54 Nicole Watts, 'Routes to ethnic resistance: Virtual Kurdistan west and the transformation of Kurdish politics in Turkey', Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington (2001).

55 Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish question* (Lanham, 1998);

56 Arda İbikoğlu, 'Turkish prisons: From wards to cells', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association (Fairbanks, 2003).

57 Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, 'Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and politics in the light of the February 28 process', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102 (2003), pp. 309–32.

1997, shortly after pushing the Islamist dominated coalition out of power, a new law was passed which made eight year public primary education compulsory in order to prevent religious schools from training children at an early age. In 1998 the headscarf ban was reinforced, making it all but impossible for covered women to work in government offices or enrol in public schools and universities. Also in 1998 the WP was closed down. Its successor, the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, henceforth VP), would also be closed down in 2000. Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the mayor of Istanbul at the time, received a ten month prison sentence in 1998 for a 'subversive' poem read at a rally several years before. And in 1999 an elected member of parliament was prevented from taking the oath of office because she refused to take off her headscarf. Subsequently she was stripped of her citizenship.

The structure of the Turkish state and its approach to individual, religious and minority rights quickly became anachronistic in the late twentieth century. While the world was going through an ever closer integration and notions of individual and human rights, civil society and democracy were gaining universal appeal and credibility, Turkey's leadership seemed to be retreating back to old fashioned intolerance. Especially for a state that had ambitions of becoming a full member of the EU, this was strange behaviour. To make matters even more difficult, in the 1980s and 1990s Turkish society became better informed, better integrated and better connected to the outside world. Particularly important was the cessation of the state monopoly in radio and television, which led to quick multiplication of private stations and channels. Equally significant was the revamping and expansion of Turkey's communication network which led to a significant increase in fixed lines and mobile telephones. The people of Turkey also became more conscious of their diversity, more open in practising their Muslim religion, more interested in their Ottoman past, more willing to open up to the outside world and generally more tolerant than their rulers. In a nationwide survey conducted in 1999, 66.6 per cent of the respondents said that women should be permitted to work in the public sector and attend universities while wearing their headscarves. This survey also showed that, contrary to what was being claimed by officials, Turkish society was not deeply divided along secular religious lines. Almost 70 per cent of the respondents clearly stated their preference to live in a society where religion did not direct the affairs of the state and only 2.7 and 6 per cent respectively described themselves as atheists and very religious.⁵⁸ Several other surveys conducted during the 1990s also

⁵⁸ Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Türkiye'de din toplum ve siyaset* (Istanbul, 2000).

found consistently strong support for Turkey's membership of the EU.⁵⁹ The changes in Turkish society during these years can also be traced through its cultural output. In music, we have already alluded to the popularity of *arabesk* music, which mixes the elements of Turkish classical and folk music with those of its western pop and Arabic counterparts. The immensely popular songs that grew out of this genre in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the experience and the passions of the newly urbanised peripheral communities around Turkish cities.⁶⁰ In literature too, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the eclipse of an older generation of popular novels by authors such as Yaşar Kemal, which probed the harshness of rural life, by those of a new crop of internationally acclaimed writers including Orhan Pamuk, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2006, Latife Tekin and Elif Şafak, which explored the contradictions of Turkey's modern urban identity.⁶¹

Throughout the 1990s, partly through democratic politics and partly as a result of the multiplying links between Turkey and global networks of communication, civil society and NGOs, various groups within Turkey acquired ways of exerting pressure on the Turkish state. Influential business associations and chambers of commerce published position papers criticising the 12 September laws, the ban on headscarves and the state's Kurdish policy. In a sign of the strength of this opposition, this campaign included both older firms that had long benefited from state protection and younger firms excluded from this privileged circle.⁶² At the same time, various Kurdish organisations in Europe succeeded in creating international public sympathy for the Kurdish cause. Turkey's Kurdish groups were also able to apply for and receive compensation from the Turkish state by filing suits with the European Court of Human Rights.⁶³ In July 1997 *The Economist* summarised the contradictions and the growing isolation of the Turkish state with the headline 'The Increasing Loneliness of Being Turkey'.⁶⁴

59 TÜSES, *Türkiye'de siyasi partilerin seçmenleri ve toplum düzeni* (Ankara, 1999).

60 Meral Özbek, 'Arabesk culture: A case of modernization and popular identity', in Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds.), *Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey* (Seattle, 1997), pp. 211–32.

61 See, e.g., Orhan Pamuk, *Snow* (New York, 2004); Latife Tekin, *Berji Kristin: Tales from the garbage hills* (New York, 1992); Elif Şafak, *The flea palace* (London, 2004).

62 Ziya Öniş and Umut Türem, 'Entrepreneurs, democracy, and citizenship in Turkey', *Comparative Politics*, 34 (2002), pp. 439–55; Işık Özel, 'Beyond the orthodox paradox: The break up of state business coalitions in Turkey in the 1980s', *Journal of International Affairs*, 57 (2003), pp. 97–112.

63 Watts, 'Routes to ethnic resistance', pp. 187–96.

64 *The Economist*, 19 July 1997, pp. 21–3.

This situation changed as a result of the cumulative effect of several unrelated developments in the second half of the 1990s. The first of these was a traffic accident which took place in 1996, on the highway between Istanbul and Izmir, killing all but one of the passengers of a car. It turned out that the passengers of this vehicle included a senior police official, a drug kingpin wanted by Interpol and an anti PKK Kurdish leader who was also a member of the parliament; and in the boot were government issue weapons, silencers and fake diplomatic passports. This accident led to the first of a series of scandals which exposed corrupt relations between the security apparatus and the underworld.

The second important development was the capture in 1999, with the help of the CIA, of the PKK's leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in Kenya, where he had been hiding after being pushed out of his sanctuary in Syria. Öcalan's capture greatly diminished the power of the Kurdish insurgency and undercut one of the principal reasons the military had always put forth to justify its continuing role in the Turkish government and its tactics in eastern Turkey.

The third development was the devastating earthquake that hit Istanbul and the industrial heartland of Turkey in August 1999, leaving 17,000 people dead, 30,000 injured and 500,000 homeless. It soon became apparent that the scale of destruction and the very high number of casualties were due, in part, to decades of governmental neglect in properly inspecting and enforcing the country's building codes. This discovery, coupled with the tardiness with which the military and other official rescue teams responded to this disaster, peeled off another layer of the state and the military's prestige in the eyes of the populace. Also, Greece, which had been held up as the eternal enemy for much of the history of modern Turkey, turned out to be one of the fastest and most efficient sources of aid and comfort for the victims. This latter development ushered in an unprecedented period of cooperation between the two states, helping, among other things, with Turkey's accession to candidate status in the EU.

Finally, there was the economic crisis of 2001, when, partly as a result of the corrupt and populist economic policies of successive governments and partly as a result of infighting among the members of the political elite, the Turkish economy came close to total collapse. Turkey's GNP contracted by about 9.5 per cent in 2001², official unemployment rates passed 15 per cent, and close to 20 per cent of the population fell below the poverty line. The shocks of the earthquake and the economic crisis also exposed the plight of the large numbers of people who had become linked to urban economies through low paying jobs. Even though the labour of these people had made possible

the export boom and the globalisation of Istanbul, they received very limited benefits from the growth and expansion of Turkey's economy and were among the first to suffer from the adverse turn in trends in 2001. 2. With the earthquake, the 2001 crisis also laid bare the fault lines of Turkey's recent developmental record. In the last twenty years, real wages had declined by as much as 35 per cent, and the income inequality between the wealthier and poorer parts of the country had grown significantly worse. In 2000, per capita GDP was calculated to be about \$16,000 in Istanbul, whereas in Şırnak, in eastern Turkey, the corresponding figure was less than \$2,000.⁶⁵

It may be an exaggeration to suggest that these four developments proved to be the final straws that finally broke the back of military bureaucratic power in Turkey. It seemed thus, however, when, in the elections of November 2002, every political party and leader who had been involved in the coalition governments of the preceding period was voted out of parliament.⁶⁶ In contrast, the JDP, which had been formed only two years earlier, emerged as the clear winner, with 363 seats in the 550 seat parliament. The only other party that passed the threshold to enter the parliament was the RPP, which benefited from having been out of parliament and hence untainted by the scandals of the previous years. The JDP was formed by a group of younger deputies who split from the older guard of the Islamist movement when the VP was closed down by the state security court.⁶⁷ Those who were left behind formed their own Islamist party, Saadet Partisi (Happiness Party), which in 2002 received only 2.5 per cent of the vote. The JDP founders abandoned their confrontational tactics and identified their mission in broadly modern terms, by emphasising the themes of democracy, human rights, development and justice. They distinguished themselves from the old guard of the Islamist movement who had become part of a new elite. Above all, they signalled securing Turkey's full membership in the EU as their ultimate objective. On this basis the JDP was also able to set itself apart from the other parties and gather support from a constituency which far exceeded strictly 'Islamist' voters. The personal stories of the founders showed how different they were from the previous political leaders in the country. For example, party chairman and prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan grew up in a neighbourhood in Istanbul which was originally settled by the very first wave

65 UNDP, *Turkey's national human development report, 2004* (New York, 2005)

66 Soli Özel, 'Turkey at the polls: After the tsunami', *Journal of Democracy*, 14 (2003), pp. 80–94.

67 Cizre and Çınar, 'Turkey 2002', pp. 322–28.

of immigrants into the city. He was trained in one of the preacher schools which were always regarded with suspicion by the government elite.

Bridging the gap

Since coming to power with a strong majority in 2002 the JDP has significantly accelerated the series of reforms required by the EU to bring Turkey's legal, political and economic institutions and practices into conformity with their European counterparts. The state security courts which had been set up by the military were abolished, the penal code was revised, the military was brought under civilian control and Kurdish and other minorities were allowed to learn and use their own languages. In foreign policy too, progress has been made in resolving seemingly intractable problems such as Cyprus, and in avoiding new ones, by staying out of the war in Iraq without seriously offending the United States. Finally, after the disastrous year that followed the 2001 crisis, the economy grew on average by 7.3 percent between 2002 and 2005.⁶⁸ Also since 2004, inflation has remained in single digits for the first time in over twenty years. As Turkish governments have carried out recent reforms, international organisations have kept a close watch over the country. The IMF has insisted on the implementation of the stabilisation programme negotiated in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, and the parameters of political and judicial reform have been set by the Copenhagen criteria that the EU requires of all candidate members.

Today, as a probable future member of the EU, Turkey is closer than ever to the goals that were set by Atatürk. In December 2004 the EU confirmed that Turkey's judicial and political institutions were sufficiently in line with their European counterparts to move onto the next phase of negotiations. Ironically, in its journey towards the EU Turkey has been led recently by a party that grew out of the country's Islamist movement. While the specific character of Islam in Turkey explains part of this anomaly,⁶⁹ the more important explanation lies with the closing of the gap between the formal/institutional and social aspects of Turkey's modern transformation. Today, for the first time since the 1950s, Turkey is governed by a party that has organic ties with a significant plurality of its population. This has forced the old political elite to watch from the sidelines as Turkey continued its

68 TÜSIAD, *Türkiye ekonomisi, 2004* (Istanbul, 2005).

69 Annemarie Schimmel, 'Islam in Turkey', in A.J. Arberry (ed.), *Religion in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 68–95.

transformation. For this reason alone, the early years of the twenty first century are likely to go down as a major turning point in Turkey's modern history.

None of this should imply that the transformations that were ushered in 2003 are irreversible. Already at the end of 2006, eight of the thirty four articles under which Turkey's accession to the EU was being negotiated were suspended and Turkey had to watch as Bulgaria and Romania became full members of the EU. There are signs that the recently marginalised elites are trying to reassert their power, and the war in Iraq and the nationalistic turn in Europe are making it easier for them to push back against the forces of change. An assassin who has been linked to the country's security agencies murdered the prominent Turkish Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul on 19 January 2007. The tensions that developed in 2007 led to a political stalemate, in which the parliament failed to select a new president to replace Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose term had ended. General elections that were held in July 2007 gave the JDP an even larger share of the vote and a bigger majority in the parliament. Taking advantage of this, the JDP engineered the election of Abdullah Gül as president of the republic on 28 August 2007. The JDP control of the major levers of the government caused the members of the old elite to become even more concerned about their status in the country and the direction Turkey was taking. For example, the repeal on 9 February 2008 of a law that had barred female students with headscarves from universities is interpreted by them as a major step away from the path of secular modernisation. Whether and how far Turkey will slide back to its former closed self will depend on both external and internal factors. At the time of the writing of this chapter, the country appears to be growing uncertain about its direction. A historical perspective on how similar critical points were handled in the past should be useful for understanding and managing the new difficulties that confront Turkey.

West Asia from the First World War

CHARLES TRIPP

Introduction

The loss by the Ottoman Empire of its last Arab provinces during the First World War, and the dissolution soon thereafter of the Ottoman state itself, opened up the possibilities of radical political change in the region. The political map was to be remade, in terms not simply of the formal institutions of governance, but also of the economic and social processes associated with them, introducing new ideas of political community and authority. However, as the inhabitants of the *mashriq* (the eastern part of the Arab world) were to discover, they had exchanged one dominion for another. The French and British empires divided the region between them and the League of Nations formally approved these arrangements by awarding mandates to France and Great Britain to bring these territories to independence as sovereign states. This act led eventually to the creation of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. It also set in motion the process that resulted in 1948 in the partition of the territories of the Palestine mandate between Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

In so far as the history of Islam in these countries is the history of Muslims and their reactions to the new conditions, these developments represented both an opportunity and a threat to differently situated groups of Muslims. There were those who argued that the new political and economic framework could help to regenerate their societies. The particular configuration of states, and the continuation of British and French imperial control, came in for criticism. But for much of the urban, politically active Muslim population nationalism, secularism, capitalism and socialism represented ways of engaging with the modern world and offered means of escaping from the debilitating influence of 'tradition'. For many of those involved, this secular outlook was perfectly compatible with their beliefs as Muslims. Effectively calling for a functional separation of religion and state, they acknowledged the normative power of Islam and its importance for social identity, but for them

politics was a matter of struggling with the imperial powers, and with each other, for control of the state.

However, there was also another kind of response. This came from Muslims concerned about the consequences of such developments for the place of Islam in public life and thus for the future of Islam itself as a religion. Across the region, numerous individuals and movements fashioned distinctively Islamic rejoinders to the secular ideas and structures that had such a powerful hold on the lives and imaginations of their fellow Muslims. Some believed this was best achieved by reinstating and rehabilitating the traditional scholarly hierarchies of the Islamic tradition. Generally more visible, however, were those who saw active engagement with the modern world as the best way of preserving and reinforcing the core values of Islam itself. These were the Islamists of the new century – individuals who developed distinctive ideologies that drew upon the normative and symbolic repertoire of Islam and of a variety of Islamic traditions. The modern history of Islam in this area is also, therefore, a history of the ideas and movements associated with this form of response, and these will be the focus of this chapter.

1920–48: imperial creations: new states and the politics of Islam

The awarding of the mandates for Syria to France and for Mesopotamia and Palestine to Great Britain by the League of Nations in April 1920 sanctioned the occupation of these territories and opened the way for their political reorganisation. In Syria, France created the state of Greater Lebanon, thereby greatly enlarging the territory of the old Ottoman *mutaṣarrıfıyya* (autonomous sub province, established in 1861) with its mainly Maronite Christian and Druze population and incorporating the predominantly Muslim populations of Tripoli (Sunni) to the north, of the Bekaa Valley (Shi‘i) to the east and of the Jabal ‘Amil (Shi‘i) to the south. France also occupied the rest of Syria, dismantling the short lived Arab kingdom of Amır Fayṣal ibn Ḥusayn (r. 1918–20) in Damascus, and including Dayr al Zur in the east up to the newly established boundaries of Iraq.

Iraq

Iraq was the name given by the British to their mandate in Mesopotamia. It comprised the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, occupied by British forces during the First World War, and consolidated by

the British authorities into a single state, as the best way of defending British interests in the Middle East. In this state building project, the British had the support of many of the largely secular, Ottoman elites of these provinces, even if other sections of the population – most notably the Shī‘ī clerics of the *‘atabat* (literally, ‘thresholds’, denoting the Shī‘ī holy cities in Iraq) and their tribal followers in southern Iraq, as well as the chiefs of the Kurdish tribes in the mountains of the north east – were anxious about the implications for their own autonomy and interests.

Some of these fears appeared to be confirmed as the new state began to take on definition. In searching for a figure of sufficient authority to command respect in Iraq, the British looked to the traditional religious hierarchy of the Sunni Muslim community, choosing the elderly Sayyid ‘Abd al Raḥman al Kaylānī (d. 1927), *naqīb al ashraf* (senior descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad in a community) of Baghdad and head of the Qadiriyya order of Sufis, to be the first prime minister of the country. Faced by political forces with which he was ill equipped to deal, the *naqīb*’s tenure of the premiership did not last long. However, for some it confirmed the impression that Great Britain would exclude the established Shī‘ī leadership from the power structures of the new state and was looking instead to the hierarchies of the defunct Ottoman state.

This impression was largely correct. British officials in Iraq at the time acknowledged that the Shī‘a constituted a sizeable part, even a majority, of Iraq’s population, but had no intention of letting this count. The mandate system assumed that the populations of these territories were not ready for self rule and needed to be trained in modern politics before being recognised as sovereign. In this respect, the British placed more faith in the bureaucratic and political elites of the Ottoman Empire, drawn almost exclusively from the Sunni population, than in the clerical or tribal leaders of the Shī‘a. They regarded the clerics in particular as obscurantist, too close to the clerical establishment in Persia and fanatical in their opposition to the kind of modernity that Great Britain was planning for Iraq. British contempt for and exclusion of the Shī‘ī hierarchy cost both parties dear.

In 1920 it contributed to the outbreak of the Iraqi revolt which challenged British rule and drove British forces out of much of the south of the country. Some of the groundwork had been laid by the activities of the sons of two of the most eminent Shī‘ī *mujtahids* (Shī‘ī clerics recognised as competent to deliver independent opinions on the *shari‘a*) of Iraq, Ayat Allah Ḥasan al Ṣadr (d. 1935) and Ayat Allah Mīrza Muḥammad Taqī al Shīrāzī (d. 1920), through the predominantly Shī‘ī political organisation, Ḥaras al Istiqlāl (Independence guard). Cooperating with Sunni Arab officers in the organisation of al ‘Ahd

(the Covenant), they raised the standard of revolt in the summer of 1920, when Ayat Allah al Shīrazī proclaimed a *fatwa* permitting the use of force against infidel rule. This led to a widespread and bloody rebellion throughout much of southern Iraq. It lasted some four months and was finally suppressed, but cost thousands of Iraqi lives, as well as those of hundreds of British and Indian troops.

The rebellion convinced the British to hand over a greater degree of self rule to the Iraqis, but the beneficiaries were not those who had fought hardest in the revolt. On the contrary, the rebellion of the Shīʿī clerics and shaykhs had persuaded the British authorities of their enmity and intransigence. They granted office and privilege instead to the largely Sunni ex Ottoman army officers and administrators. At their head, in 1921, the British placed Amīr Fayṣal ibn Ḥusayn (r. 1921–32) as the first king of Iraq. Purely secular and strategic calculations determined their choice, but they also believed that Fayṣal, as a *sayyid* (descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad), would appeal to the disgruntled and disappointed Shīʿī clerics. It was a vain hope, even if he did have some success in drawing into his own circle many of the Shīʿī tribal shaykhs of Iraq.

In 1923 the disdain of the most eminent of the Shīʿī clerics for the kind of state that was emerging became clear when Ayat Allahs al Khālīsī (d. 1932), al Naʿīmī (d. 1936) and al Iṣfahānī (d. 1945) came out against the process whereby a constitution was being drafted for the new Iraqi state. Al Khālīsī was arrested and sent into exile, first in Mecca and then in Qum. He was joined there by a number of prominent clerics, all of whom disliked what Iraq was becoming, as a secular state dominated by the same Ottoman elites who had long excluded the Shīʿa from political life. However, to the disappointment of the clerics, their self imposed exile failed to provoke any widespread movement of protest and sympathy. Instead, Iraqi politics was firmly set on a course in which secular elites, both Sunni and Shīʿī, would play the decisive roles, preoccupied by their struggles with the British and with each other, acting for themselves or espousing ideologies based on national identities or on class interests.

Thereafter, distinctively Islamic issues or movements faded from view in the politics of monarchical Iraq. Encouraged by the monarchy and disillusioned by their brief engagement with the politics of the modern state, many of the Shīʿī clerics turned their backs on Iraqi politics and concentrated on jurisprudence and on the well being of the community. This did not mean that there was not a lively, sometimes acrimonious, internal politics within the Shīʿī community, as different families, factions and clerics sought relative advantage through a particular circle of learning (*ḥawza ʿilmiyya*) or access to

the resources of the shrine cities of Najaf, Karbala' and al Kazimiyya. Occasionally, aspects of sectarian prejudice would surface in public debate. However, the ostentatious disengagement of the clerics from politics turned many younger Shi'a away both from the religious leaders, and from the idea that Islam had a role to play in modern politics. Instead, like many of their Sunni counterparts, they espoused the secular ideologies of nationalism, militarism, liberalism, social democracy or communism.

Palestine

It could be argued that it was the fervent wish of the British authorities in Palestine that politics there should take an equally secular direction. However, the peculiar situation of the territory meant that this was never likely. The declaration by the British foreign secretary, Sir Arthur Balfour, in 1917 that Great Britain 'would view with favour the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine' indicated that a distinctive and unsettling future awaited this country. The 'religious question' would become one of the defining features of Palestinian politics. Many in the majority community of Sunni Muslims in Palestine feared the implications of unlimited Jewish immigration, land purchase and the establishment of a formidable Zionist political apparatus with easy access to the British authorities. As early as 1920, riots at the festival of Nabı Musa showed that the sectarian aspect of politics was already well to the fore.

Partly in response, the British authorities established the Supreme Muslim Council (al Majlis al Islami al A'ala, SMC) in 1922, hoping to reassure Palestinian Muslims that Great Britain intended to live up to the second part of Balfour's pledge that 'nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non Jewish communities in Palestine'. Endowed by the British authorities with the wealth of substantial *awqaf* (sing. *waqf* religious endowment), the SMC was charged with regulating the affairs of the Muslim community. However, in the absence of any secular representative body that might have bridged the communal divide between Muslim and Christian Arabs on one side and the Jewish community on the other, the SMC soon became the principal political institution for Muslim Palestinians. This was particularly so after the appointment of Hajj Amin al Husayni (d. 1974) as *mufti* of Jerusalem and thus as 'grand *mufti*' (*al mufti al akbar* a title suggesting scholarly pre eminence, but in fact invented by the British authorities) in 1921.¹ Until his dismissal by the British high

¹ Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al Hajj Amin al Husayni and the Palestinian national movement* (New York, 1988), pp. 21–33.

commissioner in 1937, Amin al Ḥusaynī was the dominant figure on the SMC, using it to the advantage of his own faction in Palestinian politics, as well as to oppose the growing Jewish immigration which British policy continued to allow.

One of al Ḥusaynī's strategies was to 'Islamise' the Palestinian cause, seeking to mobilise sentiment across the Islamic world on behalf of Palestine and, specifically, for the defence of Jerusalem. In 1928 the Committee for the Protection of al Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Muslim Places was set up, and highlighted the religious aspect of the first major outbreak of intercommunal violence in Palestine during the 'Wailing Wall' riots of 1929. The SMC also convened the 1931 Islamic Congress in Jerusalem, helped greatly by al Ḥusaynī's contacts with the Indian Khilafat movement. There was little follow up, but the congress attracted pre eminent Islamic thinkers, such as Rashīd Riḍa (d. 1935) and Muḥammad Iqbal (d. 1938), and made a public effort to bridge sectarian differences between Sunnī and Shī'ī Muslims. It also passed a series of resolutions which drew attention not only to the dangers faced by the Holy Places of Jerusalem, but also to the threat facing the Muslim community in Palestine through the extensive programme of land purchase by the Jewish Agency.²

Land purchase and the threat to the established Muslim Arab society of Palestine became one of the main themes of politics during the 1930s. Unlike the international conference activities, this was a development that engaged the majority rural population. Using the networks of mosques, preachers and Islamic associations throughout the country, convening congresses of 'ulama' at regular intervals, the SMC mobilised against the 'judaisation' (*tahwīd*) of Palestine, declaring the whole country a sacred land, a trust (*amana*) of God. It embodied these ideas in a 1935 *fatwa* against land sales. Signed by numerous Palestinian 'ulama', but also by Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian and Indian 'ulama', it declared that whoever sold land in Palestine to the Jews 'necessarily commits infidelity (*kufīr*) and apostasy (*irtidād*)', as well as 'treason (*khīyana*) to God and his Messenger'.³

It is unclear whether these declarations had much effect on land sales, but the issue contributed to the Arab revolt in Palestine which broke out a year or

2 Uri Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine* (Leiden, 1987), pp. 187–220; A. W. Kayyali, *Palestine: A modern history* (London, n.d.), pp. 138–44; Mattar, *Mufti of Jerusalem*, pp. 35–45, 56–64; H. A. R. Gibb, 'The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931', in A. J. Toynbee (ed.), *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), pp. 99–108.

3 Kupferschmidt, *Supreme Muslim Council*, pp. 240–7; Martin Kolinsky, *Law, order and riots in Mandatory Palestine, 1928–35* (London, 1993) pp. 184–6.

so later. The SMC and al Ḥusaynī inevitably became involved. They had already been criticised by populist Islamist movements, such as that organised by Shaykh ‘Izz al Dīn al Qassam (d. 1935), who declared that nothing short of armed jihad against the infidel would safeguard the Islamic community of Palestine.⁴ Similar sentiments were voiced at many a local *mawsim* (religious festival), often becoming the focus of popular resentment. Tapping into another vein of largely urban Islamic sentiment, the Young Men’s Muslim Association (YMMA, Jam‘iyyat al Shubban al Muslimīn), originally established in Egypt, made inroads into Palestine during this period. Educational and recreational in intent, it also made young Muslims more aware of their own political identities as Muslims, by publicising causes from across the Muslim world. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that al Ḥusaynī encouraged the formation of a secret organisation, al Jihad al Muqaddas (the holy struggle), led first by his cousin ‘Abd al Qadir (d. 1948), and then directly by himself.⁵

The defeat of the revolt in Palestine by 1939, the death of al Qassam and others, as well as the dismissal and exile of Amin al Ḥusaynī dismantled much of the organisation of resistance structured around Islamic institutions. The focus of the Palestine question shifted away from its Islamic aspect and towards a secular, nationalist one. The pan Islamic, communal sentiments encouraged by the YMMA continued, and from the mid 1940s the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was active in Palestine. By 1947 some twenty five branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, with nearly twenty thousand members, had been established in the country.⁶ However, political debate revolved around the question of Arab, rather than Muslim, Palestine. When war came in 1948, due to the failures and ambitions of all the parties involved, Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood were active in the fighting, but could not make any difference to an outcome determined by the relative strengths of the armed forces of the Zionist movement, then of the state of Israel, and of the Arab states, respectively.

Transjordan

Some of those who participated in the war of 1948 were volunteers from the Muslim Brotherhood in Transjordan. In 1945 the Association of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Amman by Shaykh ‘Abd al Laṭīf Abu Qura and

4 Kayyali, *Palestine*, pp. 180–2. 5 Kupferschmidt, *Supreme Muslim Council*, pp. 230–9, 253.

6 Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Bloomington, 1994), p. 3.

was warmly welcomed by Amīr ‘Abd Allāh (r. 1921–51).⁷ Transjordan, initially a ‘territory’, then an emirate and finally, in 1946, a sovereign kingdom, had been carved out of the lands awarded to Great Britain as part of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia. By 1924 the country had been recognised as administratively distinct from Palestine, and the framework of the state was being consolidated, after a rather shaky start, under the leadership of Amīr ‘Abd Allāh ibn Ḥusayn, elder brother of the newly installed king of Iraq, Fayṣal.

One of the aims of the British separation of Transjordan from Palestine was to limit the area of the Jewish ‘national home’ promised in the Balfour Declaration. Transjordan was thereby closed to Jewish settlement, removing it from the sectarian and communal politics of Palestine, even if, as either Muslim or Christian Arabs, many Transjordanians sympathised with the struggle of the Palestinians in their attempt to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state. Amīr ‘Abd Allāh, although also unwilling to see a Jewish state emerge on the other bank of the Jordan, did not object to the establishment of a Jewish community in Palestine, as long as it accepted the status of a semi autonomous entity within a larger Arab state, preferably ruled by himself. In some respects he saw the Zionist movement at this stage as an ally against Amin al Ḥusaynī and the Palestinian nationalist movement.

When it became clear that war was inevitable in 1948 and that ‘Abd Allāh’s Ottoman vision of autonomous *millets* (Ar. *milal*, sing. *milla* religious community) thriving under the dynastic suzerainty of the Hashemite nobility had no appeal in a world of national self determination, he committed his Arab Legion to the occupation and defence of Jerusalem, and as much of the west bank of the Jordan as they could hold. The Arab Legion succeeded in defending east Jerusalem and, importantly, the Ḥaram al Sharīf. This allowed ‘Abd Allāh to present himself as the defender of one of the holiest sites of Islam, and thus, by implication, of Islam itself. However, the effect was somewhat lessened by the welter of mutual recrimination and suspicion that erupted in the aftermath of the failure of the Arab armies in Palestine to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel.

For ‘Abd Allāh, whose politics were dynastic, secular and, in the consolidation of Transjordan, largely tribal and military in orientation, Islam was an integral part of his and of most of his subjects’ identity. However, in terms of his statecraft it was largely instrumental. It was, therefore, natural that he

⁷ Abd al Fattah El Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question, 1928–1947* (London, 1998), pp. 148–50.

should commit himself to the defence of the Ḥaram al Sharif, since it was unthinkable that he should allow it to be occupied by non Muslims. It was also natural that he should thereafter become the patron of the Islamic hierarchy of the city. Nevertheless, both in this and in his encouragement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Transjordan, he was clearly seeking to check the emergence both of an alternative Islamic leadership and of a Palestinian nationalism that would reject his own claims to rule and might look instead to a figure such as Amin al Ḥusaynī.

Syria

Palestine was not the only target of ‘Abd Allah’s ambitions. His vision of Greater Syria as a state under his own leadership, stretching across most of the Arab provinces detached from the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War remained a powerful theme in his policies until his death in 1951. The shaky attachment, as he saw it, of the Syrians to the truncated state of Syria that had emerged from the French mandate gave him cause to hope that his ambitions might be realised. However, by this stage two distinct states had been formed, the republics of Syria and Lebanon. Troubled as their politics were in many respects, they had developed as separate states, with distinctive patterns of politics, both Islamic and secular.

In Syria there was an official Islamic hierarchy of *muftis*, preachers and *imams* based on the mosque network and the *waqf* administration. They were recognised by the French authorities, but the main interlocutors of the mandatory power were the notable families, which had formed the ruling stratum under the Ottomans. However, further down the social scale, particularly in the cities, a distinctive Islamic politics was developing. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed the emergence of a number of Islamic charitable organisations, known as *jam‘iyyat* (sing. *jam‘iyya* groups or societies), which were established as mutual welfare societies, often linked to educational projects and to the provision of services on a limited scale. Organised chiefly by the urban middle and lower middle classes, they were intended to soften the impact of rapid urbanisation and of the inequalities of Syrian society.⁸

The most active of these associations developed into the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in the 1940s. Emerging from the Aleppo based association of the Dar al Arqam, among others, and much influenced by the example of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was essentially a federation of Islamic societies. In the early years of independence

8 Umar Abd Allah, *The Islamic struggle in Syria* (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 88–90.

they were brought together by Muṣṭafa al Sibaʿī (d. 1964), the chief ideologue of the movement and its leader until illness forced him to stand aside in the late 1950s. In 1946 he was elected *al muraqib al ʿamm* (general supervisor) of the movement, the membership of which comprised urban professionals, traders and teachers, as well as some *ʿulamaʾ*.

Before a succession of military *coups d'état* in 1949 restricted the scope of representative life, the Muslim Brotherhood was active in electoral politics. It stood for election in the Syrian parliament and sought to represent 'the Muslim view' in a political world otherwise dominated by the great land owners, the upper middle class or their nationalist and socialist challengers. Al Sibaʿī refused to see the Muslim Brotherhood as merely one party among many, claiming in 1947 that 'our movement is neither a *jamʿiyya* nor a political party, but a *ruh* (spirit) that permeates every being of the *umma* (Islamic community): it is a new revolution'.⁹ Nevertheless, it was also an effective political organisation, within the limitations of the political system in Syria. Its power could never match that of the established order, but it represented a growing movement, expressing the sentiments of those who were disconcerted by the intrusion of Western, secular culture into their country and who felt excluded from the benefits of an economy dominated by the great landowners, the new industrialists and the military.

Lebanon

Similar dissatisfactions had characterised the emergence of a distinct Muslim politics in Lebanon. However, it was given a very specific colouration both by the confessional structure of the Lebanese state and by the differences between the social and economic situations of the two principal Muslim communities of Lebanon: the Sunnis of the coast and the north and the Shiʿa of the east and the south. The Sunni urban elites of Beirut and Tripoli had been prominent in the Ottoman establishment, although, as elsewhere, they had also produced some of its main critics. The collapse of the Ottoman state in 1918 saw the formation of institutions of self government, including the revival of the educational charity *Jamʿiyyat al Maqasid al Khayriyat al Islamiyya* (called simply the 'Makassed' in Western writings on Lebanon), which gave a voice and a sense of purpose to a Sunni urban community in which scions of the great families such as the Salam, the al Ṣulḥ and the Karami played a prominent part.¹⁰

⁹ Ibid., p. 93.

¹⁰ Michael Johnson, *Class and client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim community and the Lebanese state, 1840–1985* (London, 1986), p. 14.

The arrival of the French army of occupation and the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 caused deep disquiet among the Sunni Muslim leaders. Having been part of the dominant architecture of the Ottoman state, with family and financial ties to Damascus, Latakia, Aleppo and Homs, the Sunni Muslim notables found themselves representing a minority within a state dominated by the Maronite Christian community, under the control of the French authorities, administratively separated from Syria. It was not surprising that in the first two decades of Lebanon's existence the most vocal opposition, not simply to the French occupation but also to the very existence of a separate Lebanese state, should have come from the Sunni Muslim community. They boycotted the first elections of 1922 and protested vehemently against the Lebanese constitution of 1926 which both confirmed their minority status and fixed the boundaries of Greater Lebanon.

Greater urbanisation and the consequences of the global economic depression of the 1930s led to new forms of mass politics in the streets of Beirut in particular. Fearful of the secular, radical ideologies that began to appeal to the mass of the dispossessed, elites of all communities adopted new, populist political strategies. Increasingly, the language they used was that of a communalism defined by sectarian identity. In March 1936, as negotiations for a treaty with France took shape, bringing the prospect of an independent Lebanon closer, one of the leaders of the Sunni Muslim community, Salim 'Alī Salam (d. 1938), convened a Conference of the Coast, bringing together Sunni and Shi'ī Muslim notables, to protest against the status quo and to call for the separation of the Muslim areas of Lebanon and their re-attachment to Syria. The conference paved the way for the Sunni *muftī* of Lebanon to form a Muslim consultative council, which then convened an Islamic congress to give voice to Lebanese Muslims' discontents. Some of these, however, found a more direct and violent expression. In response to the formation of groups such as the predominantly Maronite Falangist party militia, al Kata'ib (the Squadrons), the Sunni Muslim community formed a counter militia, al Najjada (The helpers). It was not long before bloody clashes occurred between the two.¹¹

The violence of these events and the pretext they gave for France to continue its occupation of Lebanon, as well as changes in the national economy and within the Maronite community itself, caused the Sunni Muslim leadership to draw back from the abyss of communal confrontation. Under the leadership of Riyaḍ al Ṣulḥ (d. 1951), in particular, the Sunni Muslim

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 19, 23–6.

notables began to see the advantages of collaborating with the leaders of other communities, specifically the Maronites, in securing the Lebanese republic and national economy, free of French control. This sentiment was shared by a growing number of Maronites, led by Bishara al Khuri (d. 1964). The result was the agreement of 1943 known as the National Pact. Effectively an agreement between the leaders of the two principal communities to work together within an independent Lebanon, the National Pact reinforced the confessional nature of the republic by fixing the formula for sharing government offices. It was this pact that formed the basis of the politics of independent Lebanon.

1948–70: independence: nationalism, socialism and Islamism

The era of independence ushered in by the 1940s was also an era of great hopes for the remaking of the new states of the *mashriq*. Even the early conspicuous failure, *al nakba* (the catastrophe) of 1948 in which the hopes for an independent Palestine were shattered by war, became a catalyst for the emergence of radical movements. For the most part, their ideas of reform were secular in orientation. The participants were almost all Muslim in terms of their religious identity, but this meant little for their political orientation. The young army officers, state servants and urbanised peasantry who played an increasingly prominent part in the politics of the region were driven by the visions of Arab nationalism, of state socialism and of Marxism. These ideologies provided the blueprints for social transformation, echoing the concerns of the Cold War and the process of decolonisation.

It is against this background that Islamist thinkers and their followers in the *mashriq* tried to position themselves. Some took a traditional view, generally supported by the state backed Islamic establishments, which advocated the maintenance of personal status laws based on the *shari‘a*, and concentrated on educational initiatives and lobbying of those in power. Others saw this as dangerously passive. They developed a distinct set of ideas to counter secularism and to reinstate Islamic values at the heart of public life. This demanded a more active political strategy. Constrained during much of this period by popular indifference or by the counterblasts of secular ideologies and the regimes that espoused them, these ideas would only later become the basis of effective political mobilisation as disenchantment with the new secular state elites set in.

Palestine and Jordan

It was not surprising that the site for one of the earliest expressions of radical political Islamism should have been Palestine. After the war of 1948 and the establishment of the state of Israel on the territory of much of the Palestine mandate, the remainder of the country was divided between the kingdom of Jordan, which took control of Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the kingdom of Egypt, which occupied the Gaza Strip. Palestinians who remained in the various segments of historical Palestine found themselves under the jurisdictions of three different states. Expressing a radical disillusionment with the secular powers that had so conspicuously failed to prevent the dismemberment of Palestine, Taqī al Dīn al Nabhanī (d. 1977) wrote his most famous works in the early 1950s.¹²

In these he set forth his ideas for an alternative political and economic order, founded on Islamic principles, repudiating the dominant models of the territorial nation state and of the capitalist economy. Strongly influenced by the writings of contemporary Islamists, al Nabhanī nevertheless brought to his thesis a distinctive sensibility, forged in the struggle for Palestine. His call for a general Islamic liberation from the forces of materialism and secular power was a protest against the dead end into which compromises with imperialists or alliances with Arab states had led the Palestinians. In its transnational scope, this vision went far beyond the nation state, expressing outrage at the territorial carve up of the region. In founding Ḥizb al Tahrīr al Islāmī (the Islamic liberation party) al Nabhanī drew about him like minded Palestinians and other Muslims, but the hostility of the Jordanian government limited its effectiveness as a movement.¹³

More effective as an organisation among the Palestinians was the Muslim Brotherhood, now split between branches operating under Egyptian control and those active under Jordanian auspices. The presence of the Egyptian army in Gaza, with its Brotherhood members and sympathisers, had given a boost to the organisation there.¹⁴ However, it was also vulnerable to the troubled relations between the Brotherhood in Egypt and the Egyptian government. Banned by the Egyptian government in 1949, it transformed itself into an educational establishment, Jam'īyyat al Tawḥīd (Monotheism

12 Taqī al Dīn al Nabhanī, *Niẓām al ḥukm fī al Islam* (Jerusalem, 1953); Taqī al Dīn al Nabhanī, *al Niẓām al iqtisādī fī al Islam* (Amman, n.d.).

13 Suha Taji Farouki, *A fundamental quest: Hizb al Tahrir and the search for an Islamic caliphate* (London, 1996), pp. 76–90.

14 El Awaisi, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 150–71.

society). With the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 it gained greater freedom to organise, given the close relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers, but again suffered from repression after 1954 when the government of Nasser clamped down on the organisation in Egypt.

Thereafter it operated behind various front organisations, occasionally coming into the open, as in its opposition to the Israeli occupation of 1956, but the Egyptian security apparatus kept it under close surveillance. This culminated in the purges and arrests of the mid 1960s which decimated the Brotherhood in Gaza and drove many into exile, significantly weakening it on the eve of the second Israeli occupation in 1967.¹⁵ However, one of the results of the Brotherhood's activities in Gaza among students was the formation in Cairo of the League of Palestinian Students. It was dominated by student sympathisers of the Muslim Brotherhood, among them Yasser Arafat (d. 2004), Salah Khalaf (d. 1991) and others who were to be founders of the organisation Fatah (reverse acronym of *Ḥaraka Taḥrīr Filasṭīn* (Movement for the liberation of Palestine)). It appealed to young men impatient with the Brotherhood's inaction and was intended to provide a secular focus for Palestinian resistance, but it had its origins in a distinctive Palestinian Islamist milieu, expressing a generation's protest against the fate of the Palestinians and the incompetence of their leaders.¹⁶

For the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood on the West Bank, the relationship with the Jordanian authorities was more stable. Soon after the annexation of the West Bank in 1950, King 'Abd Allah had brought all Palestinian religious institutions under Amman's direct control. This became the main centre for the administration of the *shari'a* courts, the appointment of religious officials and the oversight of *awqaf* on both sides of the river.¹⁷ King Ḥusayn (r. 1952–99), who came to the throne in 1952, followed the policies of his grandfather and saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a useful ally in facing down the challenges of Palestinian nationalism, radical Arab nationalism, socialism and radical Islamism of the kind represented by al Nabhanī. In return for legal recognition and freedom to organise, the Brotherhood gave the king its loyal support. Under its new leader, Muḥammad 'Abd al Raḥman Khalifa, it participated in parliamentary elections and portrayed the king as 'defender of Islam' when confronted by the attempted *coup d'état*

¹⁵ Abu Amr, *Islamic fundamentalism*, pp. 7–9.

¹⁶ Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political thought and practice* (Washington DC, 2000), pp. 25–7.

¹⁷ Kupferschmidt, *Supreme Muslim Council*, pp. 257–8.

of Sulaiman Nabulsi (d. 1976) and 'Alī Abu Nuwwar (d. 1991) in 1957.¹⁸ Although critical at times of Jordan's alliances with Western powers, the Brotherhood was unswerving in its support for the monarchy, seeing it as a bastion against Nasserism, Ba'athism and other secular or socialist creeds.

Syria

Across the border in Syria, the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood made these dangers only too visible. It had only participated intermittently in public life after the restoration of parliament in 1954, devoting itself chiefly to educational and welfare activities. In 1957, due to increasing ill health, al Siba'ī handed over control of the organisation to Isam al 'Aṭṭar, who led the Brotherhood until ousted in 1970. Like all other political organisations, the Brotherhood was banned in 1958 when Egypt effectively took over Syria with the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR). Ironically, whilst the organisation was suppressed, Nasser's government appropriated al Siba'ī's best known work, *Ishtirakiyyat al Islam* (The socialism of Islam), as a means of legitimising and mobilising public support for the socialist development programme of the UAR, known variously as 'Arab socialism' and 'Islamic socialism'.

In fact, al Siba'ī's work, developed from his writings of the 1950s, was intended as a critique both of the social injustice of Syria's class divided society and of the socialist and Marxist ideas that were winning adherents among the Syrian intelligentsia. In keeping with his view that Muslims should establish their values in the world through social and political action, al Siba'ī wanted to show that all the principles for the radical reconstruction of society could be found in Islam. He was trying to persuade a younger generation of Syrians that they need not look to secular ideologies for an alternative to capitalism. On the contrary, social justice through 'mutual social responsibility' (*al takaful al ijtimā'ī*), through the regulation of property in the public interest and through the restraint of hedonistic egoism could be achieved by a dynamic interpretation of Islamic traditions, informed by a burning sense of social justice. Beyond the strategic concerns of the Brotherhood in Syria, al Siba'ī was also expressing a more widespread concern for the moral economy. For him, a distinctive Islamic sociability had been fractured by the forces of European colonialism and liberal capitalism. His task was therefore

¹⁸ Ziad Abu Amr, 'La monarchie jordanienne et les Frères musulmans ou les modalités d'endiguement d'une opposition loyaliste', in B. Kodmani Darwish and M. Chartouni Dubarry (eds.), *Les états arabes face à la contestation Islamiste* (Paris, 1997), pp. 130–1.

the re founding of the moral economy, imbuing people's everyday transactions with Islamic values, while encouraging them to engage fully with a world transformed by new technology.¹⁹

With the breakup of the UAR in 1961, parliamentary life was briefly restored and al 'Aṭṭar led the Brotherhood to relative electoral success. However, representative life was fragile and soon succumbed to the power of military factions and conspiracies, culminating in the Ba'thist *coup d'état* of March 1963. The new regime of radical, secular Arab nationalists and socialists lost little time in suppressing its critics, including the Muslim Brotherhood, forcing al 'Aṭṭar into exile. This created a dilemma for those remaining in Syria. Some advocated armed resistance as the only way of engaging with an authoritarian system seemingly bent on eliminating Islam from public life. Strongly advocated at the time by Marwan Ḥadid (d. 1976) from Hama, and supported by others from the north, this remained a minority position, partly because of the strength of the Damascus Brotherhood, still under the control of al 'Aṭṭar. Gauging accurately the strength of the Ba'thist regime, especially in the security apparatus, al 'Aṭṭar recognised that armed confrontation would be suicidal. However, it was to be an issue that recurred with increasing bitterness and desperation in Brotherhood debates as regime repression intensified.²⁰

Iraq

During the same period in Iraq a similar set of concerns about secularism, socialism and the iniquities of a capitalist order had led to debates among Shī'ī and Sunnī scholars alike. The overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in July 1958 had been unmourned, but the regime of 'Abd al Karīm Qasim (prime minister 1958–63), which gave new freedoms to organisations such as the Iraqi Communist Party, seemed to some to represent a threat to Islam and to Islamic values in Iraqi public life. At the forefront of those Islamic scholars who tried to formulate an Islamic riposte to the dangers of the age was the Shī'ī cleric, Ayat Allah Muḥammad Baqir al Ṣadr (d. 1980) of Najaf. Al Ṣadr was preoccupied with the influence of secular, Marxist and socialist ideas on the younger generation of the Shī'a, turning them away from the clerical authorities and causing them to neglect the role of Islam. Yet at the same time, given the glaring social injustices in Iraq, he saw why Marxism

19 Muṣṭafa al Siba'ī, *Ishtirakiyyat al Islam* (Damascus, 1960), pp. 174–211, 319–24; Muṣṭafa al Siba'ī, *Akhlaquna al ijtimā'iyya* (Beirut, 1972), pp. 41–9, 74–80, 110–14.

20 Abd Allah, *Islamic struggle*, pp. 101–6.

had such an appeal. He felt strongly that unless Shī'ī clerics modified their traditional disdain for political engagement and their silence on material and economic concerns, they would lose the attention and loyalty of their communal following, placing not only the hierarchy, but also the values they espoused in jeopardy.

Baqir al Ṣadr sought both to present a refutation of historical materialism and to demonstrate that a searing critique of capitalism could be found in the Islamic tradition. These were the themes on which he expounded with great originality in his two major works *Falsafatuna* (Our philosophy) and *Iqtisāduna* (Our economy). Similarly to al Sibā'ī in Syria, although with a greater degree of sophistication and a more informed awareness of the counter arguments of both capitalism and communism, al Ṣadr was determined to prove both that Islam had something important to say in a fast changing world and that it represented a system that would be both ethically more sound and more efficient at delivering the greatest benefits to the greatest number.²¹

This was an implicit reproach to much of the Shī'ī clerical hierarchy in Iraq, although al Ṣadr had many admirers amongst the clerics, particularly since the radical nature of the Qasim regime and its Ba'ṯhist and Arab nationalist successors made the nature of the threat all too plain. In fact, the relative freedoms allowed by 'Abd al Karīm Qasim permitted al Ṣadr and others to lay the foundations for al Da'wa (The call), an organisation dedicated to the promotion of a more activist and engaged Islamism. Based in the Shī'ī urban population of Iraq, it tried to counter the influence of secular and socialist organisations. Al Da'wa established networks, set up educational groups, put out publications and organised demonstrations over particular issues. However, like all other public actors in Iraq it had a limited stage on which to operate, given the absence of representative life.²²

In 1960 Qasim introduced licences for political parties and, possibly fearing the sectarian implications of communally defined parties, only permitted the formation of a unified Islamic Party (al Ḥizb al Islāmī). In practice, Shī'ī representation in the party was weak – the Shī'ī Grand Ayat Allah Muḥsin al Ḥakīm (d. 1970) discouraged participation – and its leadership was dominated by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the Islamic Party had much in common with members of al Da'wa when it came to

21 Muḥammad Baqir al Ṣadr, *Iqtisāduna* (Beirut, 1982), pp. 255–356, 628–37; Muḥammad Baqir al Ṣadr, *Falsafatuna* (Beirut, 1982).

22 Abdul Halim al Ruhaimi, 'The Da'wa Islamic Party: Origins, actors and ideology', in Faleh Abdul Jabar (ed.), *Ayatollahs, Sufis and ideologues* (London, 2002), pp. 149–61.

criticism of Qasim's government, especially its nationalisation of land, which they saw as counter to *shari'a* injunctions to respect private property. It was not long before the Islamic Party was being harassed by a government irked by being told repeatedly that its measures were contrary to the *shari'a*. Some of its branches were closed down and its publications restricted. More importantly, in the absence of representative institutions, there was no effective way in which its voice could be heard, and it had more or less ceased its activities before the overthrow of Qasim in 1963.²³

With 'Abd al Salam 'Arif's (pres. 1963–6) dismissal of the radical and chaotic Ba'thist government in November 1963, it seemed to some that power had passed into the hands of a man who wished to restore Islam to its central place in public life. 'Arif made much of his personal piety and had contact with Sunni Islamist circles, leading initially to a number of regulations requiring greater public observance of Islamic rulings. However, he was also an admirer of Nasser in Egypt and was determined to introduce a similar set of socialist measures in Iraq, in support of which he co-opted the Sunni religious establishment, as well as much of the Muslim Brotherhood, persuading them to endorse these measures as a form of 'Islamic socialism'.

'Arif could not exercise the same kind of authority over the Shi'ī clerics or organisations. On the contrary, eminent members of the Shi'ī clerical hierarchy publicly condemned the nationalisation measures and the expropriations of landed property that accompanied them. At street level, their sentiments were echoed and amplified by al Da'wa, giving 'Arif cause for concern. In fact, his shift away from Nasserist socialism well before his sudden death in 1966 removed the possibility of serious confrontation. Nevertheless, the mobilisation among the Shi'a, their concern about the substance of social and economic legislation and the establishment of novel forms of political organisation suggested that the influence of Baqir al Ṣadr and others like him was making itself felt.²⁴ The exile to Najaf in 1964 of the Iranian cleric Ayat Allah Ruḥ Allah Khomeini (1903–89) with his own political, activist ideas further stimulated the debate.

Lebanon

At more or less the same time, in another part of the Shi'ī world, stirrings of discontent and the beginnings of new forms of political mobilisation were

23 Basim al 'Azami, 'The Muslim Brotherhood: Genesis and development', in Abdul Jabbar (ed.), *Ayatollahs, Sufis and ideologues*, pp. 166–71.

24 Charles Tripp, *A history of Iraq*, 3rd edn (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 179–83.

becoming visible. The Shi'a of Lebanon had witnessed two decades of confessional politics based on the National Pact of 1943, leading to a division of the spoils among the *zu'ama'*, the heads of the leading families of the confessional communities of Lebanon. These had been the chief beneficiaries of the unprecedented growth of the Lebanese economy in the decades following independence. An entrepreneurial free for all, largely unregulated by an intentionally weak state, suited the interests of the business world of the coastal cities. Although dominated by members of the Christian communities, the expanding world of economic opportunity provided openings for the many Sunni Muslim business and community leaders, long established in Beirut and Tripoli, and gave them a stake in the status quo.

Less enchanted by this situation were the poorer urban Sunnis. For them, the hopes of independence had come up against the harsh reality of class privilege and the insecurity of poverty. In some cases this was alleviated by the philanthropic activities of individual Sunni leaders. By and large, however, Sunni urban politics at the lower end of the socio economic scale was dominated by local strongmen *qabaḍayat* or by the emerging parties of Arab nationalist or socialist dissent. These ideas, especially those of Nasserism, gained a significant following. Secular and Arab nationalist in character, they also called for a radical revision of the existing order which, in a Lebanese context, easily translated into a sectarian call for an end to Maronite Christian dominance. As the civil war of 1958 demonstrated, such resentments could have violent repercussions, even if sparked off by political conflicts that were secular at heart. Thus President Chamoun's (pres. 1952–8) manoeuvres, as the time approached for his retirement in 1958, combined with the regional drama of the formation of the UAR in neighbouring Syria, the ambitions of President Nasser (pres. 1954–70) and the need by many of the Sunni *zu'ama'* in Lebanon to shore up their declining authority, led to the first major outbreak of intercommunal violence that year.²⁵

This was eventually resolved, although not before the eruption of even greater violence when elements of the Maronite community felt themselves under siege and fought back. However, key players, such as the Maronite General Shihab (pres. 1958–64), refused to see this as a sectarian matter and, trusted by many, he put himself forward as the solution. In some respects the regime he then introduced, under the label of 'Shihabism', was one that took account of the needs of those whose resentments had fuelled the violence of 1958. In particular, the more active state and its intervention in areas hitherto

²⁵ Johnson, *Class and client*, pp. 127–35.

neglected by the *zu'ama'* held the promise of alleviating the worst conditions of the Sunni Muslim poor. At the same time, he was careful not to antagonise the entrepreneurial class and those who saw the state primarily as a permissive, stable framework for the pursuit of their own financial interests. In this respect, the secular and inegalitarian framework of the Lebanese political economy continued to grow apace, fuelled by investment from the emerging oil economies of the Middle East.

In all of these events there was one community which, although well on its way to becoming the largest single confessional community in Lebanon, had been largely neglected. The Shi'a who inhabited much of the Bekaa Valley, most of the south of the country and, increasingly, the burgeoning slums of southern Beirut had taken little part in these events, remaining under the control of their traditional, virtually feudal *zu'ama'*, such as the al As'ads of Naba'iyya. These families also controlled the clerical establishment, prominent among whom at the time was the conservative *mujtahid* Sayyid Muḥammad Taqī Ṣādiq (d. 1966). His message of quietism and political abstention was welcomed by the leading families, who saw no advantage and some danger in popular mobilisation, having witnessed its effects among the Sunnis. Nor did the *zu'ama'* have much quarrel with the Maronite dominated order since the two elites saw each other as potential allies against the Sunni Muslim leaders, whom they equally mistrusted, although for rather different reasons.

Nevertheless, changes were beginning to affect the Shi'a as much as others in Lebanon. Demographic growth and migration, both to the cities of the coast and to South America and West Africa, had placed many beyond the reach of their traditional leaders and the customary networks of social support. Similarly, in the countryside, the capitalisation of agriculture introduced hardheaded and market oriented relations of production, eroding some of the feelings of mutual obligation that had characterised relations between landlord and peasant. Equally, the opening up of educational opportunities through the secular school curriculum was fostering a generation of young Shi'a with a waning respect for the clerics who had hitherto dominated the education of the community. These elements comprised the diverse but increasingly self conscious constituency of the Shi'a which became receptive to the message of Sayyid Musa al Ṣadr (d. 1978) when he arrived in Lebanon in the late 1950s.²⁶

²⁶ Majed Halawi, *A Lebanon defied: Musa al Sadr and the Shi'a community* (Boulder, 1992), pp. 49–81.

Musa al Ṣadr was a key figure in the transformation of the Shīʿa of Lebanon into a significant political force which challenged the old confessional agreements hammered out mainly between the Sunnī Muslim and Maronite leaders. He came from a long line of distinguished clerics, and could trace his ancestry back to the Shīʿa of southern Lebanon. However, for the preceding four generations, the family had been established in Najaf, Mashhad and Qum. His father, Ayat Allah Ṣadr al Dīn al Ṣadr (d. 1940), one of the most eminent scholars in Najaf, had joined the clerical migration of the 1920s from the newly established state of Iraq to the more congenial surroundings of Qum.²⁷ Musa al Ṣadr himself was born in Iran, but much of his extended family remained in Iraq, including his cousin Muḥammad Baqir al Ṣadr.

Musa al Ṣadr did not produce mature philosophical works like those written by his cousin, but his concerns were very similar. He was an activist cleric, ready to engage and if necessary to do battle with the world. His aim was to right the injustices he believed were being done to his community and to ensure that Islamic principles were respected by making them relevant to contemporary concerns. Aware of the impact of European ideas and power on the Islamic world, he was critical of that power and of its values, but saw the need to engage with it because, as he said, 'Europe, with all its good and evil, is the future of this part of the world', and to understand it is to be able to deal 'with the destruction that this European invasion brings in its train'.²⁸ He had no time for the obscurantism and conservatism of many of his fellow clerics since he believed this ill equipped them to give advice, guidance or protection to the community in the social conflicts developing in Lebanon.

He was not a social revolutionary, but his message was a radical one in the context of Lebanese Shīʿism. For that reason he was regarded with suspicion by the traditional clerics, and with alarm by the great families. However, he gained support amongst many who were becoming more conscious of their Shīʿī identities, but felt excluded either because they did not come from notable families, or because the concerns of the Shīʿa were rarely taken into account by Lebanon's political leaders. This support led to the formation of the Supreme Islamic Shīʿī Council (al Majlis al Islāmī al Shīʿī al Aʿala), set up and headed by Musa al Ṣadr in the mid 1960s. It was not a radical body and was made up largely of the established clerical and lay figures of the Shīʿī

27 Fouad Ajami, *The vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon* (Ithaca, 1986), pp. 32–41.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 96.

community, but, under al Ṣadr, it became the voice of the Shīʿa, organising around issues of resource allocation, deprivation and communal protection. As the political situation deteriorated in the early 1970s its role – and that of al Ṣadr – became increasingly prominent.²⁹

1970–2007: authoritarian rule and Islamist political engagement

Given the disappointments of the first twenty five years of independence, it was not surprising that the 1970s should have ushered in a period of unrest in the *mashriq*. It allowed Islamist movements to put into practice many of the ideas developed in the preceding years – ideas that had increasing appeal following general disenchantment with nationalist and socialist regimes. Nevertheless, despite their universal vision of an ascendant Islam, the ideas and strategies of the Islamist organisations were shaped more by the political realities of the states in which they operated. The struggle to control state policy now came to the fore.

Lebanon

It was in Lebanon that this militancy first made itself felt. Communal disaffection, sectarian politics and the emergence of party and communal militias contributed to the turmoil of Lebanese politics in the early 1970s. In this setting, Musa al Ṣadr founded a militant political organisation, Ḥarakat al Maḥrūmīn (Movement of the deprived). It staged its first public show of strength in March 1974 and soon its militia – Amal (an acronym of Afwaj al Muqawamat al Lubnaniyya (Battalions of the Lebanese resistance)) – had become a visible sign of this new style of militant Shīʿī politics.³⁰ The movement accepted the plural, confessional nature of Lebanese politics, but called for its overhaul and redress for the Shīʿa.

This was not radical enough for some, and in the civil war that engulfed Lebanon from 1975, al Ṣadr's calls for reconciliation with the other communities often fell on deaf ears. However, Shīʿī militancy was creating increasing friction between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) forces and the Shīʿa of southern Lebanon, whose villages bore the brunt of Israeli reprisals.

29 Augustus R. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a* (Austin, 1987), pp. 37–44; Ferdinand Smit, *The battle for South Lebanon: The radicalisation of Lebanon's Shi'ites, 1982–1985* (Amsterdam, 2000), pp. 64–5.

30 Johnson, *Class and client*, pp. 171–2; Smit, *Battle for South Lebanon*, pp. 73–80; Halawi, *Lebanon defied*, pp. 182–7.

The attempt to resolve this tension cost al Ṣadr his life. In 1978 he disappeared while on a visit to Libya, almost certainly killed by the Libyan authorities because he was seen as an obstacle to Libyan leader Gaddafi's plans for the PLO in Lebanon.

Al Ṣadr's death led to greater emphasis on Amal's secular, communal nature as an organisation operating within the existing Lebanese political system. However, this coincided with the dramatic events of the revolution in Iran of 1978/9 which brought to power Ayat Allah Khomeini and led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The repercussions were felt across the Islamic world, particularly amongst the Shī'a of Lebanon, and, although Amal's leadership supported the Iranian revolution, few of them shared Khomeini's political vision of *wilayat al faqih* (rule of the jurisconsult). However, enthusiasm for Khomeini's uncompromising ideas about Islamic government grew.³¹ Even so, most Shī'a looked to Ayat Allah Abū'l Qasim al Khu'ī (d. 1992) of Najaf as their *marja'* (source of emulation), and to Amal, now led by the lawyer Nabih Barri, for their political representation. Barri rejected the idea of an Islamic state, believing that the secular state in Lebanon should be strengthened, precisely to redress the imbalances in power among the communities. He also reflected Shī'a resentment at the continued presence of the PLO in Lebanon, leading to frequent clashes between Amal and PLO forces in the period preceding the Israeli invasion of June 1982.

This dramatic and violent event brought Israeli forces to Beirut, driving both Syrian and PLO forces before them and causing thousands of casualties in Lebanon's coastal cities. At first welcomed by many of the Shī'a of the south as deliverance from the PLO, the invasion drew Iran more closely into Lebanese affairs, with the despatch of Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley. This was both cause and effect of the radicalisation of a section of the Shī'a. Within Amal it led to the formation of Amal Islāmī (Islamic Amal) under Husayn al Musawī, whose views were so much at odds with Barri's that he and his followers were expelled from the organisation in 1982.³²

Enthusiasm for Islamic government was soon expressed in a more formidable organisation. In early 1984 Ḥizbullah (The party of God) appeared in strength in Baalbek, although its constituent parts had already been cooperating, particularly in the southern suburbs of Beirut and increasingly in the south of the country. Many of the clerics who helped to set up the

³¹ Smit, *Battle for South Lebanon*, pp. 105–8.

³² Stephan Rosiny, *Islamismus bei den Schiiten im Libanon* (Berlin, 1996), pp. III–20.

organisation had studied under Baqir al Ṣadr in Najaf and were admirers of Khomeini and of the achievements of the Iranian revolution. Men such as Sayyid ‘Abbas al Musawī (d. 1992) and Shaykh Subḥī al Ṭufaylī were sympathetic to the Iranian government at the time, even if they did not always echo its policies. When, towards the end of 1983, the relationship between the Israeli occupying forces and the local Shī‘ī population began to deteriorate, it was Ḥizbullah that exploited the situation and launched a series of devastating attacks on Israeli forces and installations.³³

In 1985 Ḥizbullah outlined its main goals: the expulsion of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the eventual establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. These goals seemed to commit the organisation to a war on many fronts, against formidable odds. However, the ground had been prepared by the influence of the cleric most closely identified with the spiritual guidance of Ḥizbullah, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allah. An Islamic scholar who had written extensively on contemporary political concerns, Faḍl Allah stressed the right to use force in self defence, and the need to uphold Islamic principles and, if necessary, to fight to defend them. For him, Islam was both a ‘call’ and a state (*da‘wa wa dawla*). He remained constant in his belief that an Islamic state should be established in Lebanon, but believed that it must be the result of a long process of persuasion which would bring all Lebanese, even the Christians, to see the advantages of an Islamic order.³⁴

These twin goals have shaped Ḥizbullah involvement in Lebanese politics, particularly after the Ṭa’if Accords in 1989, which brought the civil war to an end. From 1992, under its new secretary general, Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣr Allah, it deployed a twofold strategy of fighting the Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon and organising itself as an effective communal party representing the Shī‘a. The guerrilla campaign precipitated Israel’s decision to withdraw in 2000 and greatly enhanced Ḥizbullah’s reputation across the country, contributing to its electoral success. In 2005 it was included in the government for the first time, but the following year its actions against Israeli forces provoked the devastating, if indecisive, war of 2006. Undeclared and undaunted, Ḥizbullah made numerous demands of the Lebanese government, from which it resigned, turning to direct action in an effort to bring it down. In the increasingly turbulent politics of Lebanon, Ḥizbullah showed

³³ Ibid., pp. 126–36.

³⁴ Smit, *Battle for South Lebanon*, pp. 247–57; Rosiny, *Islamismus bei den Schiiten*, pp. 142–5; Chibli Mallat, *Shi‘i thought from the south of Lebanon* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 35–42; Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah, *Islam wa manṭiq al quwa* (Beirut, 1979).

that its combination of paramilitary might and community support had made it a formidable player.

Syria

Syria's involvement in Lebanon following its 1976 military intervention, effectively in support of the Christian forces, helped to precipitate violent conflict between the Ba'thist government and its Islamist opponents. Dominated by Hafiz al Asad (pres. 1971–2000) and his fellow 'Alawis the regime laid itself open to the charge that Syria was ruled by a narrow sectarian community. The issue had surfaced in 1973 when al Asad introduced a new constitution, omitting any mention of the role of Islam. This enraged clerics and Muslim lay people alike and sparked off widespread rioting. The Muslim Brotherhood rallied the traditionally disdainful '*ulama*', and the combined protests had some impact. Al Asad inserted the stipulation that the president of the republic must be a Muslim. Since many of the protestors regarded al Asad and the 'Alawis as infidels, this did little to placate them. However, al Asad also obtained a *fatwa* from Musa al Ṣadr in Lebanon that the 'Alawis were a branch of the Shī'a and thus part of the Muslim *umma*. The general sense of outrage had, however, allowed the new, more aggressive leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood to organise actively in defiance of the regime.³⁵

In 1970 al 'Aṭṭar had been challenged by the members of the Brotherhood precisely over the issue of armed jihad. This resulted in a rift between al 'Aṭṭar's followers and those who looked to Marwan Ḥadid, Sa'īd Ḥawwa (d. 1989) and 'Adnan Sa'd al Din. Their more militant attitude dictated the pace of the growing confrontation. The death of Ḥadid in custody in 1976 preceded a mounting campaign of violence on both sides, marked by the massacre of over sixty 'Alawī military cadets in Aleppo in 1979 by the Brotherhood, and the killing of scores of Brotherhood prisoners in the infamous Tadmur prison in 1980.³⁶ Strikes, demonstrations and police repression, as well as bombings, assassinations, shoot outs and extra judicial killings of the regime's opponents were becoming so much of part of Syrian life that it seemed that the country was heading towards civil war. The formation of the Islamic Front in Syria (al Jabahat al Islamiyya fī Suriyya) in 1980 brought the

35 Abd Allah, *Islamic struggle*, p. 111; Abbas Kelidar, 'Religion and state in Syria', *Asian Affairs*, 1 (1974), pp. 16–22.

36 Nikolaos van Dam, *The struggle for power in Syria: Politics and society under Asad and the Ba'th Party* (London, 1996), pp. 89–100; Middle East Watch, *Syria unmasked* (New Haven, 1990), pp. 61–2.

two wings of the Brotherhood together under the leadership of 'Alī Ṣadr al Dīn al Bayanūnī, 'Adnan Sa'd al Dīn and Sa'īd Ḥawwa, making it a more effective countrywide organisation, and intensifying the armed struggle.³⁷

In April 1982 the decisive confrontation took place in Hama. Groups affiliated to the Islamic Front seized control of the city, but found themselves isolated. In a few days of ferocious fighting, al Asad's Special Brigades reduced much of the old city of Hama to rubble, killing not only all the units of the Islamic Front, but also thousands of its trapped civilian inhabitants.³⁸ This broke the back of the Islamist resistance. Small radical groups continued a campaign of intermittent violence, but the Muslim Brotherhood abandoned armed jihad as a means of changing the regime in Syria, and by the 1990s some elements had entered into a dialogue with the government. Al Asad made no concessions, but did make various symbolic gestures towards Islam. After 1996, under the exiled leadership of al Bayanūnī, the Brotherhood placed less emphasis on the establishment of an Islamic state in Syria, and joined instead the secular calls for greater liberalisation of political life, which became more vocal after the succession of Bashar al Asad to the presidency following his father's death in 2000.³⁹

Jordan

These events in Syria inevitably affected Jordan, since it represented a safe haven from the Syrian security services. At times the issue became so critical that it threatened to result in open conflict between the two countries, but it also led to sporadic attempts by the Jordanian government to curb the Brotherhood in the interests of better relations with Syria. However, by the late 1980s the king needed the Brotherhood's help to defuse growing public dissatisfaction over the critical state of the Jordanian economy. The unrest, with its overtones of tribal and provincial disenchantment with the dynasty, was as serious as the disaffection of the Palestinians had been in the 1970s. It was then that the bond between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood had proved its worth for the king, helping him in the violent confrontations between Jordanian security forces and the PLO in 1970–1 and in the troubled years that followed.

37 Abd Allah, *Islamic struggle*, pp. 112–17, 123–4; Raymond Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from above* (London, 2001), pp. 97–101.

38 Van Dam, *Struggle for power in Syria*, pp. 111–17.

39 Chris Kutschera, 'L'éclipse des frères musulmans syriens', *Les Cahiers de l'Orient*, 7 (1987), pp. 121–31; Hans Gunter Lohmeyer, *Islamismus und sozialer Konflikt in Syrien*, *Ethnizität und Gesellschaft Occasional Papers* no. 26 (Berlin, 1990), pp. 56–61; Annabelle Bottcher, *Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad* (Freiburg, 1998), pp. 107–19, 149–65; Eyal Zisser, *Asad's Legacy* (London, 2001), pp. 196–203.

The king's answer to the crisis of 1989 was to hold parliamentary elections the freest since the 1950s. The Muslim Brotherhood threw itself into the election campaign and emerged as the largest single bloc in the new parliament where, together with some independent Islamists, it formed the Islamic Action Front (IAF). This proved useful for the king in the summer of 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Brotherhood backed his opposition to Western military action against Iraq and supported him when the dire financial consequences of breaking ranks with the Gulf states became apparent. As a reward, members of the IAF were appointed as ministers in January 1991, bringing Muslim Brothers into the Jordanian government for the first time.

However, acceptance of government office was controversial in a way that participation in the elections had not been and, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the king's rapprochement with the United States and participation in the peace process with Israel led to a falling out with the Brotherhood. The IAF left the government and the king amended the electoral law to favour traditional and independent candidates. In the 1993 elections the Brotherhood lost many of its seats, and no longer dominated the parliament. However, part of the reason for its electoral loss was the disillusionment felt by some of the electorate that the Brotherhood had achieved so little during the previous four years.

More radical expectations were also putting a strain on the Brotherhood's support for the dynasty, particularly after the signing of a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1994, leading some to support *Ḥizb al Taḥrīr* or the activist, radical Islamist group *Jaysh Muḥammad* (Muhammad's army). Founded by Samīḥ Abu Zaydan, and composed initially of Jordanians who had joined the *mujahidīn* (Islamist resistance fighters under the Soviet occupation) in Afghanistan, it attracted younger Islamists who shared the belief that they had an obligation to pursue armed jihad wherever secular government reinforced *jahiliyya* (ignorance (of the message of God)) and condoned *shirk* (idolatry). These views and associated acts of violence meant that it was soon targeted by the Jordanian security forces and had limited impact. However, there exists a violent and unreconciled element in the Islamist movement in Jordan, even if it remains on the margins of mainstream Islamist politics. In fact, after the election boycott of 1997, the pragmatic leadership of the Brotherhood reasserted itself, ready to re-establish a working relationship with King 'Abd Allah II, who succeeded his father in 1999.⁴⁰

40 Abu Amr, 'La monarchie jordanienne', pp. 129–34; Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan* (Tel Aviv, 1998), pp. 47–50.

Palestine

Similar processes had affected the Muslim Brotherhood and its relations with other Islamist groups in Palestine following Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood was in a poor condition to organise any form of resistance, and this was largely left to the PLO. Some members of the Brotherhood, impatient with inaction, broke with it to form smaller groupings, strongly influenced by Islamist radicalism in Egypt. They rejected gradualism and called for violent opposition to the Israeli occupation, forming the networks which became al Jihād al Islāmī (Islamic Jihad) in the 1980s.⁴¹

The Brotherhood leadership recognised that the Israeli occupation and Palestinian nationalist, sometimes socialist, resistance were pushing Islamic institutions and values to the margins. It therefore adopted a strategy of communal development, through educational programmes and preaching. Financially assisted by Palestinians in the oil rich states of the Gulf, the results were soon visible in the occupied territories, as the number of mosques, for example, doubled on the West Bank and trebled in Gaza in the two decades following 1967. In 1973 the Brotherhood in Gaza set up al Mujama' al Islāmī (the Islamic centre) to coordinate its welfare and educational activities, including the newly established Islamic University of Gaza. This became a leading institution in forming a new generation of Islamist intellectuals, numbering among its founders men who shaped Islamist politics in Palestine for the next thirty years: Aḥmad Yasīn (d. 2004), 'Abd al 'Azīz al Rantīsī (d. 2004) and Muḥammad al Zahhar.⁴² During the 1980s the Brotherhood also made inroads into the campuses of Palestinian universities, raising its visibility and often capitalising on disillusionment with the apparent lack of success of the secular PLO.⁴³

The outbreak of the *intifāda* (uprising) in 1987 galvanised the Muslim Brotherhood into new forms of activity. The *intifāda* was a spontaneous response to years of anger at Israeli military occupation. It was led by young men who had only known the condition of occupation and sharply resented it. This impassioned movement challenged established Palestinian organisations, which then tried to channel and direct it. Prominent among these was Ḥamas (acronym of Ḥarakat al Muqawamat al Islamiyya (Movement of Islamic resistance)), which emerged in late 1987 to facilitate Brotherhood

41 Hroub, *Hamas*, pp. 31–3. 42 Abu Amr, *Islamic fundamentalism*, pp. 14–16.

43 Khalid Nimr Abu al 'Umrain, *Ḥamas Ḥarakat al Muqawamat al Islamiyya* (Cairo, 2000), pp. 180–93.

participation in the *intifāda*, and to protect it from the consequences of doing so. In large measure, it was a successful strategy.

Ḥamas, with its military apparatus, Kata'ib 'Izz al Dīn al Qassam (The 'Izz al Dīn al Qassam brigades), became deeply involved in the *intifāda*, and its 1988 charter showed how its aspirations were shaped by the contours of the Palestinian national struggle. It stated that Ḥamas was 'a distinctively Palestinian movement', the object of which was to 'raise the banner of God over every inch of Palestine', sacralising Palestinian national aspirations by declaring that 'the land of Palestine is an Islamic land entrusted to the Muslim generations until Judgment Day. No one may renounce all or even part of it'.⁴⁴

This was also the case of the initially more radical organisation, al Jihad al Islāmī, the leaders of which, 'Abd al 'Azīz al 'Awda and Fathī al Shīqaqī (d. 1995), had been calling for armed resistance to Israel since 1980. Critical of the quietism of the Muslim Brotherhood, al 'Awda gained a following among the same generation that was to spark the *intifāda*, rearticulating the views of Egyptians Ḥasan al Banna (d. 1949) and Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966), as well as those of Khomeini, on the need for Islamic government to dispel the forces of *jahiliyya*. Nevertheless, al Jihad al Islāmī is also a product of Palestinian history and is focused on the condition of Palestine. Al 'Awda acknowledged this, declaring: 'I am a Palestinian Muslim; I consider Palestine to be the most important nation in the Islamic world. I hope that an Islamic state can be established there; we dream of this.'⁴⁵

The Oslo agreements of 1993 and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) under President Arafat (pres. 1993–2004), generated an optimism that gave way to disappointment in the years that followed. Negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities were intermittent and unequal, while resentment mounted at the corruption of politics under Arafat. As the situation deteriorated, and attitudes hardened, the Islamists prepared for a more militant stance against the Israeli occupation. This erupted in the second *intifāda* *intifādat al aqsa* the armed uprising of 2000 which initiated years of violence, devastated the Palestinian territories and embittered relations on all sides.

44 Hroub, *Hamas*, pp. 270, 273; Jawad al Ḥamad and Iyad al Barghuthī (eds.), *Dirasa fi al fikr al siyasi li Ḥarakat al Muqawamat al Islamiyya (Ḥamas)*, 1987–1996 (Amman, 1997), pp. 155–71.

45 Abu Amr, *Islamic fundamentalism*, pp. 90–7, 103–5; Fathī al Shīqaqī, 'Al qaḍīyyat al filastīniyya', *al Mukhtar al Islāmī* (13) July 1980', in Rif'at Sayyid Aḥmad (ed.), *Riḥlat al damm alladhī ḥazama al saif al a'mal al kamila li l shahīd al dukkur Fathī al Shīqaqī* (Cairo, 1997), part 1, pp. 172–89.

Under the pressure of these events, the ranks of the Islamist organisations in Palestine swelled, giving Ḥamas a dominant position in the municipal elections in Gaza in 2005 and in the elections for the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC) in 2006. It won over half the seats and formed a government, under Prime Minister Isma‘īl Haniyya, thereby presenting a challenge to Fataḥ’s Maḥmud ‘Abbas who had been elected president of the PNA in 2005, following the death of Arafat. Since Ḥamas refused to recognise Israel, President ‘Abbas could not easily press forward with negotiations for further Israeli withdrawals, nor could he do much to remedy the deteriorating economic situation in Palestine, where vital aid from the European Union and the United States had been cut off when the Ḥamas government took office. Stalemate was characterised by a worsening security situation as well, with clashes not only between Palestinian and Israeli forces, but also between forces loyal to Ḥamas and those of Fataḥ. Temporarily resolved by the formation of a Ḥamas Fataḥ coalition government in 2007, these developments put increasing pressure on Ḥamas as it tried to govern an embryonic nation state from an ideological vantage point that made compromise uncomfortable.

Iraq

Like their counterparts in Syria and Palestine, both the traditional Islamic hierarchy and the activists of various Islamist organisations in Iraq were also faced by the problem of how best to respond to established state power which they regarded as oppressive and hostile. In this case, the Ba‘thist regime that came to power in 1968 was manifestly secular, yet also expected public backing from the clerical establishment, whether Sunni or Shi‘i. In 1969 the most senior Shi‘i cleric in Iraq, Ayat Allah Muḥsin al Ḥakīm, clashed with the government over this, as did his successor Ayat Allah Abu’l Qasim al Khu‘i. In many respects he represented a very prominent trend in Shi‘i Islam which holds that worldly power corrupts and which discourages active clerical engagement in politics. With the increasing repression of Shi‘i organisations by the government, Ayat Allah Muḥammad Baqir al Ṣadr and al Da‘wa seemed to some to be more effective in protecting the community. However, the ferocity of the government response to the *intifaḍa ṣafar* (uprising of the month of Ṣafar) in 1977 showed that there were clear limits to open defiance.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Hanna Batatu, ‘Shi‘i organizations in Iraq: Al Da‘wah al Islamiyyah and al Mujahidin’, in J. R. I. Cole and N. Keddie (eds.), *Shi‘ism and social protest* (New Haven, 1986), pp. 192–7.

In 1978 events in Iran gave new heart to al Da‘wa and to those who believed that an Islamic ordering of the state was possible, despite the formidable odds against it. With the overthrow of the shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Iraqi government was faced by dangers from without and within. To the east, Iran made no secret of its desire to ‘export the revolution’. At the same time, the success of the revolution and the establishment of a state founded on distinctive Islamic principles, presided over by Shi‘i clerics and suffused with the symbolism of Shi‘i sacred history, acted as a powerful influence on large sections of Iraq’s Shi‘a. It was the hope of some, and clearly the dread of the Iraqi government, that these two powerful forces would come together and overturn the existing political order in Iraq itself.

This combination of factors led Saddam Hussein (pres. 1979–2003) to take over the presidency of Iraq in mid 1979. Al Ṣadr was placed under house arrest, and the protests across the Shi‘i south and in Baghdad were met by violent repression: thousands were arrested, many disappeared into the prison network of the regime, scores were executed, including both Shi‘i and Sunni ‘*ulama*’, and others fled into exile. At the same time, al Da‘wa agreed with some of the smaller radical Islamist organisations – Jund al Imam (Army of the Imam) and Munẓamat al ‘Amal al Islāmī (Islamic task organisation) – on the need for armed force to overthrow the regime. Unusually, the generally conservative and cautious Jama‘at al ‘Ulama’ (Society of religious scholars, founded by Ayat Allah al Ḥakīm in 1958) endorsed this strategy.

When, in 1980, members of the Islamic Task Organisation tried to assassinate the deputy prime minister the repression intensified. Membership of al Da‘wa was made punishable by death and Ayat Allah Baqir al Ṣadr, and his sister, Bint al Huda (d. 1980), an Islamic scholar in her own right, were seized by the authorities and summarily executed in Baghdad in April 1980. In Najaf the senior cleric, Ayat Allah al Khu‘ī, was placed under close guard, and tens of thousands of Shi‘i Iraqis were deported on the pretext that their Iranian family origins made their loyalties suspect. These measures were a prelude to the war that broke out in September 1980, when Iraqi forces invaded southern Iran. The war was to last nearly eight years, costing about one and a half million casualties on both sides and effectively ruining the economies of these two hitherto oil rich countries.

As the war dragged on, the Iraqi government tried to mobilise its own population. It launched a campaign of sustained public religiosity, including a programme of mosque building, restoration of the great Shi‘i shrines of Iraq

and the honouring of religious scholars. Ayat Allah Khomeini and his fellow clerics were depicted as thinly disguised Iranian nationalists and 'Magians'. By contrast, Saddam Hussein was portrayed not simply as a pious Muslim, but also as a direct descendant of the fourth caliph, Imam 'Alī. The war years witnessed the attempted 'nationalisation' of Islam in Iraq, bringing together the discourse of hitherto secular Ba'thism and that of Islamic identity in ways that would have seemed unimaginable only a few years before.⁴⁷

It is hard to know how much effect this had on the bulk of the Iraqi population. For some, it clearly had no effect at all. In 1982 Muḥammad Baqir al Ḥakīm (d. 2003), a son of the late Ayat Allah al Ḥakīm, formed al Majlis al A'ala li l Thawrat al Islamiyya fī al 'Iraq (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)), amongst the growing Iraqi exile population in Iran, subscribing both to Khomeini's doctrine of the *wilayat al faqih* and vowing to dedicate the organisation to the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. Its armed wing, the Badr Brigade, was intermittently active, but had no visible impact on the course of the war, which ended in the summer of 1988. The Iranian government had finally accepted the UN ceasefire, acknowledging that it could not achieve its war aim of setting up a like minded Islamic government in Baghdad.

The ending of the war, proclaimed as a victory in Iraq, was a hollow victory. So great were the problems confronting Saddam Hussein in its aftermath that in 1990 he embarked on another risky military adventure, the invasion and annexation of Kuwait. Intended to pressurise the oil rich Gulf states into cancelling Iraq's multi billion dollar debts and contributing to its reconstruction, the invasion of Kuwait had disastrous consequences for Iraq. An international coalition, led by the United States, under the authority of the UN, carried out a brief military campaign in January and February 1991 which destroyed whole sectors of Iraq's infrastructure and routed the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait.

It was then that the accumulated anger of the predominantly Shī'ī population of southern Iraq exploded into what was known as the *intifāda sha'ban* (uprising of the month of Sha'ban). Led by neighbourhood committees and by Shī'ī Islamist organisations, the rebels captured towns across southern Iraq. However, despite the formation of a committee to keep order, which had the blessing of Ayat Allah al Khu'ī, the rebellion lacked coordination. Saddam Hussein used the Special Republican Guard in a systematic and

47 Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, Iraq, *The Central Report of the Ninth Regional Congress, June 1982* (Baghdad, 1983), pp. 245–84.

ruthless campaign of reconquest and the Shī'ī rebels, confined to the towns they had captured and denied US air support, were crushed city by city with terrible loss of life. By the end of March the rebellion was over and al Khu'ī was forced to declare his support for Saddam Hussein and to call for an end to the revolt.

Saddam Hussein had survived, but Iraq paid a fearsome price since the international economic sanctions imposed when Iraq invaded Kuwait were maintained for the next twelve years. Under these conditions the Iraqi government continued to pose as the true guardian of the Islamic community, inscribing '*Allahu Akbar*' (God is most great) on the Iraqi flag, patronising favoured clerics in the Shī'ī establishment, and lavishly restoring the shrines at Najaf and Karbala', damaged by its own forces in 1991. It also patronised the Sunni '*ulama*', helping to revive some of the prominent Sufi orders so characteristic of Sunni Islam in Iraq, such as the Qadiriyya, the Naqshbandiyya and Sahrawardiyya.

Among the population at large there was a noticeable increase in religiosity, possibly due to the miserable conditions of the sanctions era, which emphasised the importance of mosque networks and charitable foundations. One of the most prominent of these was organised by Ayat Allah Muḥammad Ṣādiq al Ṣadr (d. 1999). The size of his following, and his protest when a succession of senior Shī'ī clerics were murdered by government agents in the mid 1990s, made him a marked man, and he too was murdered in 1999, together with two of his sons. The extensive riots that followed were swiftly suppressed. However, there was little that the principal *marja'* and senior Shī'ī cleric, Ayat Allah 'Alī al Sistani, could do. He shared his late mentor al Khu'ī's mistrust of political activism, but he had also been placed under virtual house arrest in 1994 because of the regime's fear of his independence and authority.

The only area of Iraq to escape Saddam Hussein's control was the part of north eastern Iraq under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government set up under the protection of the allies following the failed rebellion of 1991. Dominated by two secular Kurdish nationalist parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and their sometimes violent relationship, the region witnessed the emergence of a relatively plural politics. Kurdish Islamist parties took advantage of this – most notably the Kurdistan Islamic Party. Their critique of the Kurdish government was a conventional Islamist one, focusing on the lack of *shari'a* based legislation and the absence of enforced observance of distinctively Islamic practices in public life. Nevertheless, they accepted the framework of the regional administration and the emerging forms of representative life. This distinguished

them from the more radical Anşar al Sunna (Followers of the Sunna), who rejected the existing order and held to a strict interpretation of Islamic obligations, which they tried to enforce in a few inaccessible villages of north eastern Kurdistan to which they had been forced to retreat.

In the event, Saddam Hussein's downfall came about as a result not of internal opposition, but of the invasion of Iraq by the United States and some of its allies in March 2003. For over a year Iraq was administered by the United States through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), assisted by a British administration in Basra. Many exiles returned, al Da'wa resurfaced and Ayat Allah 'Alī al Sistani emerged as a figure whose following among the Shī'a of Iraq made him a national leader, courted by the occupying powers. Although wary of endorsing the occupation of Iraq, he called for cooperation with the occupiers while order was restored. This was of immeasurable benefit to the US forces, who discovered that governing Iraq was a difficult, contested and increasingly violent business. Partly to address these problems, the CPA looked to the communal leaders of Iraq to assist in the maintenance of order.

Thus, al Da'wa re emerged as an active player, as did the SCIRI, while in various parts of Iraq the Islamic Task Organisation, Hizbullah and other Shī'ī Islamist groups began to organise openly. Given the breakdown of security following the dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces and police, armed militias associated with the different groupings appeared. This was the case of Jaysh al Mahdī (the Mahdī's army), led by Muqtaḍa al Ṣadr, one of the surviving sons of the late Ayat Allah Ṣādiq al Ṣadr. Muqtaḍa gained influence among the younger generation of poor and unemployed Shī'a because of his Islamist populist message, mixing demands for social justice with defiance of foreign occupation.

For many of the Shī'a, resentment of foreign occupation was tempered by the belief that it could allow the development of representative institutions which would ensure that the Shī'ī majority in Iraq (about 55 per cent of the population) would for the first time in Iraqi history have an influence proportionate to their numbers. The same prospect filled others in Iraq with dread. For secularists the role of Islam was of concern, while for many of the Sunni Arabs, whether Islamist or nationalist, the possibility of being ruled by a Shī'ī majority seemed to herald a world turned upside down. In these conditions a violent resistance movement emerged among the resentful former members of the Iraqi security forces and among the Sunni Islamist groupings.

The sectarian implications of this development soon became apparent. Shī'ī neighbourhoods and political figures were targeted, including Ayat

Allah Muḥammad Baqir al Ḥakīm, killed in Najaf in August 2003. Shī‘ī militias retaliated, and this, in turn, encouraged the growth of self consciously Sunni Muslim organisations. The Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq had long existed, in the shape of the Iraqi Islamic Party, but its cooperation with the occupying powers led to challenges from more radical groups, such as Jaysh Muḥammad and al Jaysh al Islāmī (Islamic army). Meanwhile Anṣār al Sunna, dislodged from their refuge on the Iranian border, spread through Iraq, linking up with like minded groups, some identifying themselves as part of the transnational organisation of al Qa‘ida, recruiting Iraqis and non Iraqis alike for a violent struggle against the foreign occupiers and their Shī‘ī allies.

The elections of 2005 confirmed the victory of the United Iraqi Alliance, known as the ‘Shī‘ī list’, endorsed by al Sistani and comprising the SCIRI, al Da‘wa and the followers of Muqtaḍa al Ṣadr. They and the Kurdish nationalist parties drafted the new constitution and dominated parliament, alienating many of the Sunni Muslims of Arab Iraq, mainly represented by the Iraqi Islamic Party. Although the latter was included in a ‘government of national unity’ in 2006, this did little to halt the sectarian warfare and insurgency, especially in mixed cities such as Baghdad, and the violence across Iraq cost some 36,000 lives that year alone. The irony was that the collapse of the dictatorship had led to more open and plural politics. But this generally followed communal lines, and appeared to encourage a murderous struggle between sectarian and ethnic communities to establish their dominance in different parts of the country. The challenge was how to harness and reconcile these passions, if the state as a whole were not to fragment.

Conclusions

Three major themes recur in the history of distinctively Islamic responses to the forces that shaped the modern Middle East in the twentieth century. The first is the ambivalence shown towards the state as an apparatus and as an idea. For many Islamists the territorial nation state has been at best a questionable object of loyalty and at worst a secular institution that demanded the kind of submission a Muslim should give to God alone. Yet most of the Islamist organisations in the region were deeply implicated in the politics of specific states and their associated societies – even where such movements had transnational affiliations. By the end of the century, therefore, the territorial nation state had become a powerful presence in the *mashriq*, the

centre of gravity both of political action and of the political imagination, whether Islamic or secular.

Equally, the dominant economic system of market driven development had drawn the region into the global capitalist economy and had set in motion forces within these societies of enormous transformative potential. New understandings of property rights, capitalist investment in agriculture and the beginnings of industrial production, as well as the financial institutions to organise and regulate the pace of development – all of these processes intensified as the foundations of national economies were laid down in the new states. For Muslims concerned about the impact of these developments on the communities of Islamic belief there were two main preoccupations. The first was a fear for the degradation of the moral economy caused by new techniques of wealth creation and the normative framework of capitalism. However, there was also a wish that Muslims should work effectively within the global economy in ways that combined economic productivity with distinctively Islamic values.

Finally, partly as a consequence of these debates and movements, an increasingly sectarian definition of Islamic identity emerged. Discourses of Islamic communal identification within the arena of the nation state encouraged a sharply critical, sometimes utilitarian attitude to existing Islamic traditions. Defensive preoccupations led some to reduce what it means to be a Muslim to a set of prescriptions which did violence to traditional scholarship and sharpened sectarian differences among Muslims, as well as with non Muslims, reinforcing fault lines in communally divided societies. Ironically, in the search for authenticity, many Islamist movements had adopted the idioms of the very nationalism that they had dedicated themselves to oppose. The working out of these tensions and their implications for the handling of power thus constitute the basis of an important aspect of the history of Islam in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine during the twentieth century.

Egypt from 1919

JOEL GORDON

The national moment

When the Young Turks allied with the Central Powers in the Great War, Britain declared Egypt a protectorate, severing its formal links to the Ottoman Empire. The British deposed the khedive, ‘Abbas Hilmi II (r. 1892–1914) and appointed his uncle, Ḥusayn Kamil (r. 1914–17), sultan. Nationalists attempted to forge links with Istanbul and Berlin, and made two attempts on the sultan’s life. Yet with martial law in place, the short lived legislative assembly proscribed and most leading politicians under house arrest, political life ground to a halt. Officially, the protectorate would last only the war’s duration, but a wave of civilian administrators arrived, along with thousands of Commonwealth troops. Egypt was the springboard for the Gallipoli campaign, then the invasion of Syria. Not under arms, but supporting British forces, were over 100,000 Egyptian conscripts. From Egypt’s farms the British requisitioned livestock, foodstuffs and equipment. Landowners were forced to plant grains instead of cotton. All of Egypt suffered from spiralling prices. Beneath the surface, nationalist politics reached a boiling point.

Two days after the armistice was signed in November 1918, the Wafd, a self-styled Egyptian delegation of nationalist leaders, presented to British authorities a formal request to attend the Paris peace conference in order to press demands for an end to the protectorate. The high commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, entertained Sa’d Zaghlul (d. 1927) and several associates, but his superiors in London rejected their proposal. The Wafd commenced a petition drive validating its leadership of the national movement. When British authorities arrested Zaghlul and three colleagues and deported them, unrest erupted in Cairo and quickly spread throughout the country. Demonstrations, strikes, riots and acts of sabotage prompted a new high commissioner, Sir Edmund Allenby, to release the Wafd leaders and allow

Zaghlul to lead a delegation to France in April 1919. However, Britain's intention to retain the protectorate prompted Egyptians to boycott the Milner mission of 1919–20 and demonstrate against negotiations held between British foreign secretary Lord Curzon and Zaghlul's rival 'Adli Yakan (d. 1933) in 1921. Wafd leaders were again sent into exile, but with no real cessation in civil disturbances, Allenby pressed for a redefinition of Anglo Egyptian relations.

The uprising became the defining moment in Egyptian nationalist identity formation. Whatever the disappointments of the coming years and there would be many Egyptians treasured memories of 1919. The 'revolution' would be recalled in memoirs and fiction as the mobilisation of the entire nation. Students, workers, shopkeepers, urban professionals and peasants marched side by side. Upper class 'veiled' women took to the streets and traversed British barricades. The Wafdists women's committee, led by Huda Sha'rawi (d. 1947), laid the groundwork for the abandonment of restrictive garb and the emergence of educated women into the public sphere. Muslim, Christian and Jewish clerics spoke to mixed congregations in each other's houses of worship. Crescent and cross fused into a shared symbol and the oration of the late nationalist leader Muṣṭafa Kamil (d. 1908) 'my country, you have my love and devotion' set to music by popular composer Sayyid Darwish (d. 1923), became the nationalist anthem.

The liberal experiment

Under British supervision and amid fractious battles over just how much supervision to accept Egyptian nationalists laid foundations for an independent constitutional monarchy and the onset of the liberal era. In 1921 Sultan Aḥmad Fu'ad (r. 1917–36), who had succeeded Ḥusayn Kamil in 1917, became King Fu'ad I. Under the 1923 constitution the monarch retained authority to dismiss parliament at royal whim and appoint a government without calling elections. The British 'reserved' the right to intervene in Egyptian domestic affairs in four areas: imperial communications; minority issues; internal security; and the Sudan. For liberals such as Zaghlul, whose Wafd now transformed itself into a political party, the rallying cry became 'full independence'. Much to their dismay, royal prerogative, British reservations and the political conservatism of landed and new industrial elites fearful of the populist power unleashed by the 1919 revolution all contributed to the ultimate failure of the liberal 'experiment'.

In late 1923 the Wafd swept Egypt's first elections. In January 1924, at Fu'ad's invitation, Sa'd Zaghlul became prime minister. Zaghlul quickly set out to strengthen parliament's hand, antagonising both the palace and the British. Eleven months later, following the murder of Sir Lee Stack, the British commander of Egypt's armed forces and governor general of the Sudan, by Wafdist linked militants, High Commissioner Allenby delivered an ultimatum forcing Zaghlul to resign; in his place the king appointed a minority government led by a long time rival. Arguably, the system never recovered.

A vicious cycle of politics ensued for the next three decades. Wafd led street protests invariably compelled the king, always in consultation with his British overseers, to shuffle minority governments and finally call elections. Clean elections always produced a Wafdist victory, but the majority party's positions engendered a political stalemate that resulted in monarchical intervention and the reappointment of unelected minority coalitions. Between 1924 and 1952 the majority party ruled only six times, never holding power longer than two years. Sa'd Zaghlul led the Wafd to victory twice after 1924, but on both occasions declined to form a government and instead presided over the chamber of deputies. Upon his death in 1927, he was succeeded by Muṣṭafa al Naḥḥas (d. 1965). Naḥḥas would lead the party through increasingly troubled days to the brink of catastrophe.

During the 1930s Egypt's parliamentary experience became characterised by street violence and the emergence of political movements unaffiliated with organised legal parties. Most sponsored paramilitary wings. Following the dismissal of Naḥḥas's first government in 1930, King Fu'ad turned to Isma'īl Ṣiḍqī (d. 1950), who annulled the 1923 constitution and oversaw ratification of a new charter that constituted a virtual palace dictatorship. Ṣiḍqī's iron fist incited street demonstrations that ultimately brought down his government and forced his successor, another minority leader, to revalidate the earlier constitution and cede power to a national unity government. In 1936, with the Wafd re-elected and the world on the brink of war, Britain negotiated Egypt's full independence. Sir Miles Lampson, high commissioner since 1933, became ambassador. Lampson served until 1946, and dominated the youthful, unprepared new king, Faruq (r. 1936–52), who had assumed the throne upon his father's death. Under terms of the treaty, Britain reserved the right to defend Egypt against external aggression; with the outbreak of the Second World War the British pressed the minority prime minister, 'Alī Mahir (d. 1960) by now the Wafd had again been dismissed to declare war upon the Axis.

Reorientations

By the onset of the Second World War Egyptian politics had fractured into myriad competing, bitterly contentious forces. Most minority party leaders had belonged to the Wafd in its initial incarnation as a national delegation. Those who departed early, particularly founders of the Constitutional Liberals, represented narrow socio economic interests, the pasha class, and for some the liberal ethos meant little. Men like Muḥammad Maḥmud (d. 1941), Ismaʿīl Ṣiḍqī and ʿAlī Mahir viewed the Wafdists as political extremists who would never be able to negotiate independence with the British. However tolerant of monarchical authoritarianism, each sought political independence and national economic development. Still, their contention for power with the majority party, their willingness to rule by royal fiat and, in Ṣiḍqī's case, revoke constitutional authority, poisoned the political order and fostered a politics of recrimination.

Banished from the power they rightfully held to be theirs, Wafdist leaders also contributed to the demise of political trust. Whoever gained office whether via elections or appointment purged government administration, placing their own clients in patronage positions. Within Wafdist ranks internal rifts produced a variety of splinter parties. By 1938 a self styled Saʿdist party, founded by Aḥmad Mahir (d. 1945) and Maḥmud al Nuqrashī (d. 1948), both of whom had been implicated in the murder of Lee Stack, claimed the true mantle of Zaghlul. Yet the Saʿdists immediately ran candidates in the 1938 elections that the Wafd boycotted, and party leaders joined a minority government. In the 1940s, Mahir and Nuqrashī would lead anti Wafd minority coalitions. In 1942 Makram ʿUbayd (d. 1961), considered the social conscience of the Wafd, formed the Independent Wafdist Bloc, and he too allied on several occasions with minority alliances. Within the Wafd a new generation of students and graduates formed a 'Wafdist Vanguard' and joined forces with other non parliamentary movements to promote a leftist agenda that many party elders looked upon with scorn. As Wafdist elders aged Muṣṭafa al Naḥḥas ran the party well into his seventies and was regarded by many as senile younger conservative members, men from big families, like Fuʿad Siraj al Dīn (d. 2000), came to dominate party ranks, further alienating youthful progressives.

Outside the structure of established parties a variety of extra parliamentary forces also began to contest the soul of the nation. Young Egypt, founded in 1933 by twenty two year old activist lawyers Aḥmad Ḥusayn (d. 1982) and Faṭḥī Riḍwan (d. 1988), modelled itself upon European scouting and

paramilitary youth movements. The Green Shirts participated in demonstrations against the Şiḍqī constitution and initiated a fund raising drive – the piastre plan – to finance industrialisation projects. Non Marxist, with a conservative religious streak, in the mid 1940s Young Egypt's leaders renamed their movement the Egyptian Socialist Party. In 1950 the interim party chief, Ibrahim Shukrī, won a seat in parliament and introduced legislation to institute agrarian reform. His programme presaged the Nasserist project; at the same time the party journal trumpeted 'revolution'; such provocation landed the movement's co founder, Aḥmad Ḥusayn, in prison.

More influential was the Society of Muslim Brothers founded by Ḥasan al Banna (d. 1949) in 1928. A schoolteacher trained at the Dar al 'Ulum, Banna remains among the most significant figures in the birth and spread of contemporary Islamism. More charismatic leader than sophisticated ideologue, he inspired devotion among his followers, primarily middle class professionals unsettled by the perceived corruption of social and moral principles by Western secularism. Preaching nationalism founded on an 'Islamic order' and supported by a network of social welfare agencies, his movement soon spread to both industrial and rural sectors. By the late 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood challenged the Wafd's claim to represent the majority. Like their counterparts in Young Egypt, Brotherhood leaders remained ambivalent about working within the formal political system. In 1942 Banna considered fielding candidates for parliamentary elections, but Wafdist leaders dissuaded him. In the 1945 elections, which the Wafd boycotted and the Sa'dists rigged, the Brothers ran several candidates without success. In 1950 British officials suspected that some thirty Brothers filed as independents. Confronting the ever violent world of street politics, the Brothers, too, formed paramilitary 'rovers' units and a secret organisation, and began to infiltrate the police and army. Young officers, including many who later founded the Free Officers, joined clandestine cells. Their recruiters emphasised patriotism over religious devotion, and impressed them with the Brothers' organisational savvy.

Smaller in numbers and always fractious, but extremely influential, were a variety of communist fronts that also began to appear on the political stage by the late 1930s. Although the communists developed a popular base among industrial workers, particularly after the Second World War, they never represented a mass movement. The left had perhaps its greatest influence on the intelligentsia. However, ideological disputes common to the international left contributed to their weakness. Those deemed non Egyptian, including a core of founding Jewish members, were purged from most organisations by the early 1950s. Uncertainty over whether to collaborate

with young progressive Wafdists or to support popularly elected governments even a nationalist revolution promoted dissonance and depleted energies. On the other hand, the communist left increasingly found common cause with a growing reformist discourse addressing issues of land, poverty, labour and economic redistribution. The communists, too, made inroads into the military, and by the early 1950s had far greater influence on Egypt's future rulers than the Muslim Brothers.

For all but those with a stake in the status quo, 'social justice' became the slogan of the day from the 1930s onward. Forward looking technocrats associated with the Society of National Renaissance emphasised the need for rational, scientific planning. Secular liberals, socialists, Marxists and Islamists all supplied terms of discourse and models for social activism and reorganisation. However different their orientations or disciplinary training, figures such as the engineer Mirrit Ghali (d. 1992), the economist Rashid al Barrawi (d. 1987) and Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966), the Muslim Brothers' ideologue, trumpeted the necessity of fundamental social reform. Scholars no longer accept this turn of many secular leaning intellectuals towards 'the large scale production of Islamic literature (*Islamiyyat*)', with a focus on prophetic traditions (Ḥadīth, Sunna) and biographies of the companions and 'righteous' caliphs, as a liberal 'crisis of orientation'.¹ Rather than evincing a losing battle between 'reason and revelation', the religious writings of thinkers such as Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (d. 1956) constituted 'a revisionist interpretation of Islamic modernism, its methodology, and its legacy' in order to speak to a broader audience and further a Western oriented agenda.²

War and remembrance

In the early 1940s, with the Axis ascendant, Faruq, his advisers and loyal minority politicians sought to avoid the declaration of war that Britain demanded. In February 1942, with Rommel's Afrika Korps poised to take Alexandria and popular sentiment ambivalent if not outwardly pro German, British authorities delivered an ultimatum: Faruq must appoint a pro British government or surrender his throne. On 4 February, his palace surrounded by British armour, the king capitulated. Muṣṭafa al Naḥḥas agreed to form the only non elected Wafdist government in the parliamentary era. For many,

¹ Israel Gershoni, 'Egyptian liberalism in an age of "crisis of orientation"', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 31 (1999), p. 551.

² Charles D. Smith, *Islam and the search for social order in modern Egypt* (Albany, 1983), p. 8.

Nahḥas had tarnished the Wafd's nationalist credentials. Makram 'Ubayd, by now a bitter personal rival, became the latest star defector from the party. His *Black Book* detailed Wafdist corruption; his Independent Wafdist Bloc contributed to the fragmentation and debasement of political party life.

For others, including young military officers, the humiliation of 4 February became a rallying cry. Muḥammad Najib (d. 1984), the senior officer chosen to lead the Free Officers junta, would later recall the shame felt by Egyptian officers when British troops publicly ridiculed the king, for whom they themselves had little regard, in playful dirty ditties. Senior British officials, recognising the ultimatum's impact on the profligate monarch, later regretted not having deposed him. With Rommel's defeat at El Alamein in November 1942, the German threat receded. Two years after assuming power, Nahḥas was again dismissed, this time in favour of a coalition led by Sa'dist leader Aḥmad Mahir. Mahir finally declared war on the Axis in February 1945. Leaving parliament, he was gunned down by a young nationalist.

The assassination inaugurated a five year cycle of political violence targeted killings, bombings, riots that brought the liberal system to a halt. Britain withdrew military forces to the Suez Canal, but a series of failed negotiations to secure full departure from Egypt and the Sudan proved incendiary. Much of the violence, however, stemmed from internal ailments: economic hardship that prompted labour unrest, and a heightened animosity not only between popular forces and authoritarian rulers, but at times between and among popular forces. Students clashed repeatedly with the police, and on several occasions were martyred. The escalation of violence in Palestine, then Egypt's defeat in the 1948 Arab Israeli war, added fuel to the fire. Political violence peaked in late 1948 when a Sa'dist led coalition outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and instituted mass detentions. In November Brotherhood gunmen murdered Prime Minister Nuqrashī; two months later Ḥasan al Banna was killed in retribution. Martial law and a roundup that netted Brothers, communists and socialists alike restored a semblance of order, but in the absence of a popularly elected government Egypt appeared ungovernable.

The last hope for the liberal order, in the view of many, was free elections. In January 1950 the Wafd regained power in what proved to be its 'last hurrah'.³ Muṣṭafa al Nahḥas peppered his cabinet with newcomers, men

³ Joel Gordon, 'The false hopes of 1950', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21 (1989), pp. 193–214.

from lower party ranks. Ṭaha Ḥusayn (d. 1973) and Dr Aḥmad Ḥusayn (d. 1984) were bona fide celebrities in reformist circles. None of the reformist ministers, however, survived; each fell victim to party infighting, and all were dismayed at Naḥḥas's timidity in challenging palace interests. By the fall of 1951 the Wafd had squandered its popular mandate. When Naḥḥas tore up the 1936 Anglo Egyptian treaty and proclaimed an 'armed struggle' against British forces, Muslim Brothers and other paramilitaries flocked to the Canal. On 26 January 1952, a day after the 'massacre' of overmatched auxiliary police by British forces in Ismailia, enraged Egyptians took to the streets of Cairo, torching symbols of foreign domination and engulfing much of the city centre in flames. Witnesses to 'Black Saturday' pointed to signs of premeditated arson, but the general antipathy of the mob could not be discounted. As his capital burned, Faruq entertained guests at a lavish party on behalf of his newly born son. When the Cinema Metro – owned by MGM and primarily a purveyor of Hollywood fare – reopened after repairs it screened the epic recasting of Nero's Rome, *Quo Vadis*, an irony lost on few Egyptians.

Faith in liberalism waned. Despairing at the paralysis of political life and the rampant political violence, public intellectuals began to advocate benevolent authoritarianism. Following 'Black Saturday' the king turned to two independents, with reputations for political probity, 'Alī Mahir and Aḥmad al Hilālī (d. 1958). The first emphasised liberation, the second internal purification, but neither succeeded. Finally, on 23 July 1952 rebellious Free Officers seized power.

Cosmopolitan backdrop

Egypt at mid century remained a rural nation uncertain of its relationship to the broader Arab world. Seventy per cent of Egypt's 19 million inhabitants lived on the land. Yet agricultural expansion had stalled after the First World War, and a series of crises in the 1920s and early 1930s sparked a drive for import substitution and industrialisation among national capitalists. As rents rose, real wages declined. The Second World War stimulated Egyptian industry, and rural overcrowding prompted mass migrations to urban centres, particularly Cairo. The 'unrelieved horror' of rural life⁴ inspired calls for agrarian reform that would only come to fruition after the military assumed power. Popular sentiments regarding Arab nationalism remained tangential until the 1930s, when Palestine first began to resonate in Egyptian

4 Doreen Warriner, *Land and poverty in the Middle East* (London, 1948), p. 39.

consciousness. When Britain proposed the economic integration of eastern Arab states in the mid 1940s, the Naḥḥas government promoted a broader based Arab League that was founded in 1945 and based in Cairo.

Early in the century Egypt had become the cultural capital of the Arab world. Relative political freedom had drawn a literary intelligentsia well before the First World War. The theatres and cabarets of Cairo and Alexandria drew singers, actors and dancers from throughout the Arab world. By the 1920s nascent but growing film, recording and broadcast industries underscored Egypt's centrality and enhanced its cosmopolitanism. For all the drawing power of the Muslim Brothers and their professed ire against 'immoral' manifestations of popular mass mediated culture, the movers and shakers of arts, letters and high society evoked a pervasive modernism that was Western oriented, bourgeois and predominantly secular.

Cinema became the intersection for the performing arts, as singers, vaudevilleans and dramatic actors gravitated towards motion pictures. The first Egyptian silent films were desert romances. With sound, musicals, screwball comedies and tear jerkers dominated the theatres. In 1934 Ṭal'at Ḥarb (d. 1941), the founder of Bank Miṣr, established Studio Miṣr outside Cairo. Other capitalists followed suit, and 'Hollywood on the Nile' was born. In the years after the Second World War the booming industry produced between forty and fifty films annually. Stars endorsed products and set fashion trends, but critics complained that the industry had become stuck in conventional melodramatic retreads. In the early 1950s a new generation of directors began to push the bounds of state censorship, endeavoring to treat social problems more honestly, to address the national question, to depict more vividly sexuality and modern romance.

Free Officers coup and the Nasser revolution

The junior officers who seized power in a bloodless coup in the early morning hours of 23 July 1952 had no clear agenda and hardly saw themselves as revolutionaries. As they proclaimed, they sought to liberate Egypt from foreign occupation and restore 'sound' parliamentary life. They came from middle class urban and rural backgrounds, and had joined the military after 1936, when Egypt gained sovereign control over and sought to expand its armed forces. Humiliated by the British in February 1942, they felt betrayed by palace and politicians during the 1948 Palestine War. Fellow students and messmates, then instructors at the military academy, they now came

together to form a secret society independent of all civilian parties or movements. Those who professed continuing dual loyalties, particularly a few Muslim Brothers, were expelled. By 1952 the Free Officers envisioned a coup, but acted only when they feared arrest. Hoping to collaborate with like minded civilian counterparts, they ordered the political parties to purge their leaders. When the parties resisted, in January 1953 the officers outlawed them, proclaimed a three year transition period of martial rule and for the first time anointed themselves a 'revolutionary command council'.

During the following two years the Free Officers consolidated their hold on power. In June 1953 they abolished the monarchy and proclaimed Egypt a republic. They appointed Muḥammad Najīb, the popular general who had served as their front man on the junta, president. But public impatience with the lack of progress towards either democratic reform or the expulsion of the British from the Suez Canal fired growing disenchantment with military rule. Communists had grown suspicious after the new regime failed to support a textile strike and executed two labour leaders in August 1952. Although exempted from the decree banning political parties, the Muslim Brothers grew increasingly disillusioned by the officers' stubborn independence. Rent by divisions following the assassination of Ḥasan al Banna, the movement fell increasingly under the sway of more militant elements. In January 1954, after campus demonstrations, the regime outlawed the Brotherhood.

Matters came to a head in March 1954, precipitated by Muḥammad Najīb's sudden dismissal. Najīb had alienated himself from his younger colleagues, particularly Gamal Abd al Nasser (d. 1970), the real leader of the Free Officers movement. Previously content to remain in the background, Nasser now asserted his claim to power. Public opinion, however, swung towards Najīb, and the revolutionary council recalled him. The officers lifted press censorship and faced widespread calls for their return to the barracks. Nevertheless, mobilising support in the streets via the newly founded Liberation Rally, the regime held firm. Claiming to act on behalf of the masses, in late March the junta reasserted martial authority and in the aftermath of the crisis purged dissident elements in the press, labour unions, professional associations and universities. In the autumn of 1954 the regime signed a disengagement accord with the British government, paving the way for total British withdrawal from Egyptian soil.

In October 1954 a Muslim Brother tried to assassinate Nasser during a public rally in Alexandria. The regime responded forcefully, arresting thousands of Brothers and putting the movement's leadership on trial. In January 1955 the assailant and five others went to the gallows. Secure at home, Nasser

was championed abroad as a forward thinking autocrat. He oversaw the promulgation of a new constitution, and was elected president in 1956. Yet Egypt never made the transition into the sound democracy the Free Officers had promised. Following the Liberation Rally, the regime fashioned two further one party experiments, the National Union (1958) and the Arab Socialist Union (1961). Nasser ran for re election, but always and proudly captured 99 per cent of the vote. The failure to democratise consistently generated discontent; yet throughout most of his formal fourteen year rule, the Egyptian body politic those not imprisoned generally proved willing to trade democracy for the promised attainment of other national and regional goals.

Voice of the Arabs

By 1955 the revolutionary government turned its attention increasingly to regional and international relations. In April 1955 Nasser attended the Afro Asian Bandung conference in Indonesia, where he rubbed shoulders with Yugoslavia's Tito, India's Nehru and China's Zhou En Lai. To the dismay of Western supporters, Egypt began to promote 'positive neutrality'. The unresolved issue of recognising Israel and the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes had not dominated Egyptian concerns in the immediate aftermath of the Palestine War. Guerrilla raids and foraging incursions across the border from the Gaza Strip had been policed by both sides. But in February 1955 the Israelis determined to make a show of force and raided deep into Gaza, leaving thirty eight dead and thirty one wounded. The raid shook the Nasser regime and heightened its resolve to arm Egypt. Frustrated at Western hesitation, the Egyptians turned to the Soviet bloc for weapons and exerted diplomatic pressure on Arab states not to join Iraq in the Anglo American sponsored Baghdad Pact. Matters came to a head when the United States and Britain withdrew commitments of financial support for the Aswan High Dam. Nasser responded in July 1956 by nationalising the Suez Canal company, a legal act under international law, yet a move that outraged the British government and sparked an international crisis.

In nationalising the canal company Nasser played to long standing Egyptian grievances against foreign domination. Never had the masses been so moved by his leadership. At the same time, Egyptian authorities endeavoured to keep the canal open, so as to not provide a *casus belli* for outside intervention. Despite apparent resolution of the crisis under United Nations auspices, Britain, France and Israel conspired to provoke a war to

unseat Nasser. The 'tripartite aggression' commenced on 29 October with a multi pronged Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, followed by an Anglo French call for a ceasefire and mutual Israeli Egyptian pullback from the canal. When Egypt refused, British and French planes bombed Egyptian installations; the two European nations then landed forces, which engaged in fierce urban combat with Egyptian troops and irregulars. The transparent conspiracy sparked outrage in Britain and prompted the Americans to threaten economic sanctions against its allies. Under American pressure, the attack collapsed. Israeli forces withdrew and the United Nations dispatched a peacekeeping force to monitor the Egyptian Israeli border. British prime minister Anthony Eden resigned in disgrace; Nasser reigned as a regional hero.

The second half of the 1950s marks the peak of Nasser's international predominance. *Ṣawt al 'Arab* (Voice of the Arabs), the new state radio channel founded by the revolutionary government, broadcast calls for national liberation in indigenous languages throughout the decolonising world. Self styled Free Officer societies sprang up in neighbouring Arab states never controlled directly, as threatened regimes asserted, but clearly drawing inspiration from Egypt. In July 1958 Iraqi officers toppled the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq; the timely arrival of British paratroopers saved Jordan's King Ḥusayn from a similar fate. Earlier that year, bowing to pressure from Ba'thist leaders in Syria, Nasser brought Egypt into an ill fated unitary state, the United Arab Republic (UAR). Nasser was president and the Egyptian military commander 'Abd al Ḥakīm 'Amr (d. 1967) governor general of the Syrian province. Syrian politicians and military officers felt slighted, and the middle class worried about Egypt's growing statist tendencies. Nasser always doubted the efficacy of the project. Even if he had meant pan Arab ventures to be less formal, he could not escape his calling as undisputed leader of the Arab world. Still, he was outraged when Syrian army officers staged a coup and declared the union dissolved in September 1961. Decrying the Syrian secessionists as 'reactionaries', he also insisted that the Arab world had a long way to go before such unionist schemes should be again considered.

Even so, during the 1960s Nasser found Egypt drawn into a series of debilitating regional conflicts. When republican rebels deposed the Yemeni imam in September 1962, Nasser threw diplomatic and military support to the new regime. Based on flawed advice from 'Amr, eager to restore military pride after the Syrian fiasco, Egypt committed some 50,000 troops to the Yemen civil war. Saudi Arabia supported the royalists in what turned out to

be a proxy conflict between two antagonists in the broader 'Arab cold war' that pitted monarchies against revolutionary republics. Within the latter camp tensions remained high, and by the late 1960s vocal elements in Syria, in particular, regularly challenged Nasser to engage Israel and cease hiding behind the barrier of UN forces posted on the Egyptian Israeli border since 1956. Nasser rebuffed such challenges, as he did a succession of initiatives to re form and broaden the UAR.

By the spring of 1967 escalating violence on the Israeli borders with Syria and Jordan threatened to steal the initiative from Nasser. He did not seek major armed conflict with Israel, but in May 1967 he felt compelled to ask the UN to withdraw its forces from the Sinai and Gaza. When, against the advice of military advisers, UN secretary general U Thant quickly acceded to Egypt's request, Nasser remilitarised the Sinai, then closed the Straits of Tiran in the Red Sea to Israeli shipping. The Israelis considered this as an act of war. Nasser found his back to the wall. He hoped at best for superpower intervention; at worst he trusted his army could beat back an Israeli attack. In both cases he miscalculated.

The June 1967 Six Day War left the entire Nasserist project in disarray. For Egypt the conflict essentially ended within hours of the pre emptive Israeli strike against its air installations that began around 8 a.m. on 5 June. Lacking air support, Egyptian troops stood no chance against the Israeli ground offensive; by 7 June Israel had swept through Gaza and deep into the Sinai (in addition to capturing old Jerusalem and much of the West Bank). Even with war clouds gathering, Nasser's high command had been totally unprepared. In a cruel, ironic reprise of the 1948 Palestine War, Egyptian state radio broadcast counter feit accounts of stunning Israeli setbacks. Nasser himself probably knew little of the truth for several days. Finally, in a televised broadcast on the evening of 9 June, he revealed the scope of the defeat and tendered his resignation, along with that of 'Amr and other leading commanders. The speech remains the tragic antithesis of his radio broadcast from al Azhar Mosque in October 1956, when, amidst the noise of British bombs falling outside Cairo, he vowed to continue the fight. Egypt, however, refused to accept his retreat. Legions poured into the streets far too many for this to be purely a stage managed event to insist he stay on. Nasser withdrew his resignation, but not those of his associates. The night of long knives would soon ensue.

Nasser's revolutions

The Free Officers had seized power with limited reformist aims: 'purification' of the political order and 'liberation' from foreign occupation. In promoting

an early reform agenda the officers positioned themselves within the dominant progressive discourse of their era and generation. Within days of taking power, even before deposing King Faruq, they stripped pashas and beys of their titles and proscribed governmental perks. They promulgated land reform in September 1952 that limited each landholding family to 200 *faddans* (1 *faddan* = approximately 1 acre), allowing an extra 100 *faddans* to families with children. The excess would be distributed to landless peasants. In 1953 the regime founded a National Production Council, loosened limits on foreign ownership of business and eased restrictions on foreign concessions in certain spheres. A new Liberation Province stood central to projects for land reclamation. The great engine for economic transformation and social welfare would be the Aswan High Dam, supported by the Soviets after Anglo American hesitance. Planning became the watchword for statist guidance, if not yet ownership. Throughout the 1950s, although with increasing scepticism, the regime looked to national capitalists to promote industrialisation and domestic capital investment. By the mid 1950s the state embarked upon a different course, characterised by 'egyptianization of foreign establishments; by closer state control of business; by nationalization and sequestration first of foreign and then of Egyptian property; by intensified industrialization; and by sharply increased taxation on the higher incomes'.⁵

The 1960s ushered in a new phase. With the 'July laws', announced on the revolution's anniversary in 1961, the state nationalised heavy industry and finance, and set a lower ceiling on land ownership. A year later, in May 1962, the National Action Charter formalised the ideological underpinnings of Arab Socialism. If the July laws had mortified Syrian capitalists and sparked the end of the UAR, they also produced an uneasy rapprochement with the Egyptian left. In 1958 communist leaders, most still in prison, agreed to form a unified party. By the early 1960s they began to warm to the regime's statist orientation and bargained on their ability to push it further down a socialist path.

If Syria's secession from the UAR proved the immediate impetus for the charter, the measures nonetheless reflected a growing consensus that the state needed to be more actively involved in engineering national development; this included bringing representatives of the working class to the fore. The biggest critique of the single party National Union related to the persistence of power residing in the hand of rural notables, who utilised the congress to further their class interests at the expense of labourers and peasants. Within the newly formed Arab Socialist Union (ASU), specific

5 Charles Issawi, *Egypt in revolution* (London, 1963), p. 54.

provision was made for working class representatives to constitute 50 per cent of those elected.

Hand in hand with industrialisation, the regime promoted an array of programmes to improve living standards in both rural and urban sectors. Schools, health clinics, agricultural cooperatives, running water, electricity and affordable housing headed the agenda. Cinemas went up throughout the provinces. Television premiered in the early 1960s, the medium serving educational purposes as well as entertainment. The economic record would remain mixed. A disagreement with the Kennedy administration led Washington to temporarily halt shipments under the Food for Peace programme. Industrial output, land reclamation and agrarian reform never matched expectations. By the early 1960s the number of farmers holding less than 5 *faddans* actually grew, leaving more people on the edge of poverty. This prompted a revised land reform, limiting landholders to 100 *faddans*. The public sector swelled with a rising number of college graduates, all promised state employment. Student enrolment at all levels burgeoned, including numbers of girls working their way through to university. Popular film and stage comedies parodied the patronising attitudes women confronted as they entered the white collar work force. In the 1964 comedy hit *Lil Rijal Faqat* (For men only), two gorgeous industrial engineers pose as men in order to gain hands on access to an unproductive oil field and succeed where their male counterparts had failed.

Until the catastrophe of 1967 the Nasser era was one of great enthusiasm and national purpose. Socialist inspired revolutionary iconography featured strong working and middle class men and women, Upper Egyptians and Nubians (even as the latter were being displaced, their ancestral lands flooded to make way for the High Dam). At gala concerts to mark revolutionary state holidays, leading singers such as Umm Kulthum (d. 1975) and 'Abd al Ḥalīm Hafīz (d. 1977) performed newly composed anthems that celebrated Egypt's 'socialist garden' and its leader, Gamal, 'beloved by millions'.

There remained, to be sure, centres of discontent. Those dispossessed by the socialist decrees constituted a steady opposition. Leftists struggled to remain optimistic; in 1965 the Egyptian Communist Party dissolved, its members taking up positions within the ASU. Most Muslim Brothers remained in prison, living under abominable conditions. Democracy never materialised. A secret vanguard within the ASU ensured that the party toed the regime line. Friends of Nasser and others in high places, such as the journalist Muṣṭafa Amin (d. 1997), found themselves in prison for speaking too critically. The authoritarian nature of the state intensified by the

mid 1960s as economic disappointment, the military quagmire in the Yemen and a sense of political stagnation – underscored by the mass turnout for the funeral of Muṣṭafa al Naḥḥas in 1965 – came to dominate public consciousness.

The military formed the basis of the ‘praetorian state’.⁶ In 1955 Nasser and all his Revolutionary Command Council compatriots except ‘Abd al Ḥakīm ‘Amr resigned their commissions. ‘Amr, who had been hastily promoted to field marshal, retained command of the armed forces, along with the defence portfolio. Under his patronage, close allies rose to unprecedented positions of power. Officers received special perks, including housing, and profited from political connections. ‘Amr cronies controlled both civilian and military intelligence apparatuses, and the field marshal, charismatic but a man of questionable moral scruples, established a network that threatened Nasser’s position as supreme ruler. The two remained close, but in the aftermath of the UAR breakup, when Nasser tried to restrict ‘Amr’s power, the field marshal considered calling loyal units into the streets. Mutual friends brought about a reconciliation. ‘Amr wound up heading the Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism, founded in the wake of the murder of an ASU official by resentful landowners in April 1966. Charged to destroy once and for all the power of rural elites, the committee served as yet another arm of ‘Amr’s reach into the power structure of the state.

The field marshal weathered a variety of storms throughout the Nasser era, but could not escape responsibility for the June 1967 debacle. Forced to resign, even as Nasser retained power, ‘Amr barricaded himself in his villa. His death by poison in September 1967 – most accept it as suicide, perhaps allowed by his old friend; others still claim that Nasser ordered ‘Amr murdered – remains fuel for tabloid exposés. Society at large called for a fuller reckoning with those directly responsible for the defeat. When light sentences were handed down against military commanders in February 1968, workers and students, including a revitalised Islamist movement, took to the streets in protest.

Nasserist society pre- and post-1967

Underpinning the optimism of the Nasser era was a modern secular society, very much a continuation of trends dominant throughout the twentieth century. After falling out with the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime showed no inclination to compromise with Islamist ideology, and acted to bring

6 Amos Perlmutter, *Egypt: The praetorian state* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1974).

institutionalised religion under direct state authority. In 1955 the government abolished *shari'a* courts and brought preaching and mosque administration under the authority of the *waqf* ministry (pious endowments). In 1961 the shaykh al Azhar became a government appointee and the Ministry of Education assumed control over the university, attaching secular arts and sciences faculties to the thousand year old theological seminary.

Muslim Brothers rounded up in 1954 remained in prison, in appalling conditions, where many became radicalised. Sayyid Quṭb wrote first a multi volume exegesis of the Qur'an, then his most audacious work, *Ma'alim fi'l ṭariq* (Signposts/Milestones). Eschewing his earlier gradualism, Quṭb now called for a militant vanguard to make war upon the modern state, which he characterised as *jahili*, invoking terminology generally reserved for the pre Islamic 'age of ignorance'. The regime released the ailing Quṭb in 1965; within the year he was rearrested along with some 100 activists, charged with plotting to overthrow the government. How directly involved he had been with younger firebrands remains controversial, but the regime saw fit to execute him and several accomplices in 1966.

The Nasserist state championed the arts, showcasing local traditions, but with particular emphasis on Western classical forms: dance, music, theatre, literature and the cinema. Soviet bloc ballet troupes and European orchestras toured Egypt; so did American jazz ensembles. For Sorbonne trained culture minister Tharwat 'Ukasha, *ḥajj* meant a trip to Bayreuth to hear Wagner's Ring Cycle.⁷ Umm Kulthum, Egypt's leading vocalist since the late 1920s, still opted to affect a proper, matronly look (even as she broke hearts with her plaintive love songs). Yet by the 1950s, when a new generation of singers and film stars came of age, a more overt sexuality, more in keeping with Western youth culture, might be displayed.

With the onset of the Nasser revolution, cineastes broke free of taboos against depicting social ills, including sexual obsession. With socialism came a state funded film industry, charged with charting new artistic ground and breaking free from profit conscious studio moguls. Veteran film makers took greater risks – not always commercially successful – and a new generation was trained at the state run film institute. In the aftermath of June 1967 censors allowed film makers unprecedented freedom to address current problems. A series of popular films openly criticised regime failings, including corruption and authoritarianism. This movement may well have served as a

⁷ Interview with author, 25 April 1985.

safety valve to release pent up hostilities, but at the time it furthered a discussion of the future that could not be silenced.

Nasser's Egypt, at least in the cities, looked very much like a European nation. Pop music showed the influence of rock and roll. Women's skirts grew shorter, men's hair longer, and university students shared public space much as their counterparts in the West. Yet, in the aftermath of the defeat, the Islamist critique of Westernised modern Egypt sounded louder and began to draw more adherents. The student movement that emerged during the last years of Nasser's rule remained dominated by leftists – they called for the revolution to right itself rather than collapse – but a growing number of dissidents began to articulate an alternative.

Legacies

In the aftermath of the 1967 *naksa* (setback), the country found itself engaged in deep soul searching. The extent of Nasser's diabetes and related ailments remained a state secret. Despite doctors' orders, he found no respite from a chain of crises that commanded his immediate attention. Arab leaders gathered in Khartoum in August 1967 to propound the three noes: no peace; no recognition; and no negotiation with Israel. Concurrently, Nasser sought and gained rearmament from his Soviet allies, then embarked on a costly, but perhaps politically necessary, war of attrition across the Suez Canal. He promised a major overhaul of the ASU; in practical terms little changed. He still commanded enormous regional respect: Mu'ammar al Gaddafi, the young colonel who overthrew Libya's monarchy in September 1969, modelled himself on his Egyptian idol.

It was on the regional stage that Nasser spoke his last lines and forever cemented his pan Arab legacy. When Jordanian Palestinian hostilities exploded in 'Black September' in 1970, Nasser summoned Arab leaders, including Jordan's King Ḥusayn and Palestine Liberation Organisation leader Yasser Arafat, to Cairo. Exerting moral suasion – 'we are in a race with death'⁸ – he oversaw the conclusion of the ceasefire that would relocate PLO headquarters to Lebanon. Shortly after seeing off the last Arab leader at Cairo airport, Nasser collapsed and died. The country erupted in a wave of emotion as mourners poured into the streets, a political funeral unlike any since seen in Egypt.

8 Robert Stephens, *Nasser* (London and New York, 1971), p. 554.

Nasser's legacies are decidedly mixed, but he remains the giant of his era, a figure against whom all aspirants to leadership of the Arab world are still compared. The democratic experiment clearly fell short. The socialist economic transformation, for all its achievements, engendered strong sentiment on behalf of liberalisation. Nasser's Arabist policy produced the humiliation of the UAR and, ultimately, the disastrous defeat of June 1967. In the aftermath of his death, Egyptians clearly sought dramatic realignment of domestic and foreign policies. Yet, three decades of disappointments later, many recall the heady days of independence and Suez, the enthusiasm of the High Dam, and the emphasis on social justice. Many who comprise the Nasser generation, one that still exudes a great impact on contemporary Egypt, recognise that they owe their position to Nasserist educational and cultural policies. In succeeding eras, characterised too often by crass consumerism and globalisation, the Nasser era recalls a time of indigenous cultural production, however modelled on foreign fashions.

Uncertain successor

Anwar al Sadat (d. 1981), Nasser's Free Officer comrade and successor, built upon and undid key components of the Nasserist state. A member of the original ruling junta, Sadat had in subsequent years never held key government positions. But Nasser valued him as a loyalist, especially one who posed no political threat, and appointed him vice president in 1969. The 'centres of power' within the ASU and state security apparatus, unsure of their own political capital in the public realm, viewed him as malleable. Sadat, however, asserted his independence. In May 1971 he arrested his antagonists and, to popular applause, proclaimed a 'corrective revolution'. Storehouses of wire taps were ceremoniously destroyed. ASU leaders and key intelligence and media figures were purged, and show trials held. The new regime promoted a public campaign of 'de Nasserisation', focusing on the excesses, errors and civil liberties abuses of the Nasserist state. Nasser himself escaped criticism, but his official portraits came down and no monument was erected to mark his achievements.

Sadat confronted international challenges in characteristic fashion, wavering with seeming uncertainty, then acting decisively when least expected. In late 1970 he approved an extension to the ceasefire on the Egyptian Israeli border that Nasser had signed under US auspices. The following year he promised 'decisive' action to break the deadlock, and suffered public scorn for his failure. In 1972 he expelled some 20,000 Soviet military advisers, but later

reached agreement on a major rearmament package. Then, in October 1973, after gaining financial support from the Gulf states and securing a Syrian promise to cooperate in military action, Sadat ordered a full scale attack against Israeli defences in the Sinai. Belatedly recognising that he was no longer bluffing and overconfident in their ability to withstand an Egyptian offensive, the Israeli government hastily mobilised forces to defend the Bar Lev line along the east bank of the Suez Canal. On 6 October Egyptian troops overran Israeli defences and, supported by air strikes behind Israeli lines, struck deep into the Sinai. Within a week Sadat had achieved far more than anticipated, or planned for. With a timely airlift of petrol and supplies from the Americans (and having repulsed at great cost a simultaneous Syrian offensive on the Golan Heights), the Israelis turned the military tide of the war during its second week. Egypt found its Third Army surrounded on the west bank of the Suez Canal and accepted a ceasefire. But Sadat had scored a major political victory. The 'hero of the crossing' had emerged from Nasser's shadow and the onus of 1967. A shaken Israeli leadership embarked on a series of negotiations with the Egyptians that produced a graduated pull back of their forces deep into the Sinai, and ultimately set the stage for the 1979 peace treaty.

Trumpeting victory, in his April 1974 'October Paper' Sadat unveiled the outline for political and economic liberalisation that would ultimately undo much of the Nasserist project. Democratisation proved halting. Sadat first approved three 'platforms' within the ASU, then legalised two opposition parties, the leftist National Progressive Unionist Party and the conservative Liberal Socialist Labour Party. For a brief moment in 1978 the old Wafd also won re certification, but when septuagenarian leader Fu'ad Siraj al Din openly derided the Free Officers' rising as a 'putsch', comparing it unfavourably to the 1919 'revolution', the courts ruled that convicted old regime leaders could not re enter political life. Sadat refashioned the ASU into the National Democratic Party (NDP), but few saw real promise for democratic progress.

Sadat's *infitah* (open door policy), by dismantling significant portions of the public sector and loosening restrictions on foreign and local capitalist investment, went much further in transforming Egyptian society. Fortunes were made, particularly in real estate and construction. For the majority, what later might be termed 'shock capitalism' proved disquieting. Prices that had remained stable for years suddenly skyrocketed. Private vehicles choked urban streets. New high rises and additional floors on existing structures shot up overnight (often skirting building codes). Yet housing became

unaffordable for many in the growing middle class. Skilled and unskilled labourers migrated to oil rich Arab states. When, in January 1977, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Sadat's government cut subsidies on basic foodstuffs and public transport, people took to the streets chanting 'Hero of the Crossing, where is our bread' and invoking Nasser's name. After three days of rioting, the army restored order and Sadat restored the subsidies. He could not, however, erase pervasive popular images – later parlayed into popular television soap operas and hit films – of unrestrained fat cats and low class parvenus devouring public space and bulldozing public morality. Confronted with fundamental weaknesses in his economic project and recognising the debilitating effect of defence spending, Sadat came to envision normalisation of relations with Israel as the key to securing a peace dividend, including massive amounts of foreign aid.

Islamising society

Sadat's regime did not create the 'Islamic resurgence' that took root throughout the region in the 1970s; his government did, however, go to great lengths to foster it at home. After 1967 a revitalised Muslim Brotherhood, linked to 'ulama' resentful of statist control of the religious establishment, re-emerged within the context of popular rebelliousness. Sadat opened prison doors to jailed Islamists and allowed Brothers who had fled abroad to return. The Brotherhood remained proscribed, but the society was allowed to publish two journals, the revived *al Da'wa* (The call) and the new *al I'tiṣām* (Adherence). Within the Brotherhood two tendencies vied for influence. An old guard, represented by Supreme Guide Ḥasan al Huḍaybī (d. 1973), then 'Umar al Tilmissanī (d. 1986), and bolstered by the returning exiles, struggled against a more militant strand to reassert the movement's gradualist call for public outreach and education. As Huḍaybī phrased it in a published denunciation of Sayyid Quṭb, the Brothers were 'preachers not judges'. The militants, more representative of imprisoned cadres and inspired by Quṭb's radical writings, advocated confrontation and mobilised youthful adherents to action. In April 1974 one small group assaulted the Technical Military Institute in Heliopolis, a failed attempt to stage a *coup d'état* and assassinate Sadat.

Other youthful, radical offshoots of the Brotherhood sought to emulate the spiritual detachment of the early Islamic community as exemplified in the *hijra* (migration) from Mecca to Medina in 622. The Society of Muslims, labelled *al Takfīr wa'l Hijra* (excommunication and *hijra*) by the state,

endeavoured to live apart from 'infidel' society, renting out apartment blocks and arranging marriages within the group. In July 1977, responding to police crackdowns against fellow members, they kidnapped and murdered a former *waqf* minister, then embarrassed public prosecutors with their defiance in open court.

Far more influential in the long run were the *jama'at Islamiyya*, youth associations rooted in a revitalised Islamist student movement on university campuses. Nasser had tolerated the re emergence of Muslim Brothers on campuses after 1968, but Sadat funnelled them funding in order to displace the Nasserists. Few have failed to note the ultimate irony of this political miscalculation, but for the moment Sadat attained his desired end. By the mid 1970s the leftists had been eclipsed on campus. The *jama'at* founded summer camps at which students were indoctrinated with Islamist ideology and instructed in 'proper' religious practices and behaviour. The new Islamist guard established private transport services to bus students to class, demanding proper attire and guaranteeing a ride free from sexual intimidation or unbecoming bodily contact. They also began to set the tone on campus, segregating lecture halls by row, carving out public prayer space and insisting that prayer times be honoured, even during class sessions.

Such activity easily spilled over into society at large. Women wearing *hijab* variations of stylised 'proper' Islamic dress, often glossed in the West as the 'veil' began to be seen more frequently in public, including government and corporate offices. Men commandeered hallways for group prayer during working hours. The *jama'at* organised outdoor prayer meetings on holidays, most notably in Abdin Square across from the presidential (formerly royal) palace. By 1979 privately funded (*ahli*) mosques outside the auspices of government control far outnumbered the state supervised (*hukumi*) mosques. Prayer mats for Friday communal prayer covered pavements and side streets and loudspeakers broadcast the *khutba* (sermon) throughout Egypt's metropolitan areas. Religious programming on television proliferated, while outspoken clerics such as 'Abd al Ḥamid Kishk (d. 1996) disseminated their sermons on cassette. Whereas in Nasser's day the conspicuously devout served as dramatic comic props, in Sadat's Egypt their activity became increasingly normative. Sadat played personally to this trend, fashioning himself the 'believer president'. In his first year in office his government had proclaimed the *shari'a* 'a principal source of legislation' in the nation.

The contradictions in all this emerged soon after Sadat embarked on his peace initiative with Israel. The president's stated willingness, delivered to parliament in November 1977, to venture into the enemy's home to discuss

reconciliation, caught his chief foreign policy advisers, as well as the world at large, by surprise. His reception in Israel and speech before the Knesset captured international attention and sparked enthusiasm in many quarters at home. The principles hammered out with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in March 1978 paved the final path toward normalisation of relations in 1979, although questions left outstanding regarding Palestinian self-determination quickly fell by the wayside. Sadat felt duped, but stayed his course. When the Arab League expelled Egypt and transferred its headquarters to Tunisia he responded with vitriol, labelling Arab leaders 'pygmies'. Disquiet at home intensified. Islamists, whether mainstream Muslim Brothers, *jama'at* members, outspoken al-Azhar shaykhs or adherents of more radical movements such as Jihad (Holy struggle), an offshoot of the Military Academy group, or the newly formed Jama'a Islamiyya (Islamic group), charged the president with betrayal. Nasserists agreed. The general public withheld judgement, but as the promised peace dividend failed to materialise Egypt now received roughly the same amount of American foreign aid as Israel, but lost massive amounts of Arab petrodollars and the country grew more unsettled, opinion began to shift against the regime and its initiatives.

The incipient conflict between adherents of the Islamist trends and the state soon exploded in open warfare. In June 1979 Sadat outlawed the *jama'at*, freezing the assets of the Egyptian student union and bringing it under faculty control. In November over 100 Jihad members were arrested and charged with plotting to overthrow the government. By 1980 shootouts with security forces occurred with greater frequency. Sectarian violence, primarily in heavily Christian Upper Egypt but increasingly in Cairo, posed an additional threat to national unity. Firebrand *imams* such as 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, spiritual adviser to Jihad, legitimised attacks on non-Muslims who appeared to flout Islamic law, and proclaimed valid the looting of Christian businesses to finance radical Muslim separatism. Sadat responded by drafting ethics legislation known popularly as the 'Law of Shame' that outlawed any criticism of the regime and established a special prosecutor to bring cases before a 'Values Court'. Public outcry forced him to modify the text; it became criminal either to negate divine teaching or to urge disloyalty to the nation. But militant Islamists were not appeased.

The violence reached a climax in June 1981 in the overcrowded working-class Cairo neighbourhood of Zawiya al-Hamra', where a dispute over land ownership, incited by the interference of local NDP representatives (contravening an earlier court decision on behalf of Coptic property holders)

provoked riots that claimed seventeen lives and saw previously unheard of acts of brutality. In extremist *ahli* mosques, Jihad members discussed a treatise written by the leader of the Cairo branch. In *al Farīda al gha'iba* (The neglected creed), Muḥammad 'Abd al Salam Faraj (d. 1982) asserted the obligation of Muslims to struggle on behalf of an Islamic state and to eliminate 'infidel leaders'. Faraj's book became a *fatwa* against Sadat's life.

Sadat now invoked the Law of Shame. His dragnet included 1,536 representatives of all political perspectives, a *Who's Who* of Egypt's independent minded intelligentsia. One detainee was Muḥammad al Islambuli, a Jihad leader from Upper Egypt. His brother, Khalid (d. 1982), a junior officer, managed to place loyal cadres in his truck and secure live ammunition for the 6 October parade to mark the eighth anniversary of the 'crossing'. When they passed the presidential reviewing stand, the group emerged shooting, killing Sadat and seven others. Their act shocked nation and world, but Sadat's funeral prompted no outpouring of grief, as had Nasser's eleven years earlier. Fearful for the future, already unsettled by the tumult of Sadat's final days, Egyptians displayed little emotion. For radical Islamists the funeral became an occasion for self congratulation. At his trial, prior to being sentenced to death, Khalid al Islambuli proclaimed defiantly as he had upon his arrest 'I have killed Pharaoh, and I do not fear death'.

Mubarak's Egypt: staying the course?

Vice president Hosni Mubarak, who sat by Sadat at the reviewing stand on 6 October, succeeded as president, and has ruled Egypt ever since. Mubarak immediately confronted an insurrection in Asyut that took several days to suppress; a simultaneous rebellion planned for Cairo never materialised. He declared martial law (it remains in place twenty seven years later), then embarked on a delicate balancing act. Between November 1981 and January 1982 the regime released leading Islamists such as 'Umar al Tilmissani and Shaykh Kishk. In March 1982 'Abd al Salam Faraj and the four Sadat assassins were sentenced to death. In orchestrated recantations, confessed militants appeared on television to renounce violence, even as the Azhari '*ulama*' who supervised the spectacle reaffirmed the foundational role of religion in daily life. In September 1984 surprisingly lenient sentences were handed down to perpetrators of the Asyut uprising.

Mubarak endeavoured to walk a middle path between Nasser's socialism, which he did not seek to widen, and Sadat's capitalism, which cried out for restraints. He allowed charges to be filed against Sadat's brother 'Ismat and

others who had come to personify economic liberalism run amok. Simultaneously, the regime began loosening restrictions on organised political activity. New political parties gained licences, chief among them a revived Wafd, but also a Nasserist party, all with rights to publish their own newspapers. Along with a proliferation of new dailies and weeklies that quickly pushed the bounds of government censorship as well as journalistic ethics bookstores and pavement kiosks featured scores of memoirs by victims of both the Nasser and Sadat regimes. Some looked with guarded optimism at the sustainability of politics on the 'margins rather than from the center'.⁹

In parliamentary elections held in 1984, the first since Sadat's killing, the Wafd, informally aligned with the still illegal Muslim Brotherhood, received 15 per cent of the vote. The alliance, which alienated secular and Coptic voters, did not last, and the Brothers later allied with the Socialist Labour Party (an offshoot of the old Socialist Party) to contest elections in 1987. This bloc netted the Socialists, who had been shut out of parliament in 1984, 17 per cent (Wafdist representation dropped to 11 per cent). Despite a series of legal victories that mandated an easing of electoral restrictions, all opposition forces save the left boycotted the 1992 elections. The immediate cause was to protest against the extension of martial law. The 1995 elections, which took place in an atmosphere of heightened political violence (and the backdrop of Algeria) and a government crackdown on the Muslim Brothers, resulted many argued by design in the weakest showing by opposition forces to date.

The political violence that characterised Mubarak's second decade of rule came on the heels of uneasy efforts to establish a degree of rapprochement with moderate Islamists by granting concessions to their conservative social agenda. In 1985 the courts struck down the controversial 'Jihan' laws, personal status provisions named for Sadat's outspoken wife, that granted women greater rights in matters of divorce and child custody. Bowing to arguments presented by Islamist lawyers, the court agreed that the measures, whatever their merits, had been forced through unconstitutionally. Secularist civil rights proponents found themselves trapped in a Hobson's choice, applauding the judiciary for its independence yet regretting the specific battleground case. The government also tolerated the rapid spread of 'Islamic' banks. Promising a 25 per cent return on investments, within five years these institutions attracted \$10–25 billion from hundreds of thousands of

9 Raymond William Baker, *Sadat and after: Struggles for Egypt's political soul* (Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. xiii–xiv.

investors. State officials stood by as the *'ulama'* took a more active role in pronouncing bans on contemporary and classical Arabic fiction that offended religious sensibilities, most notoriously *The 1001 Nights*. Most ominous of all, in the mid 1980s several hundred jailed militants were freed on condition they leave the country. Many wound up in Afghanistan, recruited into the *mujahidīn*, where they became battle hardened and trained in advanced insurgency, skills that some brought back home a decade later.

By the mid 1980s trouble signs appeared on the horizon. In May 1985 the speaker of parliament, Rif'at al Mahjub (d. 1990), blocked pending legislation to make *shari'a* the sole source of law, and the government placed all *ahli* mosques under state control. All sermons now required government approval. To ensure state sovereignty over the religious sector, the government dismissed and in some cases arrested outspoken clerics, chief among them Ḥafīz Salama, who preached to growing throngs in the al Nur Mosque in Cairo's 'Abbasiyya district. By the late 1980s the state changed its stance on Islamic banks. Now perceiving them as a threat to state finance as well as a dangerous state sanctioned bastion of Islamist capital, the government instigated a smear campaign not entirely based on falsehood that undermined public confidence, prompting mass withdrawals. A series of restrictions followed that decisively brought about their demise.

Behind the scenes, leaders of Jihad and other militant movements committed to destabilising and ultimately toppling the 'infidel' state began rebuilding their networks. Their resurgence commenced in 1987 with attempts on the lives of two former interior ministers and an outspoken anti Islamist editor. While the radical cells solidified their base in the south, attacking police with increasing frequency, the ultimate showdown brewed in Cairo. In the autumn of 1988 troops attacked Islamist enclaves in Heliopolis. The early 1990s witnessed a series of high profile assassinations: Rif'at al Mahjub in October 1990; outspoken secularist intellectual Faraj Fuda'a a man with whom al Azhar shaykhs had been willing to debate in public in June 1992; then the attempt on Nobel laureate Nagib Mahfouz (d. 2006) in October 1994. The period was also marked by the first attacks on tourists in Upper Egypt, a manoeuvre designed to undermine confidence in the regime and sabotage a major source of economic livelihood. In November 1992 Shaykh Gabr, the self styled religious leader of Imbaba, the sprawling working class city within a city on the Nile's north west bank, declared government authority irrelevant. A month later the army moved into the 'Islamic republic' and over the course of six weeks restored state sovereignty, although the heavy handed nature of the presence,

accompanied by wide scale roundups of suspects, did little to win hearts and minds. Violence between Islamist and state forces peaked in 1996–7, prompting calls for a negotiated ceasefire from jailed Jihad leaders, including ‘Umar ‘Abd al Raḥman, by then incarcerated in the United States for his links to the bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993. The turning point proved to be the massacre of some seventy foreign tourists at the temple of Hatshepsut, near Luxor, in November 1997. The action sparked public outcry. Upper Egypt, while a fount of social grievances, remained dependent on tourist revenues, which had been diminishing since the early 1990s. Agriculturists also felt the pinch of official bans on sugar cane production, a tactic designed to deny militants haven for roadside attacks and cover from air surveillance. Militant activism had been applauded in many quarters, or at least seen as no more reprehensible than state violence; but now Egyptians began to confront the prospect of another Algeria. Sensing that they had outplayed the violence card, their ranks depleted by arrests and killings, radical Islamists called for an end to such attacks. Whether a temporary expedience or genuine re evaluation of tactics, the truce has held.

Jihad by other means?

If radical Islamism has peaked, or even been decisively defeated – an argument posed by some analysts – the Islamist trend remains powerful within Egyptian civil society. By the mid 1990s graduates of the 1970s Islamist student movement controlled all major professional associations (lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.). Highly organised and promoting benefits such as higher pensions and health insurance, they swept to victory in a series of elections, including the heavily Coptic pharmacists’ syndicate. The associations soon became emboldened, speaking out more forthrightly on matters of domestic civil liberties and foreign policy, particularly with regard to Palestine. The courts also became a special forum for advancing the Islamist agenda. In a landmark decision, an appellate court upheld heresy charges brought against Cairo University professor Naṣr Abu Zayd. The plaintiff, a colleague who had led a successful campaign against Abu Zayd’s promotion within the academy, enlisted a crusading Islamist lawyer to invoke the Islamic legal concept of *ḥisba*, believed to have lapsed with the abolition of *shari‘a* courts in 1955, by which any member of the community might press charges against another for violating religious tenets. In Abu Zayd’s case the charge was apostasy, the judgment a legally mandated divorce from his wife. The couple fled the country; the government

responded by requiring future *ḥisba* cases to pass through the attorney general's office. Although no other case reached this level of notoriety, the Abu Zayd verdict validated the impetus for further legal actions against editors, film makers and, in one case, an actress whose picture on the cover of a magazine inspired indecency charges. The courts also became the legal battleground for school dress codes, female circumcision and censorship of 'blasphemous' fiction and films that purportedly depicted prophets and early Islamic holy figures. All such cases were argued within a *shari'a* context and supported by leading establishment '*ulama*'.

The state, fighting a bitter war with the militants, responded slowly to this 'retraditionalization behind the liberal mask'.¹⁰ In the immediate aftermath of the 1992 earthquakes, Islamist groups proved far more efficient at providing relief, and the government erred grievously by shutting down their operations. The February 1995 Associations Law placed elections to professional syndicates under direct control of the courts. Later that spring, the engineers and lawyers syndicates were placed under state custody. The government increasingly decried the public posture of the Muslim Brothers who, while condemning extremist violence, underscored the legitimacy of the overall Islamist enterprise and emphasised the state's responsibility in fostering militancy. On the eve of parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1995 the authorities arrested scores of Brothers, including campaign workers and even candidates standing for office. When the elections produced a virtual lockout of opposition representatives, aggrieved candidates sued. The courts ruled the election invalid and imposed strict guidelines for a new round, in which six Muslim Brother sympathisers won seats. The Brothers continue to demonstrate their electoral potential. Allowed to run openly for the first time under their own banner in the autumn 2005 parliamentary elections (even as their movement remains proscribed), Brotherhood candidates captured 88 of 454 seats, despite governmental interference in the latter rounds of polling. Few doubt that, if allowed, the Brothers would have attained even greater representation.

The outstanding question remains the extent to which Egypt has witnessed a religious revival at the state level despite the seeming failure of religious militants to seize power through a concentrated programme of violence. Some argue that 'the battle the militants lost was but the cumulative result of the Islamist movement's long expansion and decline during

¹⁰ Hamied Ansari, *Egypt: Stalled society* (Albany, 1986), title of ch. 9.

the last quarter of the twentieth century'.¹¹ The counter argument downplays the militants and emphasises the 'grassroots movement emerging from the streets' that aims to transform Egypt 'from the bottom up, creating an Islamic order'.¹² Underscoring this is a 'change of paradigm' away from the secularist ideologies that dominated social and political discourse throughout the twentieth century – liberalism, Marxism, Nasserism, Arab socialism – towards the Islamist alternative world view; for several decades secularists have found themselves forced to 'justify their concepts in terms of Islam rather than vice versa'.¹³ In the bloodiest days of Mubarak's reign, to the Islamist slogan 'Islam is the solution', the state could only muster the meek response: 'Islam is not terrorism'.

The battle has also been waged in the popular media, film and dramatic television serials most notably, and here too the lines are blurred. In the early 1990s, when scenarists first touched upon societal fault lines – prior to that the *hijab* remained conspicuously absent from the dramatised social field – Islamists were invariably depicted in a crude, unflattering manner, as pathological or, at best, naive dupes of sinister forces. In the 1992 comedy hit *al Irhab wal kabab* (Terrorism and shish kebab), a clever parody of bureaucratic inertia, a prime culprit prays incessantly – and demonstrably – on government time, a throwback to Nasser era satire. Two years later, *al Irhabī* (The terrorist) sought to humanise secular nationalism by pitting a socially inept – and sociologically problematic – militant against the warmth of an upper middle class family. Only in recent years have pious minded young people occasionally been given sympathetic or even neutral treatment. In the 2003 hit *Sahar al layali* (Sleepless nights), one of the women in a foursome of estranged young professional couples is veiled, without narrative relevance other than the reality of demographics.

Some observers of the Egyptian scene have noted the purported beginnings of a pendulum swing away from the most demonstrative displays of public piety. The number of women sporting Islamic dress, which long ago became highly commoditised and fashionable, seems to have 'stabilized or even regressed slightly'.¹⁴ Shrewd spectators note a trend towards 'down veiling', a shift to 'less concealing', less conservative designs.¹⁵ Male trends are

¹¹ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), p. 20.

¹² Geneive Abdo, *No God but God: Egypt and the triumph of Islam* (Oxford and New York, 2000), p. 5.

¹³ Gudrun Kramer, 'The change of paradigm', *Peuples méditerranéens*, 41 2 (1987–8), p. 299.

¹⁴ Gilles Kepel, *Bad moon rising* (London, 2003), p. 14.

¹⁵ Linda Herrera, 'Downveiling', *ISIM Newsletter*, 6 (2000), p. 1.

more difficult to gauge because men are far more likely to be arrested or harassed for wearing long beards or certain clothing styles. Simultaneously, a resurgence of secular, even 'impious', behaviour seems to have commenced. Egyptian beer, privatised in the 1990s and sold more openly in groceries than in previous decades, is advertised in state owned magazines. In films geared to youth audiences, fashionable actors – although still generally men – drink in popular yuppie hang outs and do not suffer grave consequences. How this all is received in Asyut or Imbaba is the unanswered question.

All is played out against the backdrop of 11 September 2001, the occupation of Iraq, the ongoing Israeli Palestinian confrontation, the uncertainty of Egypt's political future and the wired world of cellular phones, internet cafés and satellite television. The political future is uncertain. Hosni Mubarak, who has ruled since 1981 without a vice president, has no clear successor other than his son Gamal. The regime allowed the first multi candidate presidential elections in September 2005, but Mubarak's most vocal opponent, 'Ayman Nur, soon found himself imprisoned on highly suspect charges of election fraud. Many Egyptians fear their country may follow Syria down the path to 'republarchy' (*jumlukiya*), the 'destiny foretold for the sons of [Arab] presidents'.¹⁶ To counter this a broad based movement, Kifaya (Enough – a rebuke to Mubarak's political longevity), composed of secular, Islamist and Coptic elements, has attempted to revitalise street politics. Still, official politics seems to have atrophied, with voter turnout shrinking and civil liberties under increasing threat. In February 2006, fearful of Islamist electoral gains, the NDP dominated parliament postponed local elections.

The social and cultural landscape seems equally mystifying. If at times Egypt seems in the thrall of a pervasive nostalgia, that is a sentiment generated by those who came of age under Nasser and Sadat, supporters as well as detractors of each, or both. Those who run the state remain uncertain to what extent they want to, or should, promote historical dramas, such as the 1996 biopic *Nasser 56*, that may reflect poorly on current administration, or pop music by singers such as Sha'ban 'Abd al Raḥim that strays onto dangerous political turf. For the younger generation, Egypt must appear to be very much in flux, between political generations and cultural orientations, as well as between those with access to the latest technology and those who can only dream of such interfacing.

¹⁶ Kepel, *Bad Moon*, p. 34.

Sudan from 1919

CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN AND RICHARD A. LOBBAN, JR.

Sudanese have struggled to forge a national identity within African, Arab, Christian, Muslim and animist traditions. Chronic civil war in Africa's geographically largest nation has frustrated this quest since independence in 1956. There are regional divisions, and between wealthy urban elites and poor rural farmers. There are issues of politics, a secular democratic society versus a sacred order with a history of militarism and occasional multi party governments. Petroleum, mainly from the south, has complicated the goal of a stable unitary state. Yet in January 2005 a peace agreement ended decades of civil war between north and south. There is broad relief and optimism that 'a bad peace is better than a good war'. Still, the Naivasha Accords have not addressed all issues and parties, nor have all past agreements been honoured.

Most Sudanese are Muslims, but significant numbers are Christians and others hold indigenous and syncretic beliefs. Many southern leaders emphasise their Christianity to oppose the Islamist agendas of the Muslim regimes. The Sudan is about a third 'Northerners', who may claim an 'Arab' identity since Arabic is their first language. A third are 'Southerners', a multi ethnic and multilingual group including Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Equatorians and others. Another third are the 'marginal' ethnic groups of Darfur, Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and eastern Sudan. All of these groups have internal diversity, and debatable population sizes.

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1919–56

Turco Egyptian rule (1821–85) was toppled and the independent Mahdist state governed from 1885 to 1898. The Anglo Egyptian 'Reconquest' launched British colonial administration (1898–1956) following the 1898 Karari massacre and the assassination of the Mahdist Khalifa 'Abd Allahi with his surviving group. Relying at first on nineteenth century Turco Egyptian administrative precedents, most governors and officials were appointed from the 'Egyptian

services'. After the First World War colonial officers were recruited from British universities for administrative posts in Sudan. By 1920 the Anglo Egyptian Condominium installed indirect provincial rule that empowered 'tribal' shaykhs and village headmen with administrative and judicial authority under British district commissioners. This system was appropriate for the limited colonial resources and the vast colonised land.

Initially the British focused on establishing military order, and as resistance continued, it was forcefully put down. Mahdist writings and observances were outlawed, yet many Sudanese remained adherents, and the Mahdī's posthumous son Sayyid 'Abd al Raḥman (1885–1959) provided them with guidance. A practical leader, he cooperated with the British and declared his loyalty to the Crown over the Turks in the First World War, thus restraining further Mahdist revolts.

Sudan is on one of the historic pilgrimage routes to Mecca across the Sahel. Along this route is Darfur in western Sudan, where an independent Islamic sultanate emerged. In 1916 'Alī Dīnār, the last sultan, was killed by the British to implant colonial rule there. In 2003 a bloody rebellion over issues of underdevelopment in Darfur broke out, and became a major humanitarian crisis.

In 1918 the British governor general of Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, had warned that Egyptian anti colonialism and nationalism was spreading in Sudan. The March 1919 revolts in Egypt and the founding of the Graduates Club in Sudan justified his fears. Local resistance persisted in southern Sudan, and over three decades more than 170 military patrols of 50 men were used in a 'pacification' campaign. The economic integration of Sudan expanded with a railway to move troops and export cotton, livestock, and gum arabic. Port Sudan was built on the Red Sea, and the Gezira was converted to a vast cotton growing agricultural project. Economic development centred in the northern Sudan, while the south and other regions languished.

By the 1920s the limited school system created a small but articulate educated class. This group and the major ethno religious leaders grew dubious about the prospects for independence. Resistance to British rule grew, with nascent political parties expressing Sudanese nationalism. This spirit was found in small, secret societies such as the famous patriotic White Flag League, established on 20 May 1924. Their anti colonial goals found a natural alliance with the Egyptian nationalists also trying to end colonial occupation of the Nile Valley. One of its soldier leaders, a southern Muslim Dinka, 'Alī 'Abd al Latīf, was imprisoned for a year in 1922, and in July 1924 he was rearrested. In August Egyptian soldiers in Atbara began a revolt, while

cadets at the Khartoum military school refused orders. British soldiers force fully put down these revolts, and on 19 November 1924, when Sir Lee Stack was assassinated in Cairo, demonstrations in Khartoum led to a rising on 27 November. It was led by Muslim conscript soldiers, southerners 'Alī 'Abd al Laṭīf and 'Abd al Faḍl al Maz, and national postal clerk 'Ubaid Ḥajj al Amin. Startled by this vigorous movement, the British crushed the White Flag League, expelling Egyptians from Sudan, and curbing the educated Sudanese.

The two largest religious groups, the Mahdist led Umma and the Khatmiyya Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) evolved as mass political organizations. The educated classes had two factions. One was led by Shaykh Aḥmad al Sayyid al Fīl (the 'Fīlists'), supported by 'Alī al Mīrghānī of the Khatmiyya, and the other group grew around Muḥammad 'Alī Shawqī (the 'Shawqists') and had 'Abd al Raḥman al Maḥdī's (Anṣar) sympathy. Sides were also drawn in the British Egyptian rivalry. The Khatmiyya advocated 'Unity of the Nile Valley', while the Anṣar called for 'Sudan for Sudanese'.

During the Second World War, with a weakened Britain, Sudanese journalists extended support for independence. Two short lived journals had an impact on the evolution of Sudanese intellectual life. *Al Naḥḍa* appeared in 1931², and *al Fajr* began publication in 1934. Literature and literary criticism prospered. Debate often focused on defining Sudanese culture and its complex ties to the Arab world and to Equatorial Africa.

Political divisions among the educated elites centred on Sayyid 'Abd al Raḥman al Maḥdī and the Anṣar, and Sayyid 'Alī al Mīrghānī and the Khatmiyya, the two 'Sayyids'. These were mainly northern Sudanese debates since the south was deliberately excluded by the 1933 British Closed Districts Ordinance.

In 1938 the educated Sudanese created a non sectarian nationalist group, the Graduates Congress. The debate about independence also forced a choice between allying with either Britain or Egypt. In 1942 the Graduates Congress presented a petition to the British for speedy Sudanese self government, but its instant rejection precipitated a split in that group. The leading activists, including Isma'īl al Azharī, demanded a response of non cooperation with the British. This caused them to ally with Egyptian nationalists and become outspoken advocates of Nile Valley unity under their own Ashiqqa political party. Meanwhile the moderates in the Congress mistrusted Egyptian aims, and pursued independence by working with the British. 'Alī al Mīrghānī and the Khatmiyya gave support to the unionists, while 'Abd al Raḥman al Maḥdī and his Anṣar worked with the more moderate nationalists in support of a separate, independent Sudan, creating the Umma Party.

In this turmoil the British created the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan in 1944 to slow the move for independence. Some activists objected that it was only advisory, excluded the southern Sudan and consisted largely of traditional leaders, so they boycotted it. Meanwhile an elected legislative assembly was formed in 1948 that included northern and southern representatives. Unionists boycotted it, so the Umma Party dominated it. This 'Gordian knot' was cut by the 1952 Egyptian revolution. The new Egyptian leadership was more flexible regarding Sudan, and by 1953 they took steps towards Sudanese self determination. In Sudan most of the small unionist parties joined, creating the National Unionist Party (NUP) led by Isma'īl al Azhari, which won the parliamentary majority in 1953. The Umma Party also won a large number of seats. The other large block of representatives was southerners in the Liberal Party. The voice of the smaller parties was faint.

From independence to the present

On 1 January 1956 the British withdrew and Sudan was restored as an independent state under the NUP dominated parliament. Isma'īl al Azhari became the first Sudanese prime minister, and initiated the Sudanisation of the administration. While the NUP membership initially supported a Nile unity platform, they began to move towards a Sudan independent from Egypt. The preoccupation with Egypt glossed over the significant human diversity among the peoples from the east, west and south, who were justifiably disturbed by their limited role in the 'Sudanised' government. Others feared northern 'Arab' or 'Jellaba' domination. Mistrust swept across the south, and in August 1955 a mutiny broke out among southern army troops in Equatoria that left many dead or exiled. This event complicated the formation of a unified Sudan even before independence was realised.

The inherited colonial parliamentary structure did not generate stability, and in 1958 the first of multiple coups took place. The questions about the kind of government – parliamentary or presidential, centralised or federalist, and Islamic or secular – went unresolved. The effective integration of the south into national politics was unresolved, and southern leaders began to withdraw in discouragement. The northern consensus for effective government dissipated into an arena for personal, factional and sectarian feuds. The economic situation worsened with a decline in the cotton export market.

The northern parties also differed over an Islamic constitution or state. The Umma Party and the NUP (later the DUP) of the Khatmiyya called for an Islamic parliamentary system based upon *shari'a* (Islamic law). Other

Muslims opposed an Islamic charter, including the Anti Imperialist Front (from the Sudanese Communist Party, SCP), the Republican Brothers, and southern forces, who wanted a secular system that gave them full citizenship. For them, the imposition of Islamic law conjured bitter memories of Arab exploitation. Threatening secession, they boycotted the Constitutional Committee, thus failing to place Christianity constitutionally on a par with Islam as a state religion.¹

After independence the urban, educated elites looked to Isma‘īl al Azharī or the radical SCP for leadership. The Khatmiyya under the leadership of ‘Alī al Mirghani originally joined with al Azharī in the formation of the NUP, but this alliance soon broke down, and in 1956 Sayyid ‘Alī’s followers formed the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The Anṣar, following ‘Abd al Raḥman al Mahdī, remained the root of the Umma Party. Following the 1955 southern revolt, the failure of the 1958 elections to clarify the situation, and a worsening economy, General Ibrahim ‘Abbud seized power in November 1958.

Although the PDP and Umma accepted the coup, ‘Abbud banned them and they lost influence with the first military regime. Northern politicians became restive, and some were jailed briefly. ‘Abbud tried a military ‘solution’ for the ‘southern problem’, but by the end of the era most southern leaders were either in exile, prison, or fighting a civil war against Khartoum. By 1963 southern resistance transformed into the Anya Nya guerrilla force linked with the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and other exile groups.

By October 1964 widespread student demonstrations and strikes by professionals toppled ‘Abbud, who was replaced by a transitional government led by Sirr al Khatim al Khalīfa. Radical educated elites again influenced the new civilian government due to their prominence in the ‘October Revolution’. Elections and parliamentary government resumed under the older political parties’ control, but by 1965 the balance of political forces had shifted. The small but influential SCP, representing the radical intelligentsia, had few seats in parliament but shaped the political rhetoric. The Umma Party led the elections from its mass Anṣar base. A succession dispute in the Mahdist leadership split the Umma Party. ‘Abd al Raḥman died in 1959 and his experienced son and successor, Ṣiddīq, died unexpectedly in 1961. Anṣar leadership roles became more divided as Ṣiddīq’s son, Oxford educated

¹ Yusuf Fadl Hasan, ‘The role of religion in the north south conflict, with special reference to Islam’, in Yusuf Fadl Hasan, *Studies in Sudanese history* (Khartoum, 2003), pp. 207–29.

Şadiq (b. 1935) became the head of the Umma Party, while Imam al Hadī, a more conservative son of ‘Abd al Raḥman, became the *imam* or religious leader of the Anşar. Şadiq managed to oust the transitional government of Muḥammad Aḥmad Maḥjoub’s wing of his party, and became prime minister in 1966 7.

During Şadiq al Maḥdī’s first term as prime minister there was a new drive for an Islamic constitution, in reaction to the growing influence of the secular Communist Party. He said that ‘the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one, and its overpowering expression is Arabic’.² Şadiq’s brother in law Ḥasan al Turabī (b. c. 1932), the founder and head of the Muslim Brothers’ Islamic Charter Front, held the same position. The SCP and most southerners maintained their opposition, while the parliament was mired down over the ‘southern problem’. Struggling to refocus the issue, many southern leaders returned from exile in 1965 for a round table conference to reach a ‘comprehensive solution’. However, factional politics and northern inflexibility re emerged, and Khartoum reverted to military governance.

By May 1969 instability again paved the way for Colonel Ja’far Nimeiri (pres. 1969–85) to stage another military coup. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) declared that the old parties were illegal and their ‘May revolution’ continued the October 1964 revolution. The Nimeiri regime (1969–85) identified itself as a ‘democratic republic’, adopting domestic socialist programmes and restricting conservative opposition groups. A solution to the ‘southern question’ was announced when the RCC adopted the SCP position of ‘regional autonomy’ in the 9 June 1969 Declaration. By 1969 Joseph Lagu led the southern military resistance as peace negotiations unfolded between northern and southern representatives in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that resulted in signed accords by late March, just prior to the June Declaration. A ceasefire was declared, and northern and southern military and administrative systems were integrated. Thus, the first period of civil war (1955–71) ended.

In May 1971 the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) replaced all political parties, and in January 1972 the first SSU congress issued a permanent constitution, which was ratified in December 1973. Arabic was made the national language, with English as an official language of the south. Decentralisation of provincial government divided several of the larger provinces into eighteen administrative regions.

² Ibid., p. 215.

The Nimeiri regime brought a form of state socialism that nationalised banks (May 1970), cotton marketing (June 1970) and newspapers (August 1970). The revolutionary government initially appeared to be radical, with SCP members and army influential in government. The first real challenge came from conservative forces, especially the Anṣār. The Imam al Hadī led an open revolt in March 1970 that was crushed at Aba Island and in an Anṣār stronghold in Omdurman. This ended organised conservative opposition in Sudan, but Anṣār leaders and the Muslim Brothers, led by al Turabī, began working in exile. By 1970 Nimeiri began to clash with a branch of the SCP. This climaxed on 19 July 1971 when a leftist coup took control of Khartoum for three days. After Nimeiri regained power he executed three major SCP leaders, party head ‘Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, trade union leader Shafī Aḥmad al Shaykh and southern leader Joseph Garang. Those who avoided execution went underground, into exile, or were imprisoned. For a time, regional autonomy for the south persisted through a High Executive Council for the Southern Region.

In the 1970s plans for Sudan to become the agricultural ‘breadbasket of the Arab world’ were restrained by notable rural to urban migration. For Khartoum’s Three Towns metropolitan area the growth rate has been dramatic. In 1956 the urban population was about 250,000; by 1970 it had tripled to about 750,000; in 1980 it was about 1.5 million; and in 2005, after years of migration and civil war displacement, it was 6 or 7 million. Except for Nubia in the far north, most provincial capitals have also experienced growth of 9 to 11 per cent per year. For Juba, the capital of Equatoria, the urban population has lived under siege from the Sudan government and under the control of the rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Juba grew from a city of 84,000 in 1983 to 150,000 in 1990, and by 2005 it may have doubled again.

Poor central planning, insufficient local coordination and widespread corruption eventually dashed hopes for the economic development of Sudan’s agricultural potential. Domestic inflation rates grew while foreign indebtedness increased. As the World Bank and International Monetary Fund intervened with regulations, the economic burden fell upon the beleaguered Sudanese consumer, as petrol and sugar prices soared. Periodic popular demonstrations erupted over the final years of the Nimeiri regime, culminating in a popular uprising (*intifāda*) that led the military to intervene in April 1985, bringing the ‘May revolution’ government to an end. Nimeiri, in the United States at the time, accepted political exile in Egypt, and did not return to Sudan until 1999.

The most serious political failure of the Nimeiri regime was the erosion of the Addis Ababa Accords and the resurgence of civil war in 1983. Trust withered more with the discovery of oil in the south by Chevron Oil Company. The decision to locate the oil refinery in the north and to export most of the oil met with southern hostility. With southern protest more organised and unified, Nimeiri responded with a 'gerrymandering' plan to further divide the south.

While these events worsened north south relations, Nimeiri's politics moved from secular 'democracy' towards a nascent Islamism. While Nimeiri's motives are unclear, his state supported Islamisation, which began in 1977, is often attributed to antipathy towards his former communist allies and a quest for religious legitimacy, although it meant effectively abandoning his southern peace strategy. Islamisation began with a ban on alcohol production, sale and consumption, and the institution of religious taxation (*zakat*). When secular forces from the south and their northern allies objected, this gradual approach was abandoned, and he imposed Islamic law upon all Sudanese by decreeing in September 1983 that Islamic law was now state law. The leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Charter Front, Dr Ḥasan al Turabi, was charged with incorporating Islamic law into Sudanese law. The new Islamic civil and criminal codes became known as the 'September Laws', with *shari'a* law being the sole law in force. Opposition to this move came from the judiciary, and even staunch Muslim advocates such as Ṣadiq al Mahdī. Meanwhile, Nimeiri increased the application of these laws through newly appointed judges who served in the 'courts of prompt justice'. The introduction of the harsh *ḥudud* criminal penalties resulted in the use of these courts as tools of repression, especially during 1983–5, as jails filled and untold numbers had limbs amputated for theft in al Turabi's view of Islamic justice.

The breakdown of the Addis Ababa Accords stimulated a revolt led by Kerubino Kwanyin Bol and William Nyong Bol in May 1983. This revolt, in a political climate marked by the 'September Laws' and the use of *shari'a* as state law, signalled the beginning of the second civil war. Lieutenant Colonel John Garang (1945–2005), then of the Sudanese Armed Forces, was sent to suppress this revolt of southern troops protesting against reassignment to the north. Instead of crushing the mutinies, Garang joined the southern rebellion against the north with himself as head of the newly formed SPLA and its political wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLA stressed that its goal was not secession, but the liberation of the whole of the Sudanese people from years of military dictatorship. Thus, the SPLM

represented a new stage in southern politics that even attracted some northern intellectuals, such as Mansur Khalid, former minister of foreign affairs.

The popular *intifaḍa* of spring 1985 brought a massive democratic upsurge opposed to the Nimeiri government, but in the end it was another *coup d'état*, led by General Suwar al Dahab, that finished the May revolution. He kept his word that civilian rule would be restored within a year, in part because Garang refused to meet with any military government. By the spring of 1986 elections again put the Umma Party in government with Ṣadiq al Mahdī as prime minister. But the coalition government of al Mahdī failed to hold talks with the SPLM, and his use of government backed militias (*muraḥilīn*) perpetuated the war against the SPLA and resulted in reports of revived slavery.

Institutionalising Islamist rule

The third period of democracy (1986–9) again represented a failure of Ṣadiq al Mahdī's leadership, as he could not resolve the divisive issue of *sharī'a* and Islamisation, nor did he begin negotiations with the SPLM. Fighting intensified in the south, and there was a parliamentary move to withdraw *sharī'a*. In May 1989, on the verge of rescinding *sharī'a* in the weak National Assembly and with tensions mounting in the capital, the military again stepped in to 'solve' the problems of the country. This time the coup makers were backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF) and its parent organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Ḥasan al Turabī, who moved back to centre stage.

General 'Umar Ḥasan al Bashīr (b. 1944) seized power on 30 June 1989, committed to a Sudan unified under *sharī'a* law. Again, the regime banned all political parties except the NIF, and shut down all newspapers and other media, except for its own, *al Inqaz al Waṭanī* (The national salvation). The military government again promised that it would transcend sectarian party politics, or a Western style secular democracy. Many politicians and intellectuals were arrested, and allegations quickly arose of political repression and torture. Human rights organisations, such as Africa Watch and Amnesty International, criticised the regime. 'Ghost houses' became emblematic of the new use of torture and intimidation. The former Citibank building became a notorious ghost house. Prominent intellectuals were tortured, and the human rights activists were harassed. By 1996 Human Rights Watch called Sudan a 'human rights disaster'.

Facing deteriorating political conditions and harsh repression, an unprecedented alliance of the banned political parties created in exile the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that found common ground in opposition to the

al Bashir regime. All major parties, including the SPLM, signed the National Democratic Charter in Cairo in March 1990. A consensus was reached that the civil war would only end by removing *shari'a* as state law. They proposed a conference to represent all of Sudan's diverse regions and groups that would construct a secular, democratic state. In 1991 a federal system of nine states was proclaimed, but by 1994 Sudan was re divided into twenty six states.

The al Bashir regime countered the alliance of the major political parties with intransigence. It continued to pursue a military 'solution' to the civil war, and its domestic and foreign policies were guided by the strict Islamist ideology of al Turabi. Indeed, for six years of the al Bashir and al Turabi collaboration (1990–6), the Sudan hosted Osama Bin Laden and al Qa'ida. In Khartoum, Bin Laden allegedly planned the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, attacks in Somalia in 1994 and on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, various attacks on tourists in Egypt, and the attempted assassination of Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak in 1995. Bin Laden ran various businesses supporting his agenda until his presence in Sudan became a liability. Apparently the Sudanese government offered him to the Americans, who were however satisfied when he left Sudan for Afghanistan in 1996.

The regime, while claiming to have no ideology, nonetheless arrested Umma Party head Šadiq al Mahdi and Muhammad 'Uthman al Mirghani of the Democratic Unionist Party, as well as al Turabi of the NIF. In four months all three were released, and soon al Turabi's influence became apparent. By 1993 al Bashir had reinvented himself as a 'civilian' president, with the assistance of a 300 member transitional national assembly appointed to enact laws. In the restrictive parliamentary elections of March 1996 both al Bashir and al Turabi won seats that brought in the NIF as the sole party in government. Al Turabi solidified his position in February 1998, when he was elected secretary general of the National Congress, the sole legal political organisation. Al Bashir insisted that political parties would not return, and protests in towns and on campuses were met with arrests and, occasionally, with deadly force. At least nine coups were thwarted, leading to the arrest and execution of probably scores of army officers.

The new 1991 penal code legalised the application of the *hudud* Islamic punishments. These included lashing for morals offences, amputation for theft and stoning for adultery and fornication, as well as other strict punishments, such as crucifixion. Such punishments had been advocated by al Turabi during the Nimeiri and al Bashir administrations. It is alleged by human rights organisations that hundreds of amputations took place from the late 1970s to the 1990s, but the most intense period appears to have been

between 1983 and 1985 under Nimeiri. Apparently many were poor urban migrants from the western and southern parts of the country. Especially when the amputees were not Muslims, there was an outcry from such organisations as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Sudan Human Rights Organisation (Cairo) and the Sudanese Organisation Against Torture.

The lives of the poor in Sudan deteriorated due to the civil war and underdevelopment, yet elite areas in Khartoum still grew. Even before the al Bashir regime, refugee settlements expanded widely around the capital. Periodically these areas were destroyed for 'slum clearance'. The refugee inhabitants were relocated to desert settlements equally lacking in amenities, or suffered harsh police measures. Behind the government's public health and civil concerns lay an Islamic conversion agenda.

Despite international criticism, the al Bashir regime stood committed to its Islamist policies and repression of dissent through much of the 1990s. This forced many northern professionals and educators into exile. 'Islamic' dress was required for all women, and some female students were flogged for doing otherwise. Besides the *ḥadd* penalty of amputation for theft, prostitutes and other women were found guilty of *zina* (fornication or adultery) and were sentenced to death by stoning, although none of these sentences was carried out. Traditional southern women beer (*merissa*) sellers were harassed until the signing of the peace accords in 2005.

In the context of civil war and social collapse the traditional practice of slavery was revived. The government strongly denied these accusations, but numerous victims have come forward to relate their experiences. Mostly the slaves were taken from the Dinka or Nuba people who lived in the border zones. The Popular Defence Forces (PDF) or government militias (*muraḥ ilin*) captured slaves to serve as labourers, domestics and sexual slaves, or as animal herders. These controversial acts and apparent repression of Christians put Sudan on the agenda of the religious right in the United States. Some human rights groups criticised the SPLA for coercion in using child soldiers.

In foreign relations, the al Bashir regime was regionally isolated while internationally it was labelled a pariah state for its human rights record. Relations with Egypt were poor over the disputed Halayeb region on the Red Sea, and only worsened as Iran and Iraq gave military aid in 1991 to support the Sudanese 'jihad' in the south. In 1995 Sudanese were implicated in an assassination attempt on the Egyptian president. The Sudan's refusal to surrender the suspects only worsened diplomatic relations with Egypt,

Ethiopia and Uganda. Relations with Eritrea were poor since it hosted the opposition National Democratic Alliance.

In the civil war, the al Bashir regime managed in 1996 to divert some SPLA commanders to its side, most notably Riek Machar (of the Southern Sudan Independence Movement), Lam Akol (of SPLA United), and temporarily, Kerubino Bol. The lasting advantage of these alliances was negligible, but during this period the SPLA extended the civil war into southern Darfur and Kordofan. The NDA began military action in eastern Sudan. Increasingly, the SPLA came to represent the marginal peoples of the whole Sudan. Thus, to some still unknown extent, it has a national constituency.

From 1992 to 1993 inconclusive peace talks took place in Abuja, Nigeria, and were revived in Naivasha, Kenya, in 2001.⁴ The government of Sudan and the SPLA were the principal negotiators at both conferences. Traditional parties and the NDA were not officially represented as the debate again turned on questions of national identity and state religion relations. All agreed that Sudan was multi ethnic, multilingual, multicultural and multi religious, and there should be constitutional guarantees for that diversity, but they disagreed about how to articulate these concepts in a national framework. The government argued three points. First, the Muslim majority had the right to establish an Islamic constitutional system. Second, religious diversity could exempt the south from the *hudud* (punishments), but not from Islamic laws relating to business, property and taxes. Third, future assimilation would transform the Sudan into an Arab Islamic country. The government refused to consider the possibility of no official state religion.

Both wings of the SPLM rejected the government position. The SPLM maintained that Sudanese diversity must be in a secular, democratic system that would legalise political pluralism. The SPLM Nasir delegation, led by Dr Lam Akol, argued that the Sudan was composed of culturally distinct northern and southern nations that should not try to unify.

The issue of self determination was very contentious. Separation of the south from the north remained a popular southern position. The SPLM wanted a referendum after an interim period that would allow the south either to remain in the Sudan or secede. Initially the government refused to discuss issues of security, a ceasefire and foreign monitors. The SPLM sought an immediate ceasefire to lead to an interim period for the south to control its own security.

When the government and SPLM reconvened in Abuja in 1993, the government of Nigeria insisted that the first agenda item focus on the issue of religion and state; if that could be resolved, the other issues would fall into

place. If that could not be resolved, no accord was possible on any issue. The government of Sudan insisted that Islamic law had to be maintained and the SPLM argued that the government must choose between Islamic law and territorial unity. Given that polarisation, the talks adjourned deadlocked, but the agenda was set for talks at Naivasha.

Peace talks, 2001–4

Peace talks resumed as the SPLA exerted military control over most of the south except for the provincial towns. The war was in stalemate with massive displacement of people and failed peace efforts. The Machakos Accords in 2002 advanced negotiations, with the government of Sudan and SPLM accepting that *shari'a* law would remain in the north and the south would be secular. The chief negotiators were Sudan's vice president 'Alī 'Usman Muḥammad Ṭaha and SPLM/A leader Dr John Garang. The Inter Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) countries, including Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, assisted in the talks since they also had vested interests in the resolution of Sudan's civil war. European countries, especially Norway, were active in the negotiations. American military and legal threats, as well as promises of future aid, added to this mix.

The first two protocols concluded the ceasefire and implementation phases of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The 'final status' negotiations continued until 31 December 2004 when the final stage of the Naivasha Peace Accords were signed by President al Bashīr and Dr Garang. Observers included South African president, Thabo Mbeki, and Kenyan vice president, Moody Awori. President al Bashīr referred to the historic signing as 'Sudan's second independence'.³ The president was applauded when he ended his speech with 'La Allah, Alleluia', alluding to the first words of the *shahada* (the Muslim declaration of faith) that introduced some tension before concluding with the Christian word of joy.

The second stage of the signing of the CPA was on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi. In attendance were African heads of state Presidents Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, Museveni of Uganda, and Mbeki of South Africa, with Canada's special peace envoy, Senator Mobina Jaffer, European representatives, US secretary of state Colin Powell, and former US special envoy to Sudan, John Danforth. In Khartoum emotions ranged from southern jubilation to northern cautious optimism as Africa's longest civil war ended.

³ *Khartoum Monitor*, 1 January 2005.

‘Alī ‘Usman Muḥammad Ṭaha noted that:

one of the best parts of this agreement is that it would preserve the unity of Sudan during the interim period. Moreover, it would guarantee for the first time a satisfactory equation between religion and the state.⁴

While at the signing ceremony SPLA head Dr Garang said:

The solution to the fundamental problem of Sudan is to involve an all inclusive Sudanese state which will uphold the new Sudan. A new political Sudanese dispensation in which all Sudanese are equally stakeholders irrespective of their religion, irrespective of their race, tribe, or gender and if this does not work, then to look for other solutions, such as splitting the country . . . As is the case in the south, the events in Darfur, eastern Sudan and elsewhere have made it clear that we must have an all inclusive state.⁵

Despite broad approval of these accords, some Islamists dissented, and their political future remains unclear. The peace accords brought an end to the official harassment of non Muslim behaviour, such as prosecution for dress or selling beer. The Islamic *dīnār*, associated with Arab nationalism, may revert to the currency of the old Sudanese pound.⁶

Oil exploration in the 1970s indicated significant reserves in southern Sudan. After Nuer and Dinka oil rich land were militarily secured, exploitation of the southern oilfields began. However, the continued war in the south disrupted Chevron’s interests, and further exploration by Talisman was halted by international protest. Since the Naivasha Accords were signed Western oil companies have renewed their interest. The French company Total updated a 1980 contract with Sudan under the condition that operations would resume when peace and lasting security were restored in the region.⁷ Sudan is currently producing 500,000 barrels of oil daily, but may soon reach a million barrels daily. The peace ‘dividend’ has attracted foreign companies to the new opportunities in the oil and gas reserves, agriculture, construction, engineering and services.

4 ‘Welcome to the new Sudan’ (text of interview with ‘Alī ‘Usman Muḥammad Ṭaha,), *Khartoum Monitor*, 13 January 2005.

5 Sudan News Agency, ‘al Bashir: A comprehensive and durable peace will be reached’, *Sudan Vision*, 2, 135, 11 January 2004, p. 9.

6 S. C. A. Ori Ayo, ‘New currency for Sudan, Bravo!’, *Khartoum Monitor*, 30 December 2004.

7 ‘French oil company Total updates contract with Sudan’, *Khartoum Monitor*, 1 January 2005.

Observations

The twentieth century history of Sudan has at least four main themes. First, the century opened with military and colonial conquest, but by mid century independence had been achieved. Second, in nearly fifty years of independence Sudan has oscillated between lengthy periods of military rule punctuated by relatively brief periods of multi party democracy; however, neither achieved a cohesive civil society. Third, there was a persistent struggle for national identity that is, variously, Islamic, African, Afro Arab, socialist, capitalist, pluralist or unitary. Fourth, governance has fluctuated between centralism, federalism and regional autonomy. Centrifugal ethno political forces pulling the country apart have not only resulted in crises in southern Sudan, but in Darfur and eastern Sudan as well. Failure to reach national unity has undermined overall state stability with a high cost in human lives and diverted resources. The signing of the 2005 Naivasha Accords permits cautious optimism, but one tempered by deep patterns of unresolved issues.

North Africa from the First World War

KENNETH J. PERKINS

At the start of the First World War, no region of the Maghreb had eluded European colonial rule, although the length and intensity of their experiences varied. Algeria was, in theory, fully integrated with France, while in Tunisia the protectorate created the appearance of sovereignty even as it concentrated effective power in the hands of European officials. Morocco, which France and Spain had divided into two protectorates only two years before the war, and Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which the Ottoman Empire ceded to Italy in the 1912 Treaty of Lausanne, were all areas in a greater state of flux and more prone to violence.

The quest for Algerian and Tunisian political participation

Muslims from all three French dependencies contributed to the Allied war effort, with more than 400,000 serving in the French army or replacing conscripted workers.¹ They believed that their sacrifices for France – roughly a quarter died or sustained injuries – earned them and their countrymen a voice in post war colonial governance. On their repatriation, however, soldiers and labourers encountered demeaning conditions marked by disease, drought, famine and inflation. French prime minister Georges Clemenceau sympathised, and within months of the armistice parliament acted, at least regarding Algeria. The Jonnart Law enfranchised (in an electoral college separate from that of the settlers) Algerian males who had attained certain educational levels, owned property or had served in the army or the bureaucracy.

¹ Statistics on North Africans in French service during the war appear in C. R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A history* (New York, 2000), p. 175; Kenneth J. Perkins, *A history of modern Tunisia* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 74–5; and John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The origins and development of a nation* (Bloomington, 1992), p. III.

Many Algerians applauded this measure, but to Amīr Khalid, the grandson of ‘Abd al Qadir (d. 1883), an officer in the French army, and a leader in the Young Algerian movement, such reforms were inadequate. After winning election to the Algiers municipal council in 1919, Khalid urged France to bestow full citizenship on eligible Algerians without requiring them to abandon Islamic law; to grant Muslim and European residents of Algeria equal representation in Paris; and to abolish the discriminatory *Code de l’Indigénat*. Although Khalid refrained from questioning the fundamental relationship between France and Algeria, his advocacy of assimilation made him a dangerous figure to most settlers. In 1923 he abruptly left for Syria.

Khalid’s followers never recovered from his departure, but in 1926 moderate Young Algerians established the *Fédération des Elus Indigènes* to promote an agenda of Franco-Muslim equality rather than assimilation and thereby increase the influence of Muslims holding public office. Because many members were uncomfortable interacting with Algerians of social classes lower than their own, the organisation rarely reached beyond a small circle. Nor were many Europeans prepared to accord the elected Muslim representatives the respect they sought, much less to embrace them as partners in governing Algeria.

In Tunisia, ‘Abd al ‘Azīz Tha‘albī and other Young Tunisian critics of French rule re-entered the country in 1919 after years of exile for their earlier political activism. They published *La Tunisie martyre*, an indictment of the French administration which contrasted conditions before and after the protectorate, alleged that France had disrupted a ‘golden age’ of enlightened pre-colonial reforms, and posited the restoration of the 1861 constitution as the way to end the abuses of settlers and protectorate officials. In 1920 a number of disillusioned individuals, mostly from traditionally well-respected professions which had sustained dramatic losses of power, income and prestige as a result of protectorate policies, joined the Young Tunisian veterans to form the *Dustur* (Constitution) Party, which they hoped would halt further erosion of their status. Besides restoring the constitution, the party’s goals included: a parliament with Tunisian and French representatives; access for qualified Tunisians to administrative positions; equal pay for equal work; and the institution of compulsory primary education in Arabic, with instruction in French at higher levels. The *Dustur* solicited the support of the French left, but a delegation to Paris in 1920 had its visit cut short when Tha‘albī was arrested, returned to Tunisia and imprisoned, largely in response to settler hysteria conflating the *Dustur* with international communism.

Conversely, Tunisia's ruler, Naşir Bey, encouraged the Dustur, much to the irritation of Resident General Lucien Saint. The two crossed swords when the *bey* threatened abdication if the French did not address the party's demands, but when Saint dispatched troops to the beylical palace, Naşir backed down. This episode, along with the arrest of a number of particularly vocal Dusturians, demoralised the party, while Naşir's death a few months later deprived it of a valuable ally. In 1922, with the party in disarray, Saint inaugurated the Grand Council, a consultative body 70 per cent of whose members represented the less than 3 per cent of the protectorate's population that was French.² The Dustur denounced the council, but some of its members stood for and won election to the chamber, revealing a breakdown of discipline within the Dustur. Both Saint and the new *bey*, Ḥabīb, advised Tha'albi that he should leave Tunisia if he intended to continue advocating the rejection of France's offers. Cowed, he travelled to the Middle East, but his lieutenants kept the Dustur afloat by refocusing its energy.

One activist, M'ḥammad 'Alī, had been organising consumer cooperatives and promoting the party's agenda in the lower class neighbourhoods that remained a mystery to most Dusturians. When European longshoremen refused to support their Tunisian co workers' demands for wage parity in 1924, the latter's appeal to the Dustur enabled M'ḥammad 'Alī to reinforce the links between workers and the nationalist movement. Although party leaders endorsed his plan to make the striking dockworkers the core of a Tunisian union, the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT), they were more interested in enlarging the Dustur than in the plight of the workers. The CGTT orchestrated a wave of strikes in late 1924, but the nascent labour movement collapsed in the following year when the authorities arrested its leaders. The stoutly middle class Dusturians, appalled at the prospect of prison sentences, looked on the confrontational tactics of the union as dangerously provocative and made no attempt to defend it. To make matters worse, M'ḥammad 'Alī's collaboration with the Tunisian Communist Party in the creation of the CGTT confirmed the conviction of Dustur critics that the party was linked to communism.

The Dustur unequivocally dissociated itself from the communists and, without directly denouncing the CGTT, turned its back on the union. Yet, as crowds of protestors took to the streets of Tunis in imitation of the belligerent tactics of the CGTT, even the Dustur leaders recognised the political

² Ali Mahjoubi, *Les origines du mouvement national en Tunisie (1904-1934)* (Tunis, 1982), p. 311.

potential of the lower class Tunisians, despite remaining uncomfortable dealing with them. Party leaders exerted little control over the protests, but were swept up in the wave of arrests that ended them. Only the Tunisian Communist Party stood with the *Dustur* through the difficult months of 1925, heightening the perception of a link between the two. Seizing on the vulnerability of the protectorate's opponents, the resident general issued a series of decrees that banned most political activity and temporarily sidelined the *Dustur*.

Before long, other problems beset the party. In 1927, Ṭahar Ḥaddad, a prominent *Dusturian* and a scholar at the Zaytuna mosque university, published an essay faulting the party for abandoning the CGTT and being uninterested in the country's workers. A year later Ḥaddad wrote articles addressing women's roles in a modern Muslim society. Based on his innovative interpretation of the Qur'an, he supported more extensive rights for Tunisian women and encouraged them to play a more active role in public affairs. Both works irritated party leaders, but Zaytuna officials took even greater umbrage and expelled Ḥaddad from the faculty.

Whether despite that decision or because of it, the ideas of the youthful social critic – he was not yet thirty – appealed to many young, French educated party members who had joined the *Dustur* during the 1920s because it was the only viable outlet for political activity, but who were contemptuous of its leaders' docility and rejected its recent retrenchment. These young men's personal and professional achievements stemmed from their knowledge of Western culture and the ease with which they functioned in both European and Tunisian environments. If the *Dustur* chiefs yearned for an idealised past and detested the transformations wrought by the West, this younger generation harboured no such attitudes – association with the West had, after all, ensured their success – although they roundly criticised French rule. Their grasp of contemporary politics and ideology persuaded them that *Dusturian* success hinged on a more activist approach incorporating the entire Tunisian population.

At the same time as their relationship with the working class was causing such consternation for Tunisian political figures, the Algerian nationalist Messali al Ḥajj (d. 1974) was successfully mobilising North African labourers in France behind the platform of the *Etoile Nord Africaine* (ENA), which he founded in 1926. Messali's appeal lay in his articulation of distinctively different concerns from those of either the *Fédération des Elus Indigènes* or the *Dustur*, both of which he viewed as out of touch with the reality of most North Africans' lives. As its name implies, the ENA did not limit its scope to a

single dependency, but called for the end of French colonial rule across the Maghreb. This, along with denouncing capitalism and emphasising rural issues, significantly distanced it from the *Fédération*, while Messali's assessment of communism diverged dramatically from that of the *Dustur* leaders. He maintained extensive contacts with the French Communist Party and adapted many of its principles and organisational tactics, but resisted subordinating his followers' nationalism to an internationalist agenda, eventually breaking with the communists over this issue. Citing these communist ties, the French police banned the ENA in 1929, but after several years underground it resumed its campaign to provide a political base for North African workers throughout France and also set about extending its influence in Algeria.

Establishing European control in Morocco and Libya

As colonial officials attempted to thwart political opposition in Algeria and Tunisia during the 1920s, their colleagues in Morocco and Libya still faced armed resistance. Resident General Louis Hubert Lyautey had begun 'pacifying' the Moroccan countryside (in the name of the sultan) as soon as the protectorate had taken effect in 1912. Despite wartime troop shortages, his commanders lost no ground, thanks in part to the collaboration of the *grands caïds*, powerful chieftains who controlled the High Atlas Mountains south of Marrakesh. French units resumed their offensives even before the fighting in Europe ended, with most campaigns in the following decade directed against the tribes of the Middle Atlas Mountains and those positioned to threaten the Taza Gap, the natural link between Morocco and Algeria. The 'pacification' was not officially declared complete, however, until the defeat of diehard tribal opposition in the Anti Atlas Mountains in 1934.

Warfare with recalcitrant mountain tribes did not deter the development of the readily accessible agricultural plains that the French bluntly referred to as 'useful Morocco'. There, individual settlers and corporate investors benefited from the rapid extension of infrastructure (including roads, railways and dams that allowed the irrigation of new land or provided electricity) after the First World War and from the implementation of official policies (such as rebates on agricultural taxes for farmers working their land with 'modern' methods) that advantaged them over Moroccan producers. Unable to compete, many peasants deserted the countryside in search of better opportunities. But with space at a premium in Moroccan urban neighbourhoods and

accommodation beyond their means in the new European cities, rural migrants settled in vast slums and shanty towns (*bidonvilles*). Casablanca, where the population increased almost tenfold in the first decade of the protectorate, epitomised this process.³

Lyautey's previous colonial experience had made him a partisan of indirect rule and respect for indigenous tradition – philosophies that accorded well with the theory of French protection of the Sharifian government. With a few exceptions, Moroccan officials continued to meet (or fail to meet) the needs of their people. In the realm of education, for example, the French operated a handful of schools designed to mould the sons of local notables into a Gallicised elite capable of helping to administer the protectorate. Anxiety about the infiltration of alien cultural values into ordinary Moroccan class rooms prompted some religious scholars to create private schools with curricula selectively embracing modern Western learning while also stressing fundamental Muslim ideals. The founders of these 'Free (of French control) Schools' reflected the influence of the Salafiyya reform movement. Its conviction that adherence to the moral and spiritual principles of the early Muslim community gave modern societies the strength and will to resist external pressures, even as it acknowledged that the West was a repository of information and skills of enormous value, fitted the circumstances of early protectorate Morocco very well. The Free Schools did not initially have political agendas, but by the 1930s they had become hotbeds of anti French activity.

A similar Salafī inspired organisation also emerged in Algeria, providing a religiously rooted alternative to the secularism of both the *Fédération des Elus Indigènes* and the ENA. 'Abd al Ḥamīd ibn Badīs, a religious scholar, began publishing newspapers in the mid 1920s that identified Salafī principles as the essential ingredients for reinvigorating Algerian Muslim society. The motto of the Association of Algerian 'Ulama', which Ibn Badīs founded in 1931 'Algeria is my fatherland, Arabic is my language, and Islam is my religion' encapsulated the sentiments of many Muslims in a political environment where the threat of assimilation and acculturation never lay far below the surface.

A much more militant attempt to put Salafī ideals into practice occurred in northern Morocco. Spain did not initiate military operations to bring areas beyond Tetuan (the capital) and the Atlantic coastal plain under control until after the war, preferring to co opt local leaders with inducements of power

3 Janet Abu Lughod, *Rabat: Urban apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton, 1980), p. 153.

and money. Campaigns in 1920 and 1921 into the mountainous strongholds of the Jebala and the Rif provoked a well organised resistance headed by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Krim. A man of religious conviction and thoroughly modern orientation, ‘Abd al Krim sought first to relieve his followers of their foreign yoke and then to construct a political entity drawing on both Islam and the progress of the West. In pursuit of the first objective, ‘Abd al Krim’s soldiers inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Spanish army at Anoual in 1921; towards the fulfilment of the second, he created the Republic of the Rif. The Spanish offensive stalled after Anoual and, even with the advantage of air power and the occasional use of chemical weapons, Spanish forces failed to defeat ‘Abd al Krim. In 1925 he attacked the French zone, hoping to widen the anti colonial resistance by rallying Salafī intellectuals in Fez to his cause, but the foray out of the Spanish zone produced a joint Franco Spanish military operation that ended in 1926 with ‘Abd al Krim’s surrender to the French. Lyautey’s languid response to the incursion enabled his critics, already angered by his unwillingness to permit settlers uncontrolled exploitation of the protectorate, to secure his removal. His civilian successor, Théodore Steeg, had no such reservations.

Adherents of the Sanusiyya brotherhood constituted the driving force behind resistance to the Italians who had gained a tenuous foothold in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica by the First World War. Ottoman resentment at the loss of its last two North African provinces took the form of encouraging Sanusi attacks on Egypt in 1915 and supporting a republican government proclaimed in Tripolitania in 1918. The failure of the brotherhood’s offensive in Egypt discredited its leadership and resulted in the accession of a new shaykh, Idris. Just before Italy entered the war on the Allied side, the British brokered an arrangement between Italy and Idris which created an uneasy truce in Cyrenaica.

Emerging from the war victorious but weakened, Italy initially approached the Tripolitanian republicans and the Sanusiyya with caution. But when its governor crushed the republic in 1921 and set about extending Italian control over all of Tripolitania, it became clear that Italy preferred to assert itself rather than seek a *modus vivendi* with its opponents. Knowing that his men could not win on the battlefield, Idris went into exile in Egypt, although he retained his position as shaykh of the brotherhood. Its more militant members undertook a guerrilla campaign against the Italian army in Cyrenaica that ended only with the capture and execution in 1931 of its leader, ‘Umar al Mukhtar. Metropolitan officials initiated a few of the colonisation projects that they expected to provide homes and livelihoods for Italian immigrants to

Tripolitania during the 1920s, but similar ventures in Cyrenaica had to await the return of order there. Between 'Umar al Mukhtar's defeat and Italy's entry into the Second World War, the Italian population of Cyrenaica rose to 40,000. With another 70,000 of their countrymen in Tripolitania, Italians made up roughly 12 per cent of Libya's total population – a proportion of Europeans found elsewhere in the Maghreb only in Algeria.⁴

Economic woes and the maturation of nationalism in the French dependencies

Like other dependencies with economies based on primary production (either agricultural or mineral), French Algeria, Italian Libya and the Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates suffered terribly in the Depression. Across North Africa, erratic climatic conditions in the late 1920s and early 1930s – drought one year followed by flood the next – aggravated economic woes, especially for Arab and Amazigh (Berber) cultivators growing the least remunerative crops on the least fertile land with the least modern equipment. The combination of a growing Muslim rural population and the spread of mechanised farming among the settlers had overwhelmed the countryside's absorptive capacity even before the Depression, but as its impact began to register, an intensified wave of migration to the cities stretched their resources to breaking point. The extension of the *bidonvilles* came just as the unskilled jobs which the newcomers might have filled were disappearing, wages were falling and the deteriorating economies of Europe were forcing out North Africans working there. The colonial authorities' response of controlling wages, guaranteeing certain agricultural exports and launching programmes to enhance the yields of profitable export crops mainly benefited the European minority. The economic travail of North Africa's Muslims reinforced their anger at French and Italian failures to honour post war reform pledges.

Against this backdrop, ill considered policy decisions in each French dependency in 1930 further inflamed the situation. The centennial celebration of the conquest of Algeria and the convening of an international Roman Catholic congress in Tunis (followed, only a year later, by the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the French entry into that country) were provocative events which North Africans viewed as reprehensible displays of

4 Figures on the Italian and Libyan populations appear in John Wright, *Libya: A modern history* (Baltimore, 1982), p. 38; and Claudio Segrè, *Fourth shore: The Italian colonization of Libya* (Chicago, 1974), p. 144.

colonial arrogance. Even more provocative was the attempt to divide the Moroccan population through a royal decree (the *Dahir Berbère*) envisioning the removal of the Imazighan (Berbers) from the jurisdiction of Islamic law.

This blatant challenge to tradition produced swift responses. In the mosques the *latif*, a prayer usually offered in times of natural disaster, was publicly recited in a form modified to suit the occasion. Many organisers of this campaign were affiliated with the Free Schools. The police made arrests, but officials in Rabat quickly abandoned the plan and the crisis atmosphere dissipated, although not before the surge of popular protests revealed the desirability of coordinating anti colonial tactics. Over the next several years, the Zawiyya, a small coterie of educated men, some trained in French schools, others in Muslim institutions, assumed its place at the heart of the nascent nationalist movement. As its members spoke out against abuses in the administration of the protectorate, they also cultivated the Free Schools as repositories of the learning needed to end the nation's subservience. Their respect for the Sharifian monarchy and Sultan Muḥammad V's irritation with French officials set the stage for an alliance. The work of the Zawiyya culminated in 1934 with its presentation to the resident general, the sultan and leaders of the French government of a 'Plan of Reforms' to correct the shortcomings of the protectorate. Although the proposal called for adjustments in the prevailing political, economic and social order, not its overthrow, this first Moroccan attempt to define a viable relationship was brusquely rejected, leaving the Zawiyya and its growing body of supporters no choice but to bide their time.

The fanfare surrounding the Algerian centenary drew attention to the disparity between the theory of three fully assimilated French *départements* and the reality of the vastly divergent prospects of their Muslim and European residents. Only the latter celebrated. Opposition groups used the centenary as a springboard for criticising the French record, past and present, but their significantly diverse constituencies and the ideological variations among them minimised the likelihood of fruitful cooperation. In the intoxication of the moment, Algeria's rulers saw no compelling reason to heed the fragmented voices of their critics.

In Tunisia, the generation of youthful activists that had emerged when the Dustur leadership eschewed militancy after 1926 set about mobilising hitherto neglected elements of the population. Led by Ḥabīb Abu Ruqayba (usually given as Bourguiba) (pres. 1957–87), a Paris trained attorney, they pushed themselves to the political foreground through articles, initially in *La Voix du Tunisien*, the Dustur newspaper, and then, after falling out with the

old guard, in their own publication, *L'Action Tunisienne*. Concentrating on issues that underscored the protectorate's impact on customary values and practices, they decried the Christian chauvinism of the Eucharistic Congress, condemned the burial in Muslim cemeteries of persons who had taken French citizenship, and advocated the rejection of European dress as an assertion of Tunisian identity. This 'action group' dismissed the Dustur leaders' hope that French rule might yet lead to racial equality – a proposition undermined by the authorities' provision of Depression relief to *colons* far more readily than to the Tunisians who bore the brunt of the crisis – and openly asserted the right to independence. In 1933 protectorate officials responded to this heresy by dissolving the Dustur. The militants brazenly called a party congress in 1934 at which they voted out the existing leadership. Creating a rival, and more aggressive, Neo Dustur, Bourguiba sent his followers into the streets. After several months of demonstrations, Resident General Marcel Peyrouton ordered the arrest of the Neo Dustur hierarchy. The party survived, but only underground.

The victory of the left wing Popular Front coalition in French national elections in 1936 raised hopes among North African nationalists of reaching an accommodation with the French. Jailed Neo Dusturians were released, the party permitted to reconstitute itself, and Bourguiba invited to Paris for talks, during which he downplayed the call for independence in favour of reforms. A few months later 'Abd al 'Aziz Tha'albi returned from exile to reassume the leadership of the increasingly marginalised Dustur. A similar flurry of activity swept through Morocco during the fourteen months of the Popular Front. Two founders of the Zawiyya, 'Allal al Fasi, an Islamic scholar, and the French educated Ahmad Balafraj, organised the country's first political party, the National Action Bloc, in 1937, taking the Plan of Reforms as its platform. In the Spanish Zone, where Zawiyya sympathisers had also been active, 'Abd al Khalaq Torres created the National Reform Party. In all three protectorates, nationalist parties took advantage of this period of relative freedom to increase their followings and advance their goals, which they placed on the negotiating table, with varied success, in meetings with French and Spanish officials.

In Algeria, the leaders of political groups previously averse to working together recognised that the Popular Front's willingness to consider North Africans' grievances made presenting a united front a tactic that heightened the probability of success. The Association of Algerian 'Ulama', the Fédération des Elus Indigènes and the Algerian Communist Party jointly convened an Algerian Muslim Congress in 1936 which formulated a Charter

of Demands of the Muslim Algerian People similar to the Moroccan Plan of Reforms. In a pointed rebuff, the organisers did not invite Messali al Ḥajj, but they could not prevent his return to Algeria and his establishment of ENA cells there. In a significant step towards delineating common ground, the Popular Front accepted the Charter of Demands as a point of departure for further discussions. Subsequently, it introduced the Blum Violette Bill, which extended French citizenship to 25,000 Algerians with the appropriate educational, financial or state service credentials. The nationalists, except for Messali, endorsed this measure even though most regarded it as little more than a beginning. Blum Violette also enjoyed substantial support in metropolitan France, but the *colons* reviled it as a process that would end with the loss of their privileges. The settlers' lobby shifted into high gear and Algeria's European mayors vowed to resign if the bill passed. Even before parliament rejected the bill, however, the Popular Front collapsed, replaced by a government uninterested in North African nationalists' agendas. The defeat of so modest a reform instilled deep frustration across the Maghreb, convincing many activists that more aggression was needed.

The new French government focused on curbing anti colonialism, both to keep the empire intact and to minimise diverting attention from the dangers threatening Europe. With the military pacification of North Africa already achieved, its political pacification became a top priority, imperilling the survival of all but the least demanding parties. In 1937 the most militant nationalist, Messali al Ḥajj, defiantly responded to the dissolution of his Etoile by creating the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), a new organisation that differed from the old only in name. Arrested shortly thereafter, Messali spent most of the next two decades in prison. Lest they suffer a similar fate, the *évolués*, as the French disparagingly called enfranchised Algerians, distanced themselves from the partnership they had forged with the far less accommodating Association of Algerian 'Ulama'. Amid this polarisation, some members of the Fédération des Elus sought a middle ground from which they might broaden their base and erode the strong support Messali enjoyed among the working class. Towards those ends, Farḥat 'Abbas established the Union Populaire Algérienne in 1938, although he suspended party activity when Germany invaded France in 1940. In Morocco, the axe fell on the National Action Bloc, and its leaders were dispatched into exile only three months after its founding. Seeing the writing on the wall, Bourguiba and his Neo Dustur associates concluded they had little to lose in vigorously pressing the party programme. Violent clashes between party militants and the police during a Tunis demonstration in 1938 led to the repression of the party and

the imprisonment of its leaders. Before the decade had ended, nationalist movements throughout French North Africa were crippled.

The Second World War and its political ramifications

The participation of Moroccan units of the Spanish army in that country's civil war drew North Africans into European hostilities even before the outbreak of the Second World War, while many more Arab and Amazigh soldiers served with the French army during the war itself. Although the Spanish Royalist government cultivated 'Abd al Khalaq Torres in a way that the Spanish Popular Front had not, the overthrow of the republic brought no tangible benefits to Moroccan nationalists in the Spanish zone. Madrid's neutrality in the war and the takeover of the North African dependencies by the Vichy government after 1940 meant that no combat occurred in French or Spanish North Africa until November 1942, when Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria triggered a German invasion of Tunisia. By then, however, Cyrenaica had experienced more than two years of fierce fighting as Italian armies, subsequently strengthened by German reinforcements, mounted offensives to overrun Egypt and capture the Suez Canal. After definitively halting the Axis advance at El Alamein, in November 1942 British forces pushed the enemy westward through Libya and into Tunisia. With Allied armies advancing eastward from Morocco and Algeria, the Germans and Italians were trapped.

By late spring 1943 all of North Africa had been liberated. In Libya, an Allied military administration replaced the Italian colonial regime; elsewhere, the Free French took charge. In Algiers, the capital of the French government in exile, 'Abbas unveiled a Manifesto of the Algerian People. Its inclusion of demands for self determination and the promulgation of an Algerian constitution underscored the converging viewpoints of Algerian radicals and moderates. Recognising that political reforms which did not jeopardise French rule or unduly alienate the *colons* could ease tensions with the nationalists at this critical juncture, the Free French proposed extending the franchise to all adult Algerian males (in an exclusively Muslim electoral college), guaranteeing a 40 per cent share in all elected bodies to Muslims, and abolishing the hated *Code de l'Indigénat*. Their offer was too little, too late. Except for the *Fédération des Elus Indigènes*, every Algerian political organisation rejected terms it would have embraced a few years before. To keep nationalist sentiments at a high pitch, 'Abbas formed the *Amis du Manifeste*

de la Liberté (AML) in 1944 while Messali, who was for the moment at liberty, recruited new members for the PPA, among them combat veterans grouped into paramilitary units.

Nationalist revivals also occurred in the protectorates. In January 1943, as Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill planned Allied strategy at the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt met with Sultan Muḥammad V. No official record of their conversation was preserved, but it became an article of faith among North Africans that the president had expressed support for loosening colonial control when the war ended. Taking their cue from this conviction, Moroccan nationalists drafted a political manifesto in early 1944, then formed a political party whose name (Istiqlal, or Independence) made clear their objective. Free French tolerance did not extend to this length, however, and the party was banned, despite or perhaps because of the sultan's interest in it.

Royal attitudes about nationalism produced a quite different scenario in Tunisia. There, as the Neo Dustur began to reconstitute itself in 1943, it faced a challenger to its centrality in the anti colonial movement. Charging Munşif Bey with collaborating with the Germans, the Free French deposed him. But it was the *bey's* assumption of the mantle of nationalist leadership while the Neo Dustur remained in disarray that the protectorate authorities and the settlers regarded as his most egregious offence. Exile merely enhanced Munşif's prestige, compelling Neo Dustur organisers to walk a fine line as they mobilised their followers after years of limited activity. The party's quasi paralysis in the face of this situation invited bolder critics of the French, notably the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), to step forward. Formed in 1946 by Farḥat Hashad (d. 1952), a labour leader close to the Neo Dustur, the union lay at the nexus of nationalist activity until Munşif's death in 1948 allowed the party to resume its pre war role as the embodiment of the Tunisian movement. Thereafter, the union's relationship to the party – cooperative partner, ignored subordinate or disillusioned antagonist – served as a barometer of the national political scene.

The continuation of fighting in Europe after hostilities had ceased in North Africa meant that rationing, shortages and labour conscription continued to plague the Arab and Imazighan populations. In Algeria the PPA and the AML, whose disagreements were increasingly over tactics rather than goals, organised nationwide demonstrations: to celebrate the war's end, argue for better economic conditions and demand freedom. On VE Day gunfire disrupted a rally in Sétif, setting in motion events including deadly attacks on Europeans and murderous retaliatory rampages. Before order was restored, the death

toll reached the thousands, the vast majority Algerians.⁵ The authorities again proscribed the PPA and, to the chagrin of the moderate 'Abbas, outlawed the AML as well. The disturbances revealed the volatility of the Algerian situation; colonial administrators and nationalists elsewhere in North Africa took note. The former had no intention of abandoning the dependencies, but the latter had no intention of remaining indefinitely under French rule. Where the middle ground lay, and whether or not it was accessible, became the operative questions of the decade following the war.

Bringing down the curtain on colonial rule in Libya and the protectorates

Awareness that the violence that had erupted at Sétif was simmering just below the surface elsewhere in North Africa compelled France to engage the nationalists in dialogue. It also influenced thinking about Libya. Italy renounced its overseas claims in 1947, but continuing economic interests and a still sizeable Italian population left open the possibility of some post war role for the former coloniser. Cyrenaica, however, was off limits. In 1940, to reward Sanusi cooperation in the war, Britain acknowledged Idris as the province's ruler. Although his efforts to parlay this support into Cyrenaican independence failed, he did secure a British pledge that the Italians would not return to eastern Libya. Whether Idris could induce Tripolitanian leaders, most of them proponents of unity but wary of Sanusi domination, to throw in their lot with him and, if he did, whether the Allies would accept full independence, remained open questions. Doubts about Libyan preparedness for self rule and French reluctance to initiate a precedent certain to have repercussions in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco complicated the search for a political arrangement. Early in 1949 Libyan opposition to an Anglo Italian proposal to assign trusteeships over Cyrenaica (to Britain), Tripolitania (to Italy), and the Fezzan (to France) forced the Allies to seek the assistance of the United Nations. At the same time, Britain granted Cyrenaica self rule, thereby positioning Idris as the beneficiary of a UN vote for independence. The General Assembly passed such a resolution (with France abstaining) in November 1949, setting a two year deadline for its fulfilment and creating a special committee which travelled to Libya to expedite preparations for independence. The United Kingdom of Libya, with Idris as its monarch, came into being in December 1951. The irony of the least economically

⁵ Estimates from several sources are cited in Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, p. 149.

advanced North African territory. Libya's principal exports were esparto grass and scrap metal from the Second World War battlefields and the one with the most meagre record of political development acquiring sovereignty while its neighbours remained under European control was hardly lost on Moroccan and Tunisian nationalists. Indeed, many went aggressively on the offensive when stiff settler opposition sabotaged the modest reform packages proposed for the protectorates in 1946 and 1947.

In Morocco, Sultan Muḥammad V (r. 1927–61) endorsed the nationalists' goals. Dispatched to Rabat in 1947 to address this challenge, Resident General Alphonse Juin badgered and coerced the ruler for several years before playing his trump card. In 1951 Juin stood by as Thami al Glawi, a tribal leader with long standing grievances against the monarchy, unleashed his tribal warriors in an uprising that pressured the sultan into grudging compliance with French policy. The prospects of similar royal engagement with the nationalists in Tunisia ended with the death of the exiled Munṣif Bey in 1948. The Neo Dustur quickly reclaimed its pre eminence under the leadership of Ṣaḥāb ibn Yusuf (usually given Ben Yusuf), who had assumed control of the party in 1945 when Bourguiba went to Cairo to appeal for Arab League support. Ben Yusuf drew new adherents into the party, many from more traditional social backgrounds – small businessmen and Zaytuna students, for example – than it had previously attracted. Shortly after returning to Tunisia in 1949, Bourguiba outlined a course of action for securing independence while preserving France's legitimate interests in the country. Critics condemned the plan as a sell out, but Bourguiba's supporters stifled dissent within the party, much of it emanating from partisans of Ben Yusuf. The divergent outlooks embodied in the moderate, gradualist and Western oriented approach – 'Bourguibism' – and in Ben Yusuf's inclination towards more radical tactics inspired by Middle Eastern Arab nationalism constituted an uncomfortable divide within the Neo Dustur. Two years of talks collapsed when France yielded to settler pressure to reject proposals from a Tunisian government consisting of equal numbers of Frenchmen and Tunisians, including Neo Dusturians. The prime minister's subsequent attempt to place the question of Tunisia's status before the United Nations provoked such outrage in Paris that Jean de Hautecloque, an authoritarian in the Juin mould, was appointed resident general. His decision to incarcerate the entire nationalist leadership again left Farḥat Hashad and the UGTT in the forefront of the struggle.

When members of the Red Hand, a right wing settler organisation, assassinated Hashad in late 1952, violence engulfed the region. In Tunisia,

unemployed workers and the rural poor formed gangs (*fallaqa*) that prowled the south and west attacking French targets of opportunity and causing panic among foreigners. While poverty and despair motivated men to join the *fallaqa* at least as much as did political conviction, party stalwarts and union organisers hastened to attach these guerrillas to the nationalist cause. News of Hashad's assassination occasioned demonstrations in Casablanca and other Moroccan cities that triggered a flurry of ripostes by extremist settlers. French officials seized the moment to press Muḥammad V to accept reforms beneficial to the foreign community but damaging to royal authority. Still not satisfied, Resident General Guillaume, a Juin protégé, renewed his mentor's collusion with Glawi and other powerful Moroccans who wanted the sultan's removal.

In a miscalculation that presaged the end of the protectorate, France exiled Muḥammad V in August 1953, replacing him with an inconsequential relative, Muḥammad ibn 'Arafa. Months of turbulence, including an attempt on Ibn 'Arafa's life and the formation in the Spanish zone of a Liberation Army of the Arab Maghreb committed to restoring the sultan and ending colonial rule across the region, followed. By the second anniversary of the exile, which was marked by clashes between Moroccans and the security forces, the Liberation Army was wreaking havoc in the northern districts of the French protectorate. Recognising the impossibility of calming the situation in the absence of the sultan, the French abandoned Ibn 'Arafa and allowed Muḥammad V to return in November 1955, implicitly accepting the inevitability of independence. The protectorate formally ended in March 1956. Spain followed suit in the north a month later, but retained a strip of protected territory in the south bordering its colony of Spanish Sahara. It did not cede the enclave of Sidi Ifni on the Atlantic coast or the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and their hinterland, which were fully integrated parts of Spain. The newly independent government, however, regarded these regions as Moroccan and laid claim to all of them.

As French officials in Morocco sought to eliminate Muḥammad V from politics, their counterparts in Tunisia sought to sideline the Neo Dustur by negotiating with individuals unaffiliated with the party. The realisation that such a tactic could not succeed led to negotiations, in 1954, with Neo Dustur representatives who promised to curb the *fallaqa* in return for the granting of internal autonomy. Bourguiba even agreed to cooperate with French military and police forces in disarming the guerrillas as a prelude to an amnesty. In April 1955 the parties signed a convention acknowledging French control over foreign relations and defence, but Tunisian sovereignty

in all other matters. Muḥammad V's repatriation the previous autumn, followed by rapid progress towards Moroccan independence, prompted Bourguiba to demand similar treatment for Tunisia. There, too, the protectorate ended in March 1956.

The Algerian War

Developments in Algeria contributed significantly to the decision to acknowledge Moroccan and Tunisian sovereignty. Post war Algeria's political history generally replicated that of the protectorates. Its settlers, more influential than others in North Africa because of their representation in the French legislature, fought doggedly to preserve their prerogatives. Electoral reforms which Algerians viewed as inadequate were negated by fraud, instilling despair that worsened as the *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD) and the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA), the parties organised by Messali and 'Abbas after their release from prison in 1946, the first as the public face of the outlawed PPA, the second to supplant the AML, revealed their inability to influence French policy. As a result, in 1947, disillusioned radicals formed a paramilitary unit, the *Organisation Spéciale* (OS). When police smashed the OS three years later, it had drained the MTLD of activists who had abandoned hope of a political solution. Other points of contention within the party – Amazigh (Berber) resentment of its Arabocentric nature, concern among religiously inclined adherents about its secularism, and criticisms of Messali's leadership that culminated in his removal and departure for France in 1952 – precluded it from effectively challenging the colonial regime.

Admitting this reality, a cadre of party stalwarts led by Muḥammad Abu Diyaf (usually given as Boudiaf) constituted the *Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action* (CRUA) in 1954. The CRUA launched a full scale rebellion, on November 1, in the name of a *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) which aimed to unite all Algerians in an armed struggle against colonialism. The instinctive French reaction to the first guerrilla attacks was the arrest of MTLD activists who were well known to the police but had no connections with the secretive CRUA – a blunder that pushed many MTLD adherents into the FLN camp. A more constructive French response was the appointment of the intellectual Jacques Soustelle as governor general with a mandate to implement reforms blocked for almost a decade by the settlers. They distrusted Soustelle, as did the FLN, whose leaders believed that his mission would strengthen the rival UDMA. In late summer 1955 the FLN viciously

attacked French civilians in the Philippeville region. As anticipated, the French retaliated with equally brutal, and largely indiscriminate, violence and mass arrests which drove still more Algerians into the arms of the FLN. Many who tried to keep their distance were coerced into acceding to FLN authority, while those who continued to collaborate with the colonisers found themselves targets for retribution. In 1956 the UDMA's affiliation with the FLN left only the Messalist Mouvement National Algérien (MNA) outside its umbrella.

Urban guerrilla warfare in Algiers in 1956 revealed the support the FLN could summon, but the 'Battle of Algiers' fuelled French determination to crush the resistance in the capital and shatter the FLN's overall military capacity. The army sealed frontiers to prevent the entry of weapons and troops who trained in Moroccan and Tunisian camps. Highly mobile French patrols limited the damage the FLN could inflict on the countryside and the concentration of the population of rural FLN strongholds in resettlement centres deprived it of vital local support. But as the military tide turned in France's favour domestic public opinion began to turn against the war. The reported torture of FLN prisoners and French opponents of the war plagued the national conscience, while the extensive use of conscripts made the war a reality to families that might otherwise have ignored it. Considerable resentment fell upon the settlers, who appeared willing to drag France into a political and moral morass to protect their own narrow interests.

Fearful lest such opposition affect the government, settlers and soldiers in Algeria fomented an insurrection that toppled the Fourth Republic and paved the way for the return to power of Charles de Gaulle, the only political figure deemed capable of guiding the crisis to a satisfactory outcome. His plan to enfranchise Muslims, expedite Algeria's integration to France and promote economic development disappointed the settlers, but also fell short of FLN expectations of full sovereignty. The Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA), the parliament in waiting, countered de Gaulle's proposals by establishing the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) in Cairo. Within a year, de Gaulle's agreement to the principle of self determination had irreversibly alienated the settlers and antagonised army commanders, who knew their troops held the upper hand and wanted to press their advantage. Facing opposition from both sides, de Gaulle sought, but failed to find, a moderate 'third force'. He opened negotiations with the FLN in 1960, but not until January 1961 did French and Algerian voters approve a referendum on independence. In desperation, the fanatical Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS), composed of diehard

military officers and settlers, plunged Algeria into a paroxysm of violence marked by an attempted military coup, deadly assaults on supporters of Algerian independence and the sabotage of key components of the country's infrastructure. Despite this turmoil, the Evian Accords terminating French rule were signed in the spring of 1962. Even before a plebiscite in Algeria confirmed the arrangement in July, the CNRA convened in Tripoli to chart the political and economic course of the new state. As FLN factions jockeyed for position, a climate of intense mistrust arose.

Aḥmad ibn Billah (usually given Ben Bella) (pres. 1962–5) dominated the Tripoli meetings. A founding father of the FLN, Ben Bella had spent the war outside Algeria, first as a liaison with Arab governments, then as a prisoner in France. At Tripoli he secured CNRA approval of a programme envisioning a populist, socialist Algeria, but his attempt to form a Political Bureau to replace the GPRA failed and the congress ended with the question of leadership unresolved.

Following the July plebiscite, Ben Bella returned to Algeria. Backed by a coalition of key officers from the military wing of the FLN – the *Armée de Libération Nationale* (ALN) – and political figures at odds with the GPRA, among them Farḥat 'Abbas and other moderates whom the provisional government had shouldered aside, Ben Bella asserted the authority of his Political Bureau. As ALN units that had spent the war in Tunisia and Morocco bore down on the capital to support him, the GPRA bowed to the *coup de main*. This struggle between external elements of the revolution largely overlooked the fighters who had spent the war years inside Algeria and who resisted accepting the Political Bureau without a fight, but the ALN eliminated them or secured their surrender, clearing the way for elections for a constituent assembly in September, at which voters ratified a list of candidates drawn up by the Political Bureau.

Power struggles in the new nations

In many quarters Ben Bella's ascendancy gained only grudging acceptance. The FLN had subordinated the historical fragmentation of the nationalist movement to its revolutionary cause, but numerous power loci – 'clans' – still existed within the organisation. Aggravating this situation was the animosity harboured by those who had waged the war inside Algeria towards those who had worked on its behalf abroad; between military officers and civilian politicians; between secularists and the devout; and between Arabs and Imazighan. Mastering these divisive proclivities consumed much of Ben

Bella's energy. As a first step, the Political Bureau usurped the role of the constituent assembly by drafting a constitution in 1963. The document designated the FLN as the sole legal party and vested substantial powers in the presidency, an office for which Ben Bella ran, unopposed, shortly thereafter. Only in 1964, after marginalising, arresting or exiling his critics, did Ben Bella convene an FLN congress. Delegates reaffirmed the populist and socialist agenda devised at Tripoli (but, amid the political infighting, not yet acted upon) and elected Ben Bella FLN president. With government and party in hand, the only political actors not yet subordinated to Ben Bella were the generally conservative leaders of the ALN, now recast as the *Armée Nationale Populaire* (ANP). As the president moved to rectify this situation, Colonel Ḥawārī Abu Madyan (usually given Houari Boumedienne) (pres. 1965–78), who had been instrumental in the events of the summer of 1962 but disapproved of Ben Bella's subsequent political trajectory, seized power in a June 1965 coup. Ben Bella spent the next thirteen years in prison.

Similar, if less dramatic, struggles had occurred in Tunisia and Morocco as politicians competed for their reward for their services to independence. The prestige of Ḥabīb Bourguiba in Tunisia and the unique role of the sultan in Morocco made the results in both cases more certain than in Algeria. In attacking the April 1955 internal autonomy accord, Ben Yusuf accused Bourguiba of betraying nationalist goals to secure personal power. The Neo Dustur expelled Ben Yusuf, and delegates to a party congress not only quashed his supporters' attempt to block the accord, but also passed a progressive social and economic agenda implicitly rejecting Ben Yusuf's more traditionalist orientation. His aggrieved followers formed rival cells of the party and turned on mainstream Neo Dusturians. A recrudescence of the *fallaqa* bands threatened a resumption of the insurrection in southern and western Tunisia that required the government to request the assistance of French security forces. Ben Yusuf himself had already fled to Cairo, from where he continued to berate his former comrades until his assassination in 1961.

In the several years following Moroccan independence, both the Istiqlal Party and the palace aspired to dominate the national political culture. Led by 'Allal al Fasī after his return from exile in 1956, the Istiqlal counted several cabinet ministers among its members, while Maḥdī ibn Barka (usually given Ben Barka), one of its founders, presided over the National Consultative Council. The party used its power to stifle rivals, but its bourgeois urban leaders failed to extend party influence into the rural heart of Morocco, nor did they capitalise on their pre-independence alliance with the national labour union to cultivate links with urban working-class Moroccans. For

Muḥammad V, on the other hand, the respect accorded his position was amplified by the personal popularity his figurative martyrdom in the anti colonial struggle had earned him. Nevertheless, the ruler took the precaution of bringing both the police and the military, the latter commanded by Crown Prince Ḥasan, squarely under royal control. In its competition for the political high ground the palace exploited the frustration of the Istiqlal's more progressive members with the party's social conservatism. In 1958 Muḥammad V named one such individual, 'Abd Allah Ibrahim, prime minister. A few months later Ben Barka, with royal encouragement, led the Istiqlal left wing, including Ibrahim, into a new party, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP). To retain the confidence of the monarch and continue to govern, the prime minister reined in the UNFP's most radical elements and forced some, including Ben Barka, out of the country. Ibrahim's attempt to wrest control of the police from the sultan in 1960 led to his dismissal and Muḥammad V's assumption of the post of prime minister, signalling the monarchy's definitive acquisition of political supremacy. Muḥammad V died suddenly in 1961, but Ḥasan II (r. 1961–99) held the parties in check just as adeptly.

In Libya, the Sanusi family, unlike its 'Alawī counterpart in Morocco, lacked a long and rich dynastic tradition. The constitution of the new state had created a kingdom linking Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan in a federal administration. The sharpest criticism of this arrangement came from the Tripolitanian National Congress Party, which objected to the empowerment of regional forces at the expense of a strong centralised government. The party competed in the first legislative elections in February 1952, expecting that it would win enough of Tripolitania's substantial share of National Assembly seats to overturn the federal system and dominate a unified national government. But its candidates captured only a few urban constituencies.⁶ Amid accusations of voting irregularities, clashes with the police in Tripoli led to the dissolution of the party and the arrest of its leaders.

No credible threat to the monarchy appeared for the next fifteen years, in part because the friendship of Great Britain and the United States, both of which maintained military bases in Libya, assured Idris of powerful allies whose support muted the opposition, but also because vast oil deposits discovered in 1959 generated adequate revenues to finance infrastructural development and the expansion of education, health care and other social services. But despite dramatic social and economic advances, the monarchy's

⁶ Wright, *Libya*, p. 78.

stranglehold on the political system bred resentment among younger generations of Libyans conversant with the revolutionary philosophy emanating from neighbouring Nasserist Egypt. Such sentiments appealed to Mu‘ammar Qadhdhafī (usually Gaddafi) (leader of Libya, 1969) and other junior army officers who, in 1969, overthrew Idrīs in a bloodless coup and assumed power as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

Post-independence economic and political disillusion

Thanks to their triumphs in the independence struggles (or, in the Libyan case, the overthrow of an unpopular regime), the presidents of Tunisia and Algeria, the Moroccan monarch and the leader of the Libyan RCC held the political high ground and concentrated extensive powers in the hands of a small elite of trusted subordinates. Bourguiba and Boumedienne acted not only as heads of state, but also as leaders of their countries’ sole political party. After its founding in 1970, Gaddafi played a similar role at the helm of Libya’s Arab Socialist Union, but he soon disbanded the party in favour of his ‘Third International Theory’, which he presented as an alternative to existing isms. Between 1976 and 1979 three volumes of *The Green Book* elaborated Gaddafi’s political, social and economic ideals, which the 1977 proclamation of Libya as a *jamahariyya*, an Arabic neologism meaning ‘state of the masses’, was intended to be implemented through a pyramidal system of ‘people’s congresses’ ostensibly endowing citizens with control of the political process.

In Morocco, from the beginning of his reign King Ḥasan hovered above the multi party political arena, deploying the monarchy’s religious and secular prestige to marginalise both the Istiqlal and the UNFP and ensure the parliamentary influence of ‘independents’ loyal to the throne. Discontent with the manipulation of the political system and with the constraints on opposition brought students, political activists and union members into the streets of Casablanca in 1965. The king reacted by proroguing parliament, suspending the constitution and governing by decree. New constitutions (in 1970 and 1972) did nothing to promote opposition inclusion in the political process, but attempts to assassinate Ḥasan in 1971 and 1972 forced the king to seek new means of asserting his authority.

Although Boumedienne and Bourguiba avoided so severe a scenario, during the 1960s and 1970s all three states faced problems stemming from their ambitious efforts to develop industrial sectors fostering self sufficiency and sustained long term growth. Realising those goals depended heavily on

income that fluctuated in response to circumstances beyond the control of North African governments: the sale of natural resources (phosphates in Morocco and Tunisia, petroleum in Algeria); infusions of international technical and monetary assistance (largely from the West in Morocco and Tunisia, as well as in Libya until 1969, although primarily from the Soviet bloc thereafter, as had been the case in Algeria throughout); and the cultivation (in Tunisia and Morocco) of a tourist industry. SONATRACH, the enterprise managing the extraction, processing and sale of petroleum, epitomised the national companies that characterised Algeria's state controlled economy and proliferated across the Maghreb, producing everything from machinery to soap. Traditional economic sectors such as farming and herding, however, received scant attention. The emphasis on industrialisation and investment to the neglect of agriculture (at a time of steady population growth) aggravated periodic food shortages attributable to meteorological circumstances and led to recurrent failures to keep pace with consumer demands. The political need to limit price increases on staple products compelled governments to subsidise basic commodities despite the strains such practices imposed on national budgets.

Attempts to exploit formerly settler owned land as state farms, cooperatives or worker managed ventures impeded more often than they promoted the social and economic stabilisation of rural areas. The impact of agricultural mechanisation on rural employment and the (often unrealistic) expectation of jobs in urban factories created a 'push pull' process that drove unskilled, poorly educated persons from one region to the other in numbers that frequently overwhelmed available housing and services. Rural migrants populated not only slums on the outskirts of the cities but also neighbourhoods which the urban bourgeoisie, eager to move to the once European suburbs, were abandoning. In addition to this internal flux, migration to Europe (and, to a lesser extent, other Arab states) accelerated, with remittances from 'guest workers' abroad becoming another important external source of national revenue.

By the late 1970s popular disenchantment with foundering economies and unrepresentative political institutions emerged, starting in Tunisia. Since independence, Bourguiba had touted his country as a model of progress for newly independent African and Asian states, implementing educational, legal and social reforms, the most dramatic of which enhanced the quality of women's lives and broadened their participation in the public sphere. He had, however, adamantly refused to sanction political dissent, even as arbitrarily applied socialist theories that had wrought havoc on the agricultural

sector in the 1960s gave way in the following decade to a freewheeling capitalism that offered no relief to the most needy segments of the population. The inability of the Socialist Dustur Party (as the Neo Dustur had styled itself in 1964) to meet the rising expectations of the generation that had come to maturity since the end of the protectorate produced serious problems in January 1978. Defying the party leadership, the national labour union (UGTT) called a general strike to protest at the economic and political conditions. Confrontations between demonstrators and the police resulted in scores of deaths. Although the state's harsh response appeared to underscore its intolerance of opposing viewpoints, party pragmatists, fearing the collapse of the entire political edifice, demanded reforms. Departing from previous practice, the Socialist Dustur list for national assembly elections in 1979 offered voters a choice of candidates within the party and in 1981, with Bourguiba's reluctant approval, the institutionalisation of a multi party system began.

Neighbouring governments were painfully aware of the causes and ramifications of the disorders in Tunisia, which had previously been seen as the most stable of the Maghreb countries. Boumedienne's successor, Shadhili ibn Jadid (usually given Chedli ben Jedid) (pres. 1979–92), attached great importance to altering the state's economic trajectory, hoping to balance development by making better use of agrarian resources and assigning a high priority to satisfying consumer demands. Circumstances, however, conspired against him. A precipitate decline in oil prices in the mid 1980s rendered systematic planning virtually impossible as external debt soared and unemployment escalated. In Morocco the decline of phosphate prices, poor harvests and European Community import restrictions made it difficult to address an economic malaise that had manifested itself in labour unrest throughout the late 1970s. Further complicating the Moroccan situation were massive military expenditures on a war that the country could ill afford but which nonetheless enjoyed broad support.

Morocco's war in the Sahara

In 1975, as Spain prepared to terminate its administration of the Spanish Sahara, the International Court of Justice ruled that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had, as each argued, a viable claim to sovereignty over the territory. The decision strengthened Polisario, the liberation movement of the indigenous Sahrawi people. To demonstrate the conviction that the Spanish Sahara formed part of 'Greater Morocco', Ḥasan orchestrated a 'Green March' in which half a million civilians crossed into the colony in

November 1975. When Spain officially withdrew several months later, Morocco and Mauritania divided the area between them, dismissing Polisario's declaration of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and opening a full scale war. So successful was the Sahrawis' guerrilla campaign that Mauritania withdrew from the fray in 1979. Hasan's insistence on absorbing the whole of the former colony into Morocco positioned him in the forefront of a nationalist cause so powerful that all other political and economic issues were subordinated to its pursuit.

Libyan and Algerian support for Polisario opened a rift in intra Maghreb relations. Both willingly assisted a nationalist movement that discomfited a monarchy, but each had other incentives. Algeria anticipated that a Polisario victory would provide it with access to the Atlantic Ocean, facilitating the export of natural resources from its southern desert. Gaddafi's outspoken criticisms of Arab governments' shortcomings in dealing with the question of Palestine and their rejections of his demands for mergers isolated Libya in the Arab world. To compensate, Gaddafi cultivated ties with sub Saharan African states and, like them, rejected the Moroccan position on the Western Sahara. Recognised by more than two dozen African states, SADR joined the Organisation of African Unity in 1982, prompting Morocco to withdraw in protest.

Despite this diplomatic defeat, military aid and economic support from France and the United States gave Morocco the upper hand in its confrontation with Polisario. Early in the 1980s the army erected fortified sand walls which protected from Polisario attack the few cities of the territory and the phosphate mines which were its greatest economic asset. Military stalemate led to a ceasefire agreement in 1991. Three years earlier both sides had accepted a United Nations proposal for a referendum enabling the region's inhabitants to express their preferences regarding its future. The UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was charged with organising the vote, which never occurred, owing to unbridgeable differences between Morocco and the Polisario concerning voter eligibility and the options to appear on the ballot. The easing of the crisis in the late 1980s coincided with the development of common European policies in trade, immigration and other areas critical to the North African states. To present a united front on these matters, they muted the polemics of the Western Sahara dispute and created in 1989 the Union du Maghrib Arabe (UMA), whose charter envisaged cooperation among its members (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) on political, economic and social issues.

Most Moroccans' equation of support for national policy in the Sahara with patriotism extinguished much opposition to the war, even as its prosecution

severely strained the economy. Unable simultaneously to maintain the country on a war footing and meet social development objectives, in the spring of 1981 the government cancelled food subsidies. In Casablanca, where as many as a million people lived in poverty ridden slums, the abrupt price increases on basic commodities generated rioting. As in Tunisia in 1978, pro and anti government sources provided divergent casualty figures, with estimates of fatalities ranging from a few score to a thousand.⁷ As the country embarked on the structural adjustment of the economy that experts saw as holding out the only hope of long term relief, despite the short term distress sure to accompany it, Morocco's Western allies increased their assistance and the International Monetary Fund extended substantial credits to keep the country on an even keel. In return, Morocco undertook austerity measures which reduced its deficit, devalued its currency and raised taxes. Increased investment in agriculture and the privatisation of state owned enterprises also figured in the reforms. This prescription, coupled with the stabilisation of the Saharan situation and healthy inputs from tourism, revitalised the national economy in the 1980s. Some Moroccans naturally fared better than others in this turbulent process; the gap between the steadily expanding middle class and the urban and rural poor widened.

Political, social and economic malaise gives rise to Islamist movements

Events were similar in Algeria and Tunisia at more or less the same time. In 1985 and 1986, after several years of liberalising reforms had failed to cut through Algeria's economic morass, strikes and demonstrations exploded across the country. The stagnant economy sparked these protests, but social and cultural unrest added to the atmosphere of deep malaise. At the beginning of the decade, for example, students in the Tamazight (Berber) speaking region of Kabylia had protested against measures privileging the Arabic language in the education system and bureaucracy. The 'Berber Spring', as these protests were known, set in motion a campaign to safeguard Amazigh culture. The more than 60 per cent decline in the value of a barrel of crude oil in 1986 ended any prospect of Algeria improving its beleaguered economy without outside assistance. Ben Jedid hesitantly embarked on a restructuring programme under IMF auspices in 1987. In October 1988 the deadliest disturbances since the revolution claimed the lives of several hundred

7 J. C. Santucci, *Chroniques politiques marocaines (1971-1982)* (Paris, 1985), pp. 221-2.

demonstrators protesting against the attendant economic hardships.⁸ In 1989, hoping to provide a controlled outlet for popular frustration, the government promulgated a new constitution which paved the way for political pluralism. Economic and political reform were opposite sides of the same coin in Algeria no less than in Morocco and Tunisia.

Several opposition parties acquired official recognition in Tunisia in 1983, but none posed a threat to the Socialist *Dustur*. Although the authorities doled out political concessions skilfully enough to maintain the appearance of liberalisation, parallel efforts to steady the economy encountered less success. When Prime Minister Muḥammad Mzālī yielded to IMF pressures to halt food subsidies in January 1984, riots ensued. With Bourguiba in declining health and subject to periods of erratic behaviour, members of his inner circle viscerally opposed to liberalisation mounted a campaign against Mzālī and forced him to flee the country.

In the 1970s and 1980s political and economic unrest was everywhere magnified by the appearance of Islamist groups which were anxious to profit from government shortcomings. Dramatic events in the Middle Eastern Islamic world – most notably the defeat of secular Arab states by Israel in 1967 and, conversely, the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran – appeared to substantiate the conviction that religious belief, not political ideology, held the key to resolving the crises of contemporary life. Drawing inspiration from the Salafī traditions that had stimulated one strand of anti colonialism, the record of political and social activism of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of such influential intellectuals as Sayyid Quṭb and Ayat Allah Khomeini, Maghrebi Islamists contended that only the saturation of the public sphere with Islamic principles and values would cure the ills afflicting their societies and create morally sound environments in which the few were not privileged at the expense of the many. Citizens of the lower social and economic strata embraced this message, but its most enthusiastic proponents were middle class. Unemployed and under employed secondary school and university graduates frustrated by governments' inability to meet their expectations swelled the Islamists' ranks. Nevertheless, the FLN kept other actors, including Islamists, off Algeria's political stage until the late 1980s, while the Moroccan monarchy's Sharifian ancestry placed Islamist groups in a precarious position. 'Abd al Salam Yasin, a critic of Ḥasan since the 1970s and the founder in 1983 of al 'Adl w'al Iḥsan (Justice and charity), which became the largest Islamist organisation in the country, spent years in jail or under

⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, p. 249.

house arrest until the king's death in 1999. In Tunisia, where many devout Muslims never forgave the Neo Dustur for its post independence secularising reforms, the Islamist appeal found more fertile ground and, as cracks in the monolithic political structure appeared, those intent on restoring Islam to what they considered its rightful place in national life took action.

The most prominent group, the *Ḥarakat al Ittijah al Islāmī*, better known by its French acronym MTI (*Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique*), crystallised late in the 1970s under the leadership of Rashid Ghannushī. Its efforts to attain political party status (at a time when the government was sanctioning the secular opposition) were dashed on the grounds that its religious basis violated the state's commitment to secularism. The Socialist Dustur had no intention of providing a forum for a rival well positioned to connect with its many disillusioned constituents. Ghannushī and other MTI leaders were arrested in 1984 on charges that they had precipitated the riots of that year and again in 1987 when they were accused of conspiring to overthrow the government. On the latter occasion, a hotel bombing in the tourist resort of Monastir, attributed by the authorities to have been the work of the MTI, destroyed any chances of an accommodation between the state and the Islamists. At the detainees' trial, several death sentences were handed down and scores of MTI members, including Ghannushī, received lengthy prison terms. Although the prospect of eradicating the Islamist threat once and for all elated Bourguiba, the interior minister, Zain al 'Abidin ibn 'Alī (usually given Ben Ali) (president of Tunisia, 1987), persuaded him to commute the capital sentences to deprive the Islamists of martyrs. After rewarding Ben Ali with the office of prime minister, however, Bourguiba ordered the executions. Asserting that the president's physical and mental condition rendered him unable to carry out his responsibilities, Ben Ali invoked, on 7 November 1987, a constitutional provision allowing the prime minister to replace an incapacitated chief executive. Many factors eroded Bourguiba's power during his final decade in office but none more so than the success of the MTI in mobilising Tunisians resentful of the marginalisation of Islam which had occurred since independence.

The new president appeared more inclined to engage Islamists in the political process. Prisoners were released, a greater role for Islam in some aspects of public life conceded, and the MTI invited to participate with secular parties in forging a National Pact defining the political principles of the post Bourguiba era. Prior to the 1989 legislative elections the MTI refashioned itself as the *Ḥizb al Nahḍa* (Renaissance party) to comply with a proviso outlawing parties with religious names. Nevertheless, the widespread

suspicion of secular politicians that this superficial repackaging had no bearing on the Islamists' hope of altering the foundations of government resulted in the rejection of an al Nahḍa list, forcing its candidates to run as independents. Their vote totals exceeded those of any other party except for the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) – the former PSD, which had also repackaged itself.⁹ Before his voluntary post election exile, Ghannushī disgustedly observed that his followers had wanted only to join in the political process but now would seek to control it entirely. Ben Ali's subsequent portrayal of himself as defending a progressive secular republic threatened by reactionary religious forces allowed him to combine a policy of limited pluralism with his predecessor's authoritarianism.

Angered by the government's failure to condemn the military coalition arrayed against Iraq in 1991, radicals within al Nahḍa executed a series of terrorist attacks. Security forces arrested hundreds of individuals associated with the organisation, ignoring charges from human rights groups that many had committed no crime and some had been subjected to torture. Within a few months al Nahḍa was crushed, its harsh treatment accepted by many middle class Tunisians who despised a movement they feared would, if given the opportunity, repudiate the progressive agenda that had made their country a paragon of modernity and given them one of the highest qualities of life in the Arab world. Their fear that the Islamist tide then swamping Algeria might spill over into their country encouraged them to look the other way when rights they insisted upon for themselves were routinely denied to Islamists. With the suppression of the only party in a position to challenge it, the RCD cultivated the appearance of pluralism while continuing to strip it of any substance. In multi party legislative elections in 1994, 1999 and 2004, opposition parties secured only a handful of seats set aside for distribution among those crossing a specified vote threshold. Not until 1999 did Ben Ali face even perfunctory opposition to his presidency. In 2004, after the passage of a constitutional amendment allowing him to seek a fourth term, he again won handily.

The troubled decade of the 1990s in Algeria

The first multi party elections in Algeria, in 1990, filled municipal council seats. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS; Islamic Salvation Front), created the

9 Vincent Geisser, 'Tunisie: des élections pour quoi faire? Enjeux et "sens" du fait électoral de Bourguiba à Ben Ali', *Maghreb Machrek*, 168 (2000), pp. 25–6.

previous year, garnered more than half the votes, capitalising on popular irritation with the FLN, a boycott by most secular opposition parties, and its call for Islamic principles to form the basis for government. The outcome sent shock waves through the FLN establishment, prompting the remapping of voting districts and the formulation of electoral regulations favouring their party before legislative elections scheduled for the next year. Despite these advantages and the arrest of the two most prominent figures in the FIS, ‘Abbasī Madani and ‘Alī ibn al Ḥajj, the Islamists ran so strongly in the first of two rounds of voting in December 1991 that their control of the new parliament was certain.¹⁰ Unwilling to countenance such a result, FLN insiders, most with ties to the army, forced Ben Jedid to resign, cancelled the elections in midcourse, and formed the High Committee of State to govern the country. For its head, the committee selected Muḥammad Boudiaf, an FLN stalwart whose absence from Algeria since a falling out with Ben Bella left him untainted by the political manoeuvring within the FLN of Boumedienne and Ben Jedid. Espousing his determination to root out corruption and mismanagement in the FLN, Boudiaf fell foul of powerful party interests and was assassinated in June 1992. Before his death, however, he had proscribed the FIS and dissolved the municipal councils it controlled, heightening its supporters’ rage over the aborted elections and inviting violent encounters between its armed wing, the Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA; later known as the Armée Islamique du Salut, AIS) and the forces of order.

As destructive as this militia was, it paled in comparison with the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), a more radical Islamist force which emerged in 1993 and consisted of veterans of the anti Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. The FIS offshoots attacked the army and police, but the GIA singled out a wider range of targets that included state employees; educators; journalists critical of the Islamist movement; ordinary citizens deemed lax in their adhesion to Islamic values, among them women who did not wear Islamic dress; and foreigners, in the hope of frightening away technicians employed in sectors of the economy dependent on outside assistance and discouraging international investment. In a crescendo of violence, the AIS and GIA eventually turned on one another. Both were penetrated by counter intelligence agents who encouraged the commission of atrocities which turned public sentiment against the Islamists and strengthened the ‘eradicators’ in the government against those who sought to reconcile with the Islamists.

¹⁰ Martin Stone, *The agony of Algeria* (New York, 1997), p. 77.

When the High Committee of State's mandate expired in 1993, conservative army officers engineered the appointment of al Amin Zarwal (usually given Lamine Zeroual), a retired general, as president. Although his unexpected willingness to engage in dialogue with the Islamists angered eradicators, it reflected a popular desire to end the chaos into which the state had sunk. Also indicative of this mood were negotiations in Rome involving the FIS, the FLN, the FFS and several smaller parties, but not the government. The talks produced a 'National Contract' committing the signatories to a plural political culture which abided by decisions reached at the ballot box. In an important gesture of solidarity, it also referred explicitly to Algeria's Arab, Islamic and Amazigh roots. The ban on FIS activities remained, but some smaller Islamist parties operated freely. Militant Islamists, however, rejected Zeroual's efforts to engender pluralism while still leaving substantial powers in the hands of the military officers who remained at the core of the regime, but his victory in a relatively untainted 1995 presidential election – the first to offer the electorate a choice of candidates – revealed substantial popular support. Two years later a coalition dominated by a new pro government party, the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND), and the FLN won a parliamentary majority in elections in which Islamist and Amazigh parties polled roughly a third of the vote.

Ill health and criticisms by the army high command (*le pouvoir* 'the power' in the common parlance of the country) forced Zeroual from office before his term expired. 'Abd al 'Aziz Abu Tafiqa (usually given Bouteflika), a civilian politician, won the 1999 presidential election with the support of the same officers. Calling the restoration of peace the primary national imperative, Bouteflika released thousands of Islamist prisoners. His offer of amnesties and reduced prison sentences to militants who laid down their arms effectively dismantled the AIS, although the GIS and other extremists spurned his overtures. Even as sectarian violence diminished, however, new problems arose. In 2001 the anniversary of the 'Berber Spring' occasioned rioting in Kabylia sparked by the heavy handed tactics of the gendarmerie. Several hundred thousand protesters demanded an end to the abuses of the central government in Kabylia and the satisfaction of long standing Amazigh linguistic and cultural demands. Despite the crisis atmosphere that prevented Bouteflika from turning his full attention to pressing economic and social issues, he won re election in 2004 with minimal intervention by *le pouvoir*.

The crown is passed in Morocco

Because Hasan II never lost his grip on *le pouvoir*, programmes of economic restructuring and liberalisation which he had approved in the 1980s continued

in the 1990s, despite their sometimes painful consequences. Late in his life, however, the king concluded that leaving behind a stable political culture presided over by a monarchy with its powers intact necessitated engaging opposition forces that had long played no real political role. A new constitution in 1996 enhanced parliamentary authority by creating a bicameral body whose entire lower house was, for the first time, directly elected. Politicians welcomed royal assurances of the integrity of the 1997 legislative elections, but a coalition including the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP; the former UNFP) and the Istiqlal, the oldest and best organised opposition parties, won only a third of the seats. (Among the parliamentarians were members of the Parti de la Justice et du Développement, the first Islamist organisation represented in the assembly). In 1998 the king invited ‘Abd al Raḥman Yusufī, the USFP leader, to become the first opposition politician to form a government. Sixteen months later, in July 1999, Ḥasan II died.

Those anticipating that the accession of his son, Muḥammad VI (r. 1999), would soften the autocracy, accelerate the progress of political pluralism and nurture a globally integrated economy benefiting all Moroccans were buoyed by the new king’s statements and choice of political and economic advisers. Slowly but steadily, Muḥammad defined an agenda based on these principles. Elections in 2002 returned the most diverse legislature in the country’s history, both in terms of the breadth of its views and the gender of its members (there were more women than in any other Arab parliament at the time). In the first two years of its mandate, behind the leadership of Driss Jittu (usually given Jettou), a trusted royal adviser who replaced Yusufī as prime minister, the government introduced a revised personal status code upgrading the legal status of women, satisfied a long time demand of the Amazigh population by incorporating into the national curriculum instruction in Tamazight and other dialects, and signed a free trade agreement with the United States, the effects of which sparked controversy between those who viewed integration in the global economy as essential and those who saw it as destructive, at least in the short term – all measures that revealed a willingness to come to grips with the country’s difficult political, social and economic situation.

The international isolation of Libya

Libyan adventurism – support for international terrorist organisations; military intervention in Chad and, less directly, elsewhere in Africa; and assaults on exiled opponents of Gaddafi – drew harsh international criticisms that the

regime ignored, while domestic criticism met with brutal repression. Evidence of Libyan support for terrorist attacks at several European airports in 1985 laid the groundwork for a period of intensely strained relations between Libya and the United States which continued for almost two decades. In early 1986 the Reagan administration froze Libyan assets and banned economic relations between the two countries, compelling American oil companies to close lucrative operations. Libyan attacks on United States Navy warplanes over the Gulf of Sirte, which Libya claimed as territorial waters, and another terrorist incident in Europe brought retaliatory air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi which targeted Gaddafi's residence, military airfields and alleged terrorist training centres, but also heavily damaged urban neighbourhoods, causing civilian fatalities.

In 1991 the United States and Great Britain formally accused Libyan agents of the 1988 bombing of an American airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland which took more than 250 lives. When Libya offered to try the accused but refused to extradite them, and further declined to cooperate in an investigation into the 1989 destruction of a French passenger plane, the United Nations imposed sanctions in 1992. These prohibited international flights to Libya and forbade arms sales to the country, but did not prevent the export of Libyan oil, enabling its petroleum industry to continue functioning, albeit at a reduced capacity. Over and beyond the UN sanctions and its own existing restrictions, the United States deployed an additional economic weapon by levying sanctions in 1996 on third countries investing in Libya. Reeling under these pressures, Libya acquiesced in 1998 to the trial of the Lockerbie suspects in a neutral country but in accordance with Scottish law and presided over by Scottish judges. The United Nations suspended its sanctions, although those imposed by the United States remained in place even after the conviction of one defendant in 2001. Nearly a decade of enforced isolation had devastated the Libyan economy. With an eye towards reintegrating itself into the global community, the country accepted an American demand for compensation for the families of the Lockerbie victims. This, along with its disavowal, in 2004, of weapons of mass destruction development projects, ended American restrictions on the country and initiated new foreign investments.

Despite Libyan support for terrorist groups, some composed of Islamic extremists, the state security apparatus stifled opposition grounded in religion with the same fervour applied to secular critics of the regime. As in other matters, Gaddafi's pronouncements about the place of Islam in contemporary society have assumed authoritative status.

Similar efforts in Tunisia and Algeria to keep religion out of politics led to violence. Islamist successes in mobilising opposition in both states reflected popular willingness to align with movements capable of challenging party state monoliths at least as much as they did religious conviction, although conservative Tunisians' bitterness at the marginalisation of Islam in public life augmented the Islamist appeal there. The departure of Bourguiba raised prospects of an accommodation, but the Ben Ali government's refusal to legalise Islamic parties goaded their members into action – moderates with demonstrations and rhetoric, but extremists with terrorism. The government used public revulsion at terror to crush the movement and cast itself as the guardian of progressive, centrist Islamic views.

The Algerian experience with political Islam was more traumatic, but reached a more conciliatory conclusion. Depriving the FIS of its 1991 electoral victory triggered a decade of upheaval. The secular leadership dealt aggressively with extremist Muslims, but refrained from uprooting every manifestation of the Islamist movement, whose moderate elements remained intact. By allowing them into the political arena as the crisis abated, the government that had suppressed an uprising fought in the name of militant Islam acknowledged that the non violent advocacy of Islamist agendas constituted a legitimate political perspective enjoying the backing of millions of Algerians and meriting a place in national politics.

Champions of an Islamic society joined the chorus of opposition to the Moroccan government, but the religious credentials of the monarchy placed the state in a position to use Islamic ideology and symbolism in governance and to thwart approaches to Islam with which it disagreed. Nevertheless, bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, allegedly perpetrated by Moroccans recruited by international terrorist organisations, demonstrated that the monarchy's credentials could not insulate the country from radical Islam.

In the Maghreb's recent history, several models for addressing Islamist calls for a political role have emerged. A question of great import for the region's future stability is which of these models – repression; eradication of extremists and the incorporation of moderates into the political process; or the view that the national political leadership best speaks for Islam – will prevail.

Saudi Arabia, southern Arabia and the Gulf states from the First World War

DAVID COMMINS

International context

The aftermath of the First World War brought a new political order to the entire Middle East, including Arabia. The Ottoman Empire's collapse ended its role in Arabian affairs while Great Britain reached the peak of its influence. For launching the Arab revolt against the Ottomans, Sharif Ḥusayn of Mecca received British support to establish the Hashemite kingdom of the Ḥijaz. The resurgent Saʿūdī emirate led by ʿAbd al ʿAzīz ibn Saʿūd had wrested al Aḥṣa' from the Ottomans in 1913 and continued expanding after the war, conquering the Rashīdī emirate of Jabal Shammar in 1921 and the kingdom of the Ḥijaz four years later. In North Yemen, the Ottoman evacuation gave the Zaydī imamate occasion to occupy the coastal plain while Britain retained control over Aden and influence over the southern Yemeni hinterland. Little changed for Gulf coast shaykhdoms in treaty relations, with Great Britain guaranteeing their independence in exchange for conceding London dominance in foreign relations. Beyond the Ottoman sphere, Oman was divided between the coastal area under the British influenced Al Bu Saʿīd sultanate and a reinvigorated Ibaḍī imamate buttressed by tribal forces in the interior.

A breach in Britain's hegemony opened in 1933, when Saudi Arabia's King ʿAbd al ʿAzīz granted an American consortium an oil concession, a step that led to firm political and military ties between Washington and Riyadh during the Cold War. Anti British colonialism in Aden began to stir in the 1940s, and that sentiment spread to the Gulf in the 1950s among workers in the oil sector, urged by Arab nationalists to demand better wages and conditions as well as a voice in government. Dynastic rule held firm except in North Yemen, where army officers deposed the imam in 1962; five years later the British withdrew from South Yemen, yielding it to a Marxist revolutionary regime. In 1971 Great Britain withdrew from the Gulf, and the United States replaced it as the guarantor of dynasties facing domestic challenges and threats from Iraq and

Iran. Baghdad had exited the pro Western camp in the July 1958 revolution against its pro Western monarchy. Iran left the Western orbit when the 1979 revolution deposed the Pahlavi monarchy.

The Shi'ī ingredient in Iran's Islamic republic spurred unrest among Shi'īs in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, prompting their rulers to seek firm security guarantees from Washington without appearing to be subservient. The United States therefore maintained an 'over the horizon' presence until Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, whereupon the Al Sa'ud welcomed massive military intervention. The decision to retain a large American military presence, even one stationed in remote bases, caused a prolonged period of internal unrest in Saudi Arabia. With the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the United States reduced its presence in the Wahhabī kingdom, but the Islamic reaction to Iraq's guerrilla war makes close association with Washington a liability for Arabia's dynasties, whose resistance to participatory political institutions renders them dependent on an external great power, much as they had been at the opening of the period.

Transition to hydrocarbon economy

Prior to Arabia's passage to a hydrocarbon economy, agriculture, pastoral nomadism and caravan trade were the main sources of livelihood. In the eastern and southern coastal regions, fishermen, boat builders and pearl divers laboured while merchants traded throughout the Indian Ocean basin. That polyglot world included an Arabian diaspora of Ḥaḍramīs in the East Indies, Omanīs in East Africa and Yemenīs in Somalia. Enclaves of Indian, Somali and Persian merchants dominated trade in Aden, the Gulf and Oman. Two developments disrupted the Gulf regional economy and brought the half century pearling boom to a close. First, the global Depression weakened markets and financing. Then, in the 1930s, Japanese cultured pearls drove down prices. The age of oil concessions could not have arrived at a more propitious moment: oilfields provided pearl divers with employment; merchants obtained contracts to provision oil camps; and royalty payments to rulers put their shaky polities on firm fiscal ground.

Oil wealth also enabled Gulf rulers to develop modern governments. State building began with measures to regularise capacity to collect revenue, manage a budget and bolster military and police powers. Because Ottoman administrative and educational reforms barely touched Arabia, rulers turned to expatriate Arab and British advisers for guidance on such matters, and typically delegated authority over provincial affairs and specialised

departments to fellow members of the ruling lineage. After the Second World War, rising oil production made possible a more rapid and ambitious expansion of government institutions and the construction of modern transport and communications infrastructures in pursuit of the modern state's goal of achieving uniform authority through coercive means (pacifying nomadic tribes in Saudi Arabia, re establishing the Omani sultan's control over the interior) and through co optation (delivering the fruits of oil wealth as goods and services).

In political terms, oil disrupted a historical relationship between rulers and merchants by concentrating wealth with the former, but policies according merchants privileged access to commercial and real estate sectors reconciled them to the new order. As rulers renegotiated oil concessions to acquire a larger share of revenues, they acquired the means to gain citizens' allegiance in exchange for free education and health care, guaranteed employment and subsidised utilities. In the 1960s and 1970s petroleum sales funded a physical transformation as cities of asphalt, glass and steel mushroomed and hydro carbon industrial complexes sprang up. Mud walled homes were abandoned for villas and high rises equipped with electrical power, air conditioning, piped water and plumbing. Mental landscapes altered as well, as public education systems for all citizens with uniform curricula blending modern subjects, religion and national histories replaced schooling in mosque and *madrassa* for the few.

Saudi Arabia

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the third incarnation of Sa'udī Wahhabi power. The second Sa'udī emirate collapsed in 1891 after prolonged dynastic strife and came under the Rashīdis, former vassals based in Ḥa'il. In 1902 'Abd al 'Azīz ibn 'Abd al Raḥman ibn Sa'ud (r. 1932–53) seized Riyadh, and during the next thirty years extended his power through war and diplomacy. He achieved this by joining to the traditional elements of Sa'udī military power (militias raised from oasis settlements and tribal allies) the Ikhwan, former nomads residing in agricultural settlements and converted to Wahhabi doctrine.¹

The first Ikhwan settlements were set up around 1913. They represented an effort to domesticate nomads by concentrating them at oases and instructing

1 John S. Habib, *Ibn Saud's warriors of Islam* (Leiden, 1978).

them in Wahhabi tenets, including the view that other Muslims were infidels and thus legitimate targets for jihad. The Ikhwan provided a convenient instrument for Ibn Sa'ud, particularly in his campaign to wrest the Hijaz from the Hashemites in the 1920s. Once he achieved that objective, he withdrew them from the Holy Cities to prevent confrontations with pilgrims whose religious practices the Ikhwan would find objectionable. Ibn Sa'ud then commanded them to cease attacks on 'infidel' tribes in Transjordan and Iraq to avoid conflict with Great Britain, the mandatory power in those two kingdoms. The Ikhwan refused to sacrifice religious idealism for the sake of dynastic interest. Moreover, some Ikhwan leaders were tribal nobility who viewed themselves as Ibn Sa'ud's peers, not his subjects, so they were not only disinclined to obey him, but eager to challenge him. When Ibn Sa'ud conferred with Wahhabi 'ulama' in 1927 and 1928 to consider the Ikhwan's grievances, the 'ulama' endorsed his sole prerogative to wage jihad. In December 1928 a band of renegade Ikhwan attacked a caravan of Sa'udi merchants, an action that could not be justified under any Wahhabi interpretation. That incident gave Ibn Sa'ud the pretext to launch a campaign to suppress them completely. At the battle of al Sabila in March 1929 his forces inflicted a decisive defeat on the Ikhwan.

Ibn Sa'ud's handling of the Ikhwan signalled his quest for international legitimacy and his willingness to compromise Wahhabi principle if it might jeopardise his power. Managing the annual pilgrimage presented yet another challenge requiring a balance between satisfying Wahhabi rigour and international Muslim opinion. Anxiety over the Holy Cities was natural, given the bad reputation that trailed the Sa'udis for acts committed when they briefly ruled the Hijaz in the early 1800s, when Wahhabi clerics ordered the razing of saints' tombs and Sa'udi forces blocked the Ottoman pilgrimage. Ibn Sa'ud wished to dispel that reputation. He facilitated passage from Jiddah to Mecca by introducing motor transport; he regulated guides notorious for cheating pilgrims; and he improved public hygiene. Furthermore, he installed a mild regime of Wahhabi religious supervision, in part by restricting the presence of Ikhwan. Ibn Sa'ud could ill afford to alienate Muslim opinion because the pilgrim traffic brought much needed revenue until the Depression caused numbers to fall from around 100,000 to 25,000 pilgrims in 1932, the year Ibn Sa'ud proclaimed his domain the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.²

2 James Piscatori, 'Managing God's guests: The pilgrimage, Saudi Arabia and the politics of legitimacy', in Paul Dresch and James Piscatori (eds.), *Monarchies and nations: Globalisation and identity in Arab states of the Gulf* (London, 2005), p. 234.

The regions making up the newly formed kingdom had little in common. Najd remained a land of nomadic tribes and small oasis settlements whose merchants traded with the Ḥijaz, the Gulf coast, Iraq and India. The Ḥijaz was the site of Islam's two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, and the Red Sea merchant town of Jiddah. The religious culture in those places was alien to Wahhabī creed, more akin to the Ottoman pluralism of legal schools and Sufi orders. In the east, al Aḥsa' possessed rich agricultural lands and was home to a large Twelver Shī'ī population. In the south, 'Asir had a mixed population of Wahhabīs and Zaydī Shī'īs. Knitting together these disparate regions into a modern nation state would be the project of the Al Sa'ūd kings for the rest of the century. The tools at their disposal included coercion, co optation, religious indoctrination and economic development.³

During the interwar period the treasury depended on revenues from the annual influx of pilgrims, but the Depression reduced that traffic to a trickle. In 1933 Ibn Sa'ūd turned to a consortium of United States companies seeking an oil concession. Aramco geologists' discovery of oil in 1938 promised relief to the treasury, but significant production awaited the end of the Second World War. Towards the end of that conflict Ibn Sa'ūd and the United States augmented commercial ties with a strategic relationship as American defence planners obtained permission to construct a military airfield in Eastern Province (formerly al Aḥsa') as part of Washington's post war network of overseas bases. Tapping the kingdom's oil reserves required a pool of skilled labour lacking in Saudi Arabia. Ibn Sa'ūd ended the perennial taboo on admitting infidels to the Wahhabīs' purely monotheistic domain, but he minimised interaction between expatriates and citizens by creating enclaves for the former. Soon, the Eastern Province contained scattered compounds where expatriates reproduced living conditions more characteristic of California than Riyadh. The oil sector also spawned a modern working class largely composed of non Sa'ūdī Arabs who arrived with nationalist and leftist political ideas that seeped into Sa'ūdī society, causing political ferment in the 1950s and 1960s.⁴

King 'Abd al 'Azīz died in 1953, before the logic of opening to the outside world had fully unfolded. In the following decade the kingdom witnessed a power struggle between the new king, Sa'ūd (r. 1953–64), and the crown prince, Fayṣal (r. 1964–75), labour disturbances in the Eastern

3 Madawi Al Rasheed, *A history of Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 72–86.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 91–100.

Province and the spread of Arab nationalist sentiment. A handful of young princes led by Ṭalal ibn ‘Abd al ‘Azīz pressed for adopting a constitution. In 1961, Fayṣal expelled Ṭalal from the country, and he moved to Cairo, where he formed the Free Princes. Fayṣal outmanoeuvred the less adroit Sa‘ūd and assumed the throne in 1964. During his eleven year reign he developed state institutions, multiplying ministries and administrative bodies, and put in place a modern communications and transportation infrastructure. Such efforts required a large expatriate workforce, both Arab and non Arab. Just as Saudi Arabia opened up to the outside world, so it became more assertive in foreign affairs. Fayṣal closely aligned the kingdom with the United States in the Cold War to combat Arab nationalist and socialist movements. To that end, he framed an Islamic foreign policy through sponsoring multilateral religious institutions such as the Muslim World League, cultivating firm relations with conservative Muslim regimes and funding Wahhabī proselytising through overseas missions.⁵ Rising petroleum income augmented the kingdom’s influence in Arab affairs, and during the October 1973 Arab Israeli war Fayṣal imposed an oil embargo on the United States for supporting Israel, then joined other oil producers in quadrupling prices.

Saudi Arabia attained unprecedented international economic influence as oil revenues rose from \$4.3 billion in 1973 to \$22.5 billion in 1974, and reached \$113 billion in 1981.⁶ The oil boom funded construction on a vast scale, rapidly transforming cityscapes with broad boulevards lined with high rise office buildings, commercial enterprises and hotels. Populating the burgeoning cities were waves of mostly male expatriate workers from Asia and Arab countries. New money reshaped habits of consumption and leisure as well, fostered in part by Fayṣal’s introduction of television and girls’ education. Within a few years Sa‘ūdis undertook a double migration. In provincial towns some abandoned their small mud brick homes for large air conditioned villas equipped with modern amenities. Others relocated from the provinces to major cities such as Riyadh, Jiddah and Dhahran. Nomads abandoned their tents for jobs as taxi and truck drivers, oilfield workers and security forces. The shrinking population of nomads remaining in the desert embraced motor vehicles, shifted from camels to

5 Abdullah M. Sindi, ‘King Faisal and pan Islamism’, in Willard E. Beling (ed.), *King Faisal and the modernisation of Saudi Arabia* (London, 1980).

6 Keith McLachlan, ‘Saudi Arabia: Political and social evolution’, in Ian Richard Netton (ed.), *Arabia and the Gulf: From traditional society to modern states* (Totowa, NJ, 1986), p. 98.

sheep and goats, and came to rely on water tanks dispersed in the desert. Modern government had advantages: improved health care, more reliable food supplies and security with the suppression of tribal feuds and caravan raids. On the other hand, all this required sacrificing nomads' customary self sufficiency.⁷

In 1975 King Fayṣal was assassinated by the relative of a prince killed while protesting against the introduction of television. Khalid ibn 'Abd al 'Azīz (r. 1975–82) assumed the throne and continued along Fayṣal's path, but unease with corruption and moral change eroded royal authority. In November 1979 a band of militants led by Juḥayman al 'Uṭaybī stunned the world by seizing Mecca's Grand Mosque at the conclusion of the annual pilgrimage ceremonies. The rebels called for the overthrow of the Al Sa'ūd for their alleged betrayal of Islam, but the rulers obtained a *fatwa* from the Wahhābī authorities denouncing the rebels and permitting a military assault, advised by foreign forces, to regain control of the holy sanctuary.⁸ In the midst of the Mecca crisis the kingdom's Shi'ī population, concentrated in the Eastern Province and stimulated by revolution in Iran, erupted in anti government demonstrations expressing anger at discrimination. The authorities responded first with a show of force and then promises to redress grievances.⁹

In the wake of Juḥayman's uprising, King Khalid appeased conservatives with increased spending on religious institutions and curbs on liberal trends, dismissing female television broadcasters and shutting down video stores. His successor, King Fahd (r. 1982–2005), emphasised anew the dynasty's role as guardians of Islam's pilgrimage sites, adopting the title 'Custodian of the Two Holy Places' in 1986. The government had enlarged the Grand Mosque in 1955 to accommodate the larger numbers that arrived with the rise of commercial air travel after the Second World War. By the early 1980s the number of pilgrims reached nearly 2 million.¹⁰ Sa'ūdī efforts to capitalise on managing the *hajj* collided with the challenge posed by Iranians eager to preach their revolutionary message to pilgrims. The contest between Riyadh and Tehran escalated partly because the former supported Iraq in its war against Iran. A series of minor incidents between

7 Donald P. Cole, *Nomads of the nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter* (Chicago, 1975), pp. 136–63.

8 James Buchan, 'The return of the Ikhwān', in David Holden and Richard Johns (eds.), *The House of Saud* (New York, 1981), pp. 511–26.

9 Toby Craig Jones, 'Rebellion on the Saudi periphery: Modernity, marginalization and the Shi'a uprising of 1979', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 38 (2006), pp. 213–33.

10 Piscatori, 'Managing God's guests', p. 226.

Sa'udi security forces and Iranian demonstrators culminated in July 1987, when clashes and panic led to a stampede, killing several hundred pilgrims.¹¹

To counter Iran's revolutionary propaganda, Saudi Arabia relied on Islamic organisations that King Fayṣal had created during the Cold War such as the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The anti communist and Islamic threads converged in Riyadh's support for anti government insurgents in Afghanistan, where Marxists had seized power. Young Sa'udi men travelled to the Peshawar headquarters for Afghan insurgent groups in Pakistan, mixed with fellow holy warriors, and returned home bearing enthusiasm for political causes from Bosnia to the Philippines. Back in the kingdom, Muslim Brother refugees from Egypt, Jordan and Syria had been quietly spreading their ideas in schools and universities since the 1960s. Their effort, combined with Sa'udi participation in the Afghan jihad, altered the kingdom's religious landscape by weakening support for the Wahhabi establishment's obedience to the pro Western monarchy.¹²

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 brought to the surface tensions between leading clerics and younger religious personalities, known as shaykhs of the awakening (Ṣaḥwa), influenced by Muslim Brother ideas. King Fahd's decision to invite United States military forces to defend against a possible Iraqi invasion rested on a *fatwa* from the Wahhabi establishment, but it provoked harsh criticism from Ṣaḥwa shaykhs on the grounds that Islamic law prohibits seeking assistance from infidels.¹³ At the same time, Sa'udi liberals petitioned the king to move in the direction of a representative constitutional monarchy with protections for religious groups such as the Shi'is and curbs on Wahhabi authority over public behaviour. Religious conservatives responded with their own set of petitions calling for greater compliance with Islamic law in foreign and domestic policy. The petitions revealed the lines of Saudi Arabia's *Kulturkampf* and expressed a common desire for accountability of rulers to citizens and curbing corruption. King Fahd responded with a crackdown and the promulgation of a Basic Law (1992), which provided for the formation of a consultative council (*majlis*

11 Martin Kramer, 'Khomeini's messengers: The disputed pilgrimage of Islam', in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman (eds.), *Religious radicalism and politics in the Middle East* (New York, 1990), pp. 186–93.

12 David Commins, *The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia* (London, 2006), pp. 174–6.

13 Abdulaziz H. al Fahad, 'Commentary: From exclusivism to accommodation: Doctrinal and legal evolution of Wahhabism', *New York University Law Review*, 79 (2004), pp. 485–519.

al shura), comprised of appointed experts, to advise the government on policy. This step did not satisfy Ṣaḥwa shaykhs, who condemned the presence of United States military bases. In 1994 the government imprisoned leading dissidents.¹⁴

Dissent then assumed more violent form. In November 1995 militants exploded a car bomb outside the National Guard building in Riyadh, and in June 1996, they set off a powerful explosion in the Eastern Province city Khobar. The attacks targeted the Al Sa'ud's alliance with the United States. Osama Bin Laden and al Qa'ida gave ideological focus to such attacks with pronouncements calling on Muslims to rise up against the Americans, dubbed 'Crusaders' in their discourse. Bin Laden had participated in the Afghan jihad on the same side as the Sa'udi government and the United States, and when Iraq invaded Kuwait, he had offered the Al Sa'ud his services if they would agree to dispense with American military backing. But like the Ṣaḥwa shaykhs he turned against the rulers for despoiling Arabia by hosting infidel military forces. In August 1998 al Qa'ida pursued the anti American jihad with twin suicide truck bombings against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Its agents attacked an American naval vessel at Aden in October 2000. Then, on 11 September 2001, al Qa'ida struck the United States by crashing hijacked commercial airliners into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and a field in western Pennsylvania.¹⁵ At first, Sa'udis doubted that Bin Laden and al Qa'ida were responsible for the attacks. Only when al Qa'ida attacked a residential compound in Riyadh in May 2003 did Sa'udis become convinced that the organisation was indeed responsible for 11 September. Sa'udi cities then became the scene of fire fights between security forces and al Qa'ida militants.

The Al Sa'ud faced calls from home and abroad for measures to curb religious extremism and to advance political reform. A series of officially sponsored National Dialogues broached taboos such as the standing of non Wahhabi Muslims (Shi'is and Sufis), religious education and women's status.¹⁶ Elections to municipal councils and chambers of commerce were held. At the same time, there was no indication that King 'Abd Allah (r. 2005) would take steps that might diminish the Al Sa'ud's firm grip on power. Turmoil in neighbouring Iraq following the American overthrow of Saddam

14 Mamoun Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the politics of dissent* (New York, 1999).

15 Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden* (New York, 2001).

16 Stephane Lacroix, 'Between Islamists and liberals: Saudi Arabia's new "Islam liberal" reformists', *Middle East Journal*, 3 (2004), pp. 345–65.

Hussein's Ba'ath Party regime in April 2003 further unsettled many in Saudi Arabia, which became a recruiting ground for volunteers to fight the Americans. The amplification of Shī'ī power in Baghdad was not welcome in Riyadh. Likewise, movements towards participatory government in Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar fed popular expectations that made the kingdom's rulers uneasy. Nevertheless, they retained control over oil, the price of which increased due to rising global demand, and there was no political opposition of national scope to challenge the dynasty.

Oman

Muscat's Al Bu Sa'īd sultanate split in the nineteenth century between Omani and Zanzibar branches. Both were absorbed into the British sphere of influence. In 1913 a tribal rebellion in the name of reviving the Ibaḍī imamate and rejecting foreign encroachment expelled the sultan's forces from inner Oman. Tribesmen briefly threatened the sultan's seat at Muscat before British forces relieved the siege. In 1920 the British negotiated the Agreement of Sīb, partitioning Oman between the Ibaḍī imamate in the interior and the coastal sultanate. The agreement effectively prevented the repetition of a historical cycle that witnessed the occasional rising of imamate tribal forces to overthrow a coastal sultanate.¹⁷ In the revolt's aftermath, the British pressed Sultan Taymur ibn Fayṣal (r. 1913–32) to reorganise fiscal affairs and establish a regular council of ministers, but he displayed little interest in governance, and delegated authority to British and Omani advisers. He even tried to abdicate, but the British did not allow him until his son Sa'īd (r. 1932–70) attained his majority.

In the interior, Imam Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allah al Khalīlī's (r. 1920–54) realm rested on tribal power and religious legitimacy. Tribal notables and 'ulama' had elected him in 1920 after his predecessor's assassination. From his seat at Nizwa he exercised loose authority over a domain administered by governors who collected taxes and adjudicated disputes over water and land rights. Unlike other traditional Muslim rulers of the twentieth century, the Ibaḍī imam displayed little interest in adopting modern forms of governance, although an aspiration for international recognition appeared in the early 1950s with the issuance of passports and an application for membership in the

¹⁷ J. E. Peterson, *Oman in the twentieth century: Political foundations of an emerging state* (London, 1978), pp. 169–76.

Arab League.¹⁸ The autonomy guaranteed by the Agreement of Sīb did not survive Imam Muḥammad's reign because Sultan Sa'īd was determined to regain control. During the 1930s and 1940s he adroitly manoeuvred to extend his authority to inner Oman by mediating tribal disputes and paying subsidies to tribal leaders. To bolster his standing with Ibaḍīs he employed Ibaḍī *qaḍīs* to administer justice in his domain.

The quest for oil altered political dynamics in several ways. Royalties for an oil concession (1937) strengthened Sultan Sa'īd's hand and his determination to recover inner Oman, where prospectors believed oil reserves to lie. The prospect of oil wealth tempted tribal leaders to make exceptions to the imam's ban on contact with foreigners for petroleum engineers. Finally, the indeterminacy of international borders among Oman, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia fostered rival claims to concession areas held by foreign companies. In the late 1920s the Sa'ūdī governor of al Aḥṣa' dispatched tax collectors to the Buraymī oasis, a cluster of ten villages divided between Abu Dhabi and Oman. In 1949 Riyadh asserted sovereignty over Buraymī, and in August 1952 a Sa'ūdī expeditionary force occupied one of the Buraymī villages. Riyadh failed to gain Imam Muḥammad's backing, and he chose to cooperate with the sultan.¹⁹

While the Buraymī dispute moved to arbitration, Sultan Sa'īd was waging diplomacy to persuade inner Oman's shaykhs to give him their allegiance upon Imam Muḥammad's death, which occurred in May 1954. Tribal notables and '*ulama*' convened to elect a new imam, Ghalib ibn 'Alī al Hina'.¹ His decision to seek Sa'ūdī assistance weakened his standing, and in June 1955 a number of Buraymī shaykhs declared allegiance to the sultan. Shortly afterwards, Britain dispatched troops to oust the Sa'ūdīs from Buraymī in October 1955. In the next two months the sultan's forces overran the main interior towns and Imam Ghalib abdicated, but his brother Ṭalib and other backers of the imamate's independence took refuge in Saudi Arabia. Sultan Sa'īd then undertook a tour of inner Oman to mark its reintegration into the sultanate, promising to retain the imamate's officials in their positions and to refrain from punishing Imam Ghalib's former supporters.²⁰ Saudi Arabia maintained its claim to Buraymī and assisted the deposed imam's brother, Ṭalib ibn 'Alī, to mount a revolt for the imamate's restoration. He returned to Oman in

18 John Wilkinson, *The imamate tradition of Oman* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 305, 310.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 279, 291–5; Dale F. Eickelman, 'From theocracy to monarchy: Authority and legitimacy in Inner Oman, 1935–1957', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 17 (1985), pp. 13–14.

20 Eickelman, 'From theocracy to monarchy', p. 15.

June 1957 leading the Oman Revolutionary Movement to rally tribal allies and opponents of British influence. London's decision to intervene with air power reversed the course of battle and compelled Ṭalib's forces to retreat to the heights of Jabal Akhdar, where they held out until early 1959. The Oman Revolutionary Movement survived for three years, but by 1962 the imamate was extinct, the sultan's authority restored to the interior and the Sa'udi challenge in Buraymī defeated. One effect of the conflict was the establishment, with British support, of Oman's first modern military force, the Sultan's Armed Forces.

In 1958 Sultan Sa'id moved to the Dhufar port city of Salala, where he had begun residing more frequently since the late 1930s. His high handed conduct in the province incited a general uprising in 1965. The Dhufar rebellion had both tribal and ideological Marxist strands, the latter attracting strong support from the Soviet Bloc, including South Yemen, while Britain, Iran and Jordan backed the sultan. The region's small, dispersed population (roughly 60,000 in 1970) included a large non Arab segment, locally called *jibalis*, who had not come under central authority before. Hence, the rebellion expressed rejection of political integration by an autonomous region. In 1965 local tribal groupings joined forces in the Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF). The rebellion assumed a radical flavour and more ambitious goals in 1968 when the DLF assumed a new name, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf. Within two years it dominated the Dhufar mountains and a coastal town. Success spurred the formation of the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf in tribal areas of the former imamate. While the sultan's forces easily suppressed it, its appearance prompted Sa'id's son Qabus (r. 1970) to seize power.²¹

The son of a Dhufari mother, Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id had been educated in England and resided in Salala. As the rebellion gained momentum he plotted with relatives, army officers, tribal leaders and British officials to depose his father. He made his move on 23 July 1970, launching an armed assault on the palace to compel Sa'id to abdicate, who then went into exile in England. To quell the rebellion Sultan Qabus used military and political measures, pledging to improve the region's medical, education and water facilities, and offering amnesty to rebels. He also used oil revenues to expand the armed forces and obtained reinforcements from Britain, Iran and Jordan. The combination of political inducements and robust military measures resulted in the rebellion's collapse by the end of 1975.

²¹ Peterson, *Oman*, pp. 187–9.

Qabus took steps to demonstrate his determination to move Oman in new directions. He dismissed his father's officials, installed a new cabinet and returned the sultanate's seat to Muscat. Under Sultan Sa'id only Britain and India had maintained permanent envoys in Oman; Qabus established ties with Arab countries, bringing his country into the Arab League and reconciling differences with Saudi Arabia. He departed from his father's conservative policies by investing in the modernisation of infrastructure and social institutions. Construction of ports, an international airport and roads accompanied projects to lay down an electricity grid and provide clean water, health facilities and schools.²² Expatriates and Omanis returning from Bahrain, Kuwait and Zanzibar executed these projects.

Sultan Qabus also developed new political institutions that spread responsibility for decisions on social and economic policies. In 1981 he created the State Consultative Council, consisting of appointed members from each of the country's districts. Nine years later he dissolved that body and replaced it with the Omani Consultative Council. Candidates for the new body were chosen through indirect election and then final selection by the sultan. Women gained the right to vote and run for the council in 1997. The year before, the sultan issued a Basic Law, which serves as a constitutional document.²³ If measured by the criterion of political stability, Oman's gradual pace of economic, social and political development has succeeded. Dhufar is firmly integrated and a popular destination for Gulf Arab tourists. The imamate's former domain is likewise calm. The Islamist wave that washed over much of Arabia barely touched Oman. In 1994 the authorities arrested as many as 200 Islamists allegedly linked to the Muslim Brothers for plotting to sow unrest; they were released from prison the following year as part of a general amnesty for political prisoners.²⁴ In 2005 rumours spread of an Islamist conspiracy to attack a popular cultural gathering, the Muscat Festival, but it turned out to be a small group of Ibadī traditionalists quixotically seeking to re-establish the imamate. As in the 1994 case, Qabus granted the conspirators clemency.²⁵ The singular uncertainty on Oman's horizon concerns the succession. Whereas Arabia's other ruling families have a surfeit

22 Ibid., pp. 201–10.

23 J. E. Peterson, 'Oman: Three and a half decades of change and development', *Middle East Policy*, 11 (2004), pp. 133–4.

24 Abdullah Juma al Haj, 'The politics of participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council states: The Omani Consultative Council', *Middle East Journal*, 50 (1996), pp. 566–8.

25 Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout, 'Democratic development in Oman', *Middle East Journal*, 59 (2005), pp. 380–3.

of princes, the sultan has no heir, and there is no clear choice among members of Al Bu Sa'īd to succeed him.

The Gulf states

Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial states had Exclusive Agreements with Great Britain that gave London an exclusive role in foreign relations, provided shaykhs independence from larger regional powers and strengthened shaykhly lineages against internal challenges. Within each shaykhdom, the key players were ruling lineages and merchants whose commerce was critical to local economies. The pearling industry had expanded rapidly in the late 1800s; its sudden collapse in the 1930s due to the spread of Japanese pearls threatened to devastate the region. Oil concessions and payments for access to air bases revived Gulf economies, concentrated wealth in the hands of shaykhs and weakened merchants' position. Shaykhs deflected potential discontent among merchants by providing rich opportunities in real estate development and commerce. Shaykhs also used oil wealth to modernise infrastructure and develop generous benefits such as free education and health care. The shaykhdoms were notable for the absence of robust anti colonial movements, in part because of the low level of political development, but primarily because without the British the shaykhdoms would probably have been annexed by larger regional powers (Kuwait by Iraq, Bahrain by Iran, Qatar and the Trucial states by Saudi Arabia). After the British departed in 1971 the United States assumed the role of guarantor, demonstrating its commitment in 1991 by intervening against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990.

Kuwait's ruling Al Ṣabah steered the shaykhdom through troubled waters in the 1920s and 1930s when a Sa'ūdī trade embargo and the decline in pearling hurt trade. In 1934 Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Jabir (r. 1921–50) signed an oil concession with a British American consortium, the Kuwait Oil Company, and drillers struck oil in 1938. That same year, merchants and a maverick member of the Al Ṣabah launched a movement demanding a charter for an elected council (*majlis*) to oversee legal, educational and municipal reforms. Shaykh Aḥmad initially recognised the *majlis*, but dissolved it after six months when it asserted control over oil revenues.²⁶ In the 1950s his successor, Shaykh 'Abd Allah (r. 1950–65), used burgeoning

²⁶ Jill Crystal, *Oil and politics in the Gulf: Rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 47–55.

petroleum income for development programmes that required an influx of foreign workers, who by 1965 eclipsed the native population.

At independence in June 1961 ‘Abd Allah traded in the title of shaykh for *amir* and issued a constitution providing for hereditary rule with an elected, consultative national assembly, setting the tone for Kuwait to have the most liberal political climate in the Gulf, with a vibrant press and vocal deputies. The Al Ṣabah nevertheless retain control over crucial cabinet positions, receive large allowances and possess privileged access to business deals. Allegiance to the ruling family arises largely from its management of oil wealth, in particular policies providing social benefits for citizens: education through university; medical care; guaranteed employment; and subsidies for water, electricity and telephone service. Any business enterprise must have at least 51 per cent Kuwaiti ownership. While such policies elicited broad support, Arab nationalist deputies in the national assembly criticised the Al Ṣabah’s pro Western policies and royal corruption.

In 1976 the *amir* dissolved the national assembly and ruled by decree until 1981, when the Al Ṣabah rallied public support during a period of heightened regional tensions (the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran Iraq war). By then an Islamist tendency had emerged, in part as a reaction to liberal trends such as co education at the university and women’s participation in modern occupations. The local wing of the Muslim Brothers, the Social Reform Society, used positions in the ministries of education and information to reshape school curricula and censor books and television.²⁷ The early 1980s saw a rash of Iranian inspired violence, with militant attacks carried out by Shi‘i expatriates from Iraq, Lebanon and Iran on Western targets, and an assassination attempt on the *amir* in 1985. The regime again dissolved the national assembly in 1986. A pro democracy movement gathering momentum in early 1990 was cut short by Iraq’s invasion.

Iraq had asserted sovereignty over Kuwait on several occasions since the 1930s, partly because the way Britain had drawn the Iraq Kuwait boundary in 1923 so narrowly pinched Iraq’s outlet to the Persian Gulf. Iraqi forces rapidly overran the country on 2 August 1990, causing the mass flight of Kuwaitis and expatriates. During the seven month occupation, Kuwaitis who stayed behind organised a nationalist resistance movement while pro democracy activists in exile called on the Al Ṣabah to guarantee the national assembly’s restoration upon liberation. Meanwhile, the United States mobilised a broad

27 Shafeeq N. Ghabra, ‘Balancing state and society: The Islamic movement in Kuwait’, *Middle East Policy*, 5 (1997), pp. 60–1.

international coalition to expel Iraqi forces. On 16 January 1991 the US led coalition launched a six week campaign of missile and air strikes; then, on 25 February, ground forces attacked and liberated Kuwait in four days of warfare. With the United States strongly urging the *amir* to revive the national assembly, he announced elections for October 1992. The outcome was a balance among Islamist, secular liberal and royalist factions.²⁸ Islamists called for a ban on co education and tried to silence secular authors, and they joined other conservatives to block the secular liberal campaign to grant women voting rights.²⁹ That campaign succeeded in 2005, and women candidates ran for seats (without success) in the national assembly in the June 2006 elections.

Bahrain's modern experience has been coloured by sectarian tensions between the Shi'ī majority and the Sunni Al Khalifa rulers, and by relatively modest oil reserves. In 1922 Shi'īs demonstrated against discriminatory taxes and forced labour. Shaykh 'Isa (r. 1869–1923) refused to grant reforms, but the British urged him to reconsider in order to deflect Iranian pressure on behalf of fellow Shi'īs. When members of a Sunni clan attacked a Shi'ī village the British expelled the clan, forced Shaykh 'Isa to abdicate and installed his son Shaykh Ḥamad (r. 1923–42), who carried out reforms.³⁰ In 1929 Bahrain became the first Gulf shaykhdom to enter the global oil market when an American firm, the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) obtained a concession. It discovered oil in 1932 and began exporting in 1934. Oil revenues fuelled Bahrain's emergence as a centre for Gulf commerce and services, and afforded resources for developing public schools and medical services. Kuwait's 1938 reform movement inspired a counterpart to call for reforming the courts, creating a legislative assembly and affording Shi'īs access to jobs in the oil sector, where expatriate workers from India occupied high paying positions.³¹ Shaykh Ḥamad outmanoeuvred the reformers but his son Shaykh Salman (r. 1942–61) had to face a new wave of protest in the mid 1950s, when industrial grievances overlapped with rising Arab nationalist sentiment, spurred by BAPCO's continued preference for South Asian workers. In 1953 activists formed the Higher Executive Committee to renew demands for an

28 Steve Yetiv, 'Kuwait's democratic experiment in its broader international context', *Middle East Journal*, 56 (2002), pp. 257–73.

29 Ghabra, 'Balancing state and society', pp. 64–9.

30 Mahdi Abdalla al Tajir, *Bahrain, 1920–1945: Britain, the shaikh and the administration* (London, 1987), pp. 35–46.

31 Mohammed G. al Rumaithi, *Bahrain: A study on social and political change since the First World War* (Kuwait, 1975), pp. 264–72.

elected legislature and legalisation of trade unions. Shaykh Salman consented to draft new labour legislation but rejected political reform.

When Bahrain gained independence in August 1971, activists hoped that the Al Khalifa might follow the liberal path charted by the Al Ṣabah. In 1973 Shaykh 'Isa ibn Salman (r. 1961–99) issued a constitution that stipulated extensive powers for the ruler and an elected advisory national assembly. Arab nationalist and leftist deputies formed a vocal bloc that stirred lively debates until 1975, when the *amir* dissolved the national assembly for refusing to endorse a controversial security law.³² Whereas Kuwait's large petroleum income affords the means to dilute political dissent, Bahrain's small reserves provide less margin. Efforts to diversify the economy through initiatives in communications, transport and industry mitigated the impact of lower oil revenues, but the Al Khalifa lack the means to co-opt citizens with extensive social welfare programmes.

The Iranian revolution stirred unrest among the rulers and excitement among many Shi'is. Bilateral relations reached their lowest point in December 1981 when Bahrain accused Iran of conspiring to replace the Al Khalifa with an Islamic republic. Given the ties of Bahrain's Shi'is to co-religionists in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, many ordinary Sunnis doubted their loyalty. While Bahrain's Shi'is no doubt sympathise with Shi'is elsewhere, their dissent stems from underrepresentation in national politics and discrimination in access to employment. In the 1980s Shi'i political movements demanded the restoration of constitutional government, the end of discrimination and economic justice.³³ Kuwait's reinstatement of parliament in 1992 encouraged Bahrain's activists to renew calls for restoring the national assembly and ending sectarian discrimination. A wave of violent protests, bombings and harsh crackdowns washed over the country between 1994 and 1999.³⁴ The accession of Amir Ḥamad (r. 1999–) initially offered the prospect of ending the political stalemate. He promised municipal council elections, inclusion of more Shi'is in national institutions and a referendum (in which women would vote) on a charter for political reform. He also abolished the State Security Law and State Security Court. The revised constitution issued in 2002, however, assigned more power to the ruler than the 1972 constitution. Before holding elections, the regime gerrymandered districts to dilute

32 Louay Bahry, 'The opposition in Bahrain: Bellwether for the Gulf' *Middle East Policy*, 5 (1997), p. 43.

33 International Crisis Group, 'Bahrain's sectarian challenge', *Middle East Report*, 40 (2005), pp. 7–14.

34 Bahry, 'The opposition in Bahrain', pp. 44–9, 51–5.

the Shi‘i vote. Consequently, the confrontation between the Al Khalifa and the opposition remained tense and sectarian tensions unresolved.³⁵

Qatar shares with other Gulf states an abundance of hydrocarbons and a shaykhly dynasty. When Shaykh ‘Abd Allah ibn Qasim Al Thani (r. 1913–49) signed a treaty with Britain in 1916, he ensured his independence of Qatar’s former Al Khalifa suzerains and possible encroachment by Saudi Arabia. Even before oil, the balance between the Al Thani and local merchants weighed in the dynasty’s favour because of its large size and the small number of merchants. While this rendered the Al Thani less answerable to merchants, the clan has suffered from endemic intrigue against incumbents and a series of forced abdications.³⁶ In 1949 Shaykh ‘Abd Allah faced disgruntled clansmen demanding a greater share of oil royalties (dating from the 1935 concession) and administrative positions. He abdicated in favour of his son ‘Ali (r. 1949–60). Shaykh ‘Ali fared no better handling relatives clamouring for allowances and he stepped down, to be succeeded by his son Ahmad (r. 1960–72). Family pressure on Shaykh Ahmad and his preference for vacations abroad led him to make way for his cousin Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad (r. 1972–95). Family intrigue resulted in Khalifa’s deposition by his son Hamad (r. 1995).³⁷

The export of oil, begun in 1949, made possible a first phase of administrative development, under British tutelage, with the creation of fiscal and police institutions. The oil industry also stimulated political change. In 1951 Qatari workers protested at the employment of Dhufaris and successfully pressed for their expulsion. Labour unrest and Arab nationalist agitation broke out in 1956, and again in 1963. In response, the rulers established hiring preferences for Qataris and protected Qatari merchants by requiring that businesses have majority ownership for nationals.³⁸ At independence in September 1971, Shaykh Ahmad issued a temporary constitution and created municipal councils offering merchants a share in local governance. Shaykh Khalifa was the first ruler to curtail allowances to the Al Thani, electing to court the backing of ordinary Qataris with higher spending for education, health and housing. At the same time, the Al Thani continued to dominate cabinet positions and powerful institutions (armed forces, police, treasury). The rise in oil prices made it possible to embark on massive construction of infrastructure. Given Qatar’s tiny population and late start at educating its citizens, the tasks of staffing schools, health clinics and technical positions

³⁵ International Crisis Group, ‘Bahrain’s sectarian challenge’, pp. 5–6.

³⁶ Crystal, *Oil and politics*, p. 112. ³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 152–8. ³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 124–6, 144–53.

required the hiring of expatriate workers, who comprised 80 per cent of the population by the early 1980s.

Ḥamad ibn Khalifa followed his 1995 coup against his father with promises to bring significant changes to Qatar's political order. To buttress his declared commitment to liberal policies, he dissolved the Ministry of Information, ending official censorship. In 1996 he launched al Jazīra satellite television network. The network's candid treatment of taboo social and political matters (excepting Qatari affairs) gained it a wide Arab audience, inspired imitators and fostered a more open climate for public discourse. In 1998 Qatar held elections to the Chamber of Commerce (heretofore an appointive body). In municipal council elections the following year, women were eligible to vote and run for office. These moves in a liberal direction have been tempered by Amir Ḥamad's retention of complete control over revenues and budget.³⁹

In the Trucial states early twentieth century politics consisted of power struggles within ruling lineages and between neighbouring shaykhdoms. Dubai's commercial ties throughout the Indian Ocean basin made it the most cosmopolitan town of the lower Gulf, its merchants serving as the channel for modern cultural influences emanating from Cairo and Bombay. As the economy shifted in the mid 1930s from pearling to oil concessions and air base royalties, Dubai's merchants followed the example of their counterparts in Kuwait. In 1938 they pressed Shaykh Sa'īd ibn Maktum (r. 1912–58) to limit his share of oil royalties and to establish a *majlis* to supervise the treasury and institute reforms in education and municipal administration. In March 1939 Shaykh Sa'īd dissolved the *majlis* and replaced it with an appointed advisory Merchants Council.

In neighbouring Abu Dhabi, dynastic rivalries plagued the Al Nahayan until Shaykh Shakhbut ibn Sulṭān (r. 1928–66) gained control. He signed an oil concession in 1935, but the extent of the concession was unclear because of rival territorial claims asserted by Abu Dhabi, Oman and Saudi Arabia. In the mid 1950s Britain supported Abu Dhabi's claim to several villages in the Buraymī oasis. Following the discovery of oil in 1958, revenues began to grow, but Shaykh Shakhbut, a cautious autocrat in the mould of Oman's Sultan Sa'īd, refused to spend on projects like those in Kuwait and Bahrain. In 1966 Al Nahayan elders agreed to depose him and installed his brother Zayid ibn Sulṭān (r. 1966–2004), who initiated modern development.

39 Andrew Rathmell and Kirsten Schulze, 'Political reform in the Gulf: The case of Qatar', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36 (2000), pp. 53–9.

During the 1960s Britain encouraged the Trucial states to cooperate on security, oil exploration and public works. Modest steps in these areas paved the way for the more ambitious enterprise of forming an independent federation once Britain decided to withdraw from the Gulf. Abu Dhabi's Shaykh Zayid emerged as the leading voice for a federation to encompass the Trucial states, Bahrain and Qatar. Dubai's Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'īd (r. 1958–90) made adherence to the federation conditional on autonomy for each shaykhdom. Ra's al Khayma's shaykh balked at joining as he hoped that an oil discovery would spare him the need to depend on Abu Dhabi's benevolence; Iran's occupation of two disputed islands prompted him to join.⁴⁰ In the end, Bahrain and Qatar opted for independence, and in December 1971 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerged as a federation of the former Trucial states: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ra's al Khayma, Fujayrah, 'Ajman and Umm al Qaywayn. Shaykh Zayid became president and Shaykh Rashid the vice president. The seven shaykhs comprise the Supreme Council of Rulers, a body that sets policy for an appointed Council of Ministers, mostly drawn from shaykhly lineages. A forty seat appointed Federal National Council possesses consultative, not legislative, powers. Abu Dhabi and Dubai dominate these bodies because of their wealth, not their population; in fact, Sharjah and Ra's al Khayma each have more Emirati nationals than the two dominant emirates. In general, Abu Dhabi has pushed for increased centralisation while Dubai has sought to retain the autonomy of each emirate. This has made it difficult to formulate common policies on immigration and sharing revenues as well as unification of defence forces.⁴¹

The UAE has followed the Kuwaiti model of spending oil revenues to develop infrastructure and provide its citizens free education, medical care and subsidised housing. Pursuing these projects required heavy dependence on expatriate labour from Arab countries, Asia and the West. By the 1990s Emirati nationals counted for only 15 per cent of the population. While Abu Dhabi is the centre of the federal government and the purse for poorer shaykhdoms, Dubai's Al Maktum have developed a diverse range of commercial and financial enterprises to wean their emirate from dependence on oil. By the late 1990s petroleum products accounted for only 10 per cent of Dubai's GDP.

40 Christopher M. Davidson, *The United Arab Emirates: A study in survival* (London, 2005), pp. 42–9.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 189.

Yemen

Yemen stands apart from the rest of Arabia in several respects. It possesses the most extensive and productive agricultural lands in the peninsula, allowing for relatively dense settlement of Arabia's second most populous country. While other monarchies survived domestic and regional crises, Yemenis have lived under republics since the 1960s. Its recently discovered petroleum reserves are modest by Arabian standards and, unlike the oil rich states, it has long been an exporter rather than a receiver of expatriate workers. With few natural resources, Yemen depended on foreign aid to finance modern infrastructure, and regimes lacked the means to gain citizens' allegiance with social benefits. South Yemen's Marxist regime pursued revolutionary transformation while North Yemen's military dominated republics struggled to attain stability and genuine authority over its population.

In 1904 Yemen was divided between the Zaydī imamate in the north and a British sphere in the south comprising a colony in Aden and autonomous chieftaincies. Revolutionary army officers overthrew the imamate in 1962, triggering an eight year civil war against royalist forces. In Aden and the Protectorates, an anti colonial movement fought for independence, achieved in 1967. During the 1970s and 1980s coexistence between the two Yemens was uneasy because the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) had a conservative complexion and capitalist economy while the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was Marxist. In 1990 they merged to form the Republic of Yemen, but the stresses of unification resulted in war in 1994, when northern military forces thwarted former PDRY leaders seeking secession. Throughout the century Yemen underwent a state building project as rulers strove to project power over populations that had seldom felt the reach of central authority. In the early twenty first century the project remained incomplete.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire left the field clear for Imam Yahya (r. 1904–48) to embark on an enterprise similar to 'Abd al 'Aziz ibn Sa'ud's expansion and consolidation of power. Yahya expelled the Idrisī ruler of 'Asīr from southern Tihama and waged a harsh campaign to pacify that region's powerful tribesmen. When he attempted to extend his authority into the British sphere of influence, his forces retreated in the face of aerial attacks. By the 1934 Treaty of Ṣan'a', Yahya acknowledged the 1904 Anglo Ottoman boundary agreement between North and South Yemen. Also in 1934, his bid to annex 'Asīr and Najran precipitated war with Saudi Arabia. Yemeni

forces were no match for the northern neighbour, and Yahya conceded Najran and 'Asir to the Sa'udis by the Treaty of Ṭa'if.

Yahya aspired to cement authority over a population dispersed among hundreds of small settlements scattered over rugged terrain. While the imam enjoyed legitimacy among Zaydī tribes in his domain's northern parts, lower Yemen's Shafī'ī townsmen and villagers were less inclined to accord him their allegiance. He relied on Ottoman trained advisers for expertise in foreign relations and concentrated power in his immediate family by appointing his sons to govern the main towns. To augment the ranks of capable administrators, Yahya sent a few dozen Yemenis to study in Lebanon and Cairo. To strengthen military capacity, he sent a mission to Baghdad and engaged Iraqi military trainers in Ṣan'a'. Young Yemenis exposed to more advanced conditions in other countries formed a critical component of political opposition to the imamate, and quite a few found their way to Aden.⁴²

In striving to gather more power, Yahya departed from Zaydī custom by acting in the manner of a king rather than an imam.⁴³ Thus, he rankled traditionalists in 1927 when he designated his son Aḥmad as successor. Rather than rule in cooperation with other *sayyid* clans, he appointed his sons to govern provinces. Political opposition broadened as disgruntled Shafī'ī traders and educated townsmen migrated to Aden, where the Free Yemeni Movement was formed with the aspiration of turning the imamate into a constitutional monarchy. The movement's leaders plotted to unseat the imam and install a member of the rival al Wazīr clan. On 17 February 1948 the conspirators assassinated Imam Yahya, but Aḥmad escaped and rallied tribal allies to crush the revolt.⁴⁴ Imam Aḥmad (r. 1948–62) thereafter kept his court at his provincial seat in Ṭa'izz and designated his son Muḥammad al Badr as his successor.

Imam Aḥmad's reign coincided with the rise of Arab nationalism. He developed friendly ties with Egyptian president Nasser, a fellow opponent of British influence, which Aḥmad regarded as an obstacle to reuniting Yemen under his rule. When Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic in 1958, Aḥmad declared Yemen's adherence. His decision to withdraw when Syria seceded in 1961 alienated pro Egyptian army officers, and they began to plot against him. Their chance to seize power came when

42 J. Leigh Douglas, *The Free Yemeni Movement, 1935–1962* (Beirut, 1987), pp. 24–44, 110–114.

43 Bernard Haykel, *Revival and reform in Islam: The legacy of Muhammad al Shawkani* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 210–12.

44 Douglas, *The Free Yemeni Movement*, pp. 134–57.

Aḥmad died in September 1962. A week after his passing, on 26 September, they took over Ṣan‘a’ and proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic. Under President ‘Abd Allah al Sallal, a veteran of the 1948 conspiracy, the revolutionaries executed and imprisoned members of the old regime, but failed to capture Muḥammad al Badr. He escaped to the northern highlands, the bastion of tribal support for the imamate.⁴⁵

External forces complicated Yemen’s civil war. Nasser dispatched Egyptian troops to bolster republican forces while royalists drew support from Saudi Arabia. Nasser also sent civilian advisers to direct government offices in Ṣan‘a’, but their overbearing manner made the Sallal regime unpopular and exacerbated political differences on the republican side between hardliners and moderates. The royalist side was divided between proponents of full restoration and advocates of an imamate committed to modernisation. The stalemate was broken not on the battlefield in Yemen but in Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the June 1967 War against Israel. The end of British rule in South Yemen the same year also affected regional politics. Nasser agreed to withdraw Egyptian forces and King Fayṣal, alarmed at the emergence of Aden’s socialist regime, mended fences with the moderate republicans in Ṣan‘a’. At a 1970 conference in Jiddah, royalists agreed to jettison the imamate in exchange for places in the government.

The end of civil war did not bring about political stability. On the contrary, the combination of feeble governing institutions, scant resources and social divisions resulted in a series of ephemeral, ineffective regimes. In 1974 ‘Abd al Raḥman al ‘Iryani stepped down and Colonel Ibrahim al Ḥamdī became the head of state. His three years in power were notable for launching economic development efforts through a Central Planning Organisation, but administrative capacity trailed plans on paper. In October 1977 Ḥamdī was killed in obscure circumstances and another officer, Aḥmad al Ghashmī, seized power. He in turn was assassinated in June 1978. Major ‘Alī ‘Abd Allah al Ṣalīḥ then became president. He would become Yemen’s most durable leader, in part by appointing kinsmen to sensitive political, security and military posts.

As army factions jostled for power, Yemenis adapted to fluid circumstances. Saudi Arabia’s liberal entry policy for Yemenis facilitated the flow of migrant workers to oilfields and construction sites. Remittances rose from

45 Paul Dresch, *A history of modern Yemen* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 77–88.

\$40 million in 1970 to over \$1 billion a decade later.⁴⁶ Second hand oil wealth fuelled infrastructure improvement. Local development associations sprang up to provide basic medical services and clean drinking water. Reliance on remittances meant that Yemen's economy entered recession when oil prices fell in the early 1980s. The discovery of oil in the mid 1980s thus came at a propitious time. Oil revenues provided Ṣan'a' with the resources to bolster state power, building on President Ṣaliḥ's endeavour to make the General People's Congress (GPC) a mechanism to represent diverse interests, incorporate military officers in the regime and dispense patronage to local powerbrokers.⁴⁷

Southern Yemen lacked a unifying political institution like the Zaydī imamate. The impulse to unity came instead from nationalist movements. Starting in 1937, Britain governed Aden's mixed population of Arabs, Indians and Somalis as a Crown colony while leaving the hinterland's cultivators and pastoralists under the rule of local leaders. Advisory treaties with protectorate rulers gave the British influence over internal affairs in exchange for arms and development assistance, allowing a modest augmentation of services in education, health and agricultural development. In Aden, the British expanded the port and constructed a major oil refinery, spurring the population to swell from around 50,000 in 1930 to 200,000 in 1960, in large measure due to the arrival of migrant workers from the hinterland and the imamate.

Nationalist politics began with reformist groups such as the Aden Association (founded in 1949), comprised of merchants and professionals espousing a gradual path to independence within the British Commonwealth. Sharper demands for independence were sounded by the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC, founded in 1956) and its leader, 'Abd Allah al Asnaj. In the hinterland, the anti colonial cause found an unlikely advocate in the sultan of Lahj, 'Alī ibn 'Abd al Karīm al 'Abdalī, who joined the South Arabian League, a body pursuing a reformist course in seeking independence and union for Aden and the Protectorates. But Aden's cosmopolitan Arabs were not seeking union with a region whose inhabitants they regarded as backward. Nevertheless, when London rejected a proposal for independence on the Singapore model in 1962, Aden's legislative council agreed to join the Protectorates in the Federation of South Arabia. That same year, the

46 J. E. Peterson, *Yemen: The search for a modern state* (Baltimore, 1982), p. 149.

47 Robert D. Burrowes, 'Prelude to unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962–1990', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23 (1991), pp. 493–5.

ATUC established the People's Socialist Party to spread activities to the Protectorates, but with little success.⁴⁸

The task of knitting together nationalists in Aden and the hinterland fell to the National Liberation Front (NLF), a coalition of nationalist groups established in Ṣan'a' in June 1963 with the backing of the new republican government. Nasser asserted his pan Arab leadership by organising the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), largely drawing on the People's Socialist Party, but the NLF refused to cooperate.⁴⁹ In October 1963 the NLF launched a rebellion for independence. Its violent campaign forced London to abandon negotiations with the ATUC and the quest for a gradual path to independence. Instead, the British announced their decision to withdraw by the end of 1967. Fighting then erupted within the nationalist camp, with the NLF moving from bases in North Yemen and the Protectorates against the ATUC and FLOSY. As British forces were pulling out, the NLF overran the weak federal army they had trained to handle the transition to independence. By the end of November 1967 the British were gone and the NLF had proclaimed the People's Republic of South Yemen.

South Yemen was one of the least developed countries in the world, with few paved roads, medical facilities or schools. Prospects for economic development were dimmed by Britain's evacuation of the military base and termination of direct aid as well as the decline in port business due to the closure of the Suez Canal caused by the June 1967 War. Political conditions remained unsettled as Saudi Arabia and North Yemen backed armed opposition groups. The first president, Qaḥṭan al Sha'bī, was deposed in June 1969 by the NLF's radical wing and replaced by Salīm Rubay' 'Alī (known as Salmayn) as chairman of the presidential council and 'Abd al Fattāḥ Isma'īl as secretary general of the NLF's central committee. A constitution promulgated in November 1970 changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Factional strife in June 1978 resulted in the execution of Salmayn and the recasting of the NLF as the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP).

Despite meagre resources and political turmoil, the revolutionary regime took steps to transform society. It nationalised the oil refinery, large industries and foreign firms, causing northern merchants who had come to Aden for the opportunities afforded by the colonial economy to return home. An

48 Helen Lackner, *PDR Yemen: Outpost of socialist development in Arabia* (London, 1985), pp. 27–30.

49 Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, *The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Politics, economics and society* (London, 1986), pp. 24–7.

agrarian reform law put a ceiling on landholdings and the authorities converted confiscated estates to cooperatives and state farms. Measures to advance the welfare of ordinary citizens included efforts on behalf of nomads such as digging wells and placing water tanks at frequent intervals, subsidising housing for poor citizens and steps to bring about equality between men and women. The Family Law of 1974 raised the minimum marriage age for girls to sixteen, put a ceiling on bride price, restricted polygamy and bolstered women's rights in divorce and custody cases. The government also opened higher education to female students and encouraged higher participation by women in paid occupations, but conservative attitudes in smaller towns, where most of the population lived, kept many girls out of school after a few years of elementary education.⁵⁰

Relations between Yemen's two regimes were generally hostile, as Aden backed the National Democratic Front's rebellion against Ṣan'a' while the North supported remnants of FLOSY and the South Arabian League. In border clashes in February 1979, PDRY forces occupied towns inside the YAR and put them under NDF control. After mediation by Arab states, Prime Minister 'Alī Naṣīr Muḥammad adopted a moderate line, with an eye on improving relations with Saudi Arabia, and he jettisoned the NDF. There followed a showdown between 'Alī Naṣīr and the ideological purist 'Abd al Fattāḥ Isma'īl, who was forced to resign and go into exile. 'Alī Naṣīr relaxed state control over the economy to the dismay of the YSP's true believers. As strains within the regime mounted, the socialist faction brought Isma'īl back from Moscow in 1984. Finally, on 13 January 1986, 'Alī Naṣīr triggered a bloody climax when he attempted to kill Isma'īl and other rivals at a YSP conference, but 'Alī Naṣīr was defeated and forced to flee to Ṣan'a' along with thousands of followers. Thousands perished in the fighting. The YSP had essentially decapitated itself, with dozens of leaders killed, imprisoned or exiled. Moreover, the blood letting did not resolve fundamental economic and political problems confronting the PDRY's new president, 'Alī Salīm al Bīḍ.⁵¹

In the early years, socialist policies had provided affordable food, broad access to education and a general feeling of equality, but by the mid 1980s the country was stalled. Leaders hoped to discover valuable oil reserves, but the area of exploration in Shabwa Province near the border with the YAR meant

⁵⁰ Lackner, *PDR Yemen*, pp. 114–17.

⁵¹ Robert D. Burrowes, 'Oil strike and leadership struggle in South Yemen: 1986 and beyond', *Middle East Journal*, 43 (1989), pp. 442–3.

that efforts to develop oilfields would exacerbate bilateral tensions. A military confrontation in spring 1988 was averted when Presidents Ṣaliḥ and al Bīḍ decided to meet. They agreed to connect electricity grids and facilitate border crossings in preparation for reaching a union accord, a goal frequently declared in the past, but never before seriously entertained. Pressure on Aden, however, was growing as the Soviet Union declared that it would cut support for client states. In November 1989 Ṣaliḥ and al Bīḍ announced that the two regimes would achieve unification within one year under a transitional government that would hold first a referendum on a new constitution and then national parliamentary elections.⁵²

Shortly after Yemen's unification, it became embroiled in the regional crisis sparked by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Yemen withheld support for the international coalition against Iraq. Saudi Arabia retaliated by cancelling its policy of allowing Yemenis to reside without permits, causing an enormous flood of returning migrants. As many as 800,000 workers came home in six months. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states also cut financial aid. The upshot was a period of economic hardship (inflation, unemployment, arrears in payments to government workers).⁵³ Most Yemenis, though, supported government foreign policy and looked forward to the next steps to cementing the union. Given the disparity in population – the north had eleven million, the south had around two and a half million – President Ṣaliḥ's GPC seemed bound to dominate while the YSP tried to maintain influence in the south. The novel political force was the Yemeni Reform Grouping, or Iṣḻāḥ, a nominally Islamist party, established in 1990. Iṣḻāḥ's leader, 'Abd Allah al Aḥmar, is a veteran of YAR politics long associated with the moderate republicans. In the April 1993 national elections the GPC took 123 seats, followed by Iṣḻāḥ with 62, and the YSP with 56. The YSP leadership reacted to defeat by returning to Aden and boycotting the newly elected government. Tensions between rival military units loyal to the YSP and GPC flared into warfare in May 1994. In early July northern forces overran the south, subjecting Aden to extensive looting, forcing al Bīḍ into exile and consolidating Ṣaliḥ's hold on power over the entire country.⁵⁴

52 Charles Dunbar, 'The unification of Yemen: Process, politics, and prospects', *Middle East Journal*, 46 (1992), pp. 456–76.

53 Rainer Hartmann, 'Yemeni exodus from Saudi Arabia: The Gulf conflict and the ceasing of the workers' emigration', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 19 (1995), pp. 38–52.

54 Dresch, *Modern Yemen*, pp. 186–98.

In the war's aftermath, the regime strengthened presidential powers at the expense of civil liberties enjoyed by political parties and newspaper publishers during unified Yemen's first years. Şaliḥ did not dissolve the YSP because he viewed it as a useful foil to balance Işlah, which reflects both the regional upsurge of Islamists and Yemen's own complicated social and political complexion, as it contains tribal leaders and supporters of the Muslim Brothers.⁵⁵ Moreover, Işlah is just one part of a broad spectrum of religious activism along with Zaydī neo traditionalists, Sa'ūdī influenced Salafīs, Sufis and jihadist Salafīs. The pluralist landscape reflects historical religious cultures, contemporary influences from the Gulf and participation in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. The militant strain of jihadist Salafism is embodied by the Islamic Jihad movement and the Aden Abyan Islamic Army, small but dangerous groups. They have carried out attacks on Western targets, kidnapped tourists and assassinated a YSP leader. In the broad Yemeni context, however, they are overshadowed by the regime's capacity for co-opting dissidents and by the country's own diverse regional, social and religious composition.

Expatriate workers

Migrant workers and expatriate traders were mainstays in the Gulf well before the discovery of oil. Indian and Persian merchants dominated long distance trade in Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the Trucial states. During the pearling season, from July to October, thousands of men flocked to the Gulf coast from Oman, Najd and southern Iraq.⁵⁶ In its early phase the oil industry built on extant migration patterns. The Bahrain Petroleum Company, for instance, initially employed Iranians and later brought workers from India.⁵⁷ Typically, expatriates first worked in the oil sector, then, as revenues increased, they carried out construction projects and staffed medical and education sectors. In each country there was seldom any question of delaying projects until the national labour force possessed the requisite technical skills to implement them. Instead, there evolved a division between the public sector, dominated by nationals, and the private sector, dominated by expatriates.

55 Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, 'Stereotypes and political styles: Islamists and tribes folk in Yemen', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27 (1995), pp. 405–31.

56 Ian J. Seccombe, 'Labour migration to the Arabian Gulf: Evolution and characteristics, 1920–1950', *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)*, 10 (1983), p. 4.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 6–11.

The composition of the expatriate labour force has been diverse and dynamic. One tendency was for Arabs to comprise the bulk of foreign workers during the 1950s and 1960s and then for Asian workers to become predominant. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, Arabs went from nearly three quarters of expatriate workers in the early 1970s to less than one third by the late 1990s. Because of Yemen's position on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Sa'udis expelled Yemenis. Likewise, the Kuwaitis deported Palestinians after the expulsion of Iraqi forces.⁵⁸ A second tendency was the steady increase in the proportion of expatriate workers in the labour market until the mid 1990s when it peaked in Gulf Cooperation Council countries at nearly three quarters of workers. By then expatriates comprised over 80 per cent of the labour force in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. A third tendency is for nationalities to specialise in occupations: Egyptians and Palestinians as teachers, Indians and Pakistanis as engineers, Sri Lankans and Filipinos as domestic servants.⁵⁹

Even though expatriates are excluded from the privileges of citizenship, workers borrow money to pay for travel, work permits and visas because of the opportunity to earn much higher wages than in their home countries. Some expatriates live in segregated camps to work on short term construction projects; others employed by smaller firms reside with countrymen, frequently relatives or fellow villagers, often in squalid conditions. Mutual aid associations based on ethnic solidarity provide emergency assistance and social support. Professionals and business managers naturally enjoy more comfortable circumstances, but no matter how long they stay, they may not own property or a business.⁶⁰

Eventually, population growth and declining oil reserves will diminish the ability of Gulf countries to afford a large expatriate labour force, guaranteed employment for citizens in the public sector and extensive welfare benefits. Programmes to increase citizens' participation in the private sector include technical training and quotas on expatriates. Business owners, however, have not rushed to hire citizens because they demand higher wages. Employers' complaints about their compatriots' slack work ethic might merely indicate resistance to exploitation, but they could augur profound problems ahead.

58 Andrzej Kapiszewski, *Nationals and expatriates: Population and labour dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council states* (Reading, 2001) pp. 62–3.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 60.

60 Sulayman Khalaf and Saad Alkobaisi, 'Migrants' strategies of coping and patterns of accommodation in the oil rich Gulf societies: Evidence from the UAE', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 26 (1999), pp. 271–98.

Precisely when demographic pressures impinge on oil revenues will vary, with Bahrain already feeling the pinch. Political stability rests on a bargain struck in the early decades of the petroleum production. It appears that rulers will either find ways to engage citizens in productive endeavours or have to renegotiate the political bargain if they are to avoid acute political difficulties in the future.

Iran from 1919

MISAGH PARSA

Iran's tumultuous history during the twentieth century swirled around conflicts over political power, economic resources and ideological schisms. Beginning with the constitutional revolution of 1905, democratic forces mobilised to check the coercive state power. As each struggle failed, exclusive polities emerged, refusing to empower the people and grant civil liberties. Growing oil revenues, and foreign intervention, strengthened the rulers' power and facilitated state domination of society. In the 1979 revolution Iranians fought to achieve national independence, establish political freedom and reduce rising inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income. The democratic forces did not prevail, however, as a faction of the 'ulama' seized power, imposed a theocratic state, eliminated its coalition partners and repressed all opposition. In the context of global democratisation, the state generated a new set of conflicts that have yet to reach a climax.

Establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty

In the early years of the twentieth century Iran's weak, corrupt government was incapable of blocking foreign powers from exerting substantial influence over the country's affairs. Britain invaded Iran in January 1918 on the heels of Russia's October revolution as Bolsheviks withdrew their troops from Iran and renounced all tsarist privileges.¹ By 1919 Britain was the sole foreign power in Persia, and attempted to consolidate its control formally with the Anglo Persian Agreement of 1919. The agreement, authored mainly by Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, stipulated that Britain would lend Iran £2,000,000 and construct railways, revise tariffs and collect war compensation from third parties. In exchange, Britain would become the exclusive supplier

¹ Cyrus Ghani, *Iran and the rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar collapse to Pahlavi rule* (London, 1998) p. 25.

of arms, military training and administrative advisers. Curzon argued that the agreement would serve both British and Persian interests.² To ensure passage, the British bribed the venal Persian ruler, Aḥmad Shah, and a number of leading politicians and 'ulama'.³ The agreement was signed on 9 August 1919, but required additional ratification by the parliament, or *majlis*, which had been disbanded four years earlier.⁴

The Anglo Persian Agreement set off intense political conflict within Iran that lasted twenty months, during which the premiership changed hands nine times. Nationalist and leftist forces in Azerbaijan, Gilan and Mazandaran led the challenge against the government, charging that the agreement was an imperialist design to reduce Iran to a vassal state.⁵ In Azerbaijan the Democrat Party proposed reconvening parliament and establishing a republic, and they renamed their province the Country of Freedom. In Gilan the Communist Party formed a Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran and in 1920 prepared to march into Tehran with a guerrilla force of some 1,500. Mutinies in the gendarmerie and the Cossack Division paralysed the government, which was unable to end incessant tribal warfare, control British forces in the south or block the Red Army in the north.⁶

In the midst of the government's inability to convene parliament to ratify the Anglo Persian Agreement, Colonel Reza Khan led some 3,000 men into Tehran on 21 February 1921.⁷ Reza Khan's action was approved by high ranking British officers and officials, who argued that Iran needed a military strongman.⁸ In particular, the British ambassador, Herman Norman, advised Aḥmad Shah to accede to the *coup d'état* leaders' demands as they were the 'absolute masters' of the situation.⁹ Upon his arrival, Reza Khan promptly arrested some sixty influential politicians, assuring the shah that he intended to protect the monarchy from revolution. He assumed the position of army commander and asked the shah to appoint Sayyid Ṣiya, a pro British reformer, as prime minister.¹⁰

Reza Khan and Ṣiya announced that the government would prevent national disintegration, end foreign occupation, implement social transformation and usher in an age of national revival. On the day of the coup Ṣiya

2 Richard H. Ullman, *The Anglo Soviet relations, 1917-1921* (Princeton, 1972) pp. 351-2.

3 Ghani, *Iran*, pp. 43-6, 54-7. 4 *Ibid.*, p. 49.

5 Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between two revolutions* (Princeton, 1982), p. 114.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 115-17. 7 Ullman, *Anglo Soviet relations*, p. 387.

8 Stephanie Cronin, *The army and the creation of the Pahlavi state in Iran, 1910-1926* (London, 1997), p. 86; Ghani, *Iran*, pp. 154, 158, 191-2.

9 Cronin, *The army*, p. 183. 10 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

declared that the adoption of the constitution fifteen years earlier had failed to bring about any changes, and that the ruling oligarchy still controlled the country's wealth as if it were their birthright. Ziya outlined an ambitious programme for development, while Reza Khan proclaimed martial law. He suspended all publications, gatherings and the right of assembly, and he closed down cinemas, gambling clubs, theatres, shops selling alcoholic beverages and government offices – except those distributing food.¹¹ Reza Khan used martial law to demobilise his opponents, and within a month he had jailed some 200 politicians and wealth holders.¹² The new government also quickly abrogated the Anglo Persian Agreement, declaring that the measure's real intent was to neutralise the Soviet Union and its domestic supporters. They signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union that cancelled Iran's debt to the tsarist regime, nullified all concessions granted to Russia in the previous century and guaranteed that Iran's territory would not be used to attack the Soviet Union, thus paving the way for the withdrawal of the Red Army from the north.¹³ Within five months the government also terminated the services of British officers.¹⁴

Reza Khan moved swiftly to consolidate his power against domestic rivals. With the shah's support, he ousted Ziya after three months and took charge of the Ministry of War. He solidified his position with Cossacks as the British departed, defeated the Jangali movement that controlled Gilan and Mazandaran, and quelled mutinies in Tabriz and Mashhad. Between 1922 and 1925 Reza Khan successfully defeated various rebellious tribes and brought them under government control. His army brutally destroyed tribal autonomy and resistance by hanging some men in each village and committing outrages upon the women.¹⁵ During this period Reza Khan threatened the parliament with force at least twice, and ended its independence by controlling elections.¹⁶ Appointed prime minister in October 1923, he mobilised his supporters behind the scene to abolish the monarchy. His short lived attempt to establish a republic in early 1924 failed in the face of conservative opposition; but in December 1925 he convened a constituent assembly that finally deposed Ahmad Shah's Qajar dynasty. In its place, Reza Khan installed the Pahlavi dynasty and became known as Reza Shah. He then proceeded to eliminate all autonomous power centres, including prominent opposition leaders, and subordinated civil society to

¹¹ Ghani, *Iran*, p. 200. ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹³ Ullman, *Anglo Soviet relations*, pp. 350, 391; Abrahamian, *Iran*, p. 118.

¹⁴ Cronin, *The army*, pp. 92–3. ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 212. ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

his military apparatus.¹⁷ He also repressed religious and linguistic minorities in the name of national unification.¹⁸ Reza Shah's secular orientation and policies adversely affected the interests of the 'ulama' and marginalised their political influence.¹⁹ During his rule repression reduced the prevalence of popular collective action, which had become prominent during the constitutional revolution.

With rising oil revenues, Reza Shah also promoted Iran's development. He undertook an ambitious programme to develop Iran's infrastructure and modernised Iran's legal and education systems, thus undermining the 'ulama' who had played leading roles in those institutions. He introduced mandatory elementary education and established the Tehran University in 1935. By 1941 he had sent 2,395 students abroad to study.²⁰ He improved the country's public health through compulsory vaccinations and the eradication of various diseases. In the social sphere, Reza Shah stressed greater equality, and in 1935 abolished titles. He extended citizenship and education rights to women, including Tehran University, which admitted women from its inception, and in 1936 abolished the Persian *chador*, or veil.²¹

Despite advances, Iran's development was highly uneven, as state policies benefited the wealthy. Reza Shah, who came from a small landowning family, became the country's largest landlord with personal estates estimated at 2,000 villages or parts by 1941.²² He acquired more than a hundred villages per year through legal and extra legal means.²³ His personal account in the National Bank increased from 100,000 tomans in 1930 to 68,000,000 tomans (equivalent to £3,000,000) by 1941.²⁴ In contrast, 95–98 per cent of the agrarian population owned no land at all.²⁵ Large landlords in the mid 1930s owned half of all land, as well as entire villages including the inhabitants.²⁶ Reza Shah also harshly repressed peasant rebellions. Upon assuming power he

17 Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of revolution: An interpretive history of modern Iran* (New Haven, 1981), pp. 93–4.

18 Abrahamian, *Iran*, p. 163.

19 Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and politics in contemporary Iran: Clergy-state relations in the Pahlavi period* (Albany, 1980), pp. 23–59.

20 Ghani, *Iran*, p. 399; J. Bharier, *Economic development in Iran* (London, 1971), pp. 172–3.

21 L. P. Elwell Sutton, 'Reza Shah the Great: Founder of the Pahlavi dynasty', in G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran under the Pahlavis* (Stanford, 1977), p. 34.

22 A. Lambton, *The Persian land reform* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 49–50.

23 E. Hooglund, *Land and revolution in Iran, 1960–1980* (Austin, 1981), p. 40.

24 Donald N. Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi: The resurrection and reconstruction of Iran* (New York, 1975), pp. 243–4.

25 Keddie, *Roots of revolution*, p. 103.

26 Overseas Consultants Inc., *Report on seven year development plan for the Plan Organization of the Imperial Government of Iran*, 5 vols. (New York, 1949), vol. III, p. 8.

arrested 800 labour activists and leftists, and forced many others underground. The government outlawed strikes and labour unions. Workers suffered from low wages and long working hours. The working classes and small producers paid a part of the cost of the development through high interest rates and indirect taxes on basic consumer items.²⁷

Although he withstood internal opposition and a major uprising in 1935, he was eventually toppled by the shifting international situation brought on by the Second World War. When the Soviet Union requested Britain's help against German forces, Churchill proposed transferring war supplies to the Soviets by way of Iran.²⁸ Although Iran declared neutrality when war broke out, Britain and the Allies objected to Reza Shah's pro German policies and the presence of several hundred German technicians in the country.²⁹ Britain's need to supply the Soviets against the Germans, together with its dependence on Iranian oil, led to invasion from the west and the south by the British and from the north by the Soviets, subsequently bolstered by 30,000 American troops. Within three days the Iranian army began to retreat, and soon collapsed. Three weeks later, without consulting the Allies, Reza Shah abdicated and left his dynasty in the hands of his twenty year old son, Mohammad Reza.

The departure of the autocratic ruler and the young, inexperienced monarch's accession to the throne reduced state repression, resulting in the release of more than 1,250 political prisoners. At the same time, harsh economic conditions produced by war and occupation created opportunities for various classes and groups to mobilise and act collectively, as leftist and pro Western political parties and publications expanded, encouraged by the Soviet Union and Britain. Political organisations in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan launched autonomy movements, and Azerbaijani socialists under the auspices of the Soviet Union established an autonomous republic that lasted for nearly a year. However, when the Soviet Union withdrew in May 1946 in the face of reported US threats to use nuclear force,³⁰ the Iranian army attacked secessionist forces in both provinces, crushing them by December.

The nationalist movement

The most important development following the Second World War was the nationalist movement opposed to foreign control of Iran's oil, as during the

²⁷ Keddie, *Roots of revolution*, pp. 102, 107.

²⁸ Amin Saikal, *The rise and fall of the shah* (Princeton, 1980), p. 25.

²⁹ Elwell Sutton, 'Reza Shah the Great', pp. 49–50. ³⁰ *Time*, 28 January 1980.

war the Americans, and later the Soviets, attempted to win oil concessions from Iran.³¹ Dr Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882–1967), a Western educated member of parliament, led the nationalist and liberal forces in 1949, and unified them under a single umbrella organisation called the National Front. The Front advocated independent economic and political development by means of Iran's own resources, most particularly oil. The Front also pressed to restrict the shah's political power, transform agrarian relations, expand political freedoms, grant electoral franchise to women and enact liberal press laws. Within a short time the movement attracted the support of the majority of the population. The Front's struggles culminated in the conflict against the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, the largest firm in the British Empire. To the British government, which owned 51 per cent of the oil company, cheap Iranian oil was an important economic asset. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin once noted that without Iran's oil, there would be 'no hope of our being able to achieve the standard of living at which we are aiming in Great Britain'.³²

Nationalists claimed that, despite an increase in royalties from 16 to 20 per cent of profits in 1933, Iran received considerably fewer royalties than the taxes paid by the oil company to the British government. They pointed out that royalty payments during the 1940s did not keep pace with increased oil extraction because of the oil company's higher British taxes to finance the war. Nationalists also charged that the company sold Iranian oil at a discount to both the British navy and to the United States to pay off Britain's war debt. Indeed, the Anglo Iranian Oil Company's pre tax profits of £124,680,000 for 1949 and 1950 alone surpassed the entire amount of royalties, £110,000,000, the company paid to Iran in the thirty eight years of its contract.³³ British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden later sympathised with the Iranian position: 'I understand their feelings, for it must seem to them ingenuous that His Majesty's Government, as a large shareholder, should take increasing sums in taxation, and refuse the increased dividends from which the Iranian government would have benefited'.³⁴

To increase its share of oil revenues, the Iranian parliament demanded in 1949 that Britain accept a fifty-fifty profit sharing arrangement on oil, similar to terms conceded by American firms to Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. The

31 Saikal, *Rise and fall*, p. 25.

32 Stephen Kinzer, *All the shah's men: An American coup and the roots of Middle East terror* (Hoboken, NJ, 2003), p. 68.

33 Mostafa Elm, *Oil, power and principle* (Syracuse, 1992), pp. 18, 38.

34 James A. Bill, *The eagle and the lion: The tragedy of American-Iranian relations* (New York, 1988), p. 63.

British rejected the demand, offering instead to raise royalties to 24 cents per barrel, along with a few other reforms. Although the shah favoured the British offer, many Iranians were not satisfied and called him a puppet of both America and Britain.³⁵ Faced with British rejection, the National Front demanded nationalisation of Iran's oil. Public protests broke out and oil workers went on strike to support the nationalisation bill. During a parliamentary debate, Mosaddegh agreed to become prime minister provided that parliament approved nationalisation. Both chambers unanimously approved the implementation bill on the same day and elected Mosaddegh as prime minister by a vote of seventy nine to twelve. Mosaddegh expelled British workers from the oilfields in September 1951, prompting Britain to decide to invade Iran. When President Truman opposed the invasion, Britain introduced a United Nations resolution to force Iran to denationalise the oil sector. Mosaddegh personally defended Iran's case before the UN Security Council, pointing out that although the Anglo Iranian Oil Company earned £61,000,000 in 1948, Iran received only £9,000,000 while £28,000,000 was paid to the British treasury.³⁶ In the end, the Security Council refused to endorse the British resolution.

Britain also took its case to the International Court of Justice, where Mosaddegh argued in June 1952 that the court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. When the court agreed with Iran's position, the British government appealed to the Truman administration to intervene and overthrow Mosaddegh. Once again Truman rejected the idea; but his policy shifted, refusing to provide economic assistance to Iran. The State Department even prevented a US firm from sending American technicians to run Iran's oil industry for fear of antagonising Britain.³⁷

Inside Iran, British agents also conspired to overthrow Mosaddegh through a *coup d'état*. When Mosaddegh discovered their plot, he closed down the British embassy in October 1952 and expelled the entire diplomatic mission.³⁸ Britain retaliated by imposing economic measures against Iran,³⁹ freezing Iran's sterling assets in London, banning the export of key British commodities to Iran, boycotting Iranian oil, and threatening to sue anyone who purchased oil from Iran. The boycott produced an economic crisis in Iran, paralysing the government to the point where it could not pay employees' salaries.

35 Ibid., pp. 52–3. 36 Kinzer, *All the shah's men*, p. 123. 37 Ibid., p. 115.
38 Ibid., p. 3. 39 Abrahamian, *Iran*, pp. 194–5; Kinzer, *All the shah's men*, p. 110.

Mosaddegh's policies also turned some segments of the population against him.⁴⁰ Conservative politicians and the royal court were antagonised in early 1951 when Mosaddegh dissolved the senate formed by the shah two years earlier under martial law. The landed upper class, the largest single bloc in the parliament, was adversely affected by two decrees instituting agrarian reforms⁴¹ and freeing peasants from forced labour on their landlords' estates. Powerful elements in the army were angered when Mosaddegh purged more than 130 officers, including 15 generals. Finally, prominent religious leaders, including parliament speaker Ayat Allah Kashani, and Ayat Allah Bihbahani, who was influential among the poor in south Tehran, were antagonised by Mosaddegh's liberal, secular policies and his defence of women's rights and religious freedoms.⁴² Ayat Allah Kashani had joined the National Front and actively supported the nationalisation of oil, but defected from Mosaddegh, stating that the prime minister had actually worsened Iran's economic situation. On one occasion he questioned Mosaddegh rhetorically: 'Our economy is bankrupt, our villages are destroyed, our sons have become communists, our schools have taken red colors. What are you doing?'⁴³

Despite some defections, opponents could not oust Mosaddegh because of the support of the vast majority of the urban population, including the middle and working classes, and especially bazaar merchants, shopkeepers and artisans, who formed the backbone of the nationalist movement. During the conflict between Mosaddegh and the shah, Tehran bazaaris demonstrated their support for the prime minister by closing down the bazaar on at least fifty occasions. The Society of Merchants, Guilds, and Artisans continued to back Mosaddegh even after most conservative '*ulama*' and politicians had broken with the National Front. The society published a statement in *Ettelaat* newspaper on 14 April 1953 condemning Mosaddegh's opponents and demanding passage of a bill preventing the shah from interfering in civil and military affairs. Two days later, large numbers of bazaaris demonstrated in favour of Mosaddegh.⁴⁴

Industrial workers and white collar employees also mobilised for collective action in support of Mosaddegh during these conflicts. Oil workers were active in the events leading to the nationalisation of oil. Urban and industrial workers in Tehran and other cities repeatedly joined pro Mosaddegh demonstrations and rallies during crucial political events, even when some '*ulama*'

40 Misagh Parsa, *Social origins of the Iranian revolution* (New Brunswick, 1989), p. 42.

41 Hooglund, *Land and revolution*, pp. 43–4.

42 R. W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh, 1964), p. 154.

43 Kayhan, 14 September 1953. 44 *New York Times*, 14 April 1953.

broke away from the prime minister. Industrial workers in Tehran and major urban centres joined oil workers on strike in Abadan, Kirmanshah, and Isfahan when Mosaddegh resigned in July 1952. Government employees in Tehran left their offices for political demonstrations supporting the prime minister on 21 July. The following year white collar employees demonstrated in April 1953 in support of a bill limiting the monarch's power,⁴⁵ and they joined workers everywhere in political rallies on 21 July 1953, commemorating the protests of the year before.

The strength of Mosaddegh's support was revealed in July 1952 when he threatened to resign if the shah did not cease illegally appointing the minister of defence and the head of the armed forces. When the shah did not respond, the prime minister made good on his threat and resigned on 16 July, stating: 'Under the present situation, it is not possible to bring the struggles initiated by the Iranian people to a victorious conclusion.'⁴⁶ The shah named as prime minister Ahmad Qavam, who opposed Mosaddegh's foreign policy and was endorsed by Britain and the United States.⁴⁷ This appointment was met by pro Mosaddegh popular strikes and large scale demonstrations in all major cities, which prompted the government to respond with a crackdown on 21 July that left scores of protesters dead or wounded. Shaken by the scale of popular movement, Qavam resigned and went into hiding, and the shah was forced to reappoint Mosaddegh.⁴⁸

The election of Eisenhower in the USA in November 1952 changed the situation. Mosaddegh attempted to gain the new American president's support by accusing the Anglo Iranian Oil Company of colonialism and the British government of seeking to regain its former position. Although the United States initially claimed neutrality and called for negotiations, it came down on Britain's side and refused to buy Iranian oil, citing public opposition in the absence of an oil settlement. Mosaddegh then requested American economic and technical assistance to develop Iran's other resources, but Eisenhower again insisted that Iran settle its dispute with Britain before marketing its oil. Eisenhower's position followed the views of American oil companies, which feared that Iranian oil nationalisation might produce similar outcomes in other countries.⁴⁹

With the Republicans' victory in the USA, the British changed their approach and emphasised communism in place of British interest in Iranian

45 Parsa, *Social origins*, pp. 133–6. 46 *Ettelaat*, 17 July 1952.

47 Abrahamian, *Iran*, p. 195. 48 Parsa, *Social origins*, pp. 42–3.

49 R. B. Stobaugh, 'The evolution of Iranian oil policy, 1925–1975', in Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran under the Pahlavis*, p. 210.

oil. A senior agent of the British Secret Intelligence Service, Christopher Montague Woodhouse, met with top CIA and State Department officials to make the case for US intervention. 'Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts out of fire, I decided to emphasise the Communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry. I argued that even if a settlement of the oil dispute could be negotiated with Musaddiq, which was doubtful, he was still incapable of resisting a coup d'état by the Tudeh Party, Iran's official Communist Party, if it were backed by the Soviet support. Therefore he must be removed.'⁵⁰

In March 1953 the Eisenhower administration approved a *coup d'état* to overthrow Mosaddegh. Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and a distant cousin of Franklin Roosevelt, was appointed 'field commander'. Roosevelt recruited General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who had trained the Iranian Imperial Gendarmerie as well as a secret security squad. The CIA had already assembled a clandestine network of politicians, military officers, clergy, newspaper editors and street gang leaders, paying them thousands of dollars per month to push the American agenda. A leading CIA propagandist, Richard Cottam, estimated that four fifths of Tehran's newspapers were under CIA influence.⁵¹ Once the decision was made to oust Mosaddegh, the Americans and British attempted to promote instability and resentment against the prime minister. Articles in the Iranian press claimed that Mosaddegh's ancestors were Jewish and that he might be homosexual. In the Western media he was portrayed at times as a communist and at other times as the cause of instability, which could benefit the communists. The British even arranged the kidnapping, torture and murder of Iran's chief of the national police, General Muḥammad Afshartu, in late April 1953, in the hope of provoking a coup.⁵²

To carry out the coup, Roosevelt arrived in Iran followed shortly by Schwarzkopf with millions of dollars to distribute among Iranian operatives.⁵³ They recruited segments of the military, a few 'ulama', a group of well known thugs and some prostitutes from southern Tehran's poor neighbourhood. The thugs, who worked closely with the CIA agents, had no political ideology and operated purely for economic gain. When two leading thugs expressed reluctance to continue the operation and a desire to withdraw, Roosevelt offered the simple choice of cooperating for \$50,000 or

50 Bill, *The eagle and the lion*, p. 86. 51 Kinzer, *All the shah's men*, p. 6.

52 Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 coup d'état in Iran', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19 (1987), p. 270.

53 Kinzer, *All the shah's men*, p. 8.

quitting and death. They decided to take the money and cooperate.⁵⁴ The Iranian operatives failed in their initial attempt at a coup on 16 August, and the shah, who had been very reluctant to remove Mosaddegh, fled the country. Despite Washington's orders to leave Iran, Roosevelt improvised a new plan that succeeded three days later in ousting the prime minister and reinstalling the shah.

Mosaddegh was overthrown during the Cold War, but the precise cause of the coup had little to do with communism. Although the Iranian Communist Party had become very powerful, it was not able to challenge the charismatic, popular prime minister. Moreover, the Soviet Union posed little or no actual threat to Iran after 1946 when it bowed to Truman's ultimatum to leave Iranian Azerbaijan and stay out of Iran's political affairs. Neither the British MI6, nor the CIA, nor the US secretary of state Dean Acheson believed at the time that communists presented a threat to the Iranian government.⁵⁵ As early as October 1951 Truman had told Mosaddegh that the USA would wage a world war if the Soviets took over Iran.⁵⁶ With Stalin's death in early March 1953, internal divisions in Russia prevented the communists from acting in Iran. The realisation that the Soviet Union was unable to intervene in Iran may have prompted the United States to move against Mosaddegh, as Eisenhower endorsed the coup plan after Stalin died.

The decision to overthrow Mosaddegh coincided with another decision that greatly benefited American oil corporations. In 1952 the Truman administration initiated a lawsuit against oil companies, which Eisenhower withdrew a year later.⁵⁷ Eisenhower was persuaded to drop the lawsuit by two members of his administration, Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, both partners in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which had been hired to defend the oil companies against the lawsuit. American oil companies also benefited substantially from the coup. After Mosaddegh's ouster, a consortium was established to handle Iran's oil industry. Britain lost its monopoly but retained 40 per cent of Iran's oil; five American oil companies received another 40 per cent; and two European companies were given 20 per cent. The non-British companies paid \$1,000,000,000 to the Anglo Iranian Company for their concession totalling 60 per cent. The consortium agreed

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 172.

⁵⁵ M. J. Gasiorowski, *US foreign policy and the shah: Building a client state in Iran* (Ithaca, 1991), p. 83; Abrahamian, *Iran*, p. 204; K. Roosevelt, *Countercoup* (New York, 1979), p. 88.

⁵⁶ Kinzer, *All the shah's men*, p. 129.

⁵⁷ J. Kwitny, *Endless enemies: The making of an unfriendly world* (New York, 1986) p. 162.

to share its profits with Iran on a fifty-fifty basis, but refused to open its books to Iranian auditors or include Iranians on its board of directors.⁵⁸ In the succeeding years the consortium's net profits were the highest in the region, averaging 69.3 per cent of its net assets.⁵⁹

Iranians did not experience democracy in the aftermath of the coup. Tehran was placed under martial law for four years until Iran's secret intelligence agency, the SAVAK, was established with the help of the CIA. Mosaddegh was sentenced to three years in prison and his foreign minister was executed. The former prime minister was then placed under house arrest and allowed visits only from relatives and a few close friends until his death in 1967. Dozens of communists were executed and even more were imprisoned, as many fled the country. The new prime minister was General Zahidi who, according to the US ambassador in Iran, Loy Henderson, was given \$2,000,000 to help carry out the coup.⁶⁰ Zahidi had been arrested as a Nazi collaborator by the British during the Second World War and exiled to Palestine. Now he became the new prime minister. The coup of 1953 weakened the liberal National Front and practically eliminated the Tudeh Party. Arguably, this intervention by the USA and Britain in the affairs of Iran held back the development of democracy and set the stage for the revolution of 1979.

The White Revolution

State policies and external factors set the stage for the next round of conflicts. Following the coup, the shah attempted to promote economic development as a means of expanding his support and assuring his political survival. However, the government's intensified efforts to expand development had the deleterious effect of boosting inflation and the cost of living. As oil revenues rose so did imports, while the necessity of repaying foreign loans created a trade imbalance and reduced foreign exchange to zero. On the advice of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank the Iranian government implemented a stabilisation programme in September 1959 which forbade luxury imported items, raised import tariffs on non-essential goods and restricted bank credit and the sale of foreign exchange. These policies raised interest rates and produced bazaar

58 Kinzer, *All the shah's men*, p. 196.

59 J. M. Blair, *The control of oil* (New York, 1976), p. 50.

60 M. Farmanfarmaian and R. Farmanfarmaian, *Blood and oil: Inside the shah's Iran* (New York, 1997), p. 300n.

bankruptcies and bank failures. Inflation combined with low salaries generated economic problems for the middle class and provoked labour strikes.

More importantly, American policy makers pressed for reform. In May 1961, shortly after taking office, the Kennedy administration offered to provide \$35,000,000 in aid to Iran in return for a number of reforms. In response to US pressure and growing internal conflicts, the shah appointed as prime minister 'Alī Amīnī, a relative of Mosaddegh and finance minister in his administration. Amīnī dissolved the newly elected parliament, allowed the National Front to resume public activities, exiled the head of the SAVAK, granted freedom of the press and appointed as minister of agriculture Ḥasan Arsanjani, a journalist with socialist views who had advocated land reform since the early 1940s.

Liberalisation in the context of an economic crisis set off popular mobilisation and collective action in many parts of the country. The second National Front revived its organisation and briefly mobilised bazaari and student supporters, although it was divided and could not pursue a coherent strategy towards Amīnī and the shah. In one action, the Front held a mass meeting in May 1961 at Jalaliyya Field in Tehran in which 80,000 people participated.

Threatened by popular mobilisation and Amīnī's positive postures towards the National Front, the shah moved against Amīnī and the National Front. On 21 January 1962 paratroopers attacked Tehran University students who were protesting against the expulsion of two high school students engaged in political activities. Many students were injured and the university chancellor, Dr Aḥmad Farhad, resigned his post in protest against the attack. Amīnī denied any role in the repression, and six months later he resigned in a dispute with the shah over military expenditure.

The shah's next prime minister was a close friend, Asad Allah 'Alam. 'Alam allowed Arsanjani to retain his post for another year as minister of agriculture, but the shah watered down the land reform, introduced new measures and repackaged his programme as the White Revolution, or the 'Revolution of the Shah and the People'. The six point programme comprised (1) agrarian reform; (2) nationalisation of pastures and forests; (3) public sale of state owned factories to finance land reform; (4) profit sharing in industry; (5) enfranchisement of women; and (6) establishment of a literacy corps. The shah called for a plebiscite scheduled for 26 January 1963 to approve the reforms. In response, the National Front opposed the shah's dictatorial approach and called for a protest strike. The bazaar closed for three days in advance of the plebiscite and the Front called for a demonstration the day

before the voting. The government banned the demonstrations and arrested some 400 Front leaders and many of their bazaari supporters.⁶¹

The '*ulama*' were divided in their response to the shah's reforms. Only a small minority who maintained ties to the government supported the reforms; they included Ayat Allah Mahdawi, Allama Wahidi, and the *imam jum'a* of Tehran.⁶² Most of the '*ulama*' opposed land reform, especially in Azerbaijan, Isfahan, and Kirman, where the '*ulama*' had large landholdings and stood to lose under the proposed reforms. Some '*ulama*' opposed the land reform because it meant confiscating land belonging to mosques and religious institutions. Other pre eminent clerics, including Ayat Allahs Shar'i at Madari and Muḥammad Rıza Golpaygani, regarded women's franchise as unacceptable, and they specifically asked the shah to withdraw this proposed reform. Still other clergy, including Ayat Allahs Ṭalaqani, Zanjani, and Maḥallati Shirazi, criticised the shah's dictatorship and the capitulation laws and instead advocated justice for the poor.

Ruḥ Allah Musawi Khomeini was among the pre eminent clerics, although relatively young and unknown in the early 1960s. His vociferous opposition to the shah and the proposed reforms soon made him well known. He condemned virtually all aspects of the White Revolution and their broader implications for Iran's place in the world. A central theme of Khomeini's attacks was his concern for the '*ulama*'s position and for Islam, both of which he believed to be threatened by the reforms. Khomeini rejected women's suffrage and equality as a Baha'i principle. He criticised land reform as leading to negative economic consequences. He denounced⁶³ Iran's economic penetration by Israel and the United States, the loss of Iranian markets and bankruptcies among farmers and bazaaaris. Most importantly, and a point which has been ignored in scholarly analyses, Khomeini was the only political or religious leader who actually called for the overthrow of the shah's regime at this time. In the months that followed, Khomeini repeatedly criticised the shah's regime, specifically its reforms, its violation of Islam and the constitution, and its economic policies.

In the context of an economic crisis and rising authoritarianism, many segments of the population were politicised. Popular protests erupted in May and June 1963 during Muḥarram, the Shi'i month of mourning. The mourning rituals provided a unique opportunity for the expression of political

61 H. E. Chehabi, *Iranian politics and religious modernism: The liberation movement of Iran under the shah and Khomeini* (Ithaca, 1990), p. 175.

62 Akhavi, *Religion and politics*, p. 103.

63 Ruhollah Khomeini, *Ṣaḥīfa yi Nur*, 16 vols. (Tehran, 1983), vol. I, p. 56.

opposition to the government. On 3 June 1963, during the central observance of Ashura, the processions were highly politicised, and marchers shouted anti shah slogans as they reached the Marble Palace.⁶⁴ Two days later, on 5 June, Khomeini was arrested along with a number of other 'ulama' throughout the country. Within a few hours popular protests erupted in Tehran, Qum, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz and Kashan, and lasted for three days. These protests were met by brutal repression which solidified the shah's power but severed the loose alliance between the monarch and the clergy forged since the beginning of his reign.

Organisational weaknesses prevented challengers from bringing about political change. All secular opposition groups including the Tudeh Party and the National Front had been weakened following the 1953 coup. Additionally, the absence of coalition formation among major segments of the population enabled the military forces to repress and eliminate the opposition for more than a decade. Furthermore, internal divisions and loss of national networks after the overthrow of Mosaddegh prevented the second National Front from mobilising broad segments of the population before and during the June protests.

The interests of several social groups were threatened by government policies, but not all of them were drawn into the protests of June 1963. Bazaaris, for example, were unorganised and did not respond in a unified fashion. Although shopkeepers and artisans actively protested against the government's actions, merchants refrained from open opposition. In a sample of 579 individuals arrested or killed in the protests, shopkeepers and artisans constituted the largest group, while only one was a merchant.⁶⁵ Once demonstrations turned violent and shots were fired, protesting bazaaris rapidly withdrew.⁶⁶ Outside the central bazaar, some shopkeepers did not join in the actions at all, and as a result their shops were smashed and even looted.

Other major social groups also stayed away from the protests. University students, with some individual exceptions, did not actively join the demonstrators, even though most opposed the shah's regime. Instead, they remained on the university campus and prominently displayed a banner that proclaimed, 'The murderous and bloodthirsty shah spills the blood of the people.' Students also shouted slogans against dictatorship and

64 Chehabi, *Iranian politics*, p. 175.

65 Mansoor Moaddel, 'The Shi'i ulama and the state in Iran', *Theory and Society*, 15 (1986), pp. 519–66.

66 Parsa, *Social origins*, p. 100.

supporting Prime Minister Mosaddegh.⁶⁷ Industrial workers, white collar employees and peasants also did not participate much in the uprising. No workers' strike or factory shutdown occurred anywhere in the country, and white collar employees showed up at their jobs without interruption. Likewise, teachers did not take part in the protests because they had mobilised earlier and won all their demands. Peasants from Varamin joined in the Tehran demonstrations, but elsewhere peasants were conspicuously absent from political action. Inactivity by these classes and groups prevented the opposition from consolidating their actions and facilitated the effectiveness of repression. Without a consolidated opposition, the uprising was quickly quashed, and the regime's opponents were dispersed.

Dictatorship and political realignment

The political and economic developments of the early 1960s led to a realignment within the system and set the stage for the conflicts of the 1970s. In the countryside, land reform reduced the power of the landed upper class and extended state control over the peasantry. At the same time, land reform created a new class of small landlords and eliminated landless labourers, pushing them to urban areas. Economic development over the decade generated a small group whose wealth was rooted in industrial financial interests as well as the military and state bureaucracy, providing the new basis of support for the state. These new supporters were highly dependent on the state and had little political power to press for democracy.

After the events of 1963 the shah dissolved the parliament and concentrated power in his own hands. He controlled all the major centres of power in the country, including the army, government bureaucracy, the cabinet, parliament and political parties. He appointed all the top officials of the government and approved all political candidates for office. Political parties were never able to operate independently. Furthermore, the shah personally made every important political and economic decision, including national planning. The government strictly controlled the press and other media. With the consolidation of exclusive rule, the shah relied increasingly on his coercive apparatus to maintain power. He forged a powerful army, and used the

⁶⁷ Misagh Parsa, 'Mosque of last resort: State reform and social conflict in the early 1960s', in John Foran (ed.), *A century of revolution: Social movements in Iran* (Minneapolis, 1994) p. 154.

SAVAK to carry out his plans and control the population. Together, these forces provided stability for the regime.

The shah's regime also expanded its control over religious establishments and undermined the position of the '*ulama*'.⁶⁸ Supported by the United States, robust oil revenues and a strong military, the state no longer relied on internal sources of support, thus bypassing the '*ulama*' and reducing their role in political affairs. Years later, during the revolutionary struggles, Ayat Allah Shari'at Madari complained that the shah's regime violated the historically established position of the '*ulama*' as intermediary between the government and people. During the following years, state policies undermined the status and influence of the '*ulama*' still further. As their economic position deteriorated in the 1970s and their religious donations declined, large segments of the '*ulama*' became dependent on the state for economic assistance. Even some of the highest ranking '*ulama*' requested financial help from the royal court.⁶⁹ The SAVAK and the prime minister's office distributed millions of dollars among some 15,000 '*ulama*'.⁷⁰ In 1977 the economic circumstances of thousands of '*ulama*' worsened when the government of Jamshid Amuzgar cancelled the \$35,000,000 spent by the prime minister's office in supporting them.⁷¹

Specific government policies adversely affected the '*ulama*'s position. One example was the Sazman i Awqaf, or the Endowments Organisation, created by the government to take charge of land donated by individuals to religious institutions. The organisation at times illegally appropriated and sold religious properties. These actions accelerated the decline of a number of mosques. According to official figures, 20,000 mosques existed in Iran in 1965; ten years later the Endowments Organisation reported only 9,015. Between 1960 and 1975 Tehran lost 9 out of a total of 32 theological schools.⁷² The regime closed three of the country's most important clerical *madrasas*, imprisoned several '*ulama*' and prohibited the few opposing '*ulama*' from giving sermons. In the educational sphere, government policies, combined with secularisation, progressively undermined the position of the '*ulama*'. Monthly stipends for students and teachers at religious *madrasas* were abolished and replaced by significantly smaller funds dispersed by the

68 Akhavi, *Religion and politics*, p. 117.

69 A. Alam, *The shah and I: The confidential diary of Iran's royal court, 1969-1977* (London, 1991), pp. 215-16.

70 *Iranshahr*, 24 December 1982.

71 A. Taheri, *The spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic revolution* (Bethesda, 1986), p. 214.

72 Akhavi, *Religion and politics*, p. 129.

Endowments Organisation.⁷³ The government further threatened to undermine traditional '*ulama*' practices by creating a Religious Corps in 1971, modelled after the Literacy Corps, to teach peasants 'true Islam'. Such state policies, combined with growing secularisation, contributed to a gradual decline in religious education.

The '*ulama*' also came under attack from some Islamic writers and intellectuals. Šadiqī Tihirānī, an '*alim*' who left the profession, published a book vehemently criticising the '*ulama*' for corruption, selfish materialism, ignorance and failure to involve themselves in politics. He accused some religious leaders and their families of lavishly consuming religious contributions.⁷⁴ He further blamed the '*ulama*' for the fact that most people, especially the youth, did not attend mosques and had moved away from religion.⁷⁵

The expansion of secular education reduced many Iranians' interest in traditional religion. In the years prior to the revolution the number of ceremonies held in mosques dwindled, along with mosque attendance and financial donations.⁷⁶ Conditions deteriorated so much that 'many religious students were attempting to complete secular high school at night, but many also merely drifted' away from religious study.⁷⁷ Even more importantly, as economic opportunities expanded in the public and private sector, a growing number of clerical students left their profession.⁷⁸

The '*ulama*' were increasingly aware of the population's declining commitment to religion, and at times criticised it. For example, during the revolutionary struggles a prominent '*alim*' in a special mourning ceremony held at the Azerbaijani Mosque in the Tehran bazaar stated: 'It has been a while that we have been asleep. Materialistic concerns filled our beings so much, and worldly, oppressive appearances looked so God like that we had forgotten about our mission, commitment, and all the messages. But sleep, how long?'⁷⁹ Ayat Allah Khomeini repeatedly denounced the cultural transformations taking place in the country. He declared, both before and after the revolution, that under the shah 'there was nothing left of Islam; there was only the name'.⁸⁰ 'Our culture had been imported from the West. This culture penetrated all aspects of Iranian life, detaching people from Islam.'⁸¹

73 Ibid., p. 140. 74 N. Tehrani, *Ranhanat Dar Shia* (Tehran, 1970), p. 99.

75 Ibid., pp. 81, 106. 76 *Kayhan International*, 21 October 1978.

77 M. Fischer, *Iran: From religious dispute to revolution* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 127.

78 Misagh Parsa, *States, ideologies, and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines* (Cambridge, 2000) p. 137.

79 Parsa, *Social origins*, p. 197. 80 *Jumhuri Eslami*, 25 December 1982.

81 *Ettelaat*, 20 December 1982.

Acknowledging a decline in the *'ulama'*'s prestige in intellectual circles, Khomeini pleaded with intellectuals and university students not to reject the *'ulama'*. 'If they do not have political education, you should embrace them and give them political education.'⁸²

The declining political position of the *'ulama'* was illustrated on 5 June 1975 in an event ignored by virtually all scholars of the Iranian revolution. More than 1,000 clerical students seized control of the Madrasa yi Fayziyyah at Qum and were joined by clerical students from the Madrasa yi Khan, an adjacent school. The timing and place of the rebellion were well chosen. The date was the twelfth anniversary of Ayat Allah Khomeini's 1963 arrest and the subsequent massacre of protesters. The Madrasa yi Fayziyyah at Qum was located near the shrine of Faṭīma, a pilgrimage site for Shī'ī Muslims from all over the country. The student protesters raised a red flag, symbol of Shī'ī martyrdom, high enough to be seen throughout the city of Qum. They also raised a banner that read 'We commemorate the anniversary of the great rebellion of Imam Khomeini', and broadcast tapes of Khomeini's fiery speeches against the shah. From exile in Iraq, Ayat Allah Khomeini himself endorsed the clerical students' protests. In a message of condolence to the Iranian people, he congratulated them for the 'dawn of freedom' and the elimination of imperialism and its 'dirty agents'. In his message, Khomeini noted that by the second day of the rebellion, forty five students had been killed, and that the government had refused the injured admission to Qum hospitals.⁸³ The student rebellion lasted three days and nights until it was finally crushed by several units of army commandos dispatched from Tehran. Dozens of students were killed and injured and more than 500 arrested.⁸⁴ More than a hundred were convicted and given prison sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years. The school itself was shut down by SAVAK and remained closed until the end of the shah's rule.

Although reported in the national press, this protest went completely unnoticed by the vast majority of the Iranian people. The response to the Qum rebellion was very limited. Clerical students in Mashhad also demonstrated against the government, and two *'ulama'* and approximately thirty students were arrested. In Tehran and Tabriz students protested against the repression of Qum clerical students. But no mourning ceremonies were held by the *'ulama'* or the public, and no bazaar closures occurred anywhere in the

82 Khomeini, *Ṣaḥīfa yi Nur*, vol. I, p. 434. 83 Ibid., p. 434.

84 These figures are taken from a written statement by students at the Madrasa yi Fayziyyah in Qum.

country. The failure of the rebellion confirms the weaknesses of the pro Khomeini clergy and the lack of a powerful Islamic movement ready to mobilise.

While state repression undermined the '*ulama*' and effectively eliminated the moderate opposition, dissident intellectuals and political activists developed alternative analyses and perspectives to remedy Iran's problems. Some intellectuals turned to Islam, including Murtaza Muṭaharī, Mahdī Bazargan and Abū'l Ḥasan Banī Šadr, who presented a modern interpretation of Islam that was compatible with Western democracy. While opposing the dictatorial aspects of the shah's regime, these intellectuals did not advocate a fundamental transformation of Iran's social structure, and often cooperated with liberal nationalist supporters of Mosaddegh.

A few Muslim dissidents rejected Western modernity in favour of alternative Islamic analyses. Jalal Al i Aḥmad abandoned Marxism, and in his *Westoxication* criticised Iranian intellectuals who were alienated from their own tradition and history. He criticised secular Iranian intellectuals for being isolated from the masses and ignorant of the traditional beliefs of the majority of the population. He concluded that intellectuals must form an alliance with the '*ulama*' to solve the country's problems through endogenous culture and values, and called for resistance against the hegemony of Western culture. Son of a well known '*alim*', Al i Aḥmad argued that intellectuals must reach out to the '*ulama*' and the '*ulama*' must abandon their conservative stances.⁸⁵ Sociologist 'Alī Shari'atī also turned to Islam to emancipate Iran from external domination and political repression. But unlike Al i Aḥmad, he borrowed a great deal from socialism. In fact, he criticised the traditional interpretation of Islam and charged that the Shī'ite clergy did not represent the true Islam. For centuries the '*ulama*' had betrayed the cause of Islam by legitimising the power of the rulers and the wealthy upper classes.⁸⁶ Shari'atī accused the '*ulama*' of obscurantism, ignorance and hypocrisy, which caused the flight of young Iranians towards Western ideologies and culture.⁸⁷ His criticism caused the youth, and even some clerical students, to refuse to follow the lead of the highest religious leaders in religious matters.⁸⁸ Shari'atī produced a socialist version of Islam,⁸⁹ and in a public lecture in 1970 compared Imam Ḥusayn to Che Guevara, the Argentine revolutionary Marxist. The government arrested 'Alī Shari'atī in 1972 and shut down the

85 M. Boroujerdi, *Iranian intellectuals and the West: The tormented triumph of nativism* (Syracuse, 1996), pp. 72–3.

86 Abrahamian, *Iran*, p. 113. 87 Boroujerdi, *Iranian intellectuals*, pp. 110–13.

88 Parsa, *States, ideologies, and social revolutions*, p. 137. 89 Abrahamian, *Iran*, p. 105.

Islamic centre, *Husayniyya yi Irshad*, where he had criticised both the ‘*ulama*’ and Marxism for three years.

Shari‘ati’s works heavily influenced the Islamic Mujahidin, an organisation that engaged in armed struggle to overthrow the regime. Mujahidin went even further in their analysis, accepted the Marxist materialist interpretation of history and proclaimed their goal of establishing a classless Islamic society. The Mujahidin were subjected to massive repression, with more than a hundred members arrested. A segment of the organisation split off in 1975 and replaced Islamic ideology with Marxism Leninism. Internal divisions and government repression eventually demobilised the Mujahidin in the years before the revolution. The organisation continues to oppose the Islamic Republic from outside the country, favouring a revolutionary change.

Other intellectuals turned to secular socialism, advocating a transformation in the state and class structure. The significance of leftist intellectuals was demonstrated in the autumn of 1977 when the Writers’ Association organised poetry nights in Tehran. During sixteen nights, sixty four poets and writers spoke and read their poetry. Some 66 per cent of the participants were secular socialist or Marxist, 28 per cent were liberal nationalist, and only 6.3 per cent followed some sort of Islamic ideology. The growing popularity of these events, which attracted thousands of students and intellectuals, led to government repression and the end of the poetry nights. Finally, some students and dissident intellectuals, who adopted variations of Marxism in the early 1960s, formed guerrilla organisations, and used armed struggle to overthrow the regime. Prominent among these was the Marxist Leninist *Fida’iyan*, whose attacks against government forces triggered severe repression and the loss of many of their members. This organisation had a definite influence on university students and segments of the urban, educated population through political opposition and armed struggles. In the end, however, the organisation was virtually paralysed by ideological divisions and repression, and had little impact on the popular uprising that led to the overthrow of the regime. The key to the shah’s downfall was not intellectual opposition, but rather the country’s political economy.

The 1979 revolution

Centralisation of power, rapid state intervention in capital accumulation in the 1970s and rising inequalities set the stage for political conflicts. State intervention expanded as the government became the nation’s single largest banker, industrialist, employer and landlord. This expansion was driven by

burgeoning oil revenues, which shot up nearly fourteen times, from 2,500 billion rials in 1954 to 37,177 billion rials in 1963. Twenty years later, revenues had swollen to 178,196 billion rials. Oil's share in the GDP jumped from 21 per cent in 1963 4 to nearly 52 per cent in 1972 3, and 77 per cent in 1977.⁹⁰ Despite a decline in 1977 8, oil revenues still accounted for more than 35 per cent of the country's GDP.⁹¹

State sponsored development produced very impressive results in economic growth. The GNP, which had risen by 8 per cent per year in the 1960s, rose by 14.2 per cent in 1972 3, 30.3 per cent in 1973 4, and 42 per cent in 1974 5. GNP per capita also rose from \$450 in 1972 to more than \$2,400 in 1978.⁹² Although increased revenues generated an impressive record of economic development, they also produced economic disparities, largely due to state development policies. Government policies favoured the interests of large, modern manufacturing and ignored the small, traditional sector, which employed more than two thirds of the urban industrial workforce. Committed to capital accumulation, the state repressed and demobilised the labour movement, banned strikes and reduced workers' capacity for collective bargaining. State development strategy also ignored the plight of the agricultural sector and the rural population. These economic policies, combined with corruption and cronyism, increased the uneven distribution of income in Iran and enabled the royal family to become the wealthiest in the country, owning and controlling a big portion of the modern sector.⁹³ The Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, was higher in Iran in 1969 70 than any country in the Middle East, South East Asia or Western Europe, and equalled or exceeded Latin American countries for which data were available.⁹⁴ The share of household expenditure of the top 20 per cent of urban households rose from 52 to 56 per cent between 1959 and 1974, while the household expenditure of the bottom 40 per cent declined from 14 to 11 per cent.⁹⁵

Increased oil income in the first half of the 1970s proved a mixed blessing because the oil industry's rapid growth was not matched by expansion in other economic sectors. A crisis of revenue absorption led to consumer price inflation, which the state attempted to curb by lifting tariffs to encourage

90 Bank Markazi Iran, *Bank Markazi of Iran: Annual report and balance sheet* (Tehran, 1978), pp. 94 5.

91 Parsa, *States, ideologies, and social revolutions*, p. 56.

92 F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and development* (Harmondsworth, 1979), p. 138.

93 Parsa, *States, ideologies, and social revolutions*, p. 68. 94 Parsa, *Social origins*, p. 81.

95 T. Walton, 'Economic development and revolutionary upheavals in Iran', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 4 (1980), p. 283.

imports and imposing price controls and an 'anti profiteering' campaign. Prices of 16,000 items were rolled back in August 1975 to January 1974 levels, which negatively affected retail markets. Two years later inflation was still high, forcing the government to act more decisively. By 1977 a new prime minister brought on an economic recession by reducing government expenditures, scrapping ambitious state projects still in the planning stages, restricting access to bank credits⁹⁶ and continuing the anti profiteering campaign. In addition, the government imposed controls on urban land dealings and speculation, which had flourished during the oil boom.

These problems were compounded by the fact that the state and economy had become highly dependent on oil, but revenues did not expand as anticipated. A worldwide recession coupled with a mild European winter in 1975 and only a modest increase in OPEC oil prices soon diminished Iranian oil revenues. By December 1975 oil production was running 20 per cent below the previous year, squeezing state sponsored projects and financial needs. As income continued to decline, state expenditures exceeded revenues. The deficit for 1976 was 37.6 billion rials. It ballooned to 388.5 billion rials the following year⁹⁷ and to 550.2 billion rials in 1978.⁹⁸ The government responded by raising taxes on public corporations and the self employed⁹⁹ and borrowing funds from abroad.

Declining oil revenues affected the entire economy and society. The GDP, which had grown by 17.2 per cent in 1976, suddenly sank to -1.3 in 1977 and then plummeted to -11.9 in 1978. The production of large manufacturing firms declined, as did the value of industrial and non oil exports.¹⁰⁰ Carpet exports, the largest non oil export, declined by 13 per cent in both value and volume in 1977. The largest cotton textile mills had difficulty maintaining operations.¹⁰¹ Shortages of funds and electricity, along with slowed industrial production, provoked worker layoffs. In Tehran alone, tens of thousands of private housing projects were halted by lack of capital and construction materials.¹⁰² Combined with mounting economic inequalities, the recession adversely affected broad segments of the population and set the stage for the emergence of social conflicts.

96 *Ettelaat*, 23 and 29 August 1977.

97 Bank Markazi Iran, *Annual report* (Tehran, 1977), p. 139.

98 International Monetary Fund, *Government finance statistics yearbook* (Washington, DC, 1981), p. 429.

99 *Kayhan*, 1 and 23 February 1977.

100 Bank Markazi Iran, *Annual report* (Tehran, 1977), pp. 111, 152.

101 M. Moaddel, *Class, politics, and ideology in the Iranian revolution* (New York, 1993), p. 120.

102 *Ettelaat*, 16 November 1977.

External pressures in the mid 1970s introduced an element of vulnerability into the political situation. Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the UN affiliated International League for Human Rights began to expose human rights violations in Iran. Amnesty International accused Iran of being one of the world's 'worst violators of human rights'. More importantly, Jimmy Carter singled out Iran in the 1976 US presidential campaign as a country where human rights had been violated.¹⁰³ American congressmen began to question the wisdom of selling so much weaponry to a regime where power resided solely in one man.

Although the Carter administration did not really press Iran to introduce major political changes,¹⁰⁴ the shah, dependent on US support, initiated small policy changes in the government's treatment of political opponents. In March 1977 the government released 256 political prisoners, and in May permitted the International Red Cross to visit political prisoners. The government also legalised civilian trials for political opponents who criticised the government.

Prompted by the reduction of repression, leftist and secular moderate political groups were quick to mobilise for collective action. Students, who had been alone in the forefront of political struggles throughout the 1970s, stepped up collective action against the regime in the autumn of 1977. They were the first social group to call for the overthrow of the regime. The student movement had become radicalised the decade before, and generally supported the armed struggle waged by the Marxist Fida'iyān and the Mujahidīn, who advocated Islamic socialism.¹⁰⁵ Primarily leftist, these students did not demand the formation of an Islamic republic, although a minority of less active students did support Ayat Allah Khomeini. Defunct organisations such as the National Front and the Writers' Association revived by early June 1977, and published statements demanding political freedom and reform.

Bazaaris, adversely affected by the economic downturn and government's anti profiteering campaign, soon joined the struggles against the regime. Concentrated in the historical business district of Tehran, bazaari activists who had once supported Mosaddegh's National Front illegally revived the merchant guild and engaged in a number of collective actions against the shah. Bazaaris' mobilisation through their trading networks was soon

¹⁰³ Abrahamian, *Iran*, pp. 498–500.

¹⁰⁴ W. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York, 1981), pp. 19–20.

¹⁰⁵ Misagh Parsa, 'Iranian students and the revolutionary struggles', in B. Hourcade (ed.), *Iran questions et connaissances*, vol. III: *Cultures et sociétés contemporaines* (Paris, 2003).

repressed by the regime, forcing them to mobilise through mosques, which provided some protection from attacks. Bazaaris participated in the mosque led forty day cycles of mourning and shut down their businesses in more and more cities to protest at the killing of demonstrators. These actions clearly contrasted with their earlier lack of support in June 1975 for student '*ulama*' protesting on the twelfth anniversary of the 1963 uprising.¹⁰⁶

The '*ulama*' were not in a position to lead the struggle at the initial stage of the conflict. Instead, most of them had become depoliticised as a result of the repression following the 1963 uprising. The highest echelons of the '*ulama*' eschewed collective action, and instead pursued a moderate line through quiet diplomacy. Nevertheless, under pressure from the public this moderate faction of the '*ulama*' was instrumental in opening the mosques for the cycles of mourning ceremonies that continued until the autumn of 1978. Khomeini was surprised by the inaction of the '*ulama*'. In a statement he encouraged them to mobilise, saying that others had already begun mobilising and that they, too, should write and protest.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, the collective actions of students and secular political organisations encouraged the minority of politicised clerics to mobilise against the government.

Workers and white collar employees were not active in political conflicts until after the struggles were already well under way. The industrial working class took no part in the cycles of mourning ceremonies during which bazaaris shut down their shops. Workers' delayed mobilisation was an indication that their interests, conflicts and resources differed significantly from those of other classes. Workers mobilised for collective action at the end of the summer of 1978 when the sustained protests organised mainly through the mosques forced the regime to proclaim greater reforms and liberalisation. Workers, who perceived no benefits in the proposed reforms, seized the opportunity and began to mobilise and demand change. Workers with previous experience in strikes and imprisonment used their informal networks, formed secret cells and committees with trusted co workers, and launched strikes.¹⁰⁸ White collar employees, mainly in the public sector, soon joined the strikes with economic and job related demands. As employees of the state, these workers faced similar problems and grievances and confronted a common enemy. Once they entered the fray, industrial workers directly targeted their employer the state for attack.

¹⁰⁶ Parsa, *Social origins*, p. 100.

¹⁰⁷ Khomeini, *Şahıfa yi Nur*, vol. I, p. 437.

¹⁰⁸ A. Bayat, *Workers and revolution in Iran* (London, 1987), p. 91.

Initial demands by workers were mainly economic and lacked political grievances. All strikers demanded higher wages, and most also insisted on allowances or loans for housing expenses and medical insurance. Many complained of pay inequities, especially in sectors where foreign workers were employed. Some protested against arbitrary promotion rules and secret 'rewards' by heads of bureaucracies. As the number and scale of strikes burgeoned, the regime initially responded on a national level and proceeded with concessions, rather than repression. Thus the government announced on 10 October that salaries of all state employees would be raised by 25 per cent in two stages.¹⁰⁹ Five days later the state promised housing loans to 20,000 government employees.¹¹⁰ Workers' responses varied. While some returned to their jobs, others complained that although they had been on strike for days, the authorities had not even investigated their grievances. Most strikers were dissatisfied with the state's concessions, which they regarded as insufficient compared to many demands for salary increases, from 50 to 100 per cent.

As strikes continued, economic issues gave way to political demands, notably by segments of the working classes that were more concentrated in large state enterprises and possessed greater skills and solidarity structures. Some striking oil workers, for example, demanded the expulsion of various department chiefs, while other oil workers demanded freedom for all political prisoners, the dissolution of SAVAK, lifting of martial law, dissolution of government sponsored unions, the formation of independent labour unions and freedom for all political parties. Although workers were becoming increasingly political, their demands were neither Islamic nor revolutionary in nature. They were not clamouring to overthrow the state, nor were they calling for the formation of an Islamic republic. Nevertheless, within the Iranian context, workers' demands for changes were radical.

In response to spiralling social conflicts, the shah returned to a policy of repression on 6 November 1978, and appointed a military government. The army occupied all strategic institutions, including oil installations, radio and television stations, and newspapers, which had just successfully concluded a strike. With some exceptions, most strikers went back to work. But bazaaris responded to military rule by initiating unprecedented, protracted shutdowns in major cities and disrupting trade, which electrified the conflicts. Before the imposition of a military government, approximately seventy cities had

¹⁰⁹ *Ettelaat*, 10 October 1978.

¹¹⁰ *Ettelaat*, 15 October 1978.

experienced some form of collective action. Shortly after the imposition of military government roughly a hundred additional cities were rocked by anti government collective action. Strike committees sprang up everywhere to coordinate strike activities and demand political change.

Oil workers played an important role in the final stage of the conflicts. Their strikes had a distinctly different impact in part because they controlled the nation's most vital economic asset. They also shared certain characteristics which increased the likelihood that their actions would become politicised. Oil workers numbered more than 30,000 and were heavily concentrated in specific oil producing regions, which added to their ability to communicate, mobilise and act collectively. Oil workers' strikes in the early 1950s had produced a core of political experience and awareness that they controlled the state's primary source of revenue. As they rapidly became more militant in the autumn of 1978, their politicisation and conflicts mobilised other workers. In late November oil workers announced their intention to establish a national oil workers' organisation to coordinate strikes and prevent their collapse. Once such an organisation was formed, they quickly walked out again on 2 December, announcing that they would fight until victory, by which they meant the overthrow of the government. Their intention to remove the shah was echoed eight days later in a large march on Ashura during Muharram, the Shi'a mourning month, when a broad coalition of opposition forces demanded the ousting of the monarchy.

Strikes and bazaar closings soon disrupted all social and economic activities, paralysing the government. At the end of December workers representing twenty three state ministries and private sector organisations formed a central council to coordinate the strikes. The council rejected any compromise with Prime Minister Bakhtiyar, who they claimed represented 'imperialism and dictatorship', and instead they formally recognised Khomeini as leader of the people's 'anti imperialist, anti despotic' movement. The next day, 3 February 1979, parliamentary employees went on strike, followed by employees in the prime minister's office. These state employees declared their solidarity with the popular struggles and denounced violence and bloodshed by the government.¹¹¹ Employees of eleven other government ministries announced on 7 February that they would obey only the government nominated by Khomeini. The shah left Iran on 16 January, and two weeks later Khomeini returned. A broad coalition created a revolutionary situation, destabilised the armed forces, and eventually ousted the monarchy.

¹¹¹ *Kayhan*, 4 February 1979.

As the narrative demonstrates, the initial political openings did not instantly produce popular mobilisation by major classes and collectivities. Because they had different interests, solidarities and vulnerabilities, their propensities towards revolutionary action differed, and they entered the struggles at different times with specific demands before finally coming together in a broad revolutionary coalition. Thus, it is important to note that ideological explanations of the Iranian revolution that spring from a single causal variable are inadequate to explain the causes, timing and processes that comprise revolutions and hence cannot do justice to the complexities of revolutionary conflicts and struggles.¹¹²

Consolidation of power

As secular challengers were repressed and divisions prevented liberal and leftist organisations from forming coalitions, the mosque emerged as the single institution through which the monarchy's opponents could mobilise. But Ayat Allah Khomeini's rise to the position of the revolution's paramount leader was due primarily to political rather than ideological reasons. Perhaps because he sought to forge a broad coalition, Khomeini never spoke publicly to the Iranian people about his radical, theocratic ideology. While in exile in Iraq he instructed his 'ulama' supporters in late 1977 to respect and work with students and intellectuals: 'Tomorrow we will not become government ministers; our work is different. These are the ones who become ministers and representatives.'¹¹³ Later in France he characterised his own role, as he had done in the past, as merely that of a guide to the people.¹¹⁴ In fact, Khomeini's statements reflected the basic tenets of the liberal nationalist movement – specifically, freedom from dictatorship and imperialism and an end to pillaging the country's national resources. Beyond these nationalist demands, he condemned the government's violation of Islamic principles. He steadfastly maintained that an Islamic government would guarantee national independence and provide political freedom for all Iranians. In the final weeks of the revolutionary conflicts, Khomeini repeatedly declared that independence and freedom would be the essence of any Islamic republic.¹¹⁵ From Paris he hinted that in an Islamic republic even Marxists would be free to express themselves. Women, too, would be free 'to govern their fate and choose their

112 Misagh Parsa, 'Conflicts and collective action in the Iranian revolution: A quantitative analysis', *Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis*, 20, 2 (2004), pp. 39–57.

113 Khomeini, *Šaḥīfā yi Nur*, vol. I, p. 436. 114 *Ayandegan*, 10 January 1979.

115 Khomeini, *Šaḥīfā yi Nur*, vol. IV, p. 252.

activities'. The shah's dictatorial regime reduced women to objects of consumption, he asserted, while Islam opposed such treatment of women.¹¹⁶ Khomeini received popular backing because of his opposition to dictatorship and his defence of freedom and national interests, but his theocratic ideology was unknown to the majority of Iranians.

However, the Islamic Republic that Khomeini eventually constructed, and which was established in the constitution approved by referendum in December 1979, was a theocracy that restricted freedom and popular sovereignty. The highest power in this system rested with the *wilayat i faqih*, or jurist's guardianship, often referred to as the 'supreme leader'. Although in 1998 the Guardian Council ruled that non '*ulama*' could indeed become candidates for the position, they also ruled that such candidates must have a high standard of religious expertise, thus effectively disqualifying all non '*ulama*'. The supreme leader was chosen by the Assembly of Experts, which theoretically could remove him, but in reality he was appointed for life and accountable to no one. According to Article 110 of the constitution, the supreme leader had the power to veto all government decisions, and could even dismiss the president, who was elected by the people. Although the people voted to elect the Assembly of Experts, the president and the *majlis* (parliament), their choices were always restricted and limited by the power of the Guardian Council, which determined who could run for office. The Guardian Council itself was not a democratically elected body. It was composed of twelve members, half of whom were '*ulama*' and the other half 'Muslim' jurists. The supreme leader appointed half of its '*ulama*' members, and the other half was elected by the *majlis* from among the 'Muslim lawyers' nominated by the head of the judiciary, who was also appointed by the supreme leader. The supreme leader also appointed members of the Expediency Council, which was constitutionally charged with resolving disputes between the *majlis* and the Guardian Council.

The supreme leader had widespread powers under the constitution. He had a staff of some 600 and appointed some 2,000 representatives to all state ministries and institutions, enabling him to supervise and control the executive branch. As the commander in chief of all armed forces, he had the ability to declare war. The supreme leader also effectively controlled the country's powerful institutions, including the military, national police, judiciary, Ministries of Intelligence and Information, Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, or 'mobilisation', a sizeable paramilitary force. The supreme leader also

116 *Ayandegan*, 17 January 1979.

controlled dissident ‘*ulama*’ through his Special Clerical Court, which after the revolution executed dozens of clerics and defrocked and punished thousands of others. In addition to state resources, the supreme leader controlled the Mozrasafan Foundation, with assets amounting to about \$12 billion, using them as a source of funds for the clergy. In effect, the supreme leader and the ruling clergy exerted a great deal of power over economy, politics and society.

The formation of the theocratic regime generated a great deal of conflict. Khomeini and his supporters succeeded in maintaining power and eliminating coalition partners and challengers because of complex factors and processes. Amid rising domestic disagreements, Khomeini took advantage of external conflicts such as the 4 November 1979–20 January 1981 hostage crisis and the September 1980–August 1988 Iraq war to ban worker strikes, repress dissidents and discredit opponents. Khomeini and his supporters quickly monopolised the media and the mosques, brushing aside their opponents and thereby blocking other social groups from using the media or mobilising through mosques. By directly appointing Friday prayer leaders, they ensured that dissident clerics would not control the mosques. As a result, mosques, which had become the most important location for pre-revolutionary mobilisation, were closed to dissidents in the Islamic Republic.

Khomeini also met the growing strength of the left, both secular and religious, by introducing new ideological elements into his platform. He shifted from his pre-revolutionary focus on national independence and freedom from dictatorship to a resolute concentration on social justice. He stated repeatedly that Islam served the interests of the *moustaz’afin*, the oppressed and deprived, noting that the feast of the oppressed is when the oppressors are eliminated.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, he noted that the Islamic Republic was established to serve the interests of the *moustaz’afin*. To attract working class support, Khomeini sounded even more radical than Marx when he declared on May Day 1979: ‘Every day should be considered Workers’ Day for labor is the source of all things, even of heaven and hell as well as of the atom particle.’¹¹⁸ This ideological shift was significant in solidifying the Islamic Republic’s survival and the clergy’s supremacy. Khomeini also pressured the government to adopt policies favouring the lower socio-economic classes. He ordered the provisional government to expropriate Pahlavi

¹¹⁷ Khomeini, *Şahıfa yi Nur*, vol. IX, p. 246.

¹¹⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Los Angeles, 1993), p. 71.

dynasty assets and convert them to housing and employment opportunities for the poor. He opened a bank account and asked people to contribute money to build housing for the poor, and ordered the provisional government to provide free water and electricity for the poor who had been deprived during the monarchy.¹¹⁹

As Khomeini adopted leftist tenets, the Islamic Republic also relied increasingly on repression to demobilise the opposition. Although Khomeini had repeatedly praised students' struggles throughout the 1970s, after the revolution he targeted the universities as a bastion of imperialism and launched a 'cultural revolution', to reorient them. As students abandoned support for the Islamic regime and backed worker and peasant councils and women's rights, Khomeini and his allies began violent attacks on them. In the spring of 1980 dozens of students were killed in such attacks. In an unprecedented move, all colleges were closed down for at least two years, and thousands of students were expelled from universities. Soon afterwards all universities and government offices were purged, and independent workers' councils were outlawed. Harsh repression followed the removal of President Banī Šadr in 1981. Between the summers of 1981 and 1985 approximately 12,000 opponents of the state were either executed or killed in armed struggle.¹²⁰ In the summer of 1988 the government again executed thousands of political prisoners.¹²¹ Indeed, repression was the secret to the consolidation of power in the Islamic Republic.

Post-Khomeini divisions and failure of reforms

Yet the '*ulama*' and their allies who seized power did not actually share the same ideological perspective. Although these divisions were somewhat contained while Khomeini was alive, his death in June 1989, along with deepening social and economic crises in the 1990s, intensified antagonism in the polity. Two loosely defined factions emerged with different perspectives on social, economic, political and cultural issues, although some did not fit exactly either group. The relatively conservative Jami'a yi Ruḥaniyyat i Mubārīz (Society of combatant clergy) favoured expanding market forces and reducing state intervention in the economy and state subsidies. They were allied with the conservative Hay at Ha yi Mu atalefeh yi Islami

119 Khomeini, *Šahīfa yi Nur*, vol. V, p. 120.

120 Parsa, *States, ideologies, and social revolution*, p. 250.

121 Ervand Abrahamian, *Tortured confessions: Prisons and public recantations in modern Iran* (Berkeley, 1999), p. 215.

(Coalition of Islamic associations), which represented a wealthy segment of bazaar merchants. In contrast, the leftist *Anjuman i Ruḥā n i Mubārīz* (Association of combatant clergies) advocated state control of the economy, egalitarian distribution of wealth and income, and opposed normalising relations with the West.

In the early 1990s conservatives launched an assault against their opponents. Shortly before the 1992 parliamentary elections the Guardian Council disqualified many of the leading candidates of the radical faction that had dominated the parliament for the first thirteen years. Under protests, it reinstated many of the disqualified candidates, but they could not overcome the situation as the conservative faction won all twenty eight seats in Tehran, eliminating the radicals. With full control of the major centres of power and threatened by the wave of democratisation around the world, the conservatives also renewed repression of secular dissidents. During Hashimi Rafsanjani's two terms as president (August 1989–August 1997) more than eighty dissidents were murdered or simply disappeared. The government also passed a law in 1996 that criminalised dissent. The law authorised the death penalty for offences such as attacking the security of the state and insulting the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic and the memory of Imam Khomeini. Those found guilty of 'propaganda against the Islamic Regime' faced up to one year in jail.

Government policies soon came under criticism, however. The mayor of Tehran, Karbaschi, published a newspaper, *Hamshahrī*, that openly criticised the conservatives. In a daring move in November 1994, 134 leading writers signed a famous declaration against censorship. Journalists soon joined in and criticised shortcomings in the country. Islamic intellectuals such as 'Abd al Karim Surush, a former ally of the clergy, began advocating reforms and separation of religion and politics. University students openly discussed political reforms and democratisation. The Association of Islamic Students called on President Rafsanjani in 1996 to guarantee free speech and free elections for the next parliament and the presidency.

Leading members of the radical '*ulama*' who were excluded from the 1992 parliamentary elections moderated their positions in advance of new elections. They moved away from supporting state intervention in the economy, and instead emphasised political reforms, the rule of law and the strengthening of civil society. These '*ulama*' attracted a diverse coalition of moderate technocrats and leftist Islamic intellectuals who also shifted their position in support of economic and political reforms. In response to calls for reforms, President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ayat Allah Khamani's

declared that the 1997 presidential elections would be free and fair. These announcements in turn encouraged students, youth and women throughout the country to participate.

The presence of a presidential candidate of the previously radical faction who had been excluded from the government in the early 1990s mobilised a large number of people. Muḥammad Khatamī, one of four candidates approved by the Guardian Council, entered the race reluctantly after no other viable opposition candidate surfaced to receive permission from Khamanī¹. Khatamī, a mid ranking cleric, had been a member of the radical clerical faction that advocated egalitarian distribution of economic resources through state intervention in the economy. He briefly led a publishing house and was elected to the first parliament after the revolution. Appointed minister of Islamic guidance and culture in 1982, he earned a national reputation for easing restrictions on films, music, art and literature. With the ascendancy of the conservatives he was forced to resign in 1992, and was banished to the National Library in Tehran, where he faded from public view. Although Khatamī accepted the basic foundations of the theocratic regime and condemned those who would favour changing the constitution, he advocated the rule of law, tolerance for opposing views, freedom of the press and the creation of a civil society. He argued for a more democratic system in which people could determine the political process, unlike conservatives who claimed that people must obey divine rules as dictated by the supreme leader.

Khatamī's promise of reform appealed to youth, students and women, all of whom mobilised and voted for social and political change. The voter turnout was high, with 91 per cent of the electorate participating, and Khatamī won the presidency with 69 per cent of the vote against 'Alī Akbar Naṭīq Nūrī, a mid level cleric and the powerful speaker of the parliament, who had been endorsed by the religious establishment, the pro government faction of the bazaar merchants, government controlled media, Basij militia and the Anṣār i Hizb Allah.

True to his promise, Khatamī's government licensed more than 740 new publications, newspapers and magazines that advocated reform and civil liberties. More importantly, his reduction of repression in the context of rising income inequalities and corruption mobilised segments of the population to demand reforms. Once again, students played a leading role in challenging the conservatives' power. As early as November 1997 a group of students organised a rally calling for the popular election of a leader for the country with curtailed powers. Students at Tehran University demonstrated

in support of democratisation in March 1998, shouting slogans such as: 'One country, one government, determined by the vote of the people.' When in July 1999 Tehran University students were attacked while protesting against press censorship, large scale demonstrations erupted for six days and spread to universities throughout the country. Angry students in Tehran shouted radical slogans against Iran's supreme leader, Ayat Allah 'Alī Khamanī'¹²². 'Commander in chief resign!' and 'Down with the dictator!' they chanted.¹²³ They attacked the very foundation of the Islamic Republic: 'The people are miserable, the clerics are acting like gods!'¹²³ 'No more phoney parliaments!'¹²⁴ Across the country, students organised protests and published dozens of statements condemning repression and expressing solidarity with Tehran University students. Despite the fact that many social groups and organisations issued statements of support and sympathy with them, conservatives eventually silenced the students by widespread arrests and imprisonment.

Students protested on a large scale again in June 2003 against a proposed policy of privatisation of some universities. Student protests soon spread from Tehran to other cities. More importantly, ordinary people also joined the students to protest against the regime. The slogans clearly demonstrated that students opposed the entire Islamic regime. Their slogans were among the most extreme heard since the revolutionary struggles. In particular, protestors chanted very harsh slogans against the supreme leader, Ayat Allah Khamanī', even though simple criticism of the leader is punished by imprisonment. 'Khamenei, the traitor, must be hanged!' they chanted. 'Death to dictators!' 'The clerical regime is nearing its end!' others shouted. 'The nation is destitute, the *mullas* act like God!' 'Dictator, shame on you, give up power!'

Khatamī could not put an end to the repression, torture and murder of dissidents, including Daryush Furuhar, former minister of labour, and his wife, Parvinah, and Kazim Samī', a former minister of health in Mahdī Bazargan's transitional government. During Khatamī's eight year presidency, hardliners closed more than 200 newspapers¹²⁵ and imprisoned a number of leading journalists. Reporters Sans Frontières described Iran as the 'world's biggest prison for journalists'.¹²⁶ In 2003 more than fifty journalists were arrested, and an Iranian born Canadian journalist died in government custody due to a brain haemorrhage resulting from beatings.¹²⁷

¹²² *New York Times*, 15 July 1999. ¹²³ *New York Times*, 14 July 1999.

¹²⁴ *The Times*, 18 July 1999. ¹²⁵ *Washington Post*, 15 February 2004.

¹²⁶ *Financial Times*, 30 May 2001. ¹²⁷ *New York Times*, 16 July 2003.

In the context of the US invasion of Iraq, conservatives targeted the reformists in the parliament. The Guardian Council disqualified more than 2,500 reform candidates for the parliamentary elections of 2004, nearly 40 per cent, including more than eighty incumbents, for being insufficiently committed to the constitution of the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader.¹²⁸ In response, more than 600 reformist candidates whose qualifications had been approved withdrew in protest, and 120 of the deputies, or more than one third of the parliament, resigned their posts in protest.¹²⁹ Many groups including academics, intellectuals, students and reformist parties boycotted the elections. The voter turnout of 50.6 per cent of the electorate was the lowest since the 1979 revolution, and well below the 67 per cent in 2000. In Tehran the rate was 28.1 per cent. Conservatives won at least 149 of the 290 seats, sweeping out reformers, who had occupied 210 of the 290 seats in the previous parliament. Some ninety of the new deputies had backgrounds in various military and revolutionary institutions. An extremist conservative also won the presidency in the 2005 elections, and thus put an end to the reform control of the government. Although extremists did not win many seats in the 2006 local elections, reformists could not gain control.

Clearly, the Islamic Republic has been unable to put an end to the intense political conflicts unleashed during the Iranian revolution. The regime managed to repress the protests of students and teachers, and disparate regional grievances and disputes over the past decade. Yet continued economic difficulties, rising disparities, political exclusion and ideological conflicts render the Islamic Republic vulnerable to challenge. The decline in the power of the reform movement and formation of a conservative government backed by perhaps only 10 to 15 per cent of the population may in the end further the cause of genuine democracy and fundamental changes in the Islamic Republic. Indeed, evidence points to the growing radicalisation of the youth and intellectuals. The largest faction in the student movement has given up hope of reform, calling instead for fundamental transformation of the Islamic Republic.

In sum, over the twentieth century powerful internal and external forces blocked the rise of democracy in Iran. Growing oil revenues, combined with external backing, provided material support for the state in repressing the challengers and denying democratic rights to the people. The cause of democracy was further betrayed when the monarchy was replaced by a

¹²⁸ *New York Times*, 15 February 2004.

¹²⁹ *New York Times*, 2 February 2004.

theocracy and rule by a faction of the '*ulama*'. A reform movement challenged the supremacy of the conservatives in recent years, but failed to change the basic nature of the Islamic Republic. Although today conservative factions seem to be in complete control of the state apparatus, there are signs of further radicalisation of segments of the reform movement. Government policies and global changes have reawakened democratic forces in Iran, setting in motion a dynamic whose outcome has yet to reach its climax.

Central Asia and the Caucasus from the First World War

MURIEL ATKIN

The indigenous peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus underwent profound changes from the First World War to the early twenty first century. They experienced wars and revolutions. The states in which they lived broke apart, reassembled in a different way, and broke apart again. Their perceptions of who they were, what they believed and what would best serve their interests were in some ways quite different from what they had been in earlier times. Yet they were not completely divorced from what they had inherited from earlier generations, even if they might reinterpret their past in a way that would have surprised their ancestors.

The First World War

Although Central Asia was far from the main battlefields of the First World War, the region's inhabitants were affected by the conflict, first in the form of an uprising against a military draft, then in the form of famine. Late in the war, conflict spread across the southern Caucasus to the territory that would become Azerbaijan.

Wartime demands imposed heavy burdens on many inhabitants throughout the Russian empire. For Central Asians these took the form primarily of increased taxation and the requisitioning of livestock and carts as Russia's transport system neared collapse. That caused considerable hardship, especially for those peoples whose livelihood centred on animal husbandry. For the Kazakhs the problems were compounded by Russian officials' seizure of Kazakh lands and bad weather, which took an additional toll on their herds.¹ Until the war, the Russian government had regarded Central Asians and Muslim Caucasians as too alien to be suitable for service in the tsar's army. As

¹ S. Sabol, *Russian colonization and the genesis of Kazak national consciousness* (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 136.

the war dragged on, Russia's need for manpower became so acute that the government decided in 1916 to draft a quarter of a million of these peoples to perform various support functions on the home front. This, on top of the accumulated grievances of the region's inhabitants, sparked attacks on government officials and Russian settlers. The conflict was most extensive and prolonged in the Kazakh and northern Kyrgyz lands, where fighting lasted until the end of 1916 and, in some places, later. The tsar's forces reacted with often indiscriminate violence against Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes; they also armed Russian settlers to fight the tribesmen. This led to a spiral of attacks and counter attacks. Perhaps one third of the Kazakhs died in the conflict and another 300,000 fled to China, where they encountered additional hardships.²

After the fighting subsided, Central Asians faced a new crisis: famine. To the bad weather and loss of livestock was added the disruption of the grain deliveries from elsewhere in the empire, on which the Central Asians depended; the war emergency and the chaos following the fall of the monarchy meant that far too little grain reached the region to sustain the population. The result was a famine that began in 1917 and lasted until 1920 in the southern parts of Central Asia, and until 1922 in the Kazakh lands. In parts of the region Russian soldiers and settlers seized grain from Central Asians or withheld such supplies as were delivered. Diseases also claimed the lives of malnourished inhabitants. The number of Central Asians who died in the famine is estimated at between one and three million.³

In the final months of the First World War the southern Caucasus was a bone of contention between the Ottoman and British empires (the Russian empire having collapsed by then). As the Ottomans launched a drive across the Caucasus in 1918, the non Communist members of the Baku soviet, which was the nearest thing to a government in the city, turned to the British for help via Iran. A small contingent of British troops under Major General Lionel Dunsterville reached Baku in August 1918, but withdrew the following month. The Ottoman capture of Baku in September was followed by a massacre of thousands of Armenians there in reprisal for a massacre of Muslims a few months earlier. The Ottomans began an advance north from Baku along the Caspian coast, but that was cut short when the Ottoman government surrendered to the Entente powers in October 1918. According

2 Ibid., pp. 137–8; A. Khalid, *The politics of Muslim cultural reform* (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 240–1.

3 R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, rev. edn (Cambridge, MA, 1970), p. 174.

to the terms of the armistice British troops returned to occupy Baku, and remained there from November 1918 to August 1919.⁴

Long before the war ended the Russian monarchy fell (February 1917), and was replaced by a provisional government. It was beset by crises, and had little control over Central Asia or the Caucasus. In places where Russian settlers and soldiers were concentrated, notably in Tashkent and Baku, they established revolutionary assemblies, soviets. In Central Asia the soviets were hostile towards the indigenous population.⁵ The two partially autonomous Russian protectorates in Central Asia, the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva, avoided all but nominal reforms in 1917.⁶

Central Asians formed their own organisations in several cities in the province of Turkestan; each had its own political colouration, from conservative to reformist, with Jadidists active in the latter. Sharp disagreements between conservative religious figures and reformers embittered relations between the two during 1917. The First Turkestan Muslim Congress, which met in Tashkent in April 1917, contained representatives of the full spectrum of opinion. Its members disagreed on some issues but agreed on a few key points, especially autonomy for Turkestan within a reformed Russia.⁷

Some Central Asians reacted against the hostility of the Tashkent soviet by attempting to form their own government for Turkestan in Kokand in the Fergana Valley late in 1917. Supporters of this self declared autonomous government of Turkestan included Jadidists and other reformers, sedentary indigenous peoples, Kazakhs, and some anti Bolshevik Russians and Jews who lived in the valley. The Kokand government was a weak body, with few supporters or funds and no army.⁸ Further south west, an assembly of representatives of the Turkmen tribes proclaimed a new government and sought to cooperate with the aspiring government in Kokand.⁹

The situation on the southern side of the Caucasus bore a general resemblance to that in Turkestan at the fall of the monarchy. One significant difference was that the Baku soviet included indigenous peoples as well as Russians. An Armenian party, the Dashnaktsutun, was active in the Baku soviet along with members of Russia wide parties, especially the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, which numbered some

4 A. Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks* (Stanford, 1992), pp. 85 6, 91 2, 96; T. Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan* (New York, 1995), pp. 73, 75 6.

5 M. B. Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford, 1987), p. 142; Khalid, *Politics*, p. 251.

6 Khalid, *Politics*, pp. 294 5. 7 Ibid., pp. 248 50, 255 9, 263 4, 267 9.

8 Ibid., pp. 265 79; E. A. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks* (Stanford, 1990), p. 179.

9 A. Edgar, *Tribal nation* (Princeton, 2004), pp. 35 6.

Caucasians among their membership. Two Turkic Muslim parties, the nationalist Musavat and the socialist Hümmeet, managed to participate in the Baku soviet, albeit only occasionally and in the face of resistance by the other parties. Other indigenous Turkic people participated in the Baku soviet as Bolsheviks. A second centre of Turkic political activity lay further west, in the town of Ganjä.¹⁰

During 1917 Muslim peoples from various parts of the Russian empire sought a way to join forces to advance their interests. The All Russian Muslim Congress was revived in May in Moscow. Azerbaijani and Central Asian representatives agreed in calling for the transformation of the Russian state along federal lines. Other representatives, especially Volga Tatars, disagreed with this approach and controlled the congress at its second meeting, in July. Turkestanis did not participate on that occasion. Kazakhs did not support the congress, in part because they did not see it as addressing their needs and in part because they saw it as controlled by Tatars, whose influence in the Kazakh lands they resented.¹¹ Attempts to make reforms through the moribund provisional government or the constituent assembly elected in December 1917 were rendered moot by the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917.

Civil war

The future of Central Asia and the Caucasus after the fall of the tsarist regime was to be decided by force. Late in October 1917, shortly before the Bolsheviks took control of the Russian capital, a coalition of Bolsheviks and the breakaway left wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries seized power in Tashkent. They excluded Central Asians from participation, on the grounds that they lacked a proletariat. In February 1918 soldiers of the Tashkent soviet turned against the would be government in Kokand. They captured the town and massacred its inhabitants. At about the same time the Tashkent soviet overthrew the new Turkmen government, although the Soviet authorities' harsh policies towards the Turkmens soon provoked an uprising which drove them from power.¹²

Widespread uprisings by Central Asians against Soviet rule began in 1918. They reached their height in 1919, then declined into the early 1920s. The

¹⁰ Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 78–9, 81, 86.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 81; Khalid, *Politics*, p. 266; Pipes, *Formation*, pp. 76–8.

¹² Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 35–6; Khalid, *Politics*, pp. 273–4, 279.

Bolsheviks labelled their opponents *basmachi*, a derogatory term meaning 'bandit'. The anti Bolshevik fighters did not use that term for themselves. There was not one coordinated movement, nor did they have common goals, apart from opposition to the new Soviet regime. Long standing conflicts between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzes in the Ferghana Valley and Turkmens and Uzbeks in Khiva continued during the civil war. The forces formed separate bands under leaders acting on their own. Bukhara's emir, Alim Khan, tried unsuccessfully to exert overall leadership. The person who came closest to playing that role was not a Central Asian but Enver Paşa, the former Ottoman minister of war. In 1921 the Kremlin sent him to Central Asia to have him persuade the inhabitants to support the revolutionary regime. Once he reached the area he switched sides. Although several groups rallied to his banner at first, he soon antagonised the leaders of various armed bands. At the same time their own pre existing rivalries resurfaced. Enver died in a clash with Soviet forces near the eastern Bukharan town of Dushanbe in 1922. In Turkmen territory, a group of Socialist Revolutionaries attempted to seize power and sought aid from the British in fighting the Bolsheviks. General Sir Wilfrid Maleson led a contingent which arrived there in August 1918 but withdrew by April 1919. There were some Turkmens fighting on each side in the civil war, but many others tried to avoid the conflict and the depredations of both sides on non combatants.¹³

In the Kazakh lands a group of educated, reformist Kazakhs formed a political party, Alash Orda, in 1917. Aware of the weakness of its own position, it sought alliances with one group after another, including the provisional government and Russia's Western oriented Constitutional Democrats. The Bolshevik Revolution prompted Alash Orda to declare Kazakh autonomy in December 1917, but the Alash Orda government remained weak, given its inability to win popular support through land reform, the antagonism among Kazakh tribal confederations and the lingering effects of the famine. A short lived alliance with anti Bolshevik White forces operating in the area foundered on the Whites' Russian nationalism and their plunder raids on Kazakhs. This drove Alash Orda into an alliance with the Bolsheviks at the end of 1918.¹⁴

By 1919 the Bolsheviks' successes on other fronts in the civil war enabled them to divert more forces to Central Asia. The Red Army controlled most of

13 M. B. Olcott, 'The Basmachi or Freeman's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-1924', *Soviet Studies*, 33 (1981), pp. 354-6, 359, 364; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 36-7, 39; Khalid, *Politics*, pp. 285-6.

14 Sabol, *Russian colonization*, pp. 139, 141-3, 147-9.

the Kazakh lands as well as Tashkent by the end of 1919. It took Khiva and most of Bukhara in 1920. Those two principalities then became the 'people's republics' of Khwarazm and Bukhara.¹⁵ The Soviet regime controlled most of Central Asia by 1922, although fighting lasted a few years longer in some less accessible locations.

The north eastern Caucasus saw inter ethnic and intra ethnic conflicts, involving Chechens and other indigenous peoples, Russians and Cossacks, during the civil war. As was the case in Central Asia, White forces in the north Caucasian lowlands antagonised indigenous peoples and thus ensured that they would not make common cause with the Whites against the Red Army. By the end of the conflict the Bolsheviks were able to reach an accommodation with various local warlords.¹⁶

In Azerbaijan the nationalist Musavat Party declared the creation of an independent state, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, in the spring of 1918; Georgia and Armenia also declared their independence at that time. Azerbaijanis living in Iran took umbrage at their northern neighbours' appropriation of the name 'Azerbaijan', which, in the opinion of the Turkic political figures on the Iranian side of the border, did not properly apply to the people on the northern side.¹⁷ The Azerbaijani government's experience under Ottoman occupation dampened considerably the appeal of pan Turkic solidarity. The Ottomans denied the existence of a distinct Azerbaijani Turkish identity and halted reforms. The Red Army took Baku in April 1920 and made Azerbaijan a Soviet republic;¹⁸ it took Armenia in late 1920 and Georgia in early 1921.

Administrative reorganisation along ethnic lines

The newly established Bolshevik regime did not immediately attempt a bold reorganisation of the Central Asian or Caucasian territories it claimed. Moscow used a congeries of improvised territorial administrative categories as it regained control of various parts of the former Russian empire. After the civil war the leadership in Moscow began to reorganise the country's administrative structure. Lenin insisted that the Soviet regime's interests would best be served by reassuring the non Russians that it would acknowledge the

15 S. Keller, *To Moscow, not Mecca* (Westport, CT, 2001), pp. 43, 45–6.

16 Pipes, *Formation*, pp. 196–8, 214–16, 223–4.

17 T. Atabaki, *Azerbaijan*, 2nd edn (London, 2000), p. 25.

18 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 94–6, 109; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 91–4.

country's ethnic diversity in ways the old regime had not, including as regards the structure of the state.¹⁹

The process of defining nationalities and the territories to be associated with them raised a host of difficulties in Central Asia, where national identity had not previously been politically salient. Ordinary inhabitants were more likely to identify themselves in terms of tribe or locale of residence and as Muslims. The existence of a number of dialects of related Turkic languages as well as areas where inhabitants were likely to be bilingual in a Turkic language and Tajik (Central Asian Persian) blurred the distinctions among peoples. Some Central Asians, especially Kazakhs and some Uzbek Jadidists who had joined the Communist Party, objected to the reorganisation of the region along ethno territorial lines. They favoured the creation of one regionally defined administrative entity, Turkistan, instead.²⁰

In the initial structure of the Soviet Union in 1924, Kazakhstan became an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics (RSFSR). The Turkestan ASSR of 1922 encompassed most of the rest of Central Asia except for the People's Republics of Bukhara and Khwarazm. Late in 1924 it was subdivided into the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR, or union republic), which also included most of Bukhara and Khwarazm as well as the Tajik ASSR, the Turkmen SSR, which also received parts of Bukhara and Khwarazm, and the Kara Kirgiz (i.e., Kyrgyz) Autonomous Province, which became part of the RSFSR. The borders were redrawn several times and autonomous entities raised to union republics, Tajikistan in 1929, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1936.²¹

The Soviets organised the multi ethnic northern Caucasus initially into two geographically named administrative units within the RSFSR. It let one, the Daghistan ('mountain land') ASSR, remain when the Soviet Union was formed in 1924, but subdivided the other into six autonomous provinces, each named for one or more ethnic groups, including the Chechens.²²

The situation in the southern Caucasus was anomalous, in that the Kremlin had to balance its own desire to see the region as one economic and political entity with the claims of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia to be

19 Y. Slezkine, 'The USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism', *Slavic Review*, 53 (1994), pp. 420–3.

20 Ibid., pp. 427–9; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 47, 48, 57.

21 M. B. Olcott, 'Kazakhstan: Pushing for Eurasia', in I. Bremmer and R. Taras (eds.), *New states, new politics* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 551; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 50, 57–8, 68.

22 J. Ormrod, 'The North Caucasus: Confederation in conflict', in Bremmer and Taras (eds.), *New states*, p. 97.

separate, independent states since 1918. Moscow therefore allowed the three separate administrative structures to remain while creating an additional layer of administration for the entire region. This evolved through several stages into the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.²³ This federation was abolished in 1936, when the three components each became union republics.

The designation of officially recognised nationalities and the apportioning of territory were problematical. For example, Moscow decided to apply the name 'Uzbek' to the sedentary, non tribal, Turkic speaking inhabitants of southern Central Asia even though most of them were descended from people who had been living in the region long before the arrival of the Uzbek tribes in the sixteenth century.²⁴ In several of the main river valleys and cities of southern Central Asia, the people the Soviets labelled Uzbeks and the Persian speaking Tajiks had lived in close contact for centuries, influencing each other's languages and culture and intermarrying. How to determine who was an Uzbek and who a Tajik and even whether Tajiks constituted a distinct ethnic group were highly controversial subjects as well as a matter of some confusion to the people being asked to specify their nationality.²⁵ The Kremlin decided that Tashkent, a city with a large Uzbek (as well as Russian) population surrounded by countryside with a large Kazakh population, should become part of Uzbekistan, although Kazakhstan also claimed it.²⁶

The definition of ethnic groups and the borders of ethnically defined territories were not permanent, but were changed many times. For example, land was reassigned from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan when the latter was elevated to a union republic in 1929. The separate territories for Chechens and neighbouring Ingushes were merged into a single autonomous province in 1934.²⁷

Although the administrative units in the Caucasus and Central Asia bore ethnic names (except for Daghestan), none of these entities was ethnically homogeneous. They contained members of nationalities from neighbouring republics, smaller ethnic groups with or without autonomous administrative

23 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 114 16, 119 21, 128; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 107 8.

24 Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, pp. 33, 36 9, 42 3, 177; Khalid, *Politics*, pp. 188, 205 8.

25 Khalid, *Politics*, p. 189; T. Martin, *The affirmative action empire* (Ithaca, 2001), pp. 71 2; R. Masov, *Istoriia topornogo razdeleniia* (Dushanbe, 1991); M. Atkin, 'Religious, national, and other identities in Central Asia', in J. A. Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia* (Durham, NC, 1992), pp. 49 50; M. E. Subtelny, 'The symbiosis of Turk and Tajik', in B. F. Manz (ed.), *Central Asia in historical perspective* (Boulder, 1994), p. 54.

26 Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, p. 200. 27 Martin, *Affirmative action*, p. 409.

status, and members of nationalities from other regions of the Soviet Union, including Russians and Ukrainians. After a bitter dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the early 1920s for control of the Karabagh area, with its predominantly Armenian population, Moscow decided to create an entity called Nagornyi Karabagh ('mountainous Karabagh') as an autonomous province within Azerbaijan. That did not resolve the dispute, which culminated in a war in the 1990s.²⁸

The population of Central Asia and the Caucasus became even more ethnically diverse under Soviet rule. Centrally directed industrial development in the 1930s led to an influx of non indigenous peoples to Central Asia, Chechnia and Azerbaijan. The relocation of some manufacturing capacity to Central Asia as a security measure during the Second World War added to the ethnic mixture in the region. Hundreds of thousands of people left European parts of the Soviet Union for Central Asia to escape the fighting. The mass movement of people eastward was compounded by the deportation of Chechens and other nationalities on suspicion of pro German collaboration during the war. Thousands of Koreans were deported from the easternmost parts of the Soviet Union to Central Asia during the war because of Moscow's doubts about their loyalty, too.²⁹ In Kazakhstan the combination of the influx of people from elsewhere in the USSR and the sharp decrease in the number of Kazakhs during the collectivisation of agriculture in the early 1930s left Kazakhs a minority in the republic from then until the end of the Soviet Union's existence.³⁰

Recruitment of non-Russians

The same concerns that prompted Moscow to create ethnically defined republics also led it to recruit non Russians into the Communist Party and the state administration.³¹ This policy was known as *korenizatsiia* (indigenisation.) Members of Azerbaijan's socialist Hümmet Party were rapidly incorporated into the Communist Party. Some members of the Musavat Party also joined. A few Azerbaijanis had joined the Bolsheviks years before the start of

28 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 125–6; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 106–7.

29 G. Simon, *Nationalism and policy toward the nationalities in the Soviet Union*, trans. K. Forster and O. Forster (Boulder, 1991), pp. 119, 124, 126, 179, 189, 200; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p. 189; Olcott, 'Kazakhstan: Pushing for Eurasia', p. 547; J. Hughes, 'Chechnya: The causes of a protracted post Soviet conflict', *Civil Wars*, 4 (2001), pp. 21–2.

30 Olcott, 'Kazakhstan: Pushing for Eurasia', p. 547; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, pp. 179, 200.

31 Slezkine, 'The USSR as a communal apartment', pp. 434–5.

korenizatsiia.³² The experiences of the revolution and civil war persuaded many Jadidists and members of Alash Orda as well as some other proponents of modernisation that they were not strong enough to accomplish the changes they sought by themselves. The Communists were the only allies available. Other educated people of middle or upper class origins as well as people of lower social status also joined the party.³³ Many in the first generation of Central Asians and Azerbaijanis who joined the Communist Party fell foul of its leadership for a host of reasons, including suspicions of nationalism and disputes over the collectivisation of agriculture. They were removed from office in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and killed in the late 1930s.³⁴ From the purges until the post Stalin era, the eponymous nationalities in Azerbaijan and most of Central Asia constituted a minority of the membership in the republic level Communist Parties.³⁵

National in form, socialist in content

Soviet policy towards the non Russians in the early 1920s also applied to cultural matters. The policy was described by the slogan 'national in form, socialist in content', meaning that the most effective way to instil the views of the new regime in the non Russians was to communicate with them in terms they could understand. Related to this was the decision to seek a rapprochement with the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union by halting, for a few years, the radically anti Islamic measures implemented during the revolution and civil war. The new Bolshevik regime had tried to ban *shari'a* courts, confiscate *waqfs* and abolish *maktabs*. Its ability to enforce such measures in the borderlands varied, though some local officials were particularly severe in imposing the new order. That was the case in Turkestan, where the policy towards Islam included the desecration of mosques and killing of religious figures.³⁶

32 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 65, 96, 132; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 90 1, 111.

33 Sabol, *Russian colonization*, pp. 148 9; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, pp. 154 5; A. Khalid, 'Backwardness and the quest for civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in comparative perspective', *Slavic Review*, 65 (2006), pp. 239, 241; Khalid, *Politics*, pp. 288 9.

34 Khalid, 'Backwardness', p. 242; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 126 7; Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 131 4, 141, 148 50; Martin, *Affirmative action*, pp. 359, 376 7; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, pp. 216 20; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 75, 104, 124 8; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, pp. 31 4, 38, 40, 80 1, 87, 161 2, 165; Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, p. 228 9.

35 Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, pp. 31 4, 38, 40, 165.

36 T. S. Saidbaev, *Islam i obshchestvo*, 2nd rev. edn (Moscow, 1984), pp. 142 3; A. Bennigsen and C. Lemerier Quelquejay, *L'Islam en Union Soviétique* (Paris, 1968), p. 146.

This policy included defining national languages for the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus, selecting which dialects should form the basis of the standardised languages, reducing the size of the Arabic and Persian vocabulary, and encouraging differences between the Soviet versions of these languages and related ones outside the Soviet Union.³⁷ The alphabets were changed as well. Adoption of the Latin alphabet had been advocated by some reformers among Turkic peoples since the nineteenth century. The Azerbaijanis took the lead in the switch to the Latin alphabet in the Soviet Union. Moscow endorsed the idea, so the main Central Asian languages followed suit by 1929.³⁸ However, by the early 1930s Moscow's enthusiasm for the Latin alphabet began to wane. Officials no longer saw the Russian language or Cyrillic alphabet as stigmatised by association with the tsarist empire; instead, Russian had become the language of the revolution. By 1939 the Turkic languages of the Soviet Union and Tajik had adopted Cyrillic alphabets. However, they did not use a single version of Cyrillic, with the same additional symbols to represent sounds in their languages not present in Russian. This made it more difficult for a member of one Turkic nationality to read printed matter in another Turkic language.³⁹ Along with the change of alphabets came a heightened emphasis on the teaching of Russian in non-Russian schools. Through the end of the Soviet era, a knowledge of Russian was essential for career advancement.⁴⁰

The alphabet changes also reduced the various Muslim peoples' access to their literary heritage. Few books in the Arabic alphabet survived the ravages of time and Soviet book burning in the inter war years. Soviet publishing policy meant that major works of literature in Persian or the Turkic languages were rarely published in Cyrillic alphabet editions.⁴¹

Cultural policies, begun in the 1920s and continuing to the end of the Soviet era, led to the creation of newspapers, magazines and, eventually, film studios, radio and television that used local languages as well as Russian.

37 Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 132, 134, 149, 53, 162; B. Comrie, *The languages of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 48; Slezkine, 'The USSR as a communal apartment', p. 431; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, p. 45; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, p. 126.

38 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, p. 124; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, p. 139; Martin, *Affirmative action*, pp. 185, 7, 191, 193, 5.

39 J. Perry, 'Script and scripture: The three alphabets of Tajik Persian, 1927–1997', *Journal of Central Asian Studies*, 2, 1 (1997), pp. 5, 8–10; Martin, *Affirmative action*, pp. 202, 416–17.

40 Martin, *Affirmative action*, p. 457; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, p. 97; A. M. Khazanov, 'Underdevelopment and ethnic relations in Central Asia', in Manz (ed.), *Central Asia in historical perspective*, pp. 144–5.

41 M. Atkin, 'Tajiks and the Persian world', in Manz (ed.), *Central Asia in historical perspective*, p. 130.

Ethnographic museums and folkloric performance troupes provided officially sanctioned versions of the culture of the Central Asian and Caucasian peoples.

The content of a nationality's culture was subject to Soviet control. The selection of a canonical heritage from past centuries was a delicate process, given both Moscow's constraints and the fact that culture had not previously been defined in national terms.⁴² The waves of terror in the 1930s decimated the ranks of Central Asian and Azerbaijani cultural figures.⁴³

The spread of state controlled education in indigenous languages in Central Asia and the Muslim parts of the Caucasus was a slow process. The early 1930s saw a concerted effort to bring primary education in local languages to the peoples of Central Asia and others Moscow deemed backward. This did produce a substantial increase in the number of people enrolled in the lowest grades, but few Central Asian children had any further education. The implementation of universal primary education and the attainment of near universal adult literacy were achievements of the Khrushchev era.⁴⁴

The transformation of society

In the late 1920s the Kremlin under Joseph Stalin launched initiatives designed to transform the Soviet Union along socialist lines. This affected many aspects of life of all inhabitants of the USSR. It was felt with the greatest immediacy by the predominantly rural, indigenous populations of Central Asia and the Caucasus through the collectivisation of agriculture. For those peoples whose way of life was nomadic, this also entailed sedentarisation.

Although collectivisation caused terrible hardships for agricultural communities throughout the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs were the nationality that suffered the heaviest losses proportionally. They responded to forced grain requisitioning by destroying existing grain supplies and planting less. They killed or sold their herds of animals. Bad weather compounded the losses, as

42 Slezkine, 'The USSR as a communal apartment', pp. 446–7, 450; A. Khalid, 'A secular Islam: Nation, state, and religion in Uzbekistan', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 35 (2003), p. 579; Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, pp. 222–31; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, p. 173.

43 Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p. 196; Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 148–50; Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 126–7; Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, p. 228; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, p. 88.

44 Martin, *Affirmative action*, pp. 77–8; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p. 194; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, pp. 49, 54, 266–8.

did the inept implementation of collectivisation.⁴⁵ The loss of human life was also immense. The primary causes of death were hunger and illness, but fighting between Kazakhs and the authorities, and occasionally between different groups of Kazakhs, also took a toll. Perhaps 1.5 million Kazakhs lost their lives. Thousands more fled to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan or China.⁴⁶ Members of nationalities living further south in Central Asia fled to Afghanistan.⁴⁷ Violent opposition to collectivisation was widespread, not only among Kazakhs, but also elsewhere in Central Asia and in Azerbaijan.⁴⁸

Collectivisation was accompanied by an increased emphasis on cotton, which had long been cultivated in Azerbaijan and parts of Central Asia. From collectivisation through the end of the Soviet era, cotton was the dominant crop in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, with production quotas repeatedly increased, at the expense of food crops, the environment and the health of the peasants, who were exposed to dangerous levels of agricultural chemicals. By the 1980s nearly all the cotton produced in the Soviet Union came from Central Asia.⁴⁹

The Stalin era, especially the Second World War, saw a spurt of industrial growth in Azerbaijan and Central Asia.⁵⁰ In the post Stalin era industries related to agriculture and energy increased in Central Asia. Ironically, there was only scant development of the textile industry in the country's main cotton growing region.⁵¹ Central Asians were underrepresented in such industries as did exist in the region.⁵²

A distinctive feature of the Soviet attempt to transform society in Central Asia and the Caucasus was the campaign to change the status of women. The 1920s saw a general Soviet policy of women's liberation, but from 1926 it took on additional significance when directed towards the Muslim peoples, whose virtual absence of an indigenous proletariat led the Communist Party to use another disadvantaged group – women – to undermine the strength of the

45 Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, pp. 169–70, 173–4, 180–1, 183, 187; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, p. 107.

46 Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, pp. 184–6.

47 Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 215–16; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, p. 106.

48 Olcott, 'The Basmachi or Freeman's Revolt', p. 361; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 193, 197–8, 202–3, 205, 207–10, 212; Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 139–40.

49 B. Z. Rumer, 'Central Asia's cotton economy and its costs', in W. Fierman (ed.), *Soviet Central Asia* (Boulder, 1991), pp. 62–3, 80, 82–3.

50 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, p. 152.

51 Rumer, 'Central Asia's cotton economy', pp. 63, 83–6.

52 Khazanov, 'Underdevelopment and ethnic relations', pp. 144–5.

traditional social elites.⁵³ In areas where the population was predominantly sedentary, such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, women's veiling and seclusion were the prime targets of the campaign. Veiling was not the norm among some of the other Muslim peoples, so the campaign had other emphases in those cases. In Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the campaign consisted primarily of enacting laws on a range of family matters, such as making divorce more accessible for women and banning polygamy.⁵⁴

The campaign was bitterly contentious and, in the short term, brought no dramatic change in the status of women. Many religious figures objected to the campaign; there were also some reformist religious figures who endorsed it.⁵⁵ The campaign was widely unpopular with both sexes. Social pressure and physical violence were directed against women who availed themselves of their new rights.⁵⁶ Ironically, the women's liberation campaign made the practices that came under attack more important than ever as symbols of an identity and way of life to be defended against what many saw as externally imposed assimilation to Russian ways.⁵⁷ Substantial changes in the status of women belonging to the Central Asian and Caucasian Muslim nationalities did not become widespread until the post war era.

The Stalin era saw a new wave of measures intended to marginalise, if not eliminate, religion from Soviet life. This ended an interval of relative tolerance that had existed since the close of the civil war. To conciliate Muslims, confiscated *waqfs* had been restored. Courts hearing cases involving only indigenous Central Asians had been allowed to follow the *shari'a*. *Makhtabs* remained the predominant form of school available to Central Asian children at a time when the state lacked the means to provide an alternative school system. Moscow also directed Communist Party organisations in the region to seek the cooperation of reform minded Muslim religious figures, many of whom responded positively to these overtures. Yet, even before the

53 G. J. Massell, *The surrogate proletariat* (Princeton, 1974), pp. 125 7, 148 9, and chap. 4; D. Northrop, *Veiled empire* (Ithaca, 2004), pp. 41, 46, 59 60, 62 3, 65, 76 7.

54 Northrop, *Veiled empire*, pp. 77, 82, 83; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 221 2, 227, 245, 247 52, 254 5; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p. 172.

55 Keller, *To Moscow*, pp. 115 18.

56 A. Edgar, 'Bolshevism, patriarchy, and the nation: The Soviet "emancipation" of Muslim women in pan Islamic perspective', *Slavic Review*, 65 (2006), pp. 266; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 228 30, 232, 234, 244; Northrop, *Veiled empire*, pp. 90 6, 98 9, 113, 165, 175 83, 188, 192, 201 and chap. 4; Massell, *The surrogate proletariat*, pp. 259 60, 263, 275 83, 286 7, 292 4, 297 302.

57 Northrop, *Veiled empire*, pp. 43 4, 186, 316; Edgar, *Tribal nation*, pp. 227 8, 239, 241.

launching of a major anti religious campaign in the late 1920s, the Soviet regime began gradually to take back what it had conceded.⁵⁸

From the late 1920s into the 1930s the Kremlin followed an aggressively anti religious policy in the Soviet Union as a whole. The elimination of *shari'a* courts began in 1927. *Waqfs* were curtailed and then abolished in the years after 1927. The closure of *maktabs* and *madrasas*, accompanied by the expansion of the state school system, began in 1928. All of this was accompanied by an increased but frequently maladroit campaign of anti Islamic propaganda.⁵⁹ The closure, destruction or conversion to secular use of mosques proceeded by fits and starts from this era until the 1980s. Of the roughly 4,000 mosques still functioning by the late 1920s, hardly any remained in use by 1941.⁶⁰

Thousands of Islamic religious figures from Central Asia and the Caucasus were sent to the camps or executed in the late 1920s and early 1930s.⁶¹ This did not mean the elimination of all Muslim religious figures. For example, in Central Asia some continued to function thanks to the protection of sympathetic local officials and the villagers among whom they lived.⁶²

After the German invasion in 1941 the Soviet Union shifted to a policy of limited tolerance for Islam in the hope that that would bolster public support for the regime's war effort. Moscow halted anti religious propaganda. In 1943 it established new Islamic bodies subject to the central government. These were the Muslim spiritual directorates, given jurisdiction over Islamic affairs in different regions of the country: Central Asia and Kazakhstan, headquartered in Uzbekistan; the Northern Caucasus, headquartered in Daghestan; and Transcaucasia, headquartered in Azerbaijan. (A fourth spiritual directorate dealt with European Russia and Siberia.) The spiritual directorates selected the 'official clergy', as it was called in Soviet parlance, for each mosque under their jurisdiction. The directorates issued *fatwas* which *imams* were supposed to read in mosques during Friday prayers. These *fatwas* interpreted Islam in ways consonant with Soviet policy. The directorates published the Qur'an several times in the post war decades, but in small print runs and in editions of varying quality.⁶³

58 Keller, *To Moscow*, pp. 37 8, 40 2, 62 4, 80 1, 86 8, 95 6, 99 100.

59 Ibid., pp. 81, 136 7, 151 3, 158 65, 236 7.

60 Ibid., pp. 175 87, 190 2, 218 24; Y. Ro'i, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York, 2000), p. 58.

61 Khalid, 'Backwardness', pp. 239, 242; R. Madzhidov, "'Ubezhdad' a ne prinuzhdad", *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, 4 (April 1989), p. 66.

62 Keller, *To Moscow*, pp. 202 4, 217 18.

63 Ro'i, *Islam*, pp. 24, 36, 140 1, 144, 146 7, 169 71, 216.

The closure of *maktabs* and *madrasas* during the pre war anti religious campaign had eliminated legal venues for religious training. In the post war era the Soviet regime created two Islamic religious schools. The Mir i Arab *madrasa*, in Bukhara, opened in 1946. The Ismaʿīl al Bukharī Institute opened in Tashkent in 1971 to provide more advanced religious education. Each taught very few students a year. The Spiritual Directorate of Transcaucasia, with jurisdiction over the largest Shīʿite population in the Soviet Union, was unable to obtain permission to establish a Shīʿite *madrasa* in Baku. Much more religious education took place outside the control of ‘official Islam’, as people studied with relatives and the ‘unofficial clergy’.⁶⁴

Soviet law permitted Muslims to form legally recognised congregations. However, doing so was intimidating, given the Soviet context. That required not only petitioning the authorities for permission but also providing personal information about the members of the proposed congregation. By 1985, just before the collapse of the system of ‘official Islam’, there were some 750 authorised congregations of Muslims throughout the Soviet Union. The recognised congregations could request, but not necessarily obtain, use of a mosque. In the post war years the number of authorised mosques fluctuated, but was always kept small. By 1985 there were 392 mosques existing legally in the Soviet Union.⁶⁵

National identity in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras

The Soviet policy on nation building and national identity did not eliminate other kinds of identities known to the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus,⁶⁶ but it did make national identity more important than it had been. The official standardisation of national languages, the teaching of a version of the national history and literature in republics’ schools, the institutionalisation of officially approved versions of national literature and arts all influenced this change in self perception. So did the introduction in the

64 Ibid., pp. 161–4, 179, 356–7; M. Atkin, ‘The survival of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan’, *Middle East Journal*, 43 (1989), pp. 611–12; M. Atkin, ‘Islam as faith, politics, and bogeyman in Tajikistan’, in M. Bourdeaux (ed.), *The politics of religion in Russia and the new states of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY, 1995), p. 249.

65 Roʻi, *Islam*, pp. 20, 26, 60–1; V. Bykova, ‘Edinstvo protivopolozhnosti’, *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, 5 (May 1989), p. 48.

66 E. Schatz, ‘The politics of multiple identities: Lineage and ethnicity in Kazakhstan’, *Europe Asia Studies*, 52 (2000), pp. 499–502; E. Schatz, ‘Reconceptualizing clans: Kinship networks and statehood in Kazakhstan’, *Nationalities Papers*, 33 (2005), pp. 240–8; M. Atkin, ‘Tajikistan. A president and his rivals’, in S. N. Cummings (ed.), *Power and change in Central Asia* (London, 2002), pp. 101–2, 104–6.

1930s of official papers, including internal passports as well as work and military documents that listed an individual's nationality.⁶⁷ By the close of the Soviet era, in the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, as well as among the Chechens and several Daghistani peoples, those in power or aspiring to it often used nationalist appeals to garner support. Reinterpreting history was a key element of the expression of nationally defined politics.⁶⁸ One striking example of the paradoxical way this worked was the cult of Timur in independent Uzbekistan. There is irony in this, given that Timur's heirs lost their remaining territories in Central Asia to the conquering Uzbeks in the sixteenth century. Yet the Shaybanid dynasty, which led the Uzbeks to victory, did not receive similar favourable treatment. The process of casting Timur in a more favourable light than Soviet strictures had initially permitted began during the Soviet era, but was carried much further in independent Uzbekistan.⁶⁹ Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, encouraged the creation of a cult of Timur. He glossed over the mass killings for which Timur became famous, but depicted him as a strong leader who made his homeland a mighty kingdom and as the forefather of the modern Uzbeks as a people.⁷⁰

Islam modified, revived, regulated and reviled

Soviet policies changed but did not extinguish the role of Islam in Central Asian and Caucasian society. Many of the learned of the faith did not survive the turbulent times from the civil war through the Stalin terror. Access to religious literature was difficult. The knowledge and practice of Islam were sustained less by 'official Islam' than by local communities of believers for whom popular forms of observance, including Sufism, rather than the learned tradition, were paramount. This kind of Islam was also bound to the national identities that had struck root in the Soviet era.⁷¹

67 Martin, *Affirmative action*, p. 449; Slezkine, 'The USSR as a communal apartment', p. 444.

68 Atkin, 'Religious, national, and other identities', pp. 51–3, 55–7; Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, pp. 188–91.

69 B. F. Manz, 'Tamerlane's career and its uses', *Journal of World History*, 13 (2002), pp. 17–23.

70 Ibid., p. 22; S. Hegarty, 'The rehabilitation of Temur: Reconstructing national history in contemporary Uzbekistan', *Central Asia Monitor*, 1 (1995), pp. 28–9; L. Adams, 'Cultural elites in Uzbekistan: Ideological production and the state', in P. Jones Luong (ed.), *The transformation of Central Asia* (Ithaca, 2004), pp. 97, 110–12.

71 Khalid, 'A secular Islam', pp. 577–80; M. Atkin, *The subtlest battle* (Philadelphia, 1989), pp. 13–16, 20–7; B. G. Privratsky, *Muslim Turkestan* (Richmond, 2001).

In addition to the survival of folk Islam, a countervailing movement began to emerge in the 1970s. It objected to many of the Sufi and other popular Islamic practices while advocating the purification of the faith. This trend could be found among people who studied religion outside the state regulated institutions, who wanted to reinvigorate Islamic practice among the populace. Yet in the 1980s the 'official Muslim clergy' made that same argument in favour of purification.⁷² After that people who espoused such views were labelled 'Wahhabis', a term with negative connotations in the Soviet Union and its successor states.⁷³

At the close of the Soviet era and in the first years of independence, Muslims of Central Asia and the Caucasus experienced greater religious freedom than they had known since the Russian Revolution. Political leaders in the successor states in those regions decided that a benevolent stance towards Islam could strengthen their public support. The division between legally permitted 'official Islam' and illegal 'unofficial Islam' disappeared. The 'unofficial clergy' functioned openly. New mosques and religious schools proliferated.⁷⁴ The linkage between Islam and the national identity became even stronger than it had been in the Soviet era. The Muslim spiritual directorates, which in the Soviet era had regional jurisdiction, divided into separate bodies for the newly independent states.⁷⁵ In the north Caucasus, still part of the Russian Federation, the spiritual directorate split along the lines of the autonomous republics, while in multi ethnic Daghestan, different ethnic groups competed for control of the directorate.⁷⁶

From the late 1990s the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan tightened state control over Islamic institutions in ways that resembled the Soviet system of 'official Islam'. They used administrations subject to the government to

72 M. Saroyan, 'Authority and community in Soviet Islam', in M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds.), *Accounting for fundamentalisms: The dynamic character of movements* (Chicago, 1994), pp. 517–19.

73 Khalid, 'A secular Islam', pp. 581, 590; B. Babadjanov and M. Kamilov, 'Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892–1989) and the beginning of the "Great Schism" among Muslims of Uzbekistan', trans. S. Hegarty, in S. A. Dudoignon and H. Komatsu (eds.), *Islam in politics in Russia and Central Asia* (London, 2001), pp. 200–4, 208–9; R. Motika, 'Islam in post Soviet Azerbaijan', *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions*, 115 (July–September 2001), www.ehess.fr/centres/ceifr/assr/N115/006.htm.

74 Khalid, 'A secular Islam', pp. 585, 587; A. A. Rorlich, 'Islam, identity and politics: Kazakhstan, 1990–2000', *Nationalities Papers*, 31, 2 (June 2003), p. 163; Motika, 'Islam in post Soviet Azerbaijan'.

75 Khalid, 'A secular Islam', p. 587; Saroyan, 'Authority and community', pp. 525–6; Motika, 'Islam in post Soviet Azerbaijan'.

76 G. Yemelianova, 'Islam and power', in H. Pilkington and G. Yemelianova, *Islam in post Soviet Russia* (London and New York, 2003), pp. 96–7; G. Yemelianova, 'Russia's umma and its muftis', *Religion, State & Society*, 31 (2003), pp. 142–3.

regulate such things as religious education and who could legally be a religious functionary. For example, in Uzbekistan it became illegal, as it had been in the Soviet era, to teach religion outside the state regulated system or to conduct religious services outside officially sanctioned congregations.⁷⁷ Similar kinds of controls, with varying degrees of severity, were imposed in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.⁷⁸ State control over Islam in Turkmenistan had an unusual dimension stemming from President Saparmurat Niyazov's (pres. 1991–2006) cult of personality. He required that his two volume book, *Ruhnama*, be displayed as an object of veneration in all the country's mosques. He described his inspiration for the book in terms reminiscent of the way the Qur'an was revealed to Muḥammad, and required that *imams* quote from the *Ruhnama* in their sermons. State employees and applicants to university had to demonstrate their knowledge of the work.⁷⁹

Religious movements and political parties not controlled by the state operated in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the post Soviet era, although most were banned and therefore had to operate covertly. The first major religious based party was the Islamic Rebirth Party, founded as a Soviet wide organisation in 1990. Separate republican organisations split off almost immediately. The most important of these was in Tajikistan, where it played an active role in the coalition of opposition groups. Many of the armed bands that fought on the opposition side in the post independence civil war were affiliated with it. After the 1997 peace settlement the party's leadership participated in the political process. It did poorly in subsequent elections – a reflection, perhaps, of limited public support as well as the fact that elections did not meet

77 Khalid, 'A secular Islam', pp. 587–8, 590; International Crisis Group, *Central Asia: Islam and the state*, Asia Report no. 59 (Osh and Brussels, 10 July 2003), pp. 5–12, www/icg.org; G. G. Beckwith, 'Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and religious liberty: An appraisal of Uzbekistan's 1998 law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations"', *Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal* (2000), pp. 1016–19, 1021–6, 1029–34.

78 M. Ochs, 'Turkmenistan: the quest for stability and control', in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 339; Motika, 'Islam in post Soviet Azerbaijan'; R. Podoprigora, 'Religious freedom and human rights in Kazakhstan', *Religion, State & Society*, 31 (2003), pp. 127–8; B. Balci, 'Between Sunnism and Shiism: Islam in post Soviet Azerbaijan', *Central Asian Survey*, 23 (2004), pp. 211–12; M. Olimov and S. Olimova, 'Region early warning report: Political Islam in Tajikistan', Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, 31 July 2001, www.reliefweb.int; A. Blua, 'Tajikistan: Government to vet Islamic clerics' (7 August 2002), www.rferl.org/nca/features/.

79 Central Asia: Regional leaders try to control Islam', part 2, 5 August 2005, www.rferl.org; Amnesty International, 'Turkmenistan. The clampdown on dissent and religious freedom continues', web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR610032005.

international standards of fairness.⁸⁰ As of the early twenty first century it was the only legal Islamic party in Central Asia.

One organisation that achieved greater notoriety was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), formed by Islamists from Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley who had fought on the opposition side in Tajikistan's civil war, then found a haven in Afghanistan. There they developed links to the Taliban, and launched incursions north of the border. Apparently the IMU suffered substantial losses when it fought on the side of the Taliban late in 2001.⁸¹

Governments in Central Asia and Azerbaijan routinely described any Islamic organisation they did not control as extremist and terrorist, as did the government of the Russian Federation with regard to Chechnia. Although some of them, especially the IMU and some Chechen separatists, clearly did resort to violence, they did not necessarily commit all the terrorist acts governments attributed to them. Other groups, notably the *Hizb al Tahrir* and *Tablighi Jama'at* in Central Asia, appeared to be non violent, despite governments' accusations to the contrary.⁸² Many people were arrested in Central Asia on the merest suspicion that they harboured some sympathy for an unsanctioned Islamic organisation.⁸³

The post-Soviet economy

The transition to independence posed difficulties in all the successor states, in part because of the problems caused by the dissolution of a formerly integrated and interdependent economy and the diminished standard of living for many ordinary inhabitants. Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states remained largely producers of raw materials in the post Soviet era. Agriculture in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan continued to be dominated by cotton. In the first dozen years of independence the agricultural system hardly changed from what it had been in the Soviet era. This was reflected

80 International Crisis Group, *Central Asia: Islam and the state*, pp. 20 1; A. Blua, 'Tajikistan: Secular not Shari'a law prevails in eastern mountains', RFE/RL *Headlines*, 2 December 2003, www.rferl.org.

81 Khalid, 'A secular Islam', pp. 588 9, 590; International Crisis Group, *Is radical Islam inevitable in Central Asia?* Asia Report no. 72 (Osh and Brussels, 22 December 2003), www.icg.org, pp. 7 8.

82 G. Saidazimova, 'Uzbekistan: Tablighi Jamaat group added to Uzbek government's blacklist', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, feature article, 20 December 2004, www.rferl.org; G. Saidazimova, 'Kazakhstan: Government moves to add Hizb Ut Tahrir to list of terror groups', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, feature article, 18 March 2005, www.rferl.org.

83 Khalid, 'A secular Islam', p. 589; Olimov and Olimova, 'Region early warning report'.

in such things as the use of child labour, the subjugation of peasants and the continuation of environmentally harmful practices. Industries, except for extractive ones, declined substantially after the break up of the Soviet Union.⁸⁴

Of the extractive industries, oil and natural gas were the most important, especially for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Yet the actual growth of these industries after independence proved to be modest.⁸⁵ Estimates of the amount of oil located under the Caspian Sea varied considerably, although one clearly substantial deposit, Kashagan, off Kazakhstan's coast, was targeted for development. The cost of extracting and exporting oil from the Caspian region looked high, perhaps to a degree that reduced its competitiveness on the world market, into the beginning of the twenty first century. Kazakhstan's optimism about forthcoming profits from oil exports led it to neglect investment in other sectors of its economy, with adverse consequences in the 1990s.⁸⁶ Turkmenistan's natural gas industry performed poorly in the first decade after independence because of a deteriorating infrastructure and problems exporting the gas. Unlike Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan pursued little foreign investment in its energy sector. Instability in Afghanistan and the pressures of international politics left Turkmenistan dependent on Russia for a pipeline by which to export most of its gas, although a second pipeline allowed it to send some to Iran. Russia directed Turkmenistan's gas exports to Soviet successor states, which sometimes had trouble paying for their purchases.⁸⁷

84 N. Torm, 'The nexus of economic growth, employment and poverty during economic transition', Issues in Employment and Poverty Discussion Paper 13 (Geneva, October 2003), pp. 6 8, 14 16, www.ilo-mirror.com/public/english/employment/recon/poverty/download/disc13.pdf; Ochs, 'Turkmenistan', pp. 341 4; International Crisis Group, *The curse of cotton: Central Asia's destructive monoculture*, Asia Report no. 93 (Osh and Brussels: 28 February 2005), www.icg.org.

85 A. Altstadt, 'Azerbaijan's struggle toward democracy,' in Dawisha and Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, cleavage, and change*, p. 140; International Crisis Group, *Azerbaijan: Turning over a new leaf* (Baku and Brussels: 13 May 2004), pp. 1 3, www.icg.org; C. von Hirschhausen and H. Engerer, 'Energy in the Caspian Sea region in the late 1990s: the end of the boom?', *OPEC Review* (December 1999), pp. 275, 282 3, 286.

86 Von Hirschhausen and Engerer, 'Energy in the Caspian Sea', pp. 279, 281; P. Jones Luong, 'Kazakhstan: The long term costs of short term gains', in R. Ebel and R. Menon (eds.), *Energy and conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus* (London, 2000), pp. 82 5; R. M. Cutler, 'The Caspian energy conundrum', *Journal of International Affairs*, 56, 2 (2003), p. 91.

87 Von Hirschhausen and Engerer, 'Energy in the Caspian Sea', p. 286; N. Lubin, 'Turkmenistan's energy: A source of wealth or instability?', in Ebel and Menon (eds.), *Energy and conflict*, pp. 108 10; Cutler, 'The Caspian energy conundrum', pp. 92 3, 96 7; G. Saidzimova, 'Turkmenistan: Iranian president pays first visit to Ashgabat', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, feature article, 24 July 2006, www.rferl.org.

Post-Soviet statehood

The transformation of the Soviet Union's fifteen union republics into independent countries at the end of 1991 was neither sought nor caused by the republics of Central Asia or the Caucasus. In many of the newly independent countries the old Soviet elite remained in power, albeit in a new guise, and strove to preserve its privileges. This serves as a reminder that some Central Asians and Caucasians learned fluent Russian, pursued their studies through higher education, became acculturated to the Soviet outlook and had successful careers in the Soviet system. In three of the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, former first secretaries of republic level Communist Parties, Nursultan Nazarbaev (1990), Islam Karimov (1991), and Saparmurat Niyazov (1990), made themselves president and held on to power into the new century with at most the token gesture of rigged elections.⁸⁸ In Kyrgyzstan the physicist Askar Akaev seemed for a few years to offer the prospect of reformist politics, but the more time passed the more he, too, became authoritarian. He was forced from office by popular demonstrations in the 'tulip revolution' of March 2005.⁸⁹ In two other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, as well as in Chechnia, which remained part of the Russian Federation, the early years of the post Soviet era were marked by warfare.

Tajikistan's former Republican Party first secretary, Rahmon Nabiev (1930–93), seized power at the head of a coalition of anti reformists in autumn 1991. He attempted to follow the pattern elsewhere in Central Asia and make himself president of his republic. Disparate secular and religious groups, motivated by a desire for change and political ambitions of their own, formed a rival coalition. The power struggle also reflected decades of tensions among groups from different locales around the country. The opposition forced Nabiev's resignation in 1992, but the coalition he had led maintained its determination to hold on to power. Civil war erupted in 1992 and lasted, albeit at a lower level of intensity, until a 1997 peace agreement between the two coalitions. It was not Nabiev's faction, but one of its allies, that acquired many of the key government positions. Some of its former allies received

88 Ochs, 'Turkmenistan', pp. 312–14, 319–33; W. Fierman, 'Political development in Uzbekistan: democratization?', in Dawisha and Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, cleavage, and change*, pp. 360, 374–9, 383–90.

89 International Crisis Group, *Kyrgyzstan: After the revolution*, Asia Report no. 97 (Osh and Brussels, 4 May 2005), www.icg.org.

subordinate positions; some turned against it and were eventually excluded from power. The former opposition, though promised a share of power by the peace agreement, was reduced to a minor role in politics.⁹⁰

Intercommunal violence and warfare between successor states marked Azerbaijan's transition from a Soviet republic to independence. In 1988 Armenians in Nagorny Karabagh and Armenia revived the issue of transferring that territory from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Clashes within and between the two republics escalated into war in 1992, producing a flood of both Armenian and Azerbaijani refugees. After the 1994 armistice, attempts to negotiate a settlement continued unsuccessfully into the early years of the twenty first century. Ineffective leadership of the struggle for Karabagh by a veteran Communist led to his replacement in 1992 by a nationalist coalition, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. Under its rule, deteriorating relations with Russia and Iran and what to some looked like an excessively pro Turkish orientation hurt Azerbaijan's economy and its fight for Karabagh. Defeats in battle sparked a military coup, which ousted the Popular Front in 1993. A presidential election that same year brought to power a veteran Communist, Haidar Aliev (pres. 1993–2003), the former head of Azerbaijan's KGB, later the first secretary of its Communist Party, member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Soviet first deputy prime minister. He remained in office until his health deteriorated sharply in 2003, at which point he withdrew from the presidential election that year and had his son, Ilham, run instead. The younger Aliev won in a vote marred by problems.⁹¹

The close of the Soviet era saw an upsurge of nationalism in Chechnia. Nationalist appeals served as an umbrella for criticism of the status quo in many parts of the Soviet Union at that time, but the Chechens had an additional reason to sound that theme: the mass deportation of Chechens to Central Asia and Siberia in 1944 on the grounds that they had collaborated with the German invaders. That ascription of collective guilt had been unjustified, as Nikita Khrushchev later acknowledged. Chechens suffered heavy loss of life because of the grim conditions of transport and exile, and

90 M. Atkin, 'Tajikistan: reform, reaction, and civil war', in Bremmer and Taras (eds.) *New states*, pp. 602–4, 610–16; M. Atkin, 'Thwarted democratization in Tajikistan', in Dawisha and Parrott (eds.), *Conflict, cleavage, and change*, pp. 284–95, 300–2; Atkin, 'Tajikistan: A president and his rivals', pp. 99–106.

91 Swietochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan*, pp. 193–8, 204–7, 218–25; N. Dudwick, 'Armenia: paradise regained or lost?', in Bremmer and Taras (eds.), *New states*, pp. 482–8, 491–2; Altstadt, 'Azerbaijan's struggle toward democracy', p. 119; International Crisis Group, *Azerbaijan: Turning over a new leaf*, pp. 5–9, 11–12, 15–18.

faced discrimination and sometimes violence when Khrushchev allowed them to return to the Caucasus in 1957.⁹²

Chechen nationalists, led by Johar Dudaev (1944–96), a major general in the Soviet air force who had recently allied himself with the nationalists, took power from the local Communist Party leader, who had appeared to support the August 1991 failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. Under the nationalists Chechnia seceded from the Chechen Ingush Autonomous Republic and refused to join the post Soviet Russian Federation as other autonomous entities formerly part of Russia agreed to do. Negotiations and Russian attempts to isolate Chechnia's economy or overthrow Dudaev failed to resolve the dispute. In 1994 Russia sent the military to subdue Chechnia, but did not win the easy victory it had expected and withdrew after a negotiated agreement in 1996 that resolved little. Dudaev was killed by the Russians in 1996. Post war Chechnia suffered from a ruined economy, continuing troubles in relations with Russia, the escalation of criminality and the growth of bands of radicalised, Islamised Chechens. A Russian human rights organisation estimated that the 1994–6 war cost the lives of about 50,000 civilians.⁹³

The horrors of the war as well as the economic collapse and the influence of foreign Islamic extremists contributed to the growth of radicalism within the nationalist camp. It is possible that the foreign Islamic radicals' influence had as much to do with the logistical support and military training they could offer as with the politicised religious ideology they espoused. Radical Islam did not appear to find widespread support in Chechen society as a whole. An incursion by Chechen radicals into Daghestan in 1999 was followed by terrorist attacks on Russian cities which Russian authorities blamed on Chechen nationalists. This set the stage for a second Russian war on Chechnia, which began at the end of 1999. The war continued after 2000, although at a lesser level of intensity in Chechnia's northern lowlands.⁹⁴ For unknown thousands of ordinary Chechens the opening years of the twenty first century were dangerous times as forces supporting the pro Russian

92 B. G. Williams, 'Commemorating "The Deportation" in post Soviet Chechnya', *History & Memory*, 12 (2000), pp. 104, 106–12, 114, 115, 120; Simon, *Nationalism and policy*, pp. 242–4.

93 A. Cherkasov and T. Lokshina, 'Chechnya: 10 years of armed conflict', *Helsinki Monitor*, 16, 2 (April 2005), p. 143; Hughes, 'Chechnya', pp. 15, 17, 22–31.

94 Hughes, 'Chechnya', pp. 34–7; J. Wilhelmsen, 'Between a rock and a hard place: the Islamisation of the Chechen separatist movement', *Europe Asia Studies*, 57 (2005), *passim*; A. Nivat, *Chienne de guerre*, trans. S. Darnton (New York, 2001), pp. 2–4, 26–8, 97–8, 200, 203.

Chechen government, Chechen guerrillas and Russian troops abducted people, many of them non combatants. Instances occurred of torture and the extraction of confessions under duress. Some of the abducted were later released but others were killed; the fate of the rest was unknown.⁹⁵

Conclusion

In nine decades of tumultuous change the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus became more urbanised than they had been before, and better educated; they participated in a more developed economy. Yet these peoples, taken as a whole, remained less urban, less educated and had a lower standard of living than did the European peoples of the Soviet Union. Having had national identity instilled in them by a regime that did not believe in the long term significance of national ties, they learned how to use nationalism for political ends. They therefore formulated new interpretations of a heritage defined in national terms. Yet they remembered the importance of the tribe, family and locale of origin as bases of solidarity in the pursuit of their interests. They lost much of the formal tradition of religious scholarship and practice as they experienced the secular influences of modernity and Soviet anti religious policy. Yet they preserved an array of popular observances and linked religion strongly to national culture as well as to spiritual values. The religious revival of the late twentieth century took contrasting forms: advocacy of the free practice of existing popular observance and criticism of popular observance as a corruption of the pure faith. Independence, when it came to most but not all of the of the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 1990s, was marked by both political and armed conflict and the willingness of those in power to use methods borrowed from the Soviet system to preserve their authoritarian rule.

95 Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation: "Disappearances" and abductions in the Chechen Republic', web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR460502005; Amnesty International, 'Recommendations to the Council of Europe regarding ongoing human rights violations in the context of the armed conflict in Chechnya, Russian Federation', 6 June 2005, web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR460232005; Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation: Briefing torture, "disappearances" and alleged unfair trials in Russia's North Caucasus', web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR460392005; Human Rights Watch, 'Worse than a war: "Disappearances" in Chechnya a crime against humanity', hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chechnya0305/chechnya0305.pdf.

Afghanistan from 1919

NAZIF M. SHAHRANI

The drive for independence and failed modernisation

The 1920s were marked by dramatic changes in leadership and policy. Aman Allah, the third son of the assassinated Amīr Ḥabīb Allah, challenged his uncle, Crown Prince Naṣr Allah, for the throne. After seizing power (1919), he arrested Naṣr Allah and some high officials, including General Muḥammad Nadir of the Muṣaḥiban family, on suspicion of involvement in the assassination. Naṣr Allah died in jail, but members of the Muṣaḥiban family were quickly proclaimed innocent and given important government posts.

Aman Allah had been raised in the tranquil palace surroundings with secular schooling and the nationalist sentiments and modernist outlook of his mentor, father in law and close adviser, Maḥmud Ṭarzī. Unlike his predecessors, who claimed that God had chosen them to lead, he credited the 'honorable nation of Afghanistan' for putting the crown of the kingdom on his head¹.

Following a brief war (1919) he gained control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs, hence independence, from British India. This bold act earned Aman Allah the title of *ghazī* (Muslim victor/hero), provided him with much needed legitimacy and made him enormously popular within Afghanistan (however briefly) and beyond. He consolidated his power by promising salary rises to the army and creating state clergy alliances. Once securely on the throne, Ghazī Amīr Aman Allah swapped his title of Amīr for Shah Aman Allah (King Aman Allah) and began to undertake sweeping but ill fated legal, administrative, social and cultural reforms. For this purpose he relied on *shari'a* and a set of *nizamnama* (administrative regulations).

¹ See Mir Ghulam Muḥammad Ghubar, *Afghanistan dar masir i tanikh* (Qum, 1981 [1968]), p. 752; also Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Afghanistan* 2 vols. (London, 1940), vol. II, p. 264.

Aman Allah promulgated and decreed seventy six *nizamnamas*, including the first modern constitution (1923). He abolished slavery (1919), especially of the Hazara Shi'is, which his grandfather had encouraged. This early decree became enshrined as Article 10 of the constitution under the 'General Rights of the Subjects [not Citizens] of Afghanistan'. In addition, Shi'is could perform their religious rituals publicly. These policies earned Aman Allah the enduring loyalty and respect of the Hazaras.² He also abolished forced labour (1920), which was welcomed by the non Pashtun people in northern, central and western regions, where such exaction had been pervasive.

Many of the *nizamnamas* were decreed before the ratification of the 1923 constitution by a *loya jirga* (in a manner reminiscent of the recent post Taliban legal developments under Karzai). They were to achieve centralisation and direct rule. The concentration of power in the new constitution of the king alienated the liberal nationalists who were hoping for a genuine constitutional monarchy. In order to offset the loss of large British subsidies after independence, pay for the construction of new capital in Dar al Aman, buy military weapons and issue promised pay rises for the army, more *nizamnamas* were issued to increase revenue. These measures not only added to the tax burden of the impoverished subjects but also increased the likelihood of corruption and popular discontent.³

Aman Allah established friendly relations with Soviet leaders (1919), who hailed him as the head of 'the only independent Muslim State in the World' and urged him to lead other Muslim peoples to freedom and independence.⁴ Between 1919 and 1922 Aman Allah supported both the anti British Khilafat and Hijrat movements in India and the anti Bolshevik *basmachi* resistance among the Muslims of Central Asia. He also established strong ties with Persia and Turkey, and gained popularity as the champion of Islamic causes at home and abroad. However, he never delivered the promised aid to the *amir* of Bukhara and his anti Bolshevik *basmachi* fighters,⁵ and fell short of delivering most of his other promises to his subjects as well.

2 See Fayz Muḥammad Kateb, *Kabul under siege: Fayz Muḥammad's account of the 1929 Uprising*, ed. and trans. Robert D. McChesney (Princeton, 1999); Bašir Aḥmad Dowlatabadi, *Shinashnama 1 Afghanistan* (Tehran, 1381), pp. 316–26.

3 See Senzil Nawid, *Religious response to social change in Afghanistan 1919–29: King Aman Allah and the Afghan ulama* (Costa Mesa, 1999) pp. 84, 218; and Kateb, *Kabul under siege*, pp. 3, 14.

4 See Thomas T. Hammond, *Red flag over Afghanistan* (Boulder, 1984), p. 10.

5 See Nazif Shahrani, 'Resisting the Taliban and Talibanism in Afghanistan: Legacies of a century of internal colonialism and Cold War politics in a buffer state', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 5, 4 (2000), pp. 121–40.

Many of Aman Allah's reforms (e.g. the forced unveiling of women and European dress for men) were superficial imitations of those of Atatürk and Reza Shah. These reforms were put forth without long range planning or any regard for the availability of national resources, either financial or human. Meanwhile, serious disagreements within his administration encouraged corruption, bribery, graft and oppression by officials in rural areas. The central government became less responsive to complaints against the tyranny of provincial officials, who were in league with local oppressive khans. Predictably, the central focus of the anti Aman Allah campaign became his modernisation policies.

After returning home from an eight month tour of Europe, India and the Middle East in July 1928, he faced widespread rebellions in eastern and southern Pashtun borderlands as well as in the Kohdaman and Kohistan regions, and was forced to abdicate in disgrace (1929). His failures left important legacies for the Afghan political processes, and became a celebrated topic for investigation.⁶

The civil war and interregnum of 1929

In November 1928 an ordinary incident between a group of Pashtun nomads and villagers in Shinwar, not properly handled by local officials, developed into armed rebellion against the central government.⁷ It was then that Ḥabīb Allah, called Bacha i Saqaw (the 'water carrier's son'), a Tajik from the village of Kalakan, the district centre of Kohdaman, staged his attacks against Kabul, under the banner of a jihad against the 'infidel king' Aman Allah.⁸

Kabul fell and Aman Allah went into exile. Ḥabīb Allah II became *amir* (not king), and the title of *khadim ı dın ı rasul Allah* (the servant of the faith of the Prophet) was bestowed upon him by the religious dignitaries who had courted Aman Allah. Amir Ḥabīb Allah II, the only Tajik ruler of modern Afghanistan before Burhanuddin Rabbani (r. 1992–6/2001), received support

6 See, for example, Leon Poullada, *Reform and rebellion in Afghanistan: King Amanullah's failure to modernize a tribal society* (Ithaca, 1973); Rhea Talley Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan, 1914–1929: Faith, hope and the British Empire* (Garden City, NY, 1973); Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan's foreign affairs to the mid twentieth century* (Tucson, 1974), pp. 42–147; Nawid, *Religious response*.

7 See Ghubar, *Afghanistan*, pp. 818–20.

8 See Khalilullah Khalili, 'Ayan az Khurasan: Amir Ḥabīb Allah, *khademi dını Rasul Allah* (Peshawar, 1980), pp. 102–55; Adamec, *Afghanistan's foreign affairs*, p. 164; Ghubar, *Afghanistan*, pp. 172–84. For the official Muṣaḥiban version, see Amir Habibullah, *My life: From brigand to king, autobiography of Amir Habibullah* (London, n.d.)

not only from predominantly non Pashtun Turkistan and Herat but also from some Pashtun groups, including the Ghilzay tribes. The Hazaras remained loyal to Aman Allah and resisted Ḥabīb Allah's rule. Ḥabīb Allah's temporary success was due less to his personal qualities or programmes than to the growing unpopularity of Aman Allah.⁹

Indeed, the Tajik ruler failed because of many of the same administrative maladies that he and his peasant followers so despised – corruption, oppression and arbitrary rule by government officials in rural areas.¹⁰ His inability to consolidate his power throughout the country, especially in the eastern and southern frontier Pashtun tribal zone, together with lack of recognition by foreign powers, deteriorating urban economic conditions and depletion of all state revenues, made the collapse of his regime inevitable. Opposition to Ḥabīb Allah II was led by Muḥammad Nadir, an experienced Barakzay Pashtun general, a seasoned politician and Aman Allah's ambassador to France. His bid for power was dependent upon his four brothers,¹¹ the collusion of British India, the eastern frontier Pashtun tribes from Paktia and the Wazir tribes across the border.¹²

Muṣaḥiban rule: Afghan (Pashtun) nationalism and gradualism

General Muḥammad Nadir was proclaimed shah (king) by a *jirga* (assembly) of Pashtun tribesmen and religious dignitaries, including the *ḥaẓrat* of Shor Bazar, who had previously crowned Ḥabīb Allah II as well as Aman Allah. During his brief rule (1929–33), Nadir Shah, the founder of the Muṣaḥiban dynasty, introduced policies with lasting impact upon the future course of Afghanistan's political, social and economic developments.

Internationally, he signed treaties of friendship and non aggression with the Soviet Union and Great Britain and adopted what has been termed a policy of 'benevolent neutrality' towards both superpowers. This involved driving the anti Soviet *basmachi* resistance fighters across the border into Soviet hands, where most were executed; transferring Central Asian refugees

9 Poullada, *Reform and rebellion in Afghanistan*, p. 28n.

10 See Khalili, 'Ayari az Khurasan', pp. 156–64.

11 Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A history of struggle and survival* (London, 2004), pp. 104–6.

12 See Nazif Shahrani, 'King Aman Allah of Afghanistan's failed nation building project and its aftermath' (review article), *Iranian Studies*, 38, 4 (2005), pp. 661–75.

from Afghan Turkistan to the southern provinces; and stifling their opposition to Soviet atrocities.¹³

Nadir attributed his rise to 'the exclusive help of the Almighty God' and the 'sacrifices of the peoples of Afghanistan'.¹⁴ He erroneously assumed that Aman Allah's ouster was due solely to a conservative Islamic and tribal reaction against his Western inspired reform and modernisation, rather than a popular demand for an end to official corruption and for social, economic and political justice in accordance with Islamic teachings. As a result, Nadir and his successors adopted a flawed policy of ambivalence towards the role of Islam in national politics. To legitimise their dynastic rule Nadir and his successors relied on a large army and police force, the appeasement of Pashtun tribes and the religious establishment. He called a *loya jirga* to ratify a new constitution (1931).¹⁵ He established a supervisory council of Muslim scholars (Jami'at al 'Ulama'), ordered the first printing of the Qur'an in the country, removed restrictions imposed by Aman Allah on the role of Muslim functionaries (*mullas*, *mawlawis*) in education, reaffirmed the primacy of Hanafi *shari'a* law in the country,¹⁶ closed girls' schools and removed restrictions on the rights of non Muslims. All secular legal measures from Aman Allah's period were rescinded. Reverting to 'Abd al Rahman's practices, both civil and criminal cases were brought within the domain of *shari'a* courts, making the courts the most important vehicles of centralisation.

South eastern frontier Pashtun tribes who had helped him in his bid for power were granted exemptions from taxes and conscription. Discriminatory practices against non Pashtuns became rampant in the allocation of economic, educational and development resources. Many rural aristocrats were co-opted, either by being elected to or selected for the newly established rubber stamp bicameral parliament (Majlis i Shura wa A'yan). This not only gave the local khans the satisfaction of sharing government power, but helped the government to keep them under surveillance in Kabul for more than seven months annually.

Thus, the Muṣaḥiban family encapsulated local tribal and religious power structures. Their army, gendarmerie and police forces claimed half of the

13 See Shahrani, 'Resisting the Taliban and Talibanism', pp. 121–40; Sykes, *A history of Afghanistan*, vol. II, p. 323; Vartan Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan* (Stanford, 1969), pp. 330–2.

14 Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan*, pp. 297, 321–2.

15 For the text see Ramesh C. Ghosh, *Constitutional documents of the major Islamic states* (Lahore, 1947), pp. 126–43; also see Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan*, pp. 300–7.

16 This remained until the adoption of the post Taliban constitution of 2005.

national budget, and made any meaningful agricultural or industrial development impossible. The Helmand Valley project, Afghanistan's earliest major agricultural development effort, contracted to the Morrison Knudsen Company of the United States (1946), was precedent setting for at least three reasons: its large scale, 'white elephant' characteristics; its justification on political (i.e. to benefit the Pashtun) rather than on rational, economic grounds; and its heavy reliance on foreign loans and capital investment. This pattern and policy of economic development continued into the 1970s, with disastrous consequences.¹⁷

Active opposition to Muṣaḥiban rule came from the pro Aman Allah political elite; the intelligentsia, for the slow pace of his reforms and modernisation; and disillusioned nationalists who objected to Nadir's policy of friendship with the British in the face of their forward policy towards the frontier Pashtun. Armed revolts occurred in Kohdaman, in Turkistan and in southern frontier regions. Many of these incidents were attributed to pro Aman Allah forces led by the powerful Charkhī family, and on Nadir's order Ghulam Nabī Charkhī was summarily executed in October 1932. By 1933 the squabbles had become a feud leading to several assassinations, including that of Nadir (on 8 November 1933) by a Charkhī family associate.¹⁸

These challenges to Muṣaḥiban power had serious impact on the domestic and foreign policies of Nadir's successors. His only son, nineteen year old Muḥammad Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73), assumed the throne. However, his paternal uncles, Muḥammad Hashim (1933–46) and Shah Mahmud (1946–53), and an older cousin, Muḥammad Da'ud (1953–63) ruled for the next three decades as prime ministers. Domestically, they liquidated, imprisoned, suppressed or co-opted many members of various political movements – Wish Zalmiyan (Awakened youth), Waṭan (Homeland) and Nidayi Khalq (Voice of the people) – that were calling for more rapid modernisation, reform and a constitutional government. With the consolidation of Muṣaḥiban power, the physical insecurity suffered during the civil war eased, but a new sense of uncertainty and suspicion, especially among the non Pashtun ethnic groups, took hold.¹⁹

17 See Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, 1973), pp. 482–5; for a review of additional sources see Nazif Shahrani, 'State building and social fragmentation in Afghanistan', in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds.), *The state, religion and ethnic politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan* (Syracuse, NY, 1986).

18 See Adamec, *Afghanistan's foreign affairs*, pp. 191–9; Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan*, pp. 338–40.

19 Ghubar, *Afghanistan*, pp. 834–7; Khalili, 'Ayari az Khurasan', pp. 168–9.

From the 1930s through the early 1950s the Muṣaḥiban pursued a policy of 'limited guided modernisation' aimed at reducing dependence on direct rural land and livestock taxation, supporting modern schools and the development of Pashtun nationalism. The cornerstone of national ideology became the promotion of Pashtu language which became the official language in 1936 and Pashtun culture and values.²⁰ The Pashtu Tulana (Pashtu academy) promoted the 'Afghan' (i.e. Pashtun) national ideology. It was not until the constitution of 1964 that Dari/Persian (Afghanistan's lingua franca) was accorded coequal status as the other official language of Afghanistan.

To broaden the appeal of this national ideology, the common history, religion and race (i.e. Aryan origins, as in Nazi Germany) of some of the Afghan population (Pashtun, Baluch, Tajik, Nuristani) were emphasised.²¹ The emphasis on Aryan race and Pashtu language and culture was also to justify the unity of the Pashtun across the Durand Line (in British India). This proved to be a crucial issue during Da'ud's tenure as prime minister (1953–63), following the partition of India in 1947.²²

Although the Muṣaḥiban rulers invoked Islam as a key basis for national unity and independence, they remained ambivalent about its role.²³ Islam was presented in the curriculum of the country's expanding schools simply as a body of rituals and legal injunctions, rather than a vibrant religious doctrine compatible with modern life. As a result the education system produced only semi literate bureaucrats, and failed to prepare Afghan youth to meet the national challenges.

The economic consequences of the Second World War caused high inflation, food shortages, increased poverty and loss of much peasant land. The importation of manufactured consumer goods began to severely affect home industries and handicrafts. The deterioration of economic conditions was seen as clear evidence of the failure of the Muṣaḥiban policy of 'limited guided modernisation'. Therefore opposition led to the resignation of Hashim as the dictatorial prime minister in 1946.²⁴

20 See Ella Maillart, 'Afghanistan's rebirth: An interview with H. R. H. Hashim Khan in 1937', *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 27, 2 (April 1940), p. 224, 227.

21 Mohammed Ali, *The Afghans* (Lahore, 1965), pp. 3–16; also see Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan*, pp. 345–8.

22 See A. Rahman Pazhwak, *Pakhtunistan: A new state in Central Asia* (London, 1960), pp. 7–8; Afghanistan Information Bureau, London, *Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass, the focus of the new state of Pakhtunistan* (London, n.d.).

23 Donald N. Wilber, 'The structure of Islam in Afghanistan', *Middle East Journal*, 6, 1 (1949), p. 47.

24 See T. Akhramovich, *Outline history of Afghanistan after the Second World War* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 45–67; Gregorian, *The emergence of modern Afghanistan*, p. 392; Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 494–98.

His half brother Shah Mahmud, the minister of war, became prime minister (1946–53) and inaugurated a short period of liberalisation by tolerating the re emergence of organised political movements such as Wish Zalmiyan, Waṭan and Nidayi Khalq during 1947–51. These movements campaigned in the parliamentary elections of 1949 against official corruption, bribery and injustice, and proposed major social and economic reforms, including land redistribution for the poor peasants and liberalisation of politics. They were successful in securing the election of a number of reform minded deputies, but after brief experimentation they were ruthlessly suppressed.

In addition, tension between the government and the Bank-i-Milli group and the Şafī Pashtun tribal revolt (1947–9) in Nangarhar Province brought Muḥammad Da'ud, who brutally suppressed it, to national attention. It also resulted in the forced relocation of thousands of Şafī Pashtun to penal colonies throughout northern Afghanistan, once again aggravating Pashtun and non Pashtun relations in Afghan Turkistan.²⁵ Ultimately, factional struggles among the royals due to what Amin Saikal calls the politics of 'Royal Dualism' – binary fighting for power as a result of polygynous marriages within the royal family²⁶ – led to Muḥammad Da'ud replacing his uncle as the prime minister (1953–63), and launching stringent étatist economic policies.

From buffer state towards a failed nation-state, 1955–79

The decade of Da'ud's rule (1953–63) proved to be crucial for the Afghan state and its relationship with both Islam and ethnic communities. After the departure of Great Britain from India and removal of Afghanistan's 'buffer state' status, Da'ud inaugurated an active Pashtunistan policy which caused serious strain in relations with Pakistan. This policy served two purposes: promoting Pashtun nationalism as Afghan nationalism by making Pashtunistan a national issue; and providing the pretext for a strong and modernised military power base, ultimately at huge cost.

The Cold War made it possible for Da'ud's regime to receive substantial foreign aid from both the Soviets and the West. Following repeated US

25 Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 537; Thomas Barfield, 'The impact of Pashtun immigration on nomadic pastoralism in northeastern Afghanistan', in Jon Anderson and Richard Strad (eds.), *Ethnic processes and intergroup relations in contemporary Afghanistan*, Afghanistan Council, Occasional Papers no. 15 (New York, 1978); Thomas Barfield, *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan* (Austin, 1981), p. 31.

26 Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan*, p. 104.

refusals to sell arms or give loans, the first major Soviet loan of \$100 million for long term development projects and a \$25 million arms sale was given in 1955.⁶ For the first time in history the Kabul government was able to have absolute monopoly of military force against any internal challenge, and to become economically independent of its subjects, urban or rural. The government also found itself in the enviable position of providing social services to the populace on a scale hitherto impossible.

Secure in his military power, Da'ud launched his programme of national integration and development through a series of five year economic plans. The stated economic objectives of these development programmes were not realised, but an extensive communication infrastructure was built, and education was made available to large numbers of rural youth. The bureaucracy was enlarged, accommodating school graduates. Women's emancipation was declared (1959), and education for girls expanded. Reaction to these reforms, principally in Qandahar, was crushed by the new mechanised army. The military cadet school, for the first time, opened admission to non Pashtun youth and to the sons of non aristocratic rural Pashtun. Secularism and marginalisation of Islamic education, particularly in large urban schools, became the norm.

The penetration of the market economy grew in rural areas, which helped few but added to the poverty of many. Development projects mainly benefited a few, densely populated Pashtun areas and some corrupt government officials, and contributed little to the national economy. Conditions reached a crisis point when Da'ud's Pashtunist policies led to the closure of the borders by Pakistan (1961–3). This situation, together with growing policy disagreements with King Zahir, forced Da'ud's resignation as prime minister.²⁷ King Zahir appeared to take charge by launching a decade of democratic experimentation.

During the decade of Zahir Shah's rule (1963–73) large numbers of educated youth entered the political processes, and faint attempts were made to introduce a more balanced ethnic policy towards non Pashtun groups. However, the thaw in the Cold War and a substantial decline in foreign aid once again proved the unreliability of the most recent bases of the state's political economy. Discontent increased with the decline in foreign aid, the

²⁷ For a detailed study of Da'ud's era see Assem Akram, *Sardar Mohammad Daoud: Personality, ideas and politics*, e Book released July 2004, www.sardardaoud.com/ (in Persian).

saturation of the overextended bureaucracy, the unemployment of new school graduates and a lack of mobility in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy.

The framers of the new constitution of 1964 were instructed to keep close relatives of the king out of national politics. They had to create an independent judiciary, valorise modern legal codes over the *shari'a*, extend and clarify the rights of the subjects (*ittiba'/ru'aya*), encourage and expand the possibilities for local self government and convince the non Pashtun that they were no longer to be dominated by the Pashtun.²⁸ Among the most significant new articles were the rights to form political parties, freedom of the press, universal suffrage and the granting to women of equal social status.

Compared with the previous two constitutions this one was considered more liberal and forward looking. However, it was also a product of the ruler's whims, and like others did not outlast the reign of the person who promulgated it. It is important to note that the post Taliban constitution drafted under the supervision of the USA and international consultants is the reworked version of the constitution of 1964, with all the rights and privileges of the monarch (and some more), having been given to President Karzai (pres. 2004). It is also worth noting that, in a large measure, the only part of all the constitutions of Afghanistan that were/are adhered to were/are those having to do with the rights and privileges of the rulers – always at the expense of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of their subjects, the peoples of Afghanistan.

Following promulgation of the 1964 constitution²⁹ and the onset of 'new democracy', Marxist and Maoist parties were formed. In response, nascent Islamist movements emerged, not only to address the potential communist threat but to challenge the legitimacy of the Muṣaḥiban monarchy. The rise of communist and Islamist parties and movements, each with ideological ties and financial patrons outside the country, had no precedent in Afghanistan's history. Similarly, the government's dependence on foreign assistance for economic development and military weapons had reached new heights. The state depended heavily upon Soviet patronage for its survival. The government therefore suppressed the Islamist movements, while the communist groups, especially the pro Soviet Khalq (People) or People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and Parcham (Banner) Marxist parties were given free rein. As a consequence, in July 1973, Da'ud, the former prime

28 See Donald N. Wilber, 'Constitution of Afghanistan, with commentary', *Middle East Journal*, 19, 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 215–16.

29 For a text of the constitution see *ibid.*, pp. 125–9; see also Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 499–558.

minister and the king's brother in law and cousin, staged a military coup, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed himself the president of the Republic of Afghanistan (1973–8). Only five years later Da'ud himself fell victim to a coup led by the PDPA which effectively terminated the Durrani dynastic rule by establishing a communist government (1978–92).³⁰ The Islamist movements, which had been seriously weakened by the monarchy and Da'ud's royal republican regime, now suffered more devastating attacks by the communists.

Communist coup, Soviet occupation and a jihad 'victory'

The PDPA coup and direct Soviet military intervention (1979–89) in Afghanistan offered the fledgling Islamist movements a new lease on life. Islamist ideas had been brought from Egypt in the 1950s by a few Afghans studying at al Azhar university in Cairo, and by al Azhar shaykhs teaching at the faculty of Shara'iyat (Islamic Studies) at Kabul University. The Nahzat-i Jawanani Musalman (Muslim youth movement) emerged on the campus of Kabul University, initially with an underground 'professors' group and later a public student branch. Unlike the previous rural based jihad movements, the new Islamist movement was urban centred, organised and led by educated youth who questioned the legitimacy of the existing political system and called for the radical transformation of power relations. Achieving such a goal was deemed possible only through the establishment of an Islamic government.³¹

The Islamist movements attracted mostly provincial and rural youth who were studying in Kabul and other major provincial towns. Before the Marxist coup (1978), they had few active supporters among traditionally educated 'ulama' and Sufi leaders, especially in the rural areas. However, following the PDPA coup elements of the exiled Islamists living in Pakistan and elsewhere joined traditional tribal and religious leaders to launch a popular armed struggle, a jihad. The resistance attracted wide support from Muslims across the world, and from the United States and Europe. These *mujahidin*, after driving out the Soviet army (1989)³² and defeating the Afghan communists, declared Afghanistan an Islamic state (April 1992).

30 See Akram, *Sardar Mohammad Daoud*; and also Muhammad Hassan Sharq, *Ta'sis wa takhrīb-i awwalin jamhur-yi i Afghanistan: juz'ī khatirātī 1310–1374* (Peshawar, n.d.)

31 See Olivier Roy, *Islam and resistance in Afghanistan*, 2nd edn. (London, 1990).

32 See Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The inside story of the Soviet withdrawal* (New York, 1995).

However, their remarkable military victory soon deteriorated into a humiliating and bloody inter ethnic, sectarian and factional battle, resulting in a spectacular political and ideological defeat as they failed to form a functioning central government. This failure enabled the emergence of the Taliban (1994–2001) and raised serious doubts about the future viability of militant Islamist political struggles.

The resistance was spearheaded by two major factions of the original Islamist movement: the *Jamī‘at-i Islāmī* (Islamic society), headed by an al Azhar educated former professor of Islamic Studies, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who became president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992–6/2001); and *Ḥizbi Islāmī* (Islamic party), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former undergraduate engineering student at Kabul Polytechnic, who is currently an ally of al Qa‘ida terrorists fighting the US led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Rabbani and Hekmatyar’s disagreements were less over Islamist ideology than over tactics and strategies of the movement. Rabbani favoured a moderate, ‘go slow’ approach that focused on reforming ordinary Muslims to help build a new Islamic society – a populist approach seeking to effect ‘change from the bottom up’. Hekmatyar favoured radical strategies to effect change from ‘above’ by means of seizing the power of the state.

These alleged differences in perspective, combined with their ethnic differences – Rabbani a Tajik and Hekmatyar a Ghilzay Pashtun – and serious interpersonal conflicts, escalated factional strife in the economically and politically volatile and highly competitive environment of their exile community in Peshawar, Pakistan.³³ Two other developments during the jihad encouraged factional divisions. First, the official recognition by the Pakistan government of additional resistance organisations led by traditional, primarily Pashtun, ‘*ulama*’ (such as Mawlawī Yunus Khalīṣ and Mawlawī Muḥammad Nabī Muḥammadī); the heads of two *ruḥānī* families (Sibghat Allah Mujadidi, and Sayyid Aḥmad Gaylānī) with strong ties to the defunct monarchy; and a group led by another al Azhar educated former Kabul University professor, ‘Abd al Rabb Rasūl Sayyaf, a Ghilzay Pashtun. In addition, at least eight Shi‘ī resistance groups were organised in Iran and one in Pakistan. The Iranian groups formed an alliance called *Waḥdat-i Islāmī* (Islamic unity) under Muḥammad ‘Alī Mazārī (later killed by Taliban). Second, all of these *mujahidīn* groups were dependent upon their hosts as well as Muslim and non Muslim outside sources for their financial, military and political support, for which Pakistan (and, less so, Iran) also served as the

³³ See also Roy, *Islam and resistance in Afghanistan*.

official conduit. During the escalating Cold War era of the Reagan administration there was no shortage of foreign supporters with money and arms to help defeat and destroy the former Soviet empire.³⁴

The Islamist struggle, despite its remarkable military successes, did not produce a coherent Islamic political ideology or unity. In 1992 a powerful communist militia force headed by an Uzbek general, ‘Abd al Rashid Dustem, collaborated with Ahmad Shah Mas‘ud (assassinated by al Qaeda agents on 9 September 2001) to cause the collapse of Dr Najibullah’s Marxist government. Dustem and his National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Junbush i Milli yi Islami yi Afghanistan) demanded a role in the new Islamic state of Afghanistan. Hekmatyar, while earlier willing to cooperate with Pashtun communist officers in various failed military coup plots against Najibullah’s government, now opposed the alliance of former militia forces with Mas‘ud’s Shura yi Nazar which had brought the communist regime down. He objected to the inclusion of Dustem’s organisation in the government, while welcoming numerous high ranking Pashtun communist military officers. Fearing that the central government in Kabul might be dominated by the coalition of Tajik and Turkic minorities from the north, Hekmatyar initiated a devastating rocket attack against Kabul, which ruined the city and left millions in Afghanistan and beyond utterly baffled.

Military triumph, political failure and the rise of Taliban and Talibanism

The jihad victory quickly turned into a bitterly disappointing inter ethnic and sectarian war of all against all. It culminated in renewed regional proxy wars, the rising menace of the Taliban and Talibanism and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, followed by US intervention and the ongoing so called ‘War on Terror’. The rise of the Taliban and Talibanism may be explained by three closely interrelated factors: the Pashtuns’ appropriation of the exclusive right to rule since 1747, and especially after 1880; the legacies of the dysfunctional political culture of their tribal state; and the long simmering ethnic tensions in response to internal colonialism.³⁵

34 Steve Coll, *The ghost wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, bin Laden, from Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York, 2004).

35 For detailed discussion, see Nazif Shahrani, ‘The Taliban enigma: Person centered politics and extremism in Afghanistan’, *ISIM Newsletter*, 6 (2000), pp. 20–1; Shahrani, ‘Resisting the Taliban and Talibanism’, pp. 121–40; and Nazif Shahrani, ‘The future of the state and the structure of community governance in Afghanistan’, in William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban* (London, 1998), pp. 212–42.

The seeds for the rising sectarian and inter ethnic bloodshed were sown a century before the Russian invasion of December 1979 when Afghanistan was created as a buffer state under the Iron *Amir*, 'Abd al Rahman (1880–1901).³⁶ The century long (1880–1980) policies and practices of internal colonialism pursued by the centralising Afghan (Pashtun) nation state, assisted by outside powers (Great Britain, the USSR, Pakistan/Saudi Arabia, and the USA), as noted earlier, gradually transformed the ethnic and cultural differences within the multi ethnic nation state into articulated forms of social fragmentation. These communal tensions rose to the surface after the collapse of the autocratic monarchy and were further aggravated during the anti communist resistance, as well as the prolonged proxy wars leading to the creation of Taliban. Therefore, the rise of Taliban³⁷ and Talibanism³⁸ may be best understood within this troubled history of a modern Afghan buffer state perpetually indebted to foreign patron(s) and consistently hostile towards its subjects, especially the Turkic and Tajik/Farsi speaking peoples of western, northern and central Afghanistan.³⁹

From the failed nation-state to a militia state?

The contradictory policies and practices of state building have produced a dysfunctional sovereignty based, person centred, Kabul centred and kin based political culture, to the exclusion of more inclusive rules of governance. Military intervention in the post Taliban era, allegedly brought to fight the US War on Terror, has re empowered the collaborating Pashtun elites and their clients, to transform Afghanistan from a failed state to a regional militia state. Despite claims of democracy in post Taliban Afghanistan, the developments,

36 See Nazif Shahrani, 'Afghanistan to 1919', chapter 7 in this volume.

37 See Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War and religion in Afghanistan* (London, 2002); and Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (London, 2001).

38 The Taliban 'creed' of Talibanism consists of a person centred, sovereignty based, paternalistic politics legitimised by adherence to an extremist interpretation of *shari'a* plus the tribal honour codes of Pashtunwali, in support of their state building project, undertaken on behalf of Pashtun tribesmen (on both sides of the Afghan Pakistan border), and generously supported by their foreign patrons, including al Qa'ida and the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. See Marsden, *The Taliban*; and Rashid, *Taliban*.

39 See Sayed Askar Mousavi, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan* (New York, 1997); Hassan Poladi, *Hazaras* (Stockton, CA, 1989); M. Hasan Kawun Kakar, *Government and society in Afghanistan* (Austin, 1979). See also, Nancy Tapper, 'The advent of Pushtun maldars in Northwestern Afghanistan', *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies*, 36, 1 (1973), pp. 55–79; for a preliminary examination of state policies towards Afghan Turkistan, see Shahrani, 'Resisting the Taliban and Talibanism'.

so far, seem to reaffirm the old legacies of a dysfunctional political culture and a tribal state. These include:

- (1) an intensified mistrust between subjects/citizens and state authorities (and 'Westoxicated' educated elites), weakened traditional communities of trust (*jama'at*) i.e. civil society; and the general erosion of trust as a 'social capital' beyond the circles of family and close kinsmen or one's own ethno-linguistic group (*qawm*);
- (2) a person-centred, sovereignty-based paternalistic politics encouraging nepotism and the commoditisation of loyalties, the creation of a political economy of dependency and patronage at all levels of Afghan society, and the increasing dependence of government leaders, parties and movements on foreign subsidies;
- (3) a person-centred politics which has placed all ideologies (Islamic and otherwise) and moral principles at the service of preserving self-interest and protection of personal, familial, tribal or ethnic group interest/honour;
- (4) treatment of the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan as mere internal 'colonial' subjects (not citizens) to be re-conquered by the Taliban and now the post-Taliban regime in Kabul, in the name of re-establishing national 'unity' through re-centralisation of state power. Their demand for community self-governance and federal structure has been denied, and a policy of demographic aggression, ranging from resettlement of Pashtun in non-Pashtun territories to underestimating the 'minorities' actual numbers by administrative means,⁴⁰ continues;
- (5) the rise of the Taliban militia movement with its enigmatic leader, militantly anti-Shi'ī, anti-modern, anti-Western, anti-women, and especially anti-democratic policies and practices of Talibanism, which was the ultimate product of the person-centered, sovereignty-based Pashtun tribal political culture. The successes of Talibanism, fleeting as they were, fitted well within the structural patterns and dynamics of wars of succession in Afghanistan, at least during the twentieth century.

What distinguished the Taliban and the rise of Talibanism (and distinguishes the Karzai regime) are the radically altered political, ecological and

⁴⁰ For example, creating many provinces and districts in Pashtun inhabited areas for relatively small populations, and fewer such administrative/electoral units in non-Pashtun areas with larger populations. Also, unwillingness to conduct a scientific national census appears to be the latest evidence of continued administrative manipulations in the making.

economic conditions following collapse of the Soviet Union. The availability of multiple competing foreign sponsors (Muslim and otherwise), with their divergent or conflicting strategic, ideological, political and economic agendas, has offered ideal conditions for the emergence of extremist militia organisations such as the Taliban within the person centred tribal political culture of Afghanistan. Indeed, these conditions fuelled the wars of resistance against the Taliban hegemony, forcing them to resort to increasingly violent policies and practices against women, Shi'is and the non Pashtun ethnolinguistic communities.

Not surprisingly, the same conditions are also aiding the continuing bloody Taliban and al Qa'ida insurgency in Afghanistan now. In this context, a comprehensive solution resulting in peace and justice for all the peoples of Afghanistan is needed. This cannot be achieved, however, without adopting appropriate governance rules, structures and processes which address all of the tragic legacies of state and society relations in Afghanistan. A unitary client state with a large military and police force run by the Pashtun to protect their communal/tribal interests, as in the past century, and/or protect the interests of their foreign patrons, will be nothing more than a militia state. Sadly, opportunities in the post Taliban era to adopt an appropriate governance system for multi ethnic Afghanistan are diminishing.

South Asia from 1919

VALI NASR

At the end of the First World War India was in the throes of great political change. In 1919 the Montagu Chelmsford Reforms, which devolved some powers on Indians in the provinces, and the Rowlatt Act, which restricted Indian civil rights, had changed the legal and political structure of British colonialism. The massacre of Indian civilians at a festival at Jullianwala Bagh by British troops had created a breach between British rule and its Indian subjects. All of these developments served to energise the independence movement. The intellectual and political trajectory of Islam in India after 1919 was shaped in this environment and by Muslim responses to the gradual end of British rule during the inter war period. Those responses in turn had their roots in intellectual and political developments which had emerged during colonial rule in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Following the Mutiny Uprising of 1857 Muslims reacted to colonial rule in a number of ways.¹ One of the most celebrated was the modernist project of Sayyid Aḥmad Khan (d. 1898), which sought to reverse the decline of Islam in India by adopting new curricula of education and modern interpretations of the faith that brought many Muslims into the ambit of the colonial order. Reforming Muslim education also influenced ‘*ulama*’ in forming new educational formulations such as the Nadwī and Iṣlāḥī traditions centred on Nadwat al ‘Ulama’ (Council of ‘*ulama*’) and Madrasat al Iṣlāḥ (School of reform).

The other important trend among the ‘*ulama*’ was to preserve Islamic values and practice independent of the British order. Most notable in this regard was the Deoband movement, although others such as the Barelwī and Ahl i Ḥadīth (Followers of Prophetic traditions) movements too fall into the

¹ Mushirul Hasan, ‘Resistance and acquiescence in North India: Muslim responses to the West’, *Rivisti degli Studi Orientali*, 67, 1–2 (1993), pp. 83–105; Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic modernism in India and Pakistan, 1877–1964* (London, 1967).

same genre.² The Deoband movement sought to create an Islamic normative order in which Muslims could live in accordance with Islamic law, values and time honoured traditions.³ The Deoband movement set in place a pattern of social activism on the part of the '*ulama*' that was rooted in preserving and propagating Islamic identity to serve Muslim interests. This activism defined the pattern of the '*ulama*'s involvement in politics during the inter war years, combining social activism with identity politics, which culminated in such measures as the Shariat Application Act of 1937 that mobilised '*ulama*' political activism in Punjab in defence of Muslim identity.⁴ Products of Deoband formed many other religious organisations and intellectual traditions, beginning with the Jam'iyat al '*Ulama*' i Hind (JUH, Society of Indian '*ulama*', created in 1919), which was established as a forum for Deobandi '*ulama*' to exercise influence in the political arena, Tahrik i Ahḥar (Movement of the free)⁵, which emerged in the 1930s as a religio political organisation in Punjab, or the Tablighi Jama'at (Movement of propagation), formed in 1926 by Mawlana Muḥammad Ilyas (1885–1944), which sought to emphasise piety and proper religious practice among Muslims, divorced of concerns with their social and political position.⁶

The notion of creating an Islamic space within the colonial order found resonance in the views of other Islamic schools of thought that emerged during this period, most notably the Ahl i Ḥadīth.⁷ The Ahl i Ḥadīth emphasised 'correct' practice of the faith. Their notion of a 'true' Muslim community translated into a religious stand in what appeared as 'apocalyptic' times. The same theme manifested itself more openly in the political arena through such efforts as the Tahrik i Hijrat (Migration movement) of 1920, which encouraged Muslims to leave India, where Islam was not in power, for Afghanistan, which was then *dar al Islam* (abode of Islam).⁸ Hence, an important Muslim intellectual and political impulse on the eve of India's

2 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The ulama in contemporary Islam: Custodians of change* (Princeton, 2002); Usha Sanyal, *Devotional Islam and politics in British India: Ahmed Riza Khan Bareilly and his movement, 1870–1920* (New York, 2000).

3 Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Princeton, 1982).

4 David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the making of Pakistan* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 171–4.

5 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (London, 1948), pp. 27–74.

6 Barbara D. Metcalf, "'Remaking ourselves': Islamic self refashioning in a global movement of spiritual renewal', in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Accounting for fundamentalisms* (Chicago, 1996), pp. 706–25; Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jama'at i Islami and the Tablighi Jama'at', in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms observed* (Chicago, 1991), pp. 510–30.

7 Metcalf, *Islamic revival in British India*, pp. 268–80.

8 F. S. Briggs, 'The Indian Hijrat of 1920', *Muslim World*, 20, 2 (April 1930), pp. 167–86.

struggle for independence was to capture Islamic ideals in clearly defined Islamic communities that would preserve and strengthen Muslim values. This impulse would play an important role in the development of both Muslim separatism and Islamist thinking in the subsequent decades.

Of equal importance to the development of Muslim religious political consciousness was the Khilafat movement, which encouraged Muslim political activism against British rule, both independently and under the aegis of the Congress Party. Many notable Islamist thinkers and Muslim activists were first introduced to politics and to agitating for Indian independence during this period. The Khilafat movement was a response to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abrogation of the caliphate, which should be understood in the context of growing Muslim understanding of the meaning of their own loss of power in India. The movement protested against the plight of the caliphate after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and held the British accountable for its defeat in the First World War.⁹ The fate of the caliphate had underscored the insecurities that Muslims felt in India since their loss of power to the British in 1857.

The Khilafat movement unfolded across India between 1919 and 1924 in rallies and demonstrations, and through pamphlets and publications. It received support from the Congress Party and Mahatma Gandhi in particular who saw in the Khilafat a parallel to his own effort to use religious symbolism to energise the struggle against British rule. The Khilafat movement had the effect of galvanising diverse Muslim communities into a single mass movement around a common theme. Although the movement could not influence the fate of the caliphate, it helped fashion a Muslim political community while it lasted. That community became the crucible for Muslim identity formation, its attitude towards the British and its perception of its own future.

The Khilafat movement infused Muslim political consciousness with common conceptions about the West and, more generally, about social mobilisation and political propaganda, as well as the utility of putting Islamic slogans and symbols to communalist and political use – first giving a sense of shared political goals and ideals to Muslims. Many of the movement's ideas, such as its anti imperialism, uniting the various expressions of Islam in India, appeal to pan Islamism, use of Islamic symbols in enunciating political ends and its belief in the viability and desirability of resuscitating the institution of

⁹ Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious symbolism and political mobilization in India* (New York, 1982).

the caliphate, would become hallmarks of Muslim political thought in the decades leading to Partition. In addition, many of the leading figures of the Khilafat movement, such as Abu'l Kalam Azad (later India's minister of education, d. 1958), Muḥammad 'Alī (d. 1931) and 'Ubayd Allah Sindhi (d. 1944), captured the imagination of young activists, and became their role models.

The most important of these figures was Azad.¹⁰ His passionate essays in his journal *al Ḥilal* (The sickle moon) were widely popular with Muslim activists of all hues; so much so that he became a model for Islamist intellectual activism. Although Azad himself would refrain from openly Islamist positions and would eventually choose to stay within the fold of the Congress Party and loyal to its inclusive political platform, Islamist activists would continue to revere him as a role model. In many ways the self image of the Islamist intellectual, at least until recently, was shaped by Azad. Those who followed in the path of the Azad of *al Ḥilal* days sought to emulate the various aspects of his religio political career, and also to draw parallels between their own life stories and academic lives and those of Azad.¹¹ For instance, one often encounters highlights of Azad's life – his conversion experience, dabbling in Sufism, love of poetry, penchant for organisational work, and his commentary on the Qur'an (*Tarjuman al Qur'an* (Interpretation of the Qur'an)) – as well as his personal traits also featuring in Islamist intellectuals' biographies and descriptions of their careers. His oratorical, literary, and even sartorial styles – particularly his dark sunglasses – became the calling cards of Islamist intellectuals.

Azad was particularly important in giving voice to political frustrations facing Muslims, and as such helped create the notion of a singular Muslim political community, with distinct interests and objectives that were tied to Islamic values and symbols. He drew on Islamic history, Sufism and religious sources, but also on modern organisational solutions to chart a path for Muslim empowerment – influencing the balance of power between Muslims and Hindus. Azad's methods – organisation and agitational politics – were as influential as his ideas. His written works focused on two themes: Islamic revival and anti imperialism, which had close parallels in pan Islamic and reformist trends associated with Jamal al Dīn al Afghānī (d. 1897) or Muḥammad 'Abduh (d. 1905) in the Arab world at the time. He saw these themes as interconnected

¹⁰ Ian Henderson Douglas, *Abul Kalam Azad: An intellectual and religious biography*, ed. Gail Minault and Christian W. Troll (Delhi, 1988).

¹¹ S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the birth of Pakistan* (Lahore, 1965), pp. 152–3.

and mutually interdependent. However, in time he would place greater import on anti imperialism, and would view Islamic revival as a largely cultural goal that could be realised in the context of a secular and independent India. Azad's intellectual development perhaps reflected the fact that, as elsewhere in the Muslim world at the time, in India too the anti colonialist discourse was most eloquently articulated by the secular intellectuals.

Azad's early writings also emphasised the importance of organisation. He wrote extensively on the the *Ḥizb Allah* (party of God) which he intended to form in Calcutta as the Muslim vanguard force.¹² The notion of an organisational solution to Muslim political predicaments reinforced the tendency in Islamic circles to withdraw from the larger society and form Islamic communities. The concept of organisation in the thought of 'Inayat Allah Mashriqi (d. 1963) of the *Taḥrīk i Khaksar* (Movement of the devoted, created in 1931)¹³ or Sayyid Abu'l A'la' Mawdudī (d. 1979) of the *Jama'at i Islami* (Islamic party, created in 1941; hereafter the *Jama'at*) was simultaneously an organisational weapon to project power in the political arena and a holy community in which veritable Islam would flourish, and eventually shape all social organisations and relations. For Mashriqi and Mawdudī, Azad's organisational ideal was not separate from the impulse to preserve Islamic values in a true Muslim community.

Another influential voice of this period was Muḥammad Iqbal (d. 1938). Iqbal was influenced by Islamic philosophy, Sufism and also Western thought. Much like Azad he looked to an Islamic revival as a solution to Muslim political predicaments. However, unlike Azad, Iqbal was not concerned with imperialism, but with the threat to Muslim interests of Hindu domination. He sought to empower Muslims by reforming and reviving Islam, freeing it from cultural accretions and the hold of the '*ulama*', and instead to infuse it with rationalism. His brand of Islamic modernism was reminiscent of Sayyid Aḥmad Khan's thought. However, Iqbal's approach had more clear political overtones, and as such more directly resonated with Muslims. Through Iqbal's widely popular poetry his ideas became ensconced in public debates on Islam.¹⁴ Iqbal became the most lucid advocate of Islamic

12 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Organization" in Islamic revivalist movements', in Charles H. Kennedy and Rasul B. Rais (eds.), *Pakistan: 1995* (Boulder, 1995), pp. 61–82.

13 Syed Shabbir Hussain, 'Inayat Ullah Khan El Mashriqi', in *The Muslim luminaries: Leaders of religious, intellectual and political revival in South Asia* (Islamabad, 1988), pp. 246–75.

14 Annemarie Schimmel, *Gabriel's wing: Study into the religious ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal* (Leiden, 1963).

reform and revival, and an exclusivist view of the Muslim community that precluded its coexistence with Hinduism in the framework of Congress's nationalist politics.

Although Islamists were not enamoured of Iqbal's modernism, they were influenced by his notions of Islamic revival as a social and a political goal. His impact can be summed up as making reconstruction and reform of Islam central to Islamic intellectual discourse.¹⁵ He wove the yearning for the lost grandeur of the Islamic civilisation together with wisdom drawn from Islamic philosophy and mysticism and an appreciation for the progress witnessed in the West into a coherent world view. Iqbal was simultaneously a modernist and a revivalist. His views on this subject were far more sophisticated and thoroughgoing than Azad's, and as such were instrumental in shaping Muslim attitudes.

The legacy of Muslim activism at the turn of the century, combined with Azad and Iqbal's influence, laid the foundations for debates on religion, society and politics. These debates would have a formative impact on young Muslim thinkers, some of whom had received religious education at Deobandī, Nadwī, Ahl i Ḥadīth, Madrasat al Iṣlāḥ or Bareilwī schools. Some of these schools, such as the Nadwat al 'Ulama' and the Madrasat al Iṣlāḥ, were formed with the issues that would be raised by Azad and Iqbal in mind. The Nadwa sought to combine the Islamic and modern systems of education, an approach that was also central to Iqbal's plan to reform and revive Islam. The Madrasat al Iṣlāḥ similarly sought to incorporate modern ideas into the traditional system of education. The Iṣlāḥī experiment was closely associated with Ḥamīd al Dīn Farahī (d. 1930), whose ideas regarding tradition and modernity had already helped change the curriculum of the Uthmaniyya University of Hyderabad, and whose teachings on the thematic coherence of the Qur'an served as the basis of a school of thought in Pakistan, promoted by his student, Amin Aḥsan Iṣlāḥī (d. 1997) and, later, Jawid Aḥmad al Ghamidi.¹⁶

The graduates of these schools who would often join the 'ulama' who constituted the bulk of Azad's audience, and would later bear the mark of Iqbal's revivalism. Many religious thinkers and movements of the turn of the century and many of those who joined the Jama'at i Islāmī, the Khaksar or the Anjuman i Aḥḥar (Society of free Muslims; created in 1930) emerged from this background.

¹⁵ Aziz Ahmad, *Iqbal and the recent exposition of Islamic political thought* (Lahore, 1950).

¹⁶ Amin Aḥsan Islāhī, *Mawlana Ḥamīduddīn Farahī* (Lahore, n.d.); Mustansir Mir, *Coherence in the Qur'an* (Hawthorne, CA, 1987).

Muslim separatism, Indian nationalism and Islamism

The inter war period was one of uncertainty for Indian Muslims. British rule had destroyed their position of dominance, and they were now anxious about their fate in independent India. In broad brush, there were two Muslim positions during this period. First, there were those Muslim intellectual and political leaders who supported the Congress Party and actively participated in its politics. They were fiercely anti imperialist, and viewed opposition to the British as their foremost concern. The political views of many were informed by the legacy of the Mutiny Uprising of 1857. Moreover, these Muslims believed that support for the Congress Party was the best option before Muslims; the struggle for independence would forge a united Indian nation in which Muslims, owing to their contribution, would enjoy prominence.¹⁷

These Muslims accepted the Congress Party's claim to be above communal divisions, and to be capable of safeguarding the interests of India's Muslims both before independence and in a future Indian republic. They also accepted the notion that Islamic life and culture could prosper in a secular setting. Many of Muslim India's best and brightest minds – intellectual and religious leaders – followed this path, men such as Azad or Zakir Husayn (later India's president, d. 1969), and the bulk of the Indian 'ulama', especially Deobandis who gathered in the JUH, and who for the most part remained in India even after Pakistan was created.¹⁸ The JUH was created by Mawlana 'Abd al Bari (d. 1926) of Farangi Mahall in Lucknow to protect Muslim interests and give them a voice, but quickly came to be dominated by senior Deobandi 'ulama'. It became a strong supporter of Indian nationalism and the Congress Party.

Second, there were those Muslim leaders, exemplified and later led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d. 1948) in the All India Muslim League created in 1906 (Pakistan Muslim League after 1947), who did not consider opposing British rule to be the paramount concern of the Muslims, and remained apprehensive about living as a minority in a predominantly Hindu India.

¹⁷ Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim history in South Asia* (New York, 2000), pp. 210–30.

¹⁸ Yohanan Friedmann, 'The attitude of Jamiyyat al-Ulama al-Hind to the Indian National Movement and the establishment of Pakistan', in Gabriel Baer (ed.), *The 'ulama in modern history* (Jerusalem, 1971), pp. 157–83; Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *Ulama in politics: A study relating to the political activities of the ulama in the South Asian subcontinent from 1566–1947* (Karachi, 1972).

These Muslims believed that the Congress Party was not above communal loyalties; but that it was Hindu at its core, and as such would not safeguard Muslim interests. Jinnah, being forced to adopt an increasingly separatist rhetoric to achieve these ends, demanded special constitutional rights and privileges to protect Muslim interests in independent India.

As was evident from his speeches and, more importantly, from his demands of guarantees for Muslim interests, for Jinnah Muslim nationalism was not so much a religious notion as an ethno national one. Muslims for him were a people belonging to a distinct cultural grouping who shared a common identity separate from that of the majority population. For Jinnah the secularism of an Indian republic would serve as no guarantee for Muslims. The only truly secular state for Muslims would be a state in which they would predominate, for only then would their cultural identity be irrelevant to their social progress and political rights. Muslim separatism was thus forged by Jinnah as a foil for secular nationalism. It sought to construct a form of nationalism that would be based on religious rather than ethnic identity. Muslim separatism succeeded in limiting the appeal of Indian nationalism among Muslims, but it was not able altogether to replace the appeal of nationalism as an ideal.

Islamist thinkers expressed their views amidst a lively and bitter debate between Jinnah and the Muslim supporters of the Congress Party. Mawdudī, who became the most prolific and influential Islamist voice in South Asia, was keenly aware of the debate, and in fact some of his most forceful expositions on the relation between Islam, society and politics were developed in this context. He integrated the various trends of thinking that preceded him and formulated an all encompassing ideological vision. He wrote at a time when debates about organisation, education, ideology and the future of Muslims were raging across India.

In articles, pamphlets and public speeches Mawdudī rejected support for the Congress but also refused to embrace Jinnah's vision of Muslim separatism. He was not opposed to separatism; rather, he objected to a secular definition of Pakistan. For Mawdudī Pakistan should be more than just an attempt to level the playing field for Muslims; true emancipation, he argued, would be possible only in the form of a truly Islamic state. It was in this context that he emphasised reform and revival of Islam and greater emphasis on Islamic law as the basis for not only social order but conceiving of a Muslim state.¹⁹

¹⁹ Sayyid Abu al Ala' Mawdudī, *Islamic law and constitution*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Karachi, 1955).

However, it was the Muslim followers of the Congress Party, rather than the Muslim League, who were the principal focus of Mawdudī's Islamist discourse. He criticised them for conflating anti imperialism with support for secular nationalism. For Mawdudī anti imperialism only made sense in an Islamic milieu, and he rejected the notion that the Congress Party's anti British politics could represent Muslim interests, or that it could do so in a future Indian republic. As such, Mawdudī's vision rejected the notion that Islamic values could be preserved in an insular Muslim community within a larger secular society. Moreover, he argued that the true Muslim community must not be seen as an end but as the means to an end – a beginning that would culminate in the reign of Islamic values over the entire society.

Mawdudī advocated an interpretive reading of Islam, one that mobilises faith for the purpose of political action. He emphasised strict observance of Islamic law, discouraged traditional religious practices and rationalised the Islamic faith, making salvation the culmination of social action. Mawdudī viewed Islam as a holistic ideology that would both support the creation of and be enshrined in an Islamic state based on the *shari'a*. He was instrumental in making the Islamic state an ideal that would define the aims and role of Islamic activism in South Asian politics. Equally important were his views on the need for an organisation – the Jama'at – both to embody the ideals that he was putting forth and to fight for realising them in the political arena. The Jama'at model would become central to Islamist organisation in South Asia.

In Mawdudī's view Muslims had to conceive of anti imperialism outside Congress's discourse. In this regard he entered into a heated debate with the JUH, which was bent on using Islam to mobilise support for the independence movement. When the eminent JUH leader Mawlana Husayn Ahmad Madani (d. 1957) in 1939 wrote *Islam awr Mutahhidah Qaumiyat* (Islam and composite nationalism), depicting a multi communal Indian state as compatible with Islamic teachings, Mawdudī reacted strongly.²⁰

Madani's book, along with the Congress Party's direct appeal to Muslims through such measures as the Mass Contact Movement that began in 1937, convinced Mawdudī and many other young Islamic activists that the first order of business was to close off the Muslim community to the Congress Party; to preclude the possibility of a 'composite nationalism'. He articulated Islamism from this point on as the assertion of Muslims' prerogative to

²⁰ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'Pluralism, democracy and the 'ulama'', in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), *Remaking Muslim politics* (Princeton, 2005), pp. 64–7.

determine the limits of individual moral behaviour and define the nature of a Muslim's relation to Islam, but more important, and as a result, it was the means for creating impregnable walls around the Muslim community. By interpreting Islam as an ideology for a vigilant community, emphasising puritanical views and strict obedience to Islamic law, narrowly interpreted, and discouraging those customs and rituals that could serve as a bridge with Hinduism, Mawdudi moved to change the cultural milieu of Indian Islam as well as the context in which Muslims were encountering the political choices before them. As the balance of relations between Muslims and Hindus would change, at the national level and in neighbourhoods, towns and villages, 'composite nationalism' would cease to be a viable option.

Muslim nationalism and the rise of separatism

During the inter war years the British had recognised Muslims as a separate political community. The Muslim League took advantage of this to challenge Congress's claim on Muslim politics. Jinnah put forth a demand for equal status for Muslims by leveraging their numbers in Muslim majority areas.²¹

At the time Muslims constituted close to 30 per cent of India's population. They lived across India, but particularly in the north west and north east, where they formed majorities. The Muslim historical and cultural centres, associated with the glory days of Islam, were in Hindu majority areas stretching from Delhi to Lucknow in the north and from Bhopal to Hyderabad in the south. It is where the Muslims were a minority and yet had strongest attachment to the legacy of Muslim rule in India that the appeal of the Muslim League was strongest.

Underscoring Muslim separateness, however, proved to be a slippery slope, for it gave rise to, first, separatism and, ultimately, the demand for a separate Muslim state. As a result the growing Muslim communal identity, especially where Muslims were minorities and feared a Hindu rise to power, outgrew demands for equal status or constitutional guarantees for Muslims, to become the demand for Pakistan. Jinnah sought to ride the tiger of Muslim separatism, harping on Muslim identity and stoking the flames of Muslim nationalism while using the threat of separatism to elicit concessions from the British and Congress. In 1940 the Muslim League adopted the Pakistan Resolution, committing itself to achieving Pakistan as a separate

²¹ Ayesha Jalal, *The sole spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim League, and the demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge, 1985); Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Oxford, 1984).

Muslim state in the north east and north west of India. To rally support for this cause Jinnah increasingly turned to religious symbols to compel political support. Hence, the battle cry for Pakistan thenceforth became 'Pakistan ka maṭlab kya hai? La ilaha ila'llah' (What is Pakistan about? 'There is no god but God').

The struggle for Pakistan

During the nineteenth century British policy had recognised a separate Muslim identity, and from 1909 recognised its existence in politics when Muslims were granted separate electorates in the provincial councils. This was further confirmed by both the Montagu Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 and India Act of 1935. The Reforms gave Indians a measure of self government. This made the provinces, where feudal and tribal loyalties dominated, the focus of political competition.²² The Muslim card could have strengthened Jinnah's hand. However, with the limelight having now shifted to the provinces it became more difficult for him to demand Muslim representation along identity lines when the provincial elite would provide it along tribal, feudal and regional ones. Provincial politics rather than separatism became the beneficiary of those constitutional reforms. This essentially divided the Muslim voice, to the detriment of the separatist cause. As a result, Muslim separatism fell by the wayside in the 1920s, and Jinnah left India for England. During this period there was no all India Muslim political voice, and it was regional parties such as the Punjab Unionists that merged Muslim interests into broader provincial coalitions with Hindus and Sikhs.

The India Act of 1935 provided for full autonomy for the provinces. This benefited Muslims where they constituted the majority, but disadvantaged them where they were a minority. These Muslims, especially in the United Provinces, began to look to an all India voice that would secure greater rights for them by collectively negotiating at the centre on behalf of all Muslims, thus changing the calculus of numbers that the provincial structure of the Act had imposed on them. The India Act also provided for devolution of power to Indians at the centre on the basis of electoral successes in the provinces. This tied Muslim representation where they constituted a majority to the demands of Muslims where they were a minority.

Social activism by the 'ulama' too reinforced identity politics. Although most did not favour separatism, they nevertheless defended the prerogatives

²² David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the imperial system of control 1920-32* (New York, 1982).

of the Islamic faith before aspects of customary law which were closely tied to elites that controlled provincial politics. The '*ulama*' advocated implementation of the *shari'a* in place of customary law, and as such underscored purely Islamic as opposed to regional, cultural or tribal Muslim identity markers. This effort resulted in the Shariat Application Act of 1937. The Act benefited the Muslim League, which gained from loosening of the cultural ties that bound Muslims to Hindus or Sikhs in a provincial setting, as in Punjab.

It was in the context of the changes of the 1935–7 period that the Muslim League re-emerged on the political scene. The League's promise was that it could serve as the bridge between Muslim majority provinces, where Muslim power would be determined, and Muslim minority provinces, which needed that power to be exercised to their benefit. The 1937 elections, however, dented the League's prospects after it won only 4.4 per cent of the total Muslim vote cast, and was unable to challenge provincial parties in Muslim majority provinces. With this defeat it became imperative for the Muslim League to be able to claim convincingly to represent all Muslims, which meant converting the dominant political forces in Muslim majority provinces to its cause. Jinnah cleverly manipulated reservations that both Muslim majority and minority provinces had with regard to the India Act to argue that Muslims constituted a nation whose interests spanned all regions of India, and could not be compartmentalised based on provincial boundary lines. This line of argument echoed Iqbal's call for a Muslim state in 1930 and Chawdhri Rahmat 'Ali's (d. 1951) call for 'Pakistan' as an ideal Muslim state in 1933.

The advent of the Second World War changed the political context to the League's advantage. The British shelved all plans for further constitutional reforms, thus alienating Congress. Eager in wartime to placate Muslims and divide Indian opposition to British rule, the British acceded to Jinnah's demands. With gains in hand in 1940 the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution and committed itself to separatism. The greater prominence of the League at the centre led to a prolonged period of haggling over the shape of the future Indian state and the balance of power between Muslims and Hindus in it. Between 1940 and 1947 numerous commissions and summit meetings failed to produce an agreement between Congress and the Muslim League. In the end the Congress Party refused to accept Jinnah's terms, which asked for the creation of a Pakistan within a federal India, and thus an independent India with a weak centre and strong provinces. By doing so, Congress forced the creation of Pakistan as a separate sovereign state. In 1946–7, as key decisions were made, tensions escalated between Muslims and

Hindus all over India. There were riots and much loss of life. Once people realised that physical partition of the country was inevitable, populations began to move both ways between India and Pakistan; there was mass slaughter in which hundreds of thousands of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were killed. About 15 million people moved across borders, 7.3 million being enumerated as refugees by India and 7.2 million by Pakistan. It was one of the worst humanitarian disasters on record.

The demand for Pakistan was never strong in Muslim majority areas of India. In fact, the Muslim League never enjoyed a strong base there, and performed poorly in north west India (today's Pakistan) in the 1945 6 elections to the central and provincial legislatures. In the end, in 1947 Jinnah would have to rely on the feudal elite, tribal leaders and religious leaders associated with popular Islam to deliver the north western Indian provinces to Pakistan.

Scholars have often explained Muslim politics of the inter war period in the context of the two dominant forces in ethnic politics: primordial sources of identity; and instrumental uses of cultural symbols.²³ Muslim politics leading to the creation of Pakistan was fuelled by a demand for Muslim political empowerment that was anchored in an increasingly prominent and uniform Muslim identity, and was animated by instrumental uses of that identity by political actors to further their respective political agendas.²⁴ It has been argued by many among Muslim and Western scholars that separatism was premised on assumptions about a uniform Muslim community, anchored in the essentials of the faith.²⁵ Although many supporters of Pakistan and many among the religious literati refuse to question these assumptions, the Islamist discourse and its varied approach to construction of the uniform conception of community suggests that there were and continue to be multiple approaches to defining the uniform Muslim identity.²⁶

There were also voices other than those of Islamists that were important at this time. Most notable among them was that of Ghulam Ahmad Parwayz

23 Robinson, *Islam and Muslim history*, pp. 177–209.

24 Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and nationalism: Theory and comparison* (Newbury Park, CA, 1991), pp. 41–68; Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The politics of United Provinces' Muslims, 1860–1923* (Cambridge, 1974).

25 Farzana Shaikh, *Community and consensus in Islam: Muslim representation in colonial India, 1860–1947* (Cambridge, 1989).

26 David Gilmartin, 'Religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement in Punjab', *Modern Asian Studies*, 13, 3 (July 1979), pp. 485–517; Sarah F. D. Ansari, *Sufi saints and state power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 117–28; and Ayesha Jalal, *Self and sovereignty: Individual and community in South Asian Islam since 1850* (New York, 2001).

(d. 1979).²⁷ Parwayz was a modernist who advocated a revival of Islam by mixing Islamic and leftist ideas. He premised religious reform on rejecting the validity of Ḥadīth (Prophetic traditions) and thus creating space for modernist interpretation by limiting Islam to the Qur'an. His ideas resembled those of the Ahl i Qur'an (Followers of the Qur'an), which was an intellectual trend in nineteenth century India. Parwayz's ideas were popular with Pakistani modernists in the 1960s, but also gained him the opprobrium of the 'ulama' and Islamists.

Islam, politics and society in Pakistan, 1947 to the present

Given the circumstances of Pakistan's birth, the place of Islam in politics soon became central to national debate.²⁸ In that context it was less intellectual discussion and more political struggle, in particular between those forces with a claim to the state, that set the tone for debates on Islam. The struggle against colonialism as a driving force for the articulation of an Islamic discourse was supplanted by a struggle between state and society in Pakistan. This new struggle drew on the ideas that emerged in united India before Partition, and created a context for their followers to pursue the directions of those ideas. As such, politics became the principal arena for the development of Islamic ideology and politics.

The country's leadership at first resisted giving Islam a role in national politics. However, a state built in the name of Islam and as a Muslim homeland, confronted with insurmountable ethnic, linguistic and class conflicts, quickly succumbed to the temptation of mobilising Islamic symbolisms in the service of state formation.²⁹ This tendency was only reinforced over the years as the state failed to address socio economic issues and consolidate power in the centre. This has also opened the door for Islamic parties, notably the Jama'at, but also the Deobandī Jam'iyat al 'Ulama' i Islam (Society of 'ulama' of Islam, JUI) and the Barelwī Jam'iyat al 'Ulama' i Pakistan (Society of 'ulama' of Pakistan, JUP) to enter the fray.

27 Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The concept of an Islamic state: An analysis of the ideological controversy in Pakistan* (New York, 1987), pp. 128–33, 177–90.

28 Hamza Alavi, 'Ethnicity, Muslim society, and the Pakistan ideology', in Anita M. Weiss (ed.), *Islamic reassertion in Pakistan* (Syracuse, 1986), pp. 21–2.

29 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'Pakistan: Islamic state, ethnic polity', *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 16, 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 81–90.

Although the Pakistan state accepted a place for Islamic forces in national politics it was not willing to abandon secularism, or to permit Islamisation of society and politics outside the purview of its direct control. The state therefore resorted to regulating the flow of Islam in the political process, hoping gradually to negotiate arrangements with Islamic parties to that effect. It oversaw the inclusion of Islamic forces into the political process by using regulatory arrangements. The manner in which these arrangements took form also accounts for the particular role that Islamic parties have adopted in Pakistan's politics, the limits they have faced in their drive for power, and the structure of their discourse on politics and society.

The Pakistan state followed two general approaches to regulating Islamic activism. The first was directed at incorporating Islam into the state's discourse on socio political change at the same time as limiting the role of Islamic parties – the self styled advocates of Islamisation – in the political process. Here the state sought to appeal to the emotive power of Islam at the same time as it aimed to depoliticise it by limiting the political uses of faith. This approach characterised the Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto periods (1958–77) and that of Parvez Musharraf since 1999.³⁰ The second incorporated Islamic politics into the state's discourse by including Islamic parties in the political process, and even in the running of the state, all with the aim of establishing control over them. This approach characterised the Zia ul Haq period (1977–88), and, to a large extent, the democratic period as well (1988–99).

Islamic parties have disagreed over how to create an Islamic state, but their activities, collectively as well as independently, have strengthened the impetus for Islamisation. The Jama'at was particularly important in this regard, for it had a most elaborate definition of an Islamic state, economics and social order, and was moreover better organised to put forward its views. In 1949 the elite had accepted a political role for Islamic forces by adopting the Objectives Resolution, which was demanded by the Islamic forces as a statement of intent with regard to the future constitution. The resolution formally introduced Islamic concerns to constitutional debates. Subsequent state policy, culminating in the constitution of 1956, which stipulated that Pakistan was an 'Islamic Republic', only reinforced this tendency. Mawdudi's mark on these events through his writings and political

30 Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islam and the state: The case of Pakistan', in Matthew Moen and Lowell Gustafson (eds.), *The religious challenge to the state* (Philadelphia, 1992), pp. 239–67.

agitation, as well as his participation in the Islamic Teaching Committee attached to the Constituent Assembly, was notable. As a result, by the end of the first decade of Pakistan's existence Islamic forces were fully included in its political process, and had moved to appropriate the national political discourse from the state.

Although the state legitimated Islam's role in politics, it was not willing to cede control to Islamic forces. This would, however, not come to pass, as frictions and confrontations, the most notable and significant of which was the anti Aḥmadiyya riots of 1953–4, pitted the state against Islamic forces. In 1953 Islamic forces demanded that the Aḥmadiyya community be declared a non Muslim minority, arguing that if Pakistan was an Islamic polity then the Aḥmadiyya could not enjoy full rights in it. The government reacted by imposing martial law, arresting and trying religious activists on charges of sedition. The strong government reaction did not, however, end the problematic that was inherent in a secular government seeking to use Islam selectively to shore up its authority. Hence, after the constitution of 1956 formally committed Pakistan to some form of Islamicity, declaring the state an 'Islamic Republic', Islamic forces once again took the initiative in demanding implementation of Islamic laws and precepts.

The government of General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958–69), which assumed power after a military coup, sought to resolve the problem once and for all. Soon after he assumed office Ayub Khan went on the attack against Islamic parties and institutions. His government sought to redefine the ideology of the state and to anchor it in his vision of development in the face of Islam. Ayub Khan nationalised religious endowments and assumed guardianship of religious shrines, restricted religious education, introduced a secular family law and, in the constitution of 1962, removed 'Islamic' from the official name of the state. Ayub Khan was not able to completely subdue Islamic forces, however, or to undo the effects of the preceding decade's incremental politicisation of Islam and Islamisation of politics.

Unable to extricate Islam from politics, Ayub Khan accepted a role for Islam in politics; but then sought to define it along modernist lines. He encouraged thinkers such as Faḍl al Raḥman (d. 1986) and Khalīfa 'Abd al Ḥakīm (d. 1966), and such forums as the Islamic Research Institute and Institute of Islamic Culture, to formulate a modernist interpretation of Islam to undergird state ideology and provide a different relationship between Islam and Pakistan. State patronage of Islamic modernism, through such measures as the Muslim family Law Ordinance of 1961, increased tensions

with Islamists. These forces organised resistance to the Ayub Khan government's policies, and ultimately contributed to its fall in 1969.

The Ayub Khan regime fell before a rising tide of pro democracy and leftist activism across Pakistan, and ethnic nationalism in East Pakistan. The failure to convince the masses of the legitimacy of the state's modernist policy also opened the door for Islamic forces. Furthermore, the trauma of the civil war of 1971, which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan, led many Pakistanis to turn to Islam for solace. As a result, throughout the 1970s Islamic activism gained momentum, dominating student politics, labour unions and professional associations. It evolved into the main voice of dissent, eventually drowning leftist ideology, and putting on the defensive the populist government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971–7). Bhutto, who had risen to power on the crest of a widely popular left of centre movement, eventually adopted the demands of the Islamic opposition. He too sought to control and reinterpret Islam, couching his plans for Pakistan in religiously charged terms and symbolisms: *musawat i Muḥammadi* (Muhammadan justice) became the hallmark of his populism as Ayub Khan's Islamic modernism was replaced with 'Islamic socialism'. However, Bhutto too in the end proved unable to retain control of Islamic politics. Facing surging opposition to his government from a coalition of Islamist, ethnic and pro democracy parties, he shelved Islamic socialism and, in a last ditch effort to maintain control of the flow of Islam in politics, quickly adopted the demands of the Islamic opposition. It was Bhutto who finally declared the Aḥmadiyya a non Muslim minority in 1974, and in 1977 banned the serving of alcohol, along with gambling and all other social activities proscribed by Islamic law, and closed casinos and nightclubs. He had hoped that by surrendering to the demands of the Islamic groups he could mollify them. But Islamic parties were determined to use Islam to take power. They continued the anti Bhutto campaign, which only came to an end when the military, under the command of General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, staged a coup in July 1977.

General Zia (r. 1977–88) was himself a devout Muslim; but, more importantly, he understood that the state would gain more by harnessing the energies of the Islamic forces than by resisting them. He was, however, careful to protect the position of the state, and to keep Islamic forces under state control. Zia actively encouraged Islamic parties such as the Jama'at to participate in the political process, relaxed restrictions on Islamic activism and opened state institutions and policy making to Islamic forces. The bureaucracy and the military became more openly Islamic; the state provided patronage to an array of Islamic activities, and put an Islamic colouring on its policy

making. In addition, Zia placed the religious and ideological demands of the Islamic groups at the crux of state ideology and discourse on society and politics. He made no effort to reinterpret Islam, but made sure that the state rather than Islamist parties would be the initiator of Islamisation, which was introduced through a series of legal and policy initiatives in the 1979–84 period. The Islamisation package included the introduction of Islamic penal, commercial and inheritance laws and religious taxes, and public observance of Islamic strictures, especially regarding women's dress. Zia's initiatives had a greater impact as Pakistan became an integral part of the Islamically charged anti Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

During the Zia period Pakistan became more Islamic, levels of public observance increased, and Islam influenced all aspects of public policy and political interactions. Islamisation did not, however, alter the country's socio-political structure and economic regime. Zia's Islamising regime gave place to a more secular democratic order. However, his Islamic coalition continued to wield notable power. The continuation of the war in Afghanistan too necessitated that Pakistan remain true to its Islamic ideology. As a result, the democratic period that followed the Zia years, 1988–99, was marked by power struggles between the military and civilian politicians, and Islamist forces and secular political institutions. Initially the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Nawaz Sharif, and the Islamist parties, most notably the Jama'at, formed an alliance, *Islāmī Jumhūrī Ittīḥād* (Islamic Democratic Alliance, IJI) to provide a voice for pro Zia forces in the democratic process, and even to reproduce Zia's Islamisation order through the democratic process.

The IJI's success in the electoral process convinced the PML and the Jama'at of the potential for Islam in the democratic arena. The PML was the first to realise this and to pursue a political agenda that extended beyond its commitment to the IJI. By 1999 the PML had emerged as a voice for Islam in politics, and was defining the relationship between civilian rule and Islam. However, the PML government, facing charges of corruption and pressure from the military, fell to a military coup that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. Musharraf looked to the Turkish state building model of Atatürk, and also the Ayub Khan era, to serve as the model for his government, anchoring martial rule in a completely different ideological foundation. Musharraf was successful in loosening the grip of Islamists over the public sphere, reducing their ability to enforce morality on the public to set the tone for public debates. The new regime even encouraged more laxity in popular culture. Political Islam became a less dominant force in the public arena, especially in Punjab and Sind.

The events of 11 September 2001 had a momentous impact on Pakistan. General Musharraf and the military decided to support the US war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and also the hunt for Osama Bin Laden, the al Qa'ida leader, in the Afghanistan Pakistan corridor. This meant clamping down on the militant jihadi groups that the military had used as strategic assets to control Afghanistan and manage conflict in Kashmir. It also meant loosening the military's overt ties with Islamism. Still, the military's primary concern was keeping secular civilian parties at bay in order to perpetuate military rule. This led to a symbiotic relationship between the military and Islamists who were also keen to weaken secular civilian parties.

In the 2002 elections an alliance of Islamist parties (the JUI, Jama'at and JUP as well as smaller 'ulama' and Shi'i parties), the Mutahhida Majlis 'Amal (United Action Front, MMA), emerged as a powerful bloc in the parliament. The alliance reflected the Islamic parties' frustration with the military, but also indicated that with secular parties under pressure, Islamic parties now had the opportunity to gain the upper hand.³¹

The elections of 2002 produced a spectacular result for the MMA, better than Islamic parties had achieved in any of the previous elections, giving the alliance 23 per cent of seats in the national assembly and control of the North West Frontier (NWFP) and Baluchistan provinces. One important outcome of the elections was that Punjab and Sind voted very differently from the NWFP and Baluchistan. To be more precise, Pashtuns voted overwhelmingly for Islamism and the MMA, and the rest of Pakistan shied away from the MMA. This was the first time since the 1970s and the Afghan War (1979–88) that there had been such a political divide between Pashtuns and Punjabis.

The results also indicated the extent to which Pashtun politics had become Islamised/Deobandised. This is a trend that began in the 1960s when the popular JUI leader and student and devotee of Husayn Ahmad Madani, Mufti Mahmud, built a strong political machine and vote bank for the JUI in NWFP and the Pashtun areas of Baluchistan. The Afghan War further helped this process as JUI supported *madrasas* (Islamic seminaries) grew active in refugee relief work and conduct of the war, and especially the rise of the Taliban, meaning literally *madrasa* students. The Taliban emerged from among the orphans of the Afghan War, who had grown up in refugee camps. Their ties to their villages and their way of life had been severed. Many had been cared for by the Deobandi *madrasas* that had mushroomed along the

³¹ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'Military rule, Islamism and democracy in Pakistan', *Middle East Journal*, 58, 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 195–209.

Pakistan Afghanistan border. Having grown up in a misogynous environment in which military skills complemented religious fervour, their world was defined by the war and the increasingly militant rhetoric of Islamic activism. The Taliban emerged as a cohesive force in 1994 in response to the social chaos that had gripped the Pashtun heartland of southern Afghanistan after the Soviet departure. They were organised by young clerics themselves *madrasa* graduates the most notable of whom was Mulla 'Umar. The Taliban proved to be an effective military force, and their battlefield victories and the stability that came from their austere puritanism gave them popularity. After the Pakistan military took notice of the Taliban's potential it grew in power and prominence, and used the *madrasa* structure to mount a sustained drive for control of all of Afghanistan. That campaign only came to an end after the events of 11 September and the USA's Operation Enduring Freedom.

JUI and Deobandī politics in Pakistan

The JUI was formed by a small break away faction of the JUH on the eve of Partition. It was created after a group of Deobandī '*ulama*' acknowledged that Pakistan was inevitable and that the '*ulama*' had to organise accordingly to be able to have a voice in the new country's society and politics. The JUI was initially led by Muhajir (Migrants from India to Pakistan after Partition) '*ulama*' in Karachi and Punjab. Since the early 1970s the JUI has been dominated by Pashtun Deobandī '*ulama*' from the NWFP and Baluchistan, who trace their intellectual lineage to the JUH in India, and are especially devoted to Mawlana Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī, who was and continues to be widely popular among Pashtuns in NWFP and Baluchistan, as well as in Afghanistan. Many of the *madrasas* in that region were close to the JUH before Partition. For instance, the famous Dar al 'Ulum Ḥaqqaniyya in Akura Khattak, wherefrom many of the Taliban hailed, was inaugurated by Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī in 1937. The most eminent leaders of the JUI, such as Mufti Maḥmūd and Mawlana Sami' al Ḥaqq, were devotees of Madanī.³² As a result, this wing of the JUI, which was indigenous to the territories that became Pakistan, was not committed to Pakistan at the outset, and most likely had a hand in NWFP resistance to joining Pakistan in the elections of 1945–6 and the referendum of 1947.

32 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'The rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan: The changing role of Islamism and the ulama in society and politics', *Modern Asian Studies*, 34 (January 2000), pp. 139–80.

The change in the JUI's leadership has been an important development. During Pakistan's early years Islamism was closely associated with the Muhajir community. Islamist ideologues, such as Mawlana Mawdudī and his party, the Jama'at i Islāmī, and even the leadership of the JUI at the time, were deeply rooted in the Muhajir community. The Muhajir had also been the one Pakistani community that was closest to the separatist discourse of Pakistan. Hence, the nexus between Islamism and the Muhajir community made Islamism relevant to Pakistan's use of identity politics in managing its relations in the region. However, in the 1970s the leadership of the JUI passed from Muhajir 'ulama' in Karachi to Pashtun 'ulama' in the NWFP and Baluchistan – the pro JUH stalwarts.

This change in JUI leadership was all the more important as the JUI emerged in the 1970s as a powerful force in Islamic politics.³³ That power has continued to grow, both in the proliferation of *madrasas* and militant groups and at the ballot box. The prominence of Pashtuns in the JUI, and the JUI in Islamic politics, has therefore changed Islamist attitudes towards Pakistan's identity and its relation with India. Deobandī politics has been interested more in jihad than in legitimising Muslim separatism. Its interest in India is in the context of its vision of jihad, and not because it subscribes to the discourse of Muslim separatism. Since the 1970s Islamism has ceased to be a Muhajir issue (in fact, Muhajir politics have become distinctly ethnic rather than Islamic) and increasingly Pashtun, which has separated Islamic identity from the Pakistan India rivalry in important ways, and created a far more complex relationship between the two. This is a trend that is evident in other Islamist groups as well. For instance, the Jama'at i Islāmī, which was initially led by Muhajirs, is today led by a Pashtun, Qaḍī Ḥusayn Aḥmad, who comes from a Deobandī 'ulama' family, and is named after Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madani.

However, the full impact of the ascendance of Pashtuns and the JUI became clear only through the convergence of identity and state interest in the Zia period. It was then that Islamism joined hands with the military. For the next two decades the resultant alliance defined a strongly Islamic identity for Pakistan. The alliance provided Islamism with regional perspectives and encouraged it to use jihad to propagate its ideals – which were identified as Pakistan's interests now that the country was Islamic. This trend found its most clear expression through the Afghan War.

33 Sayyid A. S. Pirzada, *The politics of the Jamiat i Ulema i Islam Pakistan, 1971–1977* (Karachi, 2000).

Throughout the Afghan War Pakistan sought to control *mujahidin* groups as it promoted Islamic ideology among them. This policy continued into the 1990s when the jihad was extended to Kashmir. By 1994 the Afghan War had ground into a stalemate, and factional infighting no longer reflected the high Islamic ideals that had sustained the campaign against Soviet occupation. The growing frustration of Pakistan with the *mujahidin*, and the decline in their legitimacy, led to the rise of a new militancy which both shook up the Afghan scene and dominated Islamist activism in Pakistan. This new militancy had its origins in the Afghan War, but was also associated with the growing Shi‘i assertiveness after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the regional power rivalries that it engendered. The new militancy constituted a new tradition of interpretation and practice within Islamism, which first emerged in association with organisations such as *Ḥarakat al Mujahidin* (Movement of companions of the Prophet), *Jaysh Muḥammad* (Muḥammad’s army), *Lashkar Ṭayyiba* (Army of the pure) all of which were engaged in Kashmir the *Sunni Sipah Ṣaḥaba Pakistan* (Pakistan’s army of the companions of the Prophet) and *Lashkar Jhangwi* (Jhangwi’s army), and the *Shi‘i Sipah Muḥammad* (Muḥammad’s army).

Whereas Islamism had been a lay phenomenon the roots of the new militancy can be found in the changing role of *madrasas*. In 1947 there were 137 in Pakistan, which trained ‘*ulama*’; today the number is estimated to exceed 8,000.³⁴ The proliferation of *madrasas* belonging to the Deobandi, Barelwi and Ahl i Ḥadīth schools of Sunni Islam began in the mid 1970s, and has continued at a phenomenal pace since.

The Zia regime provided financial and other support, and also increased opportunities for employment for their graduates in government, thus encouraging greater numbers to enrol in them. Between 1975 and 2001 the rise in the number of *madrasas* was also supported by a flow of funds from Persian Gulf monarchies wishing to strengthen Islamic identity in Pakistan to create a bulwark against communism, which was seen as a threat after a Soviet coup in Kabul, and later to strengthen Sunni identity to achieve the same goal against Iranian influence. The Afghan War in the 1980s was also important in this regard, as it helped create a whole new genre of *madrasas* ones that were equally if not more concerned with jihad than with religious scholarship, and thus ensconced a jihad culture in its graduates.

These developments coincided with socio economic changes in Pakistan. Throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, owing to population pressure and

34 *Herald* (Karachi), September 1992, p. 34; *The News* (Islamabad), 2 March 1995, p. 1.

labour remittances from the Persian Gulf, the urban centres of Punjab grew in size. Urbanisation led to power struggles between the emerging Sunni middle classes, traders and merchants tied to the agricultural economy but not part of the rural power structure, and the traditional elite, who were Shi'is.³⁵ From the 1970s the Sunni middle classes in the burgeoning urban centres looked for a say in local politics. Sunni militancy became the means to break down the hold of the traditional elite over local politics. As a result, Sunni militancy and sectarian violence first surfaced in those communities where the new Sunni middle class confronted the political power of Shi'i landed elite – Jhang or Multan. In time this new militancy would spread to other parts of Pakistan.

These *madrasas* often deviated from the high standards of Deobandi education which had evolved in nineteenth century India. In particular they did away with logic, philosophy, rhetoric and Sufism, and instead focused on law, which was interpreted more in line with the Hanbali legal tradition which was also promoted by the *madrasas'* Wahhabi benefactors. Wahhabism, which dominates the practice of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula, is a stridently puritanical interpretation of Islam that dictates a literal reading of Islamic law, abjures popular religious practices and is militantly anti Shi'i.

The curriculum of these *madrasas* also instilled in the students Islamist assumptions regarding the necessity of attaining an ideal Islamic state, and the imperative of realising that goal through political struggle. Also important in the development of militancy was the competition between pro Iranian Shi'i forces and Sunni militants who received funding from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This competition was a manifestation of regional power rivalries and the effort on the part of Sunni regional powers to contain the Iranian revolution.

The greater number of *madrasas* produced a momentum for militancy, which only gained in strength with the rise of the Taliban. Since 2001 the scope of extremist activism has declined. The fall of the Taliban, and international pressure on Pakistan to rein in such activism has disrupted the extremists' ability to organise and recruit. However, this militancy remains a part of the Pakistan landscape, developing international ties with al Qaeda, and become more openly anti state. It is a different Islamist pole in Pakistan's politics, operating separately from MMA, which is focused on constitutional issues and gaining power from within the political process.

35 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan: The radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni identities', *Modern Asian Studies*, 32, 3 (1998), p. 705.

Islam, politics and society in Bangladesh, 1971 to the present

Bangladesh was born out of a nationalist struggle for independence which pitted Bengali ethnic identity against the Islamic universalism that lay at the foundations of Pakistani identity. In many regards, the creation of Bangladesh was a continuation of the communalist and separatist discourse that had produced Pakistan in 1947. The Punjabi domination of the Pakistan state between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan's inability to arrive at an acceptable constitutional formula which would give Bengalis representation commensurate to their numbers, income disparity between the two wings of the country, and the colonial attitudes that characterised West Pakistan's economic, social and political treatment of East Pakistan coalesced to alienate Bengalis and lead them down the path to separatism. With India separating the two wings of Pakistan, and the Indian army eager and able to limit Islamabad's ability to confront Bangladeshi nationalism, it became increasingly difficult for Pakistan to maintain its unity. In 1971 East Pakistanis voted overwhelmingly for the Awami League. This victory should have brought the party to power in Islamabad. However, West Pakistan's unwillingness to allow an East Pakistani party to come to power sealed the fate of united Pakistan. The struggle to force East Pakistan to remain in Pakistan only further strengthened Bangladeshi nationalism. Civil war doomed a united Pakistan, especially as it served as a pretext for India to use Pakistan's domestic imbroglio to break up the country.³⁶

As Bangladeshi identity shaped itself around national symbols and in refutation of the argument that Islamic identity supersedes ethnic differences, it also became markedly secular. In fact, the early years of Bangladesh were characterised by a forcible secularisation of society and politics.³⁷ Islamist voices such as that of Jama'at i Islami of Bangladesh, which separated from its Pakistani parent after 1971, were dismissed as unpatriotic forces that represented Pakistani 'imperialism'.³⁸

36 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'The negotiable state: Borders and power struggles in Pakistan', in Ian Lustick, Thomas Callaghy and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), *Rightsizing the state: The politics of moving borders* (New York, 2001), pp. 168–200.

37 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, 'Bangladesh politics: Secular and Islamic trends', in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), *Religion, nationalism and politics in Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1990), p. 69.

38 Razia Akter Banu, 'Jamaat i Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges and prospects', in Hussin Mutalib and Taj I. Hashmi (eds.), *Islam, Muslims, and the modern state* (New York, 1994), pp. 80–96; Kalim Bahadur, 'The emergence of Jamaat i Islami in Bangladesh', in S. R. Chakravarty (ed.), *Society, polity and economy of Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 27–38.

The pressure on Islamists weakened the kind of Islamic discourse that was on the rise in the rest of the Muslim world, demanding the Islamisation of state and society and a rigid interpretation of Islamic law. In Bangladesh, more attention was now paid to culture and education, and Sufi and everyday Bengali practice of Islam.³⁹ In Eastern Bengal Islamic movements had always been more rural in character, and hence reflected peasant values and culture, as well as the Sufi and folk attitudes towards Islam that prevail in rural areas.⁴⁰ There had always been a notable absence of demands for implementation of the *shari'a* or looking to the Islamic state as an ideal that would solve socio political problems at a time when these issues dominated politics in the western wing of Pakistan.

Still, attempts by the Mujibur Rahman government (1971–5) to assert the secularist prerogatives of the state, and to regulate religious activities and reform family law, met with resistance. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s *madrasas* followed the nationalist directives of the state, for instance replacing Urdu as medium of education with Bengali, but did not undertake reform of the curricula itself. In fact, many had been growing closer to stricter interpretations of Islamic law and Wahhabi influence owing to financial ties with Saudi Arabia.

The ability of the new state to regulate Islam faltered after a military coup replaced the Mujib regime in 1975. General Zia ul Rahman (1975–82) replaced 'Bengali nationalism' with 'Bangladeshi nationalism', a distinction that could only be justified by emphasising the Islamic character of the state.⁴¹ The palpable turn to Islam created more space for '*ulama*', Sufis and the Jama'at to organise. In addition, political instability compelled state actors to look to Islam in place of secular nationalism as a source of legitimacy. This trend gained momentum when a military government under General Husain Ershad took power in 1982 and sought to emulate the Zia model in Pakistan – providing legitimacy for the military regime by appropriating the Islamist discourse and co-opting Islamists.

The Ershad regime (1982–90) opened the door for more open Islamic activity. He established Islamic charity funds to support the poor, and his regime relied extensively on Islamic symbols to gain legitimacy and promoted

³⁹ Asim Roy, *Islamic syncretic tradition in Bengal* (Princeton, 1983).

⁴⁰ Taj I. Hashmi, *Pakistan as a peasant utopia: The communalization of class politics in East Bengal, 1920–47* (Boulder, 1992).

⁴¹ Taj I. Hashmi, 'Islamic resurgence in Bangladesh: Genesis, dynamics and implications', in Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Malik (eds.), *Religious radicalism and security in South Asia* (Honolulu, 2004), pp. 35–72.

a state led Islamisation process. However, Ershad, unlike Zia in Pakistan, did not rely on Islamists alone. In fact, he turned more to Sufi and popular symbols of Islam to define his regime's ties to the religion. He spent less time with Islamists and 'ulama' and more with Sufi *pirs* (hereditary Sufi leaders associated with shrines and popular piety) and at shrines. The Ershad period also created greater space for organisation and activism by Islamic forces and parties, most notable of which is the Jama'at. The party, which was left for dead in 1971, came back to become the fourth largest party in the country in 2001.

The resurgent Islamic forces demanded more Islamic laws and an Islamisation that went beyond appeals to popular Islam and Sufism. As a result, when democracy returned to Bangladesh in 1991, Islamist parties led by the Jama'at did very well. Compared with 2 per cent of the national vote that Islamic parties had received in the 1971 elections, in 1986 Jama'at won 3 per cent of the vote. Their share of the vote rose to 12 per cent in 1991 (performing far better than its Pakistani sister party). The party contested the 2001 elections as a part of the winning centre right coalition, and as a result received won seventeen seats in parliament and two cabinet posts.

The democratic period consolidated the gains made by Islamic forces. Rather than enforcing a state ideology on society, democracy compelled various political actors to seek to mobilise those Islamic symbols and forces that had emerged during the Ershad period to serve their interests. Islamisation thus became a grassroots political force and a bottom up rather than a top down process. What emerged alongside this development was not greater Islamism but greater pluralism in Islamic social expression and politics. Given Bangladesh's secular origins, Islamists had never dominated the discourse on Islam. From the outset they had to compete with reformers, Tablighi Jama'at, 'ulama' and Sufis for public support;⁴² and the political forces that were based on the ideal of the Islamic state had to compete with far more pluralistic initiatives that were focused in social and cultural institutions. For instance, a number of Islamic parties have been associated with Sufi leaders, such as Athrafi Pir's Zakir Party or Pir of Charminai's Islamic Constitution Movement. Moreover, national identity was far more defined and entrenched in Bangladesh than it was and is in Pakistan. As a result, Islamism had to accommodate rather than compete with or define

42 K. M. Mohsin, 'Tabligh Jama'at and Faith Movement in Bangladesh', in Ahmed (ed.), *Religion, nationalism and politics*.

nationalism. This mitigated its impact and reduced its ability to dominate the political discourse.

Consequently, although Islamist activism is a part of Bangladeshi politics, and the spectre of extremism lurks in the background, what has emerged, especially, since the advent of democracy in 1991, is a pluralist environment, in which reformers, Sufis, '*ulama*' and Islamists interact with one another as well as with socio political and economic forces which are associated with democracy and economic globalisation. These interactions have produced new approaches to Islam, and to applying Islamic values to issues as diverse as human rights, the environment, social justice and minority rights. Islamic consciousness in Bangladesh has also become enmeshed with Bengali ethnic identity to give the country's nationalism its distinctly Islamic flavour. However, the Islamic component of nationalism does not derive from adherence to Islamic law or an ideal Islamic state, as was the case during the Ershad period, but from Islamic values and ethics as reflected in Bengal's cultural and historical experience with Islam. Although in recent years there has been greater militancy, associated with returning migrant workers from the Persian Gulf and growing awareness of conflicts in the Middle East, still there is no one dominant voice in Islam's relations to Bangladeshi society and politics.

Islam, politics and society in India, 1947 to the present

After Partition the character of the Muslim community in India changed. First, in northern India in particular, the community's intellectual and political leaders, along with members of key social classes, the salaried middle classes and business elite, left for Pakistan. The Muslim community of India therefore became fragmented, poorer, and mostly lower and lower middle class, and without dominant voice in any major province.⁴³ It was now a geographically dispersed absolute minority with far less influence. Nevertheless, India has remained an important part of the Muslim world: 12 per cent of India's population, some 130 million people, are Muslims. After Partition the Muslim community's political outlook was largely shaped by the pro Congress discourse of Azad or the JUH, which accepted the promise

⁴³ Syed Shahabuddin and Theodore P. Wright, Jr., 'India: Muslim minority politics and society', in John Esposito (ed.), *Islam in Asia: religion, politics and society* (New York, 1987), pp. 152–76.

of an inclusive Indian nationalism in a secular republic. Indian Muslims became the first Muslim community to accept secularism not as an idea that was foisted on them by the state, but as a political ideal that best protects their interests. Indian Muslims did not make peace with secularism at the theological level, but they did so in the political arena.⁴⁴

This position was most clearly expressed by the influential rector of the Nadwat al 'Ulama' in Lucknow, Mawlana Abu'l Ḥasan 'Alī Nadwī (d. 1999). It also enjoyed the support of the most senior Indian 'ulama', especially the Deobandī JUH, most of whom had opted for a united India, although some migrated with their followers from Muslim minority areas of northern India, whereas others ended up in Pakistan by coincidence of their place of residence. After independence the JUH's approach to the place of Islam in the secular republic was akin to that of Deoband to British rule in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely, that Muslims would live by their own laws but would outwardly accept the legitimacy of the 'non Muslim' state. The dissociation between communal Muslim life and the character of the state therefore allowed for Indian Muslims to accept and embrace the new Indian Republic.

More communalist Muslim organisations, such as the Jama'at i Islāmī, gravitated towards adopting a secular political outlook. The Jama'at, which had rejected the idea of a united India, divided along Pakistani and Indian lines. The Indian Jama'at continued to adhere to Mawdudī's ideology.⁴⁵ However, it could not aspire to creating an Islamic state, and instead remained content with the educational and purely religious dimensions of Mawdudī's teachings. Moreover, in India the Jama'at understood the value of a secular political environment to its objectives. This instrumentalist use of secularism meant that the Jama'at would advocate secularism for Hindus and Islamism for Muslims.

The result was nevertheless significant. By agreeing to live by the rules of a secular democracy, and to participate in its processes, Indian Muslims achieved a unique balance between the directives of their faith, the reality of minority life and the demands of the modern state. Since 1947 no other Muslim population in the world has participated in as many national and local elections as have Indian Muslims. In the process they have developed a working knowledge of democracy. However, this reality did not change

44 Mushirul Hasan, *Legacy of a divided nation: India's Muslims since independence* (London, 1997), pp. 134–222.

45 M. S. Agwani, 'God's government: Jama'at i Islāmī of India', in Mutalib and Hashmi (eds.), *Islam, Muslims and the modern state*, pp. 259–77.

either the nature of their ties to their own faith or how they interpreted its laws and theology. In fact, the compulsion to participate in secular democracy has reinforced resistance to religious reform, as Muslims have not felt the need to balance their political behaviour with the teachings of their faith. The Muslims found that their minority status compelled them both to accept the rules of India's democracy and to resist change in the face of outside pressure.

Indian politics from independence to the late 1980s was dominated by the Congress Party. During this period Muslims developed clientalist ties with the party. They would support it in national and local elections and in return expected protection of Muslim communal interests such as government funding for Muslim education or protection of Muslim family law. This picture, however, began to change when Congress's hold on Indian politics waned in the late 1980s. The fracturing of the one party domination over India presented Muslims with both challenges and opportunities.

At one level, the weakening of the Congress Party opened the door for many more regional, ethnic and smaller parties, which quickly gained ground in both state and national elections. The resultant intensification of electoral competition made the Muslim vote more important, and provided Muslim communities across India with the means to bargain for benefits with various power brokers.⁴⁶ Where economic ties had existed between Muslims and Hindus this trend was further reinforced.⁴⁷ At the local level at least, the clientalism of the era of Congress domination has been replaced by a greater political assertiveness of Muslims in maximising returns from local competition for power.

At the national level, however, a different picture surfaced once Congress's grip on power began to weaken. The decline of Congress went hand in hand with resurgence of Hindu nationalism. This ideology was tied to anti Muslim socio religious movements that had been active during Partition, and had resisted Muslim separatism and rejected the social contract that Congress had with Muslims. Hindu nationalism rejected special status for minorities and argued that all Indians had to be equal before the law and the state, and that the majority Hindus must determine the underlying values and shape of Indian society and politics. At a more fundamental level, Hindu nationalism anchored its popular appeal in eradicating the Muslim mark on Indian

46 Steven Wilkinson, *Votes and violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India* (New York, 2004).

47 Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, 2002).

history reclaiming India from Muslims. At this level, Hindu nationalism is actively anti Muslim, drawing on the emotive legacy of the partition to generate support for its causes. The scars of the Partition and the deep suspicions that the separation of Pakistan had created among Hindus was thus politicised, and as such placed a great deal of pressure on Indian Muslims.

The rise of Hindu nationalism was marked by growing violence against Muslims, which surfaced as riots that were often organised by Hindu nationalist organisations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National volunteer corps, RSS), which has been in the forefront of asserting Hindu domination and anti Muslim activism, and the cadres of the Hindu nationalist party the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Indian people's party). Throughout the 1990s anti Muslim riots from Hyderabad in the south to Aligarh in the north, and eventually the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, served as a mobilisation tool for Hindu nationalism, and also manifested its growing power.⁴⁸

The rising tide of Hindu nationalism found political expression in the wake of two key events in the 1980s: the Shah Banu case and a flare up in the Kashmir conflict.⁴⁹ The Indian constitution had allowed Muslims to live in accordance with their own family law. This right had been important to Muslims because it was viewed as the guarantee of their survival as a minority in a secular state. Any change to the status of Muslim family law, and especially the notion of reforming it in response to outside pressure, provoked resistance from Muslims, who viewed the issue not as a religious one but a matter of minority rights in India.

In 1985 the Shah Banu case deeply affected relations between the Muslim community and the Indian state. In that year an elderly Muslim woman appealed to Indian civil courts to give her a better divorce settlement than the one she would receive under Muslim family law. India's Supreme Court responded to Shah Banu's appeal, and by so doing extended the writ of the Indian state into the hitherto sacrosanct arena of Muslim family law and its exclusive jurisdiction over personal and family matters in the community.

Many Muslim leaders, in particular those associated with Muslim institutions such as the Jami' Masjid in Delhi or Nadwat al 'Ulama' in Lucknow

48 Paul Brass, *The production of Hindu Muslim violence in contemporary India* (Seattle, 2003); Sudhir Kakar, *The colors of violence: Cultural identities, religion, and conflict* (Chicago, 1996).

49 Asghar Ali Engineer, *The Shah Bano controversy* (London, 1987); Ashutosh Varshney, 'India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of nationalism', *Asian Survey*, 31, 1 (November 1991), pp. 997–1007.

protested against state interference. Their protest was motivated by the rejection of secular law in lieu of Islamic law and, more important, the need to protect minority rights from state encroachment. Muslim agitation was driven by the desire to protect the boundaries of its identity, and to maximise rights and privileges given to the minority, but at the same time limiting the state's ability to integrate Muslims into the greater society. It was also an assertion of Muslim prerogative to status in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the global resurgence of Islam in the 1980s.

The expectation of Muslim demonstrators was to thwart the Indian state's attempts to break down the barrier between the larger society and the Muslim community. In that they were successful. This, however, proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. The government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sided with Muslim protestors against the Indian Supreme Court. That decision provoked a strong anti Muslim response from the Hindu majority population, a development which would in time favour Hindu nationalism. That in turn would lead the Congress Party to seek to placate Hindu anger, and in the process further stoke the flames of inter communal rivalry and violence.

Many Hindus viewed the vigilant defence of their family laws by Muslims as obscurantist in that it defended laws that disadvantaged women and appeared to be at odds with the demands of modernity. More important, the Muslims appeared to be emphatically defending minority rights, a position that was interpreted as resisting integration into Indian society. This meant that Muslims were not committed to Indian democracy, and preferred a separate but equal status. Hindu nationalists characterised this attitude as disloyalty to India, and depicted Muslim minority rights as a legacy of Partition which continued to threaten India. They furthermore argued that the Congress Party's idea of secularism was bankrupt and it was time that India acknowledged that it was a Hindu country, and that the minorities should live by the law of the land. The popularity of this line of argument problematised the Muslim position. Whereas Muslims felt that their minority rights must be preserved the majority population pressured them to express fealty to India by abandoning those rights.

The divisive implications of the Shah Banu case were further accentuated by a flare up in the Kashmir conflict in 1988, which quickly escalated into a Pakistani Indian stand off. Tensions in Kashmir were rooted in local grievances and the Congress Party's strong arm tactics during state elections. Kashmiri anger at Delhi soon metamorphosed into a nationalist movement. The uprising in the valley was supported by Pakistan, and also Islamist organisations such as the Jama'at i Islami, which had deep roots in

Kashmir. Pakistani support intensified in the 1990s as it actively promoted a 'jihad' in Kashmir modelled after the Afghan Jihad to put pressure on Delhi to negotiate over the fate of Kashmir. India reacted to Pakistani involvement by deploying large numbers of troops in the vale of Kashmir and treating the uprising as a Pakistani backed terrorist insurgency.

In Indian politics the Kashmir debacle brought back memories of the Partition. That India's only Muslim majority state, one whose status was at the heart of the India Pakistan conflict, was demanding greater autonomy and separatism and that with the help of Pakistan mobilised large numbers of Indians along political lines advocated by Hindu nationalism. Many came to see Kashmir as an extension of the Shah Banu case, as proof of the disloyalty of Muslims to India, their intent to divide up India once again, and their loyalty to Pakistan. Although Kashmiris constitute a small minority of Muslims, and their struggle was not widely supported by Muslims elsewhere in India, they nevertheless came to define Hindu attitudes towards Muslims.

The combination of the Shah Banu case and the Kashmir conflict created a rupture in Hindu Muslim relations. They also strengthened Hindu nationalism, which now depicted Muslims as occupiers, descendants of Middle Eastern settlers, and a disloyal minority which must be marginalised if not eradicated. Such ideas resonated more broadly as the Congress hold on Indian politics collapsed in the early 1990s, opening the door for the BJP to rise to power. The Hindu nationalist drive for ascendancy was paved with anti Muslim activism, which mobilised support for the BJP and helped quickly establish its place in popular politics.

Hindu nationalism's anti Muslim politics culminated in the Ayodhya debacle of 1992. After it gave in to Muslim demands over the Shah Banu case in 1985, the Congress government placated Hindu criticism by changing its position on the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and opening it to Hindus for worship. The mosque was built by the first Mughal emperor, Babur, at a site that Hindu nationalists claimed was the birthplace of the god Ram.⁵⁰ The mosque had been under government custody for decades, and had been closed to both Hindus and Muslims. By opening it to Hindu worship the government only helped inflame passions on both sides and escalate the Hindu Muslim conflict.

⁵⁰ Ramesh Thakur, 'Ayodhya and the politics of India's secularism: A double standards discourse,' *Asian Survey*, 33, 7 (July 1993), pp. 645–64.

Hindu nationalists quickly turned Ayodhya into a symbol of their movement. They asserted Hindu primacy in India by laying claim to the birthplace of a Hindu god and by demolishing a Mughal mosque, and in the process ending concessions to a minority. They mobilised public opinion around razing the mosque and constructing a temple to honour Ram. This appealed to Hindu religious sensibilities, but symbolically it sought to erase the Muslim imprint on India's history, and by implication alter the balance of Hindu-Muslim relations in the favour of the former. Ayodhya would symbolically end the special status for Muslims in India that had been a product of the politics of the Partition, and affirm the Hindu nature of the India state.⁵¹ In 1992 a Hindu mob destroyed the mosque, and with that event confirmed the change in the nature of Hindu-Muslim relations that had begun in 1985.

Since 1992 Hindu nationalism has continued to be an important political force in India, controlling the government in Delhi as well as in a number of states. The BJP's ascendance, however, has not brought stability to Indian politics, which is now fractured by the increase in power of smaller parties. This has prevented Hindu nationalists from implementing sweeping policies to marginalise Muslims completely. However, what is clear is that many of Hindu nationalist arguments have now become a part of mainstream political thinking in India. This was reflected in the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, when a Hindu nationalist mob killed some 2,000 Muslims and drove many more into refugee camps with the complicity of the local police and the state's BJP government.

Muslims have not provided a uniform response to changes in Indian politics. There have been sporadic acts of violence, but more often Muslims have allied themselves with anti-BJP forces in local and state elections, believing that electoral politics can protect their interests. However, the obvious advantages of holding the balance in India's fractured electoral politics do not address the larger problem of changes in Hindu attitudes towards Muslims, their historical legacy, their role in today's India and their rights and duties. This is a larger challenge which faces Muslims and will decide the direction of politics in the years to come.

51 Arvind Sharma, *Religion and secularism in India: After Ayodhya* (New York, 2000).

South-East Asia from 1910

ROBERT W. HEFNER

The last stand of South East Asia's independent Muslim polities took place at the turn of the twentieth century. In Malaya the British consolidated their hold on the peninsula's disunited sultanates, completing an incremental colonisation of the mainland begun in the 1870s. In the Netherlands East Indies Dutch forces shot their way into the territories not yet part of the colony, while also mopping up the last pockets of Muslim resistance in Aceh, West Java and Sulawesi. Masters of the Philippines colony since their victory in the Spanish American War, the Americans achieved in the first years of the new century what had eluded their Spanish predecessors for three hundred years. At a cost of several thousand Muslim lives, they subdued the south's fractious chiefdoms and incorporated the region into an otherwise Christian Philippines.

The passing of South East Asia's independent Muslim polities brought a momentary halt to armed resistance to the Europeans. The colonial advance also quickened the pace of social change, in a manner that heightened Muslims' awareness of their backwardness relative to the Chinese, Ĥaḡramis and Europeans involved in the new colonial economy. Even where the Europeans left native rulers in place, control of the commanding heights of politics and the economy shifted into non native hands. Territories with rich economic opportunities witnessed an influx of immigrants, often non Muslim. In the Malay peninsula at the beginning of the century, and the southern Philippines a few decades later, the non Muslim influx was so great that it threatened to make Muslims a minority in their own lands.

Even as the Western advance made Muslims more conscious of their marginalisation, it provided them with new cultural tools with which to imagine alternative social orders. First allowed into Britain's Straits Settlements and Dutch Java in the early nineteenth century, Christian missions won few Muslim souls. During the first decades of the twentieth century, however, missionary schools had a galvanising effect on Muslim reformers, who

reorganised their schools on the Western model. With the colonial regime's growing need for native administrators, state sponsored programmes of general education expanded too. By 1920 some 30 per cent of all males in British Malaya were literate. In the Netherlands Indies the literacy rate was 10 per cent. In both territories, most who passed through colonial schools were instructed in vernacular Malay, which, with Arabic, had long served as the language of Islamic scholarship in the Archipelago. In the southern Philippines American schools had made English the lingua franca for the thirteen ethno linguistic groups who comprised the south's Muslim population. English was also the medium for the Philippines' first ever printed translation of the Qur'an.

In South East Asia's new cities, the expansion in popular literacy combined with migration and population growth to create restless Muslim publics, eager to explore new modes of piety and politics. Both interests were addressed in a host of new newspapers and periodicals. These targeted the native Malay communities rather than, as had been the case with the first non European newspapers in the mid nineteenth century, Chinese, Arabs and Indian Malays.

Although few Philippine Muslims as yet made the journey, Indies and Malayan youth had been flocking to the Hijaz and Cairo for decades. In 1885 the Dutch Orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje had observed that the number of Jawa (the term for Malayo Indonesians living in the Middle East) in the Hijaz had soared,¹ as a result of steamship travel, the opening of the Suez Canal and economic growth in the pacified Archipelago. Pilgrimage declined during the First World War, but rose again shortly thereafter, buoyed by the rubber boom in Sumatra and Malaya. In 1927 some 64,000 pilgrims from the Dutch Indies and British Malaya made the pilgrimage, 42 per cent of the foreign total. In Mecca most Jawa limited themselves to religious study. In Cairo they were introduced to more novel notions, the most urgent of which was the question of how to respond to the growing threat of Western imperialism.

Ibn Sa'ud's occupation of Mecca in October 1924, and the sudden departure of four boatloads of Jawi scholars a few months later, sent shock waves through the traditionalist Muslim community in Malaya and the East Indies. The event also boosted the political fortunes of Muslim reformists. In the 1890s the Meccan Jawa had not yet been polarised along doctrinal lines. Two decades later, however, the rivalry between 'New Group' reformists (Kaum

1 C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter part of the 19th century* (Leiden, 1931), p. 215.

Muda) and 'Old Group' traditionalists (Kaum Tua) had become endemic in both the Hijaz and the Archipelago. The first Kaum Muda organisations were formed in Singapore and Penang, where newspapers, ethnic diversity and freedom of association proved conducive to Islamic reform. A few years later political activists linked the ideals of Islamic reform to new mass organisations, making the reformist challenge to traditionalists all the greater.

Notwithstanding these developments, the progress of Islamic reform in the early twentieth century Archipelago was far from uniform. In peninsular Malaya traditionalists allied with native aristocrats to impede reformist activities. In the southern Philippines traditionalists excluded reformists from positions of leadership until the 1970s. In the Dutch Indies modernist organisations faced stiff opposition from the traditionalist Nahdatul 'Ulama' (NU; Ar. Nahḍat al 'Ulama'), established in 1926. In decades to come the NU was to turn itself into the largest Muslim association in the world (with some 40 million supporters today). Other Indies Muslims looked to socialist and civic nationalist ideals rather than Islam as their political reference point. In the 1920s communist Muslims launched small scale rebellions in several districts. In the 1950s Indonesia developed the largest Communist Party in the non communist world.

The history of Islam in twentieth century South East Asia, then, is not a story of Islamic reform's unrelenting progress. From the coming of Islam in the thirteenth century to the rise of Islamic reform in the early twentieth, Malayo Indonesian Islam has been distinguished by its pluricentric diversity. No army of horse warriors ever conquered the Archipelago or united its myriad societies into a seamless Muslim empire. No ethnic group ever succeeded at making its language, customs and religious practices the hegemonic standard for all others. Until well into the modern period, politics and culture in this Muslim region remained varied, forged in a diverse array of coastal principalities, agrarian kingdoms and tribal chiefdoms.

The twentieth century introduced a new wrinkle into Muslim South East Asia's pluralist legacy. National independence provided native elites with new technologies of governance, and created middle classes keen to display their status and common culture. Rural communities that had once exercised the option of creating their own blend of *adat* custom and Islamic norms were brought under the sway of developmentalist states, whose leaders had their own ideas as to how Islam should be. The alliance of Islamic reform with the post colonial state eventually eliminated most of the exuberantly syncretic traditions for which South East Asian Islam had earlier been famous. But the profession of Islam across South East Asia remained varied nonetheless. In

the 1990s conservative Islamists decried the *umma*'s diversity as an obstacle to their unitarian ambitions. But other Muslims viewed this legacy as a local resource for Islamic pluralism and democracy. The contest between unitarian and pluralist visions of Islam remains a defining feature of South East Asian Islam.

The reformist surge

The wave of Islamic renewal that swept Muslim South East Asia during the first decades of the twentieth century built on a foundation laid in the nineteenth. In the East Indies the Dutch had suppressed a series of rebellions launched under the banner of Islamic renewal. The Dipanagara insurgency in Java (1825–30), the Padri movement in West Sumatra (1803–37), the Banten revolt (1888), and the Aceh War (1873–1912) were all accompanied by appeals for Muslim unity against foreigners and unbelievers. Although the Dutch suppressed the rebellions, the scale of the resistance showed that, as native aristocrats were co-opted into colonial service, independent '*ulama*' became a rallying point for anti-colonial sentiment.

Although officially professing a policy of non-interference, the Dutch authorities reacted to the rebellions by discouraging Muslim political activism while tolerating private devotion. The Dutch urged natives in government service to avoid undertaking the *hajj*. They also created a hierarchy of state-appointed Islamic judges and officials, subject to removal by the government. Convinced that returning pilgrims were fomenting unrest, the colonial government imposed restrictions on the *hajj*, including passport taxes and post-pilgrimage surveillance. There were no such restrictions in the British colonies, and many Indies Muslims circumvented Dutch controls by leaving for Arabia from Singapore. Dutch policy did not prevent a steady increase in the number of pilgrims, from 2,000 persons in the 1850s to 7,000 in 1900.²

In South East Asia itself the most distinctive development in the early twentieth century was, not just the spread of Islamic reform, but the growing appeal of Cairene ideas linking religious renewal to nationhood. Although at the turn of the century the number of Jawa in the Hijaz was much greater than those resident in Egypt, developments in Cairo had a galvanising effect. Commentaries on Europe's challenge were a staple of the Cairo press. Modernist reformers in the tradition of Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838/9–97)

2 J. Vredenburg, 'The hadj: Some of its features and functions in Indonesia', *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land, en Volkenkunde*, 118 (1962), p. 111.

and Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) promoted, not just a return to the Qur’an and *sunna*, but the unity and revitalisation of Muslim civilisation. Other writers stressed the need to balance pan Islamic unity with love of homeland (*waṭan*).³ After the Japanese triumph over Russia in 1904 some authors cited Japan as a model for anti colonial emulation.

The themes of Islamic renewal and love for homeland received an enthusiastic reception among the Jawa in Cairo and urban communities in the Archipelago. In 1912 Jawi students in Cairo established a Malayo Indonesian association, the Loyal Association of Students (Jamiah Setia Pelajar). The association published a journal, *Unity* (Ar. *Al Ittiḥād*), the Middle East’s first Malay language periodical, loosely modelled on Rashid Riḍa’s *al Manar*.⁴ In the Archipelago the combination of mercantile wealth, ethnic cosmopolitanism and legal freedoms made British ruled Singapore and Penang the leading centres of Cairo influenced renewal. By the early 1900s both cities had well established communities of Ḥaḍramis and Indian Malays, in addition to a polyglot population from Sumatra, Java and peninsular Malaya. In July 1906 Singapore reformists came together under the direction of a former student of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, Shaykh Muḥammad Tahir bin Jalal al Dīn al Azharī (1869–1957), to establish the first South East Asian periodical dedicated to Islamic renewal and nationhood. Most of Tahir’s editorial staff were Indian Malays and Straits Arabs, not Malays. The newspaper, *al Imam* (1906–8), modelled itself on Rashid Riḍa’s *al Manar*, to which Shaykh Tahir is reported to have contributed while residing in Cairo a few years earlier.⁵

Consistent with its staff’s multi ethnic background, *al Imam*’s editors looked sceptically at Malay customs and politics. The editors used an Arabic, rather than Malay, political vocabulary to enunciate what were to become central themes in the Kaum Muda’s critique of the religious establishment. They rejected most Malay customs (Malay, *adat*; Ar., *‘ada*) as un Islamic, and demanded that individual Muslims take responsibility for their faith. The reformists also blamed the Malay aristocracy for having invited colonial subjugation by deviating from God’s law. Only submission to the law, the editors proclaimed, would allow Muslims to respond to the unbelievers now controlling Jawi lands. Notwithstanding their dislike of foreign rule, the editors took pains not to challenge colonial authority

3 Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic nationhood and colonial Indonesia: The umma below the winds* (London and New York, 2003), p. 131.

4 Ibid., pp. 139, 165.

5 William R. Roff, *The origins of Malay nationalism*, 2nd edn. (Kuala Lumpur, 1994), pp. 59–60; Laffan, *Islamic nationhood*, p. 150.

directly. Although they trumpeted the idea of independence, the reformists also did not make clear just what the borders of the future Muslim nation might be.⁶

During these years, Singapore became the Archipelago's leading centre for reformist education. The city's *madrasas* attracted students from Sumatra, Java, peninsular Malaya and Patani in southern Thailand. In 1908 *al Imam*'s owners established a modern *madrasa*, bringing in Egyptians to serve as teachers. Elsewhere individuals studied with Arab scholars from the Hadramawt and the Hijaz, as well as Jawi scholars returned from Mecca and Cairo. In this cosmopolitan environment, many in the Jawi community began to speak of the need, not just for Muslim unity, but for a Muslim homeland linking British Malaya with the Dutch Indies.

Reformism in peninsular Malaya

Beyond the polyglot worlds of Singapore and Penang, Kaum Muda ideas received a more mixed reception. In peninsular Malaya, the Malay establishment succeeded at excluding prominent reformists from positions of official influence for most of the colonial era. Under the terms of the Pangkor Engagement signed in Perak in 1874, the British assumed responsibility for the colony's political, economic and foreign affairs. In principle, however, the British left control of 'Malay religion and custom' to the sultans and their regional chiefs. As the British extended their hold over the peninsula, they applied this same principle of (relative) non interference in religious affairs to each of the states brought into the Malayan union. The British had long dealt with Muslim institutions in India, and the 1857 Mutiny in that colony made them wary of interfering too directly in Muslim affairs.

Rather than freezing the religious status quo, however, the policy of non interference actually extended the Malay sultans' religious authority well beyond its traditional range. They had long been represented in state ceremony as defenders of the faith, and their status emoluments included the right to appoint *qadīs*. The latter position bore an only vague resemblance to the judicial office of the same name in Arab lands. Responsibility for religious and legal affairs lay largely in the hands of local chiefs and village *imams*, not Muslim jurists. 'Senior kin, village elders, and local [village] rulers were responsible for the administration of religious law and other matters bearing

6 Roff, *The origins*, pp. 57, 65; Laffan, *Islamic nationhood*, p. 156.

on religion and custom.⁷ Although peninsular society had a network of privately owned Qur'anic schools (*pondok*), there was neither a state wide system of Islamic courts nor a centrally coordinated association of jurists.

By providing a rationale and mechanism for rulers' involvement in religious affairs, the British shifted primary responsibility for religious matters from local to state officials. Relieved of political economic duties yet flush with funding from their colonial 'advisers', the sultans created a centralised and salaried administration for administering Muslim affairs and the *shari'a*. They also established councils of religious and Malay custom, appointed *qadis* to Islamic courts, and used state bureaucracies 'to produce an authoritarian form of religious administration much beyond anything known to the peninsula before'.⁸

Although excluded from government posts, reformists nonetheless made steady inroads into Malay society. After 1906 reformists founded dozens of schools in the peninsula, the graduates of which became teachers and lower level officials in the burgeoning bureaucracy.⁹ From these administrative perches, the graduates worked with the courts and religious councils to monitor conformity to the Ramadan fast, discourage the performance of calendrical festivals of pre Islamic origin, and diminish the authority of local clan officials.¹⁰

One social fact continued to frustrate the reformists' progress. Until Malaysian independence in 1957, Malay society remained predominantly rural and traditionalist. During the first decades of the twentieth century agricultural estates blossomed, mining boomed and urban settlements sprouted across the length of this prosperous colony. Rather than inviting them into the new economy, however, the British quarantined Malays in the rural sector, in an effort to shield them from social change. To provide the muscle for the modern economy, the British imported thousands of Indian and Chinese labourers. The result was that by 1920 Malays accounted for just 50 per cent of the colony's population, and only 10 per cent of its urban residents. Only 4 5 per cent of the entire Malay population lived in urban areas.¹¹

7 Michael G. Peletz, *Islamic modern: Religious courts and cultural politics in Malaysia* (Princeton and Oxford, 2002), p. 30.

8 Roff, *The origins*, p. 72; see also Anthony Milner, *The invention of politics in colonial Malaya: Contesting nationalism and the expansion of the public sphere* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 217 18.

9 Roff, *The origins*, p. 77; see also Rosnani Hashim, *Educational dualism in Malaysia: Implications for theory and practice* (Kuala Lumpur, 1996), pp. 23 4.

10 Peletz, *Islamic modern*, pp. 54 8. 11 Roff, *The origins*, p. 253.

Malay society's colonially leveraged traditionalism circumscribed the appeal of Kaum Muda reformism. The same social conservatism undermined the prospects for proponents of radical nationalism to win followers. In the 1920s a few Malays had begun to call for the formation of a pan Malay nation state. Graduates of vernacular schools that educated rural Malays, the nationalists looked to their socialist and radical nationalist counterparts in the Dutch East Indies for inspiration. Many aspired to some form of political union with Indonesia.¹² Whereas socialism and secular nationalism became important ideological streams in Indonesia, however, in Malaya the movement won few followers. The passage from colonial rule to national independence was instead mediated by neo traditional elites, recruited from the ranks of the Malay aristocracy and the English educated bureaucracy.

Reformism and its rivals in the Dutch East Indies

In the Dutch East Indies the progress of Kaum Muda reform was even more chequered than in Malaya. With its large merchant class, historic links to Singapore and tradition of Meccan influenced renewal (stretching back to the eighteenth century), West Sumatra's Minangkabau region quickly distinguished itself as the colony's most energetic centre of reform. Reformism here was also more self consciously political than its counterparts in Singapore and Java.

Minangkabau had a history of politicised reformism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the province had been torn by the Padri rebellion (1803–37), which pitted independent '*ulama*' and Meccan influenced reformists against traditionalist rulers and scholars. The Dutch intervened in the conflict after 1819, and their assistance eventually turned the tide against the rebels. Although the Dutch attempted to rally traditional chiefs against the stream, the war only hastened the penetration of Islamic reform into Minangkabau. In 1833 the Dutch exiled the last Minangkabau king to Java. The action eliminated any possibility of a future alliance of native aristocrats and Kaum Tua '*ulama*' against reformists, like that which proved so influential in peninsular Malaya. As European colonialism reached deeper into Minangkabau society its people looked not to native aristocrats for guidance, but to Muslim scholars, new Muslim intellectuals and radical nationalists.

Minangkabau society also had a history of involvement with Arabia. In the last decades of the nineteenth century a Minangkabau religious scholar,

¹² Roff, *The origins*, p. 255.

Shaykh Aḥmad Khaṭīb al Minangkabawī (1860–1916), had been elevated by Ottoman authorities to the salaried position of *imam* and *khaṭīb* (preacher) at the al Ḥaram Mosque in Mecca. Although a Shafī‘ī who had been initiated into the Naqshbandī order, Khaṭīb was critical of unreformed Sufism; he was also a resolute opponent of Dutch rule.¹³ Although Khaṭīb spent his last years in Mecca, he became the spiritual patron for a generation of Muslim reformists who returned to proselytise in the Archipelago.

By the early twentieth century, then, West Sumatra had established itself as the Dutch Indies’ most important centre of Islamic reform. But the reformists faced stiff opposition from activists more concerned with politics than Islamic renewal. Some notables, for example, sought to revive and modernise Minangkabau *adat*, renowned for its system of matrilineal inheritance and the high status it accorded women. In 1906 a ‘Young Malay’ group took shape under the leadership of Datuk Sutan Maharadja, inspired in part by the example of the Ottoman Young Turks. The Young Malays championed women’s education, established the Indies’ first women’s newspaper, *Soenting Melajoe*, and decried what Sutan Maharadja described as the subordination of Minangkabau Islam to ‘Mecca people’.¹⁴

Although progressive traditionalists and secular nationalists continued to win the hearts of some Minangkabau, circumstances in the early twentieth century favoured the cause of Islamic reform. After 1910 growing numbers of graduates from Aḥmad Khaṭīb’s study circles in Mecca returned home and militated for religious reform. The reformists decried what they regarded as the heterodoxy of local *ṭuruq*. They took exception to the practice of *taqlīd* (imitation) in religious learning, and called for a return to the Qur’an and Sunna. The reformists also developed new media and religious associations. In the West Sumatran town of Padang reformists launched the East Indies’ first Kaum Muda journal, *al Munir*, published from 1911 to 1916.¹⁵ In 1912 Padang reformists established the Enterprise Association (Sarekat Usaha) for business and trade, and shortly thereafter opened the first private Dutch Native School (HIS, Hollandsch Inlandsche School) to offer courses on Islam. In 1920 reformists organised the Association of Islamic Religious Teachers (PGAI, Persatuan Guru Agama Islam).¹⁶

13 Laffan, *Islamic nationhood*, pp. 107–9; Deliar Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia 1900–1942* (Kuala Lumpur, 1993), pp. 19, 30–1.

14 Taufik Abdullah, *Schools and politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra* (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 12–13; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 217.

15 Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 39.

16 Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, pp. 16–17.

In the 1900s Minangkabau scholars returning from Mecca undertook reforms that were to transform Islamic education in West Sumatra. In 1909 they opened the first Muslim reformist school, the Adabiyah, in Padang. In 1915 they established the first modernist school for girls in Padang Panjang. In 1916 one of the most influential schools, the Jembatan Besi, introduced a system of graded classes to replace the loosely structured study circles previously favoured for religious instruction. In 1918 reformist students and teachers came together to establish the Thawalib, a modern organisation intended to serve the practical needs of *madrassa* students. Thawalib chapters were soon established across Sumatra. With them came the use of desks, classrooms and instruction in general subjects such as geography and history. Thawalib schools also used textbooks imported from Egypt, among which were works by Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Riḍa.¹⁷

Falling coffee production coupled with the colonial government’s introduction of monetary taxation provoked a small tax revolt in 1908, which the authorities easily suppressed. But radical opposition to Dutch rule continued. In 1915 a local chapter of the Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union) was established in Padang, four years after the organisation’s founding in central Java. The first openly political organisation in Minangkabau, the Padang SI soon split along New Group and Old Group lines. A few years later the organisation experienced an even greater crisis, as it was torn between its mainstream membership and Muslim communists.

By the 1920s some Thawalib students were exploring local syntheses of Islam and communism. The effort was initially associated with a railway worker and religious teacher from a prominent Minangkabau family, Ḥajji Datuk Batuah. Batuah had spent 1909–15 in Mecca, but in Java during 1923 he came under the influence of Muslim communists. As adviser to the Thawalib, Batuah won many students to the cause of Islamic communism, but he also earned the enmity of Dutch authorities and Kaum Muda scholars. On 11 November 1923 Dutch officials arrested Batuah, one week after the establishment of the Communist Party in West Sumatra. In 1924 the PGAI declared communism incompatible with Islam.¹⁸ Some activist students nonetheless continued to promote what they called *ilmu kominih* (‘communist knowledge’). Thawalib students were well represented in the ranks of insurgents

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 34–5; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 45–6.

¹⁸ Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 37; Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 48–9.

involved in poorly coordinated communist uprisings that took place in West Sumatra (as well as Batavia and Banten) in December 1926.¹⁹

The group that most benefited from the resulting anti communist repression in Minangkabau was the reformist Muhammadiyah, which favoured educational and welfare programmes over mass politics. The first Muhammadiyah chapter was established in West Sumatra in 1925. By 1930 the organisation had emerged as the largest sponsor of reformist education in West Sumatra and Java. The Muhammadiyah's wildfire spread was in part the result of the organisation's dedication to school reform, at a time when urban Muslims were increasingly aware of the practical benefits of education.²⁰ But the organisation's popularity also reflected the general tenor of Muslim life in Minangkabau. By the 1930s the West Sumatran community had developed the social mien for which it was to be renowned for the remainder of the century, marked by its dedication to educational modernisation; high rates of female literacy and public participation; and a commitment to Islamic reform and an ethnically inclusive nationalism.

In Java the proponents of Islamic reform faced stiffer competition for Muslim hearts and minds than did reformists in Minangkabau and Malaya. Half of the Dutch East Indies' population resided on this densely populated island; no region in South East Asia had been more profoundly transformed by nineteenth century colonialism. After the Dutch Java War (1825–30) the Europeans had left two small principalities in place in south central Java, in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. The remainder of the island was governed by Dutch appointed officials, known as *priyayi*. Some *priyayi* claimed descent from the families of regionally influential notables, but by the end of the nineteenth century most were salaried bureaucrats with only vague claims to aristocratic descent.²¹

Although Western scholars once presented them as uniform adherents of 'Hindu Buddhism' or a syncretic 'Javanese Islam' (*Islam Jawa*), some *priyayi* were actually observant Muslims. Moreover, whatever their rulers' religious preferences, the inland courts never exercised an effective hegemony over the whole of Java. After the Islamisation of central Java's last Hindu Buddhist kingdom in the early sixteenth century political authority in the island had

19 B. Schrieke, 'The causes and effects of communism on the west coast of Sumatra', in B. Schrieke, *Indonesian sociological studies*, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1955), vol. I, pp. 95–159.

20 Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 209.

21 Heather Sutherland, *The making of a bureaucratic elite: The colonial transformation of the Javanese priyayi* (Singapore, 1979), p. 78; Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (Dordrecht, 1984), pp. 27–9.

fragmented into regionally based principalities, each with its own social and religious personality. The Banten region in western Java took on a Malayo Sumatran face, with a venerable tradition of scholarship and 'ulama' authority. The north coast mixed a vibrant Javanism with Malay and Arabic influences. The eastern salient was home to Java's only surviving Hindus, as well as a populist tradition of Muslim syncretism organised around founders' cults and magic.²²

Rather than reflecting the radiance of culturally hegemonic courts, then, religion in Java was characterised by a fissiparous diversity. In some corners of the island there were Qur'anic schools and scholarly networks as *shari'a* minded as any in Sumatra. In other regions, however, Javanist Muslims expressed open disdain for Islamic law and maintained regional cults of guardian and ancestor spirits. Although but one influence among many, the principalities in Yogyakarta and Surakarta contributed to this religious pot pourri. In addition to hosting Islamic calendrical festivals, the sultan of Yogyakarta presented offerings each year to the guardian spirit of the Mount Merapi volcano (north of the capital) and to the female guardian of the South Java Sea. Court officials in the nearby kingdom of Surakarta sponsored an annual buffalo sacrifice to the goddess Durga.²³ The courts' spiritual eclecticism, the vibrancy of regional traditions and Dutch hostility to Islam all combined to make many Javanese indifferent to reformist understandings of the *shari'a*. As the struggle to define Islam in Java intensified, then, it did not just involve Old Group traditionalists and New Group reformists, but nominally Islamic adherents of 'Javanese Islam' (*Islam Jawa*).

The Javanese were not the only Muslims in the Archipelago to inhabit a luxuriant spiritual forest. In the early twentieth century the aristocratic classes among the Bugis, a coastal people living in what is today the province of South Sulawesi, had an indigenous tradition which, although ostensibly Islamic, was as much at odds with Sunni orthodoxy as its Javanist counterparts.²⁴ On the island of Lombok, the Sasak also possessed a distinctly ethnic variant of Islam, known as the Wetu Telu (Three Times). The Three Timers

22 Andrew Beatty, *Varieties of Javanese religion: An anthropological account* (Cambridge, 1999); Robert W. Hefner, *Hindu Javanese: Tengger tradition and Islam* (Princeton, 1985).

23 Stephen C. Headley, *Durga's mosque: Cosmology, conversion and community in central Javanese Islam* (Singapore, 2004); Mark Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative piety and mysticism in the sultanate of Yogyakarta* (Tucson, 1989), pp. 215–40.

24 Christian Pelras, *The Bugis* (Oxford, 1996); Martin Rossler, 'Islamization and the reshaping of identities in rural South Sulawesi', in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvath (eds.), *Islam in an era of nation states: Politics and religious renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu, 1997), pp. 275–306.

had rituals, origin myths and religious specialists distinct from those of their Sunni neighbours. They used their mosques, not for congregational worship, but for celebrating calendrical festivals of world origin and fertility. As with Java's Javanists, the Three Timers experienced a crisis of tradition in the independence period, as a result of the growing influence of Islamic reform.²⁵

If Java was not alone in its cacophony of religious voices, it was distinctive in the degree to which tensions between syncretist and normative minded Muslims were modernised and politicised. In the mid nineteenth century a few syncretic Muslims had responded to challenges from reformist Muslims by converting to Christianity. In the early twentieth century others from Java's nominally Islamic community organised new religious movements known as 'interiority' (*kebatinan*). Some of these spiritualist movements maintained a vague identification with Islam. Others, however, claimed to be the beneficiaries of new prophecies and scripture.²⁶ The Dutch provided legal protection for these openly apostatic movements, but the new religions caused deep resentment among pious Muslims.

If Java was the centre of the Dutch Indies' most assertive new religions, it was also the incubator for the colony's most powerful Muslim organisations. In 1912, in the south central Javanese city of Yogyakarta, a local businessman and religious scholar, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dachlan (1869–1923), founded what was to become the second largest of Indonesia's Muslim organisations, the Muhammadiyah. Dachlan had spent two periods of study in Mecca, at a time when Cairene ideals were in the air. A gentle scholar known for his moderation, Dachlan eschewed mass based politics in favour of a reformist message that emphasised the self sufficiency of scripture, the moral responsibility of individual believers and the need to accommodate Islamic learning to modern science and education.²⁷

During the 1920s and 1930s the Muhammadiyah spread rapidly across Indonesia, winning a quarter of a million followers by 1940. The organisation's

25 Sven Cederroth, *The spell of the ancestors and the power of Mekkah: A Sasak community on Lombok* (Gothenburg, 1981); Kari G. Telle, 'Place, hearth and ritual: Contested practices in a Muslim community in central Lombok', Ph.D. thesis, Bergen University (2003).

26 See, for example, Antoon Geels, *Subud and the Javanese mystical tradition* (Richmond, 1997); Robert W. Hefner, 'Islamizing Java? Religion and politics in rural East Java', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 46, 3 (1987), pp. 533–54.

27 Alfian, *The Muhammadiyah: The political behavior of a Muslim modernist organization under Dutch colonialism* (Yogyakarta, 1989), pp. 136–51; James L. Peacock, *Purifying the faith: The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam*, Monographs in Southeast Asian Studies (Tempe, 1992), pp. 23–36; Mitsuo Nakamura, *The crescent arises over the banyan tree: A study of the Muhammadiyah movement in a central Javanese town* (Yogyakarta, 1983), pp. 45–50.

expansion coincided with basic changes in the Indies' political economy. The booming export economy fuelled the growth of markets and towns, which attracted immigrants from varied ethnic backgrounds. As John Bowen has described for the Gayo highlands in northern Sumatra,²⁸ the mixed ethnic landscape favoured the emergence of a reformist Islam 'detached from any particular place' and from any particular ethnic group. It was in these post traditional settings that the Muhammadiya won its largest following. To this day the organisation's primary base lies among merchants and the urban middle class.

During its first three decades the Muhammadiya built 800 mosques, 2,000 schools and dozens of hospitals and orphanages. Dachlan acknowledged that the institutional model for his initiative was Christian missionaries. In the 1910s and 1920s European pastors had managed to win a few converts in central Java, mostly from the syncretic fringe of the Javanist community.²⁹ From the 1910s on, however, the Muhammadiya's most serious rivals were not Christians but a diverse assortment of nationalists, socialists and Muslim traditionalists.

In 1911 H.Ĥajji SamanhudĤ (1868 1956), a merchant from the town of Surakarta, established the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Union of Islamic Merchants). The organisation sought to respond to the economic power of Chinese merchants, who had benefited from recent liberalisations in the colonial economy. Renamed the Sarekat Islam (SI) a year later, it became the East Indies' first ever mass based movement.

Although it had been established in Java to 'create harmony and mutual assistance' among observant Muslims,³⁰ the SI quickly moved beyond its ethnic and confessional base, attracting non Javanese leaders and individuals of diverse ideological persuasions. Its leaders were united, not by formal Islamic learning, but by their background in Western schools and their desire to draw on that experience for the purposes of religious and national renewal. The Javanese born 'Umar Sa'id Tjokroaminoto (1882 1934) was keen to synthesise the ideals of Islam, nationalism and Western socialism. By the late 1910s the SI leadership spoke openly of the need for self government. Formulated at its second national congress in 1917, the party's Declaration of

28 John R. Bowen, *Muslims through discourse: Religion and ritual in Gayo society* (Princeton, 1993), p. 33.

29 Abdullah, *Schools and politics*, p. 106; Philip van Akkeren, *Sri and Christ: A study of the indigenous church in East Java* (London, 1969).

30 Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 104.

Principles decried racial domination and 'sinful capitalism', while declaring that Islam was the 'preacher of democratic ideas'.³¹

The SI's wildfire spread made it a lightning rod for all manner of popular discontent. During 1913–14 there were outbreaks of violence against Chinese in Java. Between 1916 and 1919 SI's membership grew from 360,000 to 2.5 million. By 1917 the organisation had attracted a significant leftist following. The leader of what was to become the 'red SI' was Semaun (1899–1971), a Javanese railway worker who, in 1915, came under the influence of the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV), which in 1918 mutated into the Indonesian Communist Party. From his base in Semarang, Semaun criticised the central SI leadership and pressed for the adoption of a vigorously anti-capitalist line.³² The rivalry between the 'red' and 'white' wings of the SI came to a head at the October 1921 congress in Surabaya, when SI's non-communist leadership passed a resolution forbidding dual membership in mass organisations. Forced to choose between SI and the Communist Party, the leftist rank and file resigned from SI. Their white opponents justified the expulsion on the grounds that 'all virtues of the other [political] principles can be found in Islam while all defects, faults, and evils of the other principles are absent in Islam'.³³

Weakened by factional struggle, the surviving SI was further compromised by the state repression that followed a wave of communist-led strikes and peasant actions between 1925 and 1927. Shortly thereafter, leadership of the fledgling nationalist movement passed from SI to non-confessional nationalists, including Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta. Most of the new nationalist leaders were Muslim, and, as with Hatta, some were religiously observant. But their Western schooling and dedication to the cause of Indonesian independence led them to embrace a religiously inclusive nationalism, a doctrine that still enjoys great support in Muslim circles today.

The 1920s and 1930s also saw new forms of public association develop in the heretofore disorganised traditionalist community. In Java, Sumatra, South Kalimantan and Sulawesi, traditionalist '*ulama*' learned from the experience of their reformist rivals and established national organisations with administrative bureaucracies. The largest of these neo-traditionalist bodies was the NU, founded in Surabaya, East Java, in January 1926. The NU leadership left ultimate responsibility for curricular matters to the scholars who operated

31 Ibid., p. 113.

32 On Semaun, see Takashi Shiraishi, *An age in motion: Popular radicalism in Java, 1912–1926* (Ithaca, 1990), pp. 98–105.

33 Quoted in Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, p. 124.

individual schools. However, during the 1930s many NU boarding schools adopted elements of the reformist educational programme, including class rooms and instruction in secular topics. In the 1950s and the 1960s the NU worked with the national government to establish high schools, colleges and clinics. While maintaining an official commitment to *taqlid* and the Shafīʿī school of law, NU scholars also took innovative positions on modern banking (allowed), agricultural improvements (urgent) and who was best suited to lead the nationalist movement (Sukarno). In the 1950s NU scholars wrote extensively on Islam and nationalism, opening the way for others who, in the 1980s and 1990s, offered religious arguments in support of democracy and civil society.³⁴

Muslims as minorities

Most countries in South East Asia have at least some Muslims among their native population. Tiny Brunei is majority Muslim, with Islamic traditions drawn from a general Malay cultural stock. Vietnam, Burma and Singapore have prominent Muslim minorities. Among South East Asian countries with Muslim minorities, however, the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia underwent the most far reaching changes in the twentieth century. In the first two regions once dominant Muslim populations found themselves incorporated into post colonial states with decidedly non Islamic ambitions. In Cambodia a once prosperous minority was marginalised under European rule and then almost exterminated under Pol Pot's communist repression.

Malay Muslim settlement in the region that today comprises Thailand's four southern provinces, Pattani, Yala, Satun and Narathiwat, dates back to the late fourteenth century. Across maritime South East Asia this was a period of trade expansion and conversion to Islam. Situated on the Kra isthmus astride the trade route linking southern China to the Archipelago and India, Patani³⁵ was an early participant in both processes. By the seventeenth century the kingdom had earned a reputation as the foremost centre of Islamic learning in the Malay peninsula. When, in the late nineteenth century, travel between the Hijaz and South East Asia grew, Patani Muslims

34 Greg Barton, 'Neo modernism: A vital synthesis of traditionalism and modernism in Indonesian Islam', *Studia Islamika* 2, 3 (1995), esp. pp. 45–58; Ahmad Baso, *Civil Society versus masyarakat madani: Arkeologi pemikiran 'civil society' dalam Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1999); Andrée Feillard, *Islam et armée dans l'Indonésie contemporaine* (Paris, 1995), pp. 73, 8, 274–6.

35 The Malay spelling for the Patani region uses one *t*; the Thai spelling uses two.

figured prominently. During his visit in the 1880s Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch scholar administrator, observed that there were many Patani scholars in Mecca; some contributed to the town's Malay language press.³⁶ A Patani native, Ahmad Patani (1856–1906), studied in Cairo and Mecca, and was eventually elevated by Turkish authorities to the role of supervisor of the Malay Printing Press.³⁷ His *fatwas* were central to the dissemination of reformist thought in Patani.

In the late eighteenth century the kingdom of Patani had been brought under the nominal suzerainty of the Siam court. From the late nineteenth century onward, however, Siamese authorities tightened their grip on the south. During the 1890s King Chulalongkorn replaced local Malay rulers with commissioners appointed by Bangkok. The king was prompted to act by fears of a British takeover of the provinces, like that which had recently forced the northern Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis into the Malayan union.³⁸

After the military's overthrow of the Thai monarchy in 1932, Thai authorities initiated programmes designed to tether Patani's Malays to the Buddhist nation state. In 1938 Friday congregational worship was discouraged; plans were announced to phase out Islamic law; and students were required to study Thai rather than Malay in school. In 1944 *shari'a* courts and the office of *qadi* were abolished. After the Second World War the Thai government lifted the restrictions on Friday worship and again allowed the use of Islamic law in family affairs. However, after a conservative faction gained ascendance in Bangkok in 1947, Thai authorities returned to their assimilationist policies. In the early 1960s the government asked all Islamic schools to register with the government. Schools were also required to provide instruction in secular subjects and to replace Arabic with Thai script. These measures raised tensions, and in the late 1960s an armed separatist movement emerged.

From the beginning the Patani separatists were divided along ideological lines. The first group, the National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional), professed a mix of anti capitalist and Malay nationalist sentiments. In 1968 an Islamist organisation was established, the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), and quickly became the largest secessionist organisation.

36 Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter part*, pp. 286–7.

37 Virginia Matheson and M. B. Hooker, 'The Jawi literature in Patani: The maintenance of an Islamic tradition', *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 61, 1 (1988), p. 28.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 7; Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A history of Malaysia* (London, 1982), pp. 156–72.

It recruited heavily among alumni of Middle Eastern schools. In the early 1970s the PULO's armed wing launched an insurgency campaign in Thailand, attacking schools and Buddhist temples. In 1994 the unit was blamed for an attempted bombing of the Israeli embassy.³⁹

During these years, the PULO's leaders strengthened their ties to Middle Eastern patrons, and made regular visits to Malaysia to meet with leaders from that country's Islamist party, the Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS, All Malaysia Islamic party). In the late 1990s Thai authorities alleged that the PULO had established ties with Osama Bin Laden's al Qa'ida, but the claim remains unsubstantiated. In 2004 violence in the troubled province escalated. More than four hundred people were killed in clashes between Muslims and security officials, including seventy eight lightly armed Muslims who died in an assault by Thai soldiers on a historic Patani mosque. These incidents heightened tensions in the southern provinces, and led Malaysian and Indonesian authorities to demand that the Thai government show more restraint when dealing with Muslims.

The situation in the southern Philippines showed a historical dynamic similar to that in southern Thailand, but this region's twentieth century transformation was even greater. Although by the 1570s the Spanish had subjugated the northern and central portions of the Philippine archipelago, they never achieved full control of the Muslim south. Sovereignty over the territory was nonetheless transferred to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (1898), that brought the Spanish American war to an end. The Americans moved quickly to pacify the south, completing the process in 1913 at a cost of several thousand Muslim lives.⁴⁰

The Spanish had long referred to all southern Muslims as 'Moros', and in the 1960s Muslim separatists appropriated the label in an effort to build nationalist solidarity among the region's thirteen Muslim ethno linguistic groups. Contrary to the claims of modern Moro nationalists, the Muslim population was never unified under a single ruler, and never created a united front against foreign invaders. The Muslims did share certain religious and political traditions. Local legend has it that Islam arrived in the region in the early sixteenth century, after the fall of Melaka to Portuguese adventurers in 1511. Over the decades that followed, a new social hierarchy spread across the

39 Peter Chalk, 'Militant Islamic separatism in southern Thailand', in Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein (eds.), *Islam in Asia: Changing political realities* (New Brunswick, 2002), p. 172.

40 Peter G. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920* (Quezon City, 1983), p. 164.

south, organised around the tripartite structure of hereditary aristocrats, commoners and slaves. High ranking aristocrats claimed ancestry back to émigré nobles from Melaka and *sharif* families from Mecca.⁴¹ Many also claimed to possess supernatural powers.

Until well into the mid twentieth century authority in the Islamic community was organised around this pattern of sacralised hierarchy. The sultan or regional *datu* was responsible for appointing each community's mosque *imam*, who returned the favour by paying his respects to the ruling family in his weekly sermon. Most *imams* were not *madrasa* trained scholars but relatives of the sultan or *datu*. There were no independent *qaḍīs*, and major disputes were resolved by the *datu*. The larger sultanates possessed legal codes that combined Shafi'i and customary law, but everyday justice was left to local leaders, not jurists.⁴² Contact with educational centres in the Middle East was limited; commoners received little formal instruction in their faith; and attendance at Friday worship was low.

Rather than boosting reformist fortunes, the American interregnum strengthened *datu* traditionalism. Although high ranking sultans suffered a loss of power, many mid level *datu*s collaborated with the American pacification effort. After 1913 those who had been rewarded with positions in the new state administration. In the 1910s a Syrian born Christian adviser to the Americans, Najeeb Saleeby, observed that the main characteristic of the southern Muslims was not religious fanaticism but *datu* centredness. Saleeby recommended that the south be integrated into the Philippine nation through education, including instruction in Islam, and state sponsored migration by Christian villagers from the north, who were regarded as more civilised than the southerners.⁴³

Rather than diminishing the south's separateness, these policies laid the foundation for an overarching Moro identity. In the 1940s and 1950s the *datu* leadership developed cordial political and business ties with the Christian elite in Manila. Some Muslim men even took Christian wives. Gradually, however, the elite's experience in Manila sharpened its sense of itself as Muslim. For commoners in the south, the flow of Christian migrants to Mindanao had an even more polarising effect. Pressed by poverty and armed conflict in Luzon and Visayas, the trickle of northern immigrants became a flood in the 1950s. By 1975 once Muslim Mindanao was more than 60 per cent

41 Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday politics and armed separatism in the southern Philippines* (Berkeley, 1998), p. 49.

42 Ibid., pp. 57, 62. 43 Ibid., pp. 87, 105.

Christian.⁴⁴ Adding to the tensions was the fact that the government provided greater opportunities for Christian immigrants than it did indigent Muslims. In the 1960s and 1970s deforestation and road construction opened vast stretches of interior land, but the best was set aside for Christian bosses. By the 1960s tensions in Mindanao had reached such explosive levels that Christians and Muslims were organising sectarian militias. Some Muslim leaders called for the creation of an independent Islamic republic on the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Clashes with regular and irregular government forces soon followed, especially after the 1968 massacre of a group of Muslim recruits training with the Philippine armed forces.

Up to this time *datu* leaders in the south had suffered few challenges to their authority. However, at the margins of established society, a reformist counter elite was emerging. From 1955 to 1978 Egypt granted more than two hundred scholarships to young Philippine Muslims, most of whom studied at Cairo's al Azhar University. In the 1970s and 1980s Saudi scholarships swelled the ranks of Philippine Muslims in the Middle East. Upon returning to their homeland, most students became religious teachers in the south. Most were openly critical of *datu* authority, and condemned folk Islamic observances as polytheistic. In 1969 one of the most prominent of the young teachers, Hashim Salamat, established Nurul Islam to promote Islamic renewal. Shortly thereafter ninety young Muslim recruits went to Malaysia to undergo training as guerrilla fighters.⁴⁵

Christian Muslim violence escalated after President Marcos's declaration of martial law in September 1972. Large scale attacks by government forces in the south led many Muslims to view the state as the enemy and *datu* officials as collaborators. In late 1972 the diverse wings of the insurgency came together to form a new organisation, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which enjoyed Libyan backing. Although some younger *datus* supported the rebellion, the MNLF leadership consisted primarily of Middle Eastern graduates and alumni of Philippine universities.⁴⁶ During the 1980s clashes between MNLF and government forces abated, but the reformists' challenge to *datu* leadership grew.

Throughout its history the Moro movement has been plagued by leadership disputes and freelance criminals claiming to act in the organisation's

⁴⁴ Chalk, 'Militant Islamic separatism', p. 188.

⁴⁵ McKenna, *Muslim rulers and rebels*, pp. 143, 147; International Crisis Group, 'Southern Philippines background: Terrorism and the peace process', ICG Report No. 80 (Singapore and Brussels, 13 July 2004), p. 4.

⁴⁶ McKenna, *Muslim rulers and rebels*, pp. 159, 163.

name. In 1984 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was established by the former vice chairman of the MNLF, who disagreed with the latter group's willingness to negotiate autonomy rather than full independence for the Muslim south. Although not ideologically distinct from the MNLF, the MILF has courted international support more vigorously than the MNLF. In the early 1980s the MILF sent several hundred fighters to Afghanistan for training. Upon returning to the Philippines the fighters established a network of training camps in the south. By the late 1990s the camps had graduated 120,000 Moro fighters, as well as a smaller number of Indonesians from militant groups such as the Jema'ah Islamiyyah (JI; Ar., Jama'a Islamiyya).⁴⁷

In September 1996 the Philippine government signed a treaty with representatives of the MNLF; the MILF agreed a 'general cessation of hostilities' the following year. Many Christian politicians opposed the agreement, however, and blocked its implementation. In late 1999 negotiations were supposed to proceed to a second stage, but were derailed by the outbreak of violence in the south. In 2000 the violence took an ominous new turn, as militants killed dozens of Christians. The Philippine armed forces responded by launching an offensive which culminated in the capture of the MILF's main training camp in July 2000.

Rather than damping armed resistance, the army's seizure of the MILF camps decentralised the organisation's leadership and exacerbated the problem of freelance violence. A smaller and more violent entity, the Abu Sayyaf Group, became increasingly active, mixing attacks on the Philippine army with the kidnapping and beheading of Christians. The Abu Sayyaf Group also forged ties with Indonesia's JI. Notwithstanding the arrival of US armed forces in 2002 the conflict in the south continued, becoming the largest armed insurgency in South East Asia.

In the modern era Muslims in Cambodia have received less international attention than their counterparts in Thailand and the Philippines, but their story is all the more remarkable. Islam was carried to Cambodia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by two groups: Chams fleeing advancing Vietnamese armies in central Vietnam, and ethnic Chvea, matrilineal Muslims who had migrated from the Malay peninsula and West Sumatra. Although a small minority, Muslims in the Buddhist kingdom came to play a large role in the military and state administration. In the seventeenth century King Ramadhipati (1642–58) converted to Islam and massacred 200 Dutch

47 ICG, 'Southern Philippines backgrounder', pp. 4–7.

traders in Phnom Penh in 1643.⁴⁸ In 1657 and 1782 dissident Muslims launched rebellions against other Cambodian kings.⁴⁸

With the arrival of the French in the late nineteenth century, Muslims lost their privileged position in the military and civilian administration. Muslim parents also proved more reluctant than their Buddhist counterparts to send their children to French schools, the preferred avenue into the colonial service. During the 1930s and 1940s, however, the colonial peace facilitated trade expansion, in which Muslims actively participated. Commerce and colonialism also brought Kaum Muda reformism, which arrived in Cambodia in the 1930s by way of Kelantan on the Malay peninsula.⁴⁹

Until the devastation of the Pol Pot era, Kaum Tua traditionalists, most of whom adhered to the Shafi'i school of law, remained the dominant stream in Cambodia's Muslim community. There was also a smaller syncretic group known as the Imam San. The Imam San preferred to pray once a week rather than five times per day. They wrote in an archaic Cham script, claimed to have translated the Qur'an into Cham before its transcription into Arabic, and declared that they had been given special magical knowledge by the Prophet's son in law, 'Ali.

Scholars disagree as to the number of Muslim Cambodians on the eve of the Pol Pot regime, with estimates ranging from 250,000 to 700,000.⁵⁰ Half the Muslim population is thought to have perished under the revolutionary government, which classified Muslims as culturally alien. By the end of the Pol Pot period the number of mosques in Cambodia had fallen from 113 to 5. The number of religious teachers and judges fell from 300 and 113 to 38 and 20 respectively.⁵¹

Although some fled Cambodia, the Muslim community as a whole revived in the 1980s, aided by an influx of teachers and money from Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The Tablighi Jama'at was among the earliest arrivals. In 1989 a Tablighi training centre was established in Kampong Cham Province. By the late 1990s the Tablighi network dispatched preachers into most Muslim villages once a week. By 2000 the Tablighis had become the largest of Cambodia's new Muslim movements.

48 Mak Phoun, 'La Communauté au Cambodge du XV au XVIII siècle', in *Actes du Séminaire sur le Champa* (Paris, 1998), pp. 68–96.

49 Bjorn Blengli, *The Cham: Religious diversity and change among Cambodia's Muslims* (Trondheim, 2003), pp. 68–80.

50 Ben Kiernan, 'Orphans of Genocide: The Cham Muslims of Kampuchea under Pol Pot', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 20, 4 (October–December 1988) pp. 2–33.

51 Blengli, *The Cham*, pp. 80–2.

Saudi, Kuwaiti and Gulf assistance to Cambodian Muslims began in 1985, but increased dramatically with the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Authority in the 1990s. Most Middle Eastern aid was dedicated to the construction of mosques and religious schools, with the result that today the best schools to which Muslims have access are those financed by Saudi and Kuwaiti donors. In the mid 1990s hundreds of Cambodian Muslims were awarded scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia and Egypt; a smaller number went to Malaysia and Indonesia. The destruction of the Pol Pot era and the scale of foreign Muslim assistance have created powerful reformist currents, and today indigenous traditions of learning and ritual are in sharp decline.⁵² The scale of religious developments did not escape the attention of JI radicals from Indonesia and Malaysia. In 2003 militants from that organisation are alleged to have plotted to bomb the United States embassy in Phnom Penh. The leader of the JI's military wing, Hambali, resided in the country during 2002–3, and took a Cambodian wife, just prior to his arrest in Thailand in June 2003.

Nation making and democratisation in Indonesia

Nowhere was the post colonial restructuring of Muslim culture and politics more complex than in Indonesia. During their occupation of 1942–5 the Japanese had reversed Dutch policy and sponsored the formation of mass based organisations. The Japanese attempted to extend equal favours to Muslims and non confessional nationalists, but, rather than damping tensions between the two groups, these policies intensified them.⁵³ During Indonesia's war of independence (1945–9) armed militias organised along confessional lines.

The last two years of the independence war witnessed two sectarian rebellions that were a harbinger of conflicts to come. In West Java in May 1948 Muslim dissidents under the leadership of S. M. Kartosuwirjo (1905–62) took exception to concessions the republican leadership had negotiated with Dutch officials, who were attempting to reoccupy their colony. Under the terms of a ceasefire agreement West Java's Siliwangi division was to withdraw to republican territories in central Java. Alleging betrayal by the republican government, Kartosuwirjo announced the establishment of an Islamic state in West Java, the Darul Islam (DI). From their mountain bases

52 Bjorn Blengsli, 'Islamic education in Cambodia: Religious diversity, trends, and change among the Islamic Khmers', unpublished paper, National Bureau of Asian Research (Seattle, August 2005).

53 Harry J. Benda, *The crescent and the rising sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese occupation, 1942–1945* (Dordrecht, 1983); Noer, *The modernist Muslim movement*, pp. 112–37.

DI fighters mounted a low grade guerrilla war until Kartosuwirjo's capture and execution in 1962.⁵⁴

The DI rebellion left two lasting legacies. First, it hardened the attitude of conservative nationalists in the Indonesian armed forces towards militant Islam. Second, it created a determined network of activists who rejected all forms of secular government. In the 1980s DI alumni joined with young militants to form a new grouping, which eventually evolved into the JI. The JI sent fighters to train in Afghanistan and the southern Philippines, and carried out bombings of Christian targets from 1999 to 2004.⁵⁵

The second incident during the independence war pitted Muslims against communists. Although the abortive rebellions of the mid 1920s had dealt a severe blow, the Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia) rebounded during the independence war, particularly in Java, where it won followers in the Javanist wing of the Muslim community. In September 1948 clashes broke out between communists and pro republican forces in south central Java. Outgunned, the communists fell back to the city of Madiun. As pro republican forces advanced on the town, the communists slaughtered several thousand political and Muslim notables. After the communist forces were defeated, Muslim peasants launched revenge attacks on Javanist villagers who had supported the communists. For years to come politics in Indonesia was haunted by the memory of this violence.⁵⁶

Despite these setbacks, from 1950 to 1957 Indonesia developed one of East Asia's freest parliamentary democracies. But the elections of 1955 and 1957 showed that the public remained deeply divided, with half of the electorate favouring the establishment of an Islamic state and the other half supporting nationalists and communists opposed to any establishment of religion.⁵⁷ In December 1956 dissident army councils in Sumatra seized control of local government, with the blessing of at least some Muslim reformists from the Masyumi Party. Locked in a three way contest with Muslim parties and regional commanders, President Sukarno proclaimed martial law on 14 March 1957, inaugurating a new era of presidentially dominated 'guided

54 C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague, 1981), pp. 125–6.

55 International Crisis Group, 'al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia', ICG Asia Briefing (Brussels, 8 August 2002), pp. 2–3.

56 Ann Swift, *The road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist uprising of 1948*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, no. 69 (Ithaca, 1989), pp. 73–80.

57 Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian elections of 1955*, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, 1957).

democracy'. From this period on the president looked to the Communist Party for help in containing the challenge from the military and reformist Muslims.

This contest came to a tragic climax in September and October 1965. In the aftermath of a failed left wing junior officers' coup, the army leadership accused the Communist Party of masterminding the coup and planning to execute religious leaders. Armed with these allegations, the military mobilised Muslim paramilitaries (as well as, in Bali, conservative Hindus) in a campaign that eventually claimed half a million lives.⁵⁸ In Java most of the victims were Javanist Muslims. Once the largest communist party in the non communist world, the shattered PKI never recovered from the violence.

Muslim leaders expected to be rewarded for their cooperation against the PKI by Masyumi's rehabilitation and being given a role in government. But the Suharto led 'New Order' government refused to lift the ban on Masyumi, and excluded Muslim parties from any significant role in government. Notwithstanding these restrictions, Muslim influence grew steadily under the New Order, as a result of pietistic trends in society and state officials' realisation that it was in their interest to make cultural concessions to Muslims. In 1975 the government introduced regulations requiring students in all schools to receive two hours of instruction each week in a state recognised religion (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism). The government also worked with the Muhammadiyah and NU to 'build up' (*membina*) religious observance among citizens not yet adhering to a state recognised religion. In Java, Lombok and Makassar the collaboration helped to suppress syncretic variants of Islam and most of the new religions that had flourished in the 1950s.⁵⁹

Islam in New Order Indonesia had less conservative currents as well. Under the direction of a series of forward thinking ministers of religion the New Order regime invested heavily in Islamic education.⁶⁰ In the mid 1970s the ministry introduced technical, professional and general education into the country's more than 10,000 private Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*). The reforms were welcomed by Muslim parents and most school directors. Today

58 Robert Cribb (ed.), *The Indonesia killings 1965 1966: Stories from Java and Bali*, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia no. 21 (Melbourne, 1991).

59 Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?', pp. 546–50; M. Bambang Pranowo, 'Creating Islamic tradition in rural Java', Ph.D. thesis, Monash University (1991).

60 For social biographies of the ministers see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (eds.), *Menteri menteri agama RI: Biografi sosial politik* (Jakarta, 1998).

students in most private and state Islamic schools devote 70 per cent of their school day to general studies.

The state supported system of Islamic universities (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) also expanded during the Suharto era, blossoming into twenty eight university campuses. The universities' curriculum was expanded to include comparative religion, social and political science and professional training. Although the ministry continued to send students to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it dispatched its most gifted students to Ph.D. programmes in Western Europe and the United States. Upon returning to Indonesia the students were charged with implementing additional curricular reforms. During the 1990s the Islamic universities launched a programme designed to bring their offerings up to the same standard as the general university system. By the end of the New Order the top universities had earned a reputation as among the most forward thinking centres of Islamic learning in the world.

The New Order regime also succeeded at implementing programmes of mass education, creating the first generation of Indonesians with near universal literacy skills. Aided by Indonesia's continuing economic expansion, these developments brought a new Muslim middle class into existence and fuelled a resurgence in Islamic piety. Beginning in the 1980s attendance at Friday congregational worship and enrolment in neighbourhood religious classes soared. There was a growing market for Islamic books, *halal* food and Muslim dress. Once a minority practice among women, the wearing of the *hijab* (known in Indonesian as *jilbab*) became widespread.

Aware of the growing Islamic resurgence, the government made additional concessions to Muslim interests in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The reforms included new regulations to strengthen religious courts; the compilation of a code of Islamic law; the lifting of the ban on the veil in schools and government offices; the abolition of a sports lottery; the sponsorship of an annual festival of Islamic culture; the founding of the country's first Islamic bank; and sponsorship of a national association of Islamic intellectuals (ICMI) intended to serve as an in government lobby for Muslim affairs.⁶¹ In the early 1990s foreign observers began to speak of a 'honeymoon' between President Suharto and the Muslim community.

61 Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, 2000), pp. 128–66; Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the ideology of tolerance* (London, 1995), pp. 75–121.

With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and democratic transitions in Korea and Taiwan, however, the leaders of the Muhammadiyah and NU urged President Suharto to go further and implement democratic reforms. Public scholars such as Nurcholish Madjid, Harun Nasution, and Dawam Rahardjo organised seminars and journals aimed at demonstrating the compatibility of Islam and democracy.⁶² By the mid 1990s Indonesia had developed the largest Muslim led democracy movement in the world.

Not all Muslim leaders were happy with the mainstream leadership's embrace of democratic ideals. Politicians earlier associated with the Masyumi Party took exception to the pro democracy turn. In 1967 the Masyumi old guard founded the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytization (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII). The DDII secured funds from Saudi and Gulf patrons to send students to conservative Salafiyya schools in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan. During the 1980s and early 1990s hundreds of students also travelled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets. The DDII and its sister organisations also worked to develop a network of conservative Islamist mosques, boarding schools and study groups. Although reform minded leaders controlled the commanding heights of Muslim society, conservative Islamists managed to create a small but disciplined network of militants.

Faced with a growing political opposition, the Suharto regime in the late 1990s reached out to the DDII, which, up to this point, had been among the president's most ardent critics. With the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 1998, opposition to the regime intensified. The president's aides responded by alleging that the Muslim led democracy movement was really controlled by an international conspiracy of Catholics, Chinese, Americans and Jews. As the economic crisis worsened the president's supporters called for Muslims to take action against Chinese 'rats' and other 'traitors to the nation'.⁶³ In the regime's final weeks cities across Indonesia were shaken by outbreaks of anti Chinese and anti Christian violence.

The tactics of the late Suharto period were not sufficient to save the regime, which fell in May 1998. The speed of the collapse, however, created a vacuum of power and fierce struggles in Jakarta and the provinces for control of state posts. In eastern Indonesia and Kalimantan, where Christians and Muslims live in near equal numbers, the competition escalated into ethno religious violence. The worst outbreaks occurred between 1999 and

62 Masykuri Abdillah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to the concept of democracy (1966-1993)* (Hamburg, 1997); Fauzan Saleh, *Modern trends in Islamic theological discourse in twentieth century Indonesia: A critical survey* (Leiden, 2001), esp. pp. 196-307.

63 Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 201-7.

2004 in the provinces of Maluku and North Maluku in eastern Indonesia, where some 10,000 people were killed and a million made homeless.

The elections of June 1999 and April 2004 showed that the Muslim public as a whole had little appetite for sectarian violence or radical Islamism. In 1999 only 16 per cent of the electorate voted for parties advocating the implementation of Islamic law. By comparison, in the country's previous free and fair elections in 1955, 44 per cent of the electorate cast their vote for parties advocating some form of Islamic state. These and other data indicate that the Islamic resurgence of the 1980s and 1990s had not given rise to an equally heightened commitment to Islamist politics.

A series of bombings from October 2002 to October 2004 were a reminder that JI militants were still active at the margins of the Islamist community. But even conservative militants denounced the group's actions as un-Islamic. By the time of the 2004 election, the political situation had stabilised. Indonesians again voted overwhelmingly for parties of a nationalist or non-confessional stripe. Meanwhile, the great pillars of Muslim civil society – Muslim higher education, the Muhammadiyah and NU – affirmed their commitment to political moderation and democracy. Politics in Indonesia continues to be plagued by high levels of corruption, and there is a small but well entrenched radical Islamist flank. But democracy and multi-religious nationalism continue to enjoy broad Muslim support.

Nation making and resurgence in Malaysia

In post-war Malaysia the drivers of Muslim culture and politics were not secular nationalism and Islamism, but ethnic competition between Malays and non-Malays. In 1946 the British had proposed a plan for Malayan union that would have curtailed Malay privileges while extending equal citizenship rights to Chinese and Indians. The Malay leadership objected, and in 1948 it succeeded in getting the authorities to devise a different plan, the Federation of Malaya Agreement. The terms of the 1948 agreement were eventually enshrined in the 1957 constitution. The constitution maintained the authority of the Malay rulers, made Malay the national language and recognised Islam as the religion of state while extending formal religious freedoms to all citizens. The agreements also reserved a guaranteed share of positions in the civil service for Malays.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian politics under Mahathir* (London and New York, 1999), p. 18.

The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was organised in 1946 in response to the Malay union plan, and has been a champion of Malay political, economic and cultural interests ever since. During its first decades the party leadership was dominated by British educated aristocrats. Appointed deputy prime minister in 1976 and prime minister in 1981, Mahathir Mohamad was the first commoner to lead the federal government, and during 1983 and 1984 he campaigned to restrict the aristocracy's privileges.⁶⁵ The success of Mahathir's effort marked the arrival of the 'new Malay' (*Melayu baru*) middle class on the national stage.⁶⁶

During the 1950s and 1960s the UMNO launched programmes to improve the situation of the Malay population, which was the poorest and least urbanised of the peninsula's ethnic communities. Malays were only nominally represented in business, and comprised just 11 per cent of university students.⁶⁷ After an electoral setback to the UMNO dominated governing coalition, ethnic riots broke out in the capital on 13 May 1969. Some 200 people died, most of them Chinese. In the months that followed the government imposed restrictions on speech deemed ethnically inflammatory, made it a crime to challenge the constitutionally enshrined privileges of the Malays, and tightened regulations governing non Malay acquisition of citizenship. The government also announced plans for a New Economic Policy (NEP), which was to use state funds to provide Malays with expanded opportunities in government, education and business.

During its operational life, which ended in 1990, the NEP was plagued by accusations of corruption and cronyism; it also caused resentment among Chinese and Indians. Between 1971 and 1993, however, the economy grew at an annual average rate of 8 per cent, and the Malay middle class rose from 18 to 28 per cent of the population. The number of citizens living in poverty plummeted to just 9 per cent. Equally remarkable, the gap between the wealthiest and lowest income brackets narrowed. Malay representation among industrial workers also tripled, and the farm population fell from 65 to 33 per cent of the labour force.⁶⁸ By the late 1980s these achievements allowed the Mahathir government to relax quotas and give Chinese businesses a greater share of state contracts. Implemented in the early 1990s, the

65 Milne and Mauzy, *Malaysian politics*, pp. 31–9.

66 Abdul Rahman Embong, *State led modernization and the new middle class in Malaysia* (New York, 2002), esp. pp. 59–77.

67 Hussin Mutalib, *Islam and ethnicity in Malay politics* (Singapore, 1990), p. 58.

68 Milne and Mauzy, *Malaysian politics*, p. 62.

post NEP National Development Policy adopted an even more inclusive attitude towards non Malay and foreign participation in the economy.

Although ethnic and class divisions have softened in recent years, debates over Islam and the state have grown sharper. In the 1950s and 1960s, while still under aristocratic leadership, the UMNO had made a largely ceremonial commitment to Islamic affairs. The first Malaysian prime minister, Tunkey Abdul Rahman, had stated openly that he believed Islam could not solve the country's problems and should not be used as the basis for government. The rivalry between the UMNO and its main Malay opponent, the Pan Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS, *Parti Islam Se Malaysia*), however, forced the UMNO to devise its own programmes of state supported Islamisation. The federal government erected its first national mosque in 1961, and sponsored the first ever national Qur'an recitation the following year.⁶⁹ Over the next few years the federal government built religious schools, required radio and television stations to broadcast the call to prayer, established an Islamic Centre to coordinate research on Islamic affairs, and organised a government office (PERKIM) to convert non Muslims to Islam. The Mahathir administration (1981–2003) was even more ambitious in its Islamisation programmes, launching initiatives in law and banking and, with Saudi assistance, establishing an International Islamic University in 1983. Individual states in the Malaysian union responded to the federal programmes by passing religious legislation of their own, including punishments for Muslims who consume alcohol, and draconian penalties for non Muslims who proselytise among Muslims.⁷⁰

Founded in 1951 by, among others, former members of the UMNO's religious bureau, the PAS has long been the only serious challenger to UMNO dominance in the Malay community. During its first three decades the PAS combined ethno nationalism with Islamist appeals. The party campaigned against the inclusion of Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, on the ground that Singapore's Chinese population might challenge Malay privileges. In 1963 it called for the establishment of an Islamic state. However, declaring that 'Malaya belongs to Malays', the party also called for non Malays to be barred from leadership positions in government and the military.⁷¹

69 Mutalib, *Islam and ethnicity*, p. 35.

70 Ibid., p. 136; Susan E. Ackerman and Raymond L. M. Lee, *Heaven in transition: Non Muslim religious innovation and ethnic identity in Malaysia* (Honolulu, 1988), p. 40.

71 Mutalib, *Islam and ethnicity*, p. 109.

The tension in the PAS between Islamist and ethno nationalist principles continued until 1981², when a young faction ousted the old guard leadership. Earlier, during the 1970s, a new generation of student activists and graduates of Middle Eastern schools had flocked to the party. Unlike their PAS elders, the young leadership spoke warmly of the Iranian revolution, and promoted reforms intended to ensure '*ulama*' dominance in party affairs.⁷² The new leadership also called for the establishment of an Islamic state under '*ulama*' authority.

Mahathir and the UMNO responded to the PAS challenge with Islamisation programmes of their own. Equally important, in 1982 Mahathir recruited the most prominent of the student Islamists, Anwar Ibrahim, to his government. Anwar was given responsibility for the government's Islamic initiatives. By the late 1990s the charismatic Anwar seemed positioned to succeed Mahathir as prime minister. However, during 1997–8, Mahathir and Anwar quarrelled over how to respond to the Asian economic crisis. In September 1998 Anwar was arrested on charges of corruption and homosexual misconduct; he was eventually convicted. Malay displeasure at Anwar's harsh treatment led to significant electoral gains by the PAS led opposition in December 1999.

In 2004 the new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, a man known for his piety and upright manner, assumed the helm of the UMNO coalition, which went on to recover much of its earlier support. Shortly after the 2004 elections Anwar was freed from jail. The Badawi government has also made what it calls 'civilizational Islam' (*Islam hadhari*) a central element in its domestic and international platform. The concept emphasises the need for Muslim moderation, inclusiveness and forward mindedness, and underscores the moral and historical necessity of collaboration across cultures, rather than a clash of civilisations.

Conclusion

From earliest times to today the most striking feature of Muslim politics and culture in South East Asia has been their remarkable diversity. No empire ever subjugated the region's polyglot communities, and no ethnic group ever succeeded at setting the cultural standard for all others. The colonial and

72 Ibid., p. 113; cf. Judith Nagata, *The reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern religious radicals and their roots* (Vancouver, 1984), pp. 48–54; and Farish Noor, 'The localization of Islamist discourse in the *tafsir* of Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat, *Murshid'ul Am* of PAS', in Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman (eds.), *Malaysia: Islam, society and politics* (Singapore, 2003), pp. 195–235.

post colonial state imposed a new grid on this pluricentric pattern, and shifted control over religious affairs from local communities to state bureaucracies. Under British colonialism Malay aristocrats were accorded a more central role in the management of religious affairs than their counterparts in the Dutch Indies. The colonially created bureaucracy provided a rationale for heightened state meddling in local religious affairs. At the same time, rivalries with the economically dominant Chinese increased pressures for intellectual conformity and a closing of Malay Muslim ranks.

Indonesia, too, has had its share of ethnic tensions. Although economically powerful, the Chinese presence (2 per cent of the population) was never sufficient to make appeals for Muslim unity and intellectual conformity widely compelling. From earliest times to today, Islam in Indonesia has been marked by such regional and intellectual variety that many Muslims have concluded that demands for seamless unity threaten their chosen profession of the faith. Equally important, in the twentieth century most Indonesian Muslims have rallied to nationalist ideals which, despite some dissenting voices, remain ethnically and religiously inclusive.

During the independent era the state in these two countries intervened even more extensively in Islamic affairs. But the *étatist* process was by no means zero sum. State administrators in both countries worked with Muslim organisations to boost literacy rates and implement educational reforms. Indonesia's Muslim civic organisations became the largest in the entire Muslim world. Equally remarkable, in the 1980s and 1990s their leadership lent its voice to calls for pluralist democracy.

In the southern Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia, nation making in the twentieth century has often excluded Muslims, pushing public Islam into a defensive rather than inclusive posture. Across South East Asia's expanse, however, the heightened mobility of people and ideas continues to provoke debate, not least of all as regards how Muslims should engage modern markets, media and the state. Crises of governance and nation will certainly continue, and where they coincide with ethno religious inequalities they may be accompanied by calls for a totalising profession of the faith. Nonetheless, the aspiration for a pluralist and democratic Muslim politics has arrived on the South East Asian stage. It will remain a force in regional affairs for many years to come.

Africa south of the Sahara from the First World War

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The twentieth century was decisive in making Islam the faith of significant numbers of Africans south of the Sahara (majorities in many areas and sizeable minorities in others). This upsurge in Muslim affiliation occurred at a time of Western domination: in the first half of the century European colonial regimes set the parameters for African political and economic change, and thereafter the structures and global relations they established influenced the trajectories of independent African states. This growth also took place at a time of global Muslim revival. Some credit European colonialism with facilitating Muslim expansion, and others highlight external Islamic influences, but local actors and circumstances influenced and complicated the processes of Muslim religious change. Colonial rule was uneven in its implementation, contradictory in its effects and contested by Africans: Muslims found gaps and operated in those spaces. Global Islamic discourses informed African Muslims, but the most successful leaders were those who expended their own intellectual effort and developed organisations that met specific local needs. Islam's expansion was a result of indigenous initiatives in a context shaped by European colonialism and Islamic revival.

Twentieth century expansion occurred after over a thousand years of Muslim presence in sub Saharan Africa. Arabian, Indian Ocean and North African Muslims made initial contacts, but local converts and their descendants usually proselytised thereafter. In contrast with northern Africa, Arabic did not become a local language except in the Sudan; Africans maintained their own languages and identities as they became Muslim. '*Ulama*' often were members of lineages that specialised in Islamic knowledge and bolstered their religious authority through claims of descent from illustrious ancestors. Throughout the pre colonial era religious and commercial networks tended to overlap, with the result that Muslims frequently were affluent minorities wherever they resided. Individual scholars could and did act autonomously

from established interests, such as calling for jihad against political elites. By the late nineteenth century, through centuries of proselytisation more than military action, Muslim majorities had emerged in selected regions of western Africa, the Horn and coastal eastern Africa.

Islam's long experience as a minority faith in sub-Saharan Africa meant that Muslims interpreted Islamic texts in dynamic interplay with local cultures. They had a 'cluttered arsenal' of practices and beliefs:¹ elements of African expressive culture found their way into Muslim rituals, and specific aspects of Islamic knowledge, especially the 'esoteric sciences' such as prophetic medicine, numerology and '*ilm al awfaq*, or 'magic squares', were emphasised and elaborated.² '*Ulama*' certainly participated in the full range of Islamic intellectual activities, but their public reputations hinged on practical demonstrations of their knowledge through socially recognized acts such as healing the ill or protecting believers against harm. Local norms also were relevant in Muslim legal processes: even today Muslims on Unguja island in the Zanzibar archipelago use the word *sharia* (from the Arabic *shari'a*) to refer to law generally, and modify it to refer to Islamic textual precedents (*sharia za dini* or *sharia za kiislam*) and custom (*sharia za mila*).³ This terminology underscores the serious consideration *mila* received when scholars made legal decisions. Local engagements with Islamic texts led to numerous configurations of Muslim beliefs and practices across the continent. Disagreements over the degree of accommodation with local cultures occurred. In the colonial era these discussions frequently were concealed from outsiders, but vigorous disputation among Muslims erupted in the public sphere during the last three decades of the twentieth century.

This chapter focuses on Muslim communities in tropical Africa after the First World War. The first section examines colonial encounters between European officials and Muslims, and is followed by an analysis of Muslim expansion. The third section assesses Muslim participation in nationalist and post colonial politics. The last section discusses recent Islamic movements. Each section includes case studies, selected for their depth of scholarship and relevance to the discussion.

1 Clifford Geertz, *The interpretation of cultures* (New York, 1973), p. 172.

2 Louis Brenner, 'The "esoteric sciences" in West African Islam', in Brian du Toit and Ismail Abdalla (eds.), *African healing strategies* (Buffalo, 1985), pp. 20–8.

3 Erin Elizabeth Styles, 'A kadhi and his court: Marriage, divorce and Zanzibar's Islamic legal tradition', Ph.D. thesis, Washington University (2002), pp. 93–4.

European colonial rule

From the late nineteenth century Europeans imposed their rule in sub Saharan Africa. Concepts such as jihad, *hijra* (emigration) and *taqiyya* (implying acquiescence to a greater political power while maintaining inner adherence to the faith) informed Muslim responses. Reactions could vary within a society and over time: rival groups often adopted different strategies of alliance and resistance, and leaders negotiated treaties, but then fought when European territorial ambitions were revealed; or commoners accepted colonialism only to resist when new taxes were imposed. Only in Ethiopia and Liberia did African political elites retain power at the end of the First World War, but they were unable to shield their territories from the forces of global capitalism and, in the case of Ethiopia during the 1930s, subsequent colonial invasion.

European colonial administrations ruled through African intermediaries. The powers with the largest numbers of Muslim subjects, Britain and France, selectively recruited Muslim elites. European attitudes influenced the process, as did Muslim responses to the initiatives. The French harboured the most enduring negative biases toward Muslims, but all colonial powers were concerned with 'pan Islamism' and put Muslims under various degrees of surveillance.⁴ Muslim leaders whom Europeans deemed trustworthy often used colonial sanction to enlarge the powers associated with their offices, whereas Muslims who aroused European suspicions had their movements curtailed or were exiled. Muslim 'resisters' provided inspiration to some,⁵ but it was equally the case that those who worked with colonial powers preserved Muslim political roles and extended the scope of institutions that might otherwise have been eliminated.

A review of the administration of justice reveals the workings of colonial rule. European officials generally recognised two types of courts, those they established based in European law and those based in African 'custom', which in Muslim contexts could mean *shari'a*. Criminal matters were the domain of European courts in most, but not all, territories, whereas civil matters involving Africans were handled by local courts. Colonial officials intervened in civil cases when Europeans had interests, such as land cases in towns, but

4 Christopher Harrison, *France and Islam in West Africa, 1860-1960* (Cambridge, 1988); Muhammad Sani Umar, *Islam and colonialism: Intellectual responses of Muslims of northern Nigeria to British colonial rule* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 24-62.

5 Alphonse Gouilly, *L'Islam dans l'Afrique occidentale française* (Paris, 1952); Alioune Traoré, *Islam et colonisation en Afrique: Cheikh Hamahoullah, homme de foi et résistant* (Paris, 1983).

otherwise they allowed local judges great latitude. In Muslim contexts the existence of Islamic legal texts, available in English and French translation, encouraged some Europeans to press for codification and standardisation, even in contexts where judges had not necessarily followed all textual recommendations in the past; Muslim judicial autonomy thus depended upon specific circumstances.⁶ In appeals the system reproduced the colonial hierarchy, terminating in bodies that included Europeans, who intervened as they wished.

Europeans founded new institutions to support their rule. In French West Africa the colonial administration established colonial schools to train a new administrative cadre; in Muslim contexts they adopted Algerian precedents in Franco Arab *medersas* (from the Arabic term *madrasa*).⁷ In British colonial contexts the educational precedents for Muslims often came from Egypt or the Sudan, where Egyptian models had been adopted. These schools were colonial projects, geared towards educating sons of Muslim elites. Colonial armies and police forces also had a Muslim presence. In the Gold Coast, for example, the British recruited Hausa speaking Muslims from Nigeria for their armies and rewarded them with land in Accra.⁸ The French colonial army also included a significant number of African Muslims.⁹ The barracks as well as colonial schools were institutional sites for complex negotiations of Muslim identities in the colonial period.¹⁰

European colonial regimes embarked on ambitious projects to transform sub Saharan African economies. The goal was to foster wage labour in enterprises producing goods for export. European firms marginalised existing African enterprises through their access to global capital and markets: they monopolised wholesale commerce and ran extractive industries and plantations. Lebanese and Indian merchants tended to control retail trade, but some opportunities existed for Africans in the colonial economy. Cash cropping, which Africans had begun in the nineteenth century, became a dominant activity in the twentieth century. Urbanisation also occurred at a rapid pace,

6 Allan Christelow, 'Islamic law in Africa', in Nehemia Levtzion and Randall Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa* (London, 2000).

7 Louis Brenner, *Controlling knowledge: Religion, power and schooling in a west African Muslim society* (Bloomington, 2001).

8 Kelly Tucker, 'A history of Accra's *zongos*: Heterogeneity and social change', Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University (2002).

9 Myron Echenberg, *Colonial conscripts: the tirailleurs Sénégalaise in French West Africa, 1857-1960* (Portsmouth, 1991).

10 Gregory Mann, 'The *tirailleur* everywhere: Military veterans in colonial and post colonial Mali, 1918-1968', Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University (2000).

especially in towns linked to the export sector. Africans usually filled positions at the lowest ranks in the towns, although those with access to formal education, usually at Christian missions, joined a small African middle class. As cash cropping expanded and towns grew, some rural areas became reserves from which Africans migrated to work elsewhere.

The transition to a monetised economy was incomplete, especially in rural areas. At the start of the colonial era millions of slaves toiled in sub Saharan Africa; in some regions, such as the western African savannah and coastal eastern Africa, Muslims owned large plantations, and slaves constituted more than half the population.¹¹ Colonial edicts abolished slavery, but enforcement was another matter, as officials often placed the onus on slaves to demand their freedom and compensate their owners. A few instances of mass slave exoduses occurred, but emancipation generally was a lengthy process in which slaves negotiated new labour relations, often as tenants, with their former masters.¹² In other economic domains, too, colonial transformations produced uneven results for the long term benefit of the continent.¹³ Europeans disrupted local and regional economies, and left in their place a distorted system in which Africa participated in global exchanges at a relative disadvantage.

Northern Nigeria

Working relations developed between British officials and Muslim elites in northern Nigeria, a territory including the Sokoto empire founded after 'Usman dan Fodio's nineteenth century jihad. The British invaded the north in 1897 and, after Sultan Muḥammad Attahiru died fighting colonial forces in 1903, most *masu sarauta* (political titleholders) accepted their rule. The British imposed a new administrative centre at Kaduna and severed the links between the former capital at Sokoto and each 'emirate', but they retained *masu sarauta* and provided only minimal supervision through British officials in each emirate. As officials rotated frequently, a stable group of influential emirs dominated northern Nigeria.¹⁴ The north was

11 Paul Lovejoy, *Transformations in slavery: A history of slavery in Africa* (Cambridge, 1983).

12 Frederick Cooper, *From slaves to squatters: Plantation agriculture in Zanzibar and coastal Kenya, 1890–1925* (New Haven, 1980); Martin Klein, *Slavery and colonial rule in French West Africa* (Cambridge, 1998); Paul Lovejoy and Jan Hogendorn, *Slow death for slavery: The course of abolition in northern Nigeria, 1897–1936* (Cambridge, 1993).

13 Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: The past of the present* (Cambridge, 2002).

14 Murray Last, 'The "colonial caliphate" of northern Nigeria', in David Robinson and Jean Louis Triaud (eds.), *Le temps des marabouts: itinéraires et stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale française, v. 1880–1960* (Paris, 1997), pp. 67–82.

amalgamated with the south into a united territory in 1914, but it continued to be administered with considerable autonomy: the British restricted Christian missionaries to non Muslim areas and expanded the emirate structure into areas where Muslim authority had not previously been extended.

In addition to British courts, two types of Muslim courts operated in the colonial era. *Alkali* courts (from the Arabic term *qaḍī*) considered family and commercial matters; and emir's courts took property and homicide cases. Muslim scholars staffed the former and joined *masu sarauta* in the latter. Initially Muslim courts contravened British edicts prohibiting slavery by applying the concept of *wilaya* (clientage) in slavery cases.¹⁵ The British ultimately forbade this tactic, and imposed several measures over the years to tighten their control. Judges forced to rule in accord with colonial edicts were careful to craft judgments that did not overtly contradict Islamic precedents.¹⁶ Where judges had wider latitude they followed *shari'a* recommendations, but not in all instances. For example, they continued to follow custom in property cases,¹⁷ and some ruled in novel ways to restrict women's roles.¹⁸ A colonial observer remarked on both the general conformity to *shari'a* and differences among specific jurists in adherence to textual precedents.¹⁹ In the late 1940s the question of who ultimately controlled the courts came to the fore when British officials reversed on appeal an emir's court judgment in a murder case. Judicial reforms in the 1950s partially rectified the matter by sanctioning a new Muslim appellate judge or 'Grand Kadi',²⁰ but this office did not eliminate the ambiguities associated with the existence of diverse legal systems in one territory.

Colonial economic changes eroded the position of *masu sarauta*. Kano became an economic centre in the mid 1910s after a railway connected it to the coast, initially spurring cash crop production and later industrialisation.²¹ Hausa *talakawa* (peasants) along the railway began to grow peanuts or migrated to towns to work for wages. Slaves also came to *murgu* arrangements with their masters whereby they were released to work

15 Thus ruled Emir Abbas: *Selected cases from the records of the emir of Kano's Judicial Council*, ed. and trans. Allan Christelow (East Lansing, 1994).

16 Umar, *Islam and colonialism*, pp. 182–205.

17 Allan Christelow, 'Islamic law and judicial practice in Nigeria: An historical perspective', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22 (2002), p. 189.

18 Steven Pierce, 'Farmers and "prostitutes": Twentieth century problems of female inheritance in Kano Emirate, Nigeria', *Journal of African History*, 44 (2003), pp. 463–86.

19 J. N. D. Anderson, *Islamic law in Africa* (London, 1954).

20 Christelow, 'Islamic law and judicial practice', pp. 193–5.

21 Paul Lubeck, *Islam and urban labor in northern Nigeria* (Cambridge, 1986).

part time on their own account and eventually paid for emancipation through profits from cash cropping or wage labour.²² Merchants involved themselves in transportation services and new commercial activities. Newly affluent *talakawa*, former slaves and merchants sought to increase their local stature by emulating *masu sarauta* practices, such as adopting *kulle* (seclusion and veiling of adult women). While *kulle* created a separate women's sphere for some, it equally served to transfer labour burdens in households from senior to junior wives.²³ Wealthy merchants also patronised local 'ulama', ultimately shifting the bases of financial support for scholarly activities from *masu sarauta* to affluent businessmen.²⁴ Continued British support for *masu sarauta*, however, meant the full effect of these developments would occur after independence.

French West Africa

French West Africa, the large colonial unit administered by the French from a colonial capital at Dakar, included large numbers of Muslim subjects. French retention of most members of the Muslim elite in the jihad state in Fuuta Jalon (Guinea) showed that they could engage Muslims as the British did in Sokoto, but the French found other ways to interact with Muslim leaders. In Senegal, where Islam had been the majority faith in Fuuta Tooro and was becoming so for Wolof speakers in Bawol, Jolof, Kajoor and Waalo, the French developed relations with Sufi leaders not as intermediaries, but as opinion leaders who would advise Muslims to accept French rule in return for relative autonomy in religious affairs. Muslim leaders went to great lengths to develop connections with local communities before forging relations with the French, but these elites eventually helped establish a system of informal governance.²⁵ By the 1930s the process culminated with the emergence of Sa'id ibn Nur or Seydou Nourou Taal (d. 1960), grandson of al-Hajj 'Umar, as *grand marabout* ('great holy man') whom officials sent throughout French West Africa to rally support for their edicts. These arrangements fostered civil society but did not create direct ties to the colonial apparatus: Sufi

22 Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow death for slavery*, pp. 160–2, 203–6.

23 Barbara Cooper, 'Reflections on slavery, seclusion and female labor in the Maradi region of Niger in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries', *Journal of African History*, 35 (1994), pp. 61–78.

24 Ibrahim Tahir, 'Scholars, saints, Sufis and capitalists in Kano, 1904–1974', Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University (1975).

25 David Robinson, *Paths of accommodation: Muslim societies and French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Athens, 2000).

leaders did not serve as judges, and ‘*ulama*’ who had adjudicated in the pre colonial era saw their roles diminished.²⁶

Colonial interventions also worked against Muslims, as seen in French actions towards the Ḥamawīyya, a branch of the Tijānī Sufi order propagated by Aḥmad Ḥamahu Allah Haidara (Shaykh Ḥamallah) of Nioro in the French Soudan (Mali). Ḥamallah did not overtly challenge the French administration, but he chose not to recognise it either, and in 1925 the French exiled him to Côte d’Ivoire. The imprisonment served to increase his stature, attracting civil servants to a movement that had gained support among desert side herders, merchants and former slaves. Released from prison in 1935, Ḥamallah agreed to stop abbreviating his *ṣalat* (daily prayer, a practice he had started in confinement), but enduring French suspicions and a violent incident involving Ḥamawī disciples led the French to execute many supporters and exile Ḥamallah to France, where he died in 1943.²⁷ The French also moved against Ya’qub Sylla (d. 1988), a Ḥamawī disciple. Ya’qub preached uncompromising equality in all matters, and recruited former slaves and others of lower social status to his movement in the Upper Senegal Valley. In 1929 the French exiled Ya’qub to Côte d’Ivoire after violence broke out involving his disciples. In 1933, after his release, Ya’qub remained in Côte d’Ivoire, developed a successful enterprise in a cash cropping region and reconstituted his religious community there.²⁸

Zanzibar

Zanzibar’s experience is one in which colonial rule exacerbated divisions in the Muslim community. The Omani sultan ruled from Zanzibar town on Unguja island; his eastern African commercial empire was largely financed by immigrant Indian investors and focused on two activities: caravans obtaining ivory and slaves from the mainland; and plantation production of cash crops by slaves on the coast and Zanzibar archipelago. The administration was mainly in the hands of Arabs, but indigenous Kiswahili speaking

26 Dominique Sarr and Richard Roberts, ‘The jurisdiction of Muslim tribunals in colonial Senegal, 1857–1932’, in Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds.), *Law in colonial Africa* (Portsmouth, 1991), pp. 131–45; Charles Stewart, ‘Colonial justice and the spread of Islam in the early twentieth century’, in Robinson and Triaud (eds.), *Le temps des marabouts*, pp. 53–66.

27 Benjamin Soares, ‘The spiritual economy of Nioro du Sahel: Islamic discourses and practices in a Malian religious center’, Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University (1997); Traoré, *Islam et colonisation*.

28 Sean Hanretta, ‘Constructing a religious community in French West Africa: The Ḥamawī Sufis of Yacouba Sylla’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin Madison (2003).

Muslims, who had welcomed Omanis to the islands and coast, participated in commercial activities and joined the lower ranks of the administration. Zanzibar's Muslims were diverse: Omanis were Ibaḍī; many Indians were Shi'ī; and indigenous Kiswahili speaking groups, slaves who converted and immigrant Ḥaḍramī Arabs were Sunnī. In 1890 the British established a protectorate over the Zanzibar archipelago, including the two largest islands, Unguja and Pemba, through an agreement with the sultan, who ruled along with a British resident from Zanzibar town. The British viewed Zanzibar's diversity through a lens which stressed race and class: Arabs and Indians were 'non natives' whom the British favoured through recruitment into the colonial administration, edicts regulating former slaves and other race based policies.

The colonial justice and education systems are illustrative of the colonial order. Ḥaḍramī judges, whom Sultan Barghash (d. 1888) had recruited to run his courts, still staffed the colonial era Muslim courts, which maintained separate Ibaḍī and Sunnī spheres, but the British also established their own courts. This judicial system became weighted towards British courts over time: a succession of edicts reduced the authority of Muslim judges, so that by the 1950s they only heard cases involving personal status, primarily divorce and unsubstantial inheritance cases. The British also established a Wakf Commission in 1905, and passed subsequent decrees to give the government increased control of *waqf* lands. The commission, staffed by two Muslim judges and four British representatives (increased to six British members in the 1930s), ruled in favour of British interests and contravened *waqf* provisions; its Muslim judges could only write dissenting opinions, as the cases were decided by majority vote.²⁹ The education system reflected the race based policies of the era: it provided schooling for Africans to the primary level, but for Arabs to the secondary levels so that they could work in the civil service, after colleges were founded in the 1920s. Muslim scholars maintained the Arabic language Islamic schools for which Zanzibar had gained a reputation, but they pushed for Kiswahili (an African language with numerous Arabic loan words) as the instructional language in the colonial schools. Parents, however, preferred Arabic, not merely for liturgical reasons but in reaction to implicit assumptions about African inferiority and inability to learn Arabic. Primary school teachers indeed espoused notions of

29 Anne Bang, 'Intellectuals and civil servants in early twentieth century Zanzibar: Ulama and the colonial state', in Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti (ed.), *Islam in East Africa: New sources* (Rome, 2001), pp. 59–98.

‘Arab’ superiority: their writings reveal how they disparaged African ‘custom’ and saw themselves in the vanguard of a reformist Islamic civilization in Zanzibar.³⁰

Muslim expansion during the colonial era

Colonial officials remarked on the widespread and often rapid expansion in Muslim affiliation in sub Saharan Africa. The extent of growth is difficult to know precisely, given incomplete census data, but the overall trend is indisputable.³¹ Where Muslim majorities already had emerged, in some regions of the western African savannah, the Horn and the eastern African coast, they were consolidated and expanded in the colonial era, and where Muslims had lived as minorities their numbers increased, especially in the towns of colonial western and eastern Africa. Conversion was an individual matter, the processes of which were complex, but patterns nevertheless emerged. Inspired Muslim evangelism was pervasive and effective. Public practice of Islam’s rituals by Muslim intermediaries also was influential; some rulers adopted Islam, followed by the conversion of many of their subjects. Aspiring traders found that conversion had the benefit of access to vast social networks. In regions where Muslims were minorities, but lived as majorities in urban neighbourhoods, non Muslim immigrants to those neighbourhoods sometimes converted and, if they returned home, took the faith with them. Emancipation also was a significant factor in conversion. Some former slaves rejected Islam as the religion of their former owners, but others responded to its message of equality before God and claimed Muslim identities. The adoption of locally defined ‘Muslim’ clothing styles was one way for former slaves to assert equal status; in Zanzibar town during the early colonial period, for example, former women slaves set the fashion agenda, and elite women sometimes followed their sartorial lead.³² In other domains, however, elites often were disdainful of assertions of identity from former slaves.

The most pervasive agents of proselytisation during the colonial era were Sufis. *Taṣawwuf* (Sufism) in its dominant African expression is a spiritual

30 Jonathon Glassman, ‘Slower than a massacre: The multiple sources of racial thought in colonial Africa’, *American Historical Review*, 109 (2004), pp. 720–54.

31 Lidwien Kapteijns, ‘Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa’, David Sperling, ‘The coastal hinterland and interior of east Africa’ and Edward Alpers, ‘East central Africa’, all in Levtzion and Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa*, pp. 227–50, 273–302, 303–25; Mervyn Hiskett, *The development of Islam in West Africa* (London, 1984).

32 Laura Fair, ‘Dressing up: Clothing, class and gender in post abolition Zanzibar’, *Journal of African History*, 39 (1998), pp. 63–94.

discipline in which disciples seek religious enlightenment through an intimate relationship with a shaykh (master). Shaykhs have attained an elevated spiritual status and reveal litanies, reputedly transmitted in an unbroken chain from the founder of a particular Sufi way. The core ritual is *dhikr*, a devotion during which disciples recite litanies in hopes of having an experience of proximity to God. Sufi orders (*ṭuruq* (sg. *ṭarīqa*)) tend to formalise the disciple guide bond and create social hierarchy through layers of relationships leading from disciples through shaykhs to other leaders and ultimately to the founder of the *ṭarīqa* or his successor. Sufi titles indicate roles in the order or their depth of spiritual immersion: a *walī* (saint), for example, is someone who has had intense mystical experiences. Sufi *ṭuruq* are global organisations with local branches throughout the Muslim world. Their expansion sometimes led to fission, as inspired leaders started new branches or regenerated established lines autonomously from other branches.

The twentieth century was an era of Sufi innovation and expansion, as *ṭuruq* became mass movements in sub Saharan Africa. Sufi orders, after spreading through scholarly networks in the nineteenth century, underwent transformations to meet the spiritual and social needs of Africans living under colonial rule.³³ Shaykhs made Sufism relevant to new audiences by composing poetry in vernacular languages and including local cultural expressions such as dancing and drumming at *dhikr* sessions. They also used the *ṭarīqa* to meet new economic and social ends. Some developed organisations that supported the expansion of cash cropping or commercial activities. Others proved adept at welcoming former slaves or recent immigrants, and forging new solidarities across class or ethnic boundaries. Shaykhs also served as healers who demonstrated their command of esoteric knowledge by curing the ill; they drew on areas of Muslim expertise that ‘*ulama*’ had employed for centuries.³⁴ Many leaders came from established Muslim scholarly lineages, but Sufism’s emphasis on spiritual matters meant that pious disciples could rise quickly, and several shaykhs came from humble backgrounds.

Sufi expansion in the twentieth century can be conceptualised as the development of the Muslim devotional marketplace, with Sufi *ṭuruq*

33 Knut Vikør, ‘Sufi brotherhoods in Africa’, in Levtzion and Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa*, pp. 441–76.

34 Ismail Abdalla, *Islam, medicine and practitioners in northern Nigeria* (Lewiston, NY, 1997); Lorenzo Declich, ‘Zanzibar: Some nineteenth century Arabic writings on healing’, in Scott Reese (ed.), *The transmission of learning in Islamic Africa* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 257–73; David Owusu Ansah, *Islamic talismanic tradition in nineteenth century Asante* (Lewiston, NY, 1991).

competing for followers and offering disciples a range of spiritual options.³⁵ In turn, Sufi orders depended upon gifts from disciples in a system that reflected the integration of spiritual and material affairs. Members of the *ṭuruq* often gave *hadaya* (non charitable gifts) to their shaykh or *wali*, who in turn performed a *du'a* (petitionary prayer) to God. To colonial officials the exchange of the disciples' goods, cash or labour services for no tangible benefit seemed exploitative; some tried to stop it, but with little success. The Sufi view instead stressed a cycle of giving that began with God, who was the ultimate source of all gifts and sent blessings (*baraka*) to saints and through them to shaykhs and their disciples. *Hadaya* returned gifts up the cycle, to ensure a continuous flow of blessings and express the status of givers as appreciative recipients of God's gifts.³⁶ Providing labour for the *ṭariqa* carried the implication of work for God and was understood to be similar to the performance of *dhikr*: both moved the participant along a path towards God. Sufi leaders never actively sought gifts, but they certainly depended upon them.

Sufi *ṭuruq* sometimes involved women, either as disciples or indirectly through religious education and devotional activities developed for them. Some Sufi leaders were known to have educated their wives and sisters and inducted them into the *ṭariqa*; these women in turn brought other women into the order.³⁷ Elite women sponsored segregated activities at their homes and usually included women of various social rankings.³⁸ At public events such as *mawlid al nabi* (the Prophet's birthday) and *wazifa* (public *dhikr* sessions), many Sufis tolerated the mixing of genders; the adoption of modest styles of attire by women facilitated their participation. These gatherings nevertheless attracted criticism from some Muslims, and over the course of the twentieth century the tendency has been towards increased gender segregation in Sufi activities. Segregation could lead to distinctive women's events, as in Somalia, where women recited *sittaat*, hymns invoking notable women from the early Muslim centuries, such as Faṭīma, whom the women believed might appear before them and assist with their fertility or childbirth

35 Charles Stewart uses the term 'devotional marketplace' in 'Colonial justice and the spread of Islam'. Murray Last first used the metaphor 'prayer economy,' in 'Charisma and medicine in northern Nigeria', in Donal Cruise O'Brien and Christian Coulon (eds.), *Charisma and brotherhood in African Islam* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 183–204.

36 Hanretta, 'Constructing a religious community'; Benjamin Soares, 'The prayer economy in a Malian town', *Cahiers d'études africaines* 36 (1996), pp. 739–53.

37 Alaine Hutson, 'We are many: Women Sufis and Islamic scholars in twentieth century Kano, Nigeria', Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University (1998).

38 Margaret Strobel, *Muslim women in Mombasa, 1890–1975* (New Haven, 1979).

concerns.³⁹ Sufi orders thereby recruited to their ranks those who previously might have sought to relieve their medical afflictions through spirit mediums (*bori* and *zar* in African Muslim contexts).⁴⁰

Sufi leaders constructed their *ṭuruq* locally, but had connections with global Muslim networks. Sufi leaders travelled to northern Africa or south west Asia to enhance their spiritual experiences and status by establishing personal ties with more prestigious shaykhs, and competition between *ṭuruq* prompted leaders at major centres to send representatives to the expanding Sufi domain in sub Saharan Africa. *Ṭuruq* differed in significant ways – most obviously in the litanies that they transmitted, but also in their organising principles. Some tended to allow more local autonomy, whereas other orders were centralised. The influence of specific *ṭuruq* varied: the Qadiri order established relatively autonomous branches in both western and eastern Africa, whereas the Shadhili *ṭariqa* only had a presence in eastern Africa, and the Tijani *ṭariqa* had branches in western Africa.

Muslim preachers joined Sufi leaders in encouraging conversion to Islam. Peripatetic ‘*ulama*’ travelled widely to take the message to non Muslims. Some of the most effective preachers were converts who returned to their communities to spread Islam. In the French Soudan (Mali), for example, Saliḥ Siby converted, studied the esoteric Islamic sciences and returned to proselytise in the rural area of his origins, where beliefs in intercessionist spirits still predominated. Siby addressed his converts’ beliefs by incorporating local ritual objects, such as masks, into Muslim events, such as children’s games, thereby de sacralising the objects.⁴¹ Preaching required great patience or seizing an opportune moment. In another region of French Soudan former slaves of Muslim masters carried Islam with them when they fled after the abolition of slavery. They returned to a region in which indigenous beliefs predominated, quietly practised Islam in private gatherings across several villages, and only proclaimed their faith publicly when they gained local status as elders.⁴² The activities of former slaves, Muslim preachers and

39 Lidwien Kapteijns, with Mariam Omar Ali, ‘Sittaat: Somali women’s songs for the “mothers of believers”,’ in Kenneth Harrow (ed.), *The marabout and the muse* (Portsmouth, 1996).

40 I. M. Lewis, Ahmad al Safi and Sayyid Hurreiz (eds.), *Women’s medicine: The Zar Bori cult and beyond* (Edinburgh, 1991); Adeline Masquelier, *Prayer has spoiled every thing: Possession, power and identity in an Islamic town in Niger* (Durham, 2001).

41 Benjamin Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’, in Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman (eds.), *Public Islam and the common good* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 212–13.

42 Brian Peterson, ‘Slave emancipation, trans local social processes and the spread of Islam in French colonial Bugani, 1893–1914’, *Journal of African History*, 45 (2004), pp. 421–44.

others have not been documented fully, but their efforts contributed greatly to the expansion of Islam in the colonial era.

The growth of Muslim affiliation created a demand for teachers to provide basic literacy skills in Arabic. Schools that taught memorisation and recitation of the Qur'an by rote were ubiquitous in sub Saharan Africa. They were the first stage in a system of education that included the full panoply of Islamic disciplines at advanced schools.⁴³ The Qur'an schools experienced growth in the early twentieth century, as recent converts sent their children to these schools. The preference for religious education meant that Muslims tended not to send their children to Western style schools, especially Christian missionary schools. The example of Western style schools, however, inspired some Muslims to adopt new pedagogies in the instruction of Arabic. Some of the first attempts were spontaneous efforts, but the most sustained and successful 'reformed' Muslim schools were those that were established by Africans who had studied or travelled abroad.⁴⁴ The Aḥmadiyya Muslim community, founded by the Punjabi Muslim Ghulam Aḥmad (d. 1908), also sent missionaries to found schools in Africa based on Western models.⁴⁵ Increasing Arabic literacy provided a growing audience for texts; presses in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and elsewhere in the Muslim world increased their publication of works authored by African Muslims and others, selling them in expanding numbers in sub Saharan Africa during the colonial era.

Muslim urban associations were another development of the colonial era that supported if not spurred conversion. The dynamics of colonial urbanisation influenced the organisation of these associations. Europeans thought of Africans as living in 'tribes' or unchanging, culturally bounded ethnic groups, whereas the reality was more complex: permeable social boundaries allowed individuals to participate in a local initiation, engage in a particular occupation or learn a new language and ultimately 'become' members of a new group. Africans, confronted with European notions about 'tribes', often formed associations to lobby for resources based on colonial categories; the process tended to crystallise ethnic groups, although permeable boundaries still existed. In some towns Muslim urban associations offered a basis to

43 Stefan Reichmuth, 'Islamic education and scholarship in sub Saharan Africa,' in Levtzion and Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa*, pp. 419–40.

44 Brenner, *Controlling knowledge*; Lansiné Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa* (Evanston, 1974); Stefan Reichmuth, *Islamische bildung und soziale integration in Ilorin (Nigeria)* (Münster, 1998).

45 Humphrey Fisher, *The Ahmadiyya: A study in contemporary Islam along the West African coast* (London, 1963).

transcend ethnicity by pooling efforts to make the *hajj* or to support educational institutions, but in many instances competition or rivalry led to separate Muslim ethnic associations.⁴⁶ Divisions also were pronounced in regions where non African Muslim immigrants formed associations along communal lines (exclusively for Arabs or Indians, for example).

Muslim associations, Sufi *ṭuruq*, preachers and teachers contributed their voices to a growing public sphere.⁴⁷ Muslim participation in public discussions certainly was not new, but colonial rule enhanced the public sphere in several ways. Altered colonial political boundaries and transformed economies disrupted local affairs, brought Muslims from various regions together and opened new spaces for interaction, outside state institutions but transcending kinship groups.⁴⁸ Technological innovations and cultural flows from Europe also produced a sense of social rupture, encouraging Muslims to consider alternative futures and engagements with things 'modern'. Printing presses and the radio created new means for disseminating ideas. The importance of the public sphere grew over time and is most evident in the post colonial era, but its emerging significance in the first half of the twentieth century is undeniable.

An overarching concern was how much to accommodate local cultural practices, especially in the performance of Islamic obligations in the ritual and social spheres. In some contexts, such as colonial barracks, where young Muslims lived away from their families, consensus emerged on proper practices, but Islam equally provided a means to underscore differences between groups. Social boundaries were maintained through different meanings attached to Islamic concepts, distinctive liturgical practices such as gestures during *ṣalat* and choices about which Muslim holidays to celebrate and in what way. Some '*ulama*' observed the growing diversity and called for reform to eliminate innovations in local practices, but they were only influential in elite circles. Sometimes conflicts occurred at mosques or Islamic celebrations, but most of the time Muslims allowed other communities, whether defined by Sufi affiliation, ethnicity or other markers, to define their own practices in a public sphere that tolerated Muslim diversity.

46 Abner Cohen, *Custom and politics in urban Africa: A study of Hausa migrants in Yoruba towns* (London, 1969); Erin Schildkrout, *People of the zongo: The transformation of ethnic identities in Ghana* (Cambridge, 1978).

47 Dale Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, 'Muslim publics', in Salvatore and Eickelman (eds.), *Public Islam and the common good*, pp. 3–27.

48 Robert Launay and Benjamin Soares, 'The formation of an Islamic sphere in French West Africa', *Economy and Society*, 28 (1999), pp. 497–519.

Somalia and Somaliland

The Somali speaking peoples of the Horn were divided between colonial powers, with the largest concentrations in two territories, Italian Somalia and British Somaliland (Somalis also lived in French controlled Djibouti and eastern regions of Ethiopia and Kenya). Before the colonial era most Somalis were camel herders in the arid Horn, but some resided in or traded at coastal entrepôts along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Somalis recognised regional differences, roughly between north and south, as some areas in the south supported intensive agricultural production. Camel pastoralism occurred in both regions, and clans were the most effective units of social solidarity.⁴⁹ Sufi revival came to the Horn in the nineteenth century, through *ṭuruq* associated with Aḥmad b. Idris, such as the Aḥmadī and Ṣaliḥī orders, and the reinvigorated Qadiri *ṭarīqa*.⁵⁰ These *ṭuruq* established new forms of social organisation that brought individuals from diverse clans together into farming settlements (even in the arid north), where they received Arabic language and Islamic education. The *ṭuruq* differed in several regards: their responses to European imperialism, with the Ṣaliḥiyya leading military resistance and the Qadiriyya advocating caution; *tawassul* (intercession by Sufi saints), with the orders inspired by Ibn Idris rejecting it; and devotional practices, with the Qadiri *ṭarīqa* allowing sensual stimulation (through drumming and dance or drinking coffee or chewing *qat*, a local narcotic). This contrast between exuberant and puritanical expressions of Sufi devotion remained during the colonial era, as descendants of nineteenth century saints consolidated the *ṭuruq* at some remove from the workings of colonial regimes.⁵¹

Tanganyika and Zanzibar

Tanganyika and Zanzibar were separate territories throughout the colonial era, although the islands and coast were part of a Swahili cultural zone defined by Muslim affiliation, a cosmopolitan urban life (involving both indigenous groups and immigrants) and Kiswahili as a first language. Residing in the interior of Tanganyika were diverse populations of farmers and herders, all speaking different languages; in the nineteenth century

49 Lee Cassenelli, *The shaping of Somali society: Reconstructing the history of a pastoral people, 1600–1900* (Philadelphia, 1982).

50 R. S. O'Fahey, *Enigmatic saint: Ahmad ibn Idris and the Idrisi tradition* (Evanston, 1990); Scott Reese, *Traders and Sufis in southern Somalia* (Leiden, 2005).

51 Kapteijns, 'Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa', pp. 233–7, 241–5.

Kiswahili became a lingua franca in interior commercial towns. German officials made it their administrative language, and recruited coastal Kiswahili speakers as intermediaries. After the First World War, when Britain assumed control over Tanganyika, British officials maintained Kiswahili speaking elites along the coast, displaced them in the interior for local intermediaries, but retained the Kiswahili language administratively. In both Zanzibar and Tanganyika the British distinguished between 'natives' and 'non natives', the latter category referring to communities of Arabs, Indians and Europeans.

The twentieth century was an era of Sufi expansion into the interior from the coast and islands, where the Qadiri and Shadhili *ṭuruq* had been established since the 1880s. The Comorian shaykh, Muḥammad Ma'ruf (d. 1905), established the Shadhili *ṭariqa* in Zanzibar, and other Comorians propagated it thereafter in Tanganyika and Nyasaland (Malawi). The Shadhili order tended not to be as open to incorporating local customs into Sufi devotions and ceremonies as the Qadiriyya. One of the most pervasive branches of the latter was associated with the Somali shaykh Uways b. Muḥammad al Barawī (d. 1909), who travelled to Zanzibar and inducted numerous disciples into the *ṭariqa*. Practices and litanies associated with Uways spread to the coast and interior towns of Tanganyika, and in the process numerous branches were founded. Another dynamic Qadiri order was launched in Bagamoyo under Yahya b. 'Abd Allah (Shaykh Ramiya) (d. 1931), a former slave of a prominent Omani merchant. Under Ramiya and his son, Muḥammad, this *ṭariqa* expanded throughout Tanganyika and neighbouring regions. Ramiya's rise points to social forces underlying Sufi expansion in eastern Africa: former slaves and recent converts joined the *ṭuruq* in large numbers and pushed for elements of African expressive culture, such as drumming and dancing, at Sufi events. Many Sufi *ṭuruq* also were inclusive of women, encouraging private activities but also allowing them to attend public events. Conflicts emerged between, and sometimes within, orders; the disputes involved liturgical issues, but also reflected the assertions of former slaves or recent converts who wished to have equal status within their Muslim community.⁵²

Zanzibar, while home to Sufi *ṭuruq*, including the 'Alawī order,⁵³ was influenced by other Islamic movements. Modernist ideas from Egypt excited Zanzibari 'ulama' as well as young Arabs who attended colonial schools and

52 August Nimtz, *Islam and politics in east Africa: The Sufi orders in Tanzania* (Minneapolis, 1980).

53 Anne Bang, *Sufis and scholars of the sea: Family networks in east Africa, 1860–1925* (London, 2003).

were employed as civil servants. The Mombasan scholar al Amin b. 'Alī al Mazrū'ī (d. 1947), who studied in Zanzibar, became the most prominent Muslim modernist in East Africa: he published a Kiswahili language news paper, *Islah* (from the Arabic *al iṣlāḥ*, 'reform'), which inspired the next generation of Zanzibari 'ulama' to publish educational pamphlets on ritual and social matters in Kiswahili.⁵⁴ Other Islamic currents were present on Zanzibar, energising Shī'ī communities among immigrant Indians; the Aga Khan, for example, encouraged interaction between Indian and African Muslims.

Senegal

The early twentieth century witnessed mass conversions and a proliferation of Sufi orders in Senegal. Popularisation of the Qadiriyya occurred along several lines. Descendants of Saharan shaykhs who first brought the *ṭarīqa* into the region cultivated constituencies: Sa'ad Bu (d. 1917) spread the Faḍiliyya, a branch named after his father, and Sidi Baba (d. 1924) propagated the Mukhtariyya, a branch named after his grandfather.⁵⁵ The most dramatic Sufi expansion was associated with Aḥmad Bamba Mbakke (d. 1927), a disciple of Sidi Baba, who founded what in essence became a new Sufi order known as the Muridiyya. In 1912, only a quarter century after Bamba began his efforts, he had some 70,000 Wolof speaking disciples; the Muridiyya grew to over 400,000 disciples by the 1960s and to over 3 million today. Bamba condemned the moral failings of Wolof elites and cautioned against contact with the French, stressing *tarbiyya* (education in *taṣawwuf*) and hard labour as the foundations for salvation.⁵⁶ This message particularly attracted farmers and former slaves, most of whom were fleeing the French colonial advance or their masters.⁵⁷ Bamba's disciples founded rural settlements at some remove from political centres, combining religious instruction with the production of peanuts, Senegal's cash crop.⁵⁸ The Muridiyya also incorporated many aspects of Wolof social practices into its organisation and festivals. For example, disciples who traced initiation through Ibrahīm Fall (d. 1930), a

54 Randall Pouwels, 'Sh. Al Amin b. Ali Mazrui and Islamic modernism in East Africa, 1875–1947', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 13 (1981), pp. 329–45.

55 Charles Stewart, *Islam and social order in Mauritania* (Oxford, 1973).

56 Cheikh Anta Babou, 'Educating the Murid: Theory and practices of education in Amadou Bamba's thought', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (2003), pp. 310–27.

57 James Searing, 'God alone is king': *Islam and emancipation in Senegal; the Wolof kingdoms of Kajoor and Bawol, 1859–1914* (Portsmouth, 2002).

58 Jean Copans, *Les marabouts de l'arachide: la confrérie mouride et les paysans du Sénégal* (Paris, 1980).

ceddo (slave soldier) who submitted to Bamba in 1886, wore distinctive attire and performed dances that reflected their heritage.⁵⁹

The Tijaniyya also was active in Senegal. Descendants of al Ḥajj ‘Umar remained influential, most notably Seydou Nourou Taal. Two other Tijaniyya branches were important: one associated with Malik Sy (d. 1922) and the other with ‘Abd Allah Niass (d. 1922). Sy founded one of the first *ṭuruq* to recruit in Senegalese towns; it developed the *daaira* or ‘circle’, a neighbourhood organisation that was so successful that other orders eventually adopted it.⁶⁰ ‘Abd Allah Niass’s branch splintered after his death, with a younger son, Ibrahim (d. 1975), starting the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya. This new *ṭarīqa* was based in Senegal, but Ibrahim built a trans regional, multi ethnic order, recruiting merchants as well as recent migrants in growing towns throughout western Africa and the Sudan.⁶¹ Ibrahim stressed *tarbiyya al Ibrahimiyya al Tijaniyya*, his own system of spiritual education, which served to ease access to the *ṭarīqa*. He also distinguished his movement from other Tijani orders by adopting *qabḍ* (performing *ṣalat* with arms folded across the chest) instead of *saḍl* (praying with arms down at the side), the Maliki practice, which informed practice in northern and western Africa.

Muslims had lived for generations in coastal *communes*, such as St Louis and Dakar, where they could claim status as French citizens. Muslims expected to have access to Islamic courts, in the *communes* and wherever they travelled or maintained households in the interior, but the French ruled against such rights in the early twentieth century.⁶² Muslim organisations were established in St Louis and Dakar to defend their rights, organise the pilgrimage and support Arabic language education. The French, however, limited the scope of urban associations, and most disbanded after a few years. In the 1950s Cheikh Touré, a Senegalese graduate of an Arabic language institute in Algeria, joined others in founding Ittihad al Thaqafi al Islami, also known as the Union Culturelle Musulmane, which ran Arabic language schools in several towns, organised conferences and published *Le réveil islamique*

59 Donal Cruise O’Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The political and economic organization of an Islamic brotherhood* (Oxford, 1971).

60 Leonardo Villalón, *Islamic society and state power in Senegal: Disciples and citizens in Fatick* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 152–62.

61 Christopher Gray, ‘The rise of the Niassene Tijaniyya, 1875–present’, *Islam et sociétés au sud de Sahara*, 2 (1988), pp. 34–60.

62 Rebecca Shekeikis, ‘Customized courts: French colonial legal institutions in Kayes, French Soudan, c. 1880–c. 1913’, Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University (2003).

monthly. Touré also criticised practices associated with Sufism in his 1957 treatise *Afin que tu deviennes un croyant*.⁶³

Nigeria

In northern Nigeria, especially the Hausa speaking areas where the largest concentration of Muslims resided, two Sufi *ṭuruq* became mass organisations during the colonial era. Membership in the Qadiriyya order had previously been confined to *masu sarauta*, and the Tijaniyya only had branches in a few locales. The decisive event for the latter was the 1937 meeting between ‘Abd Allah Bayero, emir of Kano, and Ibrahim Niass in Mecca; Bayero became Ibrahim’s disciple, and promoted the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya. An emerging group of wealthy Hausa merchants joined it as well.⁶⁴ By the time of Niass’s visits to Nigeria in the 1950s this order had become a mass movement, with thousands gathering for a chance to see him at mass rallies and later to receive *tarbiyya al Ibrahimiyya al Tijaniyya* and join the *ṭariqa*. Also during the 1950s Naṣir Kabara regenerated the Qadiri *ṭariqa* in Kano, in part through devotional innovations in *dhikr* which he learned during a trip to Baghdad. Kabara successfully constructed a mass organisation to compete with the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya.⁶⁵ Rivalries between these two *ṭuruq* sometimes led to violent confrontations between disciples until the leaders of both orders formed an alliance in the 1970s.

Southern Nigeria, the colonial domain where the British established themselves with a colony at Lagos in the mid nineteenth century, also experienced growth in Muslim affiliation during the colonial era. Some Muslims were Hausa immigrants from the north,⁶⁶ but the most significant expansion was associated with conversions among Yoruba speakers in the towns of south western Nigeria; 40 per cent of Yoruba speakers identified themselves as Muslim by the end of the colonial era, and some southern towns came to have Muslim majorities.⁶⁷ Their conversions were inspired in part by the proselytisation of itinerant preachers from Ilorin, a town in the former Sokoto empire where a small community of Yoruba scholars had been established in the nineteenth century. The most famous Ilorin preacher

63 Roman Loimeier, ‘Cheikh Touré: du reformisme à l’islamisme, un musulman sénégalais dans le siècle,’ *Islam et sociétés au sud de Sahara*, 8 (1994), pp. 55–66.

64 John Paden, *Religion and political authority in Kano* (Berkeley, 1973).

65 Roman Loimeier, *Islamic reform and political change in northern Nigeria* (Evanston, 1997).

66 Cohen, *Custom and politics*.

67 David Laitin, ‘Religion, political culture and the Weberian tradition’, *World Politics*, 30 (1978), p. 589; Peter Clarke and Ian Linden, *Islam in Modern Nigeria* (Munich, 1984).

was Chado 'Kokewu' Kobere (d. 1935), who supported himself as a tailor but made his reputation performing *wáká* (Yoruba performed couplets) criticising indigenous religious practices based on Islamic values.⁶⁸ Yoruba speaking Muslims also were active in forming urban associations to promote Islamic education. In 1923 the Anṣar al Dīn society was founded in Lagos and there after established branches in other major southern towns, where its Arabic language schools educated large numbers of Yoruba converts.⁶⁹ Several other Muslim associations were organised, including one by the Aḥmadiyya Muslim community.

Nationalism and new states

Muslims participated in nationalist movements that pushed for independence across sub Saharan Africa after the Second World War. The dominant colonial powers hoped for a gradual transition to legislative governments: British territories already had legislative councils, to which broader access was granted and power ultimately devolved, and the French established new assemblies in their territories in the 1950s. Nationalists organised mass based parties to contest elections and, in a dramatic half decade beginning in 1957, African leaders came to power in much of sub Saharan Africa. Independence, however, did not fundamentally alter what colonial rule had wrought: political boundaries that incorporated diverse ethnic groups and economies, oriented at their disadvantage to Europe. Nationalist leaders, too, were educated in European languages and assumed that Western political and economic models would sustain their states. In the end, forging a nation proved much more difficult than imagined, and economic development, no matter whether pursued through socialist or capitalist policies, was elusive. In many countries, authoritarian or military governments emerged and brought little benefit. The recent democratic transitions have altered politics in some states, but most African economies are still not flourishing.

Muslims involved themselves in post colonial politics. As states enacted new laws restricting or forbidding Muslim precedents in areas such as marriage, divorce and inheritance, all in the name of standardisation or

68 Stefan Reichmuth, 'A regional centre of Islamic learning in Nigeria: Ilorin and its influence on Yoruba Islam', in Nicole Grandin and Marc Gaborieau (eds.), *Madrasa: la transmission du savoir dans le monde musulman* (Paris, 1997), pp. 241–2.

69 Stefan Reichmuth, 'Education and the growth of religious associations among Yoruba Muslims: The Anṣar Ud Deen Society of Nigeria', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 26 (1996), pp. 365–405.

equality, Muslims raised voices in opposition, but to no avail. State sponsored Islamic organisations often served to limit debate rather than foster dialogue on these and other issues. Despite these frustrations most Muslims continue to acknowledge the authority of secular states and seek patronage in the form of assistance in making the *hajj*, funding for Arabic schools and support for other activities. Muslims also are active members of secular political parties and governments across the continent; several have been elected presidents, including a Muslim by a Christian majority electorate in Malawi. Islamism, defined as the effort to win political power and govern by Islamic values, is not a pronounced development in sub Saharan Africa outside the Sudan. Some Muslims have espoused Islamist ideas, but they have not won broad popular support. The most influential Islamist movements are in northern Nigeria and Somalia. In eastern Africa, too, political discontent increasingly is being channelled in Islamist directions.⁷⁰

Senegal

Senegal's national struggle has roots in the push to gain representation in the French assembly based on politics in the coastal *communes*. Independence was achieved, however, by mass based parties organising the vote in the more populous regions outside the *communes*. The Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS) constructed the best ties with Sufi orders, won elections in 1960 and came to power with Léopold Senghor, a Christian, as president and Mamadou Dia, a Muslim, as prime minister. Dia was supportive of the Union Culturelle Musulmane, recruited Cheikh Touré into the civil service and seemed poised to implement reformist policies. In a 1962 UPS power struggle that extended well beyond this issue, Senghor ousted Dia and consolidated power. Senghor was committed to his Sufi political base, tabled Dia's agenda and controlled Touré's influence through a state sponsored Muslim association.⁷¹

The intersection of state power and Sufi influence remains a dimension of Senegalese politics and contributes to its political stability.⁷² The *ṭuruq* can point to tangible benefits from this arrangement; for example, Touba, the

70 Abdin Chande, 'Radicalism and reform in east Africa,' in Levtzion and Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa*, pp. 349–69.

71 Roman Loimeier, 'The secular state and Islam in Senegal', in David Westerlund and Eva Evers Rosander (eds.), *Questioning the secular state: The worldwide resurgence of religion* (London, 1966), pp. 185–6; Roman Loimeier, 'L'Islam ne se vend plus: The Islamic reform movement and the state in Senegal', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 30 (2000), pp. 176–7.

72 Villalón, *Islamic society and state power in Senegal*.

religious capital of the Murīdī order, gained distinctive official status as an autonomous rural community in 1976.⁷³ Sufi influence, however, has not extended to all matters. In 1971 Senegal enacted the Family Code, a law that reflected the secular principles of the state, despite Sufi objections. Senghor's successor as president, Abdou Diouf, a Muslim, never made concessions on the secular nature of the state. Diouf continued to engage Sufi leaders, but by the 1980s he had to contend with several Muslim reformist movements. Diouf and the Parti Socialiste, the renamed ruling party, adeptly played each movement against the other and reduced the political influence of both Sufis and reformers.⁷⁴ In 2000 Diouf lost to an opposition candidate, Abdoulaye Wade, a disciple of the Murīdī order, but Wade made no moves to concede greater power to Sufi *ṭuruq* or to alter Senegal's status as a secular state. The most pressing issue for Senegal's Sufi communities is the generational leadership transition looming for several orders.⁷⁵

Somalia

Somalia was created by the union of Italian Somalia and British Somaliland at independence in 1960. The colonial regimes, as noted above, did not develop relations with Sufi *ṭuruq*. Rather, descent (Somali clan and sub clan) loyalties were emphasised, reinforced by rising debt that led most Somalis to depend upon relatives in the small middle class.⁷⁶ The Somali Youth League, the victorious nationalist party, did not alter these patterns, nor did the regime founded after General Muḥammad Siyaad Barre's 1969 *coup d'état*. Barre stressed 'scientific socialism' and nationalism rooted in the Somali language, but he also practised the politics of clan.⁷⁷ His regime's enduring features economic decline, military losses associated with campaigns against Ethiopia and dictatorial rule (illustrated, for example, in the 1975 public execution of ten Muslim leaders who spoke against a new inheritance law) ultimately led to a crisis in 1990, when an uprising occurred and the state collapsed in the ensuing violence. In (the former British) Somaliland in the north, local elites, including clan elders and Sufi leaders, established a viable state and revoked

73 Eric Ross, 'Touba: A spiritual metropolis in the modern world', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 29 (1995), pp. 222–59.

74 Loimeier, 'L'Islam ne se vend plus', pp. 183–6.

75 Leonardo Villalón, 'Generational changes, political stagnation and the evolving dynamics of religion and politics in Senegal', *Africa Today* 3, 4 (1999), pp. 129–47.

76 Lidwien Kapteijns, 'Gender relations and the transformation of the northern Somali pastoral tradition', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 28 (1995), pp. 241–59.

77 I. M. Lewis, *A modern history of the Somali: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa*, 4th edn (Athens, 2002).

the union with Somalia. In the south no central authority asserted control, leaving Somalia to competing 'strongmen' who organised militias around Somali clan and sub clan ties. Some Somali families continued to run businesses and commercial networks amid the political fragmentation, but they did not provide a basis for transcending clan rivalries. In 2004 the United Nations recognised a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somali leaders, but it is unclear whether the TFG, which is supported by many local 'strongmen', can control the militias and bring a new political order to Somalia.

Muslims offered alternatives to the clannism of 'strongmen' in Somalia. Sufi leaders put aside past divisions among the *ṭuruq* and formed an organisation to provide social services in the early 1990s, but their combined resources proved insufficient to the task. Non governmental organisations, including al Iṣḥāḥ (which was funded by Kuwait and other Gulf states), were more effective in providing critical services, such as medical clinics and schools. These Muslim aid organisations also pushed the Salafī perspectives of their donors.⁷⁸ Beginning in the mid 1990s, Somali Muslims founded neighbourhood Islamic courts in Mogadishu, the port city and former capital, and rendered judgments based on *shari'a* principles and local custom. Actively encouraged by local business leaders, these Islamic courts gradually widened their influence in Mogadishu. Also in the mid 1990s, the Ittihad al Islam (Islamic union) established control over several rural villages before an invading Ethiopian force ended the Islamist initiative and dispersed its leaders.⁷⁹ Almost a decade later, in mid 2006, former Ittihad al Islam members joined with leaders of the Islamic courts to create the Union of Islamic Courts. The Union's forces defeated the clan militias in Mogadishu and then moved to attack the TFG in Baidoa. In late 2006 the Ethiopian army decisively intervened, crushing the Union's forces, driving its leaders out of Somalia and installing the TFG in Mogadishu. Islamic courts remain attractive to some Somalis, and TFG efforts to unite Somalia may require an accommodation with Muslim leaders.

Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populous and ethnically diverse state in Africa, and Muslims constituted almost half its population at independence.

⁷⁸ Roland Marchal, 'Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war', in Alex de Waal (ed.), *Islamism and its enemies in the Horn* (Bloomington, 2004), pp. 114–45.

⁷⁹ Ken Menkhaus, 'Political Islam in Somalia', *Middle East Policy*, 9 (2002), pp. 109–23.

Hausa speaking Muslims dominated numerically in the old Sokoto domains of the north; elsewhere Muslims were influential in several contexts, such as the towns of the south west, where large numbers of Yoruba speaking Muslims resided. Muslim organisations, such as the Sufi *ṭuruq*, helped transcend ethnic boundaries, but Nigerian Muslim communities still maintained divisions along linguistic and ethnic lines. The British administered colonial Nigeria as relatively autonomous regions, and at independence handed power to a federal Nigerian state with three regions (north, south west and south east). Numerous regional or ethnic parties formed, and three came to dominate, reflecting the influence of large communities of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa speakers in the south west, south east and north, respectively. The effort of northern politicians, most of whom were Muslim, to use their region's population advantage to control the federal state at independence enshrined concern for 'northern dominance' as an element of national discourse. Underlying this debate was recognition of the differences in educational backgrounds between the regions: the north had fewer Western schools, and its residents were at a disadvantage when applying for civil service and other positions.

Aḥmad Bello dominated nationalist politics in northern Nigeria. Bello was a descendant of 'Usman dan Fodio and had a titular role in the emirate structure, but he consolidated his political position at Kaduna, the north's colonial capital, where he and others educated in colonial schools effectively ran the administration in the 1950s. Bello worked for the success of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), but the NPC was challenged, at the regional level, by the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), a party that sought to reduce the power of *masu sarauta*. Both the NPC and NEPU campaigned on fidelity to Islamic values. For example, Bello tried to popularize the Ṭarīqa 'Uthmaniyya, an umbrella movement meant to unify all orders under leadership sympathetic to the NPC, and NEPU leaders challenged *kulle*, the local practice of secluding and veiling women that was favoured by elites, by arguing that it was against Muslim precedents.⁸⁰ Bello used the police and courts to stymie NEPU activities, helping the NPC to win elections in 1960 and claim control at both the regional (northern) and federal levels. The NPC era ended abruptly with the 1966 *coup d'état* that took the lives of Bello and

80 Jonathan Reynolds, *The time of politics/zamanin siyasa: Islam and the politics of legitimacy in northern Nigeria* (San Francisco, 1999).

several northern politicians. Communal violence followed by the secession of the south east (Biafra) led to a three year civil war.

The 1970 military victory by federal forces kept Nigeria united, and was followed by steps to reduce regionalism in politics. Over the years the number of Nigerian regions has grown from three to over thirty five; one result of these changes was the abolition of the emirate structure in the north. At the same time the influence of '*ulama*' grew, as affluent Hausa merchants patronised them generously. Muslim issues consequently have surfaced at the national level, with the most contentious being the status and operation of Islamic law. Muslim courts have operated continuously in northern Nigeria, but an effort to establish a national Muslim court of appeal for them was considered but ultimately rejected in the late 1970s, dashing the hopes of many '*ulama*'. From the late 1990s political leaders of several northern states sanctioned Muslim judges to rule on criminal matters, a domain which had been proscribed in constitutional provisions from the late 1950s.⁸¹ This move won these politicians local support from many Muslims, but it also stirred national debate about the status of Islamic law. Regionalism, with a much more overt religious dimension, still figures prominently in Nigerian politics.

Islamist voices have been raised in the north. Ibrahim al Zakzaki, a university student leader in the late 1970s, founded a movement known variously as the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria or more popularly, 'Yan Shia (the Shi'a).⁸² Although not Shi'i, al Zakzaki was inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution, called for an Islamic state in Nigeria and attracted support from Western educated university students and faculty. His fiery rhetoric and activism in the 1980s and 1990s led to street clashes with security forces, and he has spent several years in prison.⁸³ Recently, al Zakzaki has focused on providing social services to Muslims, with Iran as an external donor. He hopes his activities will prepare the way for an Islamic state in Nigeria some time in the future; he consequently is critical of the recent imposition of Muslim law in criminal cases as premature and thus too limited.⁸⁴

81 Christelow, 'Islamic law and judicial practice'.

82 Muhammad Sani Umar, 'Education and Islamic trends in northern Nigeria: 1970s 1990s,' *Africa Today*, 48 (2001), p. 138; Ousmane Kane, 'Izala: The rise of Muslim reformism in Africa,' in Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds.), *Accounting for fundamentalisms* (Chicago, 1994), p. 502.

83 Umar, 'Education and Islamic trends,' p. 139; William Miles, 'Religious pluralisms in northern Nigeria,' in Levtzion and Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa*, p. 220.

84 Christelow, 'Islamic law and judicial practice', pp. 197–8.

Tanzania

Tanzania was formed in 1964 by the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Kiswahili became the national language of the union; it is a second language for most Tanzanians but the first language of the people along the eastern African coast and islands. At independence Muslims were a significant majority in Zanzibar, and over 30 per cent of the population on the mainland. Tanganyika won independence first, and Muslims played important roles in the struggle. The main nationalist party, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU), wove together a coalition of civil servants, clerks, cash cropping farmers, organised labour, Sufi disciples and urban dwellers under the leadership of Julius Nyerere.⁸⁵ The British tried to restrict TANU's activities, for example barring civil servants from membership, but were not able to stop this grassroots movement. Muslims were crucial TANU organisers who drew on their urban networks throughout the territory. Abdulwahid Sykes (d. 1968), for example, used his connections as secretary of an earlier urban association to help launch TANU in the 1940s and 1950s.⁸⁶ Muslim women, especially middle aged divorcees, also joined TANU, recruited other women at *ngoma* (dance) groups and performed music at political events. Bibi Titi Muḥammad (d. 2000) became head of TANU's women's section but, more importantly, composed and performed songs that defined TANU in popular Kiswahili metaphors.⁸⁷ TANU swept to power with Nyerere as leader in 1961.

The nationalist era exposed deep social cleavages in Zanzibar. Arabs staffed the administration, colonial policies favoured Arab landowners and the British recognised Arabs, Asians and Africans as distinct groups with different rights, even though such categorisations, especially between Arabs and Africans, belied complex realities. Political associations mirrored these categories in the 1930s and 1940s, when appointments to the legislative council did not include African representation. In the 1950s the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) was founded by journalists, teachers, civil servants and other members of the 'new Arab' elite who reworked concepts associated with Islamic modernism and Arab nationalism into a local construct. They stressed loyalty to the sultan and *ustaarabu* (a Kiswahili term meaning 'civilisation' and

85 John Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979).

86 Mohamed Said, *The life and times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924–1968): The untold story of the Muslim struggle against British colonialism in Tanganyika* (London, 1998).

87 Susan Geiger, *TANU women: Gender and culture in the making of Tanganyikan nationalism, 1955–65* (Portsmouth, 1997).

associated with Islamic values) as the bases of a multi ethnic Zanzibari nationalism. This ideology, however, implied the continued hegemony of Arabs, and came to be opposed by the 'African nationalism' of the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), formed as an alliance between immigrant workers from the mainland, former slaves and indigenous Swahili groups. The politics of competing nationalisms increased racialism,⁸⁸ and adept political manoeuvring led to ZNP electoral victories in the early 1960s. In 1964, only weeks after the British handed power to the sultan and the ZNP, a revolutionary group staged a *coup d'état* and unleashed violence against Arabs. The sultan and most Arabs fled, and the group recognised the ASP as the new rulers. Later in 1964 the ASP forged a union with Tanganyika, with limited constitutional autonomy for Zanzibar within the structure of a new Tanzania.⁸⁹

For the first twenty years of the union Tanzania pursued a socialist agenda. Islamic notions of social justice may well have influenced the conceptualisation and implementation of *ujamaa* (socialism), as Muslims were a majority in TANU (and also in Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary party), as the ruling party was known after the 1977 ASP TANU merger).⁹⁰ At the same time the government sought to control all aspects of society, including religious life. In 1968 TANU banned a Muslim organisation because of its 'capitalist' tendencies, and for more than a decade after the revolution the ASP viewed many Muslim activities in Zanzibar with suspicion as carry overs from the sultan's era. The state promoted an official Tanzanian Muslim Council (BAKWATA as its acronym appears in Kiswahili), but few Muslims identified with it, and BAKWATA consequently was not able to articulate an effective Muslim voice.⁹¹ Tanzania passed a secular marriage law in 1971, but it also agreed in 1984 to a new constitution for Zanzibar that recognised, in addition to state magistrates' courts, Muslim primary and appellate courts for civil matters, thereby returning to a dual justice system after a chaotic period when People's Courts had operated on the islands. In the late 1980s Nyerere's successor as president, 'Alī Ḥasan Mwinyi, a Muslim from Zanzibar, came

88 Jonathon Glassman, 'Sorting out the tribes: The creation of racial identities in Zanzibar's newspaper wars', *Journal of African History*, 41 (2000), pp. 395–428; Glassman, 'Slower than a massacre'.

89 Michael Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to revolution* (Princeton, 1965).

90 Abdulaziz Lodhi and David Westerlund, 'African Islam in Tanzania', English translation of contribution to *Majoritetens Islam* (Stockholm, 1994), www.islamtz.org/articles/islam2.htm.

91 François Constantin, 'Leadership, Muslim identities and East African politics: Tradition, bureaucratization and communication', in Louis Brenner (ed.), *Muslim identity and social change in sub Saharan Africa* (Bloomington, 1993), pp. 36–58.

under pressure from external donors to liberalise the economy and open the political process. Several Muslim associations were formed to lobby the state, but their influence has not been significant. Renewed political activity also led to a movement calling for greater autonomy for Zanzibar. The state's continuing crackdown on this initiative is serving to increase desires for separation and the potential for an Islamist movement.

Scripturalism and Muslim modernities

The late twentieth century was an era of Muslim reassessment in sub Saharan Africa. Some focused on what they saw as *bid'a madhmuma* (blameworthy innovation) in the practice of Islam and called for reform based on individual engagement with the core texts of the faith, the Qur'an and Ḥadīth.⁹² These reformers identified Sufi *ṭuruq* in particular as the main sources of innovation. This new 'scripturalism', with its emphasis on textual authority, occurred at a time of increased interaction in the Islamic world: Africans travelled more frequently and studied abroad in larger numbers, and numerous international Muslim organisations operated in Africa.⁹³ New technologies also encouraged the circulation of ideas beyond elites to Muslim masses.⁹⁴ Some scholars associate external influences with the rise of the scripturalist tendency in recent Muslim movements in Africa. Certainly the oil wealth associated with some Muslim states increased their leverage in Africa, but cultural flows are much more diverse and involve South Asia and other regions of Africa. The stress on external stimuli also obscures the processes whereby African Muslims reworked ideas from diverse sources to produce a message relevant to their communities. The vigorous exchanges between scripturalists and their opponents have precedent in the nineteenth century, so the current era marks a return to public debates among African Muslims.

Scripturalism offers an appealing new vision and expresses an 'alternative modernity' to that provided by the West.⁹⁵ Most Muslims in sub Saharan Africa, whether influenced by Sufism or not, have not emphasised text based

92 Roman Loimeier, 'Patterns and peculiarities of Islamic reform in Africa', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (2003), pp. 237–62.

93 John Hunwick, 'Sub Saharan Africa and the wider world of Islam: Historical and contemporary perspectives', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 26 (1996), pp. 230–57.

94 Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson, 'Redefining Muslim publics', in Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson (eds.), *New media and the Muslim world: The emerging public sphere*, 2nd edn (Bloomington, 2003), pp. 1–18.

95 Dilip Gaonkar, 'On alternative modernities', *Public Culture*, 11 (1999), pp. 1–18.

understandings of Islam. Arabic was learned by rote for liturgical purposes, and esoteric forms of spirituality were valued. Scripturalism therefore appears as a new form of Muslim engagement, a local 'modernity' linked to a global practice. Enhancing the image of the scripturalists is their method of Arabic instruction that breaks from practices associated with 'traditional' Qur'an schools. Their Arabic schools, too, benefit from several recent developments: transnational financial support for educational initiatives; the willingness of some African states to include these schools in the national education system if they met curricular requirements; expanded opportunities for students to continue their studies at Arabic language universities abroad; and the possibility of future employment as teachers in the expanding network of Arabic language schools in Africa. Scripturalists also use new media, such as audio cassettes, video recordings, radio and television, to argue in vernacular languages for their text based understandings of Muslim practice. Finally, their rituals and dress often are distinct from local styles, emphasising austerity in the former and modesty, especially for women, in the latter. Paradoxically, scripturalist movements that call for the elimination of innovation attract followers in part due to their novel formulation of an alternative Muslim modernity.

Advocates of the new scripturalism energise discussions in the public sphere. The initial impulses towards a text based Islam came in the colonial era from Muslims who had been educated in the old system and served in conventional '*ulama*' roles, such as jurists or teachers; their criticism of Sufism often was muted. Subsequent scripturalist leaders follow various career paths and deliver blunt attacks on their opponents.⁹⁶ From the 1970s anti Sufi rhetoric produced a response from Sufi shaykhs, many of whom put aside their rivalries to forge a united front against the scripturalists. The shaykhs and others now involve themselves in the new media, as African Muslims have come to expect that leaders will produce cassettes, go on radio and television, and otherwise debate in the public sphere: face to face relations no longer are an essential aspect of Muslim movements in Africa.⁹⁷ Muslims embracing neither scripturalist nor Sufi styles also have arisen to provide even more possibilities. Islamist movements, as noted above, have surfaced

96 Kai Kresse, "'Swahili enlightenment'? East African reformist discourse at the turning point: The example of Sheikh Muhammad Kasim Mazrui', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (2003), pp. 279–309.

97 Dorothea Schulz, "'Charisma and brotherhood" revisited: Mass mediated forms of spirituality in urban Mali', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71.

in some regions. All these developments infuse the public sphere with new vigour and excitement.

Tanzania

Tanzania has eastern Africa's largest number of Muslims, and scripturalism is most influential in Zanzibar. In the 1950s and 1960s the most influential reformer was Zanzibar's most senior scholar, 'Abd Allah Ṣaliḥ al Farsī (d. 1982), a student of al Amin b. 'Ali al Mazrū'ī of Mombasa. Al Farsī served as *qaḍī* in Zanzibar, but his most lasting contributions were publications that made textual dimensions of Islam more accessible to Muslims: he translated the Qur'an and wrote pamphlets about Muslim ritual practices and obligations in Kiswahili.⁹⁸ Al Farsī left Zanzibar in 1967 and resided for the rest of his life in Mombasa; other '*ulama*' left after the 1964 revolution, and advanced Muslim education on the islands suffered. A new generation, many of whom had studied in Saudi Arabia and the Sudan, nonetheless is elaborating on the scripturalism of past Zanzibari '*ulama*' and more forcefully questioning a broad range of local practices. One of the most outspoken of the new generation is Nassoro Bachu, who has written an influential treatise and speaks publicly on numerous issues. Many Zanzibari Muslims dismiss Nassoro and other scripturalists by calling them *watu wa bid'a* (people focusing on innovation) instead of their preferred referent, *Anṣar al Sunna* (Followers of the Sunna). They also belittle some of the most extreme examples of female attire favoured by scripturalists, such as the dress exposing only the eyes which is known popularly as *kininja* (dress of the Ninja (a popular cinema figure)).⁹⁹ Scripturalist discourse nevertheless has influenced practices, with more modest dress for all Muslim women now the norm. Political developments in Zanzibar also create a context in which Islamist ideas may gain popularity.

Senegal

Sufi *ṭuruq* remain dominant in Senegal, but scripturalist movements also are present. The group commonly known as Ibadou (from the Arabic Jama'at 'Ibad al Raḥman (Society of the servants of the merciful)) was founded in the

98 Justo Lacunza Balda, 'Translations of the Quran into Swahili', in Eva Evers Rosander and David Westerlund (eds.), *African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists* (London, 1997), pp. 95–126; Loimeier, 'Patterns and peculiarities of Islamic reform'.

99 Allyson Purpura, 'Knowledge and agency: The social relations of Islamic expertise in Zanzibar town', Ph.D. thesis, City University of New York (1997).

late 1970s by a friend of Cheikh Touré. Ibadou formed local branches in most of the major Senegalese towns, built Arabic language schools with funds from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and forcefully attacked Sufi practices. In the 1980s Senegalese youths rallied behind Ibadou, but by the 1990s it no longer commanded the same levels or intensity of support. The movement did not disband, but it did moderate its criticism of the Sufi orders.¹⁰⁰ The Sufi *ṭuruq* also have adapted to the times, sometimes drawing ideas from Sufi student organisations. Murid university students, for example, organized a *daaira* in 1979 that eventually became an influential wing of the *ṭarīqa*. It promoted new technologies in the service of the order, such as computer databases of disciples and broadcasting of the annual *māggal* (festival), but its influence recently waned due to internal rivalries within the order.¹⁰¹ Rivalries also spurred the rise of another Sufi movement, again with origins as a student *daaira*, known as *Da'irat al Mustarshidin wa l Mustarshidat* (Circle of the rightly guided men and women). Its founder wanted to promote the succession of a particular Tijani leader to the position of *khalīfa*, but it also engages in political discourse and offers a release for generational criticisms of the orders more generally.¹⁰² One of the most expressive new forms of Sufi piety is the singing of praises to Sufi shaykhs by Senegalese popular musicians. Many artists, including internationally famous figures such as Baaba Maal, Youssou Ndour and Cheikh Ndiguel Lo, draw on past forms of local verbal art, for instance Sufi devotional recitations and Senegalese praise singing, and combine them with world music forms.¹⁰³ Most Sufi leaders deem this activity acceptable, although some wonder whether the songs should be played at bars where drinking, smoking and unacceptable interaction between the genders occur.

South Africa

South Africa has not been discussed until now because of its distinctive political history: after 1910 it no longer was a colony, and its minority government imposed restrictions on its non white populations, especially from 1948 until majority rule in 1994. Muslims, who are less than 2 per cent of the population, are divided between those in the Western Cape who claim Malay identity and those in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal who have Indian ancestry. From the 1970s scripturalist movements emerged; in Durban, for

100 Loimeier, 'L'Islam ne se vend plus', pp. 178–81; Villalón, 'Generational changes', pp. 137–8.

101 Villalón, 'Generational changes', pp. 138–41. 102 Ibid., pp. 141–3.

103 Fiona McLaughlin, 'Islam and popular music in Senegal', *Africa*, 67 (1997), pp. 560–82.

example, the Tablighi Jama'at ('preaching party'), representing the mercantile class, stirred heated local debates by criticising as blameworthy innovations the practices of the Indian Muslim majority, most of whom descend from indentured servants.¹⁰⁴ The struggle against apartheid involved Muslims, especially after the 1969 death in police custody of a prominent Muslim. With the coming of majority rule, the ruling African National Congress built a diverse coalition, and has appointed Muslims to government posts.¹⁰⁵ Islamist ideas circulate in small circles, notably among members of the Muslim Youth Movement.¹⁰⁶ At the grassroots, Cape Town's Muslims organised the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, a vigilante group to defend against high crime rates in the townships.

Nigeria

In Nigeria the new scripturalism in its anti Sufi form is most pronounced in the north. The nineteenth century jihad leaders expressed a scripturalist tendency, but did not engage in anti Sufi rhetoric (as 'Usman and his followers were members of the Qadiri *ṭariqa*). The recent initiative in northern Nigeria has direct roots in the colonial era, including Sa'ad Zungur (d. 1958), who opposed the veneration of saints. Zungur's mantle was taken up by Abu Bakr Gumi (d. 1992), who was educated in a colonial school and served as Ahmad Bello's religious adviser in the 1950s and 1960s. Gumi moderated his scripturalist views to further Bello's nationalist political agenda, but he renewed his criticism of Sufi practices after Bello's death in 1966. In 1972 he wrote an Arabic treatise criticising many beliefs and practices associated with Sufism; its Hausa translation circulated widely after 1978. Gumi also used radio, television and Hausa language newspapers to spread his views, and received financial support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for some of his activities. Sufi leaders put aside differences and formed a coalition in the early 1970s, but their initiative was met in 1978 by a movement founded by Gumi's supporters, known commonly as Izala (from the Arabic Jama'at Izalat al Bid'a wa Iqamat al Sunna (Group for the Eradication of Innovation and the Upholding of the Sunna)). Izala received financial support from

104 Goolam Vahed, 'Contesting "orthodoxy": The Tablighi Sunni conflict among South African Muslims in the 1970s and 1980s', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 23 (2003), pp. 313–34.

105 Robert Shell, 'Islam in southern Africa, 1652–1998,' in Levzion and Pouwels (eds.), *The history of Islam in Africa*, pp. 242–3.

106 Abdulkader Tayob, *Islamic resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement* (Cape Town, 1996).

prominent Hausa businessmen, opened new mosques and Arabic language schools and trained a large number of preachers in texts such as *Kitab al tawḥīd* by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab, the eighteenth century Arabian reformer. It also condemned Sufism explicitly and harshly.¹⁰⁷ In the mid 1980s, however, some members moderated their anti Sufi views,¹⁰⁸ and Gumi himself met with Naṣir Kabara in 1990.¹⁰⁹ Internal leadership rivalries, in addition to disagreements over the softening of the anti Sufi position, split Izala in the early 1990s, but the movement nonetheless remains influential in the north, as do the Sufi orders.

Not all Islamic developments in northern Nigeria are scripturalist. In the early 1980s violent protests occurred in several northern Nigerian towns, inspired by Muḥammad Marwa, often referred to as Mai Tatsine (‘one who says, “cursed be”’). Marwa condemned most aspects of urban life and articulated an esoteric, puritanical vision of Islam. His message resonated primarily with migrants from outside Nigeria who had not found work, but it also attracted rural youths who had been trained in Qur’an schools.¹¹⁰ While not quite an organised movement, the protests expressed a rejection of ‘modernity’ as some disadvantaged Muslims experienced it. More recently a few Muslim leaders began to practise *rukiyya* or spirit exorcism. *Rukiyya* gained popularity in the mid 1990s as a response to reports of mass schoolgirl possessions. The ‘spirits’ invading the schoolgirls referenced *bori*, a local intercessionist ritual that Muslims have condemned since the jihad era but has never been eradicated. Those practising *rukiyya* asked schoolgirls to gather in public areas, where they shouted verses from the Qur’an into their ears and even slapped the ‘hosts’ (the girls) until the spirits were subdued. The possessions spoke to anxieties the girls felt, as many were caught between conservative family expectations of marriage and new opportunities associated with universal education. *Rukiyya*, although

107 Ousmane Kane, *Muslim modernity in postcolonial Africa: A study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Reinstatement of Tradition* (Leiden, 2003); Loimeier, *Islamic reform and political change*; Muhammad Sani Umar, ‘Changing Islamic identity in Nigeria: From Sufism to anti Sufism’, in Brenner (ed.), *Muslim identity and social change*, pp. 154–78.

108 Umar, ‘Education and Islamic trends’, pp. 136–7.

109 Kane, ‘Rise of Muslim reformism’, p. 505.

110 Allan Christelow, ‘The ‘Yan Tatsine disturbances in Kano’, *Muslim World*, 75 (1985), pp. 69–84; Mervyn Hiskett, ‘The Maitatsine riots in Kano, 1980: An assessment’, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17 (1987), pp. 209–23; Paul Lubeck, ‘Islamic protest under semi industrial capitalism: ‘Yan Tatsine explained’, *Africa*, 55 (1985), pp. 369–89; Michael Watts, ‘Islamic modernities? Citizenship, civil society and Islamism in a Nigerian city’, *Public Culture*, 8 (1996), pp. 251–89.

condemned by scripturalists as *shirk*, was defended by its practitioners with references to published texts from Saudi Arabia, such as the English translation of Ibn Taymiyya's *Essay on the Jinn*. *Rukiyya* specialists also promoted a host of local practices recognised as effective against unseen powers: they distinguished themselves as protectors, knowledgeable in prophetic healing, and distinct from Izala and al Zakzaki's Muslim Brothers, whose medical clinics were unable to address the mass possessions.¹¹¹

In contemporary Nigeria, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, no single Muslim movement dominates the religious arena. Muslims educated in Arabic language schools or Western universities tend to support new movements, such as Izala and the Muslim Brothers, but the popularity of *rukiyya* points to the ways Muslims can be attracted to movements that draw on local cultural symbols. The eruption of urban violence in the 1980s, associated with Mai Tatsine's rejection of 'modernity', also serves as a forceful reminder that existing movements may not express the views of all Muslims, especially those in rural areas who perceive themselves to be outside the mainstream.

Conclusion

Africa's Muslim communities participated in the full spectrum of activities associated with the Muslim world after the First World War. They confronted Western domination and built on the momentum of nineteenth century revivalist movements. Some resisted European assertions, under scoring Islam's status as an alternative to the West, while others came to an accommodation with Europeans, establishing a context in which Muslims could operate with partial autonomy under colonial rule. The revivalist impulse was largely in Sufi hands; advocates of Islamic modernism and Islamism existed, but for most of the twentieth century their ideas were only influential in elite circles. Sufi *ṭuruq* became mass organisations in which spiritual matters were emphasised. As a result of inspired proselytisation by Sufis, itinerant preachers and others, sub Saharan Africa became the most rapidly expanding Muslim domain in the twentieth century. Overwhelming Muslim majorities now exist in most states in the Horn and many states in western Africa (Senegal south through the Gambia to Guinea and east through Mali and Niger to Chad); they are influential minorities in eastern Africa (and perhaps 40 per cent of the population in Tanzania); and Muslims

¹¹¹ Susan O'Brien, 'Spirit discipline: Gender, Islam and hierarchies of treatment in post colonial northern Nigeria', *Interventions*, 3 (2001), pp. 222–41.

approach half or more of the population in several states, such as Côte d'Ivoire, where the Muslim population stood at less than 10 per cent in the early twentieth century, and Nigeria, which is Africa's most populous state.

The momentum of conversions encouraged a range of local engagements with Islam, but in the early twenty first century homogenising pressures are increasing. The frequency and intensity of interactions between Africa and the rest of the Muslim world encourage this trend and enhance the allure of external practices and beliefs. Equally significant, the expansion of Arabic language schools has increased the number of Africans able to read and come to their own judgements on religious matters. While Sufism remains an element of the Muslim heritage, other movements have attracted large followings. Scripturalists offer a text based faith, resolve tensions between local and global Islamic currents through the adoption of puritanical forms of Muslim piety and meet African yearnings for an alternative modernity through access to religious networks in affluent regions of the Muslim world. Islamism also has its adherents, although most Africans remain content to seek patronage from secular elites in control of post colonial states; Islamist currents are growing where Muslim majorities feel dispossessed or face political repression, or where state collapse provides Islamists with opportunities. Other forms of Muslim religious expression, drawing on cultural symbols with deep historical resonance in Africa, also remain salient. The diversity of Muslim cultural flows, as well as Africa's own heterogeneity, will continue to ensure that a variety of Muslim perspectives are expressed in Africa's vibrant public sphere.

Islam in China from the First World War

DRU C. GLADNEY

Since the First World War China has been engaged in an unremitting project of nationalisation that includes, among other things, emancipation from its imperial past, engagement with Western political institutions and establishment of its sovereignty over its bounded territory. One recent challenge to this nationalist project, with roots in the early twentieth century, is that of a widespread separatist movement among one Muslim group known as the Uyghur. That the largest Muslim group in China, known as the Hui, have not participated in or been sympathetic to such a movement speaks volumes regarding the diversity of Islamic identity and practice in China over the last century. Recent events related to 11 September 2001 illustrate China's ongoing attempts to integrate its diverse Muslim populations to Chinese rule.

As part of China's continuing efforts to maintain national unity and police separatist movements at home and abroad, on 14 December 2003, for the first time in its history, the Ministry of Public Security released a list of four organisations and eleven individuals that it deemed to be terrorists. This list included: the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was identified as an international terrorist organisation by the United Nations in 2002 after Chinese and US prompting (see below); the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organisation; the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC); and the Eastern Turkistan Information Centre. The eleven 'Eastern Turkistan' terrorists were Hasan Mahsum, Muhanmetemin Hazret, Dolqun Isa, Abudujelili Kalakash, Abudukadir Yapuquan, Abudumijit Abduhammatkelim, Abudula Kariaji, Abulimit Turxun, Huadaberdi Haxerbik, Yaseen Muhammad and Atahan Abuduhani.¹ Interestingly, included in the list was a Mr Hasan

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¹ 'China releases list of international terrorists', *Xinhua*, received by NewsEDGE/LAN, 14 December 2003, 19.10.

Mahsum, the reputed leader of ETIM, who had been reported killed in a Pakistani raid on an al Qa'ida camp in Waziristan on 2 October 2003.² On 10 November 2003 Dolqun Isa, who was also included on the list, and the elected president of the WUYC, asserted at a meeting in Munich that he had nothing to do with terrorism, that such violence was contrary to his devout faith in Islam, and handed out a brochure of the East Turkistan (Uyghuristan) National Congress entitled 'Help the Uyghurs to Fight Terrorism'.³

These rather conflicting reports raise important questions about Muslims, Islam, the institutional links between the state and the policing of religion and Muslim identity politics in the People's Republic since 11 September 2001. Are all Muslims supportive of Uyghur separatism? What are the roots of Uyghur separatism? Why do the Hui not support an independent Islamic state? How do these differences illustrate the 'unity and diversity' of Islam in China today? China's Muslims are now facing their second millennium under Chinese rule. Many of the challenges they confront remain the same as they have for the last 1,400 years of continuous interaction with Chinese society, but many others are new as a result of China's transformed and increasingly globalised society, and especially the watershed events of the 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent 'War on Terror'. Muslims in China live as minority communities amid a sea of people who, in their view, are largely pork eating, polytheist, secularist and 'heathen' (*kafir*). Nevertheless, many of their small and isolated communities have survived in rather inhospitable circumstances for over a millennium.

Though small in population percentage (about 2 per cent in China, 1 per cent in Japan and less than 1 per cent in Korea), the Muslim populations of East Asia are nevertheless large in comparison with those of other Muslim states. In fact, there are more Muslims living in China today than there are in Malaysia, and more than in every Middle Eastern Muslim nation except Iran, Turkey and Egypt (and about the same number as in Iraq). Indeed, China's primary objection to NATO involvement in Kosovo centred on its fear that this might encourage the aiding and abetting of separatists, a potential problem in the light of the fact that independence groups in Xinjiang, Tibet and even Taiwan remain a major Chinese concern. As Muslims in Asia, they are part of the largest Islamic population in the world.

This chapter will seek to examine Islamic identity and expression in China with special attention to the Hui and Uyghur. Most relevant to this is the

2 Radio Free Asia, Uyghur service, 'Separatist leader killed in Waziristan', 15 December 2003, www.rfa.org/service/index.html?service_uyg.

3 Personal encounter, 10 November 2003; 'Help the Uyghurs to fight terrorism', East Turkistan (Uyghuristan) National Congress, (Munich, n.d.), acquired 11 November 2003.

thesis put forth that successful Muslim accommodation to minority status in China can be seen to be a measure of the extent to which Muslim groups allow the reconciliation of the dictates of Islam to the contexts of their particular socio historical setting. This goes against the view that can be found in the writings of some analysts of Islam in China, who have consistently argued that Islam in the region is almost unavoidably rebellious and that Muslims in general are inherently problematic to a non Muslim state.⁴

Islam in China today

According to the reasonably accurate 2000 national census of China the total Muslim population is 20.3 million, including Hui (9,816,805); Uyghur (8,399,393); Kazakh (1,250,458); Dongxiang (513,805); Kyrgyz (160,823); Salar (104,503); Tajik (41,028); Uzbek (14,502); Bonan (16,505); and Tatar (4,890).⁵ The Hui speak mainly Sino Tibetan languages; Turkic language speakers include the Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Salar and Tatar; combined Turkic Mongolian speakers include the Dongxiang and Bonan, concentrated in Gansu's mountainous Hexi corridor; and the Tajik speak a variety of Indo Persian dialects. It is important to note, however, that the Chinese census registered people by nationality, not religious affiliation, so the actual number of Muslims is still unknown, and all population figures are clearly influenced by politics in their use and interpretation. Nevertheless, there are few Han converts to Islam, and perhaps even fewer members of the ten nationalities listed above who would dare to say they are not Muslim, at least in front of their parents. Islamic identity in China can best be described as ethno religious in that history, ethnicity and state nationality policy has left an indelible mark on contemporary Muslim identity and it is almost impossible to discuss Islam without reference to ethnic and national identity.⁶

Archaeological discoveries of large collections of Islamic artefacts and epigraphy on the south east coast suggest that the earliest Muslim communities in China were descended from Arab, Persian, Central Asian and

4 Raphael Israeli, *Islam in China: Religion, ethnicity, culture and politics* (Lanham, MD, 2002); Raphael Israeli, *Muslims in China: A study in cultural confrontation*, Scandinavia Monographs in East Asian Studies, no. 29. (New York, 1981); Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim far northwest* (Richmond, 2003); Michael Dillon, *Hui Muslims in China* (London, 1997).

5 For an analysis of the 2000 population statistics, see Yang Shengmin and Ding Hong (eds.), *An ethnography of China (Zhongguo Minzu zhi)* (Beijing, 2002).

6 Dru C. Gladney, *Dislocating China: Muslims, minorities, and other subaltern subjects* (Chicago, 2004), pp. 4 21.

Mongolian Muslim merchants, militia and officials who settled first along China's south east coast from the seventh through the tenth centuries.⁷ Later, larger migrations to the north from Central Asia under the Mongol Yuan dynasty in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries added to these Muslim populations by gradually intermarrying with the local Chinese populations, and raising their children as Muslims. Practising Sunni, Ḥanafī Islam, and residing in independent small communities clustered around a central mosque, these communities were characterised by relatively isolated, independent Islamic villages and urban enclaves, which related with each other via trading networks and later came to be known as the Gedimu or traditionalist Hui Muslims. Nevertheless, these scattered Islamic settlements shared a common feeling of belonging to the wider Islamic community (*umma*), which was validated by origin myths and folktales, and continually reinforced by travelling Muslim teachers known locally as *ahong*.⁸

Hui Muslims and Islamic accommodation to Chinese society

Islam in China has primarily been propagated over the last 1,300 years among the people now known as Hui, but many of the issues confronting them are relevant to the Turkic and Indo European Muslims on China's inner Asian frontier. Though Hui speak a number of non Chinese languages, most Hui are closer to Han Chinese than other Muslim nationalities in terms of demographic proximity and cultural accommodation. The attempt to adapt many of their Muslim practices to the Han way of life has led to criticisms among some Muslim reformers. In the wake of modern Islamic reform movements that have swept across China, a wide spectrum of Islamic belief and practice can now be found among those Muslims in China referred to as the Hui.

The Hui have been labelled the 'Chinese speaking Muslims', 'Chinese Muslims' and, most recently, 'Sino Muslims'.⁹ However, this terminology is misleading since by law all Muslims living in China are 'Chinese' by

7 See Dru Gladney, 'Islam in China to 1800', in David Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds.), *The new Cambridge history of Islam*, vol. III: *The Eastern Islamic world, eleventh to eighteenth centuries* (Cambridge, 2010).

8 For a study of Muslim origin myths and their relevance for contemporary identity politics, see *ibid.*, pp. 99–115.

9 For the debate over the definition of Hui and reference to them as 'Sino Muslims', see Jonathan Lipman, *Familiar strangers: A history of Muslims in northwest China* (Seattle, 1998); p. xxiv; and Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, MA, 1996), pp. 21–35.

citizenship, and there are large Hui communities who speak primarily the non Chinese languages dominant in the areas where they live. In this case citizenship, like religious membership, has since the end of the last dynasty always been rather inflexible.¹⁰ This is the case, for example, with the Tibetan, Mongolian, Thai (*Dai zu*), and Hainan Muslims of China, who are also classified by the state as Hui. These 'Hui' Muslims speak Tibetan, Mongolian and Thai as their first languages, with Han Chinese the national language that they learn in school, along with the Arabic and Persian that some of them also learn at the mosque. Interestingly, since Tajik is not an official language in China, the Tajiks of Xinjiang (who speak a Darian branch language, distantly related to old Persian, and quite different from the Tajik languages spoken in Tajikistan), the Tajik schoolchildren learn in either Turkic Uyghur or Han Chinese.¹¹ The Tajik are the only Shī'ite Muslims in China, adhering to Isma'īlī Shī'ism and quite distinct from the majority Sunni Tajiks in neighbouring Tajikistan.

Nevertheless, it is true that compared to the other Muslim nationalities in China, most Hui are closer to the Han Chinese in terms of demographic proximity and cultural accommodation, adapting many of their Islamic practices to Han ways of life. However, this type of cultural accommodation can also become the target of sharp criticism from some Muslim reformers. In the past this was not as great a problem for the Turkic, Mongolian and Tajik groups, as they were traditionally more isolated from the Han and their identities not as threatened, though this has begun to change in the last forty years. As a result of the state sponsored nationality identification campaigns launched in the 1950s, these groups began to think of themselves more as ethnic nationalities, as something more than just 'Muslims'. The Hui are unique among the fifty five identified minority nationalities in China in that they are the only nationality for whom religion (Islam) is the single unifying

10 See Aihwa Ong, *Flexible citizenship: The cultural logic of transnationality* (Durham, NC, 1999), p. 23. Note that Uyghurs waiting for an independent Uyghuristan find Chinese citizenship the least flexible, especially when threatened with extradition while in the diaspora, while Hui have rarely challenged Chinese citizenship. Similarly, membership of the Muslim community in China is legislated by birth, in the sense that once born a Hui one is always a Hui, regardless of belief or even membership of the Communist Party.

11 The Tajik are the only official nationality still lacking a script, and must learn in either Uyghur or Han Chinese in their own Tajik Autonomous County of Tashkurgan (interview, Tashkurgan County chairman, 25 August 2001). Yang Shengmin has indicated that Uyghur cadres opposed granting a separate written language to the Tajiks (personal communication, 4 December 2003); however, political concerns over links to Iran and Tajikistan through the promulgation of a Persian script are clearly an important factor.

category of identity, even though many members of the Hui nationality may not actively practise Islam. Indeed, a recent ethnography of Chinese nationalities includes the Hui in the section of 'Han language' nationalities (Hanyu Minzu), who, along with the Manchu, have no particular language of their own, but speak the Chinese dialects wherever they reside (which for many Hui in the south, means that they speak primarily Cantonese, Fujianese, Shanghaiese and Sichuanese, along with the Mongolian, Tibetan and Thai speaking Hui described above).¹²

The Nationalists' Guomindang (GMD) 'nationality' policy identified five peoples of China, dominated by the Han. They included Uyghurs under the general rubric of 'Hui Muslims', which referred to all Muslim groups in China at that time. The Communists continued this policy, and eventually recognised fifty six nationalities. Uyghurs and eight other Muslim groups were separated from the general category 'Hui', which thenceforth was used only with reference to Muslims who primarily spoke Chinese or did not have a separate language of their own. As a policy of ethnic control, this owed much to practices that the Soviet state had applied earlier to Central Asia. It proved to be an effective means by which the Chinese Communists could integrate the religion into China.

The institution most responsible for regulating and monitoring Islamic practices in China is the China Islamic Affairs Association (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui). This association, founded in 1956 at the same time as China formed the 'Three Self Organisation', which is responsible for monitoring all Christian (Catholic and Protestant) activities, makes the final recommendations to government regarding the establishment of new mosques, formation of Islamic schools and general policy regarding the legality of certain Islamic practices (such as outlawing headscarves in public schools), and plays an increasingly important role in China's Middle Eastern international affairs, as well as supporting particularly Islamic schools among the Hui (see below).

In the north west, in addition to allowing from two to four students (*halifat*) to train privately in each mosque, the government approved and funded several Islamic schools (*yixueyuan*) throughout the region. In 1988 the state provided funding to establish a large Islamic seminary and mosque complex outside the West Gate of Yinchuan near Luo Village. Similarly, the Islamic college in Urumqi was established in 1985, and other regional and provincial governments have followed suit. This indicates a 'regionalisation'

¹² Yang and Ding (eds.), *An ethnography of China*.

of state sponsored Islamic education which until the 1980s had been officially concentrated at the China Islamic Affairs Commission in Beijing, located near the Oxen Street Mosque in the Xuanwu district in south west Beijing.¹³

The increased promotion of exchange with foreign Muslim countries is exposing more urban Hui to international aspects of their Islamic heritage. Though in the past coverage of the Palestinian Israeli conflict was rather minimal, increased coverage of the first Gulf War raised Muslim awareness of political and religious conflicts in the region. Widespread coverage of the wars in Iraq, and Afghanistan on China's border, have exposed Muslims in China, as never before, to the many tensions in the Middle East. Among urban Hui, Islamic knowledge tends to be higher than in rural areas, perhaps because of increased educational levels and more media exposure. Unlike the vast majority of Hui in rural areas, many urban Hui interviewed keep up with international affairs, and they often read the magazine published by the China Islamic Affairs Association, *Zhongguo Musilin* (China's Muslims). Few were aware of and interested in the sectarian disputes in the earlier Iran Iraq conflict, but most knew of Shi'ism, and most were keenly interested in the developments over the US led war in Iraq.

Institutions engaged in managing China's Muslims, and the Muslims themselves, have all been strongly affected by Middle Eastern affairs over the last two decades. The People's Republic of China (PRC), as one of five permanent voting members of the UN Security Council, and as a significant exporter of military hardware to the Middle East, has become a recognised player in Middle Eastern affairs. Following a temporary but precipitate decline in trade with many Western nations after the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989, the importance of China's Middle Eastern trading partners (most of them Muslim, since China did not recognise Israel until 1992) rose considerably. This may account for the fact that China established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in August 1990, with the first direct Sino Saudi exchanges taking place since 1949; Saudi Arabia subsequently cancelled its long standing diplomatic relationship with Taiwan and withdrew its ambassador, despite a lucrative trade history. In the face of a long term friendship with Iraq, China went along with most of the UN resolutions in the first Gulf War against Iraq. Although it abstained from Resolution 678 on supporting the ground war, and did not endorse the US led coalition war against Saddam Hussein in 2003, China continues to enjoy a fairly 'teflon' reputation in the

13 Graham Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, 'Islam in Xinjiang', in Frederick S. Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim borderland* (Armonk, NY, 2004), pp. 320–5.

Middle East as an untarnished source of low grade weaponry and cheap, reliable labour.¹⁴ In the words of the late Hājī Shi Kunbing, former lead *imam* of the famous Oxen Street Mosque in Beijing: 'With so much now at stake in the Middle East, the government cannot risk antagonising its Muslim minorities.'¹⁵

Interestingly, although China's government did not endorse the US led coalition war against Iraq, and only voiced 'strong concern' about the possible collateral injury of civilians, urging a peaceful resolution, its Muslim population was ahead of the government in publicly condemning the war. On 23 March 2003 Chen Guangyan, vice president of the China Islamic Association, declared:

We strongly condemn the United States and its allies for attacking Iraq and not turning to diplomacy to resolve this conflict . . . We side with the war protesters in the US and elsewhere around the world. We strongly urge the US to stop its campaign and to return to the negotiating tables to resolve this issue. War is wrong.¹⁶

The next day, Hājī Muḥammad Nusr Ma Liangji, lead *imam* of the Great Mosque in Xi'an, which boasts 70,000 members, made the following statement:

Though we don't go to the Middle East that often, we are all part of the same brotherhood . . . Mr Bush's invasion of Iraq is an incursion of Iraq's sovereignty. Islam is a religion of peace and the US shouldn't do this. No one in the world agrees with this and we in the Muslim community in China absolutely object to this.

Shortly after these statements were made, Hājī Yu Zhengui, president of the China Islamic Association, confirmed that Muslims across China were deeply angered by the US led war, and had been asking the government for permission to engage in public street protest.¹⁷ As of late March 2003 permission had not been granted, though there were rumours of small Muslim protests in Changzhi (Shanxi), Tianjin, Nanjing, Beijing, and Shandong. The Chinese did give permission for some limited protests by foreigners and students in late March and early April, but perhaps out of fear that a Muslim protest might get out of hand, possibly disturbing social stability

¹⁴ Lillian Harris, *China considers the Middle East* (London, 1993); Ytzhak Shichor, *East wind over Arabia: Origins and implications of the Sino Saudi missile deal* (Berkeley, 1989).

¹⁵ Interview with Hājī Shi Kunbing, Ramadan 1985.

¹⁶ Cited in Allen T. Cheng, 'A surprise move by the mainland's Islamic community', *South China Morning Post*, 25 March 2003.

¹⁷ Interview with Hājī Yu Zhengui, 2003.

or, even worse, disrupting improving Sino US relations, the Muslims were never allowed to protest against the war against Iraq. These examples illustrate the increasing international role of institutions engaged in managing China's Muslims and their Islamic expression.

Hui Islamic orders and Chinese culture

Sufism began to make a substantial impact in China proper in the late seventeenth century, arriving mainly along the Central Asian trade routes with saintly shaykhs, both Chinese and foreign, who brought new teachings from the pilgrimage cities.¹⁸ These charismatic teachers and trades men established widespread networks and brotherhood associations, including most prominently the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Kubrawiyya. Islamic preachers in China, including Ma Laichi, Ma Mingxin, Qi Jingyi and Ma Qixi, spent most of their time trying to convert other Muslims to their religious order, leading to disputes that had a great impact on twentieth century Islam in China. Nevertheless, Islam in China for the most part has grown biologically through birth, adoption and intermarriage. Historical records do not yield evidence of large conversions of Chinese non Muslims to Islam.

The hierarchical organisation of Sufi networks helped in the mobilisation of large numbers of Hui during economic and political crises of the seven teenth through the nineteenth centuries, assisting widespread Muslim led rebellions and resistance movements against late Ming and Qing imperial rule in Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu and Xinjiang.¹⁹ In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Wahhabi inspired reform movements, known as the Yihewani, rose to popularity under Nationalist and warlord sponsorship, and were noted for their critical stance towards traditionalist Gedimu Islam, which they viewed as being overly acculturated to non Muslim Chinese practices, and to forms of popular Sufism such as saint and tomb veneration.

Beyond such internal Muslim critiques, the Chinese state has also launched its own criticisms of certain Islamic orders among the Hui. The stakes in such debates were often economic as well as ideological. For example, during the land reform campaigns of the 1950s the state appropriated mosque and *waqf* (Islamic endowment) holdings from traditional Muslim religious institutions.

¹⁸ See Gladney, 'Islam in China to 1800'.

¹⁹ See *ibid.*

These measures met with great resistance from the Sufi *menhuan* (royal lineages) that had accumulated a great deal due to their hierarchical centralised leadership. The earlier movements of Islamic peoples and ideas into China can be divided into the earlier diasporic mode of traditionalist Gedimu Islam, and the later mode of interconnected alliances of Sufi patron client networks.²⁰ A third mode or, to use Fletcher's terms, tide of Islam in China, was caught up in the very nationalist conflicts that gave rise to the First World War.²¹

The third mode: scripturalist concerns and modernist reforms

A third mode identifiable in Chinese Islam began at the end of the Qing dynasty, a period of increased interaction between China and the outside world, when many Muslims began travelling to and returning from the Middle East. In the early decades of the twentieth century China was exposed to many new foreign ideas and in the face of Japanese and Western imperialist encroachment sought a Chinese approach to governance. Intellectual and organisational activity by Chinese Muslims during this period was intense. Increased contact with the Middle East led Chinese Muslims to re evaluate their traditional notions of Islam. The Protestant missionary Claude Pickens recorded that from 1923 to 1934 there were 834 known Hui Muslims who made the *hajj*, or pilgrimage, to Mecca. In 1937, according to one observer, over 170 Hui pilgrims boarded a steamer in Shanghai bound for Mecca. By 1939 at least thirty three Hui Muslims had studied at Cairo's prestigious al Azhar University. While these numbers are not significant when compared with pilgrims from other Asian Muslim areas, the influence and prestige attached to these returning Hui *hajjis* was profound, particularly in isolated communities. 'In this respect', Fletcher observed, 'the more secluded and remote a Muslim community was from the main centers of Islamic cultural life in the Middle East, the more susceptible it was to those centers' most recent trends.'²²

As a result of political events and the influence of foreign Muslim ideas, numerous new Hui organisations emerged. In 1912, one year after Sun

²⁰ See *ibid.*

²¹ Joseph Fletcher, *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, ed. Beatrice Forbes Manz (Aldershot, 1995).

²² Joseph Fletcher, 'The Sufi "paths" (*turuq*) in China', unpublished manuscript, Harvard University. French version published as 'Les "voies" (*turuq*) a soufies en Chines', in Alexandre Popovic (ed.), *Les ordres mystiques dans l'Islam, cheminements et situation actuelle* (Paris, 1988).

Yat sen was inaugurated provisional president of the Chinese Republic in Nanjing, the Chinese Muslim Federation was also formed in that city. This was followed by the establishment of other Hui Muslim associations: the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association (Beijing, 1912); the Chinese Muslim Educational Association (Shanghai, 1925); the Chinese Muslim Association (1925); the Chinese Muslim Young Students' Association (Nanjing, 1931); the Society for the Promotion of Education among Muslims (Nanjing, 1931); and the Chinese Muslim General Association (Jinan, 1934).

The Muslim periodical press flourished as never before. Although it was reported that circulation was low, there were over one hundred known Muslim periodicals produced before the outbreak of the Sino Japanese War in 1937. Thirty journals were published between 1911 and 1937 in Beijing alone, prompting one author to suggest that while Chinese Islam's traditional religious centre was still Linxia (Hezhou), its cultural centre had shifted to Beijing. This took place when many Hui intellectuals travelled to Japan, the Middle East and the West. Caught up in the nationalist fervour of the first half of the century, they published magazines and founded organisations, questioning their identity as never before in a process that one Hui historian, Ma Shouqian, has termed 'the new awakening of the Hui at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries'. As many of these Hui *hajjis* returned from their pilgrimages to the Middle East, they initiated reforms, engaging themselves once again in the contested space between Islamic ideals and Chinese culture.

The term 'Hui' narrowed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from a generic term including all Muslims, no matter what their ethno linguistic background, to denote mostly Chinese speaking Muslims who were caught up in the nationalist movements of twentieth century China.²³ Djamal al Di Bai Shouyi, the famous Hui Marxist historian, was the first to argue persuasively that 'Islam' should be glossed in Chinese as *Yisilan jiao* (Islam), not *Hui jiao* (the Hui religion).²⁴ In a chapter entitled 'The Huihui people and the Huihui religion', Bai argued that even though Hui are descendants of Muslims and have inherited certain Muslim cultural traditions such as pork abstention, they do not all necessarily believe in Islam: 'Muslim' is different from 'Hui person' (*Hui min*), and one should not use the term

²³ See Gladney, 'Islam in China to 1800'.

²⁴ Bai Shouyi, 'Huihui minzu de xingcheng' (The nature of the Hui nationality), *Guangming Rebao*, 17 February 1951, p. 2.

Huijiao (Hui religion) but 'Islam' (*Yisilan jiao*). He argued that the Hui believed not in their own religion, but in the world religion of Islam, and therefore are Muslims in faith. In ethnicity they are the Hui people, not Hui religion disciples. In Marxist terms, he identified a process of the indigenisation of a world religion, in this case Islam, to a local context, which for the communities now known as the Hui had been going on for 1,200 years.²⁵ Muslim groups, identified by Chinese linguists with supposedly their own language, derived their ethnonym from their language family; in this way the Uyghur, Kazakh, Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tatar were identified. In this the Chinese were heavily influenced by the 1920s Soviet identification of these peoples in Soviet Central Asia.²⁶ Bai went on to identify the Muslim peoples not distinguished by language or locality as a catch all residual group known as *Hui min*, not *Huijiao*. Thus the official category of the Hui was legitimised, one might even say invented, so far as the legal definition of who is considered Hui is concerned.

The rise of the Yihewani

Influenced by Wahhabi ideals in the Arabian Peninsula, returning Hui reformers introduced the Yihewani (Chinese for the *Ikhwan al Muslimin*, or Muslim Brotherhood) to China, a religio political movement that some times supported China's nationalist concerns, and sometimes warlord politics. While the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere in the Islamic world has been depicted as anti modernist and recidivist, this is not true in China. In fact, the Yihewani in China eventually diverged so far from its Muslim Brotherhood beginnings that it is misleading even to refer to the Yihewani in China as 'Ikhwan' or as a single movement or order. It has now become merely another 'mode' of Islamic practice, an alternative to Gedimu Islam and Sufism in China.

The beginnings of the Yihewani movement in China can be traced to Ma Wanfu (1849–1934), who returned from the *hajj* in 1892 to teach in the Hezhou area. Eventually known in China as the Yihewani, the initial reformers were primarily concerned with religious scripturalist orthodoxy – so much so that

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Connor quotes the following statement by Stalin in 1923 that revealed his early intention of passing on their nationality policy to China: 'We must here, in Russia, in our federation, solve the national problem in a correct, a *model way*, in order to set an example to the East, which represents the heavy reserves of our revolution' (emphasis in original): Walker Connor, *The national question in Marxist Leninist theory and strategy* (Princeton, 1984), pp. 53ff.

they are still known as the ‘venerate the scriptures faction’ (*zunjing pai*). Though the reformers were concerned with larger goals than merely ‘correcting’ what they regarded as unorthodox practice, like previous reforms in China, it is at the practical and ritual level that they initiated their critique. Seeking perhaps to replace ‘Islamic theatre’ with scripture, they proscribed the veneration of saints, their tombs and shrines, and sought to stem the growing influence of well known individual *ahong* and Sufi *menhuan* leaders. Stressing orthodox practice through advocating a purified, ‘non Chinese’ Islam, they criticised such cultural accretions as the wearing of white mourning dress (*dai xiao*) and the decoration of mosques with Chinese or Arabic texts. At one point Ma Wanfu even proposed the exclusive use of Arabic and Persian in all education instead of Chinese. Following strict Wahhabi practice, Yihewani mosques are distinguished by their almost complete lack of adornment on the inside, with white walls and no inscriptions, as well as a preference for Arabian style mosque architecture. This contrasts sharply with other more Chinese style mosques in China, typical of the ‘old’ Gedimu, whose buildings resemble Confucian temples in their sweeping roofs and symmetrical courtyards (with the Xi’an Huajue Great Mosque as the best example). The Yihewani also proscribed the adornment of their mosques with Arabic, especially Chinese, Qur’anic texts and banners, whereas this is the most striking iconographic marker of Sufi mosques and worship centres in the north west, whose walls and tombs are often layered with Arabic and Chinese texts on silk and cloth banners in the distinctive Hui style art that fluidly combines Arabic and Chinese calligraphy.

The Yihewani flourished in north west China under the patronage of several Muslim warlords during the Nationalist period, most notably Ma Bufang. In a modernist discourse, arguing that the Yihewani supported education, a rationalised, less mystical religious expression and a strong Chinese nation, Ma Bufang supported the expansion of the Yihewani throughout north west China. He must also have been aware that wherever the Yihewani went the hierarchical authority of the Sufi shaykhs and the solidarity of their *menhuan* was contested, thus protecting Ma from other organised religious institutions that might orchestrate an effective resistance to his expansion. This could not have been lost on the early Communists, either, who travelled through Ma Bufang’s territory and the north west on their Long March, which ended in Yan’an, near Ningxia, a heavily populated Muslim area dominated at that time by Ma Hongkui, a cousin of Ma Bufang, who also supported the Yihewani. After the founding of the PRC, the state quickly suppressed all Sufi *menhuan* as feudalistic and gave tacit support to the

Yihewani. Though Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui both fled with the Nationalists to Taiwan, their policy of opposing Sufi organisations was left behind with the Communists. The China Islamic Association, established in 1955, was heavily dominated by the Yihewani, and was supportive of the 1957 8 public criticisms and show trials of the Naqshbandi shaykh Ma Zhenwu specifically, and Sufism in general, as feudalist and exploitative of the masses. After the purges of the Cultural Revolution, in which eventually all Islamic orders were affected, the Yihewani was the first to receive renewed state patronage. Most of the large mosques that were rebuilt with state funds throughout China, as compensation for damages and destruction caused by the Red Guards during the now repudiated Cultural Revolution, happened to be Yihewani mosques, though all orders were equally criticised during the radical period.

While no Chinese official will admit that the Yihewani receives special treatment, this is cause for some resentment among Muslims. The great South Gate Mosque in Yinchuan city, the capital of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, was one of the first mosques rebuilt in Ningxia with state funds – it just happened to be staffed by Yihewani *imams*, though the state said it was a ‘non sectarian’ mosque. After the state spent over 50,000 yuan to rebuild the mosque in 1982 the local Muslims, most of whom were Gedimu and Khufiyya, refused to attend. The building sat almost empty for the first few years, and the state attempted to recoup its losses over the large Arab styled architectural structure by turning it into a tourist attraction and selling tickets at the entrance. This, of course, only confirmed its lack of religious legitimacy among many local Hui Muslims, especially the Gedimu and Sufis. In 1985 a visiting Kuwaiti delegation became aware of the situation and, instead of donating money to the South Gate Mosque as originally planned, they gave \$10,000 (about 30,000 yuan) towards refurbishing the much smaller traditional Central Mosque instead, which was a Gedimu mosque popular among the locals.

The Yihewani continue to be a powerful Islamic group throughout China. Like the Gedimu, they emphasise leadership through training and education rather than inheritance and succession. The Yihewani differ from the Gedimu primarily in ritual matters and their stress on reform through Chinese education and modernism. Unlike the Gedimu they do not chant the scriptures collectively, do not visit tombs, do not celebrate the death days of their ancestors, and do not gather for Islamic festivals in remembrance of saints. Because of its emphasis on nationalist concerns, education, modernisation and decentralised leadership the movement has attracted more urban

intellectual Muslims. This is why the Yihewani in China cannot be regarded as a tightly founded 'order', as the Muslim Brotherhood may often be portrayed in the Middle East; rather, it is a mode of Islamic reform and orientation in China, which the educated and often urban Muslims find more attractive than the traditional Gedimu or the Sufis. The Yihewani's nationalistic ideals, and their co-optation by the earlier Republic Nationalists and the Communist Party led many of the more religious Yihewani to become disillusioned with the order. It was seen by many to be no longer a fundamentalistic agent of reform, but an institutionalised organ of the state for systematising and monitoring Islamic practice. Though still influential politically, it has lost its dynamic appeal to many of the most conservative Muslims in China. For the vast majority of urban Hui Muslims, and even many rural Muslims in the small towns of the northern plains, however, it is merely the mosque that they belong to by virtue of birth or marriage, and few can tell the difference between Yihewani and Gedimu, let alone between the myriad orders of Sufis. One Hui worker in Hangzhou once declared that the basic difference between the Gedimu (he used the term *laojiao*, 'old teachings') and in this case the Yihewani (*xinjiao*, 'new teachings') was that the Yihewani did not eat crab and the Gedimu did; the Yihewani did not because 'crabs walked sideways'.²⁷

The isolation of the early 'Gedimu' communities was mitigated somewhat during the collectivisation campaigns in the 1950s, when Han and Hui villages were often administered as clusters by a single commune. They have also been brought closer together through national telecommunications and transportation networks established by the state, including such umbrella organisations as the China Islamic Association, established in 1955, which seeks to coordinate religious affairs among all Muslim groups. With the complete dismantling of the commune in China, however, these homogeneous Hui communities are once again becoming more segregated. While these disparate communities among the Gedimu were generally linked only by trade and a sense of a common religious heritage, an attachment to the basic Islamic beliefs as handed down to them by their ancestors, it was the entry of the Sufi brotherhoods into China that eventually began to link many of these isolated communities together through extensive socio religious networks.

While the total population of the various Islamic associations in China has not been published, one Muslim Chinese scholar, Yang Huaizhong estimates

²⁷ Personal observation.

that of the 2,132 mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 1990, 560 belonged to the Yihewani, 560 to the Khufiyya, 464 to the Jahriyya, 415 to the traditional Gedimu and 133 belonged to Qadiriyya religious worship sites (some of which include mosques). The most comprehensive estimate given so far for Hui membership in Islamic orders throughout China is by the Hui historian Ma Tong. Out of an estimated total in 1988 of 6,781,500 Hui Muslims, Ma Tong recorded that there were 58.2 per cent Gedimu, 21 per cent Yihewani, 10.9 per cent Jahriyya, 7.2 per cent Khufiyya, 1.4 per cent Qadiriyya and 0.7 per cent Kubrawiyya.

The rise of the Salafiyya: a fourth mode?

The extent of the recent rise in popularity of the Salafiyya in north west China is difficult to assess as there are no published figures as to its membership or number of mosques, and few discussions of the movement in the voluminous literature on Islam in China. It has been notable, however, that many Muslims formerly associated with the Yihewani or Gedimu have joined, or declared their intention to join, the Salafiyya. Perhaps on account of discontent with the official patronage of the Yihewani by the political warlords and official organs of power in China, the Salafiyya originally arose out of the Yihewani in the mid 1930s and quickly spread throughout the north west. Since the early 1980s reforms, when religious expression was again officially allowed,²⁸ the Salafiyya have flourished perhaps more than any other Islamic movement among the Hui. One Chinese scholar calls them 'the faction that is most faithful to the original teaching of Islam'.²⁹ They take the Qur'an as the very words of Allah, and in the terms of American fundamentalism, the verbally inspired word of God. As Dale Eickelman found among the Salafiyya in Morocco:

Like their counterparts who emerged in the eastern Arab world in the late nineteenth century, Salafi Muslims argued that the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet were the only true bases of Islam, thus sharply distinguishing what they considered 'true' Islam from the popular Sufism of urban religious brotherhoods and of maraboutism.³⁰

28 Personal observation, mid 1980s.

29 Da Yingyu, 'Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Sailaifeiye pai shulue' (A brief narration of China's Islamic Salafiyya order), in Chinese Islamic Research Committee (ed.), *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao yanjiu wenji* (Compendium of Chinese Islamic Research) (Yinchuan, 1988), p. 157.

30 Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and society in a pilgrimage center* (Austin, 1976), p. 227.

Unlike the Yihewani leadership in China, the Salafiyya stressed a non politicised fundamentalistic return to Wahhabī scripturalist ideals. Arguing that the Yihewani had been corrupted by Chinese cultural accretions, such as the loss of its original founder's ideal of pursuing pure Islamic education in Arabic and Persian, as well as being co-opted by the state, the Salafiyya represent one of the most recent versions of reform movements in China. While their scripturalist debates with the Yihewani did not lead to a 'battle for the Qur'an' in China, the struggle for legitimacy of both Yihewani and Salafiyya took place in a discourse of Qur'anic textualism.

Like former Islamic reform movements the Salafiyya was transmitted (and translated) to China through the agency of a returned *hajjī* from the Islamic heartlands, who began spreading his 'new teaching' in China's own Muslim heartland: Hezhou. In 1934 a small group of Hui members of the Yihewani left Hezhou on the *hajj*, led by Ma Debao, from the heavily Muslim populated Guanghe County's Bai ('White') Village, along with Ma Yinu, Ma Zhenliu and Ma Ling, the four 'Mas'.³¹ While on the pilgrimage Ma Debao came under the influence of a certain Salafī named in the Chinese sources as Huzhandi, who is reported to have been from the Soviet Union. It is not known if this Huzhandi was a direct disciple of Muḥammad 'Abduḥ, the founder of the Salafiyya, but many Hui Salafis believe this to be the case. Many of China's Muslims were educated at al Azhar in Egypt, where Muḥammad 'Abduḥ was himself schooled, so it is not unlikely that there would have been some connections. In addition to bringing back to China his new interpretations of the Qur'an and the original teachings of the Prophet, he brought two Salafī manuals, listed in Chinese sources as the *Buerhenu Satuier* (Glorious explanation) and the *Xianyoushe Islamu* (Army of Islam).

Upon his return to China he was also further trained under a visiting foreign Salafī teacher, Jialei Buhali, reportedly an Arab from Bukhara.³² Under their teaching Ma Debao began to suspect that Islam in China had been too influenced by Confucian, Buddhist and Daoist ideas. He wished to return to a more purified Arabian Islam, free from Chinese cultural and ideological syncretic adaptations. Ma Debao was confronted with a similar

31 'Ma' (马) is the most common surname among Hui Muslims in China, tracing its origins to the Ming dynasty when many Muslims were required to take on Chinese surnames and 'Ma' most closely resembled the first syllable for 'Muḥammad'. It is also the Chinese character for 'horse', and since many Hui were engaged as caravaneers it was a natural choice for a surname.

32 Da, 'Zhongguo Yisilanjiao', pp. 158–9.

challenge to that of the founder of his order, only from a different direction. As Ira Lapidus notes, 'for 'Abduh the central problem was not political but religious: how, when Muslims were adopting Western ways and Western values, could they maintain the vitality of Islam in the modern world?'³³ For Hui Muslims in 1930s China, caught between the fall of the last Chinese dynasty, the imperial aggrandisements of the Western colonial powers and the civil war between Nationalist and Communist, their concerns were certainly political *and* religious. However, for Ma Debao and his followers, it was thought that only through a fundamentalist return to the precepts of the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet would the Muslims be able to survive this stormy period and help renew their nation, as opposed to the Yihewani whom he saw as seeking the patronage of one political faction over another. As with 'Abd al Ḥamid ibn Badis, the leader of the *iṣlah* (reform) among the Young Tunisians, who also took his inspiration from the Salafiyya, it was the Qur'an and the Ḥadith that were to serve as the only rallying point of the Salafiyya in China.

Since Ma Debao and his followers were critical of the Yihewani for moving away from their earlier Wahhabī ideals, they held several open debates with famous Yihewani scholars, particularly disputing the authority of the four schools of jurisprudence. In 1937 the Salafiyya in China formally split from the Yihewani. Since the Yihewani was under the patronage at that time of the Nationalist warlord Ma Bufang, the Salafiyya were severely restricted in their movements, persecuted as 'heterodox' (*xie jiao*) and followers of 'foreign teachings' (*wai dao*), unable to propagate their order except in secret. It was only after the founding of the PRC in 1949 that they began to again come out into the open. By 1950, of the twelve Yihewani mosques in Hezhou's Bafang Muslim district, there were two mosques, the New Fifth Mosque and the Qi Mosque, which belonged to the Salafiyya, along with twelve *imams*. This period of open propagation was short lived, however, as in 1958 the state initiated a series of radical 'religious reform campaigns', which regarded almost all religious practices as feudal, forcing the Salafiyya once again to go underground. Public approval did not come until twenty years later under the economic and social reforms of Deng Xiaoping, who in 1978 once again allowed free religious expression. It was not until 1982, however, that most Muslims in the north west began to rebuild their mosques and practise Islam openly. The central mosque for the Salafiyya in Hezhou has now become the

33 Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic societies*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2002), p. 517.

Qianhezhe Mosque, in the Bafang district.³⁴ The Salafiyya also claim to have mosques and followers throughout the north west, including Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang, particularly in such market and urban centres as Linxia, Lanzhou, Weixian, Wuwei, Tianshui, Zhangjiachuan, Pingliang, Yinchuan and Xi'an.

Due to its suppressed and rather secretive beginnings, the Salafiyya became known by various names. Since Ma Debao was from Bai ('White') Village, outside Hezhou, and the movement gained quick acceptance there, it became known as the Bai, or White, Teaching. Since the Salafiyya emphasise that *salaf* in Arabic means 'ancestral' or 'the previous generations', they say that their order reveres the first three generations of Islam. They signify their adherence to these first three generations by raising their hands three times, with palms extended upward, during prayer. Among outsiders, therefore, they have been derided as the 'teaching of the three salutations' (Santaijiao), as most Muslims in China raise their hands only once during prayer.³⁵ Instead, they prefer to be known as either the Salafiyya or, in Chinese, the Shengxun pai (Faction of the Prophet's teaching).

Following the Yihewani, the Salafiyya promote a scripturalist Islam that is rationalist and anti experiential. Like the late Rashīd Riḍa (1865–1935), their fellow Salafi leader in Syria, they emphasise opposition to Sufism and cultural syncretism, rather than modernism.³⁶ Perhaps as a result of the drift of the Yihewani towards secularism and nationalism, the Salafiyya in China put more stress on scripturalism and orthodox practice. Again publicly repudiating other Islamic expressions in China at the level of practice, they emphasise divine unity and criticise the Sufis and Gedimu alike for their patronage of tombs, saints and the miraculous. They also will not receive alms during readings, but offer to use the money to buy scriptures instead. They regard the burning of incense during worship, still practised by the Gedimu and Yihewani, as the syncretistic influence of Buddhism and Daoism. They also reject the commemoration ceremonies on the fourth, seventh, fortieth, one year and three year memorial death days as frequently practised by Gedimu, Sufis and some Yihewani. They also oppose the collection of fees for performing engagement and marriage ceremonies, as is common among

34 Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefectural Basic Situation Committee (ed.), *Linxia Huzu Zizhizhou Gaikuang* (Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefectural Basic Situation) (Lanzhou, 1986), p. 77.

35 Qiu Shulin (ed.), *Zhongguo Huizu dacidian* (Great encyclopedia of China's Hui nationality) (Yinchuan, 1992), p. 819.

36 Lapidus, *Islamic societies*, p. 581.

the Yihewani. Like those of the Yihewani, the insides of their mosques are unadorned with Islamic insignia or scripture, while the outside may have one Arabic verse, in contrast to the Chinese frequently seen on the outside of Gedimu and even some Yihewani mosques, and the ornate Arabic and Chinese banners throughout the Sufi mosques and tombs.

Like their founder, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, the Salafiyya see renewal as a result of educational, legal and spiritual reform. But for the Salafiyya these reforms are all based on the Qur’an, whereas the Yihewani allowed for secular and even Marxist educational training. Just as the discrediting of the Sufis and urban Muslim intellectuals by the French in Morocco help to promote the cause of the Salafiyya,³⁷ so the domination of the intellectual elite among the Yihewani and other Islamic orders by the Communist Party in China might have contributed to the Salafiyya movement’s call for a purified, non accommodationist and largely non political Islam. The further discreditation and decentralisation of the Communist Party in most of the world, if not eventually China, may also give credence to the Salafiyya’s cause. The Salafiyya are one of the few Islamic movements in China that can claim both a resistance to Chinese cultural assimilation and a refusal to collaborate with the state. This may account for their dramatic rise in popularity since 1980, and could augur its place at the forefront of a new tide of Islamic reform in China. It is one of the few Islamic movements to coalesce and flourish after the founding of the PRC, when China’s diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern Muslim nations took several critical twists and unexpected turns.

Islam and Chinese nationalism

In the twentieth century many Muslims supported the earliest Communist call for economic equality, autonomy, freedom of religion and recognised nationality status, and were active in the early establishment of the PRC. However, many of them later became disenchanted by growing critiques of religious practice during several periods in the PRC beginning in 1957. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) Muslims became the focus for both anti religious and anti ethnic nationalist critiques, leading to widespread persecutions, mosque closings and at least one large massacre of 1,000 Hui following a 1975 uprising in Yunnan Province. Since Deng Xiaoping’s post 1978 reforms Muslims have sought to take advantage of liberalised

³⁷ Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam*, pp. 227–8; Lapidus, *Islamic societies*, p. 609.

economic and religious policies, while keeping a watchful eye on the ever swinging pendulum of Chinese radical politics. There are now more mosques open in China than there were prior to 1949, and Muslims are allowed to go on the *hajj* to Mecca, as well as engaging in cross border trade with co religionists in Central Asia, the Middle East and, increasingly, South East Asia.

With the dramatic increase in the number of Muslims travelling back and forth to the Middle East came new waves of Islamic reformist thought, including criticism of local Muslim practices in China. Through similar channels other Chinese Muslims have also been exposed to various types of new, often politically radical, Islamic ideologies. These developments have fuelled Islamic factional struggles that have continued to further China's Muslims' internal divisions. For example, in February 1994 four Naqshbandi Sufi leaders were sentenced to long term imprisonment for their support of internal factional disputes in the southern Ningxia region that had led to at least sixty deaths on both sides and People's Liberation Army intervention.

Increasing Muslim political activism on a national scale and rapid state responses to such developments indicate the growing importance Beijing attaches to Muslim related issues. In 1986 Uyghurs in Xinjiang marched through the streets of Urumqi protesting against a wide range of issues, including the environmental degradation of the Zungharian plain, nuclear testing in the Taklamakan district, increased Han immigration to Xinjiang and ethnic insults at Xinjiang University. Muslims throughout China protested against the publication of a Chinese book *Sexual customs* in May 1989, and a children's book in October 1993, that portrayed Muslims, particularly their ban on pork, in a derogatory fashion. In each case the government responded quickly, meeting most of the Muslims' demands, condemning the publications and arresting the authors, and closing down the printing houses.³⁸

These developments have influenced all Muslim nationalities in China today. However, they have found their most overtly political expressions among those Hui who are most faced with the task of accommodating new Islamic movements within Chinese culture. By comparison, among the Uyghur, a more recent integration into Chinese society as a result of Mongolian and Manchu expansion into Central Asian has forced them to reach different degrees of social and political accommodations that have

³⁸ Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, pp. 1–22.

challenged their identity. In terms of integration, the Uyghur as a people are perhaps the least integrated into Chinese society, while the Hui are, due to several historical and social factors, at the other end of the spectrum.

Increased Muslim activism in China might be thought of as 'nationalistic', but it is also a nationalism that may often transcend the boundaries of the contemporary nation state, via mass communications, increased travel and, more recently, the internet. Earlier Islamic movements in China were precipitated by China's opening to the outside world. No matter what conservative leaders in the government might wish, China's Muslim politics have reached a new stage of openness. If China wants to participate further in the international political sphere of nation states, this is unavoidable. With the opening to the West in recent years, travel to and from the Islamic heartlands has dramatically increased in China.

Uyghurs, Muslims and Chinese citizenship

In 1997 bombs exploded in a city park in Beijing on 13 May (killing one) and on two buses on 7 March (killing two), as well as on 25 February in the north western border city of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, (killing nine). Though sporadically reported since the early 1980s, such incidents have been increasingly common since 1997 and are documented in several scathing reports on Chinese government policy in the region by Amnesty International.³⁹

Most Uyghur firmly believe that their ancestors were the indigenous people of the Tarim basin, which did not become officially known in Chinese as 'Xinjiang' (new dominion) until 1884.⁴⁰ It was not until 1760 that the Manchu Qing dynasty exerted full and formal control over the region. This administration lasted for a century before it fell to the Ya'qub Beg rebellion (1864–77) and expanding Russian influence.⁴¹ With the resumption of Manchu Qing rule in the region, the area became known for the first time as Xinjiang, the 'new borderland' in 1884.⁴² The end of the Qing

39 Amnesty International, 'People's Republic of China: Gross violations of human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region' (London, April 1999); Amnesty International, 'People's Republic of China: China's anti terrorism legislation and repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region' (London, March 2002); Amnesty International, 'Uyghurs held in Guantanamo Bay', 4 December 2003.

40 See Gladney, 'Islam in China to 1800'.

41 Kim Hodong, *Holy war in China: The Muslim rebellion and state in Chinese Central Asia, 1866–1877* (Stanford, 2003).

42 James A. Millward, *Beyond the pass: Economy, ethnicity, and empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1865* (Stanford, 1998).

dynasty in 1912 and the rise of Great Game rivalries between China, Russia and Britain saw the region torn by competing loyalties and marked by two short lived and drastically different attempts at independence: the establishment of an 'East Turkistan Republic' in Kashgar in 1933, and another in Yining in 1944.⁴³ As Andrew Forbes has noted, these rebellions and attempts at self rule did little to bridge competing political, religious and regional differences among the Turkic people who had only become known as the Uyghur in 1921 under the Nationalist governor, Sheng Shicai, who was catering to Soviet nationality 'divide and rule' strategies of recognising groups such as Uyghur, Uzbek and Kazakh as separate Turkic nationalities.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Rudelson's research suggests there remains persistent regional diversity along three, and perhaps four, macro regions of Uyghuristan: the north western Zungharia plateau; the southern Tarim basin; the south west Pamir region; and the eastern Kumul Turpan Hami corridor.⁴⁵

Uyghur indigeneity and the challenge to Chinese sovereignty

The *minzu* (nationality) policy under the Chinese Nationalists identified five peoples of China, with the Han in the majority. The recognition of the Uyghur as an official Chinese 'nationality' under a Soviet influenced policy of nationality recognition contributed to a widespread acceptance today of the idea of a continuity with the ancient Uyghur kingdom and their eventual 'ethno genesis' of the concept of 'Uyghur' as a bona fide nationality. This policy was continued under the Communists, who eventually recognised fifty six nationalities, with the Han occupying a 91 per cent majority, in 1990. The 'peaceful liberation' of Xinjiang by the Chinese Communists in 1949, and its subsequent establishment as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on 1 October 1955, perpetuated the Nationalist policy of recognising the Uyghur as a minority nationality under Chinese rule.⁴⁶ However, the designation of the Uyghur as a 'nationality' masks tremendous regional and linguistic diversity. It also includes groups such as the Loplyk and Dolans, which

43 Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem challenge to Chinese authority in Xinjiang, 1944-49* (Armonk, NY, 1990).

44 Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 29.

45 Justin Jon Rudelson, *Oasis identities: Uyghur nationalism along China's Silk Road* (New York, 1998).

46 Burhan Shahidi, *Xinjiang wushi nian* (Xinjiang: fifty years) (Beijing, 1984).

have very little in common with the oasis based Turkic Muslims that have come to be known as the Uyghur. At the same time, contemporary Uyghur separatists look back to the brief periods of independent self rule under Ya'qub Beg (r. 1867–77) and the Eastern Turkistan Republics, in addition to the earlier glories of the Uyghur kingdoms in Turpan and Karabalghasan, as evidence of their rightful claims to the region.

Today a number of Uyghur separatist organisations exist, based mainly in foreign cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Almaty, Munich, Amsterdam, Melbourne and Washington, DC; they may differ on their political goals and strategies for the region, but they all share a common vision of a unilinear Uyghur claim on the region which has been disrupted by Chinese and Soviet intervention. The independence of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics in 1991 has done much to encourage these Uyghur organisations in their hopes for an independent 'Turkistan', despite the fact the new, mainly Muslim, Central Asian governments all signed protocols with China in the spring of 1996 that they would not harbour or support separatist groups.

Within the region, though many portray them as united around separatist or Islamist causes, the Uyghur continue to be divided from within by religious conflicts, in this case competing Sufi and non Sufi factions, territorial loyalties (whether they be oases or places of origin), linguistic discrepancies, commoner elite alienation and competing political loyalties. These divided loyalties were demonstrated by the attack in May 1996 on the *imam* of the Idgah Mosque in Kashgar by other Uyghurs, as well as the assassination of at least six Uyghur officials in September 2001.

It is also important to note that Islam was only one of several unifying markers for Uyghur identity, depending on those with whom they were in cooperation at the time. For example, the Uyghur distinguish themselves from the Hui Muslim Chinese as the legitimate autochthonous minority, since both share a belief in Sunni Islam. In contrast to the nomadic Muslim peoples (Kazakh or Kyrgyz), the Uyghur might stress their attachment to the land and oases of origin. In opposition to the Han Chinese, the Uyghur will generally emphasise their long history in the region. It is this contested understanding of history that continues to influence much of the current debate over separatist and Chinese claims to the region. The multiple emphases in defining their identity have also served to mitigate the appeal that Islamic fundamentalist groups (often glossed as 'Wahhabiyya' in the region), such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, have had among the Uyghur.

Alleged incursions of Taliban fighters through the Wakhan corridor into China where Xinjiang shares a narrow border with Afghanistan led to the

area being swamped by Chinese security forces and large military exercises, at least one month prior to the 11 September attack on the USA. These military exercises suggest growing government concern about these border areas much earlier than the 11 September attack. Under US and Chinese pressure Pakistan returned one Uyghur activist to China, apprehended among hundreds of Taliban detainees, which follows a pattern of repatriations of suspected Uyghur separatists in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. During the war in Afghanistan, US forces arrested as many as twenty two Uyghurs fighting with the Taliban, who were incarcerated in Guantánamo Bay. Amnesty International has claimed that Chinese government round ups of so called terrorists and separatists have led to hurried public trials and immediate, summary executions of possibly thousands of locals. Troop movements to the area, related to the nationwide campaign against crime known as 'Strike Hard', launched in 1998, which includes the call to erect a 'great wall of steel' against separatists in Xinjiang, were reportedly the largest since the suppression of the large Akto insurrection in April 1990.⁴⁷

International campaigns for Uyghur rights and possible independence have become increasingly vocal and well organised, especially on the internet. Repeated public appeals have been made to Abdulahat Abdurixit, the Uyghur People's Government chairman of Xinjiang in Urumqi. Notably, the elected chair of the Unrepresented Nations' and Peoples' Organisation (UNPO) based in The Hague is a Uyghur, Erkin AlpTekin, son of the separatist leader, Isa Yusuf AlpTekin, who is buried in Istanbul, where there is a park dedicated to his memory. In Spring 2004 Erkin AlpTekin was elected by several international Uyghur organisations as the head of a newly formed World Uyghur Congress. The growing influence of 'cyber separatism' and international popularisation of the Uyghur cause concerns Chinese authorities, who hope to convince the world that the Uyghurs do pose a real domestic and international terrorist threat.

China's Uyghur separatists are small in number, poorly equipped, loosely linked and vastly out gunned by the People's Liberation Army and People's Police. It is also important to note that though sometimes disgruntled about some rights abuses and mistreatment issues, China's nine other official Muslim minorities do not in general support Uyghur separatism.⁴⁸ There is

47 This was the first major uprising in Xinjiang that took place in the southern Tarim region near Baren Township, which initiated a series of unrelated and sporadic protests which took place in the region.

48 Nicolas Becquelin, 'Xinjian in the nineties', *China Journal*, 44 (2001), p. 25.

continued enmity between Uyghur and Hui (often known as 'Dungan' in Xinjiang and Central Asia).⁴⁹ Few Hui support an independent Xinjiang, and the million Kazakhs in Xinjiang would have very little say in an independent 'Uyghuristan'. Local support for separatist activities, particularly in Xinjiang and other border regions, is ambivalent and ambiguous at best, given the economic disparity between these regions and their foreign neighbours, including Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and, especially, Afghanistan. There are strong memories in the region of mass starvation and widespread destruction during the Sino Japanese and civil war in the first half of the twentieth century, including intra Muslim and Muslim Chinese bloody conflicts, not to mention the chaotic horrors of the Cultural Revolution. Many local activists are not calling for complete separatism or real independence, but generally express concerns over environmental degradation, nuclear testing, religious freedom, over taxation, and recently imposed limits on childbearing. Many ethnic leaders are simply calling for 'real' autonomy according to Chinese law for the five Autonomous Regions that are each led by First Party Secretaries who are all Han Chinese controlled by Beijing. Freedom of religion, protected by China's constitution, does not seem to be a key issue, as mosques are full in the region and pilgrimages to Mecca are often allowed for Uyghur and other Muslims (though some visitors to the region report an increase in restrictions against mosque attendance by youth, students and government officials). In addition, Islamic extremism does not as yet appear to have widespread appeal, especially among urban, educated Uyghur. However, the government has consistently rounded up any Uyghur suspected of being 'too' religious,⁵⁰ especially those identified as Sufis or the so called Wahhabis (a euphemism in the region for a strict Muslim, rather than an organised Islamic school). Also, in contrast to most strict Wahhabi practices, it is clear that Uyghur Islam continues to celebrate the mystical, enjoying tomb veneration and saint patronage, as well as enjoying Uyghur cultural practices such as raucous singing and dancing.⁵¹ These periodic roundups, detentions and public condemnations of terrorism and separatism have not erased the problem, but have forced it underground, or at least out

49 Ildiko Beller Hann, 'Temperamental neighbors: Uighur Han relations in Xinjian, northwest China', in G. Schlee (ed.), *Imagined difference: Hatred and the construction of identity* (Münster, 2001).

50 Fuller and Lipman, 'Islam in Xinjiang', p. 329.

51 Ildiko Beller Hann, 'Making the oil fragrant: Dealings with the supernatural among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang', *Asian Ethnicity*, 2, 1 (2001), pp. 9–23.

of the public's eye, and increased the possibility of alienating Uyghur Muslims even further from mainstream Chinese society.

The history of Chinese Muslim relations in Xinjiang has been one of relative peace and quiet, broken by enormous social and political disruptions, fostered by both internal and external crises. The relative quiet of recent years does not indicate that the ongoing problems of the region have been resolved or opposition dissolved. Interestingly, a recent *neibu* (internal circulation only) collection of articles discussing the 'Xinjiang Problem' and the challenges of separatism and terrorism (with the terms often conflated) recognises that there have been no incidents since 2000, and blames the tensions between Han and Uyghur in the region on the 'internationalisation' (*guoji hua*) of the issue.⁵²

The opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang has not reached the level of Chechnia or the *intifada* in Palestine but, as with the Basque separatists of the ETA in Spain, or the former IRA in Ireland and England, it is one that may erupt in limited, violent moments of terror and resistance.⁵³ And just as these oppositional movements have not been resolved in Europe, the Uyghur problem in Xinjiang does not appear to be one that will readily go away. The admitted problem of Uyghur terrorism and dissent, even in the diaspora, is thus problematic for a government that wants to encourage integration and development in a region where the majority population are not only ethnically different but also devoutly Muslim. How does a government integrate a strongly religious minority (be it Muslim, Tibetan, Christian or Buddhist) into a Marxist capitalist system? China's policy of intolerance towards dissent and economic stimulus has not seemed to have resolved this issue.

52 See Ma Dazheng (马大正), *The state takes precedence: Research and analysis on the Xinjiang stability problem* (国家利益高于一切: 新疆稳定问题的观察与思考) (Urumqi, 2003), p. 128: 'Since the first half of the year 2000, the situation in Xinjiang has been peaceful (平静), despite my earlier description of the seriousness of this issue, and should be accurately described as dramatically changed since the internationalization of the Xinjiang problem (新疆问题国际化).'

53 Gardner Bovingdon, 'The not so silent majority: Uyghur resistance to Han rule in Xinjiang', *Modern China*, 28, 1 (2002), pp. 40–1.

Islam in the West

HUMAYUN ANSARI

Muslims represent a permanent, expanding and diverse element in the populations of most Western states. But contrary to popular perceptions, Islam's presence in Europe goes back some 1,400 years, and it is claimed that Muslims were among the earliest visitors to North America, accompanying Spanish explorers.¹ In Europe the main difference today is between the Balkan Muslims, who have their beginning in Ottoman conquests and migration from the fourteenth century onwards, and those who have migrated to Western Europe more recently. In the United States growing evidence exists of African Muslims being brought there as slaves, while in the twentieth century many African Americans converted to Islam. Far smaller numbers arrived in Australia and New Zealand, largely for economic reasons, from the 1850s onwards.

These substantial Muslim populations have significant implications for the societies in which they live. Their distinct religious and cultural practices fuel an array of reactions, but responses to their presence in general betray little awareness that Islam has long been part of European history, just as Judaism and, more emphatically, Christianity have been. Instead of 'Christian Europe', the continent could be viewed as having been fashioned by these three world faiths with common origins in the Middle East. Islam, thus, is no more a usurper of Christian Europe than Christianity was of Judaic and 'pagan' traditions previously. All, it could be argued, are equally entitled to be recognised as part of the European or Western heritage, and not simply as the 'Other'.

The historical engagement of Islam with the West has always reflected changing commercial, military and geopolitical power balances. The era of European colonial expansion affected European perceptions of, and attitudes

¹ M. A. Gomez, *Black crescent: The experience and legacy of African Muslims in the Americas* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. ix, 3 5.

towards, Muslims, and vice versa, as many of the latter came under Europe's imperial control. By the mid eighteenth century Western Europe's military advantage brought large swathes of the Muslim world under 'infidel' rule. Through their East India companies the British, French and Dutch gained commercial and then territorial control of distant Muslim lands, these interactions establishing channels along which Muslim migration from the Indian subcontinent, South East Asia and West Africa later flowed.

Islam in the West: 1800–1947

Muslim migration to Britain, France and the Netherlands represented an offshoot of the mainstream of migration that transported thousands of Muslims as slaves and indentured labour to the colonies and even the metro pole itself. European ideas also began to shape institutions, bending existing systems in the Muslim world to Western interests, transforming societies, administrative machinery and structures. Western dominance, perceived to be the outcome of scientific and technological superiority, genuinely impressed many Muslims, and compelled at least some of them to seek to learn about and assimilate the 'modern' world, if necessary by accessing it in the imperial countries themselves.

Britain

Compared with the mass migration that began after the Second World War, Muslim settlement here remained limited until 1945. However, the first relatively permanent Muslim populations in Britain can be traced back to the mid nineteenth century. These consisted primarily of sailors, but also included merchants, itinerant entertainers, servants, princes, students and a sprinkling from the professional classes.² While motives for migration were largely economic, a combination of complex factors led individuals finally to settle in Britain. The vast majority was in some way connected with the empire, but their heterogeneity produced a textured Muslim presence. For instance, Muslims from Ottoman territories – sailors and traders – arrived from the early nineteenth century, joined subsequently by secularising intellectuals seeking 'sanctuary' thanks to the repressive political environment of the Ottoman regime. Britain's reputation as a place of opportunity likewise attracted Moroccan and other Arab men of enterprise to its commercial centres. Taking advantage of textile manufacturing in places such as

2 H. Ansari, *'The infidel within': Muslims in Britain since 1800* (London, 2004), pp. 24–51.

Manchester, they set up trading houses from the 1830s whence they exported cotton goods back to their home countries and further east. These Muslims created separate enclaves, becoming a permanent feature of Manchester life, and retaining features of their distinctive culture until the 1930s.³

From the early nineteenth century Indian Muslims similarly began to visit Britain in search of adventure, knowledge and opportunities. There were *nawabs* with their retinues, merchants and traders, small farmers, professionals and hundreds of students. Many succeeded in developing credibility within establishment circles and were able to influence, albeit in a modest way, official thinking and policy on issues that were of concern to them, despite general perceptions of Islam as a religion associated with killing and depravity. At the beginning of the twentieth century some became convinced of pan Islam, and established political societies intended to stem the decline of the *umma*, in particular the Ottoman caliphate. After Turkey's defeat in 1918 they turned their energies to the cause of Indian home rule. Others, adhering scrupulously to religious ritual, endeavoured to mould themselves in the British image, attempting to escape 'the domination of aliens' by acquiring the refined tastes of the 'dominating natives' and displaying loyalty to the British Empire.

One significant group were maritime workers or lascars. With Aden as a refuelling stop for ships and following the opening of Suez Canal, an estimated 51,000 had landed at British ports annually by 1914. The First World War resulted in an enormous demand for labour to replace conscripted men. Muslim seamen, attracted by higher wages, were recruited, as were workers for wartime industries. By the 1920s these Muslims represented a significant element in dockside working class communities, where they encountered considerable antipathy that tended either to separate them from their white counterparts, encapsulating them into distinct groups, or to integrate them with indigenous local communities, dissolving the ties that bound them.⁴

By 1920 the mini boom created by wartime circumstances had fizzled out. Demobilising men demanded jobs filled by migrants. News of tensions and deteriorating conditions of life thus put a brake on further migration, and the inter war period was characterised by a relative downturn in the arrival of Muslims in Britain, with numbers only picking up in the late 1930s when the economy revived. Many, supported financially by existing networks and

3 F. Halliday, 'The millet of Manchester: Arab merchants and cotton trade', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 19, 2 (1992), p. 160.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 92–144.

institutions (lodging houses, cafés, religious centres), lived in cheap and overcrowded accommodation in close proximity to their occupations. Since patterns of engagement before 1945 were greatly shaped by British dominance of Muslim societies, this produced notions of 'subject peoples', including many Muslims, which led, by and large, to negative evaluations with discriminatory effects. Suffering social and economic exclusion those who married local women were often stigmatised they responded in a variety of ways: sometimes they came together in social and self help groups to protect their interests; at other times they joined more comprehensive organisations to assert their rights. Either way, social cohesion was greatly sustained by Islam, kinship, common locality and friendship, and was secured by the reproduction and reimagining of Muslim ways of living that necessitated setting up religious institutions: the first *zawiya* (centre of religious activity) was established in 1860 in Cardiff. Here, while Islam played a dominant role in defining Yemeni and Somali community life, this was also shaped by its own distinctive features that marked it out from that of other Muslim groups.⁵

Elsewhere, Islamic institution building was carried out in a more deliberate fashion with the focus on introducing the British population to Islam. The earliest example was the Liverpool Muslim Institute, established by Abdullah Quilliam (d. 1932), a Manx lawyer who converted to Islam in 1887. It consisted of a mosque, a school, a printing press and a refuge for unwanted children, and it published two periodicals. The overwhelming majority of the congregation, until its demise in 1908, comprised converts. In 1913 another Islamic mission took shape, this time involving London's Muslim population, with the Woking Mosque (established in 1889) at its hub. Khwaja Kamaluddin (d. 1932), the leader of the mission and a barrister, was concerned to pursue a modernist Islam. He wanted to establish a degree of consonance between Islam and Christianity, through the well established traditions of rational discussion and persuasion, and his aim was to integrate Islam and Muslims into the fabric of Britain's social landscape. Belonging to the elite themselves, the mission's leading lights were able to develop good connections with the British establishment and so tried to influence its views and policies in respect of Muslim concerns. Throughout the inter war period the Woking Mosque operated as the symbol of the worldwide Muslim community in Britain, with visiting Muslim dignitaries enhancing its status.

Being Muslim in Britain at this time was not an easy task: small in size and against a backdrop of racial hostility and religious bigotry, Muslim

5 K. Little, *Negroes in Britain: A study of racial relations in English society* (London, 1972).

communities sought the rights that went with being British, while hanging on, through processes of institutionalisation, to their distinct identities and what distinguished them from others among whom they lived. To a great extent Muslim communities succeeded in both endeavours, but their successes were often won in the face of resentment from sections of wider society who resisted their presence for ideological, economic and social reasons.

France

From the mid eighteenth century commercial monopolies provided a conduit along which small numbers of Muslims from the Indian subcontinent, South East Asia and West Africa travelled to France. After Napoleon's foray into Egypt in 1798–1801, the focus of French imperial aspirations shifted to North, West and Central Africa. France took Algiers in 1830 and then consolidated its control over Maghrebian Muslims until the eve of the First World War. Tunisia was annexed in 1882, followed by vast tracts of West and Central African land. The number of Muslims in France increased accordingly. Between 1826 and 1831 Muḥammad 'Alī, the ruler of Egypt, sent an educational mission to Paris comprising forty four students from leading Cairo families. Napoleon's Arab soldiers are known to have settled in the Rhone Valley by the second half of the nineteenth century, likewise Algerian salesmen from 1870. By the end of the century there were roughly 800 Muslims in Paris, many of them students from France's colonies. Later, after the liberalisation of immigration controls in 1905, Muslim workers filled the huge shortages of labour in agriculture, coal mining, chemicals and other sectors of low paid, dangerous jobs. Among the first migrants were also drovers and itinerant peddlers, who travelled on foot to seaside resorts and spa towns selling oriental carpets and trinkets. Settling in cities such as Marseilles, their numbers increased through the process of 'chain' migration.

By 1914 the number of Muslims was estimated to be around 30,000. Many more proceeded to arrive from various parts of France's Muslim empire including 300,000 Algerians, 35,000 Moroccans, 18,000 Tunisians and many thousands of Sahelians – to serve the French war effort as either soldiers or, because of labour shortages, on farms and in factories.⁶ While soldiers were warmly received, workers encountered suspicion and hostility. Towards the

6 S. A. Diouf, 'Invisible Muslims: The Sahelians in France', in Y. Y. Haddad and J. I. Smith (eds.), *Muslim minorities in the West: Visible and invisible* (Walnut Creek, 2002), pp. 145–59; T. Stovold, 'The color line behind the lines: Racial violence in France during the Great War', *American Historical Review*, 103, 3 (June 1998), pp. 737–69.

end of the war simmering antipathy turned into a wave of racial violence, and all but 5,000 were repatriated immediately after 1918. A further large influx occurred between 1920 and 1924, and in 1931 the number of Algerians in France reached its inter war peak of 123,000. During the following fifteen years the Muslim population of France oscillated in line with the health of the economy, changes in immigration controls and the situation created by the Second World War. Most perceived themselves to be economic exiles compelled to be in France as a result of colonial exploitation, though once there they quickly became aware of higher wages and a better standard of living. ‘Enclave’ communities, usually located in dense pockets of urban settlement, were structured around kin, village and ‘tribal’ links, and provided a range of services as support networks emerged. Identities were further sustained by the constant circulatory movement between France and their home villages, which retarded integration through maintenance of links with their societies of origin.

For these migrants, Islamic customs and practice formed the bedrock of their identity. Initially, most tried to observe the key tenets of Islam, albeit generally within private spaces. Few drank alcohol. With the settlement of larger numbers of Muslims in working class localities, religious institutions began to surface. Initially, cafés doubled up as locations for collective worship and religious celebrations. Then *zawiyas* were established, as were branches of religious co fraternities and various Sufi orders. *Muftis* regularly collected religious dues. The central role of the café in the social life of North African migrants was particularly apparent in the growth and organisation of the nationalist Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA). Its establishment in 1926 coincided with North African condemnation of France as an imperialist power, whose ideology, marked by racism and oppression, was viewed as suppressing the legitimate rights of the colonised. The ENA penetrated this milieu by spreading propaganda, collecting funds and holding meetings in cafés. Up to the 1920s the politically active secularised elite of educated Muslim migrants operated in organisations such as the Young Algerian movement (Jeunes Algériens). Student (for instance, Association des Etudiants Nord Africains de Paris, Amicale des Etudiants Musulmans) and workers’ organisations were established. Their broad aim was to reconstitute a lost homeland and maintain an endangered culture. Their programmes demanded equality of political and union rights, the separation of mosque and state, freedom of expression for Muslims and their press, and the abolition of the *Code de l’Indigénat*, a discriminatory, segregationist and punitive code applied to the Muslims. Where large numbers of Muslims were gathered together,

however, the French authorities were often prepared to make some provision for their religious needs. Government sponsored and funded projects (such as the Paris Mosque, built in 1926 ostensibly to honour the sacrifices of Muslim soldiers during the First World War, and the Muslim hospital and cemetery constructed in Bobigny in 1937), while rejected by some as manifestations of colonialism, were designed to present France as the champion of Islam.

The Muslim presence in France, thus, steadily increased from early nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War. Distinct cultural and religious institutions emerged which provided the basis for the formation of the North African Muslim communities and identities across the length and breadth of France in the post 1945 period. Meanwhile, many French Muslim men came into closer social contact with local women in factories, cafés, cinemas and dance halls, and by the 1930s a significant number, having developed stable relationships, including marriages, were assimilated into French society.⁷

North America

The presence of Muslims here dates back to the establishment of the earliest European settlements. The first known Muslims came with Marcos de Niza in 1539 to explore Arizona. Spanish controlled Florida from 1565 to 1763 featured a significant black population, while the French imported large numbers of slaves from Senegambia to Louisiana: both contained significant numbers of Muslims. With a strong and clear sense of identification with their Islamic heritage, they made genuine and persistent efforts to sustain their religious practices and to transmit it within their families. However, their lack of access to Islamic texts, faltering collective memories and gradual loss of religious knowledge, combined with enslavement, marriage to non Muslims and the pressure to convert to Christianity, inevitably undermined the Islamic way of life in early America. Islam thus did not survive as a coherent system of faith among African Americans, though Noble Drew Ali (b. 1886), the founder of the Moorish Science Temple in 1913 and Elijah Muhammad (b. 1898), who consolidated the Nation of Islam in the 1930s,

7 R. Aissaoui, “‘Nous voulons déchirer le bâillon et briser nos chaînes’: Racism, colonialism and universalism in the discourse of Algerian nationalists in France between the wars’, *French History*, 17, 2 (2003), pp. 186–209; N. MacMaster, *Colonial migrants and racism: Algerians in France, 1900–62* (London, 1997).

were both born during a time when Islam may still have been practised in some form among African born Muslims.⁸

During the second half of the nineteenth century Islam reappeared in the United States through another channel. The deterioration in the socio economic conditions in the Ottoman state, coupled with industrialisation in North America and the availability of relatively highly paid employment, made the prospect of migration to the 'new world' highly attractive for peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Emigration, primarily for economic reasons, began as a steady trickle in the 1860s, reaching significant proportions particularly after the Ottoman government lifted its ban on this in 1896. Among those who emigrated in the 1880s were Shi'is, many settling in Michigan, and Kurds, Albanians and Turks, who headed for the major metropolitan areas of the Midwest and north east. Most were young men who found work easily. Many worked as pedlars, and some eventually came to own businesses. Those from peasant backgrounds were employed on farming estates or in mining industries. By 1910 the number of Ottoman immigrants had reached almost 60,000, of whom a large proportion were women and children joining husbands and fathers. After the Suez Canal opened in 1869 Yemenis too began to arrive. A few acquired US citizenship by fighting in the First World War. As land shortage, drought and epidemics took their combined toll, Muslims from northern India migrated between 1875 and 1912 and settled on the west coast.⁹ Conjugal obligations or economic reasons were similar determining factors in the decision of students from West and southern Africa to settle permanently in the United States in the late nineteenth century. Another migrant group consisted of seamen and stowaways who jumped ship at sea ports such as New York and New Orleans, and blended into local Muslim communities. Some of this diverse range of Muslims initiated liaisons with or married non Muslim women. Strict adherence to Islamic requirements grew increasingly difficult, though many retained aspects of their religious identity. After 1918 the flow of Muslim immigrants resumed. By the 1940s some 200 Sunni and Shi'i families had settled in Detroit alone. Among these early immigrants the bonds of loyalty remained entirely with the 'old country', and assimilation was an undesirable option. When not engaged in work, they preferred to keep to themselves at home or in their restaurants and coffee houses, which

8 M. A. Gomez, 'Muslims in early America', *Journal of Southern History*, 60, 4 (November 1994), pp. 671-710.

9 Liyakat Takim, 'Multiple identities in a pluralistic world: Shi'ism in America', in Y. Y. Haddad (ed.), *Muslims in the West: From sojourners to citizens* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 218-32.

functioned as community centres where people could speak their own language without intrusion and share news and letters from family and home.

As these Muslims put down roots they established institutions and centres of worship. The initial major Muslim encounter with Chicago, from which evolved its later Muslim community, came during the Columbian Exposition in 1893 with a mosque in Cairo Street, where daily congregations were held and religious festivals celebrated. The Bosnian community established a Muslim organisation, the Khaivat Ummah, in 1906. Numerous social dynamics contributed to this phenomenon, including prevailing racial politics, immigrants' ignorance of the language and society, fears about deportation, preoccupation with achieving economic prosperity and the natural tendency of arriving immigrants to remain collectively introverted in an attempt to sustain their culture. Throughout the 1930s Sunni and Shi'ī communities arranged joint, non sectarian gatherings. This changed from the early 1940s.¹⁰

During this period Muslim immigrants failed, for the most part, to proselytise among African Americans. The one notable exception was the heterodox Ahmadiyya movement. When Muftī Muhammad Sadiq arrived in New York City in 1920, a time of acute racial persecution, he quickly identified African Americans as a receptive audience already looking for a dignity restoring way of life. Between 1921 and 1924 Ahmadiyya missionaries converted more than a thousand African Americans and, in the following decades, established centres in other cities. During the 1920s African American interest in Islam increased, partly because identification with it allowed them, to some degree, to circumvent 'Jim Crow' laws and social exclusion. The 'great migration' of Southern blacks to northern industrial centres also broke links with Southern churches, seen as legitimising their oppression, and brought them into contact with migrant Muslims, exposing them to Islam's emphasis on racial equality and social justice, as well as its place in their African heritage. Noble Drew Ali's Moorish Science Temple offered socially and politically excluded African Americans a positive sense of belonging. At the time of Drew's death in 1927, some 30,000 of his followers were actively engaged in temples in the black ghettos of the east and the north.¹¹

¹⁰ G. Schmidt, 'The complexity of belonging: Sunni Muslim immigrants in Chicago', in Haddad and Smith (eds.), *Muslim minorities in the West*, pp. 107–23.

¹¹ Gomez, *Black crescent*, pp. 276–330.

Islamic ideas also gained currency in tandem with other movements, such as Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement Association, which sought to generate self esteem and pride by exhorting rejection of white society and valorising the African heritage. Indeed, Elijah Poole, who took over the Nation of Islam from Wali Fard, its founder, after his disappearance in 1934, was one of Garvey's most dedicated followers. The Nation of Islam, born in 1930 out of the need to construct an identity that restored a sense of black autonomy and empowerment, preached self reliance within an 'Islamic' framework. Its separatism was based on its view that the ghetto was a place of degradation and corruption, created by the 'blue eyed devil', and should be abandoned as a precondition for creating a 'virtuous' community. Fard left Elijah Muhammad in charge of an organised community in Detroit comprising about eight thousand members. While the Nation of Islam represented a 'heretical' strand in terms of doctrine and practice and its influence declined (especially with Elijah Muhammad's imprisonment between 1942 and 1946 for refusing the draft), it still appealed to sections of the black population, out of whom evolved today's African American Muslim population.¹²

Australia

Muslim interaction with the Australian landscape goes back several centuries, with evidence of Malay settlement from the sixteenth century in parts of northern Australia. In the nineteenth century the northern town of Broome emerged as the main centre of the Malay Muslim population drawn to working in the pearling industry, which was deemed unsuitable for 'white men'. As Australia expanded economically and its population increased, so the need grew to exploit its impenetrable interior. Camels from north western India were 'imported', and from 1860 to 1910 between 2,000 and 4,000 Punjabi and Pashtun men carried supplies to remote sheep stations and worked on the construction of transport routes and overland telegraph links between Australia's major cities. These so called 'Afghans' formed tight but isolated communities on the edges of gold mining outback towns such as Coolgardie. To a degree their religious and cultural practices, such as abstinence from alcohol and dietary prohibitions, forced them to live segregated lives. Nor as temporary labourers were they allowed to bring their families, and so some married Aboriginal and even European women. Most white

12. K. H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman emigration to America, 1860-1914', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 17, 2 (May 1985), pp. 175-209.

Australians, however, viewed them as 'sojourners', providing cheap and dependable labour, with whom social intercourse was unnecessary. Meanwhile, other embryonic Muslim communities were also developing. From the 1880s Muslims already living in Perth, Sydney and Melbourne were joined by newcomers, who worked as farm labourers, for instance tending banana plantations in Queensland. As early as 1885, in Melbourne, the community was sufficiently well organised to hold 'Id prayers in the grounds of the Observatory. One of the oldest mosques, still in use today, was built in 1889 in Adelaide, while the remains of a number of mosques can be seen on the old route between Adelaide and Brisbane.

Many of the more settled migrants worked as pedlars, supplying goods needed to farmers in the outback, some of whom regarded them with respect for their honesty as well as the service that they provided. At the same time they could be attacked for their 'disreputable mode of living' in overcrowded, squalid houses. They were associated with filth, criminal behaviour and disease, and were even accused of bullying women in outlying farming districts into buying the products that they hawked. In the 1890s a campaign of racist vilification was mounted against them in Queensland. Deemed to be inassimilable, they were castigated for not drinking alcohol and for opening their own shops and butcheries. White trade unionists attacked them for providing cheap labour. Prejudices about their racial inferiority and immoral habits created an underlying climate of antipathy. This hostility, however, was clearly based on race, as European Muslims did not experience any such denigration – on the contrary, these particular Muslims were seen as valuable additions to Australia's rural population.

After the creation of the Australian Federation in 1901 the White Australia Policy was formalised in the Immigration Restriction Act that effectively prohibited new migration of Muslims from Asia. In 1903 non Europeans were denied the right to apply for naturalisation. Disallowed citizenship, and experiencing hostility and discrimination, many left. Others lived out their lives on the margins. As their numbers dwindled, many lost their Islamic faith, though a few continued to maintain this aspect of their identity. In the event, the White Australia Policy did not completely halt the flow of Muslim immigration. Individuals were allowed entry on a case by case basis, as were religious teachers. Nor could it prevent Muslims from the Balkans, as Europeans, from entering Australia. Between 1900 and 1920 1,000 Albanians, motivated by the desire for economic betterment, arrived in Western Australia where they worked on timber plantations, and where they were joined by a further 400 between 1930 and 1939. Later larger

Muslim migrations from former Yugoslavia, Turkey and Romania followed. Turkish Cypriots holding British passports were part of the flow of migrants that steadily increased during the 1940s. Still, even by 1947, the number of Muslims in Australia totalled less than three thousand.¹³

Muslim communities in post-1945 Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe by the 1990s contained an estimated 8,250,000 Muslims, comprising about 15 per cent of the population. Albania (70%) and perhaps Bosnia (60%) are the only European countries where Muslims form the majority of the population. Other substantial minorities of Muslims live in Macedonia (30%), former Yugoslavia (20%) and Bulgaria (13%). Much smaller numbers of Muslims have also inhabited Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. Ethnically they come from Albanian, Turk, Slav, Tatar Roma and Pomak backgrounds. On the whole, Muslims here have largely assimilated into the European mould: they wear their faith lightly, and their leaderships do not wish to establish Islamic states.

During the Second World War most of Poland's Tatar intelligentsia was exterminated by the Nazis in retaliation for the Tatar detachment's resistance against the invading German army in September 1939. The rebuilding of Muslim organisational structures only began in 1969 with the creation of the Muslim Religious Union of Poland. Since then mosques have been restored and contacts established with the wider Islamic world. The Union of Polish Tatars was established in 1992, together with at least three other Muslim organisations, representing different religious strands. Well integrated into Polish society, these Muslims, nevertheless, have maintained a strong awareness of their own culture and religious distinctness. They stress loyalty and love for Poland, their 'motherland', which, in their view, has assured them freedom and civil rights and to which they and their ancestors, for centuries, have given their services and lives. Indeed, they offer a possible model of how Europe's Muslims can relate to their specific societies: sustaining their own identity and making positive contributions to the wider community.

In the Balkan region, despite the Ottoman decline and the rise of Orthodox Christian nationalisms in Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria in the nineteenth century, Islam continued to play a significant part in the lives of Balkan Muslims. Islamic law, administered through state run *shari'a* courts, operated

¹³ A. H. Johns and A. Saeed, 'Muslims in Australia: The building of a community', in Haddad and Smith (eds.), *Muslim minorities in the West*, pp. 195–216.

until these courts were abolished in March 1946. Bosnian elites retained the Ottoman language as a sign of high status and Muslim identity. From both religious and secular intellectuals there emerged a Bosnian concept of ethnic identity, partly religious, partly national, which was separate from Serb and Croat identities. The upshot was that post 1945 Bosnian Muslims encompassed people who continued to practise Islam albeit under trying circumstances, and those who did not but considered themselves Muslim by ancestry or by virtue of culture and ethnicity.

After the Second World War many Balkan countries were taken over by Communist parties, which encouraged secularisation with considerable ideological zeal. In Yugoslavia they banned Sufi orders, closed down religious seminaries and mosques, took control of the income of the *waqfs* and suppressed the 'young Muslim' movement in 1949. After 1966 Tito's administration adopted a more tolerant nationalities policy, and in 1971 Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a separate 'ethnic' and equal nationality within the Yugoslav state. Islamic institutions began to be reopened. These new policies were evidently intended to offset local Serbian and Croatian political pressures, since Muslim identity was not encouraged among Albanians and Turks or among Muslims living in predominantly Serbian provinces. However, the basically secular character of Bosnian Muslim identity remained, and (as demonstrated by the trial of lawyer Alija Izetbegovic and eleven others in 1983 on charges of 'hostile and counter revolutionary activities') any sign of nationalism or 'pan Islamic' expression was quickly stamped out.

With the Communist collapse in 1990 the Bosnian Muslim Party of Democratic Action, headed by Izetbegovic, called for an independent, secular, multinational Bosnian state. Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina responded by declaring their own Serbian republic, made war on Muslims, and attempted by 'ethnic cleansing' to drive them out of the region. They accused Bosnians (Muslims since the mid fifteenth century) of betraying the mythic 'nation' by adopting Islam, and proceeded to wreak vengeance in horrifying episodes of torture, rape and mass murder. The Serbian assault was also directed against mosques, historical buildings and other artefacts in an effort to eradicate all signs of Bosnian identity. The civil war was finally brought to an end with NATO support in 1995, with Bosnia divided into two states – one Muslim and Croatian, the other Serbian. The war, thus, intensified the identification of Bosnian Muslims with Islam, a process assisted by the demise of Communist rule, international support from Muslim countries, and UN and NATO support for minority rights. A Muslim vocabulary

employing jihad and *shahid* (martyr) became part of Bosnian discourse. Muslim teaching and practice resumed; and Sarajevo became an important centre of Muslim publishing.

In the Albania of Enver Hoxha (r. 1946–85), where 70 per cent of the population was nominally Muslim, religious activity was banned and Islamic institutions were systematically destroyed. Atheism was promulgated and encouraged as state policy. Article 55 of the penal code laid down penalties, including the death sentence, for religious activities. Following the dismantling of the Communist regime in 1991 there was a steep rise in religious feeling. Safeguards against discrimination on the basis of religion or belief were built into the constitution, as was the right to change religion. This led to some young people with Muslim family origins, brought up in an anti religious environment without mosques, without religious knowledge and without access to the Qur'an or Islamic learning, converting to Catholicism or attending the worship services of other religious communities. Religious tolerance, partly built on inter faith family ties and passed on from generation to generation, was revitalised, and made Albania an example of harmonious religious coexistence.

Nevertheless, since the demise of Communism, which resulted in the almost complete collapse of the economic infrastructure and spiralling unemployment, the Albanian government has developed stronger connections with the Islamic world, seeking its support to overcome this crisis. Towards the end of 1992 Albania joined the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), which prompted considerable concern that it might be distancing itself from European cultural traditions, and flirting with Islamic fundamentalism. Most observers, however, accepted that membership was acquired primarily for pragmatic and not religious reasons. Indeed, the government reiterated its commitment to secularism and, in a balancing move, praised Albanian Catholics for showing 'exemplary esteem and respect' for Islamic and Orthodox communities. Having established diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1991, in a further show of goodwill, the government hosted Pope John Paul II's visit to Albania in 1993 – the first ever by a pope.

Muslims in Bulgaria, like other Balkan Muslims, experienced discrimination and persecution under regimes of different colours. After the Communist takeover in 1944 measures were taken by the state to create a specifically Bulgarian national consciousness, by assimilating largely rural Turks or forcing them out of the country. Muslim practices were forbidden, bringing Muslim identities under severe assault. The most concerted attack came in 1984, when Turkish names were forcibly changed and public use of

the Turkish language was banned. Turkish literature was removed from school curricula and wearing of Turkish dress was forbidden. These periodic bouts of repression led to a mass exodus to Turkey in 1989. With the collapse of the Communist regime, Bulgarian Muslims started to recover their ethnic and religious identities. Feelings of ethnic separateness and the strength of religious convictions had been declining, especially among young Muslims, until the onset of the assimilation programme in 1984. From then on solidarity among ethnic Turks deepened, and political parties were formed that represent Muslim concerns and interests. Tensions between the three ethnic categories of Muslims – Bulgarian Turks, the Roma and the Pomaks – remain, though Muslim customs have undergone a renewal among all three since the beginning of democratisation.¹⁴

Contours of Muslim life in the West

Since the Second World War Muslims have migrated to the West (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) in much larger numbers. This migration differed in both scale and composition – its volume shot up and its character changed. And once the flow of primary newcomers was more or less halted by the mid 1970s, migrants who were already in the West were joined by their families, as well as by growing numbers of political refugees. The circumstances and timing of these patterns of migration were influenced by the broader economic context, and formed part of a bigger global movement of labour from poorer countries to richer, more industrialised societies. Involved in all this were ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors that often operated in tandem. Processes of chain migration and the presence of pioneers influenced patterns of migration and settlement, which were also affected by immigration legislation passed by post war Western governments.

For the most part Muslims came to Europe as ‘guest workers’ to help the post war economic reconstruction, helping to meet the great demand for unskilled labour to fuel economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the Indian subcontinent had been part of the British Empire, and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia likewise under French imperial rule, South Asian Muslims went to Britain while North African and Senegalese Muslims,

¹⁴ I.M. Lapidus, *A history of Islamic societies*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 785–9; Y. Courbage, ‘Demographic transition among Muslims in Eastern Europe’, *Population: An English Selection*, 4 (1992), pp. 161–86.

including those who had served in the French army during colonial wars, headed for France. In similar fashion, Indonesian and Surinam Muslims migrated to the Netherlands.

But, whether as part of the state sponsored programmes or through private initiative, Muslim migrants, mainly single young men with little education, initially arrived to carry out the jobs in mines and factories rejected by European nationals. Muslim workers were often regarded as a temporary expedient, to be discharged when they were no longer needed. Migrants also saw labouring in Europe as a short term strategy that would enable them to return home with savings and a more prosperous future. Muslim migration to North America involved much the same kinds of people with similar short term economic objectives.

From the early 1970s, especially after the 1973 oil crisis, Western economies experienced a sharp downturn. Recession and economic restructuring caused a sharp rise in unemployment among migrants, resulting in a higher demand for welfare resources, which, in turn, increased antagonism between 'native' and migrant populations. Stringent controls were introduced to make migration much more difficult, and some Western European states even introduced schemes to assist the repatriation of their migrant workers. These measures, however, did not stop the inward flow. Instead of returning home, most migrants decided to stay. Moreover, they now called their families over. Host governments initially cooperated by imposing few restrictions on wives and children and, in the following decades, family reunification became the principal legal route for immigration. With family reunion largely reaching completion by the mid 1980s, it has been family formation – when young Muslims living and often born in the West marry spouses from their families' countries of origin – that has become the most important form of legal migration. However, labour migration has not been totally replaced. Improved transport and communications, together with increased internationalisation, have resulted in greater mobility of highly skilled and qualified technicians, professionals and executives pursuing careers in many Western societies.

From the 1970s other forms of migration gathered momentum. Ethnic and communal conflicts, political and religious persecution, famines and natural disasters, compelled mass movements of Muslims. In the 1980s and 1990s thousands were forced to flee from developing states to the West in order to escape political instability and 'generalised violence' that had become endemic in many. Consequently, the number of Muslim refugees and asylum seekers from, for example, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Kurdistan, Algeria

and Bosnia, rose sharply. Since 2000 annual asylum applications by Middle Eastern and North African nationals to European countries have more than doubled, as compared with the numbers recorded during the 1980s: UNCHR statistics for the period 1992 and 2001 show that Turkey, Iraq and Iran were among the top ten countries of origin of asylum applications to the European Union.¹⁵

Europe's response to these pressures has been to portray immigrants and asylum seekers as a security threat, setting in train a process of stigmatisation of asylum seekers, refugees and Muslims. A barrage of restrictive new legislation has been instituted, including tougher measures dealing with asylum seekers and clandestine migrants and tighter rules governing family reunification/formation. Furthermore, there have been efforts to harmonise and coordinate immigration policies of EU member states and to strengthen external frontier controls. But, as Europe's frontiers became increasingly difficult to penetrate, greater numbers of economic migrants and asylum seekers were forced into the hands of unscrupulous people trafficking networks. The imposition of even more restrictive policies from the 1990s produced an inevitable escalation in unauthorised clandestine migration, especially to countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, which were experiencing rapid economic growth. Current Europol estimates place annual illegal immigration at 500,000 persons. The vast majority of the 158,000 Moroccans living in Italy in 2001 were initially without residence permits and only acquired legal status by virtue of legislation introduced between 1986 and 1998. While there are marked variations in the extent to which the acquisition of citizenship has taken place, the increase has been sharp, both among immigrants and their descendants. While the number of Turkish nationals in Germany who had taken up citizenship was 25,520 in the two decades prior to 1992, between 1992 and 2000 398,998 Turks applied for naturalisation. The highest rates of naturalisation are today found in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands.

Muslims in the West thus reflect the diversity of global Islam. While reliable statistics are hard to come by, their overall numbers are estimated to be over 40 million (41,187,743). There are considerable differences in ethnic makeup of Muslims as well as differences in the social and economic conditions of Muslim communities. Politically, too, there is immense variety,

15 A. al Shahi and R. Lawless (eds.), *Immigrants and Minorities*, 22, 2–3 (July/November, 2003) (special issue on Middle East and North African Immigrants to Europe: Islam, Citizenship and Transnational Links).

reflecting the complexity of the rest of the Muslim world. Islam in the West does not speak with one voice.

Behind the appearance of relative homogeneity, for instance, Muslims living in Western societies are distributed into ethnically distinct communities, upholding a broad range of sectarian allegiances. While the vast majority adhere to scriptural beliefs and practices (as articulated and interpreted by the acknowledged Sunni and Shī‘ī schools of Islamic law), many, alongside these main sectarian divisions, have pursued a range of mystical traditions, which over centuries have focused primarily on the inner spiritual dimension of Islam. From the Second World War onwards growing numbers organised themselves in Sufi orders or brotherhoods (*ṭarīqas*), characterised by widely differing religious understandings (*maslaks*). Most of the institutional structures involved were imported from abroad in ways not dissimilar to other Islamic traditions, becoming part of international networks with origins in the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and Europe – the Naqshbandī, Qadiri and Chishtī *ṭarīqas* of South and Central Asia, the Shadhilī tradition from North Africa, the ‘Alawī from Yemen and the Tijaniyya from West Africa. While their structures have tended to be informal, attracting followers essentially through charismatic leadership, many *murīds* have institutionalised Sufi practices by forming, for instance, *dhikr* circles. While some *ṭarīqas* proved successful in their ability to attract converts to Islam, their activities have taken place largely around immigrant groups, and few have been able to transcend ethnic boundaries.¹⁶

This diversity also manifests itself in other ways, for instance in the legacies of the migration process. Muslim immigrants to Western Europe have tended to come from working class rural backgrounds. In contrast, both Canada and the United States (at least in the early post Second World War period) had highly selective immigration policies concentrating on professional and middle class immigrants. Muslim immigrants to North America, from the 1960s, came from highly educated, urban and professional backgrounds. The majority are now linguistically competent, well placed in terms of occupational status, and their educational attainment exceeds the average. Nearly ten million Muslims are estimated to be resident in the United States today, of whom more than a million are Pakistani and Indian in terms of family origin, and over 250,000 have connections with Iran. 30–35 per cent of

16 J. Malik and J. Hinnells (eds.), *Sufism in the West* (Abingdon, 2006); Ansari, ‘*The infidel within*’, pp. 137–43, 356–60; Haddad (ed.), *Muslims in the West*, pp. 138, 288.

North American Muslims are African American in terms of ethnicity. Some evolved out of the Nation of Islam tradition, which still has around fifty thousand followers; others are new converts to one of a variety of Islamic movements, both mainstream and sectarian; Canadian Muslims number somewhere around half a million. The number of Muslims in Australia has risen from about 38,000 (0.5% of the total population) in 1947 to 281,578 (1.5%), according to the 2001 census. While some estimates have placed the Muslim population of New Zealand close to 40,000, government census figures show that in 2001 it was 23,631: but, despite having doubled every five years since 1980, it still comprises less than 1 per cent of the total population. In Western Europe, France, with nearly 6 million, contains the highest number of Muslims. While the proportion of Muslims in the total population of the West remains below 4 per cent, nevertheless Islam is now second only to Christianity in number of adherents in most Western nations. This reality presents a new set of challenges, both to Muslims who have chosen to migrate and to host societies that are increasingly feeling the pressure to accommodate these particular citizens.

In the main, however, Muslims living in the West are concentrated in urban or suburban areas of larger cities – London, Paris, Berlin, New York. In the Metropolitan Detroit town of Dearborn in the United States there has emerged perhaps the largest concentration of Arabs outside the Middle East, a large proportion employed by the Ford Motor Company. Muslim populations in the West are set to increase at a quicker rate than their non Muslim counterparts because the present generation of Muslims is younger, even if its fertility rate is beginning to drop towards the average. The initial gender imbalance produced by the early immigration of single males had largely disappeared by the early 1990s, though more recent arrivals still display a male bias. Structural changes in family patterns have been gradual, with most Muslims living in relatively large, traditionally structured families. Inter ethnic marriages, while increasing, have remained the exception rather than the rule.

The housing profile of Muslims has similarly been shaped by migratory history, socio cultural and educational background and material circumstances. The legacy of these patterns has created informal segregation between white and Muslim communities, in terms of housing and education. In Britain, for instance, Oldham and Burnley, where riots in 2001 took place, are deeply segregated towns, and have become more so over the last ten years, as poverty, unemployment and a corresponding lack of interaction has increased. Mistrust and misunderstanding makes it easier for tension to be

aggravated, especially by racist and xenophobic organisations, along ethnic and religious lines.

Disadvantaged in terms of education and vocational training, the majority of Muslim immigrants entered Western Europe at the bottom of the socio economic ladder. Many remain concentrated in semi skilled and unskilled sectors of industry. They have experienced twice and sometimes three times the national average rates of unemployment, and have been overrepresented in the lowest income bands. However, social mobility is increasing, leading to a higher proportion of Muslims, particularly younger ones, moving into professional occupations, services, technical and office work as well as small businesses. Recent research suggests that there are currently over five thousand Muslim millionaires in Britain, with liquid assets of more than £3.6 billion.¹⁷ In the United States and Canada Muslims are among those with the highest levels of education, per capita income and the highest percentage of persons working in managerial and professional fields.

Interaction between various generations of migrants and host societies is shaped in the main by the policies of receiving countries towards citizenship, the perceptions of the already settled populations of immigrants and the institutional apparatus for the incorporation of immigrants into the wider community. Substantial differences exist between American and European societies in terms of their general approach towards immigrants. Accordingly different historical, cultural and institutional developments mean that Western states have attempted a variety of strategies for integrating Muslim newcomers. The French have insisted that, as citizens, immigrants need to shed their own cultural, religious, political and ideological allegiances, and assimilate into the pre existing consensus on societal arrangements. Conversely, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Scandinavian states have accepted the existence of alternative cultural immigrant identities, and have sought to embrace them within the wider context. Canada has gone a step further by actively encouraging multiculturalism through the provision of resources for new immigrants to sustain ethnic cultures and their own languages.

All these various strategies for integrating Muslims have met with limited success. One significant obstacle has been the perceptions that host societies and Muslim immigrants hold about each other. Islam for many Westerners represents the 'Other'. They fear that it is incompatible with Western liberal values and institutions. The Christian/secular West, however, has effectively

¹⁷ H. Ansari, *Muslims in Britain* (London, 2002) p. 9.

constructed and stigmatised an Islam that resembles little that is of value in ordinary Muslim lives. It has conjured up Islam as a dangerous force, irrational, violent and fanatical, which requires tight control but also needs to be kept at a distance. Imagery connected with the Iranian revolution (1979), the burning of Salman Rushdie's *The satanic verses* (1989), orchestrated hysteria before and after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (1990–1), the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the 1990s, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Iraq War (from 2003) and the headscarves controversy in France (2003–4), alongside the usually negatively slanted media coverage, has reinforced the belief that Islam is a violent, inflexible, backward religion and that Muslims, prone to extremist behaviour and activities, possess the potential for endangering social and political cohesion. In return, Muslims could contend that Western societies do not seem able to accept the plurality of cultures, religions and ideologies that has resulted from their settlement within them.

In addition, many Europeans see Muslim immigrants as they once saw subordinate colonial subjects who needed to be 'socialised' into the 'superior' Western civilisation by education and other cultural means. Muslim immigrant identities have been similarly shaped by colonial and neo colonial histories, collective memories, events and perceptions in their countries of origin. While they may accept that the West offers democratic freedoms and civil rights and is technologically and politically more advanced than their 'home' countries, they are often suspicious of its emphasis on individual freedom, and consider it to be morally corrupt. The West's perceived decadence presents a challenge to their values and makes them extremely anxious about their own survival. Since there exist few models in Muslim history to provide guidelines for living permanently in a society with a large non Muslim majority, and in which non Muslim law, government and institutions predominate, Muslims in the West have sought to adjust to, and accommodate, existing institutions and practices, experimenting and negotiating between actual and perceived demands and values of Western societies and their own needs, beliefs and practices. The fact that, in some respects, their values and traditions have been in conflict with, or have been perceived to be in conflict with, the established norms of the non Muslim majority populations has made the task facing Muslim communities in the West a difficult one.

Many Muslims, for instance, perceive the legal framework in the majority of Western countries as indifferent to their religious needs. For instance, in Britain's culturally diverse and plural society, they argue that this framework does not offer equality of treatment in terms of available legal remedies,

while some elements of English law might even appear to be in conflict with Islamic principles. Muslim family law has come into conflict with aspects of English law, forcing British Muslims to look for ways of reconciling the two. In the absence of the state conceding Muslim demands, a parallel set of institutions has been established, where feasible, to resolve disputes, both formally and informally, according to Islamic law. *Shari'a* courts under the aegis of the Islamic Shariah Council UK, composed of religious scholars, provide guidance on the basis of their understanding of Islamic law, albeit on a strictly voluntary basis.¹⁸

On a day to day level the stereotyping of Muslims has contributed to discrimination, exclusion and disadvantage. This is nothing new: in early post war Muslim settlement it tended to take an ethnic and racial form. More recent evidence suggests that Muslims have also been subject to more specifically religious discrimination. Important issues have included the unavailability of *halal* food; refusal to allow time off for religious festivals and prayers; lack of (or inadequate) prayer facilities; and issues of dress and language in a range of public and private settings, such as schools, colleges and prisons. The wearing of the *hijab* has proved highly problematic in schools and some workplaces. More broadly, hostility to Muslims has ranged from abuse to physical violence, including assaults on individuals, the desecration of graves and attacks on mosques and other Muslim community buildings. Gradually, however, Western states are introducing legislative measures to counter such unfavourable treatment. In December 2003 an EU directive made religious discrimination in employment illegal, and in 2006 the British government likewise enacted legislation making incitement to religious hatred unlawful.¹⁹

Regardless of their growing numbers in Europe and North America, and their increasing wealth in the United States and Canada, Muslims are aware that they have little political power to influence decision or policy makers. Political participation is hampered by lack of experience and the fear of the consequences of political involvement. External factors include the perceived or real shunning of Muslims by mainstream parties because they are viewed as a liability in that their participation might antagonise groups with much greater voting power. All the same, growing numbers of Muslims now regard formal political mechanisms as an effective way of getting their problems

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 22–4.

¹⁹ The Stationery Office, *The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003* (London, 2003). See also the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006.

addressed, if not solved. Muslim participation, expanding since the 1970s, is reflected in their representation in local and national political institutions. However, while Muslim involvement with mainstream parties at the grass roots level has risen, by the late 1990s Muslims filled few positions with real power. Discriminatory attitudes continue to play a part in this: Muslims have faced resistance in selection processes because of Christian doctrinal opposition (for instance, in the Netherlands), and negative stereotyping, including an assumed lack of professionalism and ideological commitment to democratic practices.

Consequently, many Muslims, having demonstrated their commitment to the principles of democracy and pluralism, have often felt cheated and used by mainstream political parties. Disillusioned, some have shifted to non parliamentary political action. In Britain, in the early 1990s, the Muslim Parliament suggested the creation of a separate parallel political system. *Ḥizb al Tahrir*, a radical Islamist group (banned in Germany), rejecting democracy as un Islamic, aimed 'to change the current corrupt society and transform it . . . by establishing an Islamic state (not just in Britain but all over the world . . .) in which the *shari'a* would be implemented in its entirety'.²⁰ The Nation of Islam in the United States, which, under Elijah Muhammad, had refused any engagement with mainstream politics, since his death has evolved a less hostile approach towards national and local institutions.

Muslim political engagement with Western societies has thus taken a variety of forms. In the context of economic deprivation and social exclusion, some Muslims see involvement in Western mainstream politics as an ideological betrayal and as part of the process of cultural homogenisation. Alienated and resentful, they pursue the politics of the street, confronting the power of the state through direct, and disruptive, collective action, as was the case in *The satanic verses* episode in Britain or the headscarves affair in France. But this spontaneous and relatively unorganised political response has produced, arguably, very few positive results and a great deal more in terms of negative 'backlash' from wider society. In the meantime, the majority of Muslims have patiently carried on voting, running for public office and attempting to penetrate those institutions that possess the political power to make policies and allocate resources. For instance, in the United States the American Muslim Alliance, American Muslim Council, Muslim Public Affairs Council and Council on American Islamic Relations, separately and together in the form of the American Muslim Political Co ordination

²⁰ Ansari, *Muslims in Britain*, p. 20.

Council (AMPCC), have moved towards electoral and mass politics, supporting both Democratic and Republican parties. The AMPCC decided to endorse George W. Bush for president in the 2000 elections, when an estimated 2.3 million American Muslims voted for him.²¹

The fact that the language used at home in immigrant Muslim families has often been the mother tongue from the country of origin means that children can have limited skills in the medium of instruction prior to starting school. Consequently, it was not surprising that educational achievement among young Muslims in Western Europe tended to be on average lower than among other ethnic groups. But as the influence of the European education system has taken hold, the rate and level of educational attainment, even among the most deprived Muslim ethnic groups, has risen significantly. In contrast, American and Australian Muslims have a record of being linguistically more competent, their educational attainment exceeds the average and they are relatively better placed in occupational structure.

Education represents a major site of struggle for equality of opportunity and the assertion of a distinct identity for Muslims in the West. It is on educational issues that Muslims have been most successful in having many of their needs recognised, albeit in the face of considerable opposition from broad sections of wider society. Muslims, unhappy with the unacceptably low academic attainment of many Muslim pupils, began to express unease with state provision of education in the 1960s. They questioned the values imparted in the state school environment, and identified aspects of disadvantage and discrimination that were affecting their children's capacity to build a positive sense of their identity. Concerned to transmit Islamic values to the next generation, they were dissatisfied with the lack of Islamic instruction in state schools. In the wider context of the so called 'Islamic resurgence' during the 1970s and 1980s, there was also a reaction against Western educational aims and methods, which were seen as materialistic, anti religious and anti Islamic. In countries such as Britain the privileging of Christianity over other religions in daily worship at school was resented. A two pronged approach was adopted. First, supplementary (or Qur'an) schools were set up to provide religious instruction within the communities themselves. In the United States and Canada, for instance, religious instruction is now being carried out in more than 1,500 'Sunday' schools, youth groups and retreats run by various mosques and Islamic centres. Second, organisations were

21 A. Saeed, 'The American Muslim paradox', in Haddad and Smith (eds.), *Muslim minorities in the West*, pp. 48–51.

established concerned only with the education of Muslims. These negotiated a spectrum of issues from the provision of Islamic education in a variety of forms in state schools to the production of Islamic knowledge and research. Some helped to finance and manage the establishment of independent 'Muslim' schools (with an Islamic ethos) as an alternative to the state system, offering academic and vocational qualifications in religious and secular subjects. Those who were disillusioned with state provision, and had the financial means, established independent Muslim schools, in which Islam permeated the curriculum and established the overall ethos: their numbers vary from one in France to over a hundred in Britain and the United States. A notable development in the United States was the organisation of about a hundred schools (named after the founder, Elijah Muhammad's wife Sister Clara Muhammad) after Warith Deen Muhammad reformed and renamed the Nation of Islam in 1976.²²

Considerable resistance to incorporating Muslim demands still persists in the educational establishment and in the majority populations at large. Muslim schools are regarded as socially divisive with the potential to produce 'extremism'. However, by the 1990s most issues of religious practice were being addressed to varying degrees in different Western countries at local and national levels, though some continue to produce tension between Muslims and the majority community. For instance, the adoption of the *hijab* by Muslim schoolgirls has been particularly controversial in France and, though not to the same extent, in other Western countries, including Britain. In 1989 three students of Moroccan origin were excluded from school as the veil was deemed to be a form of religious expression that infringed the law separating church and state. The so called *foulard* affair ignited a national debate regarding the broader question of the place of Islam and Muslims in the West. In France it culminated in the 2004 law, strongly supported by the majority of the French population, which specifically banned all prominent religious symbols from state schools. On the other hand, the Austrian state has for some time now not only permitted religious teaching in state schools (as have the Dutch, Belgian, Portuguese and German authorities more recently) but it also pays the salaries of Islamic religious teachers. The demand for publicly funded Muslim schools as a matter of equity, since such schools have been granted to other religious minorities, has also been met to some extent in other Western states, including Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden

22 Y. Y. Haddad, 'The globalization of Islam', in J. L. Esposito (ed.), *The Oxford history of Islam* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 601–42.

and Britain. These schools offer largely secular education in an Islamic environment. At the other end of the spectrum, in the explicitly secular French and American state school system, there is little room for religious instruction, let alone Islam.

The settling of large numbers of Muslims and other faith communities in the West has, to a considerable extent, transformed the latter into a multi cultural and multi faith space. At the same time, it has brought Muslims into a social contract with secularised states, compelling the former to organise their lives within the framework of existing church state relations, the key aspects of which are religious liberty and equality and autonomy of and cooperation with faith communities. As Muslims have become better organised they have increasingly managed to have their demands included within various multicultural policies through a process of institutional negotiation and accommodation. Many religious needs, with the exception of, for instance, the banning of the veil in French state schools and that of the traditional Islamic ritual slaughter of animals in Sweden, have been met as part of the right to religious freedoms.²³

At the same time, the separation of church and state has long been an essential principle in the secularisation of Western societies. This process has been integral to the structure of American society from its inception, and has come to characterise most European countries since the early and mid twentieth century. With regard to faith communities, secularisation has meant that political power in the West is broadly defined by its neutral interaction with religious institutions. However, in practice this principle of neutrality does not always coincide with church state separation. In fact, it is circumscribed, and realised to varying degrees within various historically constituted institutional structures, ranging from the recognition of Christianity as the state religion to the accordance of official status to none. First, there are those states that 'cooperate' with the so called 'churches'. They officially recognise all religions by law, though the specific nature of this recognition varies. Islam was acknowledged in this way in Belgium in 1974 as it was in Austria in 1979, bestowing considerable financial and other advantages upon it. In Germany, while the constitution requires the state to remain neutral in religious matters, this neutrality does not prevent Christian churches and the Jewish community from enjoying the status of public corporations, thus giving legal authority to their social functions. Islam is

23 L. De Gregorio (ed.), 'Synoptic tables', in R. Aluffi and G. Zincone (eds.), *The legal treatment of Islamic minorities in Europe* (Leuven, 2004), pp. 296–315.

yet to be accorded such recognition. Second, in certain states the right to practise one's faith and the official recognition of that faith are not always synonymous. For instance, countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece have state religions. However, as in Italy and Spain, where one religion is recognised as dominant for historical or cultural reasons, others need not be denied all rights. In 1992 the Spanish state reached an agreement with the Islamic Commission granting financial and legal benefits, recognising religious marriages as legally binding and introducing religious instruction in state schools. Third, in countries where rigid separation between church and state exists, the institutionalisation of Islam is not a political issue, and it is left to the initiative of Muslims themselves though this is not always free from government interference. In such cases the state provides no support of any kind to organised religions and presents itself as the guarantor of religious freedom that ensures their equal treatment. Such is the case in the United States, where no one questions Islam's institutional organisation and legitimacy. There has been no pressure to 'cobble' together officially recognisable interlocutors. American Muslims have developed a diverse range of religious institutions free of government interference or control, and have been able to play an active role in the public sphere through their different associations. Not so in France, however, where, while the state, since the 1905 Act, has guaranteed the free practice of religions, it does not recognise or subsidise any religion. However, the growth of religious needs and demands of the French Muslim communities since 1989 have highlighted the need for a dialogue between representatives of Islam and public authorities. The government has attempted to create a unified interlocutor, but has only succeeded in the mushrooming of Muslim organisations. A French Council of the Muslim Religion was officially installed in 2003, but its claim as the representative voice of French Islam remains questionable.²⁴

The majority of Muslim immigrants in the West, whose primary focus was their country of origin to which they hoped to return with enough resources to resettle in greater comfort, initially showed little interest in setting up religious institutions. However, once they had decided to settle and raise families in the West their concern became the transmission of their religion to the next generation. Gradually religion based bodies emerged. Considerable experimentation was involved in developing these structures, reflecting the fact that the institutionalisation of Islam in West has been a complex and diverse process. Every Muslim community was predisposed to organise itself within

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 290–5.

the juridical boundaries of the place in the West to which it had immigrated. The nature and form of its institutions were determined by what the host country's legal system recognised as the jurisdiction of Muslim authority. Thus, Muslims faced a variety of statutes that regulated the establishment of Islamic institutions.

A range of heterogeneous Muslim organisations has emerged since 1945, representing distinct memberships, client groups and administrative structures. Their functions and activities reveal converging as well as conflicting concerns, depending on their particular orientations. Many Muslims would claim that early goals have been achieved to a substantial degree. Facilities are now available on a wide scale, enabling Muslims to practise their faith in diverse ways. An infrastructure has been established to sustain Islam among future generations. The intervention of organisations such as the Muslim Educational Trust in England and Diyanet in the Netherlands means that Muslim pupils in state schools are now offered religious education that is specific to their faith. Religious commitment regarding dress and diet is widely accepted, due in no small measure to the efforts of dedicated Muslim organisations. Their lobbying, locally and nationally, has led to modification of school curricula in line with the wishes of Muslim parents.

Muslim communities in the early twenty first century West now articulate their specific needs in the context of external factors and constraints, such as racism and available socio economic opportunities. Within the changing context of politics, specific forms of organisation have developed. The first priority of these organisations was to represent Muslim issues to the institutions of the different states in the West, at both the local and national level. Bodies representing the interests of Western born Muslim youth and women also took shape. Some functioned as local self help groups. Others operated as 'umbrella' organisations, embracing divergent ideological strands and interests. What had emerged by the end of the 1970s was a patchwork of communities with their particular imprint on the organisations that they had created. Much of this development was locally initiated. But access to resources, particularly funding, required a wider effort from activists within these communities and, in some cases, this compelled them to establish formal links with religious institutions in their countries of origin. By the mid 1980s mosques were serving a range of functions: as places of worship; as venues for religious education of adults and children; as centres for publication of religious tracts; and as libraries and bookshops. They also offered funeral services, advice on immigration matters and social security and counselling services for families. Many were able to obtain resources to run

mother tongue and English classes. Others tried to become effective community centres, organising activities for the elderly, women and young people. On the wider level, they acted as brokers between their communities and institutions of wider society, communicating information about Islam and the needs of Muslims.

From the mid 1980s there was awareness of the need for greater coordination. Muslim organisations proceeded to become much more robust in the representation of wider Muslim interests, and they became more effective in dealing with local government, national policy structures and other areas of public life. As they gained in confidence, their agendas broadened to address a widening set of social and political issues, ranging from gaining recognition of Muslim family law to political representation. In the British context this culminated in the formation of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in May 1996. During the same period, the number of organisations involved in propagating Islam expanded enormously and to growing effect.

Muslims migrating to the West brought their religious identity with them to a new socio cultural setting, presenting them in turn with a range of different challenges. At the same time, Muslims born and raised in the West inherited an attachment, albeit diminishing, to their families' countries of origin, as well as the problem of securing their own place within Western societies. They had to work hard to sustain their religious beliefs and practices, since the quasi secular structure of these societies tended to render a religious world view increasingly irrelevant. Alongside trends among some Muslims towards greater secularisation, others have become firmer and more uncompromising in their religious convictions. A range of perspectives on the matter of religion has evolved among Muslims in the West, linked to age, ethnic background, socio economic circumstances, education and gender. The coming together of diverse groups of Muslims through processes of migration, settlement and, to a limited extent, conversion has undoubtedly generated both 'fission' and 'fusion'.

Thus, Muslim identities in the West by the beginning of the twenty first century had been shaped by evolving social histories and cultural dimensions, themselves not fixed or seen as immutable. No single, clearly defined, perception of Muslim identity exists. On the contrary, this identity is complex, diverse and equivocal. The result is a range of 'identities' that coexist within Muslim communities in the West, and which have never been static and immutable – rather, the specifically Islamic element has always synthesised with local pre existing cultures in order to take root within any environment. Younger generations of Muslims, for instance, are

engaging with Western culture, the political system, educational institutions and the media, in more extensive and creative ways than their parents and grandparents. Syncretic and hybridised forms of identification among young Muslims in the West are gaining popularity. Many young Muslim women have transformed Western dress by wearing it in combination with their own ethnic forms of clothing, endowing it with new significance. The process is also apparent in the wide variety of contemporary Muslim musical production.

Islamists (religio political activists), meanwhile, have adopted more rigid and holistic approaches. Indeed, the impact of globalisation on religious practice is reflected in the wide spectrum of adherence to the normative rituals, ranging from maximalists to minimalists to the indifferent. Diversification of choice, together with the secular content of much that is on offer to the individual in the 'global market', empowers those who have felt marginalised and excluded from traditional channels of self expression, such as Muslim women and so called 'deviant' Muslims (gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans gendered), to resolve their Muslim identities. While much discussion is carried out within an 'orthodox' Islamic perspective, the communications revolution has made it possible to skirt round traditional religious authority, and indeed challenge it, and so potentially undermine it by claiming validity for alternative moral and intellectual viewpoints, thus transcending its influence and power. The result is not one single neatly identifiable Western Muslim identity but, instead, a range of Western Muslim identities, expressed in their different inclinations towards Western culture.²⁵

Living in the West has resulted in the formulation of 'trans religious' values. Being part of culturally pluralist societies has necessitated that Muslims become more engaged in a dialogue with the *umma* of other people. Consequently, Muslims are critiquing not only the West, but also Islam itself. In this process they are seeking to create a kind of Islam that is better able to address the dilemmas of living in the West in a rapidly globalising context. Diasporic living has compelled Western Muslims to encounter alternative articulations and interpretations. They have been also been encouraged to generate innovative critical thinking, which commands the potential for producing 'new theologies' more responsive to the pressures and assumptions of a relativising post modern and sceptical world. A recent notable

²⁵ See angelfire.com/ca2/queermuslims and http://.com/West_hollywood/Heights/8977/index.html; P. Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim politics: Reimagining the umma* (London, 2001), p. 181.

development took place in New York in March 2005, when Professor Amina Wadud led a public, mixed gender Friday prayer service, thus symbolically asserting the right of Muslim women to spiritual and intellectual equality.²⁶

A large body of Muslim opinion in the West now agrees that it is futile to talk of an undifferentiated Islam. They increasingly challenge the hegemony of traditional authority and its intolerance of hybridity. At the same time, they are re examining issues of power and 'Othering' within their religious practices. The relativist character of their discourse means that no particular positions are negated, and difference is negotiated rather than eradicated. As part of this discourse, Muslims living in early twenty first century Western transnational space are busy creating a range of identities that combine their consciousness of the *umma* with their citizenship of societies in the West.

26 'Woman leads US Muslims in prayer', *BBC News Online*, 18 March 2005, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4361931.stm.

Glossary

<i>adat</i> (Ar. ‘ <i>ada</i>)	custom, customary law in South East Asia
<i>ahong</i>	travelling Islamic teacher, China
‘Alawī	Moroccan dynastic family; also an important Shi‘ī minority in Syria; members of the ‘Alawiyya
‘Alawiyya	a religious group which recruited its followers among families of Sharifian descent from Hadramawt
Alevi	follower of the caliph ‘Alī; Shi‘ī tinged Muslim religious minority found in eastern Anatolia
‘ <i>alim</i>	see ‘ <i>ulama</i> ’
<i>amir</i>	prince, chief, commander. See also emir
<i>amir al mu’minin</i>	caliphal title, ‘commander of the faithful’; a title often assumed by Muslim rulers
<i>anşar</i>	helpers, supporters
‘ <i>aqida</i>	creed, belief
<i>ashraf</i>	see <i>sharif</i>
Ayat Allah	‘sign of God’, title awarded to the highest rank of Ithna ‘Ashari or Twelver Shi‘ī <i>mujtahids</i>
<i>beg</i>	prince, sovereign, chieftain; commander; in the Ottoman empire during the nineteenth century, a title given to high ranking civilian officials and military officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel; in the twentieth century a title of respect; pronounced <i>bey</i> by the seventeenth century
<i>bey</i>	title of the Husaynid rulers of Tunisia and other North African rulers. See also <i>beg</i>
<i>bid‘a</i> (pl. <i>bida‘</i>)	un-Islamic innovation

caliph	successor to the Prophet Muḥammad, leader of the Sunni community, title assumed by the Ottoman sultan following the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca; also a title adopted by some Muslim rulers
<i>cizye</i>	see <i>jizya</i>
<i>dar al ḥarb</i>	‘the abode of war’; non Muslim lands not acknowledging the sovereignty of and not paying tribute to a Muslim ruler
<i>dar al Islam</i>	‘abode of Islam’; land under the rule of a Muslim ruler
<i>datu</i>	title of local notable in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei
<i>da‘wa</i>	missionary movement, call
<i>dhikr</i>	religious service or litany of a Sufi order through which disciples hope to come close to God
<i>dīn</i>	religion
emir	prince, chief, commander, ruler; title of the ruler of the autonomous Russian protectorate of Bukhara, and of the rulers of various African states. See also <i>amir</i>
<i>faddan</i>	measure of land: 1 <i>faddan</i> = approximately 1 acre
Fara’idī	followers of the movement of Islamic reform in Bengal founded by Hajjī Shari‘at Allah (d. 1840), who preached that Muslims must follow the <i>fara’id</i> or obligatory duties enjoined by the Qur’an and the Prophet
<i>fatwa</i>	an opinion on a legal matter furnished by a <i>muftī</i>
<i>ferman</i>	Ottoman imperial edict
<i>fiqh</i>	jurisprudence; works of jurisprudence
<i>ḥadd</i> (pl. <i>ḥudud</i>)	fixed punishment in Islamic law for certain crimes, such as the amputation of the arm for theft
Ḥadīth	body of traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions, one of the sources of Islamic law

<i>ḥadīth</i>	an individual tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad or of his companions; a Prophetic tradition
<i>ḥajj</i>	the pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>ḥajjī</i>	one who has completed the pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>ḥalāl</i>	sanctioned by religion; food that is lawful to eat
Ḥanafī	one of the four 'schools' (<i>madhhabs</i>) of Sunni law; official <i>madhhab</i> in the Ottoman Empire
Ḥanbalī	one of the four 'schools' (<i>madhhabs</i>) of Sunni law
Ḥaram al Sharīf	the Muslim religious site in Jerusalem containing the Dome of the Rock and the al Aqsa Mosque
<i>ḥijāb</i>	variations of stylised 'proper' Islamic dress, often glossed in the West as the 'veil'
<i>hijra</i>	(<i>hijrat</i> in South Asia) withdrawal; the emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622, which marks the beginning of the Islamic era; emigration in imitation of the Prophet
<i>ḥudūd</i>	see <i>ḥadd</i>
Hui	the largest Muslim group in China
Ibādī	a branch of Islam distinct from Sunni and Shī'ī Islam, located principally in Oman
<i>ijtihād</i>	use of individual reason in interpreting law, as opposed to <i>taqlīd</i> ; renewal in legal development
Ikhwan	'brothers': former nomads in Saudi Arabia residing in agricultural settlements, the first of which were set up in 1913 and which represented an effort to domesticate nomads by concentrating them at oases
imam	a title of 'Alī, the fourth Sunni caliph and the first Shī'ī imam; a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad through the line of his cousin 'Alī who serves as the divinely guided leader of the Shī'ī religious community; title awarded to the Ayat Allah Khomeini; also the title of the ruler of the Ibādī state of Oman from 1920 and that of the Zaydī rulers of North Yemen until their deposition in September 1962

<i>imam</i>	a prayer leader; the leader of a mosque community; religious scholars of Cape Town
<i>intifāda</i>	the Palestinian uprisings in 1987 and 2000; popular uprising in the spring of 1985 against the Nimeiri government in Sudan
<i>irtidād</i>	public rejection of Islam, apostasy
<i>işlah</i>	reform
Ithna ‘Asharī Shī‘ism	Twelver Shī‘ism; the branch of Shī‘ism dominant in Iran and Iraq
Jadidism	a thoroughgoing critique of Muslim society as it was in Russian Central Asia and a programme for reform
<i>jahilī</i>	heathen, referring to the pre Islamic ‘age of ignorance’; term used by Sayyid Quṭb to describe the modern state in order to justify the waging of jihad against it
<i>jahiliyya</i> :	ignorance (of the message of God), a charge often made against secular governments in the Muslim world
<i>jama‘a</i> (pl. <i>jama‘at</i>)	community, association
<i>jama‘at Islamiyya</i>	associations rooted in a revitalised Islamist student movement on Egyptian university campuses
<i>jam‘iyya</i> (pl. <i>jam‘iyyat</i>)	group or society; more specifically, an Islamic charitable organisation
jihad	striving; fighting for the sake of Islam; holy war; effort to purify Islam; the struggle against the base self; popular armed struggle against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
<i>jizya</i>	(Tur. <i>cizye</i>) tax paid by non Muslims; poll tax
<i>kadī</i>	see <i>qaḍī</i>
<i>kalam</i>	theology
<i>khalīfa</i>	deputy or successor of a Sufi shaykh; deputy of a ruler; title claimed by Amīr ‘Abd al Raḥman Khan (r. 1880–1901) of Afghanistan as vice regent of God. See also caliph
khan	sovereign, title used by rulers of the Mongols and their successor states; tribal ruler; title of local rulers in Afghanistan

<i>kharaj</i>	state revenue land, land tax paid on conquered territories
<i>khaṭīb</i>	preacher in a mosque; a 'senior preacher'
khedive	official title granted to the hereditary governor of Egypt by the Ottoman sultan in 1867
<i>khuṭba</i>	Friday sermon in a mosque
<i>kufr</i>	infidelity, unbelief
<i>kuttab</i>	Qur'an school
<i>madhhab</i>	school of religious law
<i>madrasa</i> (Tur. <i>medrese</i>)	institution of higher Islamic religious education
Mahdī	'expected one', a messianic figure in Muslim belief; title claimed by Muḥammad Aḥmad (1844–85), the leader of an Islamic revival movement in the Sudan, as well as various other leaders throughout Islamic history
<i>majlis</i>	a parliament or advisory council
<i>maktab</i> (Tur. <i>mekteb</i>)	an elementary school in which children acquire basic knowledge of Islamic ritual and belief
Malikī	one of the four 'schools' (<i>madhhabs</i>) of Sunni Islamic law
<i>mamluk</i>	a slave purchased to be trained as a soldier or government official
Mamluks	households or factions headed by and consisting of <i>mamluks</i> who dominated Egyptian politics until their final defeat by Muḥammad 'Alī in 1811
<i>marja'</i>	model; source of emulation, a Shī'ī <i>mujtahid</i> acknowledged to be a or the pre eminent interpreter of law; legal scholar
<i>marja'iyyat</i>	a concept by which Shī'īs were encouraged to tie themselves to the particular teachings of a <i>mujtahid</i>
<i>mashriq</i>	normally, the Arab speaking regions to the east of Egypt and the north of Arabia
<i>masjid</i>	mosque
<i>mawlawī</i>	title of respect applied to 'ulama' and heads of Sufi orders

<i>mawlid</i>	celebration of the anniversary of a person's death, usually that of a Sufi saint
<i>mawlid al nabi</i>	celebration of the birthday of the Prophet
<i>millet</i> (Ar. <i>milla</i> , pl. <i>milal</i>)	religious community in the Ottoman Empire, especially a non Muslim one
<i>miri</i>	state owned agricultural land
<i>mufti</i>	a specialist in Islamic law who issues legal opinions
<i>mujaddid</i>	'renewer'; honorific title given to prominent religious reformers
<i>mujahidın</i>	combatants, warriors for the faith; specifically, members of Muslim resistance groups fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
<i>mujtahid</i>	' <i>ulama</i> ' recognised as competent to deliver independent opinions on the <i>shari'a</i>
<i>mulla</i>	Muslim functionary, member of the ' <i>ulama</i> ', title of respect for a Muslim scholar
<i>naqib al ashraf</i>	chief of the descendants of the Prophet
<i>ngoma</i>	a type of dance that was a pre Islamic ritual that African slaves and migrants continued to practise after conversion to Islam
<i>nizam</i>	Islamic system of values and standards of behaviour
<i>Nizam ı Cedid</i>	the New Order, programme of reform instituted by the Ottoman sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807); also refers to the new model infantry created by the reforms
<i>nizam i jedid</i>	the name applied to the new army of peasant conscripts trained and organised on the French model created by Egyptian governor Muḥammad 'Alı
<i>paşa</i>	title for the highest ranking military officers and civilian officials in the Ottoman Empire
<i>pesantren</i>	private Islamic boarding schools of Java
<i>pir</i>	spiritual teacher, head of a Sufi convent, a hereditary Sufi leader associated with a shrine and popular piety
<i>pondok</i>	religious boarding school in the Malay peninsula, privately owned Qur'anic school

<i>priyayi</i>	the traditional aristocratic class of Java; Dutch appointed officials who governed parts of Java
<i>qaḍī</i> (Tur. <i>kadı</i>)	judge of Islamic law
<i>salaf</i>	ancestral or the previous generations, a reference to the first three generations of Islam; <i>al salaf al ṣalīḥun</i> , the earliest generations of Muslims, ‘the pious forebears’, whose understanding and practice of the faith were idealised as closer to the Prophet’s Islam than those of later generations
Salafī, Salafīyya	a movement that seeks to return the understanding and practice of Islam to that of the Prophet’s Islam; a movement faithful to the original teachings of Islam that in China originally arose out of the Yihewani in the mid 1930s and quickly spread throughout the north west
<i>sayyid</i>	title given to the Prophet Muḥammad’s direct descendants; honorific given to Muslim saints; in Oman it means descendants of Aḥmad Sa‘īd ‘Al Bu Sa‘īdī’
Shafī‘ī	one of the four ‘schools’ (<i>madhhabs</i>) of Sunni Islamic law
shah	king; dynastic ruler of Iran
<i>sharī‘a</i>	Islamic law
<i>sharīf</i> (pl. <i>ashraf</i>)	noble; of high rank; descendant of the Prophet; the Prophet’s kin; in India nobility, Muslims who had migrated to India from outside, or alternatively had acquired the genealogy or the resources to claim to have done so
shaykh	head of a Sufi order; a religious scholar, leader of a tribe; title of rulers of Persian Gulf coast states
shaykh al Azhar	rector of al Azhar, the great traditional Muslim centre of learning in Cairo
<i>shaykh al Islam</i>	head of Muslim courts; chief <i>muftī</i> . See also <i>ṣeyhülislam</i>

Shī‘a	the Shī‘ī community, one of the two principal branches of Islam – the other being the Sunni; it is divided into a number of different branches, e.g. Zaydī Shī‘īs, Twelver or Ithna ‘Asharī Shī‘īs
<i>shirk</i>	idolatry, polytheism
<i>shura</i>	council
Sufism (Ar. <i>taṣawwuf</i>)	Islamic mysticism
Sunna	the example of the Prophet Muḥammad, one of the sources of the faith together with the Qur‘an and Ḥadīth
Sunni	one of the two principal branches of Islam, the other being Shī‘ī Islam
<i>şeyhülislam</i>	the chief Islamic authority of the Ottoman religious hierarchy
<i>takfir</i>	labelling other Muslims infidels or unbelievers
Taliban	‘ <i>madrassa</i> students’; the puritan ruling regime of Afghanistan (1994–2001)
Tanzimat	‘Reorganisation’, term used to describe the period 1839–76 in Ottoman history and its reforms which climaxed with the issuing of the first Ottoman constitution in 1876
<i>taqlid</i>	imitation, unquestioning acceptance of the achievement of Islamic scholarship as it has been handed down, the opposite of <i>ijtihād</i>
<i>tarbush</i>	a cap of cloth or felt, usually red, with a tassel, that became the headgear of Westernised officials, replacing the turban; called the fez in the Ottoman Empire
<i>ṭarīqa</i>	Sufi brotherhood or mystical order
Ṭarīqa-yi Muḥammadi	‘Brotherhood of Muḥammad’, the title adopted by the followers of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī
<i>tawassul</i>	‘approaching’ God; intercession by Sufi saints
<i>tawḥid</i>	the unicity of God
<i>tekke</i>	dervish lodge
‘ <i>ulama</i> ’ (sing. ‘ <i>alim</i> ’; Tur. <i>ulema</i>)	religious scholars
<i>umma</i>	the Islamic community; can also refer to a non-Muslim community

‘ <i>ushr</i>	Islamic tax on agricultural production; also cultivated and reclaimable land granted by Muḥammad ‘Alī to himself and his family, officers and officials after 1840 to ensure their loyalty
Wahhabī	a religious reform movement which was led by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab. It was centred on Najd and was closely affiliated with Saudi political ambitions. It has some times been called a <i>madhhab</i> and sometimes a <i>dīn</i> (a religion). Its followers are known for their austere and puritanical lifestyle; the term has been frequently used adjectivally to describe Muslim movements and individuals thought to be extreme and/or puritan.
Wahhabiyya	Muslims who follow, or are thought to follow, Wahhabī tenets
<i>waqf</i> (Tur. <i>evkaf</i>)	religious endowment
<i>wilayat i faqīh</i>	Khomeini’s doctrine of rule of the jurisconsult
Yihewani	Chinese for the Ikhwan al Muslimin or Muslim Brotherhood; term for Wahhabī inspired reform movements in China
<i>zakat</i>	the alms tax; religious taxation
Zaydī	a branch of Shī‘ī Islam, prominent in the highlands of Yemen

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